Sri E Bhima Rao
Prl. District Judge
PDJ Court VIZIANAGARAM · Vizianagaram · Andhra Pradesh
Sri E Bhima Rao, Prl. District Judge, is posted at PDJ Court VIZIANAGARAM, Vizianagaram, Andhra Pradesh, India. 861 court orders on record since 2017. 20 judgments with full text available. Primarily handles MVOP, F, MC cases.
Featured Judgments
IN THE COURT OF THE JUDGE, FAMILY COURT CUM III ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
JUDGE, VIZIANAGARAM
Present: Sri E.Bhima Rao,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram.
Tuesday, this the 25th day of June, 2019
Criminal Appeal No.54/2013
Special Judicial First Class Magistrate From which Court the appeal is:(Excise), Vizianagaram.
Number of the Case in thatC.C. No.111/2010 : Court
Sri Sanapala Satyanarayana, S/o Late Suryanarayana, Hindu, Aged about 54 Name and description of the :years, R/o D.No.11-8-25/1, Plot No.21, appellant/accused Daspalla Hills, Visakhapatnam (A-1).
Sri V.S.N. Sastry, Advocate for the Appellant is defended by:Appellant.
(1) Ashok Kumar Mandhani, S/o Ganapathi Lal Mandhani, Age 45 years, R/o 401, Geeta Towers, Kirlampudi Name and Description of theLayout, Visakhapatnam. : Complainant/respondent (2) State represented by the Additional Public Prosecutor, Vizianagaram.
(1) Sri B. Satyanarayana and Sri B. Karthik, Advocates for the 1st respondent. (For 1st respondent) Complainant/Respondentare : defended by: (2)AdditionalPublicProsecutor, Vizianagaram. (For 2nd respondent)
The appellant-Accused is found guilty for Section of Law under which thethe offence punishable U/s.138 of NI Act appellant is convicted in the:and accordingly he was convicted lower CourtU/s.255(2), Cr.P.C. for the said offence.
Whether confirmed, reversed orCONFIRMED. The appeal is dismissed by modified, if modified what isconfirming the conviction and sentence : modifiedpassed by the trial Court.
Date of presentation:04.04.2013 Date of filing:04.04.2013
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 2
Bail bonds, if any,:--- Hearing:08.05.2019 Judgment:25.06.2019
The appeal coming on 08.05.2019 for final hearing before me in the present of Sri V.S.N. Sastry, Advocate for the appellant-accused, and of
Sri B.Satyanarayana and Sri B. Karthik, Advocates for the 1st respondent/Complainant, and of the Additional Public Prosecutor for the 2nd respondent/state, and having stood over for consideration to the date, the
Court delivered the following:
J U D G M E N T
The appeal is filed by the appellant-accused against the conviction and sentence passed in C.C.No.111/2010, dt.11.03.2013 whereby the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Vizianagaram, sentenced the accused, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of 18 (Eighteen) Months and to pay a fine of Rs.8,000/- (Rupees Eight Thousand only), in default he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of Six
Months for the offence punishable U/s.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.
2.The appellant herein is the accused and the 1st respondent herein is the complainant in the complaint filed by the 1st respondent in the trial
Court. For the sake of convenience, the parties are, henceforth, referred to as per their array in the trial Court.
3.Originally the complainant filed the complaint against the four accused persons. But case against A-2 to A-4 was dismissed as per the docket orders dated 20.10.2009 of the trial Court. The case was proceeded against A-1 (Sri Sanapala Satyanarayana) only in the trial Court.
4.The complainant filed the complaint against the accused for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act with the following allegations : The complainant is the resident of Visakhapatnam and also having his office at
Vizianagaram and the accused are the residents of Visakhapatnam and the accused approached the complainant and requested the complainant to purchase the property measuring to an extent of 70 Sq. Yards being
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 3 undivided and unspecified share out of the total property to an extent of 2069 Sq. yards together with Flat No.404 measuring 2150 Square Feet in third floor and Car parking measuring 100 Square Feet in stilt floor of
Madhava town at Kanakal Dibba Area, covered by block No.41, T.S. No.1451 and part of Allipuram Ward within the limits of Greater Visakhapatnam
Municipal Corporation for which the complainant agreed and so some negotiations took place between the accused and the complainant and ultimately agreed to certain understandings and entered into an agreement of sale for the same. Towards the said agreement cum understandings in between the complainant and the accused, the complainant paid a sum of
Rs.10,01,001/- towards the advance sale consideration on 07.07.2007 and paid further sum of Rs.11,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration on the said date itself and the accused received and acknowledged the said amounts. In consequent to the said agreement, the 1st accused, the third accused on behalf of the second accused as a G.P.A. Holder and the fourth accused jointly executed an agreement of sale dated 07th day of September, 2007 agreeing to sell the aforesaid property to the complainant for a sum of
Rs.53,54,650/- and agreeing to register the said aforesaid property to the complainant before 30.11.2017 as well as acknowledging the aforesaid amounts received by the accused from the complainant. From that day itself, the complainant is ready and willing to perform the complainant’s part of duty as per the aforesaid contract and also paid a further sum of
Rs.5,00,000/- towards the remaining sale consideration on 11.10.2007 which the accused acknowledged but all the accused tried to postpone the same i.e., registering for one reason or the other even when the complainant is ready with the balance sale consideration and to perform the complainant’s part of duty as per the aforesaid agreement for the best reasons known to the accused. In all, the complainant paid and all the accused received a sum of Rs.26,01,001/- towards the advance sale consideration, which all the accused acknowledged with respect to the aforesaid property. Later on some
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 4 untoward incidents took place with respect to the aforesaid building and so all the accused requested the complainant to cancel the aforesaid agreement which the accused executed in favour of the complainant.
Therefore, as per the request of the accused, the accused and the complainant mutually agreed for cancellation of the aforesaid agreement of sale subject to the satisfaction of some terms, conditions and understandings included in the cancellation endorsement. As per the terms and understandings, the accused is liable to repay the entire advance sale consideration of Rs.26,01,001/- which the complainant paid to all the accused and all the accused received and acknowledged the same on various dates.
(a).The complainant further submits that towards the discharge of the aforesaid amount, which the accused is liable to repay the said advance sale consideration to the complainant, the first accused on behalf of all the accused issued a cheque bearing No.090585, dated 25.4.2008 for a sum of
Rs.26,01,001/- drawn on Bank of India, Harbor Road Branch, Visakhapatnam in favour of the complainant towards the satisfaction of the said aforesaid amount. Thereafter, the complainant presented the said cheque for collection at Vizianagaram through the complainant’s Banker i.e., Karur
Vysya Bank, Vizianagaram but quite surprisingly the said cheque is returned unpaid stating “Funds Insufficient” in the accused bank account. The complainant received the said cheque unpaid along with the Banker’s memo
dated 04.09.2008. The 1st accused on behalf of all the accused issued the
aforesaid cheque with an undertaking stating that the accused will make necessary arrangements to honour the said cheque and also stating that there are sufficient funds in the said bank account, but the first accused issued the said cheque knowing fully well about the insufficiency of the funds in the said bank account and also knowing fully well about the consequences of the bounce of the cheque. Therefore, all the accused are jointly and severally liable for the punishment under the provisions of the Negotiable
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 5
Instruments Act. With respect to the aforesaid agreement of sale and cancellation agreement and endorsement which the first accused, third accused on behalf of the second accused as a G.P.A. Holder and the fourth accused executed in favour of the complainant, the complainant is reserving a right to take necessary separate legal action against all the accused under the due process of law and for the said separate action also, all the accused are jointly and severally liable for the same in every manner whatsoever.
Thereafter, the complainant got issued a registered lawyer’s notice dated 11th day of September, 2008 to all the accused calling the accused to repay the said cheque amount to the complainant within fifteen days from the date of receipt of that notice which the accused failed to take the said notice and the said notices are returned on 27.09.2008 and so the complainant invoked the jurisdiction of the Court for the said cheque amount. Therefore, the complainant prays to punish the accused for the offence punishable U/s.138 r/w.142 of N.I. Act and also direct the accused to pay the said amount of
Rs.26,01,001/- along with the compensation amount to the complainant.
Hence, the complaint.
5.The learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class,
Vizianagaram took cognizance for the offence U/s.138 & 142 of N.I. Act against the accused and registered as C.C.No.775/2009 on the file of the
Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Vizianagaram and in view of the
orders of the District Court in P.R.No.225/2010-A, dated 05.10.2010, the matter was transferred to the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Vizianagaram and renumbered as C.C.No.111/2010, and after appearance of accused, copies of documents were furnished to him and at that stage, and the accused was examined U/s.251, Cr.P.C., for the offence
U/s.138 and 142 of N.I. Act, explaining the accusation made against him, for which, he denied the offence and pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
6.During the course of trial, the complainant himself examined as
P.W.1 and and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.6. Ex.P.1 is cheque bearing No.090585,
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 6 dt.25.04.2008; Ex.P.2 is Banker memo, dt.04.09.2008; Ex.P.3 is office copy of registered lawyer’s notice, dt.11.09.2008; Ex.P.4 is returned cover, dt.27.09.2008; Ex.P.5 is agreement of sale, dt.07.09.2007; and Ex.P.6 is cancellation endorsement on the back side of the 1st page of Ex.P.5, respectively.
7.After closure of complainant’s evidence, the accused was examined U/s.313, Cr.P.C. by putting the incriminating material available in the evidence of complainant’s witness, for which, he denied the same. When the accused was asked to enter into defence, he stated that he has defence evidence on his behalf and he further stated that he has nothing to say anything about the case. On behalf of the accused, the accused (A-1) himself examined as D.W.1 and no documents marked on his behalf.
8.After considering the oral and documentary evidence, and after hearing both sides, the trial Court found the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him to suffer simple Imprisonment for a period of 18 (Eighteen) months, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of
Six months for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
9.Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the accused preferred the present appeal contending, inter alia, with the following grounds:
The Calendar and Judgment of the trial Court is contrary to Law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. The trial Court ought to have acquitted the appellant/accused, as there is no evidence on record to convict the appellant/accused. The trial Court without considering the case and failed to note that there is no legally enforceable debt in this case on hand and as per the terms of Ex.P.5 Agreement of Sale, the condition is that the complainant is only entitled to a flat and there is no necessity for the appellant/accused to repay any amount to the complainant and hence, the basic requirement U/s.138 of N.I. Act is found missing in this case and hence, the burden heavily lies on the complainant to prove the legally enforceable
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 7 debt and then only the burden shifts on the appellant/accused to rebut the presumption. The trial Court confused himself about the merits of the case as Ex.P.6 cancellation endorsement on the back side of Ex.P.5 clearly indicates that the agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque, so it is clear that if the cheque is not encashed, the agreement remains valid and there is no scope for filing the cheque bounce case as per the endorsement but the trial Court without considering the same
pronounced the verdict by convicting the appellant purely on wrong notions
by applying Sec.139 presumption to the case on hand which in fact is no way applicable to the case on hand and hence the conviction is liable to be reversed on this ground alone.
(a).The trial Court failed to understand the intention of the parties while making Ex.P.6 cancellation endorsement as their intention is only to provide security for Ex.P.5 transaction and specifically mentioned the clause such as ‘the agreement will be cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque’ which clearly indicates that there is no confirmation for the
honouring of the cheque and if the cheque is not honoured, there is no
criminal liability fastened on the accused and the complainant can safely proceed with Ex.P.5 agreement of sale but the trial Court without considering the same simply convicted the accused merely on presumptions and surmises and without going into the merits of the case and hence, the
Judgment of the trial Court is liable to be reversed and the appellant/accused is entitled for an acquittal. The trial Court failed to note that as there is no cancellation clause or default clause in Ex.P.5 agreement of sale which only stipulated the condition that the accused has to deliver the flat to the complainant within a particular period and if delayed, shall pay some damages but there is no necessity for the appellant/accused to refund the amount and hence, there is no basis for the issuance of cheque by the appellant/accused and hence there is no legally enforceable debt in the case
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 8 on hand and the Judgment of the trial Court is not based on facts and Law and is liable to be reversed.
(b).The learned Magistrate without applying his mind and without perusing the material on record and without analyzing the same, convicted the accused though absolutely there is no ground to convict the accused and hence the same is liable to be set-aside. The trial Court did not properly analyze the case Law submitted on behalf of the accused i.e., (1) 2007 (2)
SCC (Cri) 498; (2) AIIMR (Cri) 2009 1074; (3) 2003 (1) SCC 1; (4) 2004 (8)
SCC 774; (5) 2006 (3) SCC (Crl) 114, which are directly applicable to the case on hand and simply concluded those citations are not applicable to the case on hand, which clearly indicates that he did not properly studied the case law and went on wrong lines and convicted the accused purely on presumptions which is illegal and the said Judgment is liable to be set-aside. The learned
Magistrate failed to follow the cross-examination of P.W.1 wherein he clearly
admitted that there is no legally enforceable debt and hence the conviction based on false grounds and presumption and in routine manner is liable to be set aside and the accused is entitled for an acquittal in the matter.
(c).The learned Judge without touching the arguments submitted by the counsel for the appellant/accused, convicted the appellant/accused purely on assumptions. The trial Court failed to note that the notice is not served on the appellant/accused and hence the burden is on the complainant to prove that the appellant/accused has intentionally avoided to receive the notice and in that process he has to examine the postal authorities but the complainant did not examine any witness to prove that the accused avoided to receive the notice and hence, the appellant/accused is entitled to be acquitted on this ground alone. The trial Court did not mention the contentions of the appellant/accused and by blind findings and with wrongful views, convicted the appellant/accused which is not maintainable and hence the appellant/accused is entitled for acquittal. Therefore, the appellant/accused prays to allow the criminal appeal by setting aside the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 9 calendar and judgment in C.C.No.111/2010, dt.11.3.2013 by acquitting the appellant/accused.
10. During the stage of Appeal, the accused/appellant filed a petition
U/s.391 of Cr.P.C., vide Crl.M.P.No.294/2014 in Crl.A.No.54/2013 before this
Court praying to summon the postal authorities/postman concerned to give evidence regarding the service of the statutory notice on the addressee, as per the endorsement on the postal cover. In the said petition, the 1st respondent/complainant filed a counter resisting the maintainability of the petition. After hearing both sides, this Court allowed the said petition, on 25.2.2016.
11. In this Appeal, the 1st respondent/complainant preferred a revision
before the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of
Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, praying to quash the orders passed by this Court in Crl. M.P.No.294/2014, in which the Hon’ble High Court
Stayed all the proceedings in this Appeal, vide Crl. R.C. No.1087/2016.
12. In view of the directions of the Hon’ble apex Court of India, vide
Judgment, dt.28.03.2018 in Crl. Appeal Nos.1375-1376 of 2013, which was communicated by the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., in the Circular of ROC
No.2573/OP Cell/2018, dt.18.04.2018, in which it was observed that, in all pending matters before the High Courts or other Courts relating to P.C. Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless, express order extending stay is produced. Since the speaking order was not filed before this Court as per the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the learned counsels for both parties reported to proceed with the matter and accordingly, this Court proceeded with the matter. During the pendency of this appeal, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant reported that the revision petition which was filed by him is withdrawn and
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 10 filed a memo along with the net-copy of the withdrawal proceedings before this Court.
13.On behalf of the accused/appellant, one K. Ramakrishna,
Postman of Daspalla Area, Visakhapatnam, is examined as R.W.2 and no documents marked on his side. It is pertinent to note that since the accused himself examined as D.W.1 in the trialCourt, in this case the above witness is to be treated as D.W.2. But mistakenly the said witness i.e., Postman is examined as R.W.2, instead of D.W.2. Hence, wherever, R.W.2 is referred in this Judgment, it maybe treated as D.W.2.
14.Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. Apart from oral arguments, the learned counsel for the Appellant/Accused filed written arguments and
additional written arguments; and on the other hand, apart from the oral
arguments, the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent/Complainant, filed written arguments and perused the same.
15.After perusal of the entire evidence on record, grounds of appeal and oral arguments submitted by the the learned counsels for the both parties, and upon considering the material available on record, now the points for determination before this Court are :
(1) Whether there is a legally enforceable existing
liability in between the complainant and
accused ?
(2) Whether the accused issued the cheque to
discharge part of the said liability ?
(3) Whether the complainant complied all the
requirements to constitute the offence U/s.138
of N.I. Act ?
(4) Whether there are grounds to interfere with the
findings of the trial Court ?
(5) To what relief ?
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 11
16. Point Nos.1 to 3:
The case of the complainant is that he is the Director of the complainant company in the above complaint and presently he is residing at
Visakhapatnam, native of Vizianagaram having his place of business in
Vizianagaram and also a house and office in Vizianagaram. The accused approached him and requested him to purchase the property measuring to an extent of 70 Sq. Yards being undivided and unspecified share out of the total extent of 2069 Sq. Yards together with Flat No.404 measuring 2150
Square Feet in Third Floor and Car Parking measuring 100 Square Feet in stilt floor of Madhava Towers at Kanakala Dibba Area, covered by Block No.41 in
T.S.No.1451 and Part of Allipuram Ward within the limits of Greater
Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, for which the complainant agreed and so some negotiations took place between the accused and the complainant and ultimately he agreed to certain understandings and entered into an agreement of sale for the same. Further, towards the said agreement cum understandings in between the accused and the complainant, the complainant paid a sum of Rs.10,01,001/- towards the advance sale consideration on 07.07.2007 and paid further sum of Rs.11,00,000/-towards the advance sale consideration on the said date itself and the accused received and acknowledged the said amounts. Further, in consequent to the said agreement, the accused in his individual capacity and also in the capacity of the G.P.A. Holder of Sudhakar Birlangi together with Nagaja
Constructions executed Ex.P.5 Agreement of Sale, dt.07.9.2007, agreeing to sell the aforesaid property to the complainant company for a sum of
Rs.53,54,650/- and agreeing to register the said aforesaid property to the complainant before 30.11.2007 as well as acknowledging the aforesaid amounts received by the accused from him. From that day itself, the complainant is ready and willing to perform his part of duty as per the aforesaid contract and also paid a further sum of Rs.5,00,000/- towards the remaining sale consideration on 11.10.2017 which the accused
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 12 acknowledged but the accused tried to postpone the same i.e., registering for one reason or the other even when he is ready with the balance sale consideration and to perform his part of duty as per the aforesaid agreement for the best reasons known to the accused. In all, the complainant paid and in all the accused received a sum of Rs.26,01,001/- towards the advance sale consideration, which the accused acknowledged with respect to the aforesaid property. Later on some untoward incidents took place with respect to the aforesaid building and so the accused requested the complainant to cancel the aforesaid agreement, which the accused executed in his favour.
Therefore, as per the request of the accused, the accused and complainant mutually agreed for cancellation of the aforesaid agreement of sale subject to the satisfaction of some terms, conditions and understandings included in
Ex.P.6 cancellation endorsement written and included on the back side of the aforesaid Ex.P.5 agreement of sale. As per the terms and understandings, the accused is liable to repay the entire advance sale consideration of
Rs.26,01,001/- which he paid to the accused and the accused received and acknowledged the same on various dates. Towards the discharge of the aforesaid amount, which the accused is liable to repay the said advance sale consideration to the complainant, the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque bearing
No.090585 dated 25.04.2008 for a sum of Rs.26,01,001/- drawn on Bank of
India, Harbor Road Branch, Visakhapatnam in favour of the complainant towards the satisfaction of the said aforesaid amount. Thereafter, he presented the said cheque for collection at Vizianagaram through their
Banker i.e., Karur Vysya Bank, Vizianagaram, but quite surprisingly the said cheque is returned unpaid stating “Funds Insufficient” in the accused bank account. The complainant received the said cheque for collection at
Vizianagaram through their Banker i.e., Karur Vysya Bank, Vizianagaram, but quite surprisingly the said cheque was returned unpaid under Ex.P.2 banker memo dated 04.09.2008 stating “Funds Insufficient” in the accused Bank
Account. The complainant received the said cheque for collection at
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 13
Vizianagaram through their Banker i.e., Karur Vysya Bank, Vizianagaram but quite surprisingly the said cheque is returned unpaid stating “Funds
Insufficient” in the accused bank account. The complainant received the said cheque unpaid along with the banker’s memo dated 04.09.2008. The accused issued the aforesaid cheque with an undertaking stating that the accused will make necessary arrangements to honour the said cheque and also stating that there are sufficient funds in the said bank account, but the accused issued the said cheque knowing fully well about the insufficiency of the funds in the said bank account and also knowing fully well about the consequences of the bounce of the cheque. Therefore, the accused is liable for the punishment under the provisions of the N.I. Act. Thereafter, the complainant got issued Ex.P.3 registered lawyer’s notice dated 11.09.2008 to the accused calling the accused to repay the said cheque amount to the complainant within fifteen days from the date of receipt of that notice which the accused failed to take the said notice is returned on 27.09.2008 under
Ex.P.4 returned cover. Later on, the complainant filed a suit on the file of the
Additional District Judge at Visakhapatnam and the accused filed his written
statement there with all false and untenable allegations, which are not at all valid and binding on the complainant in any manner whatsoever. Therefore, the complainant prays to punish the accused as per the provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Act.
17.The learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted written arguments and argued that issuance of Ex.P.1 cheque is only as a security to the Complainant and denied the issuance of cheque towards a legally enforceable debt in the circumstances prevailing by then, as the building had collapsed on 06.01.2008, unfortunately while laying the top floor slab by M/s.
L & T Company Limited and the construction work had been stagnated since then. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused further argued that the appellant/accused never received Ex.P.3 statutory notice and hence the main ingredient of Sec.138(c) of the N.I. Act has not been satisfied and hence no
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 14 offence has been made out in this case and the complainant utterly failed to comply with the requirements of Sec.138 of N.I. Act and hence, no offence has been made out against the accused. He further argued that the appellant did not commit any offence as the Appellant/Accused commenced construction of the building with the funds advanced by the purchasers including the complainant. But the building had collapsed in the construction stage while laying the top floor slab by L & T Company Limited and hence, only due to the said act of God, the appellant could not complete the work but not otherwise. He further argued that as Ex.P.5 agreement to sell was entered into by the complainant and the appellant and other site owners wherein, neither a ‘cancellation clause’ nor a ‘default clause’ is mentioned and hence there is no necessity to refund the amount as per the terms of the agreement, which is the basis for issuing Ex.P.1 cheque. Ex.P.1 cheque was issued only with a good intention towards collateral security by specifically making a mention of Ex.P.6 endorsement on Ex.P.5 agreement to sell and the same had been corroborated by the cross-examination of D.W.1, wherein
D.W.1 had clearly stated that “he never expected that the Complainant would deposit the cheque”. He further argued that in Ex.P.6 endorsement, it is clearly mentioned that “hence both parties agreed to cancel this agreement by mutual consent subject to realization of the cheque”. The narration of the above mentioned lines clearly indicate that if the cheque is encashed, the agreement will be cancelled. In other words, if the cheque is not encashed, the agreement will hold good. In such situation, the complainant can proceed against the appellant basing on the agreement only i.e., by filing a suit for specific performance of contract. In this matter the cheque is not encashed and hence the agreement is in force but peculiarly, the complainant has taken undue advantage of the cheque available with him and invoked the provisions of Sec.138 of N.I. Act and is prosecuting the appellant. He further argued that the complainant has filed a suit in O.S.No.365/2008 on the file of the II Addl., District Judge’s Court,
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 15
Visakhapatnam claiming back the amount of Rs.26,01,001/- plus interest along with Rs.20 Lakhs as compensation and costs and other reliefs. The complainant also filed a petition in I.A.No.1495/2008 in the above said suit and got attached the subject building property of the Appellant/Accused.
When everyone including the complainant is claiming back the amounts, it became impossible for the appellant/accused to complete the construction.
As the complainant got attached the property, no new purchasers have come forward to purchase the flats as they got feared about the attachment orders over the schedule property. In this way the complainant created the panicky situation by putting the appellant/accused into troubles and also prosecuting the appellant/accused by misusing the cheque issued by the appellant only as a collateral security. He further argued that Sec.73 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872, stipulates the compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract and Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 says that the compensation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for, are not applicable to the case on hand as there is no breach of contract in this matter. It is not the case where the accused/appellant stopped the construction and in which case, it can be termed as breach of contract. But in the matter on hand by investing huge funds, the accused/appellant made a big construction and raised all six floors, but as the top floor has collapsed, which is an act of god, two persons had died and sentimentally, even the complainant is not co-operating for construction and accepting the flat and only seeking for refund of his money and hence, there is no breach on the part of the appellant/accused in the above matter. Hence, Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 has no applicability in the said matter on hand. He further argued that the presumptions U/s.139 and 118 (a) of N.I.
Act are rebuttable and once the appellant/accused rebut the presumption by discharging by preponderance of probabilities, the burden will be shifted on the complainant. The appellant/accused rebutted the presumption U/s.139 of N.I. Act by examining himself as witness i.e., D.W.1 stating that the cheque
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 16 was issued towards collateral security and then the burden shifted on the complainant. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant/accused prays to set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the
Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, (Excise), Vizianagaram in
C.C.No.111/2010, dt.11.3.2013 for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act by allowing the appeal and acquit the accused for the said offence.
18.The learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted
additional written arguments and argued that the agreement is completely
silent about the aspect of refund of money and hence there is no necessity
for the appellant/accused to refund the amount as per the said agreement, if
there is any such clause to refund the money and if the appellant/accused issued the cheque basing on such clause, then only, it can be termed as there is legally enforceable debt as there is a provision in the agreement to refund the amount but since there is no such provision in the agreement to refund the amount to the respondent/complainant, it could not be termed as there is no legally enforceable debt and it can be safely presumed that the accused need not refund the amount. He further argued that it is clearly mentioned in the agreement through Ex.P.6 endorsement that the “Agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque” as the cheque is not encashed, the agreement got valid and restored and is not cancelled. Hence, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for specific performance of contract, directing the appellant/accused to deliver a flat as
Ex.P.5 agreement stipulates the condition of only delivering the flat after its construction. Peculiarly the respondent/complainant has not filed the suit, can alternatively claim the refund of the money if the appellant/accused fails to deliver the flat. In the ghastly incident of collapse of building, two persons were died, sentimentally no person is coming forward to proceed with the construction including the present complainant. Hence, the appellant/accused could not proceed with the construction till date. However, though there is no necessity for refund of the money as per the terms of
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 17
Ex.P.5, only as a matter of courtesy, he tried to issue a cheque only with a condition that if it is honoured, the agreement is cancelled and the words otherwise means that if the cheque is not honoured, the agreement is continued. So, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for delivering of the flat as per the terms and conditions of the agreement, but he filed a suit only for refund of money and even if the said suit is decreed, it cannot be terms as an enforceable debt as the accused is not issued the cheque as per the terms of Ex.P.5. He issued only on humanitarian grounds but not as per the terms of Ex.P.5. Hence, the issuance of cheque is not in accordance with the provisions of Sec.138 of N.I. Act, as there is no legally enforceable debt,.
In fact, there is no such legally enforceable debt, but the agreement conditions are otherwise and the cheque is not issued in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, as there is no refund clause. He further argued that the provisions of Sections 73 & 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 are not applicable to the case on hand as there is no breach of contract. He further argued that with respect to the dispute in the service of legal notice is concerned, the counsel for the appellant/accused clearly cross-examined the respondent/complainant and wherein he specifically raised the plea of non-receipt of the notice by the accused and hence, the arguments advanced by the respondent/complainant that there is no cross-examination in the trial Court in respect of the issuance of legal notice. When the service of notice is denied and when the doors are locked, it is for the complainant to prove the issuance of notice and if fails to prove the presumption shall in favour of the accused and the trial Court ought to have acquitted the accused as there is no proper service of notice on the part of the complainant. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant/accused prays to set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the
Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, (Excise), Vizianagaram in
C.C.No.111/2010, dt.11.3.2013 for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act by allowing the appeal and acquit the accused for the said offence.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 18
19.Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ complainant submitted written arguments and argued that the appellant admitted the execution of Ex.P.5 agreement of sale and also admitted the receipt of the advance sale consideration of Rs.26,01,001/- from the respondent. The appellant further admitted the fact that some untoward incident took place with respect to the entire property including the property covered under Ex.P.5 and also admitted the said entire property including the property under Ex.P.5 is in the same state of condition as of on the date of untoward incident and also admitted that the appellant and others did not take any steps to reconstruct the entire building as previously agreed from all the last five to eight years. The appellant further agreed that for cancellation of Ex.P.5 agreement of sale and accordingly appellant issued executed Ex.P.1 cheque to the respondent and accordingly the appellant executed cancellation endorsement Ex.P.6 on the back side of Ex.P.5 agreement of sale. The appellant admitted the issue of Ex.P.1 cheque by the appellant to the respondent, towards discharge of the aforesaid debt payable to the respondent by the appellant. The appellant admitted that in order to appellant’s liability, the appellant issued Ex.P.1 cheque towards his liability delivering the property. The appellant admitted his signature on Ex.P.1 cheque and also admitted the issue of the same to the respondent mentioning the same in Ex.P.6 cancellation endorsement. The appellant admitted the bounce of cheque as per Ex.P.2 bankers memo. The appellant further admitted that he did not pay any amount either after the notice got issued to the appellant by the respondent i.e., original of Ex.P.3 or after the receipt of summons from the Court till now. He further argued that the word
Security means safeguard for any transaction or for any amount that may arise in future in relating to the business and like nature. He further argued that in the present case, absolutely there is no question of amount derivation or transaction in future in any manner whatsoever. In fact, even as per the case of the appellant, the amount that the appellant is liable to pay to the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 19 respondent is derived on the date of Ex.P.6 cancellation endorsement and accordingly Ex.P.1 cheque is issued towards part satisfaction of the same.
There is no question of future transactions in the above case in any manner whatsoever and so for the same, the question of security also does not arise, which itself cuts the entire case of the appellant in all the ways. Further, except the present transaction on hand, there are no any other transactions in between the appellant and the respondent and so also, the question of security does not arise under any circumstances in any manner whatsoever.
There is no mention in Ex.P.6 cancellation endorsement, which execution is admitted by the Appellant that the cheque is issued for the purpose of security and not for the discharge of the debt amount payable to the respondent in any manner whatsoever. The word ‘security’ is not at all included in Ex.P.5 in any manner whatsoever. The appellant also admitted that “the appellant did not address any letter to the respondent stating that appellant issued Ex.P.1 cheque for security purpose and not to present the same for collection”. The appellant did not plead anywhere till now that
Ex.P.1 cheque is issued towards security only and not otherwise in any manner whatsoever including in the civil suit got filed by the respondent against the appellant and others. He further argued that the address mentioned in Ex.P.3 lawyer;’s notice, Ex.P.4 cover returned belongs to the appellant only and the appellant in the cross-examination also admitted the same clearly specifically stating that “the address noted on the postal covers is that of his address”. The address on Exs.P.3 and P.4 are one and the same and the same is included in the complaint got filed by the respondent. For the same address, the appellant received summons from the Court. As such, absolutely there is no any wrong mention of the address of the appellant in any manner whatsoever and the respondent with clean hands has got served the registered cover with acknowledgement due to the correct address of the appellant only. As per the endorsement on Ex.P.4, it could be observed that clearly the intimation is given to the appellant by the postal authorities, but
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 20 the appellant for the reasons best known to him failed to receive the cover and failed to take necessary steps with this regard and as such, unclean hands of the appellant is clearly visible and the said allegations alleged by the appellant should be struck off in all the ways. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant prays to dismiss the appeal by conforming the calendar and Judgment passed by the trial Court.
20.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant also filed
additional written arguments and argued that Ex.P.1 was issued by the
accused towards legally enforceable debt. Originally, the contract in between the appellant and the respondent is on basis of Ex.P.5 Agreement of sale. So, the aggrieved party under the said contract of agreement of sale can opt for any relief under the specific performance. Admittedly the said building in question is in the same state of condition from the date it is collapsed at about seven years back till now and no steps are taken for construction or removal of the structures. The appellant himself admitted that the specific performance of Ex.P.5 agreement of sale is not at all possible. So, the only option available for the respondent is the other mode of specific performance i.e., refund of the advance sale consideration. As per
Ex.P.6 cancellation endorsement, if the cheque is enchased the Ex.P.5 agreement of sale is cancelled and if not agreement holds good. In this case, the cheque in question is not encashed, so the agreement under Ex.P.5 is not cancelled and the same is in force. As the agreement of sale is in force, the aggrieved party can seek for relief of specific performance for registration of the property, or can seek relief of refund of advance sale consideration.
Since the building was totally collapsed, the relief of registration of property is not possible due to untowards incident, therefore, the only option available to the respondent is for refund of advance sale consideration for which the present cheque in question under Ex.P.1 is issued by the appellant.
Therefore, absolutely Ex.P.1 cheque was issued towards the discharge of refund of advance sale consideration, which is another mode of specific
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 21 performance and the same is also legally enforceable. Therefore, the provisions of the N.I. Act apply to the present case on hand. Under the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, the respondent is entitled for refund of advance sale consideration amount, which is a legally enforceable debt. If the appellant really did not have any criminal intention to evade the amount payable to the respondent, what prevented the appellant to pay the amount payable to the respondent immediately after receipt of the summons from the trial Court, during the trial before the trial
Court, after conviction held by the trial Court and even during the time of hearing before this Court. Even now the appellant failed to pay the amount to the respondent, that itself is sufficient to show that the appellant is with criminal intention under the provisions of the N.I. Act and therefore, the appellant is liable for conviction. In respect of Ex.P.1 cheque amount, the respondent filed a civil suit against the appellant in Visakhapatnam Court for recovery of said legally enforceable debt and in the said suit, it was ordered for refund of amount payable to the respondent. Therefore, the respondent prays to dismiss the above appeal by confirming the calendar and Judgment passed by the trial Court.
21.in order to prove or support the contents in the complaint and to substantiate the averments therein, the complainant herein adduced his evidence during the course of trial and he himself was examined as P.W.1 in the above case. P.W.1 filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of his chief- examination by reiterating the averments of all the complaint filed by him and all the supportive documents are marked as Exs.P.1 to P.6. During the course of cross-examination of P.W.1, it was elicited that the accused signed the agreement of sale on behalf of Sudhakar Birlangi in the capacity of G.P.A.
