IN THE COURT OF THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS
JUDGE
AT MAHABUBNAGAR.
(FAC IV ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE: NAGARKURNOOL).
Tuesday, this the 12th day of June, 2018
Present:- Sri C. Hare Krishna Bhupathi, Prl. Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar. FAC, IV Addl. Sessions Judge, Nagarkurnool.
Criminal Revision Petition No.23 of 2018
Between:-
Jupally Krishna Rao s/o Sheshagiri Rao, age: 60 years, occ: M.L.A., and Panchayat Raj Minister, Government of Telangana State, r/o Peddadagada village of Chinnambavi mandal, presently r/o Kollapur town and mandal.
...Revision Petitioner/Accused And.
State of A.P., through Police, Kollapur.
...Respondent/Complainant
This Criminal Revision petition coming on before me for final hearing on 30.05.2018 in the presence of Sri. S.Baleeshwaraiah,
Advocate for the revision petitioner and of Sri. B.Bala Gangadhar
Reddy, Advocate for the Respondent and the matter having stood over for consideration till today this court delivered the following :-
O R D E R
This is a Criminal Revision petition filed u/sec.399 Cr.PC., by the revision petitioner, who is an accused before the trial court, thereby challenging the validity and the legality of the orders
dated: 29.03.2018 on Crl.MP.No.60 of 2018 passed by the learned
Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kollapur (in short ‘the trial
court’) on an application filed by him u/Sec.239 Cr.PC before the trial court.
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2.The facts leading to the filing of this revision petition are succinctly stated as follows:-
(a) The petitioner/accused filed a petition in Crl.MP.No.60 of 2018 before the trial court u/sec.239 Cr.PC seeking his discharge from the case in C.C.No.28 of 2009 filed by the respondent against the petitioner for the offences u/Secs.171-G, 177 and 181
IPC. It is the plea of the petitioner that there was no prima-facie case against him for these offences, since there was no truth in the allegation made against him by the prosecution that he had purposefully suppressed and deliberately omitted to mention his ownership over Acs.6-00 of land in Sy.No.190 of Peddadagada village of Veepangandla mandal in the affidavit given by him along with the nomination filed for the elections held for Kollapur
Assembly Constituency during the year 2004. This petitioner has also further contended in the said application that the cognizance on those offences was taken by the court beyond the period of limitation prescribed u/Sec.469 Cr.PC and, furthermore, the defacto-complainant, i.e., the Divisional Forest Officer, shown as the Returning Officer, had no competency to file the complaint
before the police for the registration of the case and such a
complaint ought to have been filed by the District Collector,
Mahabubnagar. With these main contentions, the petitioner prayed the trial court to discharge him u/Sec.239 Cr.PC.
(b)In the counter filed by the respondent, the petition was opposed by contending that there was a strong prima-facie case to frame a charge against the petitioner/accused and that the cognizance of the offences taken by the court was also not barred by limitation. The respondent has also further contended that the 3 ascertainment of the facts mentioned in the charge sheet could be possible only after a full-fledged trial of the case before the trial court and hence it was necessary to hold the trial instead of discharging the accused at the threshold as sought for by the petitioner. With these main contentions, the respondent prayed the court to dismiss the petition.
3.After holding an enquiry and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial court was pleased to dismiss the petition by the impugned order dated: 29.03.2018 and, aggrieved by the said order passed by the trial court, the revision petitioner preferred this appeal with the grounds of the appeal, of which, the core of contentions is concisely stated as follows:-
The grievance of the revision petitioner is that the trial court failed to appreciate the contentions of the petitioner in correct perspective and the reasons assigned by the trial court in the impugned order are not tenable under law. The petitioner has also further contended that the holding of the trial court that the case falls u/Sec.469 Cr.PC for computing the period of limitation for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offences against the petitioner is against the norms of law and the same is not legally acceptable. The revision petitioner reiterated the contentions that the Divisional Forest Officer, who is cited as the first witness in the list of witnesses annexed to the charge sheet, was not competent to lodge the complaint against the petitioner and hence that infirmity goes to the root of the prosecution case.