Holder. Mr. Kola Balasubrahmam on behalf of Nagaja constructions as
Managing Partner signed pn the agreement of sale I.e, Ex.P.5 in his presence.
He admitted that in Ex.P.5 there is no clause mentioned for refund of amount by the accused and others. He is aware that the top floor of the building was
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 22 collapsed and on which 4th floor slab and 5th floor slab were constructed. The accused and his partners approached him and requested him to take refund of the amount as they are not going to construct the building. He denied the suggestion that he approached the accused and his partner and insisted them to pay the amount. He admitted that Ex.P.6 endorsement on Ex.P.5 it is mentioned that “both parties agreed to cancel this agreement by mutual consent subject to realization of the amount. He admitted that he has filed a civil suit against the accused and his partners vide O.S.No.365/2008 on the file of the IV Addl., District Judge’s Court, Visakhapatnam, claiming back the advance of Rs.26,01,001/- along with interest from the date of advance till the date of realization. He admitted that Ex.P.5 agreement no clause was mentioned entitling them to claim interest on the document. He volunteers that as per the financial transactions, prevailing in the market, as he entitled to claim interest. He has filed a criminal case basing on the bouncing of
Ex.P.1 and later he also filed civil suit and obtained attachment orders before the Judgment against the property. He denied the suggestion that in the event of the bouncing of the cheque, he can file a suit to enforce the terms of agreement of sale, but he cannot file a criminal case under Sec.138 of N.I.
Act. He denied the suggestion that since there is a clause mentioned in
Ex.P.6 on Ex.P.5 that the agreement is cancelled subject to the realization of the cheque, he cannot file a criminal case U/s.138 of N.I. Act, against the accused. He denied the suggestion that he has filed a criminal case and also civil suit against the accused in order to harass him to create terror in the mind of the accused for realization of his amount. He denied the suggestion that the case under Sec.138of N.I. Act is not maintainable and he is liable to be prosecuted for malices of prosecution for foisting criminal case against the accused. He denied the suggestion that the notices were not received by the accused and hence the case U/s.138 of N.I. Act is not maintainable. He denied the suggestion that the cheque was issued by the accused in blank as a security amount and that he foisted the false case. He volunteers that the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 23 hand writing of the cheque is that of the accused. He denied the suggestion that the cheque is not in handwriting of the accused. He denied the suggestion that he is deposing false.
22.In support of the case of the defence, the accused himself examined as D.W.1. D.W.1 deposed that he is resident of Visakhapatnam and he is doing business and he is a Contractor. Himself, one B.Sudhakar and M/s. Nagaja Constructions represented by its Managing Partner by name
Kola Balasubrahmanyam to an extent of 2069 square feet, out of which he owns and possess 669 square feet and B.Sudhakar owns 1100 square feet and Nagaja Cosntructions 300 owns square feet, respectively. He knows the complainant. They proposed to raise constructions to multi store department in the name and style of Madhava constructions. The complainant approached him to purchase a plot No.404 in 3rd floor measuring 2150 square feet along with Car parking for a sum of Rs.53,54,650/- and an advance of Rs.26,01,001/- was paid towards advance in different spells. They executed Ex.P.5 in favour of the complainant. There is no clause mentioned in Ex.P.5 for cancellation agreement or any default clause. Subsequently they have commenced construction of the multi storeyed constructions.
Unfortunately at the time of laying in the 5th floor slabbed on 06.1.2008 the slab was collapsed and due to which two slabs were already collapsed. He has invested total amount in the construction. The said slab was collapsed due to the fault of L & T Limited to lay the slab, on contract basis. He also filed suit for damages against the said L & T Limited, then the complainant approached him to complete work but the same will not be done due to the circumstances prevailing and the complainant asked a cheque for security purpose. He has given Ex.P.1 for security purpose. As per their understandings, if the cheque is encashing the agreement was cancelled and in event of the cheque is not cancelled, the agreement is hold good. We have mentioned the said understandings vide Ex.P.6 on Ex.P.5. He further deposed that he has issued the cheque only for the purpose of security but
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 24 not towards repayment. He has not received any notice in this case. The complainant also filed a suit vide O.S.No.365/2008 on the file of the Hon’ble II
Addl., District Judge’s Court, Visakhapatnam and obtained attachment orders of the site and remaining constructions. He has not committed any criminal breach of trust or any original liability. D.W.1 further deposed that as the complainant and some others filed suits and obtained attachments of the property before the Judgment, he could not raise funds, and hence he could not take steps for making further constructions.
23.During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, it was elicited that they all three persons executed agreement of sale on 07.09.2007 in favour of the complainant under Ex.P.5. They all the three persons received
Rs.26,01,001/- from the complainant from time to time in pursuance of Ex.P.5 agreement. He is the Managing Partner of M/s. Suryanarayana & Co., they are the builders of the said company, for the purpose of the construction of the said building L & T Cement agreed to supply the concrete. On 06.01.2008 the entire upper three slabs are collapsed, the building is in the same collapsed condition till now. So far they did not make any further steps to reconstruct the building so till now same is in collapsed condition. They filed a suit against L & T Cement for recovery of Rs.60,00,000/- and odd for recovery of damages. The total cost of construction of entire building is
Rs.5,50,000/-. They agreed to cancellation of agreement on 25.4.2008 subject to realization of the cheque issued by him. The signatures shown on
Ex.P.5 are relating to himself and he signed as G.P.A. Holder of B.Sudhakar and 3rd signature relating to Managing Partner of Nagaja Constructions. He signed on Ex.P.6 endorsement on behalf of himself and on behalf of B.
Sudhakar, G.P.A. Holder. Both the signatures on Ex.P.1 are relating to him. In order to discharge his liability, he issued Ex.P.1 cheque towards his liability delivering the property. The entire Ex.P.6 endorsement absolutely there is no mention stating that the cheque is issued as a security. He admitted that the complainant filed the suit for recovery of Rs.26,01,000/- and interest from
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 25 the date of cancellation of agreement and for damages of Rs.20,00,000/-.
He is contesting the said suit and the same is pending at Visakhapatnam
Court. Either himself or other executions of the agreement and complainant never expected that the building will be collapsed by making construction.
The address noted on the postal covers is that of his address. He denied the suggestion that knowing fully well about the receipt of the lawyer’s notice, he got it returned though intimated to him the postal authorities. He did not address any letter to his Banker stating that if at all the complainant presents the cheque in question don’t honour the same as he issued as a security purpose. He did not address any letter to the complainant, he issued the cheque for a security purpose and not present the same for collection. Immediately after receipt of summons in this Court at the first appearance or even sufficiently he did not file any memo or petition before this Court, stating that the cheque is issued for security purpose and not for discharge of debt amount payable to the complainant. He denied the suggestion that in order to discharge that his liability that is the debt amount of Rs.26,01,001/- payable to the complainant, he issued Ex.P.1 cheque and now in order to evade his liability, he is speaking false. He denied the suggestion that he issued Ex.P.1 cheque in order to discharge the legally enforceable debt amount of liability. They agreed to construct the entire building and agreed to deliver the respective portions to the complainant within 18 months from the date of agreement. He admitted that as on today it is not possible to execute register sale deed in favour of the complainant in terms of Ex.P.5 agreement. He admitted that so far as no injunction orders are passed by any Court restraining him and other partners to proceed with the construction in the place.
24.In this Appeal, the accused/appellant filed a petition U/s.391 of
Cr.P.C., vide Crl.M.P.No.294/2014 in Crl.A.No.54/2013 before this Court praying to summon the postal authorities/postman concerned to give evidence regarding the service of the statutory notice on the addressee, as
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 26 per the endorsement on the postal cover. After enquiry and after hearing both sides, this Court allowed the said petition, on 25.2.2016. The Postman is examined as R.W.2. R.W.2 deposed that he is resident of visakhapatnam and he is working as Postman at Andhra University, Visakhapatnam since 15 years. He received summons from the Court to give evidence. He used to serve letter within the area of Dasapalla, Visakhapatnam. He took Ex.P.4 postal cover to serve on the appellant/accused on 17.8.2008. Since the door of the appellant/accused was locked, he endorsed the same and he endorsed thereon addressee on camp deposit six days and after seven days, he has made an endorsement that addressee long camp, hence returned to sender.
25.During the course of cross-examination of R.W.2, he admitted that so far as delivery of registered covers and articles, a separate delivery sheet will be maintained and obtained signature of the person to whom he delivered the cover and in the event of failure of delivery of the cover for any reason, the reasons will be mentioned on the said sheet. He did not bring the said sheet and it was in the custody of their office. At first, he has written the served letters on sheet and thereafter, he had written the same on the cover at post office. The address of the appellant/accused on Ex.P.4 is true and correct. He came to know that the appellant/accused is on camp on the day he went to serve Ex.P.4 postal cover from the neighbour of the appellant/accused orally. He enquired the neighbour of the appellant/accused and got information to endorse the same on Ex.P.4 postal cover. He has face acquaintance with the appellant.
26.The main contention of the appellant/accused is that the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque to the complainant as a collateral security, but not for legally enforceable debt and in the agreement through Ex.P.6 endorsement it is clearly mentioned that the “Agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque” as the cheque is not encashed, the agreement got valid and restored and is not cancelled. Hence, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for specific performance of
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 27 contract, directing the appellant/accused to deliver a flat as Ex.P.5 agreement stipulates the condition of only delivering the flat after its construction. In the ghastly incident of collapse of building, two persons were died, sentimentally no person is coming forward to proceed with the construction including the present complainant. Hence, the appellant is entitled for acquittal. It is pertinent to note that Ex.P.1 cheque was issued by the accused to the complainant towards discharge of amount under Ex.P.5 agreement entered in between the complainant and accused and hence, it comes under legally enforceable debt and also comes under other liability.
When once the cheque is issued by the accused, it is the bounden duty of the accused to keep sufficient funds to facilitate for encashment of Ex.P.1 cheque.
27.P.W.1 was cross-examined by the learned counsel for the accused at length but nothing was elicited in support of the defence and nothing could be proved against the case and contents of the complainant, thus the accused has utterly failed to prove his defence in proper perspective. The contention of defence raised by the accused herein has no legs to stand and there is no iota of truth and not tenable and the unsustainable defence is raised only with an intention to escape from his liability thereby to cause and suffer financial loss and mental agony to the complainant herein. P.W.1 has adduced sufficient oral and documentary evidence on record in support of his case which is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the accused failed to prove his contention and was not able to adduce even any rebuttal evidence in the case on hand in support of his evidence as there was no proper defence and further failed to prove his burden. The contention of the accused is, it is clearly mentioned in the agreement through Ex.P.6 endorsement that the “Agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque” as the cheque is not encashed, the agreement got valid and restored and is not cancelled. Hence, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for specific performance of contract, directing the appellant/accused to
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 28 deliver a flat as Ex.P.5 agreement stipulates the condition of only delivering the flat after its construction. The said contention and defence raised by the accused has no legs to stand and it is not helpful and useful to the accused herein as he failed to prove such contention/defence. The address of the accused mentioned in the notice and the address mentioned in the summon/notice issued by this Court are one and the same and as such it is very clear that there is no dispute regarding to the address of the accused.
R.W.2, who is the postman categorically stated that he took Ex.P.4 postal cover to serve on the appellant/accused on 17.8.2008 and since the door of the appellant/accused was locked, he endorsed the same and he endorsed thereon addressee on camp deposit six days and after seven days he has made an endorsement that addressee long camp, hence returned to sender.
During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, who is the accused herein, he categorically admitted that the address noted on the postal covers is that of his address. Hence, when once the complainant sent the statutory notice under Ex.P.3 to the correct address, the burden shifts on the accused to show that he is not residing in the said address. The accused never denied the execution of Exs.P.1, P.5 and P68. D.W.1 admitted in his cross-examination that the signatures shown on Ex.P.5 are relating to himself and he signed as
G.P.A. Holder of B.Sudhakar and 3rd signature relating to managing partner of
Nagaja Constructions. He also admitted that he signed on Ex.P.6 endorsement on behalf of himself and on behalf of B.Sudhakar G.P.A. Holder and both the signatures on Ex.P.1 are relating to him, which proves the case of the complainant herein. The accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque in connection with transaction under Ex.P.5 agreement, knowing fully that the accused closed the said Account with a dishonest intention. Since Ex.P.1 cheque is issued by the accused to the complainant as per the terms of Ex.P.5 agreement, it is legally enforceable debt. The findings and observations of the trial Court are in correct lines and the trial Court rightly convicted the accused for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 29
28.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, reported in II (2010) B.C. 693, (three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court) held that:
“Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act does indeed include the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability and it is rebuttal presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is initial presumption which favours the complainant.
Sec.139 of N.I. Act is example for reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative object of improving the credibility of negotiable instrument.”
29.When the accused is not disputing his signature on Ex.P.1 cheque, as per the decision of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, reported in II (2010) B.C. 693, Sec.139 of N.I. Act does indeed include the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability and it is rebuttal presumption and it is open to accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested.
30.As per the decision of our Hon’ble Supreme Court, rendered in
R.Rajendran vs. A.J. Yuvaraj Reddy and another, reported in 2012 (2)
ALD (Crl.) 682 and Anil Dagwale, vs. K.Raju and Another reported in 2003 (1) ALD (Crl.) 276, once accused admitted his signatures on cheque, even though blank cheques were issued, burden lies on accused why he issued said cheques to complainant. In such cases, examination of complainant alone is sufficient and there is no need for any corroboration evidence from the side of complainant to prove the legally enforceable debt.
31.After considering the above case Law, it is clear that once the accused admitted his signature on cheque or proved by complainant that the signature on cheque in question is the signature of the accused, the presumption U/s.139 of N.I. Act is in favour of the complainant and that the said cheque was issued to discharge legally enforceable debt or obligation
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 30 and the burden shifts on accused to prove that the said cheque was not issued to discharge the legally enforceable debt or obligation. Ex.P.3 is office copy of Lawyer’s notice dated 11.09.2008 got issued by the complainant to the accused, demanding him to pay the cheque amount. But the same was returned to the Complainant as “Addressee Long Camp”. Therefore, the accused has committed the offence under Sec.138 of N.I. Act. It is the case of the complainant that the accused being fully aware of the issuance of cheque in order to clear the debt, evaded to honour the same, which attracts an offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act. Hence, the accused is liable for punishable U/s.138 of N.I.Act.
32. Mere raising bald allegations against without any proof cannot be believable. During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, he stated that immediately after receipt of summons from this Court in this case at the 1st appearance or even subsequently he did not file any memo or petition
before this Court stating that the cheque issued for security purpose and not
for discharge of debt amount payable to the complainant. If really the accused did not issue Ex.P.1 cheque to the complainant for collateral security, what prevented to the accused to file a petition before this Court in support of his said contention, but he kept quiet. Mere non-issuance of reply itself is not absolute proof of case of the complainant, but it is one of the circumstances probablize the correctness of the case of the complainant.
After considering the oral evidence of P.W.1 and inaction on the part of the accused, this Court is of considered opinion that the complainant proved that the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque to the complainant in discharge of legally enforceable debt and liability in terms of agreement under Ex.P.5 and the said cheque was bounced due to “Insufficient Funds”.
33.In an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, once the complainant has proved the drawing of the cheque, presentation of the cheque into the Bank, return of the cheque unpaid by the drawee Bank, giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding the payment
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 31 of the cheque amount and failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of receipt of the notice, the statutory presumptions under Sec.118 and 139 of N.I. Act will arise in favour of the complainant. Under Sec.118(a) of the N.I. Act, the Court shall presume that the negotiable instrument has been drawn for consideration. Under Sec.139 of the N.I. Act, the Court shall presume that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. The meaning and expression ‘shall presume’ has been explained in Section 4 of Indian
Evidence Act. Wherever it is provided by any Act that the Court ‘shall presume’ a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. Thus, the presumptions under Section 118 and 139 of N.I. Act are rebuttable presumptions. The burden of proof to rebut the said presumptions is upon the accused.
34.The learned counsel for the complainant contended that the accused issued cheque in favour of the complainant to discharge the liability under Ex.P.5. He submitted that the object of Sec.138 of N.I. Act is to enhance the credibility or acceptability of cheques, it is immaterial that the cheque was issued for discharge of his own debt or liability. Therefore, P.W.1 has established the essential ingredients of the offence U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
35.With regard to receiving of statutory notice, the learned counsel
for the appellant/accused contends that the statutory notice has not been
served on the accused, and the complainant managed postal authorities to get it returned, as such the complaint is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. Whereas, the learned counsel for the complainant argued that
Ex.P.3 lawyer’s notice was sent by registered post acknowledgement due to the correct address of the accused, but the accused failed to take the said notice and the said notice was returned on 27.09.2008 with an endorsement “Addressee Long camp”. R.W.2, who is the Postman, stated in his evidence that he took Ex.P.4 postal cover to serve on the appellant/accused on 17.08.2008 and since the door of the appellant/accused was locked, he
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 32 endorsed the same and he endorsed thereon, address on camp, hence returned to sender, deposit six days and after seven days he made endorsement that addressee long camp hence returned to sender. The accused intentionally avoided the service of summons, though the the complainant sent Ex.P.3 legal notice to the correct address of the accused.
Hence, by drawing presumption of service U/s.27 of General Clauses Act, the notice is deemed to have been served on the accused. For detailed appreciation, it is necessary to reproduce Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows :
“Sec.27:- Meaning of service by post:- Where any
Central Act or regulation made after commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘serve’ or either of expressions ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing preparing and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”.
36. The principle incorporation in Sec.27 of General Clauses Act is that, once the notice has been dispatched by registered post by the sender, then it shall be deemed to have been served on the addressee unless the addressee proves that it was not really served and that he was not responsible for non-service. In this connection, this court relied upon a decision reported in Vanama Srinivasa Rao Vs. State of A.P. (L.C.2012 (14) A.P., 128). In the above cited case, the Hon’ble High Court reiterated the settled position of law that once a notice has been sent by registered post to the correct address, then it must be presumed that the service has been effected.
37.In respect of service of statutory notice on the accused, this
Court relied on the following citation :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 33
N. Parameswaran Unni Vs. g. Kannan and others, reported in 2017 (2) ALT (Crl) 366 (SC), wherein it was held at Para-15 of the
Judgment, as follows :
“Sec.138 of N.I. Act – Proof of Service of Notice – Sec.28 of
General Clauses Act – Sec.114 of Evidence Act. When a notice is sent by registered Post and is returned with postal endorsement of
Refused – Not Available in the House – House Locked – Shop closed –
Addressee Not in Station – due service has to be presumed. Once a notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing to the drawer of the cheque, the service of notice is deemed to have been effected”.
During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, who is the accused herein, he categorically admitted that the address noted on the postal cover is that of his address. When the accused himself admitted that he is residing in the same address as mentioned in Ex.P.4 unserved postal address, when once a notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing to the drawer of the cheque, who is the accused herein, the service of notice is deemed to have been effected. Hence, the above citation is aptly applicable to the present case on hand.
38.Thus, it is clear that P.W.1 has sent the legal notice to the house of the accused. The conditions pertaining to the notice to be given to the drawer have been incorporated in clauses (b) and (c) or the proviso to
Section 138 of the Act which reads as follows :
“(b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, and the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice”.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 34
39. In the present case, admittedly the address mentioned on
Exs.P.4 returned postal cover and the address mentioned on Ex.P.3 lawyer’s notice, as well as the complaint are one and the same. As seen from the record, the Court summons sent by registered post to the same address have been served on the accused. Therefore, this is a clear case, where the accused has successfully avoided the receipt of statutory notice dispatched to his correct address. This kind of behaviour by trickster drawer of the cheque cannot be encouraged by the Courts. Therefore, this Court holds that the accused has failed to rebut the presumption under Section 27 of
General Clauses Act with respect to service to statutory notice to him and hence, the notice is deemed to have been served on the accused.
40.In respect of the service of Ex.P.3 legal notice is concerned, the learned counsel for the accused relied on the following citations :
(1) V. Raja Kumari Vs. P. subbarama Naidu & Another, reported in 2004 (8) SCC 774, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that :
“Meaning of service by post – Where any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘service’ or either of the expression ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, preparing and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”.
(2)Pradeep Madhukar Poinguinkar Vs. Shri Manguesh
Kuttalkar Another, in Criminal Appeal No.57/2005, of the Hon’ble
Bombay High Court, wherein his Lordship held that :
“The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the warrant was executed on the said address at Rumdamol, Davorlim, Salcete in spite of the fact that the person who had gone to execute the warrant and had made the said endorsement was not examined and
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 35 the said endorsement was otherwise not clear as to the place from which the accused was arrested. It is quite probable that the accused was arrested from a place other than the address mentioned herein above. The learned trial Court also observed that the accused had managed to return the registered A.D. by the Postal
Authorities and this the learned trial Court did without any evidence being led in that regard. On the other hand, the learned first
Appellate Court observed that the presumption available under section 27 of the General Clauses Act was a rebuttable presumption.
The learned first appellate Court noted that the postal article was not returned in the case at hand, by the Postal Authorities with the remark refused or unclaimed or addresses absent at the given address but that it was returned with the remark insufficient address, return to sender. The learned first Appellate Court noted that on the face of the said remark it only meant that the postman did not get a chance to see whether the addressee was there or not to find out whether he was refusing or accepting the service. The learned first
Appellate Court also observed that the learned trial Court had made a serious allegation against the postmaster (sic postman) and that the complainant in the complaint nor in his evidence had stated that the accused had managed to return the cheques (sic postal article) by managing the Postal Authorities and therefore there was no presumption of any such management with the Postal Authority. The learned first Appellate Court referred to section 114 of the Evidence
Act, and in my view rightly, to draw a presumption that official acts have been regularly performed. A postman is a Public Officer. The postman had returned the postal article with the endorsement insufficient address, return to sender. The said endorsement showed that the postman had not even made an attempt to serve the address/accused with the said postal article and on the contrary the accused had himself stepped into the witness box and categorically stated that he had not received the said article. In the light of the absence of necessary averments, the said endorsement and the categorical evidence given by the accused, it should not be said that the complainant had duly served the statutory notice upon the accused. Reliance placed on the cases of (v.Satyanarayana v. A.P.
Travel and Tourism Development ltd. And another) 1, 1997 (Crimes 349 and (V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu and another) 2, 2005 (1) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) (S.C.) 730 : A.I.R.2005 S.C. 109 is of no assistance
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 36 to the case of the Complainant. The view held by the learned first
Appellate Court is a correct view of the matter in the facts and circumstances of the case. There was no question of presumption of service being drawn when the postman had himself returned the postal article for insufficient address. No interference is called for in this appeal. Hence, the same is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed”.
(3) Ramesh Chand Vs Ravinder Singh Chandel, reported in 2007
CriL.J. 1313, wherein it was held that :
“It may be that the address is correct and even the addressee is available but a wrong endorsement is manipulated by the addressee. In such a case, if the facts are proved, it may amount to refusal of the notice. If the complainant is able to prove that the drawer of the cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got a false endorsement made only to defeat the process of law, the Court shall presume service of notice. Thus, however, is a matter of evidence and proof. Thus even in a case where the notice is returned with the endorsement that the premises has always been found locked or the addressee was not available at the time of postal delivery, it will be open to the complainant to prove at the trial by evidence that the endorsement is not correct and that the addressee, namely, the drawer of the cheque, with knowledge of the notice had deliberately avoided to receive notice”.
(4) D. Vinod Shivappa, Vs. Nanda Belliappa, reported in 2006 (4)
Supreme 540 wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that :
“(i) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138(b) – dishonour of Cheque – Demand notice to appellant-accused was returned with endorsement “addressee always absent during delivery time. Hence returned to sender” - In other cases notices were returned with endorsement “party not in station. Arrival not known” - Petition in question proceedings and complaint – High
Court dismissed petition – Appeal – Complainant stated that notice may be deemed to have been served – Whether appellant in the circumstances could pray for quashing of proceedings ? No –
Question where posted endorsement showed that notice could not be served on account of non-availability of addressee, whether
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 37 cause of action could arise for prosecution on basis of deemed service – Question could be answered by reference to facts of each case and no rule of universal application could be laid down – In interpreting a statute court must adopt that construction which suppressed mischief and advanced the remedy – Proviso to Section 138(b) was meant to protect honest drawers – If complainant was able to prove that drawer of cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got false endorsement made only to defeat process of law, Court shall presume service of notice –
These were all questions of facts and it would be premature to move High Court for quashing of proceedings.
Held : The question is whether in a case of this nature, where the postal endorsement shows that th8e notice could not be served on account of the non availability of the addressee, a cause of action may still arise for prosecution of the drawer of the cheque on the basis of deemed service of notice under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act. In our view this question has to be answered by reference to the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down that in all cases where notice is not served on account of non-availability of the addressee, the court must presume service of notice.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the drawer may by dubious means manage to get an incorrect endorsement made on the envelope that the parties has been found locked or that the addressee was not available at the time when postman went for delivery of the letter. It may be thaet the address is correct and even the addressee is available but a wrong endorsement is manipulated by the addressee. In such a case, if the facts are proved, it may amount to refusal of the notice. If the complainant is able to prove that the drawer of the cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got a false endorsement made only to defeat the process of law, the Court shall presume service of notice. This, however, is a matter of evidence and proof. Thus even in a case where the notice is returned with the endorsement that the premises has always been found locked or the addressee was not available at the time of postal delivery, it will be open to the complainant to prove at the trial by evidence that the endorsement is not correct and that the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 38 addressee, namely the drawer of the cheque, with knowledge of the notice had deliberately avoided to receive notice”.
(5) Jai Durga Enterprises Through Its … Vs. State of U.P. and
Indo Automobiles, reported in 2006 Cri L.J. 3312, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court held that :
“Therefore, it is essential that service upon registered notice should be affected in absence of registered post. It shall not be presumed that there is sufficient service regarding notice sent by U.P.C, and it cannot be taken into account under Section 27 of the Act that there was sufficient service upon the accused/appellants. Although, it has been denied by the applicant that no any notice was received by them in the affidavit and same has not been controverted by filing counter affidavit. Therefore, it is liable to be deemed that there was no sufficient service of legal notice upon the applicants/accused. On this basis, the impugned order passed by the court below is liable to be quashed”.
(6) S.S. Ummul Habiba,Vs. B. Rajendran, reported in 2005 (1)
ALD Cri 33, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, held that :
“On 19.12.1992, the accused issued Ex.P.3-Lawyer’s notice demanding the amount due on the cheque. The accused intentionally evaded service of the notice and the notice returned to the sender with the endorsement “intimation given; not claimed”. Since the accused evaded the service of notice, it must be deemed to be constructive notice and sufficient service of notice on the accused. The accused failed to pay the cheque amount till 15.1.1993. Hence, the Complaint was filed against the accused under Section 138 of N.I. Act”.
(7) Yadav Chandra sharma, v. Gyanendra Singh Kushwah, reported in 2017 0 Supreme (MP) 781, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – S.138 – General
Clauses Act, 1897 – S.27 – Evidence Act, 1872 – Ss.101 and 103 –
Case of dishonour of cheque – Petitioner stated that he never received notice sent by respondent – He specifically alleged
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 39 regarding interpolation over acknowledgement card – Petitioner’s application for calling postman as witness allowed”.
(8) Parimal Vs. Veena @ Bharti, reported in 2011 (3) SCC 545, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, held that :
“There is presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the Court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service.
The provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act provide that the burden of proof of the facts rests on the party who substantially asserts it and not on the party who denies it. In fact, burden of proof means that a party has to prove an allegation
before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour Section 103
provides that burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any special law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The provision of Section 103 amplifies the general rule of Section 101 that the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the affirmative of the facts in issue”.
The address of the appellant/accused as mentioned in Ex.P.3 registered lawyer’s notice; Ex.P.4 returned cover, address mentioned in the complaint and the summons issued by the Court, are one and the same. For the same address, the appellant received summons from the Court. As such, absolutely there is no any wrong mention of the address of the appellant in any manner whatsoever and the respondent with clean hands has got served the registered cover with acknowledgement due to the correct address of the appellant only. Hence, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, preparing and posting by registered post. The facts of the above cited cases are different from the present case on hand.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 40
41.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant argued that the notice is sent to the correct address of the accused and absolutely the appellant except denying the same did not rebut the same and as such, as per the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the notice is deemed service on the appellant/accused. In support of his contention he relied on the following citation 2000 (1) ALT (Crl) 42 (SC), wherein it was held that :
“Under General Clauses Act, 1987, Section 27, -
Meaning of service by post – Where sender of notice dispatched by post with the correct address, notice must be deemed to have been served on the sendee, unless he rebuts it – in the case of hand, notice deemed to have been served”.
The above citation is applicable to the present case on hand, since in the present case on hand also the complainant sent the notice to the accused to his correct address and the accused, who is examined as D.W.1 also admitted in his cross-examination that the address noted on the postal cover is that of his address. Hence, as the complainant sent legal notice to the correct address of the accused, the notice must be deemed to have been served on the accused.
42.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant further argued that a person who does not pay within fifteen days of receipt of summons from the Court along with a copy of the complaint, cannot contend that there was no proper service of notice by ignoring statutory presumption.
In view of his above said contention, he relied on the following citation 2007 (6) SCC 555, wherein it was held that :
“Remedy for person who claims that he did not receive notice sent by post is that the Appellant may pay the amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment of cheque amount within fifteen days of the receipt of summons and a person who does not pay within fifteen days of receipt of summons from the
Court along with a copy of the complaint, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice by ignoring statutory presumption under section 27 of General Clause Act and
Section 114 of Evidence Act”.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 41
In the present case on hand also the appellant failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days of the receipt of summons and hence, he cannot contend that there was no proper service of notice as per the provisions of
Sec.27 of General Clauses Act and Sec.114 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Hence, the above citation is applicable to the present case on hand.
43.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant further argued that the appellant/accused who is doing real estate business received advance amount promising to allot flat to the respondent/complainant but he could not fulfill his promise and so he is liable to pay the advance amount received as sale consideration and the cheque in question was endorsed in favour of the respondent in acknowledgement of the said liability, as such the respondent is holder in due course. In support of his contention, he relied on a citation i.e., 1994 Madras Law Journal (Cri) 112, wherein it was held that :
“Appellants, who are real estate dealers, had received amounts promising to sell three grounds of land but could not fulfill that promise and so were liable to pay the amount received as sale consideration. The cheques in question were endorsed in favour of Respondent in acknowledgement of the said liability. As such the respondent is “holder in due course”. Held in view of the allegations in the complaint, the submission that there was no legally enforceable debt and the cheques were not issued to discharge and so the offence is not made out, fails”.
In the present case also the appellant/accused received advance amount with a promise to allot a flat to the complainant, but he failed to allot the same and the cheque in question was endorsed in favour of respondent is “holder in due course”. Hence, it is legally enforceable debt. Hence, the above citation is applicable to the present case on hand.
44. The main core contention of the appellant/accused is that the cheque was issued by him to the 1st respondent/complainant towards collateral security, as such the appellant has to seek the remedy through
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 42
Civil Court only by filing a suit for specific performance of contract. It is pertinent to note that as seen from the entire material available on record and Ex.P.6 cancellation endorsement towards cancellation of Ex.A.5 agreement, in which it was mentioned that due to tragic incident occurred on 06.1.2008 in which the schedule property building was collapsed, decided to cancel the agreement by mutual consent and hence, as per the understandings of both parties of the agreement, the vendor refunding the advance sale consideration paid by the purchaser at the time of agreement and subsequent payment paid by the purchaser to the purchaser by way of cheque in favour of the purchaser towards full and final settlement of all claims of purchaser against the vendor including the refund of advance sale consideration paid by purchaser on the date of execution of the agreement.
In the said cancellation endorsement, it was further mentioned that both parties agreed to cancel the agreement by mutual consent subject to realization of the above mentioned cheque and no party of the agreement shall have any right against other party of the agreement, after the realization of the above mentioned cheque and the vendor is at liberty to offer the schedule property for sale to any other person at his will. Hence, on perusal of the above contents of Ex.A.6 cancellation endorsement, the above cheque was issued towards refund of advance amount which is liability of the accused, but it does not come under collateral purpose. Hence, in the contention raised by the accused holds no water.
45.In the present case, the accused is not disputing his signature on
Ex.P.1 cheque, therefore the statutory presumption U/s.118 of N.I. Act that the cheque has been drawn for consideration and under Sec.139 of N.I. Act that the cheque has been issued for the discharge of debt or liability will raise in favour of the complainant and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the said presumptions. The learned counsel for the accused cross- examined P.W.1 at length but nothing was elicited in favour of the accused.
Since the present case is a criminal case, the accused has to prove his
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 43 contention by preponderance of probabilities by adducing some acceptable evidence before the Court. Though the accused himself examined as D.W.1 and also examined the postman on his behalf in this Appeal as R.W.2, the accused could not prove his contention. All the suggestions made to P.W.1 in his cross-examination were denied by P.W.1. Mere denial is not sufficient to prove his contention.
46.The evidence on record established that the accused issued
Ex.P.1 cheque to discharge the liability and the same was dishonoured as “Funds Insufficient”. It is an admitted and proved fact that the complainant issued statutory notice under Ex.P.3 within the time, but the said notice of the accused was returned by the postal authorities as “Addressee Long
Camp” and the accused not arranged the funds in his account. Therefore, the complainant proved all the requirements to constitute the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
47.In the present case the complainant prove that the cheque given by the accused towards legally enforceable debt. It is also pertinent to note that once issuance of a cheque and signature thereon are admitted, presumption of a legally enforceable debt or other liability in favour of the holder of the cheque arises and accused may rebut the presumption, but mere statement of the accused may not be sufficient. In the present case the accused failed to discharge his burden of rebutting the presumption. The accused was under an obligation or liability to make payment to complainant under Ex.P.1 cheque, but he failed to make payment of said amount and cheque so issued by accused stood dishonoured for “Funds Insufficient” account closed. It is also pertinent to note that mere fact that debtor has given security in form of cheque or current cheque with agreement that it is security for fulfillment of obligation to be discharged on date itself.
48.In a case in between K.N. Beena vs. Muniyappan & Another, reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 14, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 44 “U/sec.118 unless the contrary was proved, it is to be presumed that the Negotiable Instrument (including cheque) had been made and drawn for consideration. U/s.139, the Court has to presume unless the contrary was proved that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in hole or in part, of a debt or liability, thus, in a complaint U/s.138, the Court has to presume that the cheque had been issued for a debt or liability, this presumption is rebuttable. However, the burden of proving that the cheque had not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused. Section 20 of Negotiable Instruments Act says that inchoate stamped instrument and states that if a person signs and delivers a paper stamped in accordance with law and either wholly blank or for written thereon an incomplete Negotiable
Instrument, such person thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete as the case may be upon it, the Negotiable Instrument for any amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by stamp. Sec.49 permits the holder of a Negotiable Instrument endorsed in blank to fill up the said instrument by writing upon the endorsement, the direction to pay any other person as endorsee and to complete the endorsement in the blank cheque, it makes it clear that doing for holder does not thereby incur the responsibility of an endorser as per Subhash Chand vs. Satish Varma, pages 1 to 16 on 12th May, 2016.”
49.In a case in between Rajendra vs. Usha Rani reported in (2001 L.W. (Crl.) 319), it was observed that :
“No law prescribes that in case of any Negotiable
Instrument, the entire body of the instrument shall be written only by the maker or drawer of the instrument. Once the execution is admitted, it shall be taken that the cheque was issued by the accused in favour of the complainant towards the discharge of the liability even in case where the cheque was filled up by the some other person.”
50. Section 139 of the Act always in favour of the holder of the instrument. The Court shall presume the fact as proved till it is disproved.
Admittedly, the accused did not place any cogent evidence to rebut the presumption. No doubt the accused need not adduce positive evidence to
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 45 rebut the presumption. But, in the present case, the complainant by examining himself as P.W.1, proved Ex.P.1 cheque.
51.If really the complainant also influenced the Postal Department at the time of serving notice and the complainant intentionally served the notice to him with wrong address, what prevented him to complain against the accused to the higher officials of the Postal Department for taking necessary action against the concerned postal officials, who supported the complainant. Except mere bald statements, the accused could not prove his case with cogent and convincing evidence.
52.The learned counsel for the appellant/accused relied on the following citations :
(1) Nikhil P.Gandhi, Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, reported in 2016 0 Supreme (Gujarat) 908, wherein his Lordship of Hon’ble Gujarat
High Court held that :
“(A) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 –
Dishonour of cheque – A legal fiction, although is required to be given full effect, yet has its own limitations – It cannot be taken recourse to for any purpose other than one mentioned in statute itself – Section 138 provides for a penal provision – a penal provision created by reason of a legal fiction must receive strict construction – Such a penal provision, enacted in terms of legal fiction drawn, would be attracted when a cheque is returned by bank unpaid –
Before a proceeding thereunder is initiated, all legal requirements
therefor must be complied with – Court must be satisfied that all ingredients of commission of an offence under said provision have been complied with.
(B) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 –
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482 – Dishonour of cheque – Whenever a blank cheque or postdated cheque is issued, a trust is reposed that cheque will be filled in or used according to understanding agreement between parties – If there is a prima facie reason to believe that said trust is not honoured, then continuation of prosecution under Section 138 of N.I. Act would be abuse of process of law – It is in interest of justice that parties in such cases are left to civil remedy”.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 46 (2) M/s. Indian Oil Corporation, Vs. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. &
Others, reported in 2006 (6) Supreme 66, wherein their Lordships of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, held that :
“While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purety civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There isd also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement.
Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged”.
(3) All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. & Others, Vs. Dhanesh
Badarmal Jain & Another, reported in 2007 (12) SCALE 391, wherein it was held by the Hon’ble Court that :
“Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of finding out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie cannot notice the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other admitted documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is impermissible also to look to the admitted documents. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. Supreme Courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice”.
(4) M/s. Shakti Travel & Tours, Vs. State of Bihar & Another, reported in 2000 (7) Supreme 90, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that :
“The only ground on which the learned counsel for the
Appellant prays for quashing of the complaint is that on the assertions made in paragraph 8 of the complaint, it must be held
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 47 that notice has not been served and, therefore, an application under
Section 138 could not have been maintained. Undoubtedly, the accused has a right to pay the money within 15 days from the date of the service of notice and only when it fails to pay, it is open for the complainant to file a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. That being the position and in the complaint itself having not been mentioned that the notice has been served, on the assertions made in paragraph-8, the complaint itself is not maintainable. We accordingly quash the complaint”.
It is pertinent to note that initially when the complaint is filed by the respondent under the provisions of the N.I. Act, as per the provisions of the
Sections 138, 139 and 142 of N.I. Act, the initial presumption that the cheque was drawn for discharge of liability of drawer ought to be raised by the
Courts in every case and the Appellant to rebut the same has to prove the same by adducing cogent and convincing evidence and not by mere suggestions. On perusal of the facts of the above cited cases, the facts of the above cited cases are different from the facts of the present case on hand.
53.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant argued that
Ex.P.1 cheque is not issued towards security as alleged by the respondent in any manner whatsoever. In support of his contention, the learned counsel
for the respondent/complainant relied on the following citations :
(1) 1998 Crl.L.J. 3228, wherein the Hon’ble High Court held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 118 (a) – Evidence
Act, Sec.114 – Cheque – Consideration – Presumption as to –
Drawer issued blank cheque as security for loan transaction –
Issuance of the cheque admitted – No dispute regarding signature amount and name shown in cheque – It can be presumed that cheque was supported by consideration – Presumption cannot be rebutted merely because there were some transactions between drawer and drawee of cheque”.
(2) AIR 2001 Supreme Court, 676, wherein it was held that :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 48 “Negotiable Instruments Act Ss.1 – Interpretation – Act to be interpreted in light of objectives to be achieved – Efforts to defeat objectives of law to be discouraged”.
(3) 2005 Crl.L.J. 314, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act Ss.138, 139 – Evidence Act, S.4 – Cheque issued towards balance sale consideration due under agreement of sale after delivery of possession of property agreed was given – covered under other liability – Burden would be on petitioners to establish that dishonoured cheque was not issued in discharge of debt or other liability – Respondent cannot be quashed against petitioner”.
(4) 2005 Crl.L.J. 640, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act ss.138 – Dishonour of cheque –
Blank cheque drawn in favour of the Respondent as security for repayment of amount of amount that may become due – Necessary entries were made there in after verifying accounts on behalf of respondent with respect to outstanding liability – It became a cheque only on date when liability was acknowledged and entered in cheque – Respondent has proved a liability outstanding from respondent – Said cheque was bounced for want of funds is also not disputed – Respondent guilty of offence punishable under Sec.138”.
(5) AIR 2002 Supreme Court 182, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act Ss.138, 139 – Cheque dishonour complaint – Not liable to be quashed on ground of dishonour of cheque by reason of stop payment instructions –
Presumption under Section 139 that cheque was received by holder for discharge of debt or liability arises – Presumption though is rebuttable”.
(6) AIR 2000 Supreme Court 1869, wherein it was held that :
“Complaint cannot be quashed merely on grounds that civil remedy is available”.
In the present case on hand the accused who is examined as D.W.1, admitted in his cross-examination that the signatures shown on Ex.P.5 are relating to himself and he signed as G.P.A. Holder of B.Sudhakar and 3rd signature relating to managing partner of Nagaja Constructions. He also admitted that he signed on Ex.P.6 endorsement on behalf of himself and on
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 49 behalf of B.Sudhakar G.P.A. Holder and both the signatures on Ex.P.1 are relating to him, hence there is no dispute regarding signature, amount and name shown in cheque and it can be presumed that cheque was supported by consideration. The cheque was bounced for want of funds is also not disputed.
54.Burden of proving that the cheque had not been issued for any debt or liability is on the accused. Mere denial that the cheque was not issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability in the absence of any sufficient evidence, does not shift the burden to the complainant.
55. When the accused contended that he did not issue the cheque in discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability, it is for the accused to disprove the presumption regarding the same, in this connection, it is apt to refer a decision reported in Sudhir Sabharawal v. Anil Prabhakar
Nilgirwar1 wherein it was held that:
“(10).Wherever the person accused of offence under
Section 138 of the Act intends to plead that there did not exist legally enforceable debt, it is for him to place such material
before the Court in the form of oral and documentary evidence
as is sufficient and adequate to neutralize the presumption provided for under Section 139 of the Act. In the present case, except deposing that there did not exist any such legally enforceable debt or liability, the petitioner did not come forward with any acceptable and reliable evidence. Therefore, having regard to the presumption provided for under Section 139 of the Act, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Hiten p. Dalai case (supra), and in the absence of rebuttal by the petitioner, the Courts below were left with no alternative except to continue with the presumption as to the existence of the debt in favour of the respondent. The Court is not persuaded to take a different view.”
56.In M.S. Narayana Vs State of Karnataka 2 while dealing with the legal position, regarding the standard of proof required for rebutting a 1 2003 (2) ALD (Cri) 237 22007(1) ALT (Crl) 103(SC) = 2006(6) SCC 39
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 50 presumption, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, in a case under Sec.
138 of NI Act, 1881 Hon’ble Supreme Court, held that, the presumptions under Sec. 118(a) and 139 of the Act are rebuttable and the standard of proof required for such rebuttal is preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond all reasonable doubt.
Her Lordship Further observed:
“The standard of proof evidentially is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of probabilities can be drawn not only from the material on record, but also by reference to the circumstances upon which, he relies.
Her Lordship Further held:
“Rebuttal evidence does not have to be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced before Court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonable being that of the prudent man.”
57. This Court relied on the following citation :
Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa, reported in 2019 (3) ALT (SC) 62 (D.B.), wherein it was held that :
“Signature on cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability”.
In the present case on hand, since the accused issued a cheque bearing No.090585 dt.25.4.2008 for a sum of Rs.26,01,001/- in favour of the complainant for return of the advance amount received by him from P.W.1 towards purchase of a Flat and subsequently the said cheque was dishonoured due to “Funds Insufficient” in the Account of the accused and the accused also not denied his signature on the said cheque. Hence, the accused issued the said cheque to P.W.1 towards discharge of liability.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 51
58. To decide the issue whether the accused issued the cheque to the complainant towards discharge of debt or liability, this Court also relied on the following citation :
Madan Tiwari Vs. State of Chattisgarh, reported in CRR
No.56 of 2010, of the Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, wherein it was held at Paras-9 & 10 that :
(Para-9) “We have given due consideration to the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the observations of this Court in Indus Airways (P) Ltd. V. Magnum
Aviation (P) Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539:(2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 138:(2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 845 with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act and the expression “for discharge of any debt or liability” occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the view that the question whether a post-dated cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature of transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the section is attracted and not otherwise”.
(Para-10) “Reference to the Facts of the present case clearly shows that though the word “security” I used in Clause 3.1(iii) of the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being towards repayment of installments. The repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the installment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on 28.02.2002 which was prior to the date of the cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and installments have fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the
Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability”.
In the present case also, as on the date of issue of cheque by the accused to the complainant, there is existence of liability on the accused for return of the amount received by him from the complainant towards purchase of a Flat and in that connection, the accused issued the said cheque to the complainant and hence, the amount covered under the cheque is legally recoverable by the complainant from the accused, which is
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 52 an outstanding liability, and hence, Sec.138 of N.I. Act is attracted in the present case on hand.
59. The presumption U/s.139 of NI Act is a rebuttable presumption.
It is not for the complainant to prove that the accused had issued the cheque, in question, in discharge of legally enforceable debt and that unless the contra is proved, mere holding the cheque itself is sufficient to presume that the cheque was issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt. In the connection, it is pertinent to refer to the decision reported in M/s. Greaves
Limited v. Leo Electronics Organization Others3,wherein it was held that:
“Presumption provided under S.138 is a rebuttable presumption and that Under S.139 it is not for complainant to prove that Cheques have been issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt. Thus, order dismissing complaint holding that complainant has not proved case against respondent beyond reasonable doubt is improper.”
60.The accused did not deny his signature on Ex.P.1 cheque and the trial Court had given detailed reasons for arriving at conclusions and that the judgment of the trial Court is proper perspective which needs no interference by this Court. Accordingly, Points 1 to 3 are answered.
61.Point No.4:-
The findings and observations of the trial Court are in accordance with the evidence on record and well settled legal principles. There are no grounds to interfere with the findings of the trial Court. Therefore, this Court is not interfering with the findings of the trial Court. Accordingly, the Point
No.4 is answered.
62.Point No.5:-
In the result, the appeal is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the Special Judicial Magistrate of First 3 2007 Crl. L.J. (NOC) 642 (A.P.),
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 54/2013 53
Class (Excise), Vizianagaram in C.C.No.111/2010, dated 11.03.2013 against the appellant/accused, for the offence U/s.138 of N.I. Act. Forward the
Judgment to the trial Court with a direction to take steps for execution of the sentence. The trial Court is directed to take further steps for execution of the sentence against the accused, as per Law.
Typed to my dictation, by the Stenographer Grade-I, corrected
pronounced by me in open Court, this the 25 th day of June, 2019.
Sd/- E. BHIMA RAO,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram.
Appendix of Evidence
Witnesses Examined in this Appellate Court
For Appellant/Accused:-For Respondent/Complainant:-
R.W.2:- K. Ramakrishna, Postman- N O N E - (D.W.2)
Exhibits Marked
For Appellant/Accused:-For Respondent/Complainant:-
- N I L - - N I L -
Sd/- E. BHIMA RAO,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram
Copies to:
1. The Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Vizianagaram.
2. The Appellant/Accused.
IN THE COURT OF THE JUDGE, FAMILY COURT CUM III ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
JUDGE, VIZIANAGARAM
Present: Sri E.Bhima Rao,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram.
Tuesday, this the 25th day of June, 2019
Criminal Appeal No.56/2013
Special Judicial First Class Magistrate From which Court the appeal is:(Excise), Vizianagaram.
Number of the Case in thatC.C. No.121/2010 : Court
SanapalaSatyanarayana,S/o Suryanarayana, Hindu, Aged about 49 Name and description of the :years, R/o D.No.11-8-25/1, Plot No.21, appellant/accused Daspalla Hills, Visakhapatnam (A-1).
Sri V.S.N. Sastry, Advocate for the Appellant is defended by:Appellant.
(1) M/s. Jaisukh Vinimoy Pvt. Ltd., Represented by its Director Krishna Gopal Agarwal, Hindu, Aged about 38 years, Names and Descriptions of theResident of Vizianagaram. : Complainants/respondents (2) State represented by the Additional Public Prosecutor, Vizianagaram.
(1) Sri B. Satyanarayana and Sri B. Karthik, Advocates for the 1st respondent. (For 1st respondent) Complainant/Respondentare : defended by: (2)AdditionalPublicProsecutor, Vizianagaram. (For 2nd respondent)
The appellant-Accused is found guilty for Section of Law under which thethe offence punishable U/s.138 of NI Act appellant is convicted in the:and accordingly he was convicted lower CourtU/s.255(2), Cr.P.C. for the said offence.
Whether confirmed, reversed orCONFIRMED. The appeal is dismissed by modified, if modified what isconfirming the conviction and sentence : modifiedpassed by the trial Court.
Date of presentation:04.04.2013 Date of filing:04.04.2013
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 2
Bail bonds, if any,:--- Hearing:08.05.2019 Judgment:25.06.2019
The appeal coming on 08.05.2019 for final hearing before me in the present of Sri V.S.N. Sastry, Advocate for the appellant-accused, and of
Sri B.Satyanarayana and Sri B. Karthik, Advocates for the 1st respondent/Complainant, and of the Additional Public Prosecutor for the 2nd respondent/state, and having stood over for consideration to the date, the
Court delivered the following:
J U D G M E N T
The appeal is filed by the appellant-accused against the conviction and sentence passed in C.C.No.121/2010, dt.11.03.2013 whereby the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Vizianagaram, sentenced the accused, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of 18 (Eighteen) Months and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only), in default he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of Six
Months for the offence punishable U/s.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.
2.The appellant herein is the accused and the 1st respondent herein is the complainant in the complaint filed by the 1st respondent in the trial
Court. For the sake of convenience, the parties are, henceforth, referred to as per their array in the trial Court.
3.Originally the complainant filed the complaint against the four accused persons. But case against A-2 to A-4 was dismissed as per the docket orders dated 20.10.2009 of the trial Court. The case was proceeded against A-1 (Sri Sanapala Satyanarayana) only in the trial Court.
4.The complainant filed the complaint against the accused for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act with the following allegations : The complainant is the Company constituted under the provisions of the
Company Act, having its office at Plot No.13, VNR Building, N.C.S. Road,
Vizianagaram and the accused are the residents of Visakhapatnam and this complaint is initiated by one of its Directors as per the Resolution passed by
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 3 the aforesaid Company. All the accused approached the complainant and requested the complainant to purchase the property measuring to an extent of 82 Sq. Yards being undivided and unspecified share out of the total extent of 2069 Sq. yards together with Flat No.405 measuring 2520 Sq. Feet in Third floor and Two Car Parkings each measuring 100 Sq. Feet, in total 200 Sq. Feet in Stilt Floor of Madhava Towers situated at Kanakala Dibba Area, covered by
Block No.41 in T.S. No.1451 and part of Allipuram Ward within the limits of
Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation for which the complainant agreed and so some negotiations took place between the accused and the complainant and ultimately agreed to certain understandings and entered into an agreement for the same. Further, towards the said agreement cum understandings in between the the accused and the complainant, the complainant paid a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration on 17.05.2008 and also paid a further sum of Rs.8,00,000/- again towards the advance sale consideration on 18.05.2008 to the accused and the accused received and acknowledged both the said amounts. In consequent to the said agreement, the first accused, the third accused on behalf of the second accused as a G.P.A. Holder and the fourth accused jointly executed an agreement of sale on 19th day of May, 2007 agreeing to sell the aforesaid property to the complainant and another Sri Anand Kumar
Agarwal for a sum of Rs.61,83,000/- and agreeing to register the same within sixty days from the date of agreement of sale as well as acknowledging a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- which the complainant paid towards further sale consideration on the said date itself i.e., on 19.05.2008. So, in all, the accused received a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration as on the date of agreement of sale, which the accused acknowledged and later-on again on 11.10.2008 the complainant paid a further sum of Rs.5,00,000/- and also further sum of Rs.5,00,000/- on the said same day itself to the accused and the accused received the same and so in all the complainant paid and all the accused received a sum of
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 4
Rs.35,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration with respect to the aforesaid property which all the accused agreed to sell to the complainant.
From the said date of agreement itself, the complainant is always ready and willing to perform the complainant’s part of duty as per the aforesaid contract but all the accused tried to postpone the same for one reason or the other but for the reasons best known to the accused. Later on some untoward incidents took place with respect to the aforesaid building and so all the accused requested the complainant to cancel the aforesaid agreement, which all the accused executed in favour of the complainant.
(a).Therefore, as per the request of all the accused, all the accused and the complainant mutually agreed for cancellation of the aforesaid agreement of sale subject to the satisfaction of some terms, conditions and understandings included in the cancellation endorsement. As per the said terms and understandings, all the accused became liable to repay the entire advance sale consideration of Rs.35,00,000/- which the complainant paid to the accused and which the accused received and acknowledged on various dates and so towards the discharge of the said amount, which the accused are liable to repay the said advance sale consideration to the complainant, first accused on behalf of all the accused issued a cheque dated 05.05.2008 for a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- bearing No.090586 drawn on Bank of India,
Harbour Road Branch, Visakhapatnam in favour of the complainant towards the satisfaction of the aforesaid amount. Thereafter, the complainant presented the said cheque for collection at Vizianagaram through the complainant’s Banker i.e., Karur Vysya Bank, Vizianagaram but quite surprisingly the said cheque is returned unpaid stating “Funds Insufficient” in the said bank account. The complainant received the said cheque unpaid along with Banker’s memo dated 04.09.2008. The 1st accused on behalf of all the accused issued the said cheque with an undertaking that the accused will make necessary arrangements to honour the said cheque and also stated that there are sufficient funds in the said bank account, but the first
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 5 accused on behalf of all the accused issued the said cheque knowing fully well about the insufficiency of the funds in the said bank account and also knowing fully well about the consequences of the bounce of the cheque.
Therefore, all the accused are jointly and severally liable for the punishment under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Ac. With respect to the aforesaid agreement of sale and cancellation agreement which the first accused, the third accused on behalf of the second accused as a G.P.A.
Holder and the fourth accused executed in favour of the complainant, the complainant is reserving a right to take necessary separate legal action against all the accused under the due process of law and for the said separate action also, all the accused are jointly and severally liable for the same in every manner whatsoever. Thereafter, the complainant got issued a registered lawyer’s notice dated 11th day of September, 2008 to all the accused calling the accused to repay the said cheque amount to the complainant within fifteen days from the date of receipt of that notice which the accused failed to take the said notice and the said notices are returned on 27.09.2008 and on 30.09.2008 and so the complainant invoked the jurisdiction of the Court for the said cheque amount. Therefore, the complainant prays to punish the accused for the offence punishable U/s.138 r/w.142 of N.I. Act and also direct the accused to pay the said amount of
Rs.35,00,000/- along with the compensation amount to the complainant.
Hence, the complaint.
5.The learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class,
Vizianagaram took cognizance for the offence U/s.138 & 142 of N.I. Act against the accused and registered as C.C.No.814/2009 on the file of the
Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Vizianagaram and in view of the
orders of the District Court in P.R.No.225/2010-A, dated 05.10.2010, the matter was transferred to the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Vizianagaram and renumbered as C.C.No.121/2010, and after appearance of accused, copies of documents were furnished to him and at
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 6 that stage, and the accused was examined U/s.251, Cr.P.C., for the offence
U/s.138 and 142 of N.I. Act, explaining the accusation made against him, for which, he denied the offence and pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
6.During the course of trial, the complainant himself examined as
P.W.1 and and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.8. Ex.P.1 is cheque bearing No.090586, dt.05.05.2008; Ex.P.2 is Banker memo, dt.04.09.2008; Ex.P.3 is office copy of registered lawyer’s notice, dt.11.09.2008; Ex.P.4 is returned cover; Ex.P.5 is memorandum of Association; Ex.P.6 is resolution passed by the Company;
Ex.P.7 is agreement of sale, dt.19.05.2007; and Ex.P.8 is cancellation endorsement on the back side of the 1st page of Ex.P.7, respectively.
7.After closure of complainant’s evidence, the accused was examined U/s.313, Cr.P.C. by putting the incriminating material available in the evidence of complainant’s witness, for which, he denied the same. When the accused was asked to enter into defence, he stated that he has defence evidence on his behalf and he further stated that he has nothing to say anything about the case. On behalf of the accused, the accused (A-1) himself examined as D.W.1 and no documents marked on his behalf.
8.After considering the oral and documentary evidence, and after hearing both sides, the trial Court found the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him to suffer simple Imprisonment for a period of 18 (Eighteen) Months and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only), in default he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of Six
Months for the offence punishable U/s.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.
9.Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the accused preferred the present appeal contending, inter alia, with the following grounds:
The Calendar and Judgment of the trial Court is contrary to Law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. The trial Court ought to have acquitted the appellant/accused, as there is no evidence on record to convict the appellant/accused. The trial Court without considering the case
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 7 and failed to note that there is no legally enforceable debt in this case on hand and even the complainant failed to prove the same and hence the basic requirement U/s.138 of N.I. Act is found missing in this case, as per the terms of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale, the condition is that the complainant is only entitled to a Flat and there is no necessity for the appellant/accused to repay any amount to the complainant and hence, the burden heavily lies on the complainant to prove the legally enforceable debt and then only the burden shifts on the appellant/accused to rebut the presumption and hence the
Judgment of the trial Court is liable to be reversed. The learned Judge confused himself about the merits of the case as Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement on the back side of Ex.P.7 clearly indicates that the agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque so it is clear that if the cheque is not encashed, the agreement remains valid and there is no scope for filing the cheque bounce case as per the endorsement, but the learned
Judge without considering the same pronounced the verdict by convicting the
appellant purely on wrong notions by applying Sec.139 presumption to the case on hand which in fact is no way applicable to the case on hand and hence the conviction is liable to be reversed on this ground alone.
(a).The learned Judge failed to understand the intention of the parties while making Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement as their intention is only to provide security for Ex.P.7 transaction and specifically mentioned the clause such as ‘the agreement will be cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque’ which clearly indicates that there is no confirmation for the
honouring of the cheque and if the cheque is not honoured, there is no
criminal liability fastened on the accused and the complainant can safely proceed with Ex.P.7 agreement of sale, but the learned Judge without considering the same simply convicted the accused merely on presumptions and surmises and without going into the merits of the case and hence the
Judgment is liable to be reversed and the appellant/accused is entitled to an acquittal. The learned Judge failed to note that as there is no cancellation
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 8 clause or default clause in Ex.P.7 agreement of sale which only stipulates the condition that the accused has to deliver the flat to the complainant within a particular period and if delayed, shall pay some damages, but there is no necessity for the appellant/accused to refund the amount and hence there is no basis for the issuance of cheque by the appellant/accused and hence there is no legally enforceable debt in the case on hand and the Judgment of the trial Court is not based on facts and Law and is liable to be reversed.
(b).The learned Magistrate without applying his mind and without perusing the material on record and without analyzing the same, convicted the accused though absolutely there is no ground to convict the accused and hence the same is liable to be set-aside. The trial Court did not properly analyze the case Law submitted on behalf of the accused i.e., (1) 2007 (2)
SCC (Cri) 498; (2) AIIMR (Cri) 2009 1074; (3) 2003 (1) SCC 1; (4) 2004 (8)
SCC 774; (5) 2006 (3) SCC (Crl) 114, which are directly applicable to the case on hand and simply concluded those citations are not applicable to the case on hand, and convicted the accused purely on presumptions which is illegal and the said Judgment is liable to be set aside. The learned Magistrate failed to follow the cross-examination of P.W.1 wherein he clearly admitted that there is no legally enforceable debt and hence the conviction based on false grounds and the accused is entitled for an acquittal in the matter.
(c).The learned Judge without touching the arguments submitted by the counsel for the appellant/accused, convicted the appellant/accused purely on assumptions. The trial Court failed to note that the notice is not served on the appellant/accused and hence the burden is on the complainant to prove that the appellant/accused has intentionally avoided to receive the notice and in that process he has to examine the postal authorities but the complainant did not examine any witness to prove that the accused avoided to receive the notice and hence, the appellant/accused is entitled to be acquitted on this ground alone. The trial Court did not mention the contentions of the appellant/accused and by blind findings and with wrongful
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 9 views, convicted the appellant/accused which is not maintainable and hence the appellant/accused is entitled for acquittal. Therefore, the appellant/accused prays to allow the criminal appeal by setting aside the calendar and judgment in C.C.No.121/2010, dt.11.3.2013 by acquitting the appellant/accused.
10.During the stage of Appeal, the accused/appellant filed a petition
U/s.391 of Cr.P.C., vide Crl.M.P.No.296/2014 in Crl.A.No.56/2013 on the file of this Court praying to summon the postal authorities/postman concerned to give evidence regarding the service of the statutory notice on the addressee, as per the endorsement on the postal cover. In the said petition, the 1st respondent/complainant filed a counter resisting the maintainability of the petition. After hearing both sides, this Court allowed the said petition, on 25.2.2016.
11. In this Appeal, the complainant/1st respondent preferred a revision
before the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of
Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, praying to quash the orders passed by this Court in Crl. M.P.No.296/2014, in which the Hon’ble High Court
Stayed all the proceedings in this Appeal, vide Crl. R.C. No.1084/2016.
12. In view of the directions of the Hon’ble apex Court of India, vide
Judgment, dt.28.03.2018 in Crl. Appeal Nos.1375-1376 of 2013, which was communicated by the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., in the Circular of ROC
No.2573/OP Cell/2018, dt.18.04.2018, in which it was observed that, in all pending matters before the High Courts or other Courts relating to P.C. Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless, express order extending stay is produced. Since the speaking order was not filed before this Court as per the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the learned counsels for both parties reported to proceed with the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 10 matter and accordingly, this Court proceeded with the matter. During the pendency of this appeal, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant reported that the revision petition which was filed by him is withdrawn and filed a memo along with the net-copy of the withdrawal proceedings before this Court.
13On behalf of the accused/appellant, one K. Ramakrishna,
Postman of Daspalla Area, Visakhapatnam, is examined as R.W.2 and no documents marked on his side. It is pertinent to note that since the accused himself examined as D.W.1 in the trial Court, in this case the above witness is to be treated as D.W.2. But mistakenly the said witness i.e., Postman is examined as R.W.2, instead of D.W.2. Hence, wherever, R.W.2 is referred in this Judgment, it may be treated as D.W.2.
14.Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. Apart from oral arguments, the learned counsel for the Appellant/Accused filed written arguments and
additional written arguments; and on the other hand, apart from the oral
arguments, the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent/Complainant, filed written arguments and perused the same.
15.After perusal of the entire evidence on record, grounds of appeal and oral arguments submitted by the the learned counsels for the both parties, and upon considering the material available on record, now the points for determination before this Court are :
(1) Whether there is a legally enforceable existing
liability in between the complainant and
accused ?
(2) Whether the accused issued the cheque to
discharge part of the said liability ?
(3) Whether the complainant complied all the
requirements to constitute the offence U/s.138
of N.I. Act ?
(4) Whether there are grounds to interfere with the
findings of the trial Court ?
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 11 (5) To what relief ?
16. Point Nos.1 to 3:
The case of the complainant is that he is the Director of the complainant company in the above complaint. The accused approached them and requested to purchase the property measuring to an extent of 82
Sq. Yards being undivided and unspecified share out of the total extent of 2069 Sq. Yards together with Flat No.405 measuring 2520 Square Feet in
Third floor and Two Car Parkings each measuring 100 Square Feet in total 200 square feet in stilt floor of Madhava Towers situated at Kanakala Dibba
Area, covered by Block No.41, in T.S.No.1451 and part of Allipuram ward within the limits of Greager Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, for which the complainant agreed and so some negotiations took place between the accused and the complainant and ultimately he agreed to certain understandings and entered into an agreement for the same. Further, towards the said agreement cum understandings in between the accused and the complainant, the complainant paid a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration on 17.05.2008 and also paid a further sum of
Rs.8,00,000/- again towards the advance sale consideration on 18.5.2008 to the accused and the accused received and acknowledged both the said amounts. In consequent to the said agreement, the accused in his individual capacity and as a General Power of Attorney Holder of Sudhakar Birlangi together with Nagaja constructions jointly executed an agreement of sale on 19.05.2007 under Ex.P.7, agreeing to sell the aforesaid property to the complainant company for a sum of Rs.61,83,000/- and agreeing to register the same within sixty days from the date of agreement of sale as well as acknowledging a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- which they paid towards further sale consideration on the said date itself i.e., on 19.05.2007. So, in all the accused received a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration as on the date of agreement of sale, which the accused acknowledged and later-on again on 11.10.2007 they paid a further sum of
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 12
Rs.5,00,000/- and also further sum of Rs.5,00,000/- on the same day itself to the accused and the accused received the same and so in all they paid and the accused received a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration with respect to the aforesaid property which the accused agreed to sell to them. From the said date of agreement itself, they are always ready and willing to perform their part of duty as per the aforesaid contract, but all the accused tried to postpone the same for one reason or the other, but for the reasons best known to the accused. Later on some untowards incidents took place with respect to the aforesaid building and so all the accused requested them to cancel the aforesaid agreement, which all the accused executed in their favour. Therefore, as per the request of the accused, the accused and himself mutually agreed for cancellation of the aforesaid agreement of sale subject to the satisfaction of some terms, conditions and understandings included in the under Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement on the back side of Ex.P.7 agreement of the sale. As per the said terms and understandings the accused became liable to repay the entire advance sale consideration of Rs.35,00,000/- which they paid to the accused and which the accused received and acknowledged on various dates and so towards the discharge of the said amount, which the accused is liable to repay the said advance sale consideration to them, the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque dated 05.05.2008 for a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- bearing No.090586 drawn on Bank of India, Harbour Road Branch, Visakhapatnam in their favour towards the satisfaction of the said aforesaid amount. Thereafter, they presented the said cheque for collection at Vizianagaram through their banker, i.e., Karur Vysya Bank, Vizianagaram but quite surprisingly the said cheque was returned unpaid stating “Funds Insufficient” in the said Bank
Account. He received the said cheque unpaid along with Ex.P.2 Banker’s memo, dt.04.09.2008. The accused issued the said cheque with an undertaking that the accused will make necessary arrangements to honour the said cheque and also stated that there are sufficient funds in the said
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 13 bank account, but the accused issued the said cheque knowing fully well about the insufficiency of the funds in the said Bank Account and also knowing fully well about the consequences of the bounce of the cheque.
Therefore, the accused is liable for the punishment under the provisions of the N.I. Act. Thereafter, he got issued Ex.P.3 registered Lawyer’s notice, dt.11.09.2008 to the accused calling the accused to repay the said cheque amount to them within 15 days from the date of receipt of that notice which the accused failed to take the said notice and the said notice was returned on 27.09.2008 under Ex.P.4 returned cover. Therefore, the complainant prays to punish the accused according to Law.
17.The learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted written arguments and argued that issuance of Ex.P.1 cheque is only as a security to the Complainant and denied the issuance of cheque towards a legally enforceable debt in the circumstances prevailing by then, as the building had collapsed on 06.01.2008, unfortunately while laying the top floor slab by M/s.