With these main contentions, the revision petitioner prayed the court to allow the revision and, consequently, to set aside the 4 impugned order passed by the trial court thereby discharging the petitioner from the offences.
4.During the course of the enquiry held on this revision petition, both sides submitted their detailed arguments with reference to the respective contentions as well as the record received from the trial court and, thereafter, the petition is coming for the passing of the orders.
5.Now, the following points arise for determination:
1. Whether the revision petitioner is entitled to be discharged u/Sec.239 Cr.PC from the case for the offences mentioned in the charge sheet filed against him by the respondent before the trial court?
2. Whether the impugned order dated: 29.03.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kollapur in rejecting plea of the petitioner for his discharge suffers from any infirmity or irregularity or illegality and calls for any interference by this court?
3. To what result?
6.POINT No.1:- The gist of the case arraigned against the accused as per the charge sheet filed by the respondent before the trial court is that this petitioner deliberately and purposefully omitted to mention his ownership over Acs.6-00 of land in
Sy.No.190 in Peddadagada village of Veepangandla mandal in the affidavit annexed to his nomination filed for the assembly elections held for Kollapur Assembly Constituency in the year 2004. The charge sheet filed by the S.I of Police, Kollapur being the investigating officer reads that this petitioner purchased the said land under a sale deed executed by one Guru Paidaiah s/o 5
Rama Lingaiah and got mutated the said land on his name in the revenue records and despite the fact that the Assistant
Commissioner of Endowments, Mahabubnagar raised an objection to such a mutation on the ground that the said land belongs to the Endowment Department, the mutation still continued on the name of this petitioner in the revenue records, thus showing his ownership over the same, since no effort was made by him in seeking the change of mutation and having known that fact which is within his knowledge, this petitioner deliberately and purposefully omitted to mention his ownership over that land in the affidavit filed along with his nomination
before the Returning Officer.
7.The contentions taken up by the petitioner in seeking the discharge u/Sec.239 Cr.PC are threefold – firstly, that there is no prima-facie case against him to frame a charge for any of the offences alleged against him in the charge sheet, secondly, that the Divisional Forest Officer, who is shown as the Returning
Officer, had no competency to give such a complaint against him to the police for the purpose of filing of a case, since the District
Collector ought to have given such a complaint against him and thirdly, that the cognizance was barred by time u/Sec.468 Cr.PC.
8.Insofar as the first contention of the petitioner that there is no prima-facie case against him is concerned, the documents annexed to the charge sheet filed by the police would show that as per the mutation effected in the revenue records, the land to an extent of Acs.6-00 in Sy.No.190 of Peddadagada village of
Veepangandla mandal stood on the name of this petitioner as the 6 pattedar and that the said mutation is continuing in all the revenue records for the subsequent years also, more particularly, the date on which this case was registered against this petitioner.
Insofar as the other two contentions raised by the petitioner are concerned, it is essential to make a discussion of the facts stated in the charge sheet, of which, the necessary documents are annexed to the charge sheet. As per those facts, one Pagadala
Chinnaiah belonging to the rival political party gave a report to the Election Commission thereby complaining against the violations of the mandatory legal requirements by this petitioner in filing the nomination by a purposeful omission of his ownership over the land to an extent of Acs.6-00 in Sy.No.190 in
Peddadagada village in the affidavit filed on 25.03.2004 before the Returning Officer and, in pursuance of the instructions of the
District Collector by his letter dated: 30.03.2008, the Revenue
Divisional Officer, Nagarkurnool made a detailed enquiry into that aspect and submitted his report on 17.04.2008 to the District
Collector whereunder the R.D.O., Nagarkurnool held that this petitioner concealed the facts of his ownership over the said land in the affidavit submitted to the Returning Officer. The record further discloses that the Chief Election Commissioner, by the proceeding dated: 07.07.2008, directed the District Collector,
Mahabubnagar to advise the Returning Officer of Kollapur
Assembly Constituency to file a case before the competent authorities for the violation of the election rules by this petitioner and, in pursuance of the same, the District Collector gave such instructions to the Returning Officer and, subsequently, the
Returning Officer, i.e., the Divisional Forest Officer (Wild Life
Management), Achampet, gave a complaint to the Circle 7
Inspector of Police, Kollapur on 12.12.2008 requesting to book a case against this petitioner under the relevant sections of law for submitting a false affidavit before the Returning Officer while contesting in the General Elections, 2004. The copies of all the documents were enclosed to that complaint. Basing upon that complaint lodged by the Returning Officer, the S.I of Police,
Kollapur registered a case against the petitioner for the offences u/Secs.171-G, 177 and 181 IPC and, after a full-fledged investigation, filed the charge sheet.