L & T Company Limited and the construction work had been stagnated since then. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused further argued that the appellant/accused never received Ex.P.3 statutory notice and hence the main ingredient of Sec.138(c) of the N.I. Act has not been satisfied and hence no offence has been made out in this case and the complainant utterly failed to comply with the requirements of Sec.138 of N.I. Act and hence, no offence has been made out against the accused. He further argued that the appellant did not commit any offence as the Appellant/Accused commenced construction of the building with the funds advanced by the purchasers including the complainant. But the building had collapsed in the construction stage while laying the top floor slab by L & T Company Limited and hence, only due to the said act of God, the appellant could not complete the work but not otherwise. He further argued that as Ex.P.7 agreement to sell was entered into by the complainant and the appellant and other site owners wherein, neither a ‘cancellation clause’ nor a ‘default clause’ is mentioned
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 14 and hence there is no necessity to refund the amount as per the terms of the agreement, which is the basis for issuing Ex.P.1 cheque. Ex.P.1 cheque was issued only with a good intention towards collateral security by specifically making a mention of Ex.P.8 endorsement on Ex.P.7 agreement to sell and the same had been corroborated by the cross-examination of D.W.1, wherein
D.W.1 had clearly stated that “he never expected that the Complainant would deposit the cheque”. He further argued that in Ex.P.8 endorsement, it is clearly mentioned that “hence both parties agreed to cancel this agreement by mutual consent subject to realization of the cheque”. The narration of the above mentioned lines clearly indicate that if the cheque is encashed, the agreement will be cancelled. In other words, if the cheque is not encashed, the agreement will hold good. In such situation, the complainant can proceed against the appellant basing on the agreement only i.e., by filing a suit for specific performance of contract. In this matter the cheque is not encashed and hence the agreement is in force but peculiarly, the complainant has taken undue advantage of the cheque available with him and invoked the provisions of Sec.138 of N.I. Act and is prosecuting the appellant. He further argued that the complainant has filed a suit in O.S.No.365/2008 on the file of the II Addl., District Judge’s Court,
Visakhapatnam claiming back the amount of Rs.26,01,001/- plus interest along with Rs.20 Lakhs as compensation and costs and other reliefs. The complainant also filed a petition in I.A.No.1495/2008 in the above said suit and got attached the subject building property of the Appellant/Accused.
When everyone including the complainant is claiming back the amounts, it became impossible for the appellant/accused to complete the construction.
As the complainant got attached the property, no new purchasers have come forward to purchase the flats as they got feared about the attachment orders over the schedule property. In this way the complainant created the panicky situation by putting the appellant/accused into troubles and also prosecuting the appellant/accused by misusing the cheque issued by the appellant only
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 15 as a collateral security. He further argued that Sec.73 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872, stipulates the compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract and Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 says that the compensation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for, are not applicable to the case on hand as there is no breach of contract in this matter. It is not the case where the accused/appellant stopped the construction and in which case, it can be termed as breach of contract. But in the matter on hand by investing huge funds, the accused/appellant made a big construction and raised all six floors, but as the top floor has collapsed, which is an act of god, two persons had died and sentimentally, even the complainant is not co-operating for construction and accepting the flat and only seeking for refund of his money and hence, there is no breach on the part of the appellant/accused in the above matter. Hence, Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 has no app0licability in the said matter on hand. He further argued that the presumptions U/s.139 and 118 (a) of
N.I. Act are rebuttable and once the appellant/accused rebut the presumption by discharging by preponderance of probabilities, the burden will be shifted on the complainant. The appellant/accused rebutted the presumption
U/s.139 of N.I. Act by examining himself as witness i.e., D.W.1 stating that the cheque was issued towards collateral security and then the burden shifted on the complainant. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant/accused prays to set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, (Excise), Vizianagaram in C.C.No.121/2010, dt.11.3.2013 for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act by allowing the appeal and acquit the accused for the said offence.
18.The learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted
additional written arguments and argued that the agreement is completely
silent about the aspect of refund of money and hence there is no necessity
for the appellant/accused to refund the amount as per the said agreement, if
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 16 there is any such clause to refund the money and if the appellant/accused issued the cheque basing on such clause, then only, it can be termed as there is legally enforceable debt as there is a provision in the agreement to refund the amount but since there is no such provision in the agreement to refund the amount to the respondent/complainant, it could not be termed as there is no legally enforceable debt and it can be safely presumed that the accused need not refund the amount. He further argued that it is clearly mentioned in the agreement through Ex.P.8 endorsement that the “Agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque” as the cheque is not encashed, the agreement got valid and restored and is not cancelled. Hence, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for specific performance of contract, directing the appellant/accused to deliver a flat as
Ex.P.7 agreement stipulates the condition of only delivering the flat after its construction. Peculiarly the respondent/complainant has not filed the suit, can alternatively claim the refund of the money if the appellant/accused fails to deliver the flat. In the ghastly incident of collapse of building, two persons were died, sentimentally no person is coming forward to proceed with the construction including the present complainant. Hence, the appellant/accused could not proceed with the construction till date. However, though there is no necessity for refund of the money as per the terms of
Ex.P.7, only as a matter of courtesy, he tried to issue a cheque only with a condition that if it is honoured, the agreement is cancelled and the words otherwise means that if the cheque is not honoured, the agreement is continued. So, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for delivering of the flat as per the terms and conditions of the agreement, but he filed a suit only for refund of money and even if the said suit is decreed, it cannot be terms as an enforceable debt as the accused is not issued the cheque as per the terms of Ex.P.7. He issued only on humanitarian grounds but not as per the terms of Ex.P.7. Hence, the issuance of cheque is not in accordance with the provisions of Sec.138 of N.I. Act, as there is no legally enforceable debt.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 17
In fact, there is no such legally enforceable debt, but the agreement conditions are otherwise and the cheque is not issued in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, as there is no refund clause. He further argued that the provisions of Sections 73 & 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 are not applicable to the case on hand as there is no breach of contract. He further argued that with respect to the dispute in the service of legal notice is concerned, the counsel for the appellant/accused clearly cross-examined the respondent/complainant and wherein he specifically raised the plea of non-receipt of the notice by the accused and hence, the arguments advanced by the respondent/complainant that there is no cross-examination in the trial Court in respect of the issuance of legal notice. When the service of notice is denied and when the doors are locked, it is for the complainant to prove the issuance of notice and if fails to prove the presumption shall in favour of the accused and the trial Court ought to have acquitted the accused as there is no proper service of notice on the part of the complainant. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant/accused prays to set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the
Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, (Excise), Vizianagaram in
C.C.No.121/2010, dt.11.3.2013 for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act by allowing the appeal and acquit the accused for the said offence.
19.Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ complainant submitted written arguments and argued that the appellant admitted the execution of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale and also admitted the receipt of the advance sale consideration of Rs.35,00,000/- from the respondent. The appellant further admitted the fact that some untoward incident took place with respect to the entire property including the property covered under Ex.P.7 and also admitted the said entire property including the property under Ex.P.7 is in the same state of condition as of on the date of untoward incident and also admitted that the appellant and others did not take any steps to reconstruct the entire building as previously agreed from
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 18 all the last five to eight years. The appellant further agreed that for cancellation of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale and accordingly appellant issued executed Ex.P.1 cheque to the respondent and accordingly the appellant executed cancellation endorsement Ex.P.8 on the back side of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale. The appellant admitted the issue of Ex.P.1 cheque by the appellant to the respondent, towards discharge of the aforesaid debt payable to the respondent by the appellant. The appellant admitted that in order to appellant’s liability, the appellant issued Ex.P.1 cheque towards his liability delivering the property. The appellant admitted his signature on Ex.P.1 cheque and also admitted the issue of the same to the respondent mentioning the same in Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement. The appellant admitted the bounce of cheque as per Ex.P.2 bankers memo. The appellant further admitted that he did not pay any amount either after the notice got issued to the appellant by the respondent i.e., original of Ex.P.3 or after the receipt of summons from the Court till now. He further argued that the word
Security means safeguard for any transaction or for any amount that may arise in future in relating to the business and like nature. He further argued that in the present case, absolutely there is no question of amount derivation or transaction in future in any manner whatsoever. In fact, even as per the case of the appellant, the amount that the appellant is liable to pay to the respondent is derived on the date of Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement and accordingly Ex.P.1 cheque is issued towards part satisfaction of the same.
There is no question of future transactions in the above case in any manner whatsoever and so for the same, the question of security also does not arise, which itself cuts the entire case of the appellant in all the ways. Further, except the present transaction on hand, there are no any other transactions in between the appellant and the respondent and so also, the question of security does not arise under any circumstances in any manner whatsoever.
There is no mention in Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement, which execution is admitted by the Appellant that the cheque is issued for the purpose of
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 19 security and not for the discharge of the debt amount payable to the respondent in any manner whatsoever. The word ‘security’ is not at all included in Ex.P.7 in any manner whatsoever. The appellant also admitted that “the appellant did not address any letter to the respondent stating that appellant issued Ex.P.1 cheque for security purpose and not to present the same for collection”. The appellant did not plead anywhere till now that
Ex.P.1 cheque is issued towards security only and not otherwise in any manner whatsoever including in the civil suit got filed by the respondent against the appellant and others. He further argued that the address mentioned in Ex.P.3 lawyer;’s notice, Ex.P.4 cover returned belongs to the appellant only and the appellant in the cross-examination also admitted the same clearly specifically stating that “the address noted on the postal covers is that of his address”. The address on Exs.P.3 and P.4 are one and the same and the same is included in the complaint got filed by the respondent. For the same address, the appellant received summons from the Court. As such, absolutely there is no any wrong mention of the address of the appellant in any manner whatsoever and the respondent with clean hands has got served the registered cover with acknowledgement due to the correct address of the appellant only. As per the endorsement on Ex.P.4, it could be observed that clearly the intimation is given to the appellant by the postal authorities, but the appellant for the reasons best known to him failed to receive the cover and failed to take necessary steps with this regard and as such, unclean hands of the appellant is clearly visible and the said allegations alleged by the appellant should be struck off in all the ways. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant prays to dismiss the appeal by conforming the calendar and Judgment passed by the trial Court.
20.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant also filed
additional written arguments and argued that Ex.P.1 was issued by the
accused towards legally enforceable debt. Originally, the contract in between the appellant and the respondent is on basis of Ex.P.7 Agreement of
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 20 sale. So, the aggrieved party under the said contract of agreement of sale can opt for any relief under the specific performance. Admittedly the said building in question is in the same state of condition from the date it is collapsed at about seven years back till now and no steps are taken for construction or removal of the structures. The appellant himself admitted that the specific performance of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale is not at all possible. So, the only option available for the respondent is the other mode of specific performance i.e., refund of the advance sale consideration. As per
Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement, if the cheque is enchased the Ex.P.7 agreement of sale is cancelled and if not agreement holds good. In this case, the cheque in question is not encashed, so the agreement under Ex.P.7 is not cancelled and the same is in force. As the agreement of sale is in force, the aggrieved party can seek for relief of specific performance for registration of the property, or can seek relief of refund of advance sale consideration.
Since the building was totally collapsed, the relief of registration of property is not possible due to untowards incident, therefore, the only option available to the respondent is for refund of advance sale consideration for which the present cheque in question under Ex.P.1 is issued by the appellant.
Therefore, absolutely Ex.P.1 cheque was issued towards the discharge of refund of advance sale consideration, which is another mode of specific performance and the same is also legally enforceable. Therefore, the provisions of the N.I. Act apply to the present case on hand. Under the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, the respondent is entitled for refund of advance sale consideration amount, which is a legally enforceable debt. If the appellant really did not have any criminal intention to evade the amount payable to the respondent, what prevented the appellant to pay the amount payable to the respondent immediately after receipt of the summons from the trial Court, during the trial before the trial
Court, after conviction held by the trial Court and even during the time of hearing before this Court. Even now the appellant failed to pay the amount
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 21 to the respondent, that itself is sufficient to show that the appellant is with criminal intention under the provisions of the N.I. Act and therefore, the appellant is liable for conviction. In respect of Ex.P.1 cheque amount, the respondent filed a civil suit against the appellant in Visakhapatnam Court for recovery of said legally enforceable debt and in the said suit, it was ordered for refund of amount payable to the respondent. Therefore, the respondent prays to dismiss the above appeal by confirming the calendar and Judgment passed by the trial Court.
21.in order to prove or support the contents in the complaint and to substantiate the averments therein, the complainant herein adduced his evidence during the course of trial and he himself was examined as P.W.1 in the above case. P.W.1 filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of his chief- examination by reiterating the averments of all the complaint filed by him and all the supportive documents are marked as Exs.P.1 to P.8. During the course of cross-examination of P.W.1, it was elicited that all the persons namely Sanapala Satyanarayana accused is in this case, Sudhakar Birlangi and Kola Balasubrahmanyam, who is the minor partner Nagaj a constructions executed agreement of sale in favour of the company, the accused signed on the agreement of sale on behalf of Sudhakar Birlangi in the capacity of G.P.A.
Holder. Mr. Kola Bala Subrahmanyam on behalf of Nagaja Constructions as a
Managing partner signed on the agreement of sale i.e., Ex.P.7 in his presence. He admitted that in Ex.P.7 there is no clause mentioned for refund of amount by the accused and others. He admitted that after they paid the amount of advance of the construction was commenced by the accused and his partners. He is aware of the top floor of the building was collapsed and on which 4th floor slab and 5th floor slab were collapsed. After the said incident, he went there and condoled the accused and his partners, subsequently they demanded for refund of the amount. The accused and his partners approached him and requested him to take refund of the amount as they are not going to construct the building. He admitted that Ex.P.8
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 22 endorsement on Ex.P.7 it is mentioned that “both parties agreed to cancel this agreement by mutual consent subject to realization of the amounts. He admitted that he has filed a suit against the accused and his partners vide
O.S.No.369/2008 on the file of the IV Addl., District Judge’s Court,
Visakhapatnam, claiming back the advance of Rs.35,00,000/- along with interest from the date of advance till the date of realization. He admitted that in Ex.P.7 agreement no clause was mentioned entitling them to claim interest on the document. He volunteers that as per the financial transactions prevailing in the market as he entitled to claim interest. He has filed a criminal case basing on the bouncing of Ex.P.1 and later he also filed civil suit and obtained attachment orders before the Judgment against the property. He has filed a criminal case basing on the bouncing of Ex.P.1 and later he also filed civil suit and obtained attachment orders before the
Judgment against the property. He denied the suggestion that in the event of bouncing of cheque, he can file a suit to enforce the terms of agreement of sale, but he cannot file a criminal case under Sec.138of N.I. Act. He denied the suggestion that since there is a clause mentioned in Ex.P.8 on
Ex.P.7 that the agreement is cancelled subject to the realization cheque, he cannot file a criminal case under Sec.138 of N.I. Act against the accused. He denied the suggestion that the case U/s.138 of N.I. Act is not maintainable and he is liable to be prosecuted for malices of prosecution for foisting criminal case against the accused. He denied the suggestion that the notices were not received by the accused and hence the case U/s.138 of N.I.
Act is not maintainable. He denied the suggestion that the cheque is issued by the accused in blank as a secured amount and that he foisted the false case. He volunteers that the handwriting of the cheque is that of the accused. He denied the suggestion that the cheque is not hand writing of the accused. He denied the suggestion that he is deposing false.
22.In support of the case of the defence, the accused himself examined as D.W.1. D.W.1 deposed that he is resident of Visakhapatnam
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 23 and he is doing business and he is a Contractor. Himself, one B.Sudhakar and M/s. Nagaja Constructions represented by its Managing Partner by name
Kola Balasubrahmanyam to an extent of 2069 square feet, out of which he owns and possess 669 square feet and B.Sudhakar owns 1100 square feet and Nagaja Constructions 300 owns square feet, respectively. He knows the complainant, they proposed to raise constructions to multi store department in the name and style of Madhava constructions. The complainant approached him to purchase Flat No.405 3rd floor, commercial space of 2520 square feet along withtwo car parkings for a sum of Rs.61,83,000/- as an advance of Rs.35,00,000/- was paid towards advance in different spells, they executed Ex.P.7 in favour of the complainant, there is no clause mentioned in
Ex.P.7 for cancellation agreement or any default clause, subsequently they have commercial constructions of the multi storeyed constructions.
Unfortunately at the time of laying in the 5th floor slabbed on 06.1.2008 the slab was collapsed and due to which two slabs were already collapsed. He has invested total amount in the construction. The said slab was collapsed due to the fault of L & T Limited to lay the slab, on contract basis. He also filed suit for damages against the said L & T Limited, then the complainant approached him to complete work but the same will not be done due to the circumstances prevailing and the complainant asked a cheque for security purpose. He has given Ex.P.1 for security purpose. As per their understandings, if the cheque is encashing the agreement was cancelled and in event of the cheque is not cancelled, the agreement is hold good. We have mentioned the said understandings vide Ex.P.8 on Ex.P.7. He further deposed that he has issued the cheque only for the purpose of security but not towards repayment. He has not received any notice in this case. The complainant also filed a suit vide O.S.No.369/2008 on the file of the Hon’ble
IV Addl., District Judge’s Court, Visakhapatnam and obtained attachment orders of the site and remaining constructions. He has not committed any criminal breach of trust or any original liability. He further stated that as the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 24 complainant and some others filed suits and obtained attachments of the property before the Judgment, he could not raise funds, and hence he could not take steps for making further constructions.
23.During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, it was elicited that all three persons executed agreement of sale on 19.5.2007 in favour of the complainant under Ex.P.7. They all the three persons received
Rs.35,00,000/- from the complainant from time to time in pursuance of Ex.P.7 agreement. He is the Managing Partner of M/s. Suryanarayana & Co., they are the builders of the said company, for the purpose of construction of the said building L & T Cement agreed to supply the concrete. On 06.01.2008 the entire upper three slabs are collapsed, the building is in the same collapsed condition till now. So far they did not make any further steps to re- construction of the building so till now the same is in collapsed condition.
They filed a suit against L & T Cement for recovery of Rs.60,00,000/- and odd for recovery of damages. The name of the said company L & T Limited, he did not file the copy of the plaint in this case. The total cost of the construction of the entire building is about Rs.5,50,000/-. They agreed to cancellation of agreement subject to realization of cheque issued by him.
The signatures shown on Ex.P.7 are relating to himself and he signed as a
G.P.A. Holder of B.Sudhakar and 3rd signature relating to endorsement on behalf of himself and on behalf of B. Sudhakar G.P.A. Holder. Both the signatures on Ex.P.1 are relating to him. In order to his liability, he issued
Ex.P.1 cheque towards his liability. He issued Ex.P.1 cheque towards his liability delivering the property. He admitted that he entire Ex.P.8 endorsement absolutely there is no mention stating that the cheque is issued as a security. He admitted that the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of
Rs.35,00,000/- and interest from the date of cancellation of agreement and for damages of Rs.20,00,000/-. He is contesting the said suit and the same is pending at Visakhapatnam Court. He admitted that the address mentioned on the postal covers is that of his address. He did not address
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 25 any letter to his Banker stating that if at all the complainant presents the cheque in question, don’t honour the same as he issued as a security purpose. He did not address any letter to the complainant that he issued the cheque for security purpose and not present the same for collection. He denied the suggestion that in order to discharge that his liability that is the debt amount of Rs.35,00,000/- payable to the complainant, he issued Ex.P.1 cheque and now in order to evade his liability, he is speaking false. He denied the suggestion that he issued Ex.P.1 cheque in order to discharge the legally enforceable debt amount of liability. He denied the suggestion that the cheque was not issued for security purpose. They agreed to construct the entire building and agreed to deliver the respective portions to the complainant within 18 months from the date of agreement. He admitted that as on today it is not possible to execute register sale deed in favour of the complainant in terms of EX.P.7 agreement.
24.In this Appeal, the accused/appellant filed a petition U/s.391 of
Cr.P.C., vide Crl.M.P.No.296/2014 in Crl.A.No.56/2013 before this Court praying to summon the postal authorities/postman concerned to give evidence regarding the service of the statutory notice on the addressee, as per the endorsement on the postal cover. After enquiry and after hearing both sides, this Court allowed the said petition, on 25.2.2016. The Postman is examined as R.W.2. R.W.2 deposed that he is resident of visakhapatnam and he is working as Postman at Andhra University, Visakhapatnam since 15 years. He received summons from the Court to give evidence. He used to serve letter within the area of Dasapalla, Visakhapatnam. He took Ex.P.4 postal cover to serve on the appellant/accused on 17.8.2008. Since the door of the appellant/accused was locked, he endorsed the same and he endorsed thereon addressee on camp deposit six days and after seven days, he has made an endorsement that addressee long camp, hence returned to sender.
25.During the course of cross-examination of R.W.2, he admitted that so far as delivery of registered covers and articles, a separate delivery
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 26 sheet will be maintained and obtained signature of the person to whom he delivered the cover and in the event of failure of delivery of the cover for any reason, the reasons will be mentioned on the said sheet. He did not bring the said sheet and it was in the custody of their office. At first, he has written the served letters on sheet and thereafter, he had written the same on the cover at post office. The address of the appellant/accused on Ex.P.4 is true and correct. He came to know that the appellant/accused is on camp on the day he went to serve Ex.P.4 postal cover from the neighbour of the appellant/accused orally. He enquired the neighbour of the appellant/accused and got information to endorse the same on Ex.P.4 postal cover. He has face acquaintance with the appellant.
26.The main contention of the appellant/accused is that the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque to the complainant as a collateral security, but not for legally enforceable debt and in the agreement through Ex.P.8 endorsement it is clearly mentioned that the “Agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque” as the cheque is not encashed, the agreement got valid and restored and is not cancelled. Hence, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for specific performance of contract, directing the appellant/accused to deliver a flat as Ex.P.7 agreement stipulates the condition of only delivering the flat after its construction. In the ghastly incident of collapse of building, two persons were died, sentimentally no person is coming forward to proceed with the construction including the present complainant. Hence, the appellant is entitled for acquittal. It is pertinent to note that Ex.P.1 cheque was issued by the accused to the complainant towards discharge of amount under Ex.P.7 agreement entered in between the complainant and accused and hence, it comes under legally enforceable debt and also comes under other liability.
When once the cheque is issued by the accused, it is the bounden duty of the accused to keep sufficient funds to facilitate for encashment of Ex.P.1 cheque.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 27
27.P.W.1 was cross-examined by the learned counsel for the accused at length but nothing was elicited in support of the defence and nothing could be proved against the case and contents of the complainant, thus the accused has utterly failed to prove his defence in proper perspective. The contention of defence raised by the accused herein has no legs to stand and there is no iota of truth and not tenable and the unsustainable defence is raised only with an intention to escape from his liability thereby to cause and suffer financial loss and mental agony to the complainant herein. P.W.1 has adduced sufficient oral and documentary evidence on record in support of his case which is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the accused failed to prove his contention and was not able to adduce even any rebuttal evidence in the case on hand in support of his evidence as there was no proper defence and further failed to prove his burden. The contention of the accused is, it is clearly mentioned in the agreement through Ex.P.8 endorsement that the “Agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque” as the cheque is not encashed, the agreement got valid and restored and is not cancelled. Hence, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for specific performance of contract, directing the appellant/accused to deliver a flat as Ex.P.7 agreement stipulates the condition of only delivering the flat after its construction. The said contention and defence raised by the accused has no legs to stand and it is not helpful and useful to the accused herein as he failed to prove such contention/defence. The address of the accused mentioned in the notice and the address mentioned in the summon/notice issued by this Court are one and the same and as such it is very clear that there is no dispute regarding to the address of the accused.
R.W.2, who is the postman categorically stated that he took Ex.P.4 postal cover to serve on the appellant/accused on 17.8.2008 and since the door of the appellant/accused was locked, he endorsed the same and he endorsed thereon addressee on camp deposit six days and after seven days he has made an endorsement that addressee long camp, hence returned to sender.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 28
During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, who is the accused herein, he categorically admitted that the address noted on the postal covers is that of his address. Hence, when once the complainant sent the statutory notice under Ex.P.3 to the correct address, the burden shifts on the accused to show that he is not residing in the said address. The accused never denied the execution of Exs.P.1, P.7 and P.8. D.W.1 admitted in his cross-examination that the signatures shown on Ex.P.7 are relating to himself and he signed as
G.P.A. Holder of B.Sudhakar and 3rd signature relating to managing partner of
Nagaja Constructions. He also admitted that he signed on Ex.P.8 endorsement on behalf of himself and on behalf of B.Sudhakar G.P.A. Holder and both the signatures on Ex.P.1 are relating to him, which proves the case of the complainant herein. The accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque in connection with transaction under Ex.P.7 agreement, knowing fully that the accused closed the said Account with a dishonest intention. Since Ex.P.1 cheque is issued by the accused to the complainant as per the terms of Ex.P.7 agreement, it is legally enforceable debt. The findings and observations of the trial Court are in correct lines and the trial Court rightly convicted the accused for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
28.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, reported in II (2010) B.C. 693, (three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court) held that:
“Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act does indeed include the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability and it is rebuttal presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is initial presumption which favours the complainant.
Sec.139 of N.I. Act is example for reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative object of improving the credibility of negotiable instrument.”
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 29
29.When the accused is not disputing his signature on Ex.P.1 cheque, as per the decision of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, reported in II (2010) B.C. 693, Sec.139 of N.I. Act does indeed include the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability and it is rebuttal presumption and it is open to accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested.
30.As per the decision of our Hon’ble Supreme Court, rendered in
R.Rajendran vs. A.J. Yuvaraj Reddy and another, reported in 2012 (2)
ALD (Crl.) 682 and Anil Dagwale, vs. K.Raju and Another reported in 2003 (1) ALD (Crl.) 276, once accused admitted his signatures on cheque, even though blank cheques were issued, burden lies on accused why he issued said cheques to complainant. In such cases, examination of complainant alone is sufficient and there is no need for any corroboration evidence from the side of complainant to prove the legally enforceable debt.
31.After considering the above case Law, it is clear that once the accused admitted his signature on cheque or proved by complainant that the signature on cheque in question is the signature of the accused, the presumption U/s.139 of N.I. Act is in favour of the complainant and that the said cheque was issued to discharge legally enforceable debt or obligation and the burden shifts on accused to prove that the said cheque was not issued to discharge the legally enforceable debt or obligation. Ex.P.3 is office copy of Lawyer’s notice dated 11.09.2008 got issued by the complainant to the accused, demanding him to pay the cheque amount. But the same was returned to the Complainant as “Addressee Long Camp”. Therefore, the accused has committed the offence under Sec.138 of N.I. Act. It is the case of the complainant that the accused being fully aware of the issuance of cheque in order to clear the debt, evaded to honour the same, which attracts an offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act. Hence, the accused is liable for punishable U/s.138 of N.I.Act.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 30
32. Mere raising bald allegations against without any proof cannot be believable. During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, he stated that immediately after receipt of summons from this Court in this case at the 1st appearance or even subsequently he did not file any memo or petition
before this Court stating that the cheque issued for security purpose and not
for discharge of debt amount payable to the complainant. If really the accused did not issue Ex.P.1 cheque to the complainant for collateral security, what prevented to the accused to file a petition before this Court in support of his said contention, but he kept quiet. Mere non-issuance of reply itself is not absolute proof of case of the complainant, but it is one of the circumstances probablize the correctness of the case of the complainant.
After considering the oral evidence of P.W.1 and inaction on the part of the accused, this Court is of considered opinion that the complainant proved that the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque to the complainant in discharge of legally enforceable debt and liability in terms of agreement under Ex.P.7 and the said cheque was bounced due to “Funds Insufficient”.
33.In an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, once the complainant has proved the drawing of the cheque, presentation of the cheque into the Bank, return of the cheque unpaid by the drawee Bank, giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding the payment of the cheque amount and failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of receipt of the notice, the statutory presumptions under Sec.118 and 139 of N.I. Act will arise in favour of the complainant. Under Sec.118(a) of the N.I. Act, the Court shall presume that the negotiable instrument has been drawn for consideration. Under Sec.139 of the N.I. Act, the Court shall presume that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. The meaning and expression ‘shall presume’ has been explained in Section 4 of Indian
Evidence Act. Wherever it is provided by any Act that the Court ‘shall presume’ a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 31 disproved. Thus, the presumptions under Section 118 and 139 of N.I. Act are rebuttable presumptions. The burden of proof to rebut the said presumptions is upon the accused.
34.The learned counsel for the complainant contended that the accused issued cheque in favour of the complainant to discharge the liability under Ex.P.7. He submitted that the object of Sec.138 of N.I. Act is to enhance the credibility or acceptability of cheques, it is immaterial that the cheque was issued for discharge of his own debt or liability. Therefore, P.W.1 has established the essential ingredients of the offence U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
35.With regard to receiving of statutory notice, the learned counsel
for the appellant/accused contends that the statutory notice has not been
served on the accused, and the complainant managed postal authorities to get it returned, as such the complaint is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. Whereas, the learned counsel for the complainant argued that
Ex.P.3 lawyer’s notice was sent by registered post acknowledgement due to the correct address of the accused, but the accused failed to take the said notice and the said notice was returned on 27.09.2008 with an endorsement “Addressee Long camp”. R.W.2, who is the Postman, stated in his evidence that he took Ex.P.4 postal cover to serve on the appellant/accused on 17.08.2008 and since the door of the appellant/accused was locked, he endorsed the same and he endorsed thereon, address on camp, hence returned to sender, deposit six days and after seven days he made endorsement that addressee long camp hence returned to sender. The accused intentionally avoided the service of summons, though the the complainant sent Ex.P.3 legal notice to the correct address of the accused.
Hence, by drawing presumption of service U/s.27 of General Clauses Act, the notice is deemed to have been served on the accused. For detailed appreciation, it is necessary to reproduce Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 32 “Sec.27:- Meaning of service by post:- Where any
Central Act or regulation made after commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘serve’ or either of expressions ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing preparing and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”.
36. The principle incorporation in Sec.27 of General Clauses Act is that, once the notice has been dispatched by registered post by the sender, then it shall be deemed to have been served on the addressee unless the addressee proves that it was not really served and that he was not responsible for non-service. In this connection, this court relied upon a decision reported in Vanama Srinivasa Rao Vs. State of A.P. (L.C.2012 (14) A.P., 128). In the above cited case, the Hon’ble High Court reiterated the settled position of law that once a notice has been sent by registered post to the correct address, then it must be presumed that the service has been effected.
37.In respect of service of statutory notice on the accused, this
Court relied on the following citation :
N. Parameswaran Unni Vs. g. Kannan and others, reported in 2017 (2) ALT (Crl) 366 (SC), wherein it was held at Para-15 of the
Judgment, as follows :
“Sec.138 of N.I. Act – Proof of Service of Notice – Sec.28 of General
Clauses Act – Sec.114 of Evidence Act. When a notice is sent by registered Post and is returned with postal endorsement of Refused –
Not Available in the House – House Locked – Shop closed – Addressee
Not in Station – due service has to be presumed. Once a notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing to the drawer of the cheque, the service of notice is deemed to have been effected”.
During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, who is the accused herein, he categorically admitted that the address noted on the postal cover
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 33 is that of his address. When the accused himself admitted that he is residing in the same address as mentioned in Ex.P.4 unserved postal address, when once a notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing to the drawer of the cheque, who is the accused herein, the service of notice is deemed to have been effected. Hence, the above citation is aptly applicable to the present case on hand.
38.Thus, it is clear that P.W.1 has sent the legal notice to the house of the accused. The conditions pertaining to the notice to be given to the drawer have been incorporated in clauses (b) and (c) or the proviso to
Section 138 of the Act which reads as follows :
“(b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, and the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice”.
39. In the present case, admittedly the address mentioned on
Exs.P.4 returned postal cover and the address mentioned on Ex.P.3 lawyer’s notice, as well as the complaint are one and the same. As seen from the record, the Court summons sent by registered post to the same address have been served on the accused. Therefore, this is a clear case, where the accused has successfully avoided the receipt of statutory notice dispatched to his correct address. This kind of behaviour by trickster drawer of the cheque cannot be encouraged by the Courts. Therefore, this Court holds that the accused has failed to rebut the presumption under Section 27 of
General Clauses Act with respect to service to statutory notice to him and hence, the notice is deemed to have been served on the accused.
40.In respect of the service of Ex.P.3 legal notice is concerned, the learned counsel for the accused relied on the following citations :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 34 (1) V. Raja Kumari Vs. P. subbarama Naidu & Another, reported in 2004 (8) SCC 774, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that :
“Meaning of service by post – Where any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘service’ or either of the expression ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, preparing and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”.
(2)Pradeep Madhukar Poinguinkar Vs. Shri Manguesh
Kuttalkar Another, in Criminal Appeal No.57/2005, of the Hon’ble
Bombay High Court, wherein his Lordship held that :
“The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the warrant was executed on the said address at Rumdamol, Davorlim, Salcete in spite of the fact that the person who had gone to execute the warrant and had made the said endorsement was not examined and the said endorsement was otherwise not clear as to the place from which the accused was arrested. It is quite probable that the accused was arrested from a place other than the address mentioned herein above. The learned trial Court also observed that the accused had managed to return the registered A.D. by the Postal
Authorities and this the learned trial Court did without any evidence being led in that regard. On the other hand, the learned first
Appellate Court observed that the presumption available under section 27 of the General Clauses Act was a rebuttable presumption.
The learned first appellate Court noted that the postal article was not returned in the case at hand, by the Postal Authorities with the remark refused or unclaimed or addresses absent at the given address but that it was returned with the remark insufficient address, return to sender. The learned first Appellate Court noted that on the face of the said remark it only meant that the postman did not get a chance to see whether the addressee was there or not to find out whether he was refusing or accepting the service. The learned first
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 35
Appellate Court also observed that the learned trial Court had made a serious allegation against the postmaster (sic postman) and that the complainant in the complaint nor in his evidence had stated that the accused had managed to return the cheques (sic postal article) by managing the Postal Authorities and therefore there was no presumption of any such management with the Postal Authority. The learned first Appellate Court referred to section 114 of the Evidence
Act, and in my view rightly, to draw a presumption that official acts have been regularly performed. A postman is a Public Officer. The postman had returned the postal article with the endorsement insufficient address, return to sender. The said endorsement showed that the postman had not even made an attempt to serve the address/accused with the said postal article and on the contrary the accused had himself stepped into the witness box and categorically stated that he had not received the said article. In the light of the absence of necessary averments, the said endorsement and the categorical evidence given by the accused, it should not be said that the complainant had duly served the statutory notice upon the accused. Reliance placed on the cases of (v.Satyanarayana v. A.P.
Travel and Tourism Development ltd. And another) 1, 1997 (Crimes 349 and (V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu and another) 2, 2005 (1) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) (S.C.) 730 : A.I.R.2005 S.C. 109 is of no assistance to the case of the Complainant. The view held by the learned first
Appellate Court is a correct view of the matter in the facts and circumstances of the case. There was no question of presumption of service being drawn when the postman had himself returned the postal article for insufficient address. No interference is called for in this appeal. Hence, the same is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed”.
(3) Ramesh Chand Vs Ravinder Singh Chandel, reported in 2007
CriL.J. 1313, wherein it was held that :
“It may be that the address is correct and even the addressee is available but a wrong endorsement is manipulated by the addressee. In such a case, if the facts are proved, it may amount to refusal of the notice. If the complainant is able to prove that the drawer of the cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got a false endorsement made only to defeat the process of law, the Court shall presume service of notice. Thus, however, is a matter of evidence and proof. Thus even in a case
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 36 where the notice is returned with the endorsement that the premises has always been found locked or the addressee was not available at the time of postal delivery, it will be open to the complainant to prove at the trial by evidence that the endorsement is not correct and that the addressee, namely, the drawer of the cheque, with knowledge of the notice had deliberately avoided to receive notice”.
(4) D. Vinod Shivappa, Vs. Nanda Belliappa, reported in 2006 (4)
Supreme 540 wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that :
“(i) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138(b) – dishonour of Cheque – Demand notice to appellant-accused was returned with endorsement “addressee always absent during delivery time. Hence returned to sender” - In other cases notices were returned with endorsement “party not in station. Arrival not known” - Petition in question proceedings and complaint – High
Court dismissed petition – Appeal – Complainant stated that notice may be deemed to have been served – Whether appellant in the circumstances could pray for quashing of proceedings ? No –
Question where posted endorsement showed that notice could not be served on account of non-availability of addressee, whether cause of action could arise for prosecution on basis of deemed service – Question could be answered by reference to facts of each case and no rule of universal application could be laid down – In interpreting a statute court must adopt that construction which suppressed mischief and advanced the remedy – Proviso to Section 138(b) was meant to protect honest drawers – If complainant was able to prove that drawer of cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got false endorsement made only to defeat process of law, Court shall presume service of notice –
These were all questions of facts and it would be premature to move High Court for quashing of proceedings.
Held : The question is whether in a case of this nature, where the postal endorsement shows that th8e notice could not be served on account of the non availability of the addressee, a cause of action may still arise for prosecution of the drawer of the cheque on the basis of deemed service of notice under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act. In our view this question has to
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 37 be answered by reference to the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down that in all cases where notice is not served on account of non-availability of the addressee, the court must presume service of notice.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the drawer may by dubious means manage to get an incorrect endorsement made on the envelope that the parties has been found locked or that the addressee was not available at the time when postman went for delivery of the letter. It may be thaet the address is correct and even the addressee is available but a wrong endorsement is manipulated by the addressee. In such a case, if the facts are proved, it may amount to refusal of the notice. If the complainant is able to prove that the drawer of the cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got a false endorsement made only to defeat the process of law, the Court shall presume service of notice. This, however, is a matter of evidence and proof. Thus even in a case where the notice is returned with the endorsement that the premises has always been found locked or the addressee was not available at the time of postal delivery, it will be open to the complainant to prove at the trial by evidence that the endorsement is not correct and that the addressee, namely the drawer of the cheque, with knowledge of the notice had deliberately avoided to receive notice”.
(5) Jai Durga Enterprises Through Its … Vs. State of U.P. and
Indo Automobiles, reported in 2006 Cri L.J. 3312, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court held that :
“Therefore, it is essential that service upon registered notice should be affected in absence of registered post. It shall not be presumed that there is sufficient service regarding notice sent by U.P.C, and it cannot be taken into account under Section 27 of the Act that there was sufficient service upon the accused/appellants. Although, it has been denied by the applicant that no any notice was received by them in the affidavit and same has not been controverted by filing counter affidavit. Therefore, it is liable to be deemed that there was no sufficient service of legal notice upon the applicants/accused. On this basis, the impugned order passed by the court below is liable to be quashed”.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 38 (6) S.S. Ummul Habiba,Vs. B. Rajendran, reported in 2005 (1)
ALD Cri 33, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, held that :
“On 19.12.1992, the accused issued Ex.P.3-Lawyer’s notice demanding the amount due on the cheque. The accused intentionally evaded service of the notice and the notice returned to the sender with the endorsement “intimation given; not claimed”. Since the accused evaded the service of notice, it must be deemed to be constructive notice and sufficient service of notice on the accused. The accused failed to pay the cheque amount till 15.1.1993. Hence, the Complaint was filed against the accused under Section 138 of N.I. Act”.
(7) Yadav Chandra sharma, v. Gyanendra Singh Kushwah, reported in 2017 0 Supreme (MP) 781, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – S.138 – General
Clauses Act, 1897 – S.27 – Evidence Act, 1872 – Ss.101 and 103 –
Case of dishonour of cheque – Petitioner stated that he never received notice sent by respondent – He specifically alleged regarding interpolation over acknowledgement card – Petitioner’s application for calling postman as witness allowed”.
(8) Parimal Vs. Veena @ Bharti, reported in 2011 (3) SCC 545, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, held that :
“There is presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the Court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service.
The provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act provide that the burden of proof of the facts rests on the party who substantially asserts it and not on the party who denies it. In fact, burden of proof means that a party has to prove an allegation
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 39
before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour Section 103
provides that burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any special law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The provision of Section 103 amplifies the general rule of Section 101 that the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the affirmative of the facts in issue”.
The address of the appellant/accused as mentioned in Ex.P.3 registered lawyer’s notice; Ex.P.4 returned cover, address mentioned in the complaint and the summons issued by the Court, are one and the same. For the same address, the appellant received summons from the Court. As such, absolutely there is no any wrong mention of the address of the appellant in any manner whatsoever and the respondent with clean hands has got served the registered cover with acknowledgement due to the correct address of the appellant only. Hence, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, preparing and posting by registered post. The facts of the above cited cases are different from the present case on hand.
41.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant argued that the notice is sent to the correct address of the accused and absolutely the appellant except denying the same did not rebut the same and as such, as per the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the notice is deemed service on the appellant/accused. In support of his contention he relied on the following citation 2000 (1) ALT (Crl) 42 (SC), wherein it was held that :
“Under General Clauses Act, 1987, Section 27, -
Meaning of service by post – Where sender of notice dispatched by post with the correct address, notice must be deemed to have been served on the sendee, unless he rebuts it – in the case of hand, notice deemed to have been served”.
The above citation is applicable to the present case on hand, since in the present case on hand also the complainant sent the notice to the accused to his correct address and the accused, who is examined as D.W.1 also admitted in his cross-examination that the address noted on the postal cover is that of his address. Hence, as the complainant sent legal notice to
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 40 the correct address of the accused, the notice must be deemed to have been served on the accused.
42.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant further argued that a person who does not pay within fifteen days of receipt of summons from the Court along with a copy of the complaint, cannot contend that there was no proper service of notice by ignoring statutory presumption.
In view of his above said contention, he relied on the following citation 2007 (6) SCC 555, wherein it was held that :
“Remedy for person who claims that he did not receive notice sent by post is that the Appellant may pay the amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment of cheque amount within fifteen days of the receipt of summons and a person who does not pay within fifteen days of receipt of summons from the
Court along with a copy of the complaint, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice by ignoring statutory presumption under section 27 of General Clause Act and
Section 114 of Evidence Act”.
In the present case on hand also the appellant failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days of the receipt of summons and hence, he cannot contend that there was no proper service of notice as per the provisions of
Sec.27 of General Clauses Act and Sec.114 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Hence, the above citation is applicable to the present case on hand.
43.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant further argued that the appellant/accused who is doing real estate business received advance amount promising to allot flat to the respondent/complainant but he could not fulfill his promise and so he is liable to pay the advance amount received as sale consideration and the cheque in question was endorsed in favour of the respondent in acknowledgement of the said liability, as such the respondent is holder in due course. In support of his contention, he relied on a citation i.e., 1994 Madras Law Journal (Cri) 112, wherein it was held that :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 41 “Appellants, who are real estate dealers, had received amounts promising to sell three grounds of land but could not fulfill that promise and so were liable to pay the amount received as sale consideration. The cheques in question were endorsed in favour of Respondent in acknowledgement of the said liability. As such the respondent is “holder in due course”. Held in view of the allegations in the complaint, the submission that there was no legally enforceable debt and the cheques were not issued to discharge and so the offence is not made out, fails”.
In the present case also the appellant/accused received advance amount with a promise to allot a flat to the complainant, but he failed to allot the same and the cheque in question was endorsed in favour of respondent is “holder in due course”. Hence, it is legally enforceable debt. Hence, the above citation is applicable to the present case on hand.
44. The main core contention of the appellant/accused is that the cheque was issued by him to the respondent/complainant towards collateral security, as such the appellant has to seek the remedy through Civil Court only by filing a suit for specific performance of contract. It is pertinent to note that as seen from the entire material available on record and Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement towards cancellation of Ex.A.7 agreement, in which it was mentioned that due to tragic incident occurred on 06.1.2008 in which the schedule property building was collapsed, decided to cancel the agreement by mutual consent and hence, as per the understandings of both parties of the agreement, the vendor refunding the advance sale consideration paid by the purchaser at the time of agreement and subsequent payment paid by the purchaser to the purchaser by way of cheque in favour of the purchaser towards full and final settlement of all claims of purchaser against the vendor including the refund of advance sale consideration paid by purchaser on the date of execution of the agreement.
In the said cancellation endorsement, it was further mentioned that both parties agreed to cancel the agreement by mutual consent subject to realization of the above mentioned cheque and no party of the agreement
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 42 shall have any right against other party of the agreement, after the realization of the above mentioned cheque and the vendor is at liberty to offer the schedule property for sale to any other person at his will. Hence, on perusal of the above contents of Ex.A.8 cancellation endorsement, the above cheque was issued towards refund of advance amount which is liability of the accused, but it does not come under collateral purpose. Hence, in the contention raised by the accused holds no water.
45.In the present case, the accused is not disputing his signature on
Ex.P.1 cheque, therefore the statutory presumption U/s.118 of N.I. Act that the cheque has been drawn for consideration and under Sec.139 of N.I. Act that the cheque has been issued for the discharge of debt or liability will raise in favour of the complainant and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the said presumptions. The learned counsel for the accused cross- examined P.W.1 at length but nothing was elicited in favour of the accused.
Since the present case is a criminal case, the accused has to prove his contention by preponderance of probabilities by adducing some acceptable evidence before the Court. Though the accused himself examined as D.W.1 and also examined the postman on his behalf in this Appeal as R.W.2, the accused could not prove his contention. All the suggestions made to P.W.1 in his cross-examination were denied by P.W.1. Mere denial is not sufficient to prove his contention.
46.The evidence on record established that the accused issued
Ex.P.1 cheque to discharge the liability and the same was dishonoured as “Funds Insufficient”. It is an admitted and proved fact that the complainant issued statutory notice under Ex.P.3 within the time, but the said notice of the accused was returned by the postal authorities as “Addressee Long
Camp” and the accused not arranged the funds in his account. Therefore, the complainant proved all the requirements to constitute the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 43
47.In the present case the complainant prove that the cheque given by the accused towards legally enforceable debt. It is also pertinent to note that once issuance of a cheque and signature thereon are admitted, presumption of a legally enforceable debt or other liability in favour of the holder of the cheque arises and accused may rebut the presumption, but mere statement of the accused may not be sufficient. In the present case the accused failed to discharge his burden of rebutting the presumption. The accused was under an obligation or liability to make payment to complainant under Ex.P.1 cheque, but he failed to make payment of said amount and cheque so issued by accused stood dishonoured for “Funds Insufficient” account closed. It is also pertinent to note that mere fact that debtor has given security in form of post-dated cheque or current cheque with agreement that it is security for fulfillment of obligation to be discharged on date itself.
48.In a case in between K.N. Beena vs. Muniyappan & Another, reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 14, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that :
“U/sec.118 unless the contrary was proved, it is to be presumed that the Negotiable Instrument (including cheque) had been made and drawn for consideration. U/s.139, the Court has to presume unless the contrary was proved that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in hole or in part, of a debt or liability, thus, in a complaint U/s.138, the Court has to presume that the cheque had been issued for a debt or liability, this presumption is rebuttable. However, the burden of proving that the cheque had not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused. Section 20 of Negotiable Instruments Act says that inchoate stamped instrument and states that if a person signs and delivers a paper stamped in accordance with law and either wholly blank or for written thereon an incomplete Negotiable
Instrument, such person thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete as the case may be upon it, the Negotiable Instrument for any amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by stamp. Sec.49 permits
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 44 the holder of a Negotiable Instrument endorsed in blank to fill up the said instrument by writing upon the endorsement, the direction to pay any other person as endorsee and to complete the endorsement in the blank cheque, it makes it clear that doing for holder does not thereby incur the responsibility of an endorser as per Subhash Chand vs. Satish Varma, pages 1 to 16 on 12th May, 2016.”
49.In a case in between Rajendra vs. Usha Rani reported in (2001 L.W. (Crl.) 319), it was observed that :
“No law prescribes that in case of any Negotiable
Instrument, the entire body of the instrument shall be written only by the maker or drawer of the instrument. Once the execution is admitted, it shall be taken that the cheque was issued by the accused in favour of the complainant towards the discharge of the liability even in case where the cheque was filled up by the some other person.”
50. Section 139 of the Act always in favour of the holder of the instrument. The Court shall presume the fact as proved till it is disproved.
Admittedly, the accused did not place any cogent evidence to rebut the presumption. No doubt the accused need not adduce positive evidence to rebut the presumption. But, in the present case, the complainant by examining himself as P.W.1, proved Ex.P.1 cheque.
51.If really the complainant also influenced the Postal Department at the time of serving notice and the complainant intentionally served the notice to him with wrong address, what prevented him to complain against the accused to the higher officials of the Postal Department for taking necessary action against the concerned postal officials, who supported the complainant. Except mere bald statements, the accused could not prove his case with cogent and convincing evidence.
52.The learned counsel for the appellant/accused relied on the following citations :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 45 (1) Nikhil P.Gandhi, Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, reported in 2016 0 Supreme (Gujarat) 908, wherein his Lordship of Hon’ble Gujarat
High Court held that :
“(A) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 –
Dishonour of cheque – A legal fiction, although is required to be given full effect, yet has its own limitations – It cannot be taken recourse to for any purpose other than one mentioned in statute itself – Section 138 provides for a penal provision – a penal provision created by reason of a legal fiction must receive strict construction – Such a penal provision, enacted in terms of legal fiction drawn, would be attracted when a cheque is returned by bank unpaid –
Before a proceeding thereunder is initiated, all legal requirements
therefor must be complied with – Court must be satisfied that all ingredients of commission of an offence under said provision have been complied with.
(B) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 –
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482 – Dishonour of cheque – Whenever a blank cheque or postdated cheque is issued, a trust is reposed that cheque will be filled in or used according to understanding agreement between parties – If there is a prima facie reason to believe that said trust is not honoured, then continuation of prosecution under Section 138 of N.I. Act would be abuse of process of law – It is in interest of justice that parties in such cases are left to civil remedy”.
(2) M/s. Indian Oil Corporation, Vs. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. &
Others, reported in 2006 (6) Supreme 66, wherein their Lordships of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, held that :
“While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purety civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There isd also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement.
Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 46 any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged”.
(3) All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. & Others, Vs. Dhanesh
Badarmal Jain & Another, reported in 2007 (12) SCALE 391, wherein it was held by the Hon’ble Court that :
“Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of finding out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie cannot notice the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other admitted documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is impermissible also to look to the admitted documents. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. Supreme Courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice”.
(4) M/s. Shakti Travel & Tours, Vs. State of Bihar & Another, reported in 2000 (7) Supreme 90, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that :
“The only ground on which the learned counsel for the
Appellant prays for quashing of the complaint is that on the assertions made in paragraph 8 of the complaint, it must be held that notice has not been served and, therefore, an application under
Section 138 could not have been maintained. Undoubtedly, the accused has a right to pay the money within 15 days from the date of the service of notice and only when it fails to pay, it is open for the complainant to file a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. That being the position and in the complaint itself having not been mentioned that the notice has been served, on the assertions made in paragraph-8, the complaint itself is not maintainable. We accordingly quash the complaint”.
It is pertinent to note that initially when the complaint is filed by the respondent under the provisions of the N.I. Act, as per the provisions of the
Sections 138, 139 and 142 of N.I. Act, the initial presumption that the cheque was drawn for discharge of liability of drawer ought to be raised by the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 47
Courts in every case and the Appellant to rebut the same has to prove the same by adducing cogent and convincing evidence and not by mere suggestions. On perusal of the facts of the above cited cases, the facts of the above cited cases are different from the facts of the present case on hand.
53.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant argued that
Ex.P.1 cheque is not issued towards security as alleged by the respondent in any manner whatsoever. In support of his contention, the learned counsel
for the respondent/complainant relied on the following citations :
(1) 1998 Crl.L.J. 3228, wherein the Hon’ble High Court held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 118 (a) – Evidence
Act, Sec.114 – Cheque – Consideration – Presumption as to –
Drawer issued blank cheque as security for loan transaction –
Issuance of the cheque admitted – No dispute regarding signature amount and name shown in cheque – It can be presumed that cheque was supported by consideration – Presumption cannot be rebutted merely because there were some transactions between drawer and drawee of cheque”.
(2) AIR 2001 Supreme Court, 676, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act Ss.1 – Interpretation – Act to be interpreted in light of objectives to be achieved – Efforts to defeat objectives of law to be discouraged”.
(3) 2005 Crl.L.J. 314, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act Ss.138, 139 – Evidence Act, S.4 – Cheque issued towards balance sale consideration due under agreement of sale after delivery of possession of property agreed was given – covered under other liability – Burden would be on petitioners to establish that dishonoured cheque was not issued in discharge of debt or other liability – Respondent cannot be quashed against petitioner”.
(4) 2005 Crl.L.J. 640, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act ss.138 – Dishonour of cheque –
Blank cheque drawn in favour of the Respondent as security for repayment of amount of amount that may become due – Necessary entries were made there in after verifying accounts on behalf of
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 48 respondent with respect to outstanding liability – It became a cheque only on date when liability was acknowledged and entered in cheque – Respondent has proved a liability outstanding from respondent – Said cheque was bounced for want of funds is also not disputed – Respondent guilty of offence punishable under Sec.138”.
(5) AIR 2002 Supreme Court 182, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act Ss.138, 139 – Cheque dishonour complaint – Not liable to be quashed on ground of dishonour of cheque by reason of stop payment instructions –
Presumption under Section 139 that cheque was received by holder for discharge of debt or liability arises – Presumption though is rebuttable”.
(6) AIR 2000 Supreme Court 1869, wherein it was held that :
“Complaint cannot be quashed merely on grounds that civil remedy is available”.
In the present case on hand the accused who is examined as D.W.1, admitted in his cross-examination that the signatures shown on Ex.P.7 are relating to himself and he signed as G.P.A. Holder of B.Sudhakar and 3rd signature relating to managing partner of Nagaja Constructions. He also admitted that he signed on Ex.P.8 endorsement on behalf of himself and on behalf of B.Sudhakar G.P.A. Holder and both the signatures on Ex.P.1 are relating to him, hence there is no dispute regarding signature, amount and name shown in cheque and it can be presumed that cheque was supported by consideration. The cheque was bounced for want of funds is also not disputed.
54.Burden of proving that the cheque had not been issued for any debt or liability is on the accused. Mere denial that the cheque was not issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability in the absence of any sufficient evidence, does not shift the burden to the complainant.
55. When the accused contended that he did not issue the cheque in discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability it is for the accused to disprove the presumption regarding the same, in this connection, it is apt to
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 49 refer a decision reported in Sudhir Sabharawal v. Anil Prabhakar
Nilgirwar1 wherein it was held that:
“(10).Wherever the person accused of offence under Section 138 of the Act intends to plead that there did not exist legally enforceable debt, it is for him to place such material before the
Court in the form of oral and documentary evidence as is sufficient and adequate to neutralize the presumption provided for under Section 139 of the
Act. In the present case, except deposing that there did not exist any such legally enforceable debt or liability, the petitioner did not come forward with any acceptable and reliable evidence.
Therefore, having regard to the presumption provided for under Section 139 of the Act, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hiten p. Dalai case (supra), and in the absence of rebuttal by the petitioner, the Courts below were left with no alternative except to continue with the presumption as to the existence of the debt in favour of the respondent. The Court is not persuaded to take a different view.”
56.In M.S. Narayana Vs State of Karnataka 2 while dealing with the legal position, regarding the standard of proof required for rebutting a presumption, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, in a case under Sec.
138 of NI Act, 1881 Hon’ble Supreme Court, held that, the presumptions under Sec. 118(a) and 139 of the Act are rebuttable and the standard of proof required for such rebuttal is preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond all reasonable doubt.
Her Lordship Further observed:
“The standard of proof evidentially is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of probabilities can be drawn not only from the material on record, but also by reference to the circumstances upon which, he relies.
1 2003 (2) ALD (Cri) 237 22007(1) ALT (Crl) 103(SC) = 2006(6) SCC 39
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 50
Her Lordship Further held:
“Rebuttal evidence does not have to be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced before Court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonable being that of the prudent man.”
57. This Court relied on the following citation :
Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa, reported in 2019 (3) ALT (SC) 62 (D.B.), wherein it was held that :
“Signature on cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability”.
In the present case on hand, since the accused issued a cheque bearing No.090586, dt.05.05.2008 for a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- in favour of the complainant for return of the advance amount received by him from
P.W.1 towards purchase of a Flat and subsequently the said cheque was dishonoured due to “Funds Insufficient” in the Account of the accused and the accused also not denied his signature on the said cheque. Hence, the accused issued the said cheque to P.W.1 towards discharge of liability.
58. To decide the issue whether the accused issued the cheque to the complainant towards discharge of debt or liability, this Court also relied on the following citation :
Madan Tiwari Vs. State of Chattisgarh, reported in CRR
No.56 of 2010, of the Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, wherein it was held at Paras-9 & 10 that :
(Para-9) “We have given due consideration to the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the observations of this Court in Indus Airways (P) Ltd. V. Magnum
Aviation (P) Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539:(2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 138:(2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 845 with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act and the expression “for discharge of any debt or liability”
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 51 occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the view that the question whether a post-dated cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature of transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the section is attracted and not otherwise”.
(Para-10) “Reference to the Facts of the present case clearly shows that though the word “security” I used in Clause 3.1(iii) of the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being towards repayment of installments. The repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the installment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on 28.02.2002 which was prior to the date of the cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and installments have fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the
Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability”.
In the present case also, as on the date of issue of cheque by the accused to the complainant, there is existence of liability on the accused for return of the amount received by him from the complainant towards purchase of a Flat and in that connection, the accused issued the said cheque to the complainant and hence, the amount covered under the cheque is legally recoverable by the complainant from the accused, which is an outstanding liability, and hence, Sec.138 of N.I. Act is attracted in the present case on hand.
59. The presumption U/s.139 of NI Act is a rebuttable presumption.
It is not for the complainant to prove that the accused had issued the cheque, in question, in discharge of legally enforceable debt and that unless the contra is proved, mere holding the cheque itself is sufficient to presume that the cheque was issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt. In the connection, it is pertinent to refer to the decision reported in M/s. Greaves
Limited v. Leo Electronics Organization Others3,wherein it was held that:
3 2007 Crl. L.J. (NOC) 642 (A.P.),
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 52 “Presumption provided under S.138 is a rebuttable presumption and that Under S.139 it is not for complainant to prove that Cheques have been issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt. Thus, order dismissing complaint holding that complainant has not proved case against respondent beyond reasonable doubt is improper.”
60.The accused did not deny his signature on Ex.P.1 cheque and the trial Court had given detailed reasons for arriving at conclusions and that the judgment of the trial Court is proper perspective which needs no interference by this Court. Accordingly, Points 1 to 3 are answered.
61.Point No.4:-
The findings and observations of the trial Court are in accordance with the evidence on record and well settled legal principles. There are no grounds to interfere with the findings of the trial Court. Therefore, this Court is not interfering with the findings of the trial Court. Accordingly, the Point
No.4 is answered.
62.Point No.5:-
In the result, the appeal is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the Special Judicial Magistrate of First
Class (Excise), Vizianagaram in C.C.No.121/2010, dated 11.03.2013 against the appellant/accused, for the offence U/s.138 of N.I. Act. Forward the
Judgment to the trial Court with a direction to take steps for execution of the sentence. The trial Court is directed to take further steps for execution of the sentence against the accused, as per Law.
Typed to my dictation, by the Stenographer Grade-I, corrected
pronounced by me in open Court, this the 25 th day of June, 2019.
Sd/- E. BHIMA RAO,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 56/2013 53
Appendix of Evidence
Witnesses Examined in this Appellate Court
For Appellant/Accused:-For Respondent/Complainant:-
R.W.2:- K. Ramakrishna, Postman- N O N E - (D.W.2)
Exhibits Marked
For Appellant/Accused:-For Respondent/Complainant:-
- N I L - - N I L -
Sd/- E. BHIMA RAO,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram
Copies to:
1. The Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Vizianagaram.
2. The Appellant/Accused.
IN THE COURT OF THE JUDGE, FAMILY COURT CUM III ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
JUDGE, VIZIANAGARAM
Present: Sri E.Bhima Rao,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram.
Tuesday, this the 25th day of June, 2019
Criminal Appeal No.55/2013
Special Judicial First Class Magistrate From which Court the appeal is:(Excise), Vizianagaram.
Number of the Case in thatC.C. No.112/2010 : Court
SanapalaSatyanarayana,S/o Suryanarayana, Hindu, Aged about 59 Name and description of the :years, R/o D.No.11-8-25/1, Plot No.21, appellant/accused Daspalla Hills, Visakhapatnam (A-1).
Sri V.S.N. Sastry, Advocate for the Appellant is defended by:Appellant.
(1) M/s. Jaisukh Vinimoy Pvt. Ltd., Represented by its Director Krishna Gopal Agarwal, Hindu, Aged about 38 years, Names and Descriptions of theResident of Vizianagaram. : Complainants/respondents (2) State represented by the Additional Public Prosecutor, Vizianagaram.
(1) Sri B. Satyanarayana and Sri B. Karthik, Advocates for the 1st respondent. (For 1st respondent) Complainant/Respondentare : defended by: (2)AdditionalPublicProsecutor, Vizianagaram. (For 2nd respondent)
The appellant-Accused is found guilty for Section of Law under which thethe offence punishable U/s.138 of NI Act appellant is convicted in the:and accordingly he was convicted lower CourtU/s.255(2), Cr.P.C. for the said offence.
Whether confirmed, reversed orCONFIRMED. The appeal is dismissed by modified, if modified what isconfirming the conviction and sentence : modifiedpassed by the trial Court.
Date of presentation:04.04.2013 Date of filing:04.04.2013
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 2
Bail bonds, if any,:--- Hearing:08.05.2019 Judgment:25.06.2019
The appeal coming on 08.05.2019 for final hearing before me in the present of Sri V.S.N. Sastry, Advocate for the appellant-accused, and of
Sri B.Satyanarayana and Sri B. Karthik, Advocates for the 1st respondent/Complainant, and of the Additional Public Prosecutor for the 2nd respondent/state, and having stood over for consideration to the date, the
Court delivered the following:
J U D G M E N T
The appeal is filed by the appellant-accused against the conviction and sentence passed in C.C.No.112/2010, dt.11.03.2013 whereby the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Vizianagaram, sentenced the accused, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of 18 (Eighteen) Months and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only), in default he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of Six
Months for the offence punishable U/s.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.
2.The appellant herein is the accused and the 1st respondent herein is the complainant in the complaint filed by the 1st respondent in the trial
Court. For the sake of convenience, the parties are, henceforth, referred to as per their array in the trial Court.
3.Originally the complainant filed the complaint against the four accused persons. But case against A-2 to A-4 was dismissed as per the docket orders dated 20.10.2009 of the trial Court. The case was proceeded against A-1 (Sri Sanapala Satyanarayana) only in the trial Court.
4.The complainant filed the complaint against the accused for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act with the following allegations : The complainant is the Company constituted under the provisions of the
Company Act, having its office at Plot No.13, VNR Building, N.C.S. Road,
Vizianagaram and the accused are the residents of Visakhapatnam and this complaint is initiated by one of its Directors as per the Resolution passed by
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 3 the aforesaid Company. All the accused approached the complainant and requested the complainant to purchase the property measuring an extent of 50 Sq. Yards being undivided and unspecified share out of the total extent of 2069 Sq. yards together with Commercial Space measuring 1600 Square
Feet in Second Floor and one Car parking measuring 100 Square Feet in stilt floor of Madhava Town at Kanakala Dibba Area, covered by Block No.41 in
T.S. No.1451 and part of Allipuram Ward within the limits of Greater
Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation for which the complainant agreed and so some negotiations took place between all the accused and the complainant and ultimately agreed to certain understandings and entered into an agreement for the same. Further, towards the said agreement cum understandings in between the accused and the complainant, the complainant paid a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration on 17.05.2007 and again paid a further sum of Rs.9,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration on 18.05.2007 as per request of the accused and both the said amounts, the accused received and acknowledged the same. Further, in consequent to the said agreement, the first accused, the third accused on behalf of the second accused as a G.P.A. Holder and the fourth accused jointly executed an agreement of sale on 19th day of May, 2007 agreeing to sell the aforesaid property to the complainant and another
Sri Anand Kumar Agarwal for a sum of Rs.43,00,000/- and agreeing to register the same within forty days from the date of agreement of sale as well as acknowledging a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- and another sum of
Rs.4,00,000/- which the complainant paid towards further sale consideration on the said date itself i.e., on 19.05.2007. so, in all, the accused received a sum of Rs.31,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration, which the accused acknowledged with respect to the aforesaid mentioned property.
From the said date of agreement itself, the complainant is always ready and willing to perform the complainant’s part of duty as per the aforesaid contract but all the accused tried to postpone the same for one reason or the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 4 other but for the reasons best known to all. Later on some untoward incidents took place with respect to the aforesaid building and so all the accused requested the complainant to cancel the aforesaid agreement, which the accused executed in favour of the complainant.
(a).Therefore, as per the request of all the accused, all the accused and the complainant mutually agreed for cancellation of the aforesaid agreement of sale subject to the satisfaction of some terms, conditions and understandings included in the cancellation endorsement. As per the said terms and understandings, all the accused became liable to repay the entire advance sale consideration of Rs.31,00,000/- which the complainant paid to the accused and the accused received and acknowledged on various dates and so towards the discharge of the said amount, which the accused are liable to repay the said advance sale consideration to the complainant, first accused on behalf of all the accused issued a cheque dated 25.04.2008 for a sum of Rs.31,00,000/- bearing No.090584 drawn on Bank of India, Harbour
Road Branch, Visakhapatnam in favour of the complainant towards the satisfaction of the aforesaid amount. Thereafter, the complainant presented the said cheque for collection at Vizianagaram through the complainant’s
Banker i.e., Karur Vysya Bank, Vizianagaram but quite surprisingly the said cheque is returned unpaid stating “Funds Insufficient” in the said bank account. The complainant received the said cheque unpaid along with
Banker’s memo dated 04.09.2008. The 1st accused on behalf of all the accused issued the said cheque with an undertaking that the accused will make necessary arrangements to honour the said cheque and also stated that there are sufficient funds in the said bank account, but the first accused on behalf of all the accused issued the said cheque knowing fully well about the insufficiency of the funds in the said bank account and also knowing fully well about the consequences of the bounce of the cheque. Therefore, all the accused are jointly and severally liable for the punishment under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Ac. With respect to the aforesaid
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 5 agreement of sale and cancellation agreement which the first accused, third accused on behalf of the second accused as a G.P.A. Holder and the fourth accused executed in favour of the complainant, the complainant is reserving a right to take necessary separate legal action against all the accused under the due process of law and for the said separate action also, all the accused are jointly and severally liable for the same in every manner whatsoever.
Thereafter, the complainant got issued a registered lawyer’s notice dated 11th day of September, 2008 to all the accused calling the accused to repay the said cheque amount to the complainant within fifteen days from the date of receipt of that notice which the accused failed to take the said notice and the said notices are returned on 27.09.2008 and so the complainant invoked the jurisdiction of the Court for the said cheque amount. Therefore, the complainant prays to punish the accused for the offence punishable U/s.138 r/w.142 of N.I. Act and also direct the accused to pay the said amount of
Rs.31,00,000/- along with the compensation amount to the complainant.
Hence, the complaint.
5.The learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class,
Vizianagaram took cognizance for the offence U/s.138 & 142 of N.I. Act against the accused and registered as C.C.No.776/2009 on the file of the
Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Vizianagaram and in view of the
orders of the District Court in P.R.No.225/2010-A, dated 05.10.2010, the matter was transferred to the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Vizianagaram and renumbered as C.C.No.112/2010, and after appearance of accused, copies of documents were furnished to him and at that stage, and the accused was examined U/s.251, Cr.P.C., for the offence
U/s.138 and 142 of N.I. Act, explaining the accusation made against him, for which, he denied the offence and pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
6.During the course of trial, the complainant himself examined as
P.W.1 and and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.8. Ex.P.1 is cheque bearing No.090584, dt.25.04.2008; Ex.P.2 is Banker memo, dt.04.09.2008; Ex.P.3 is office copy of
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 6 registered lawyer’s notice, dt.19.09.2008; Ex.P.4 is returned cover; Ex.P.5 is memorandum of Association; Ex.P.6 is resolution passed by the Company;
Ex.P.7 is agreement of sale, dt.19.05.2007; and Ex.P.8 is cancellation endorsement on the back side of the 1st page of Ex.P.7, respectively.
7.After closure of complainant’s evidence, the accused was examined U/s.313, Cr.P.C. by putting the incriminating material available in the evidence of complainant’s witness, for which, he denied the same. When the accused was asked to enter into defence, he stated that he has defence evidence on his behalf and he further stated that he has nothing to say anything about the case. On behalf of the accused, the accused (A-1) himself examined as D.W.1 and no documents marked on his behalf.