9.Since the District Collector was directed by the Chief
Election Officer to instruct the Returning Officer, i.e., the
Divisional Forest Officer, Achampet, to lodge a complaint against this petitioner, the District Collector, in turn, gave such a direction to the Returning Officer and, in pursuance of the same, the Returning Officer gave a complaint to the police. There is absolutely no infirmity in that complaint lodged by the District
Collector if the facts as a whole are construed. Insofar as the contentions of the petitioner on the point of limitation, the trial court has given its reasoning that Pagidala Chinnaiah might have got the information at a subsequent date and that knowledge acquired at a subsequent date is covered u/Sec.469 Cr.PC in computing the period of limitation prescribed u/Sec.468 Cr.PC.
Furthermore, u/Sec.472 Cr.PC, a wide discretion is given to the
Court which takes the cognizance of the offences to appreciate the facts as a whole given in explaining the delay and also to exercise the discretion if the same is necessary in the interests of justice. Therefore, Sec.472 Cr.PC is also the proper section to be invoked in the present circumstances of the case if the 8 correspondence held among different authorities before the final approval given by the Chief Election Commissioner to lodge a complaint is properly observed. Therefore, the reasoning given by the trial court in computing the period of limitation for the purpose of taking cognizance is on correct lines.
10.The questions regarding the availability of the prima-facie case against the petitioner are primarily the factual aspects involved in this case and, as adumbrated above, the relevant record concerning to the mutation appearing in the revenue records and also the report submitted by the R.D.O., are all the facts to be taken note of in appreciating the prima-facie case.
Moreover, it is a well settled principle of law reiterated in a catena of judgments from time to time that in order to find out the prima-facie case to frame a charge, a court is not expected to embark upon a roving enquiry to find out as to whether a charge framed would ultimate result in a conviction of the accused for that charge and what is mostly required at the stage of the framing of the charges is to find out as to whether there is some material, even if that is in a skeleton form, to probablize the case of the prosecution with the aid of the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution in the trial and a thorough scrutiny of that material by dwelling deep into the pros and cons of the prosecution case and evidence at that stage is not required. The relevant case law on this aspect is discussed in the subsequent paras hereunder.
11. In “State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Krishan Lal
Pardhan and others” (AIR 1987 SC 773), the APEX Court 9 opined that ‘at the stage of the framing of the charges, the court is not required to make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter so as to find out whether the material on record would be sufficient to record conviction against the accused’. The
Supreme Court further observed that ‘at that stage, the court is not required to pass a full-fledged judgment by thoroughly appreciating the evidence, for which there is no possibility at that stage and that what all that is required at that stage of the framing of the charges is to see whether the prima-facie case regarding the commission of certain offences is made out’. It is also further observed that ‘the question whether the charges will eventually stand proved or not can be determined only after the evidence is recorded in the case’.
12.In “State Vs. Rodda Vasudeva Reddy” (2006 (1) ALT (Crl.) 282 (AP)), the A.P. High Court held that ‘at the time of the framing of the charges, the only consideration is whether there is a prima-facie case made out showing the commission of an offence and the involvement of the charged persons and that there is no possibility of go deep into the evidence meticulously during that stage’.
13.In “State of U.P. Vs. Udal Narayan and another (1999 (4) Crimes 287 (SC)), the Supreme Court held that ‘at the time of the framing of the charges against the accused, there is no possibility to scan and scrutinize the evidence and the materials produced by the prosecution and the only consideration for the court during that stage is to see whether a prima-facie case is 10 made out from the material available out of the record placed by the prosecution’.