8.After considering the oral and documentary evidence, and after hearing both sides, the trial Court found the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him to suffer simple Imprisonment for a period of 18 (Eighteen) Months and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only), in default he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of Six
Months for the offence punishable U/s.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.
9.Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the accused preferred the present appeal contending, inter alia, with the following grounds:
The Calendar and Judgment of the trial Court is contrary to Law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. The trial Court ought to have acquitted the appellant/accused, as there is no evidence on record to convict the appellant/accused. The trial Court without considering the case and failed to note that there is no legally enforceable debt in this case on hand and even the complainant failed to prove the same and hence the basic requirement U/s.138 of N.I. Act is found missing in this case, as per the terms of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale, the condition is that the complainant is only entitled to a Flat and there is no necessity for the appellant/accused to repay any amount to the complainant and hence, the burden heavily lies on the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 7 complainant to prove the legally enforceable debt and then only the burden shifts on the appellant/accused to rebut the presumption and hence the
Judgment of the trial Court is liable to be reversed. The learned Judge confused himself about the merits of the case as Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement on the back side of Ex.P.7 clearly indicates that the agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque so it is clear that if the cheque is not encashed, the agreement remains valid and there is no scope for filing the cheque bounce case as per the endorsement, but the learned
Judge without considering the same pronounced the verdict by convicting the
appellant purely on wrong notions by applying sec.139 presumption to the case on hand which in fact is no way applicable to the case on hand and hence the conviction is liable to be reversed on this ground alone.
(a).The learned Judge failed to understand the intention of the parties while making Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement as their intention is only to provide security for Ex.P.7 transaction and specifically mentioned the clause such as ‘the agreement will be cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque’ which clearly indicates that there is no confirmation for the
honouring of the cheque and if the cheque is not honoured, there is no
criminal liability fastened on the accused and the complainant can safely proceed with Ex.P.7 agreement of sale, but the learned Judge without considering the same simply convicted the accused merely on presumptions and surmises and without going into the merits of the case and hence the
Judgment is liable to be reversed and the appellant/accused is entitled to an acquittal. The learned Judge failed to note that as there is no cancellation clause or default clause in Ex.P.7 agreement of sale which only stipulates the condition that the accused has to deliver the flat to the complainant within a particular period and if delayed, shall pay some damages, but there is no necessity for the appellant/accused to refund the amount and hence there is no basis for the issuance of cheque by the appellant/accused and hence
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 8 there is no legally enforceable debt in the case on hand and the Judgment of the trial Court is not based on facts and Law and is liable to be reversed.
(b).The learned Magistrate without applying his mind and without perusing the material on record and without analyzing the same, convicted the accused though absolutely there is no ground to convict the accused and hence the same is liable to be set-aside. The trial Court did not properly analyze the case Law submitted on behalf of the accused i.e., (1) 2007 (2)
SCC (Cri) 498; (2) AIIMR (Cri) 2009 1074; (3) 2003 (1) SCC 1; (4) 2004 (8)
SCC 774; (5) 2006 (3) SCC (Crl) 114, which are directly applicable to the case on hand and simply concluded those citations are not applicable to the case on hand, and convicted the accused purely on presumptions which is illegal and the said Judgment is liable to be set aside. The learned Magistrate failed to follow the cross-examination of P.W.1 wherein he clearly admitted that there is no legally enforceable debt and hence the conviction based on false grounds and the accused is entitled for an acquittal in the matter.
(c).The learned Judge without touching the arguments submitted by the counsel for the appellant/accused, convicted the appellant/accused purely on assumptions. The trial Court failed to note that the notice is not served on the appellant/accused and hence the burden is on the complainant to prove that the appellant/accused has intentionally avoided to receive the notice and in that process he has to examine the postal authorities but the complainant did not examine any witness to prove that the accused avoided to receive the notice and hence, the appellant/accused is entitled to be acquitted on this ground alone. The trial Court did not mention the contentions of the appellant/accused and by blind findings and with wrongful views, convicted the appellant/accused which is not maintainable and hence the appellant/accused is entitled for acquittal. Therefore, the appellant/accused prays to allow the criminal appeal by setting aside the calendar and judgment in C.C.No.112/2010, dt.11.3.2013 by acquitting the appellant/accused.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 9
10. During the stage of Appeal, the accused/appellant filed a petition
U/s.391 of Cr.P.C., vide Crl.M.P.No.295/2014 in Crl.A.No.55/2013 before this
Court praying to summon the postal authorities/postman concerned to give evidence regarding the service of the statutory notice on the addressee, as per the endorsement on the postal cover. In the said petition, the 1st respondent/complainant filed a counter resisting the maintainability of the petition. After hearing both sides, this Court allowed the said petition, on 25.2.2016.
11. In this Appeal, the 1st respondent/complainant preferred a revision before the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the
State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, praying to quash the orders passed by this Court in Crl.M.P.No.295/2014, in which the Hon’ble High
Court Stayed all the proceedings in this Appeal, vide Crl. R.C. No.1083 of 2016.
12. In view of the directions of the Hon’ble apex Court of India, vide
Judgment, dt.28.03.2018 in Crl. Appeal Nos.1375-1376 of 2013, which was communicated by the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., in the Circular of ROC
No.2573/OP Cell/2018, dt.18.04.2018, in which it was observed that, in all pending matters before the High Courts or other Courts relating to P.C. Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless, express order extending stay is produced. Since the speaking order was not filed before this Court as per the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the learned counsels for both parties reported to proceed with the matter and accordingly, this Court proceeded with the matter. During the pendency of this appeal, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant reported that the revision petition which was filed by him is withdrawn and
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 10 filed a memo along with the net-copy of the withdrawal proceedings before this Court.
13.On behalf of the accused/appellant, one K. Ramakrishna,
Postman of Daspalla Area, Visakhapatnam, is examined as R.W.2 and no documents marked on his side. It is pertinent to note that since the accused himself examined as D.W.1 in the trial Court, in this case the above witness is to be treated as D.W.2. But mistakenly the said witness i.e., Postman is examined as R.W.2, instead of D.W.2. Hence, wherever, R.W.2 is referred in this Judgment, it may be treated as D.W.2.
14.Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. Apart from oral arguments, the learned counsel for the Appellant/Accused filed written arguments and
additional written arguments; and on the other hand apart from the oral
arguments, the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent/Complainant, filed written arguments and additional arguments, and perused the same.
15.After perusal of the entire evidence on record, grounds of appeal and oral arguments submitted by the the learned counsels for the both parties, and upon considering the material available on record, now the points for determination before this Court are :
(1) Whether there is a legally enforceable existing
liability in between the complainant and
accused ?
(2) Whether the accused issued the cheque to
discharge part of the said liability ?
(3) Whether the complainant complied all the
requirements to constitute the offence U/s.138
of N.I. Act ?
(4) Whether there are grounds to interfere with the
findings of the trial Court ?
(5) To what relief ?
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 11
16. Point Nos.1 to 3:
The contention of the complainant is that he is the Director of the complainant company in the above complaint. The accused approached them and requested to purchase the property measuring an extent of 50 Sq.
Yards being undivided and unspecified share out of the total extent of 2069
Sq. Yards together with Commercial Space measuring 1600 Sq. Feet in
Second floor and one Car Parking measuring 100 Square Feet in Stilt floor of
Madhava Towers at Kanakala Dibba Area, covered by Block No.41
T.S.No.1451 and Part of Allipuram Ward within the limits of Greater
Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, for which the complainant agreed and so some negotiations took place between all the accused and himself and ultimately agreed to certain understandings and entered into an agreement for the same. Further, towards the said agreement cum understandings in between themselves and the accused, they paid a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration on 17.05.2007 and again paid a further sum of Rs.9,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration on 18.5.2007 as per request of accused and both the said amounts, the accused received and acknowledged the same. Further, in consequent to the said agreement, the accused in the capacity of the General Power of Attorney
Holder of Sudhakar Birlangi and M/s. Nagaja Constructions together executed
Ex.P.7 Agreement of Sale, dt.19.5.2007, agreeing to sell the aforesaid property to the complainant company for a sum of Rs.43,00,000/- and agreeing to register the same within forty days from the date of agreement of sale as well as acknowledging a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- and another sum of
Rs.4,00,000/- which they paid towards further sale consideration on the said date itself i.e., on 19.05.2007. So, in all the accused received a sum of
Rs.31,00,000/- towards the advance sale consideration, which the accused acknowledged with respect to the aforesaid mentioned property. From the said date of agreement itself, they are always ready and willing to perform their part of duty as per the aforesaid contract, but the accused tried to
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 12 postpone the same for one reason or the other, but for the reasons best known to them, later on some untoward incidents took place with respect to the aforesaid building and so the accused requested them to cancel the aforesaid agreement, which the accused executed in their favour. Therefore, as per the request of the accused, the accused and themselves mutually agreed for cancellation of the aforesaid agreement of sale subject to the satisfaction of some terms, conditions and understandings included in the cancellation endorsement more fully written on the back side of the aforesaid agreement of sale, and the said endorsement is marked as Ex.P.8.
As per the said terms and understandings the accused became liable to repay the entire advance sale consideration of Rs.31,00,000/- which they paid to the accused and the accused received and acknowledged on various dates and so towards the discharge of the said amount, which the accused became liable to repay the said advance sale consideration to them, the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque dated 25.4.2008 for a sum of Rs.31,00,000/- bearing No.090584 drawn on Bank of India, Harbour Road Branch,
Visakhapatnam in their favour towards the satisfaction of the said aforesaid amount. Thereafter, they presented the said cheque for collection at
Vizianagaram through their banker, i.e., Karur Vysya Bank, Vizianagaram but quite surprisingly the said cheque was returned unpaid stating “Funds
Insufficient” in the said Bank Account. He received the said cheque unpaid along with Ex.P.2 Banker’s memo, dt.04.09.2008. The accused issued the said cheque with an undertaking that he will make necessary arrangements to honour the said cheque and also stated that there are sufficient funds in the said bank account, but the accused issued the said cheque knowing fully well about the insufficient of the funds in the said Bank Account and also knowing fully well about the consequences of the bounce of the cheque.
Therefore, the accused is jointly and severally liable for the punishment under the provisions of the N.I. Act. Thereafter, he got issued Ex.P.3 registered Lawyer’s notice, dt.11.09.2008 to the accused calling the accused
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 13 to repay the said cheque amount to them within 15 days from the date of receipt of that notice which the accused failed to take the said notice and the said notice was returned on 27.09.2008 under Ex.P.4 returned cover.
Therefore, the complainant prays to punish the accused according to Law.
17.The learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted written arguments and argued that issuance of Ex.P.1 cheque is only as a security to the Complainant and denied the issuance of cheque towards a legally enforceable debt in the circumstances prevailing by then, as the building had collapsed on 06.01.2008, unfortunately while laying the top floor slab by M/s.
L & T Company Limited and the construction work had been stagnated since then. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused further argued that the appellant/accused never received Ex.P.3 statutory notice and hence the main ingredient of Sec.138(c) of the N.I. Act has not been satisfied and hence no offence has been made out in this case and the complainant utterly failed to comply with the requirements of Sec.138 of N.I. Act and hence, no offence has been made out against the accused. He further argued that the appellant did not commit any offence as the Appellant/Accused commenced construction of the building with the funds advanced by the purchasers including the complainant. But the building had collapsed in the construction stage while laying the top floor slab by L & T Company Limited and hence, only due to the said act of God, the appellant could not complete the work but not otherwise. He further argued that as Ex.P.7 agreement to sell was entered into by the complainant and the appellant and other site owners wherein, neither a ‘cancellation clause’ nor a ‘default clause’ is mentioned and hence there is no necessity to refund the amount as per the terms of the agreement, which is the basis for issuing Ex.P.1 cheque. Ex.P.1 cheque was issued only with a good intention towards collateral security by specifically making a mention of Ex.P.8 endorsement on Ex.P.7 agreement to sell and the same had been corroborated by the cross-examination of D.W.1, wherein
D.W.1 had clearly stated that “he never expected that the Complainant
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 14 would deposit the cheque”. He further argued that in Ex.P.8 endorsement, it is clearly mentioned that “hence both parties agreed to cancel this agreement by mutual consent subject to realization of the cheque”. The narration of the above mentioned lines clearly indicate that if the cheque is encashed, the agreement will be cancelled. In other words, if the cheque is not encashed, the agreement will hold good. In such situation, the complainant can proceed against the appellant basing on the agreement only i.e., by filing a suit for specific performance of contract. In this matter the cheque is not encashed and hence the agreement is in force but peculiarly, the complainant has taken undue advantage of the cheque available with him and invoked the provisions of Sec.138 of N.I. Act and is prosecuting the appellant. He further argued that the complainant has filed a suit in O.S.No.365/2008 on the file of the II Addl., District Judge’s Court,
Visakhapatnam claiming back the amount of Rs.26,01,001/- plus interest along with Rs.20 Lakhs as compensation and costs and other reliefs. The complainant also filed a petition in I.A.No.1495/2008 in the above said suit and got attached the subject building property of the Appellant/Accused.
When everyone including the complainant is claiming back the amounts, it became impossible for the appellant/accused to complete the construction.
As the complainant got attached the property, no new purchasers have come forward to purchase the flats as they got feared about the attachment orders over the schedule property. In this way the complainant created the panicky situation by putting the appellant/accused into troubles and also prosecuting the appellant/accused by misusing the cheque issued by the appellant only as a collateral security. He further argued that Sec.73 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872, stipulates the compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract and Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 says that the compensation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for, are not applicable to the case on hand as there is no breach of contract in this matter. It is not the case where the accused/appellant stopped the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 15 construction and in which case, it can be termed as breach of contract. But in the matter on hand by investing huge funds, the accused/appellant made a big construction and raised all six floors, but as the top floor has collapsed, which is an act of god, two persons had died and sentimentally, even the complainant is not co-operating for construction and accepting the flat and only seeking for refund of his money and hence, there is no breach on the part of the appellant/accused in the above matter. Hence, Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 has no applicability in the said matter on hand. He further argued that the presumptions U/s.139 and 118 (a) of N.I.
Act are rebuttable and once the appellant/accused rebut the presumption by discharging by preponderance of probabilities, the burden will be shifted on the complainant. The appellant/accused rebutted the presumption U/s.139 of N.I. Act by examining himself as witness i.e., D.W.1 stating that the cheque was issued towards collateral security and then the burden shifted on the complainant. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant/accused prays to set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the
Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, (Excise), Vizianagaram in
C.C.No.112/2010, dt.11.3.2013 for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act by allowing the appeal and acquit the accused for the said offence.
18.The learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted
additional written arguments and argued that the agreement is completely
silent about the aspect of refund of money and hence there is no necessity
for the appellant/accused to refund the amount as per the said agreement, if
there is any such clause to refund the money and if the appellant/accused issued the cheque basing on such clause, then only, it can be termed as there is legally enforceable debt as there is a provision in the agreement to refund the amount but since there is no such provision in the agreement to refund the amount to the respondent/complainant, it could not be termed as there is no legally enforceable debt and it can be safely presumed that the accused need not refund the amount. He further argued that it is clearly
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 16 mentioned in the agreement through Ex.P.8 endorsement that the “Agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque” as the cheque is not encashed, the agreement got valid and restored and is not cancelled. Hence, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for specific performance of contract, directing the appellant/accused to deliver a flat as
Ex.P.7 agreement stipulates the condition of only delivering the flat after its construction. Peculiarly the respondent/complainant has not filed the suit, can alternatively claim the refund of the money if the appellant/accused fails to deliver the flat. In the ghastly incident of collapse of building, two persons were died, sentimentally no person is coming forward to proceed with the construction including the present complainant. Hence, the appellant/accused could not proceed with the construction till date. However, though there is no necessity for refund of the money as per the terms of
Ex.P.7, only as a matter of courtesy, he tried to issue a cheque only with a condition that if it is honoured, the agreement is cancelled and the words otherwise means that if the cheque is not honoured, the agreement is continued. So, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for delivering of the flat as per the terms and conditions of the agreement, but he filed a suit only for refund of money and even if the said suit is decreed, it cannot be terms as an enforceable debt as the accused is not issued the cheque as per the terms of Ex.P.7. He issued only on humanitarian grounds but not as per the terms of Ex.P.7. Hence, the issuance of cheque is not in accordance with the provisions of Sec.138 of N.I. Act, as there is no legally enforceable debt,.
In fact, there is no such legally enforceable debt, but the agreement conditions are otherwise and the cheque is not issued in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, as there is no refund clause. He further argued that the provisions of Sections 73 & 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 are not applicable to the case on hand as there is no breach of contract. He further argued that with respect to the dispute in the service of legal notice is concerned, the counsel for the appellant/accused clearly cross-examined
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 17 the respondent/complainant and wherein he specifically raised the plea of non-receipt of the notice by the accused and hence, the arguments advanced by the respondent/complainant that there is no cross-examination in the trial Court in respect of the issuance of legal notice. When the service of notice is denied and when the doors are locked, it is for the complainant to prove the issuance of notice and if fails to prove the presumption shall in favour of the accused and the trial Court ought to have acquitted the accused as there is no proper service of notice on the part of the complainant. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant/accused prays to set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the
Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, (Excise), Vizianagaram in
C.C.No.112/2010, dt.11.3.2013 for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act by allowing the appeal and acquit the accused for the said offence.
19.Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ complainant submitted written arguments and argued that the appellant admitted the execution of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale and also admitted the receipt of the advance sale consideration of Rs.31,00,000/- from the respondent. The appellant further admitted the fact that some untoward incident took place with respect to the entire property including the property covered under Ex.P.7 and also admitted the said entire property including the property under Ex.P.7 is in the same state of condition as of on the date of untoward incident and also admitted that the appellant and others did not take any steps to reconstruct the entire building as previously agreed from all the last five to eight years. The appellant further agreed that for cancellation of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale and accordingly appellant issued executed Ex.P.1 cheque to the respondent and accordingly the appellant executed cancellation endorsement Ex.P.8 on the back side of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale. The appellant admitted the issue of Ex.P.1 cheque by the appellant to the respondent, towards discharge of the aforesaid debt payable to the respondent by the appellant. The appellant admitted that in order to
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 18 appellant’s liability, the appellant issued Ex.P.1 cheque towards his liability delivering the property. The appellant admitted his signature on Ex.P.1 cheque and also admitted the issue of the same to the respondent mentioning the same in Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement. The appellant admitted the bounce of cheque as per Ex.P.2 bankers memo. The appellant further admitted that he did not pay any amount either after the notice got issued to the appellant by the respondent i.e., original of Ex.P.3 or after the receipt of summons from the Court till now. He further argued that the word
Security means safeguard for any transaction or for any amount that may arise in future in relating to the business and like nature. He further argued that in the present case, absolutely there is no question of amount derivation or transaction in future in any manner whatsoever. In fact, even as per the case of the appellant, the amount that the appellant is liable to pay to the respondent is derived on the date of Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement and accordingly Ex.P.1 cheque is issued towards part satisfaction of the same.
There is no question of future transactions in the above case in any manner whatsoever and so for the same, the question of security also does not arise, which itself cuts the entire case of the appellant in all the ways. Further, except the present transaction on hand, there are no any other transactions in between the appellant and the respondent and so also, the question of security does not arise under any circumstances in any manner whatsoever.
There is no mention in Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement, which execution is admitted by the Appellant that the cheque is issued for the purpose of security and not for the discharge of the debt amount payable to the respondent in any manner whatsoever. The word ‘security’ is not at all included in Ex.P.7 in any manner whatsoever. The appellant also admitted that “the appellant did not address any letter to the respondent stating that appellant issued Ex.P.1 cheque for security purpose and not to present the same for collection”. The appellant did not plead anywhere till now that
Ex.P.1 cheque is issued towards security only and not otherwise in any
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 19 manner whatsoever including in the civil suit got filed by the respondent against the appellant and others. He further argued that the address mentioned in Ex.P.3 lawyer;’s notice, Ex.P.4 cover returned belongs to the appellant only and the appellant in the cross-examination also admitted the same clearly specifically stating that “the address noted on the postal covers is that of his address”. The address on Exs.P.3 and P.4 are one and the same and the same is included in the complaint got filed by the respondent. For the same address, the appellant received summons from the Court. As such, absolutely there is no any wrong mention of the address of the appellant in any manner whatsoever and the respondent with clean hands has got served the registered cover with acknowledgement due to the correct address of the appellant only. As per the endorsement on Ex.P.4, it could be observed that clearly the intimation is given to the appellant by the postal authorities, but the appellant for the reasons best known to him failed to receive the cover and failed to take necessary steps with this regard and as such, unclean hands of the appellant is clearly visible and the said allegations alleged by the appellant should be struck off in all the ways. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant prays to dismiss the appeal by conforming the calendar and Judgment passed by the trial Court.
20.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant also filed
additional written arguments and argued that Ex.P.1 was issued by the
accused towards legally enforceable debt. Originally, the contract in between the appellant and the respondent is on basis of Ex.P.7 Agreement of sale. So, the aggrieved party under the said contract of agreement of sale can opt for any relief under the specific performance. Admittedly the said building in question is in the same state of condition from the date it is collapsed at about seven years back till now and no steps are taken for construction or removal of the structures. The appellant himself admitted that the specific performance of Ex.P.7 agreement of sale is not at all possible. So, the only option available for the respondent is the other mode
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 20 of specific performance i.e., refund of the advance sale consideration. As per
Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement, if the cheque is enchased the Ex.P.7 agreement of sale is cancelled and if not agreement holds good. In this case, the cheque in question is not encashed, so the agreement under Ex.P.7 is not cancelled and the same is in force. As the agreement of sale is in force, the aggrieved party can seek for relief of specific performance for registration of the property, or can seek relief of refund of advance sale consideration.
Since the building was totally collapsed, the relief of registration of property is not possible due to untowards incident, therefore, the only option available to the respondent is for refund of advance sale consideration for which the present cheque in question under Ex.P.1 is issued by the appellant.
Therefore, absolutely Ex.P.1 cheque was issued towards the discharge of refund of advance sale consideration, which is another mode of specific performance and the same is also legally enforceable. Therefore, the provisions of the N.I. Act apply to the present case on hand. Under the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, the respondent is entitled for refund of advance sale consideration amount, which is a legally enforceable debt. If the appellant really did not have any criminal intention to evade the amount payable to the respondent, what prevented the appellant to pay the amount payable to the respondent immediately after receipt of the summons from the trial Court, during the trial before the trial
Court, after conviction held by the trial Court and even during the time of hearing before this Court. Even now the appellant failed to pay the amount to the respondent, that itself is sufficient to show that the appellant is with criminal intention under the provisions of the N.I. Act and therefore, the appellant is liable for conviction. In respect of Ex.P.1 cheque amount, the respondent filed a civil suit against the appellant in Visakhapatnam Court for recovery of said legally enforceable debt and in the said suit, it was ordered for refund of amount payable to the respondent. Therefore, the respondent
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 21 prays to dismiss the above appeal by confirming the calendar and Judgment passed by the trial Court.
21.in order to prove or support the contents in the complaint and to substantiate the averments therein, the complainant herein adduced his evidence during the course of trial and he himself was examined as P.W.1 in the above case. P.W.1 filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of his chief- examination by reiterating the averments of all the complaint filed by him and all the supportive documents are marked as Exs.P.1 to P.8. During the course of cross-examination of P.W.1, it was elicited that the accused signed the agreement of sale on behalf of Sudhakar Burlangi in the capacity of
G.P.A. Holder. Mr. Kola Balasubrahmam on behalf of Nagaja constructions as a Managing Partner signed the agreement of sale I.e, Ex.P.7 in his presence.
He admitted that in Ex.P.7 there is no clause or mention for refund of amount by the accused and others. He is aware that the top floor of the building was collapsed and on which 4th floor slab and 5th floor slab were collapsed. The accused and his partners approached him and requested him to take refund of the amount as they are not going to construct the building. He admitted that Ex.P.8 endorsement on Ex.P.7 it is mentioned that “both parties agreed to cancel this agreement by mutual consent subject to realization of the amounts. He admitted that he has filed a suit against the accused and his partners vide O.S.No.370/2008 on the file of the IV Addl., District Judge’s
Court, Visakhapatnam, claiming back the advance of Rs.31,00,000/- along with interest from the date of advance till the date of realization. As per the financial transactions prevailing in the market as he is entitled to claim interest. He denied the suggestion that the notices were not received by the accused and hence the case U/s.138 of N.I. Act is not maintainable. The handwriting of the cheque is that of the accused. He denied the suggestion that he is deposing false.
22.In support of the case of the defence, the accused himself examined as D.W.1. D.W.1 deposed that he is resident of Visakhapatnam
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 22 and he is doing business and he is a Contractor. Himself, one B.Sudhakar and M/s. Nagaja Constructions represented by its Managing Partner by name
Kola Balasubrahmanyam to an extent of 2069 square feet, out of which he owns and possess 669 square feet and B.Sudhakar owns 1100 square feet and Nagaja Cosntructions 300 owns square feet, respectively. He knows the complainant. They proposed to raise constructions to multi store department in the name and style of Madhava constructions. The complainant approached him to purchase a commercial space of 1600 square feet in 2nd floor, along with Car parking for a sum of Rs.43,00,000/- as an advance of Rs.31,00,000/- was paid towards advance in different spells.
They executed Ex.P.7 in favour of the complainant. There is no clause mentioned in Ex.P.7 for cancellation agreement or any default clause.
Subsequently they have commenced constructions of the multi storeyed constructions. Unfortunately at the time of laying in the 5th floor slabbed on 06.1.2008 the slab was collapsed and due to which two slabs were already collapsed. He has invested total amount in the construction. The said slab was collapsed due to the fault of L & T Limited to lay the slab, on contract basis. He also filed suit for damages against the said L & T Limited, then the complainant approached him to complete work but the same will not be done due to the circumstances prevailing and the complainant asked a cheque for security purpose. He has given Ex.P.1 for security purpose. As per their understandings, if the cheque is encashing the agreement was cancelled and in event of the cheque is not cancelled, the agreement is hold good. We have mentioned the said understandings vide Ex.P.8 on Ex.P.7. He further deposed that he has issued the cheque only for the purpose of security but not towards repayment. He has not received any notice in this case. The complainant also filed a suit vide O.S.No.370/2008 on the file of the Hon’ble IV Addl., District Judge’s Court, Visakhapatnam and obtained attachment orders of the site and remaining constructions. He has not committed any criminal breach of trust or any original liability. He further
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 23 stated that as the complainant and some others filed suits and obtained attachments of the property before the Judgment, he could not raise funds, and hence he could not take steps for making further constructions.
23.During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, it was elicited that on 06.1.2008 the entire upper three slabs were collapsed. So far they did not make any further steps to reconstruct the building. They filed a suit against L & T Cement for recovery of damages of Rs.60,00,000/- and odd.
The total cost of the construction of the entire building is about
Rs.5,50,000/-. In order to his liability, he issued Ex.P.1 cheque delivering the property. The address noted on the postal covers is that of his address. He did not address any letter to his Banker requesting that if at all the complainant present the cheque in question in the Bank, not to honour the same as he issued as a security purpose. He did not address any letter to the complainant stating that he issued the cheque for a security purpose and not to present the same for collection. He denied the suggestion that in order to discharge that his liability that is the debt amount of Rs.31,00,000/- payable to the complainant, he issued Ex.P.1 cheque and now in order to evade his liability, he is speaking false. He denied the suggestion that he issued Ex.P.1 cheque in order to discharge the legally enforceable debt amount of liability. He denied the suggestion that the cheque was not issued for security purpose. They agreed to construct the entire building and agreed to deliver the respective portions to the complainant within 18 months from the date of agreement. He admitted that as on today it is not possible to execute register sale deed in favour of the complainant in terms of EX.P.7 agreement.
24.In this Appeal, the accused/appellant filed a petition U/s.391 of
Cr.P.C., vide Crl.M.P.No.295/2014 in Crl.A.No.55/2013 before this Court praying to summon the postal authorities/postman concerned to give evidence regarding the service of the statutory notice on the addressee, as per the endorsement on the postal cover. After enquiry and after hearing
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 24 both sides, this Court allowed the said petition, on 25.2.2016. The Postman is examined as R.W.2. R.W.2 deposed that he is resident of visakhapatnam and he is working as Postman at Andhra University, Visakhapatnam since 15 years. He received summons from the Court to give evidence. He used to serve letter within the area of Dasapalla, Visakhapatnam. He took Ex.P.4 postal cover to serve on the appellant/accused on 17.8.2008. Since the door of the appellant/accused was locked, he endorsed the same and he endorsed thereon addressee on camp deposit six days and after seven days, he has made an endorsement that addressee long camp, hence returned to sender.
25.During the course of cross-examination of R.W.2, he admitted that so far as delivery of registered covers and articles, a separate delivery sheet will be maintained and obtained signature of the person to whom he delivered the cover and in the event of failure of delivery of the cover for any reason, the reasons will be mentioned on the said sheet. He did not bring the said sheet and it was in the custody of their office. At first, he has written the served letters on sheet and thereafter, he had written the same on the cover at post office. The address of the appellant/accused on Ex.P.4 is true and correct. He came to know that the appellant/accused is on camp on the day he went to serve Ex.P.4 postal cover from the neighbour of the appellant/accused orally. He enquired the neighbour of the appellant/accused and got information to endorse the same on Ex.P.4 postal cover. He has face acquaintance with the appellant.
26.The main contention of the appellant/accused is that the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque to the complainant as a collateral security, but not for legally enforceable debt and in the agreement through Ex.P.8 endorsement it is clearly mentioned that the “Agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque” as the cheque is not encashed, the agreement got valid and restored and is not cancelled. Hence, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for specific performance of contract, directing the appellant/accused to deliver a flat as Ex.P.7
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 25 agreement stipulates the condition of only delivering the flat after its construction. In the ghastly incident of collapse of building, two persons were died, sentimentally no person is coming forward to proceed with the construction including the present complainant. Hence, the appellant is entitled for acquittal. It is pertinent to note that Ex.P.1 cheque was issued by the accused to the complainant towards discharge of amount under Ex.P.7 agreement entered in between the complainant and accused and hence, it comes under legally enforceable debt and also comes under other liability.
When once the cheque is issued by the accused, it is the bounden duty of the accused to keep sufficient funds to facilitate for encashment of Ex.P.1 cheque.
27.P.W.1 was cross-examined by the learned counsel for the accused at length but nothing was elicited in support of the defence and nothing could be proved against the case and contents of the complainant, thus the accused has utterly failed to prove his defence in proper perspective. The contention of defence raised by the accused herein has no legs to stand and there is no iota of truth and not tenable and the unsustainable defence is raised only with an intention to escape from his liability thereby to cause and suffer financial loss and mental agony to the complainant herein. P.W.1 has adduced sufficient oral and documentary evidence on record in support of his case which is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the accused failed to prove his contention and was not able to adduce even any rebuttal evidence in the case on hand in support of his evidence as there was no proper defence and further failed to prove his burden. The contention of the accused is, it is clearly mentioned in the agreement through Ex.P.8 endorsement that the “Agreement is cancelled subject to the encashment of the cheque” as the cheque is not encashed, the agreement got valid and restored and is not cancelled. Hence, the respondent/complainant has to file a suit for specific performance of contract, directing the appellant/accused to deliver a flat as Ex.P.7 agreement stipulates the condition of only delivering
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 26 the flat after its construction. The said contention and defence raised by the accused has no legs to stand and it is not helpful and useful to the accused herein as he failed to prove such contention/defence. The address of the accused mentioned in the notice and the address mentioned in the summon/notice issued by this Court are one and the same and as such it is very clear that there is no dispute regarding to the address of the accused.
R.W.2, who is the postman categorically stated that he took Ex.P.4 postal cover to serve on the appellant/accused on 17.8.2008 and since the door of the appellant/accused was locked, he endorsed the same and he endorsed thereon addressee on camp deposit six days and after seven days he has made an endorsement that addressee long camp, hence returned to sender.
During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, who is the accused herein, he categorically admitted that the address noted on the postal covers is that of his address. Hence, when once the complainant sent the statutory notice under Ex.P.3 to the correct address, the burden shifts on the accused to show that he is not residing in the said address. The accused never denied the execution of Exs.P.1, P.7 and P.8. D.W.1 admitted in his cross-examination that the signatures shown on Ex.P.7 are relating to himself and he signed as
G.P.A. Holder of B.Sudhakar and 3rd signature relating to managing partner of
Nagaja Constructions. He also admitted that he signed on Ex.P.8 endorsement on behalf of himself and on behalf of B.Sudhakar G.P.A. Holder and both the signatures on Ex.P.1 are relating to him, which proves the case of the complainant herein. The accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque in connection with transaction under Ex.P.7 agreement, knowing fully that the accused closed the said Account with a dishonest intention. Since Ex.P.1 cheque is issued by the accused to the complainant as per the terms of Ex.P.7 agreement, it is legally enforceable debt. The findings and observations of the trial Court are in correct lines and the trial Court rightly convicted the accused for the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 27
28.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, reported in II (2010) B.C. 693, (three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court) held that:
“Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act does indeed include the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability and it is rebuttal presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is initial presumption which favours the complainant.
Sec.139 of N.I. Act is example for reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative object of improving the credibility of negotiable instrument.”
29.When the accused is not disputing his signature on Ex.P.1 cheque, as per the decision of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, reported in II (2010) B.C. 693, Sec.139 of N.I. Act does indeed include the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability and it is rebuttal presumption and it is open to accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested.
30.As per the decision of our Hon’ble Supreme Court, rendered in
R.Rajendran vs. A.J. Yuvaraj Reddy and another, reported in 2012 (2)
ALD (Crl.) 682 and Anil Dagwale, vs. K.Raju and Another reported in 2003 (1) ALD (Crl.) 276, once accused admitted his signatures on cheque, even though blank cheques were issued, burden lies on accused why he issued said cheques to complainant. In such cases, examination of complainant alone is sufficient and there is no need for any corroboration evidence from the side of complainant to prove the legally enforceable debt.
31.After considering the above case Law, it is clear that once the accused admitted his signature on cheque or proved by complainant that the signature on cheque in question is the signature of the accused, the presumption U/s.139 of N.I. Act is in favour of the complainant and that the said cheque was issued to discharge legally enforceable debt or obligation
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 28 and the burden shifts on accused to prove that the said cheque was not issued to discharge the legally enforceable debt or obligation. Ex.P.3 is office copy of Lawyer’s notice dated 19.09.2008 got issued by the complainant to the accused, demanding him to pay the cheque amount. But the same was returned to the Complainant as “Addressee Long Camp”. Therefore, the accused has committed the offence under Sec.138 of N.I. Act. It is the case of the complainant that the accused being fully aware of the issuance of cheque in order to clear the debt, evaded to honour the same, which attracts an offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act. Hence, the accused is liable for punishable U/s.138 of N.I.Act.
32. Mere raising bald allegations against without any proof cannot be believable. During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, he stated that immediately after receipt of summons from this Court in this case at the 1st appearance or even subsequently he did not file any memo or petition
before this Court stating that the cheque issued for security purpose and not
for discharge of debt amount payable to the complainant. If really the accused did not issue Ex.P.1 cheque to the complainant for collateral security, what prevented to the accused to file a petition before this Court in support of his said contention, but he kept quiet. Mere non-issuance of reply itself is not absolute proof of case of the complainant, but it is one of the circumstances probablize the correctness of the case of the complainant.
After considering the oral evidence of P.W.1 and inaction on the part of the accused, this Court is of considered opinion that the complainant proved that the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque to the complainant in discharge of legally enforceable debt and liability in terms of agreement under Ex.P.7 and the said cheque was bounced due to “Insufficient Funds”.
33.In an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, once the complainant has proved the drawing of the cheque, presentation of the cheque into the Bank, return of the cheque unpaid by the drawee Bank, giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding the payment
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 29 of the cheque amount and failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of receipt of the notice, the statutory presumptions under Sec.118 and 139 of N.I. Act will arise in favour of the complainant. Under Sec.118(a) of the N.I. Act, the Court shall presume that the negotiable instrument has been drawn for consideration. Under Sec.139 of the N.I. Act, the Court shall presume that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. The meaning and expression ‘shall presume’ has been explained in Section 4 of Indian
Evidence Act. Wherever it is provided by any Act that the Court ‘shall presume’ a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. Thus, the presumptions under Section 118 and 139 of N.I. Act are rebuttable presumptions. The burden of proof to rebut the said presumptions is upon the accused.
34.The learned counsel for the complainant contended that the accused issued cheque in favour of the complainant to discharge the liability under Ex.P.7. He submitted that the object of Sec.138 of N.I. Act is to enhance the credibility or acceptability of cheques, it is immaterial that the cheque was issued for discharge of his own debt or liability. Therefore, P.W.1 has established the essential ingredients of the offence U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
35.With regard to receiving of statutory notice, the learned counsel
for the appellant/accused contends that the statutory notice has not been
served on the accused, and the complainant managed postal authorities to get it returned, as such the complaint is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. Whereas, the learned counsel for the complainant argued that
Ex.P.3 lawyer’s notice was sent by registered post acknowledgement due to the correct address of the accused, but the accused failed to take the said notice and the said notice was returned on 27.09.2008 with an endorsement “Addressee Long camp”. R.W.2, who is the Postman, stated in his evidence that he took Ex.P.4 postal cover to serve on the appellant/accused on 17.08.2008 and since the door of the appellant/accused was locked, he
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 30 endorsed the same and he endorsed thereon, address on camp, hence returned to sender, deposit six days and after seven days he made endorsement that addressee long camp hence returned to sender. The accused intentionally avoided the service of summons, though the the complainant sent Ex.P.3 legal notice to the correct address of the accused.
Hence, by drawing presumption of service U/s.27 of General Clauses Act, the notice is deemed to have been served on the accused. For detailed appreciation, it is necessary to reproduce Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows :
“Sec.27:- Meaning of service by post:- Where any
Central Act or regulation made after commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘serve’ or either of expressions ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing preparing and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”.
36. The principle incorporation in Sec.27 of General Clauses Act is that, once the notice has been dispatched by registered post by the sender, then it shall be deemed to have been served on the addressee unless the addressee proves that it was not really served and that he was not responsible for non-service. In this connection, this court relied upon a decision reported in Vanama Srinivasa Rao Vs. State of A.P. (L.C.2012 (14) A.P., 128). In the above cited case, the Hon’ble High Court reiterated the settled position of law that once a notice has been sent by registered post to the correct address, then it must be presumed that the service has been effected.
37.In respect of service of statutory notice on the accused, this
Court relied on the following citation :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 31
N. Parameswaran Unni Vs. g. Kannan and others, reported in 2017 (2) ALT (Crl) 366 (SC), wherein it was held at Para-15 of the
Judgment, as follows :
“Sec.138 of N.I. Act – Proof of Service of Notice – Sec.28 of General
Clauses Act – Sec.114 of Evidence Act. When a notice is sent by registered Post and is returned with postal endorsement of Refused –
Not Available in the House – House Locked – Shop closed – Addressee
Not in Station – due service has to be presumed. Once a notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing to the drawer of the cheque, the service of notice is deemed to have been effected”.
During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, who is the accused herein, he categorically admitted that the address noted on the postal cover is that of his address. When the accused himself admitted that he is residing in the same address as mentioned in Ex.P.4 unserved postal address, when once a notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing to the drawer of the cheque, who is the accused herein, the service of notice is deemed to have been effected. Hence, the above citation is aptly applicable to the present case on hand.
38.Thus, it is clear that P.W.1 has sent the legal notice to the house of the accused. The conditions pertaining to the notice to be given to the drawer have been incorporated in clauses (b) and (c) or the proviso to
Section 138 of the Act which reads as follows :
“(b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, and the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice”.
39. In the present case, admittedly the address mentioned on
Exs.P.4 returned postal cover and the address mentioned on Ex.P.3 lawyer’s notice, as well as the complaint are one and the same. As seen from the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 32 record, the Court summons sent by registered post to the same address have been served on the accused. Therefore, this is a clear case, where the accused has successfully avoided the receipt of statutory notice dispatched to his correct address. This kind of behaviour by trickster drawer of the cheque cannot be encouraged by the Courts. Therefore, this Court holds that the accused has failed to rebut the presumption under Section 27 of
General Clauses Act with respect to service to statutory notice to him and hence, the notice is deemed to have been served on the accused.
40.In respect of the service of Ex.P.3 legal notice is concerned, the learned counsel for the accused relied on the following citations :
(1) V. Raja Kumari Vs. P. subbarama Naidu & Another, reported in 2004 (8) SCC 774, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that :
“Meaning of service by post – Where any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘service’ or either of the expression ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, preparing and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”.
(2)Pradeep Madhukar Poinguinkar Vs. Shri Manguesh
Kuttalkar Another, in Criminal Appeal No.57/2005, of the Hon’ble
Bombay High Court, wherein his Lordship held that :
“The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the warrant was executed on the said address at Rumdamol, Davorlim, Salcete in spite of the fact that the person who had gone to execute the warrant and had made the said endorsement was not examined and the said endorsement was otherwise not clear as to the place from which the accused was arrested. It is quite probable that the accused was arrested from a place other than the address mentioned herein above. The learned trial Court also observed that
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 33 the accused had managed to return the registered A.D. by the Postal
Authorities and this the learned trial Court did without any evidence being led in that regard. On the other hand, the learned first
Appellate Court observed that the presumption available under section 27 of the General Clauses Act was a rebuttable presumption.
The learned first appellate Court noted that the postal article was not returned in the case at hand, by the Postal Authorities with the remark refused or unclaimed or addresses absent at the given address but that it was returned with the remark insufficient address, return to sender. The learned first Appellate Court noted that on the face of the said remark it only meant that the postman did not get a chance to see whether the addressee was there or not to find out whether he was refusing or accepting the service. The learned first
Appellate Court also observed that the learned trial Court had made a serious allegation against the postmaster (sic postman) and that the complainant in the complaint nor in his evidence had stated that the accused had managed to return the cheques (sic postal article) by managing the Postal Authorities and therefore there was no presumption of any such management with the Postal Authority. The learned first Appellate Court referred to section 114 of the Evidence
Act, and in my view rightly, to draw a presumption that official acts have been regularly performed. A postman is a Public Officer. The postman had returned the postal article with the endorsement insufficient address, return to sender. The said endorsement showed that the postman had not even made an attempt to serve the address/accused with the said postal article and on the contrary the accused had himself stepped into the witness box and categorically stated that he had not received the said article. In the light of the absence of necessary averments, the said endorsement and the categorical evidence given by the accused, it should not be said that the complainant had duly served the statutory notice upon the accused. Reliance placed on the cases of (v.Satyanarayana v. A.P.
Travel and Tourism Development ltd. And another) 1, 1997 (Crimes 349 and (V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu and another) 2, 2005 (1) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) (S.C.) 730 : A.I.R.2005 S.C. 109 is of no assistance to the case of the Complainant. The view held by the learned first
Appellate Court is a correct view of the matter in the facts and circumstances of the case. There was no question of presumption of service being drawn when the postman had himself returned the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 34 postal article for insufficient address. No interference is called for in this appeal. Hence, the same is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed”.
(3) Ramesh Chand Vs Ravinder Singh Chandel, reported in 2007
CriL.J. 1313, wherein it was held that :
“It may be that the address is correct and even the addressee is available but a wrong endorsement is manipulated by the addressee. In such a case, if the facts are proved, it may amount to refusal of the notice. If the complainant is able to prove that the drawer of the cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got a false endorsement made only to defeat the process of law, the Court shall presume service of notice. Thus, however, is a matter of evidence and proof. Thus even in a case where the notice is returned with the endorsement that the premises has always been found locked or the addressee was not available at the time of postal delivery, it will be open to the complainant to prove at the trial by evidence that the endorsement is not correct and that the addressee, namely, the drawer of the cheque, with knowledge of the notice had deliberately avoided to receive notice”.
(4) D. Vinod Shivappa, Vs. Nanda Belliappa, reported in 2006 (4)
Supreme 540 wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that :
“(i) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138(b) – dishonour of Cheque – Demand notice to appellant-accused was returned with endorsement “addressee always absent during delivery time. Hence returned to sender” - In other cases notices were returned with endorsement “party not in station. Arrival not known” - Petition in question proceedings and complaint – High
Court dismissed petition – Appeal – Complainant stated that notice may be deemed to have been served – Whether appellant in the circumstances could pray for quashing of proceedings ? No –
Question where posted endorsement showed that notice could not be served on account of non-availability of addressee, whether cause of action could arise for prosecution on basis of deemed service – Question could be answered by reference to facts of each case and no rule of universal application could be laid down – In interpreting a statute court must adopt that construction which
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 35 suppressed mischief and advanced the remedy – Proviso to Section 138(b) was meant to protect honest drawers – If complainant was able to prove that drawer of cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got false endorsement made only to defeat process of law, Court shall presume service of notice –
These were all questions of facts and it would be premature to move High Court for quashing of proceedings.
Held : The question is whether in a case of this nature, where the postal endorsement shows that th8e notice could not be served on account of the non availability of the addressee, a cause of action may still arise for prosecution of the drawer of the cheque on the basis of deemed service of notice under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act. In our view this question has to be answered by reference to the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down that in all cases where notice is not served on account of non-availability of the addressee, the court must presume service of notice.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the drawer may by dubious means manage to get an incorrect endorsement made on the envelope that the parties has been found locked or that the addressee was not available at the time when postman went for delivery of the letter. It may be thaet the address is correct and even the addressee is available but a wrong endorsement is manipulated by the addressee. In such a case, if the facts are proved, it may amount to refusal of the notice. If the complainant is able to prove that the drawer of the cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got a false endorsement made only to defeat the process of law, the Court shall presume service of notice. This, however, is a matter of evidence and proof. Thus even in a case where the notice is returned with the endorsement that the premises has always been found locked or the addressee was not available at the time of postal delivery, it will be open to the complainant to prove at the trial by evidence that the endorsement is not correct and that the addressee, namely the drawer of the cheque, with knowledge of the notice had deliberately avoided to receive notice”.
(5) Jai Durga Enterprises Through Its … Vs. State of U.P. and
Indo Automobiles, reported in 2006 Cri L.J. 3312, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court held that :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 36 “Therefore, it is essential that service upon registered notice should be affected in absence of registered post. It shall not be presumed that there is sufficient service regarding notice sent by U.P.C, and it cannot be taken into account under Section 27 of the Act that there was sufficient service upon the accused/appellants. Although, it has been denied by the applicant that no any notice was received by them in the affidavit and same has not been controverted by filing counter affidavit. Therefore, it is liable to be deemed that there was no sufficient service of legal notice upon the applicants/accused. On this basis, the impugned order passed by the court below is liable to be quashed”.
(6) S.S. Ummul Habiba,Vs. B. Rajendran, reported in 2005 (1)
ALD Cri 33, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, held that :
“On 19.12.1992, the accused issued Ex.P.3-Lawyer’s notice demanding the amount due on the cheque. The accused intentionally evaded service of the notice and the notice returned to the sender with the endorsement “intimation given; not claimed”. Since the accused evaded the service of notice, it must be deemed to be constructive notice and sufficient service of notice on the accused. The accused failed to pay the cheque amount till 15.1.1993. Hence, the Complaint was filed against the accused under Section 138 of N.I. Act”.
(7) Yadav Chandra sharma, v. Gyanendra Singh Kushwah, reported in 2017 0 Supreme (MP) 781, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – S.138 – General
Clauses Act, 1897 – S.27 – Evidence Act, 1872 – Ss.101 and 103 –
Case of dishonour of cheque – Petitioner stated that he never received notice sent by respondent – He specifically alleged regarding interpolation over acknowledgement card – Petitioner’s application for calling postman as witness allowed”.
(8) Parimal Vs. Veena @ Bharti, reported in 2011 (3) SCC 545, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, held that :
“There is presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 37 doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the Court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service.
The provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act provide that the burden of proof of the facts rests on the party who substantially asserts it and not on the party who denies it. In fact, burden of proof means that a party has to prove an allegation
before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour Section 103
provides that burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any special law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The provision of Section 103 amplifies the general rule of Section 101 that the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the affirmative of the facts in issue”.
The address of the appellant/accused as mentioned in Ex.P.3 registered lawyer’s notice; Ex.P.4 returned cover, address mentioned in the complaint and the summons issued by the Court, are one and the same. For the same address, the appellant received summons from the Court. As such, absolutely there is no any wrong mention of the address of the appellant in any manner whatsoever and the respondent with clean hands has got served the registered cover with acknowledgement due to the correct address of the appellant only. Hence, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, preparing and posting by registered post. The facts of the above cited cases are different from the present case on hand.
41.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant argued that the notice is sent to the correct address of the accused and absolutely the appellant except denying the same did not rebut the same and as such, as per the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the notice is deemed service on the appellant/accused. In support of his contention he relied on the following citation 2000 (1) ALT (Crl) 42 (SC), wherein it was held that :
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 38 “Under General Clauses Act, 1987, Section 27, -
Meaning of service by post – Where sender of notice dispatched by post with the correct address, notice must be deemed to have been served on the sendee, unless he rebuts it – in the case of hand, notice deemed to have been served”.
The above citation is applicable to the present case on hand, since in the present case on hand also the complainant sent the notice to the accused to his correct address and the accused, who is examined as D.W.1 also admitted in his cross-examination that the address noted on the postal cover is that of his address. Hence, as the complainant sent legal notice to the correct address of the accused, the notice must be deemed to have been served on the accused.
42.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant further argued that a person who does not pay within fifteen days of receipt of summons from the Court along with a copy of the complaint, cannot contend that there was no proper service of notice by ignoring statutory presumption.
In view of his above said contention, he relied on the following citation 2007 (6) SCC 555, wherein it was held that :
“Remedy for person who claims that he did not receive notice sent by post is that the Appellant may pay the amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment of cheque amount within fifteen days of the receipt of summons and a person who does not pay within fifteen days of receipt of summons from the
Court along with a copy of the complaint, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice by ignoring statutory presumption under section 27 of General Clause Act and
Section 114 of Evidence Act”.
In the present case on hand also the appellant failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days of the receipt of summons and hence, he cannot contend that there was no proper service of notice as per the provisions of
Sec.27 of General Clauses Act and Sec.114 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Hence, the above citation is applicable to the present case on hand.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 39
43.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant further argued that the appellant/accused who is doing real estate business received advance amount promising to allot flat to the respondent/complainant but he could not fulfill his promise and so he is liable to pay the advance amount received as sale consideration and the cheque in question was endorsed in favour of the respondent in acknowledgement of the said liability, as such the respondent is holder in due course. In support of his contention, he relied on a citation i.e., 1994 Madras Law Journal (Cri) 112, wherein it was held that :
“Appellants, who are real estate dealers, had received amounts promising to sell three grounds of land but could not fulfill that promise and so were liable to pay the amount received as sale consideration. The cheques in question were endorsed in favour of Respondent in acknowledgement of the said liability. As such the respondent is “holder in due course”. Held in view of the allegations in the complaint, the submission that there was no legally enforceable debt and the cheques were not issued to discharge and so the offence is not made out, fails”.
In the present case also the appellant/accused received advance amount with a promise to allot a flat to the complainant, but he failed to allot the same and the cheque in question was endorsed in favour of respondent is “holder in due course”. Hence, it is legally enforceable debt. Hence, the above citation is applicable to the present case on hand.
44. The main core contention of the appellant/accused is that the cheque was issued by him to the respondent/complainant towards collateral security, as such the appellant has to seek the remedy through Civil Court only by filing a suit for specific performance of contract. It is pertinent to note that as seen from the entire material available on record and Ex.P.8 cancellation endorsement towards cancellation of Ex.A.7 agreement, in which it was mentioned that due to tragic incident occurred on 06.1.2008 in which the schedule property building was collapsed, decided to cancel the agreement by mutual consent and hence, as per the understandings of both
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 40 parties of the agreement, the vendor refunding the advance sale consideration paid by the purchaser at the time of agreement and subsequent payment paid by the purchaser to the purchaser by way of cheque in favour of the purchaser towards full and final settlement of all claims of purchaser against the vendor including the refund of advance sale consideration paid by purchaser on the date of execution of the agreement.
In the said cancellation endorsement, it was further mentioned that both parties agreed to cancel the agreement by mutual consent subject to realization of the above mentioned cheque and no party of the agreement shall have any right against other party of the agreement, after the realization of the above mentioned cheque and the vendor is at liberty to offer the schedule property for sale to any other person at his will. Hence, on perusal of the above contents of Ex.A.8 cancellation endorsement, the above cheque was issued towards refund of advance amount which is liability of the accused, but it does not come under collateral purpose. Hence, in the contention raised by the accused holds no water.
45.In the present case, the accused is not disputing his signature on
Ex.P.1 cheque, therefore the statutory presumption U/s.118 of N.I. Act that the cheque has been drawn for consideration and under Sec.139 of N.I. Act that the cheque has been issued for the discharge of debt or liability will raise in favour of the complainant and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the said presumptions. The learned counsel for the accused cross- examined P.W.1 at length but nothing was elicited in favour of the accused.
Since the present case is a criminal case, the accused has to prove his contention by preponderance of probabilities by adducing some acceptable evidence before the Court. Though the accused himself examined as D.W.1 and also examined the postman on his behalf in this Appeal as R.W.2, the accused could not prove his contention. All the suggestions made to P.W.1 in his cross-examination were denied by P.W.1. Mere denial is not sufficient to prove his contention.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 41
46.The evidence on record established that the accused issued
Ex.P.1 cheque to discharge the liability and the same was dishonoured as “Funds Insufficient”. It is an admitted and proved fact that the complainant issued statutory notice under Ex.P.3 within the time, but the said notice of the accused was returned by the postal authorities as “Addressee Long
Camp” and the accused not arranged the funds in his account. Therefore, the complainant proved all the requirements to constitute the offence punishable U/s.138 of N.I. Act.
47.In the present case the complainant prove that the cheque given by the accused towards legally enforceable debt. It is also pertinent to note that once issuance of a cheque and signature thereon are admitted, presumption of a legally enforceable debt or other liability in favour of the holder of the cheque arises and accused may rebut the presumption, but mere statement of the accused may not be sufficient. In the present case the accused failed to discharge his burden of rebutting the presumption. The accused was under an obligation or liability to make payment to complainant under Ex.P.1 cheque, but he failed to make payment of said amount and cheque so issued by accused stood dishonoured for “Funds Insufficient”. It is also pertinent to note that mere fact that debtor has given security in form of post-dated cheque or current cheque with agreement that it is security for fulfillment of obligation to be discharged on date itself.
48.In a case in between K.N. Beena vs. Muniyappan & Another, reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 14, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that :
“U/sec.118 unless the contrary was proved, it is to be presumed that the Negotiable Instrument (including cheque) had been made and drawn for consideration. U/s.139, the Court has to presume unless the contrary was proved that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in hole or in part, of a debt or liability, thus, in a complaint U/s.138, the Court has to presume that the cheque had been issued for a debt or liability,
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 42 this presumption is rebuttable. However, the burden of proving that the cheque had not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused. Section 20 of Negotiable Instruments Act says that inchoate stamped instrument and states that if a person signs and delivers a paper stamped in accordance with law and either wholly blank or for written thereon an incomplete Negotiable
Instrument, such person thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete as the case may be upon it, the Negotiable Instrument for any amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by stamp. Sec.49 permits the holder of a Negotiable Instrument endorsed in blank to fill up the said instrument by writing upon the endorsement, the direction to pay any other person as endorsee and to complete the endorsement in the blank cheque, it makes it clear that doing for holder does not thereby incur the responsibility of an endorser as per Subhash Chand vs. Satish Varma, pages 1 to 16 on 12th May, 2016.”
49.In a case in between Rajendra vs. Usha Rani reported in (2001 L.W. (Crl.) 319), it was observed that :
“No law prescribes that in case of any Negotiable Instrument, the entire body of the instrument shall be written only by the maker or drawer of the instrument. Once the execution is admitted, it shall be taken that the cheque was issued by the accused in favour of the complainant towards the discharge of the liability even in case where the cheque was filled up by the some other person.”
50. Section 139 of the Act always in favour of the holder of the instrument. The Court shall presume the fact as proved till it is disproved.
Admittedly, the accused did not place any cogent evidence to rebut the presumption. No doubt the accused need not adduce positive evidence to rebut the presumption. But, in the present case, the complainant by examining himself as P.W.1, proved Ex.P.1 cheque.
51.If really the complainant also influenced the Postal Department at the time of serving notice and the complainant intentionally served the notice to him with wrong address, what prevented him to complain against the accused to the higher officials of the Postal Department for taking necessary action against the concerned postal officials, who supported the
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 43 complainant. Except mere bald statements, the accused could not prove his case with cogent and convincing evidence.
52.The learned counsel for the appellant/accused relied on the following citations :
(1) Nikhil P.Gandhi, Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, reported in 2016 0 Supreme (Gujarat) 908, wherein his Lordship of Hon’ble Gujarat
High Court held that :
“(A) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 –
Dishonour of cheque – A legal fiction, although is required to be given full effect, yet has its own limitations – It cannot be taken recourse to for any purpose other than one mentioned in statute itself – Section 138 provides for a penal provision – a penal provision created by reason of a legal fiction must receive strict construction – Such a penal provision, enacted in terms of legal fiction drawn, would be attracted when a cheque is returned by bank unpaid –
Before a proceeding thereunder is initiated, all legal requirements
therefor must be complied with – Court must be satisfied that all ingredients of commission of an offence under said provision have been complied with.
(B) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 –
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482 – Dishonour of cheque – Whenever a blank cheque or postdated cheque is issued, a trust is reposed that cheque will be filled in or used according to understanding agreement between parties – If there is a prima facie reason to believe that said trust is not honoured, then continuation of prosecution under Section 138 of N.I. Act would be abuse of process of law – It is in interest of justice that parties in such cases are left to civil remedy”.
(2) M/s. Indian Oil Corporation, Vs. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. &
Others, reported in 2006 (6) Supreme 66, wherein their Lordships of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, held that :
“While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purety civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 44 tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There isd also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement.
Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged”.
(3) All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. & Others, Vs. Dhanesh
Badarmal Jain & Another, reported in 2007 (12) SCALE 391, wherein it was held by the Hon’ble that :
“Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of finding out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie cannot notice the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other admitted documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is impermissible also to look to the admitted documents. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. Supreme Courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice”.
(4) M/s. Shakti Travel & Tours, Vs. State of Bihar & Another, reported in 2000 (7) Supreme 90, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that :
“The only ground on which the learned counsel for the
Appellant prays for quashing of the complaint is that on the assertions made in paragraph 8 of the complaint, it must be held that notice has not been served and, therefore, an application under
Section 138 could not have been maintained. Undoubtedly, the accused has a right to pay the money within 15 days from the date of the service of notice and only when it fails to pay, it is open for the complainant to file a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. That being the position and in the complaint itself having not been mentioned that the notice has been served, on the assertions made in paragraph-8, the complaint itself is not maintainable. We accordingly quash the complaint”.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 45
It is pertinent to note that initially when the complaint is filed by the respondent under the provisions of the N.I. Act, as per the provisions of the
Sections 138, 139 and 142 of N.I. Act, the initial presumption that the cheque was drawn for discharge of liability of drawer ought to be raised by the
Courts in every case and the Appellant to rebut the same has to prove the same by adducing cogent and convincing evidence and not by mere suggestions. On perusal of the facts of the above cited cases, the facts of the above cited cases are different from the facts of the present case on hand.
53.The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant argued that
Ex.P.1 cheque is not issued towards security as alleged by the respondent in any manner whatsoever. In support of his contention, the learned counsel
for the respondent/complainant relied on the following citations :
(1) 1998 Crl.L.J. 3228, wherein the Hon’ble High Court held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 118 (a) – Evidence
Act, Sec.114 – Cheque – Consideration – Presumption as to –
Drawer issued blank cheque as security for loan transaction –
Issuance of the cheque admitted – No dispute regarding signature amount and name shown in cheque – It can be presumed that cheque was supported by consideration – Presumption cannot be rebutted merely because there were some transactions between drawer and drawee of cheque”.
(2) AIR 2001 Supreme Court, 676, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act Ss.1 – Interpretation – Act to be interpreted in light of objectives to be achieved – Efforts to defeat objectives of law to be discouraged”.
(3) 2005 Crl.L.J. 314, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act Ss.138, 139 – Evidence Act, S.4 – Cheque issued towards balance sale consideration due under agreement of sale after delivery of possession of property agreed was given – covered under other liability – Burden would be on petitioners to establish that dishonoured cheque was not issued in discharge of debt or other liability – Respondent cannot be quashed against petitioner”.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 46 (4) 2005 Crl.L.J. 640, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act ss.138 – Dishonour of cheque –
Blank cheque drawn in favour of the Respondent as security for repayment of amount of amount that may become due – Necessary entries were made there in after verifying accounts on behalf of respondent with respect to outstanding liability – It became a cheque only on date when liability was acknowledged and entered in cheque – Respondent has proved a liability outstanding from respondent – Said cheque was bounced for want of funds is also not disputed – Respondent guilty of offence punishable under Sec.138”.
(5) AIR 2002 Supreme Court 182, wherein it was held that :
“Negotiable Instruments Act Ss.138, 139 – Cheque dishonour complaint – Not liable to be quashed on ground of dishonour of cheque by reason of stop payment instructions –
Presumption under Section 139 that cheque was received by holder for discharge of debt or liability arises – Presumption though is rebuttable”.
(6) AIR 2000 Supreme Court 1869, wherein it was held that :
“Complaint cannot be quashed merely on grounds that civil remedy is available”.
In the present case on hand the accused who is examined as D.W.1, admitted in his cross-examination that the signatures shown on Ex.P.7 are relating to himself and he signed as G.P.A. Holder of B.Sudhakar and 3rd signature relating to managing partner of Nagaja Constructions. He also admitted that he signed on Ex.P.8 endorsement on behalf of himself and on behalf of B.Sudhakar G.P.A. Holder and both the signatures on Ex.P.1 are relating to him, hence there is no dispute regarding signature, amount and name shown in cheque and it can be presumed that cheque was supported by consideration. The cheque was bounced for want of funds is also not disputed.
54.Burden of proving that the cheque had not been issued for any debt or liability is on the accused. Mere denial that the cheque was not issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability in the absence of any sufficient evidence, does not shift the burden to the complainant.
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 47
55. When the accused contended that he did not issue the cheque in discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability, it is for the accused to disprove the presumption regarding the same, in this connection, it is apt to refer a decision reported in Sudhir Sabharawal v. Anil Prabhakar
Nilgirwar1 wherein it was held that:
“(10).Wherever the person accused of offence under Section 138 of the Act intends to plead that there did not exist legally enforceable debt, it is for him to place such material before the Court in the form of oral and documentary evidence as is sufficient and adequate to neutralize the presumption provided for under Section 139 of the Act. In the present case, except deposing that there did not exist any such legally enforceable debt or liability, the petitioner did not come forward with any acceptable and reliable evidence. Therefore, having regard to the presumption provided for under Section 139 of the Act, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hiten p. Dalai case (supra), and in the absence of rebuttal by the petitioner, the Courts below were left with no alternative except to continue with the presumption as to the existence of the debt in favour of the respondent. The Court is not persuaded to take a different view.”
56.In M.S. Narayana Vs State of Karnataka 2 while dealing with the legal position, regarding the standard of proof required for rebutting a presumption, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, in a case under Sec.
138 of NI Act, 1881 Hon’ble Supreme Court, held that, the presumptions under Sec. 118(a) and 139 of the Act are rebuttable and the standard of proof required for such rebuttal is preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond all reasonable doubt.
Her Lordship Further observed:
“The standard of proof evidentially is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of probabilities can be drawn not only from the material on record, but also by reference to the circumstances upon which, he relies.
Her Lordship Further held:
1 2003 (2) ALD (Cri) 237 22007(1) ALT (Crl) 103(SC) = 2006(6) SCC 39
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 48 “Rebuttal evidence does not have to be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced before Court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonable being that of the prudent man.”
57.This Court relied on the following citation :
Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa, reported in 2019 (3) ALT (SC) 62 (D.B.), wherein it was held that :
“Signature on cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability”.
In the present case on hand, since the accused issued a cheque bearing No.090584 dt.25.4.2008 for a sum of Rs.31,00,000/- in favour of the complainant for return of the advance amount received by him from P.W.1 towards purchase of a Flat and subsequently the said cheque was dishonoured due to “Funds Insufficient” in the Account of the accused and the accused also not denied his signature on the said cheque. Hence, the accused issued the said cheque to P.W.1 towards discharge of liability.
58. To decide the issue whether the accused issued the cheque to the complainant towards discharge of debt or liability, this Court also relied on the following citation :
Madan Tiwari Vs. State of Chattisgarh, reported in CRR
No.56 of 2010, of the Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, wherein it was held at Paras-9 & 10 that :
(Para-9) “We have given due consideration to the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the observations of this Court in Indus Airways (P) Ltd. V. Magnum Aviation (P) Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539:(2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 138:(2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 845 with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act and the expression “for discharge of any debt or liability” occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the view that the question whether a post-dated cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature of transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the section is attracted and not otherwise”.
(Para-10) “Reference to the Facts of the present case clearly shows that though the word “security” I used in Clause 3.1(iii) of
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 49 the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being towards repayment of installments. The repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the installment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on 28.02.2002 which was prior to the date of the cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and installments have fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability”. In the present case also, as on the date of issue of cheque by the accused to the complainant, there is existence of liability on the accused for return of the amount received by him from the complainant towards purchase of a Flat and in that connection, the accused issued the said cheque to the complainant and hence, the amount covered under the cheque is legally recoverable by the complainant from the accused, which is an outstanding liability, and hence, Sec.138 of N.I. Act is attracted in the present case on hand.
59. The presumption U/s.139 of NI Act is a rebuttable presumption.
It is not for the complainant to prove that the accused had issued the cheque, in question, in discharge of legally enforceable debt and that unless the contra is proved, mere holding the cheque itself is sufficient to presume that the cheque was issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt. In the connection, it is pertinent to refer to the decision reported in M/s. Greaves
Limited v. Leo Electronics Organization Others3,wherein it was held that:
“Presumption provided under S.138 is a rebuttable presumption and that Under S.139 it is not for complainant to prove that Cheques have been issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt. Thus, order dismissing complaint holding that complainant has not proved case against respondent beyond reasonable doubt is improper.”
60.The accused did not deny his signature on Ex.P.1 cheque and the trial Court had given detailed reasons for arriving at conclusions and that the judgment of the trial Court is proper perspective which needs no interference by this Court. Accordingly, Points 1 to 3 are answered.
3 2007 Crl. L.J. (NOC) 642 (A.P.),
III ASJ (Family) Court, VZM Criminal Appeal 55/2013 50
61.Point No.4:-
The findings and observations of the trial Court are in accordance with the evidence on record and well settled legal principles. There are no grounds to interfere with the findings of the trial Court. Therefore, this Court is not interfering with the findings of the trial Court. Accordingly, the Point
No.4 is answered.
62.Point No.5:-
In the result, the appeal is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the Special Judicial Magistrate of First
Class (Excise), Vizianagaram in C.C.No.112/2010, dated 11.03.2013 against the appellant/accused, for the offence U/s.138 of N.I. Act. Forward the
Judgment to the trial Court with a direction to take steps for execution of the sentence. The trial Court is directed to take further steps for execution of the sentence against the accused, as per Law.
Typed to my dictation, by the Stenographer Grade-I, corrected
pronounced by me in open Court, this the 25 th day of June, 2019.
Sd/- E. BHIMA RAO,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram.
Appendix of Evidence
Witnesses Examined in this Appellate Court
For Appellant/Accused:-For Respondent/Complainant:-
R.W.2:- K. Ramakrishna, Postman.- N O N E - (D.W.2)
Exhibits Marked
For Appellant/Accused:-For Respondent/Complainant:-
- N I L - - N I L -
Sd/- E. BHIMA RAO,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram Copies to:
1. The Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Vizianagaram.
2. The Appellant/Accused.
IN THE COURT OF THE JUDGE, FAMILY COURT cum III ADDITIONAL
DISTRICT JUDGE, VIZIANAGARAM
Present: Sri E.Bhima Rao,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional District Judge, Vizianagaram.