14.In “Hemchand Vs. State of Jharkhand” ((2008) 2 SCC (Crl.) 537), the Supreme Court held in para no.9 of the judgment as follows:- “At the stage of framing of charge, the court will not weigh the evidence. The stage for appreciating the evidence for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion as to whether the prosecution was able to bring home the charge against the accused or not would arise only after all the evidence is brought on record at the trial”.
It is further held in para No.13 of the judgment as follows:- “The court at the stage of framing charge exercises a limited jurisdiction. It would only have to see as to whether a prima-facie case has been made out. Whether a case of probable conviction for commission of an offence has been made out on the basis of the materials found during investigation should be the concern of the court. It, at that stage, would not delve deep into the matter for the purpose of appreciation of evidence. It would ordinarily not consider as to whether the accused would be able to establish his defence, if any”.
15.In “Palwinder Singh Vs. Balwander Singh and others” ((2009) 2 SCC (Crl.) 850), the Supreme Court observed that ‘the charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion, since there is no possibility for the marshalling and appreciation of the evidence during that stage’. The same view was shared by the Supreme Court in “Sangi Brothers (Indore) Private
Limited Vs. Sanja Choudhary and others” (2009 Crl.L.J.
338).
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16.The essence of all these observations made by the courts in the above said judgments is that the only consideration for the court at the time of the framing of the charges is whether there is a prima-facie made out against the accused out of the material placed before the court by the prosecution, since there is no possibility of marshalling the facts and thoroughly scrutinizing the evidence during that stage. It is also the opinion of the Supreme
Court as dealt with in the above referred judgments, that a strong suspicion may sometimes be sufficient to frame charges against the accused and that the court cannot embark upon a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter so as to find out whether the material on record would be sufficient to record the conviction against the accused at a later stage.
17.By applying all the above referred prepositions of law to the facts of the present case on hand, here, there is sufficient prima- facie case made out from the material placed by the prosecution that this petitioner along with the other two accused committed the offences u/sec.171-G, 177 and 181 IPC. There is sufficient material to frame the charge against this petitioner/accused for these offences and hence the petitioner is not entitled to be discharged u/sec.239 Cr.PC.
18.The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments in ‘Indofil Chemical Company, Bombay and
others Vs. Kunwarsingh Madhaosingh Mahane and
another’ (1996 Crl.L.J. 1234), in ‘Navinchandra Gandhi Vs.
Pushasen Kapadia and another’ (1986 Crl.L.J. 1218), in 12
‘Sulochana Vs. State Registrar of Chits (Investigation and
Prosecution), Madras’ (1978 Crl.L.J. 116), nd in ‘Dr. Raman
Kumar Vs. State of Jharkhand’ (2006 Crl.L.J. 4496) and in
‘Arun Vyas and another Vs. Anita Vyas’ (1999 Crl.L.J.
3479). On a careful study of these judgments, this Court is of a considered opinion none of these judgments is applicable to the present case on hand for the reasons already discussed in the foregoing paras.
19.On the evaluation of the facts discussed above with the application of the relevant case law as dealt with above, this court is of a considered view that there is a strong prima-facie case to frame the charges against the accused for the offences alleged against the accused and, accordingly, this point is decided against the petitioner.
20.Point No.2: In the light of the discussion under point No.1 above, the impugned order of the trial court in dismissing the application does not suffer from any infirmity or irregularity or illegality and the same is on correct lines. Accordingly, this point is decided against the petitioner.
21.Point No.3:Points 1 and 2, which are the major points, are decided against the revision petitioner and in favour of the respondent.
In the result, the criminal revision petition is dismissed, thereby confirming the impugned order dated: 29.03.2018 on
Crl.MP.No.60 of 2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of
First Class, Kollapur.
Dictated to the Stenographer, transcribed by him, corrected and
pronounced by me in the open Court, this the 12th day of June, 2018.
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PRL. DISTRICT JUDGE,
MAHABUBNAGAR.
FAC, IV ADDL. SESSIONS
JUDGE,
NAGARKURNOOL.
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined
-NIL-
Exhibits Marked.
For Petitioner: For Respondent:
- Nil -- Nil -
PRL. DISTRICT JUDGE,
MAHABUBNAGAR.
FAC, IV ADDL. SESSIONS
JUDGE,
NAGARKURNOOL.