Wednesday, this the 26th day of June, 2019
Appeal Suit No.40/2016
Between:
Yedla Surya Rao, S/o late Appalaswamy, Aged…Appellant/ about 54 years, Hindu, Business, R/o Plot No.40, Plaintif. Sreeram Nagar, Dharmapuri Road, Vizianagaram.
A n d:
Dr. D. Shyamala Devi, W/o late Venkata Rao, Aged
about 70 years, R/o by the side of Amruthavilla... Respondent/
Apartments, Akkayyapalem, Visakhapatnam.Defendant.
On appeal against the decree and judgment in O.S.No.157/2006,
Dated 22.04.2016 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge’s Court,
Vizianagaram.
Between:
Yedla Surya Rao, S/o late Appalaswamy, Aged 44 years, Hindu, Business, Sreeram Nagar, Plot No.40, Dharmapuri Road, Vizianagaram. …Plaintif.
A n d:
Dr.D. Shyamala Devi, W/o late Venkata Rao, Aged about 65 years, R/o by the side of Amruthavilla Apartments, Akkayyapalem, Visakhapatnam.…Defendant.
This appeal coming on 10.06.2019 for final hearing before me in the presence of Sri K. Krishna Murthy, Advocate for the appellant and of Sri
P. Rambabu, Advocate for the respondent, and having stood over for consideration to this date, this Court delivered the following:
J U D G M E N T
This appeal is filed under Order XLI, Rule 1, C.P.C. by the unsuccessful appellant-plaintif against the impugned decree and judgment
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)2 passed in O.S.No.157/2006, dt.22.04.2016 on the file of the Senior Civil
Judge’s Court, Vizianagaram.
2. The appellant herein is the plaintif and the respondent herein is the defendant in the trial Court. The parties are arrayed as depicted in the suit for the sake of convenience.
3.The suit was filed by the plaintif against the defendant for grant of specific performance (a) directing the defendant to execute registered sale deed in respect of her undivided 1/8th share in the schedule mentioned property, in favour of the plaintif, within the time that may be granted by the Court and in the event of the default to do so, order execution of such sale deed through the process of the Court; (b) If for any reasons, this Court comes to the conclusion that the relief of specific performance cannot be granted, grant in lieu of or in addition to the relief of specific performance, direct the defendant to pay the plaintif, such amount not exceeding the suit value of Rs.3,12,500/-, as compensation, for her breach of contract; (c) direct the defendant to pay to the plaintif the costs of the suit.
4.The plaintif’s case in precise is, the defendant is having an undivided 1/8th share in the schedule mentioned building with appurtenant vacant site, which devolved upon her and her other brothers and sisters, consequent on the death of their father. Such undivided share was declared by the Hon’ble District Court, in a suit filed by one of her brothers.
(a).It is learnt that all family members (brothers and sisters) of the defendant including herself, intended to dispose of the property to third parties, and in fact, negotiated with few of such third parties, and could not materialize it, owing to intransigent attitude of some of the family members.
In this regard it is quite proper to state that an advertisement for the sale of the building was also given in widely circulated Telugu papers. While so, in or about February, 2004 or so, one Chekka Trinadh, a resident of
Vizianagaram, who is a real estate broker, arranged a meeting among all the shares of the building, including defendant, and upon consensus among the
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)3 sharers to dispose of the property, the plaintif was summoned to that meeting, and ofered to sell by all the share-holders including defendant for a total sum of Rs.25,00,000/- for the whole building, and also agreed among the sharers that the litigation pending in the Hon’ble High Court as on that date, be withdrawn by the appellants thereof, and upon such withdrawal, the plaintif has to purchase the same, from each sharer to the extent of such respective share. With that understanding, all sharers including defendant received nominal amount of Rs.1,116/- as token advance, in furtherance of the oral understanding, and with an intention to go forward with, as a contract of sale, from the plaintif. Then the plaintif informed to the hearing of all the persons, present in that meeting, that he will be obtaining the sale deed from one after other sharers, since he has to pool up the sources. As many parties have attempted and dropped to purchase the property, owing to the diferences among the family members, and all the sharers made the plaintif to believe that all such diferences were sorted out, and coaxed him to agree to pay highest rate, than prevailing in that locality, by then. At that time, plaintif insisted for a formal document from all the sharers, but the said Appalanarasayya garu, and Narayanamurthy garu, who is the husband of the said D. Satyavathi, initially pooh-poohed, and later suggested, that any document relating immovable property is reduced to writing in any manner, requires registration, and that they will directly register the sale deeds, as per the drafts that may be given by plaintif.
(b).Subsequently due to diferent attitude of one of the shareholders, and refusing withdraw the contest in the appeal, and at last, after much pressure brought upon, the appeal was withdrawn. Initially, upon agreement to finally withdraw that appeal, firstly Appalanarasayya garu registered his share as decreed, later by D. Satyavathi garu, and further later by Venkata
Rao’s son and wife, and when the plaintif is contemplating to approach defendant, forestalling the move got the notice under reply issued, as if she
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)4 is ignorant of the above facts, including the amount received by her, and her agreement to sell on par with other share holders.
(c).The plaintif is given to understand, that the defendant having learnt, that he is obtaining the sale deeds as agreed upon, and in order to put a spoke, defendant got a notice issued dt.10.01.2006, and tried her best to prevail upon her brother Rama Rao not to register the sale deed in favour of defendant, but he was also pleased to keep up his promise, and registered the sale deed in favour of the plaintif on 17th of February, 2006. Since plaintif is getting ready for obtaining the sale deeds, one after the other, he could not attend to lay information into the hands of his advocate, for getting a reply notice issued, and to send the same. Accordingly a reply notice, dt.22.2.2006 was issued to the Advocate for the defendant with the above facts, and the same was received. After lapse of long time, the defendant got issued a further reply notice, dt.16.3.2006, denying the averments of the reply notice of the plaintif.
(d).The defendant is relying upon a one finding in the Judgment, that in the event when any of the sharers intended to sell, such share shall be ofered among the sharers. The plaintif replied that when all the sharers sat together, and agreed to sell to plaintif, such finding or clog cannot come in the way and more so the defendant cannot take shelter thereunder. It is pertinent to state that the plaintif was put in possession of the said building by the persons so far conveyed their shares, who were actually in physical possession of the building. While the plaintif is in exclusive possession of the schedule building, the road extension works were undertaken, and in such widening works, most of the front portion of the building was removed by the authorities, and as such, the plaintif had closed such open portion with a brick wall, and also got removed windows, and doorways, and door- frames etc, and in fact, one of the brothers of the defendant by name
Ramarao garu, had taken few of such door-frames for his personal use, from the plaintif. Thus, the building is not in possession and enjoyment of any of
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)5 the sharers including the defendant. Thus the said observation/finding as referred to above will not come in the way, and the defendant cannot take shelter thereunder. The plaintif has also taken photograph at relevant time while road extension works, removing of walls, windows etc.
(e).It is noticed from the further reply notice of the defendant that she filed a final decree petition, adding the plaintif as one of the respondents, instead of filing of a suit for partition, knowing well that the other sharers have already sold their undivided shares to the plaintif, and the plaintif now became entitled 7/8 shares, that the share of the defendant alone remain to be conveyed to the plaintif, in terms of the above said agreement to sell, and despite of the notice of the above facts, she is said to have chosen to file a final decree petition, and according to the plaintif that in view of the agreement to sell the undivided 1/8th share of the defendant unto to the plaintif and as no direction can be sought in furtherance of the decree obtained by one of the predecessors of the plaintif and as the court dealing with the final decree petition, has no jurisdiction to grant the specific performance in those proceedings, the plaintif is constrained to file this suit, for specific performance and other relives.
(f).The plaintif is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, viz., to pay the consideration and to bear the necessary expenses for stamps, registration etc, and in fact informed to the defendant by way of reply notice, dt.22.2.2006 about the same and requested the defendant to fix the date at the earliest and inform him, to enable him to go forward with the formalities, liking getting the draft sale deed prepared, and to purchase the Demand Draft, for the amount payable (consideration) etc, and further informed that he does not want any itch with any one, and much less with the defendant, since he has to prosper after purchasing the property, and further requested her to cooperate with him, and receive the sale consideration amount, and register the sale deed, as other sharers did and lastly ofered for an amicable settlement of the issue. In view of the further
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)6 reply notice issued by the defendant, the plaintif noticed refusal of the defendant to perform a part of contract, only after receipt of the said notice, dt.16.3.2006. Therefore, the plaintif filed this suit, while depositing the agreed sale consideration and also further amount towards stamp and registration charges, without deducting the token advance amount of
Rs.1,116/- into the Court. Therefore, the plaintif prays to decree the suit with costs as prayed for. Hence, the suit.
5.The defendant filed her written statement denying all the material averments of the plaint and further contended that she is one of the daughters of Dinavahini Gunnayya Panthulu Garu of Vizianagaram who died owned and possessed the plaint schedule building and site situated on the
South of M.G. Road, Vizianagaram. After his death, one of his sons filed a suit for partition of all the joint family properties including the said Building against other legal heirs including the defendant in O.S.No.114/96 on the file of the District Court, Vizianagaram and a preliminary decree was passed directing that the defendant is entitled un-divided 1/8th share in all the properties including the plaint schedule building. As per the preliminary decree in the said suit, the defendant is entitled to undivided 1/8th share in the said building and site. The said decree also gives direction as follows under relief No.3:
“If for any reason, the partition is not possible as per the above direction, auction be held between the parties and highest bidder may be allotted to the property by working out the equities”.
Thus, the above said relief by way of direction is mandatory and it is not open for the parties of that suit to enter into any agreement of purchase either oral or written by creating right of pre-emption between themselves.
Therefore, no sharer has right to alienate the share allotted to his or her share to 3rd party.
(a).While so, the defendant came to know that the other sharers have been making negotiations for the sale of the entire property to the
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)7 plaintif in gross violation of the said mandatory direction contained in the said preliminary decree, she got issued a legal notice, dt.10.01.2006 to the plaintif specifically informing him about her undivided 1/8th share and also about the direction of the preliminary decree in O.S.No.114/96 and demanded him not to interfere with her joint possession and enjoyment in the plaint schedule property. The plaintif received the said notice and kept quiet for a period of more than one month. Thereafter, the defendant filed an application for the passing of final decree petition in pursuance of the preliminary decree in F.D.I.A.No.491/2006 on 07.02.2006 impleading the plaintif herein as he was intending purchase as per the information by then.
The said final decree petition is pending. The plaintif having gained the knowledge about the filing of the final decree petition, got issued a belated reply, dt.22.2.2006 with all false and untenable allegations setting-up the oral Agreement to sell in respect of the undivided 1/8th share and other sharers for which a re-joinder dt.16.3.2006 was sent to the plaintif’s counsel repudiating all the allegations in the reply dt.22.2.2006. The plaintif did not choose to give any further reply after the receipt of the said re-joinder.
(b).The plaintif, therefore, cannot go behind the terms of the preliminary decree in O.S.No.114/96 on the file of the District Court,
Vizianagaram and purchase the property from the other sharers in gross violation of the mandatory direction in the preliminary decree. The plaintif cannot also be permitted to set-up the right of pre-emption in the absence of any such direction in the preliminary decree. The plaintif must have obtained the sale deeds from other sharers by colluding with them. The said sale deeds are, therefore, not true, valid and supported by consideration and they are not operative and binding on the defendant in any manner whatsoever. The plaintif did not and could not acquire any right, title, interest or joint possession in respect of the plaint schedule building under the said invalid and in-operative sale-deeds. The defendant came to understand that the plaintif must have colluded with other sharers and
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)8 obtained the sale-deeds to deprive the 1/8th share of the defendant in the plaint schedule property under the color of the right of pre-emption when the preliminary emphatically directs that in case of the partition as directed, is impracticable, Auction shall be conducted among the sharers but not by private sale to any of the sharers to 3rd parties including the plaintif by other sharers.
(c).The suit for specific performance on the alleged oral agreement is not legally maintainable. The defendant never participated in the joint meeting said to have been arranged at the instance of Chikka Trinadh in or about February, 2004 and agreed to sell-away her share also along with other sharers and received Rs.1,116/- as token advance. The plaintif invented and set-up the said theory for the purpose of laying a false claim in respect of the share of the defendant in the plaint schedule building. The said oral agreement of sale is not, therefore, true, valid and the same is not legally enforceable.
(d).The defendant is a retired Medical Officer. The plaint schedule property is her father’s property. She intends to keep the said property for herself as a sweet money of her late father by obeying the direction given in the preliminary decree. She after legal verification, came to know that the plaint schedule building cannot be partitioned as per the shares allotted in the preliminary decree. She, therefore, filed the final decree petition to put- forth all the above said facts and her intention to participate in the auction that is going to be conducted by the Court in case of impracticality of the partition. The defendant and other sharers have, therefore, a legal right to purchase the entire property as per the direction in the preliminary decree.
But the defendant cannot have any such right. The three shares purchased by the plaintif including the share of Dinavahini Appalanarasayya in the year 2005 behind the back of the defendant and other sharers are, therefore, not fully supported by consideration and they are not legally valid, operative and binding on the defendant and other sharers. The said sale deeds do not also
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)9 operate to create any right, title, interest or possession to the plaintif nor do they extinguish the right, title, interest and her un-divided joint possession in the plaint schedule building. The suit is, therefore, mis-conceived and the same is liable to be dismissed in-limini. There is no cause of action for filing the suit against the defendant.
(e).The Court Fee paid on the 1/8th share of the defendant is not correct. The plaintif has to pay the Court Fee on the entire sale consideration said to have been agreed which is to the tune of
Rs.25,00,000/-. The suit is filed with false, invented, frivolous and vexatious averments without any manner of rights in on the part of the plaintif as such, the plaintif is liable to pay exemplary costs as contemplated U/s.35-A of C.P.C. Therefore, the defendant prays to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs.
6.On the strength of the pleadings of the parties to the suit, the following Issues were framed by the trial Court :
1) Whether the agreement of sale is true, valid and enforceable ?
2) Whether the specific performance of agreement can be ordered ?
3) Whether the suit is valued properly and court fee paid is correct ?
4) To what relief ?
7.In the trial aforded to the both parties, the plaintif himself examined as P.W.1 and also examined one Chekka Trinadh, 3rd party to the proceedings, as P.W.2 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.6. On behalf of the defendant, the defendant herself examined as D.W.1; and also examined one
Akundi Jagannadha Sarma, who is a Purohit and resident of Vizianagaram, as
D.W.2 and no documents marked on behalf of the defendant.
8.Given, the evidence let in by the parties to the suit, the trial
Court passed the impugned Judgment and decree in favour of the defendant, by dismissing the suit filed by the the plaintif with costs, against which the present appeal was preferred on the following grounds :
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)10
The Decree and Judgment of the Senior Civil Judge,
Vizianagaram, passed in O.S.No.157/2006, dt.22.04.2016 are contrary to
Law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. The learned Senior
Civil Judge did not properly appreciate the probabilities of the case and no
reasoning is ofered while dismissing the suit, especially, on the contentions of the parties.
(a).The trial Court should have seen that the following are the admitted facts:
(I) That the plaintif/appellant purchased 7/8th shares, and whereas the defendant is entitled to 1/8th share in the total building; (Ii) That the defendant filed a final decree petition against the plaintif alone for division and allotment of her 1/8th share or for direction for sale of the plaintif’s 7/8th shares in the building, basing on suggestion made in the preliminary decree, passed between the brothers and sisters of the defendant;
(iii) That it is not the case of either of the parties, that there is any written agreement between the plaintif and other sister and brothers of the defendant (other shares to the extent of 7/8th shares);
(iv) The defendant did not challenge that the consideration of
Rs.25,00,000/- ofered by the plaintif to whole building (to all the shares) is far low price, and that the building would fetch more amount, at the relevant time.
(v) Possession of the building is with the plaintif, and that he attended to repair works, when road widening activity was undertaken by Municipality, and that the plaintif has leased out the building after remodeling it;
(vi) It is not the case of the defendant, that her other sharers agreed to sell their undivided shares to her and that she never applied for, in view of the suggestion made in the decree;
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)11
(vii) That the defendant did not raise any other defenses available under Specific Relief Act, as required under Sec.9 of the Act, except denying the oral agreement and receipt of advance amount of Rs.1,116/-;
(viii) The defendant did not choose to file the preliminary decree, more particularly when she has been banking upon it;
Unfortunately, the trial Court glossed over the above admitted facts, and totally relied upon surmises that there is a mandate in the preliminary decree, forgetting that a word “if” was used in the so-called mandate, as can be seen from the quoted text in para-3 of Written Statement, though the decree was not filed, as stated above. In view of such word, it cannot be treated as mandate, but should have been understood as a suggestion, that in case the building is not divisible into several shares.
(b).The learned Judge ought not have held in para-13 of the
Judgment under appeal that it is a legal obligation of the plaintif to strictly adhere and that the contention of the plaintif that the other sharers sold their shares remained on the record un-proved, forgetting that it is an admitted case of both the parties that the plaintif had purchased all other shares in the building. Further he ought to have seen that the said decree does not debar the sharers from selling their shares. In the same context the plaintif asserted that all the shares including the defendant have orally consented each other for selling the whole building to the plaintif. The learned Judge should have noticed that this assertion aptly fit in and strike to the sense of any ordinary and prudent person that there is an oral understanding between all the shares including the defendant on one hand and the plaintif on the other.
(c).The reasoning adopted by the trial Court in the para-14 of the
Judgment, appears to be a special pleading for the respondent in the appeal.
It should have noticed that soon the paper advertisement was made by
Rama Rao, other sharers including the defendant did not question such advertisement, on other hand it is the case of the plaintif that after such
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)12 advertisement P.W.2 negotiated with all the sharers for the sale of the building. The analogy of the trial Court in para-15 of the Judgment is the out come of the Prejudice caused in its mind against the plaintif and sympathy towards old aged defendant, especially in the backdrop of the pleading of the plaintif that all the sharers agreed to sell after withdrawing the appeal, such assertion itself suggests that the diferences among the sharers were adjusted, as such question of knowing such disputes does not arise. It is made clear by a reading of para-16 of the Judgment that the Judge of the trial Court is totally prejudiced towards the plaintif, but for that, he ought to have held that it is an admitted fact for all the sharers except the defendant have sold their undivided shares in the building, there is no need for the plaintif to file such sale deeds. The comment made by the trial Court in para-17 of the Judgment that the plaintif ought to have examined one of the sharers to prove the oral agreement is not proper or justifiable, since the plaintif had in fact summoned Dinavahi Rama Rao as witness but he having come to the Court refused to file chief-affidavit supporting the case of the plaintif, thereby he was given up, since he closely moved with the defendant and such fact was also admitted by D.W.1 in her evidence.
(d).The trial Court should have seen that the witnesses before the
Court were examined more than a decade after the incident of meeting among the sharers, as such there would be natural discrepancies and even if the witnesses depose like a parrot, such evidence should not be believed by the Court, being contrary to the human conduct. The trial Court ought not have held in para-19 that the evidence of plaintif and that his witness is not consistent. If wrongly appreciated the evidence, resulting in such conclusion was recorded. The reasoning adopted by the trial Court in para-20 of the
Judgment, is nothing sort of misunderstanding the purport of the case of the plaintif. Had he understood, that even the vendors ofered to sell after the disputes are cleared, as such, drawing inference or dwelling in surmises is contrary to law, and wait of evidence and probabilities of the case, as such
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)13 the Judgment under appeal is liable to be set-aside. Similarly the learned
Judgment, misinterpreted the preliminary decree of the Court, to suit his convenience to dismiss the suit, apparently owing to the prejudices developed in his mind against the plaintif, resulting in his finding in para-21 of the Judgment under appeal. In any view of the matter, the decree and
Judgment of the trial Court sufer from serious infirmities and liable to be set aside. Therefore, the appellant prays to allow the appeal, by setting aside the Decree and Judgment of the Senior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram, made and delivered in O.S.No.157/2006, dt.22.04.2016, and consequently allow the same, and costs throughout.
9.Heard both learned counsel for the appellant and respondent.
10.Given, the appeal grounds and contentions of the both parties to the appeal, now points for consideration are :
(1) Whether the oral agreement of sale is true, valid
and enforceable and if so, whether the plaintiff is
entitled for specific performance of agreement of
sale ?
(2) Whether the suit is valued properly and the
Court Fee paid is correct ?
(3) Whether there are any grounds to interfere with
the decree and Judgment of the trial Court ?
(4) To what relief ?
11.Point No.1:-
The case of the appellant/plaintif is that originally the plaint schedule property belongs to one Dheenavathi Gunnayya Pantulu who has children including the defendant, consequent to the demise of Gunnayya
Pantulu, one of his sons filed partition suit in O.S.No.114/96 on the file of the
Hon’ble District Court seeking preliminary decree of partition and in the said
suit, preliminary decree of partition was passed allotting the legal heirs of
Gunnayya Pantulu, their respective shares including 1/8th share to the
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)14 defendant, but due to diferences of opinion among the sharers, they could not sell out the schedule property though they tried their level best and though the sharers got given paper advertisements including Ex.A.4, at that juncture P.W.2, who is a Real Estate Broker convened a meeting among the sharers, in the said meeting, all the sharers agreed for selling the schedule property, thereupon P.W.2 summoned the plaintif to whom the sharers ofered the schedule property for an amount of Rs.25,00,000/-, thereupon the plaintif agreed for the same by saying that he would get the property registered from the sharers one after the other as he had to pool up the consideration amount, in the said joint meeting, the sharers agreed for withdrawing the appeal pending before the Hon’ble High Court, subsequently with difficulty, the appeal was withdrawn, thereafter some of the sharers registered their respective shares in the name of the plaintif, but the defendant, contra to her oral agreement, did not register her share of property upon the plaintif, but the defendant got issued Ex.A.1 with false averments, for which the plaintif could not immediately issue reply notice as he was busy in getting registered the shares of property from other sharers and he issued Ex.A.2 reply notice, and for the said reply notice, the plaintif got issued Ex.A.3 rejoinder notice with false averments through which the plaintif came to know that the defendant refused to perform her part of oral contract of sale which forced him to file the suit. The decree and Judgment of the Senior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram, passed in O.S.No.157/2006, dt.22.4.2016 are contrary to Law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and the trial Court did not properly appreciate the probabilities of the case and no reasoning is ofered while dismissing the suit, especially, on the contentions of the parties. Therefore, the appellant/plaintif prays to allow the appeal, by setting aside the decree and Judgment of the trial Court and decree the suit as prayed for.
12.On the other hand, the case of the defendant is that the entire plaint schedule property belongs to her father Deenavathi
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)15
Gunnayyapanthulu who has sons and daughters including the defendant, after demise of Gunnayyapanthulu, one of his sons filed partition suit in
O.S.No.114/96 on the file of the Hon’ble District Court, Vizianagaram which
passed preliminary decree giving 1/8th share in all the properties including the schedule mentioned property to the defendant with an observation that if partition is not possible as held in the preliminary decree, auction of the property be taken up among the sharers and highest bidder be allotted to the property by working out equities. In view of the said decree, it is not open for any of the parties to the said suit for entering into any agreement either written or oral for selling the property in derogation of pre-emptive right, subsequent to the decree and having come to know that some of the sharers started negotiating with the plaintif for selling the schedule property in gross violation of the mandate of the preliminary decree, the defendants got issued Ex.A.1 legal notice dated 10.01.2006 to the plaintif informing him about the substance of the decree in O.S.No.114/96, having received the said notice, the plaintif did not respond for a long time of more than one month, thereupon the defendant filed final decree petition vide FDIA No.491/2006 on the file of the decree delivered Court by impleading the plaintif, the said final decree petition is pending, having got knowledge of filing of the final decree petition, the plaintif got issued a belated reply notice dated 22.02.2006 under Ex.A.2 with false averments by falsely claiming that he entered into oral agreement of sale for purchasing the schedule property, for the said reply notice, the defendant got sent Ex.A.3 rejoinder notice dated 16.03.2006, but for the said notice there was no response from the end of the plaintif. The plaintif cannot go beyond the mandate of the preliminary decree passed in the above mentioned suit in O.S.No.114/96 and cannot purchase the schedule property from other sharers who have no right for selling the property in defiance of the legal mandate of the preliminary decree. The defendant never agreed for selling her share in the schedule property to the plaintif and never received any advance sale consideration
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)16 and the contention of the plaintif that there was oral agreement of sale among himself and children of Gunnayya Panthulu is nothing but a concocted story. The defendant, as per the enabling clause of the preliminary decree, is intending to purchase the schedule mentioned property in open auction for keeping it as a sweet memory of her late father, consequently she is proceeding in such a way by filing final decree petition. The three shares in the schedule mentioned property said to have been purchased by the plaintif are not valid, being unsupported by consideration, and as such they do not bind the defendant. The Court fee paid on 1/8th share of the defendant in the schedule mentioned property is incorrect as the Court Fee ought to have been paid on the total alleged sale consideration amount of
Rs.25,00,000/-. There was never any kind of privity of contract among the plaintif and the defendant and as such, the suit is liability to be dismissed.
Therefore, the respondent/defendant prays to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs.
13.The admitted facts in this case are that the entire plaint schedule property originally belongs to Deenavathi Gunnayyapanthulu, upon whose death, the said property devolved upon the defendant and her other brothers and sisters. After demise of Gunnayyapanthulu, the defendant’s brother D.S.
Venkata Rao filed partition suit in O.S.No.114/96 on the file of the Hon’ble
District Court, Vizianagaram, and the said suit was decreed granting preliminary decree of partition allotting 1/4th share to the plaintif and defendants 5 to 7 in the said suit, 1/20th share to 1st defendant, 1/4th share to 2nd defendant, 1/8th share to 4th defendant, 1/4th share to 8th defendant and the remaining share to 3rd defendant in the said plaint schedule mentioned properties including the schedule property herein, in the said preliminary decree, the Court gave an observation that if for any reason partition is not possible as per the mandate of the decree, auction be held between the parties and highest bidder be allotted with the said property by working out equities. Again the said Judgment and Decree, none of the
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)17 parties preferred appeal or review consequently the said Judgment and
Decree became final and binding on the parties to it and final decree petition, being FDIA No.491/2016, having been filed by the defendants herein in February, 2006 is pending awaiting passing of final decree.
14.To prove the case of the appellant/plaintif, the plaintif filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of his chief-examination, by reiterating the material averments of the plaint, as P.W.1 and in support of his contention, the plaintif also examined one Chekka Trinadh, who is the Real Estate Broker, as
P.W.2, and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.6. Ex.A.1 is served copy of Lawyer’s notice, dt.10.01.2006, got issued by the defendant to the plaintif; Ex.A.2 is registered lawyer’s notice, dt.22.2.2006 got issued by the plaintif to the defendant’s counsel; Ex.A.3 is served copy of registered lawyer’s notice, dt.16.3.2006, got issued by the defendant to the plaintif’s counsel; Ex.A.4 is paper publication; Ex.A.5 is photos with negatives; and Ex.A.6 is receipt,
dated 02.04.2006, respectively.
15.During the course of cross-examination of P.W.1, it was elicited that he is doing business of gunny bags in retail and he studied up to 10th
Class. P.W.1 further stated that he was informed by his counsel that earlier the defendant filed a suit, in the said suit, she obtained preliminary decree and subsequently, she filed petition seeking final decree, initially the said final decree was negatived, thereupon the defendant herein preferred a Civil
Revision to the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., which remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh disposal according to law and the same is pending for disposal. P.W.1 further stated that he does not know as to whether or not, the defendant herein claimed in the final decree petition that she is interested to keep the schedule property even by participating in the auction, as a memorial to her late father. P.W.1 denied the suggestion that prior to his proposed purchase of the schedule property, he received notice from the defendant. Prior to his purchasing the property, he did not try to know about the disputes pertaining to the schedule property. P.W.1 further
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)18 stated that he did not launch any proceedings seeking partition of his property purchased under the sale deed from the brothers and one sister of the defendant. At present, there are two big shop rooms and one small shop room in the schedule property and he leased out the said shop rooms on a monthly rent of Rs.4,000/-, Rs.3,000/- and Rs.2,000/- respectively. He is not paying share of rent to the defendant. He has been enjoying the rents since the date of purchase of the building. He could not remember date, month and year of his deliberations with the defendant and her brothers and sister, but it took place in the schedule property. By the date of settlement sitting, a proceeding pertaining to schedule property was pending before the
Hon’ble High Court of A.P., but he cannot say particulars of the same.
Subsequently the said proceeding was cancelled by defendant’s sister and he can file into the Court documentary proof to that efect. He did not obtain approved Municipal Plan for construction of shops in the schedule property.
Rama Rao who is one of the brothers of the defendant, by getting demolished previous structure, took away the wooden structures attached to it. P.W.1 denied the suggestion that he knew that worth of the old wooden structures to be in Lakhs and he and Ramarao by colluding with each other, caused monetary loss to the defendant. P.W.1 further denied the suggestion that he is in the habit of purchasing disputed properties basing on agreements of sale when the real owners of such properties do not wish for selling the same, in the said process he purchased the present property also with a view to cause loss to the defendant and thereby to get illegal gain. In
O.S.No.31/2005 and O.S.No.31/2008 on the file of the I Addl., District Judge,
Vizianagaram, the opposite parties contended that he being habituated in purchasing disputed properties, purchased the said properties basing on agreements of sale by creating litigation. P.W.1 further denied the suggestion that the defendant did not participate in any settlement meeting, the defendant did not receive any token advance from him and the defendant never agreed for selling her share of property to him. P.W.1 also
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)19 denied the suggestion that for the purpose of case, he got made paper publication under Ex.A.4. As seen from Ex.A.4, it cannot be perceived as to in which news paper and on which date, it was published. P.W.1 admitted that Rama Rao alone is not the exclusive owner of the plaint schedule property.
16.P.W.2 deposed that he is third party to the above proceedings.
Coming to know that the brothers and sisters, including the defendant, are planning to dispose of their residential house, situated in M.G. Road,
Vizianagaram, he enquired into the matter, and during enquiries, the sister of the defendant by name Satyavathi filed an appeal before the Hon’ble High
Court of A.P., and that she is interested to withdraw the same, in the event the house property is sold jointly. After meeting the defendant, her living brothers and sister, contacted the heirs of the deceased brother over phone and confirming that all of them are interested to sell the house property to one person, as a block, since the said building, if divided into several parts, as per the decree, each share would not get any habitable portion and will not be convenient for them to enjoy, he has arranged a meeting among them at the plaint schedule house property, which the defendant has only 1/8th share, in February, 2004, on one Sunday, between 11-00 to 1-00 p.m.
The defendant attended to that meeting along with her living brothers, sister and widow of the deceased brother from Delhi. After discussions among them all of them agreed to sell their respective shares in schedule building, as a block, for Rs.25,00,000/-. Well before that meeting, after gaining confidence, that the defendant and her family members would sell their respective shares in the schedule property, he mediated with the plaintif, who expressed his intention to purchase. On the day of meeting, after the discussions among the family members of the defendant, he has called the plaintif to the meeting place. The elder brother of the defendant, on behalf of all the family members spoke to the plaintif, proposed to sell the total schedule house property for Rs.25,00,000/- and that such consideration shall
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)20 be paid to the respective sharers, according to their entitlement, as per the decree. Further, the sister of the defendant by name Satyavathi and her husband Narayanamurthy informed the plaintif that they would withdraw the appeal, filed by them before the Hon’ble High Court, since all the family members agreed to sell. The plaintif having agreed to purchase at the rate quoted, he asked him to pay token advance of Rs.1,116/- to each sharer, accordingly he paid to each of the sharers, including the defendant.
Subsequently, all the sharers except the defendant executed registered sale deeds in favour of the plaintif, in furtherance of the oral understanding arrived at in the said meeting. The defendant did not turn up to execute sale deed and dodged the issue and started issuing notices to the plaintif and later got filed a petition in the Court, ofering to purchase entire building, contrary to the understanding and oral agreement mentioned above.
17.During the course of cross-examination of P.W.2, it was elicited that prior to eight years, he used to act as real estate business mediator and
L.I.C. Agent. In his mediation work, he used to physically verify the property, but he did not use to peruse the documents of the parties. Initially he had deliberation with Appalanarasayya, the eldest brother of the defendant after going through paper publication. Appalanarasayya told him that the Court litigation pertaining to the said property among him and his sister Satyavathi was pending. He did not enquire with Appalanarasayya for knowing the nature of litigation. He did not try to secure the documents pertaining to the subject matter. He did not personally try to know about the said litigation even by the date of their sitting. As of now, the said litigation is not pending as it was withdrawn by Satyavathi. The plaintif possessed the documents pertaining to the said withdrawal proceedings. The family of the defendant is very rich. The defendant can purchase the schedule property. Even in the sitting, it came into light that the defendant has 1/8th undivided share in the schedule property. He did not go through the decree passed among the defendant and her family members and as such, he does not know about the
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)21 operative portion of the decree. He did not get mention about the said decree in his evidence affidavit. When questioned P.W.2, did the plaintif ask the defendant’s family members that as per the decree, they have no right for selling the entire property, for which P.W.2 answered that the plaintif asked them for which they stated that they would withdraw the suit and thereby they would get right for selling the property. Four persons received an amount of Rs.1,116/- each towards advance from the plaintif. The advance recipients are, the defendant, Rama Rao, Appalanarasayya and wife of deceased brother of the defendant. Himself and the plaintif insisted them for execution of an agreement in writing for which they did not agree by stating that they would become ready for registration of the property directly.
He did not act as mediator for any of the transaction of the plaintif prior to the transaction in issue. He informed about the paper publication to the plaintif. Some civil litigation took place against him. He denied the suggestion that in his earlier civil litigation, the Court held that he advanced false pleadings and gave false evidence, against the said verdict, he preferred appeal to the Hon’ble District Judge, Vizianagaram, who confirmed the Judgment of the trial Court. He denied the suggestion that no sitting took place, the defendant never received any kind of advance of amount from the plaintif, the defendant never agreed to sell her share of property to the plaintif, what he specified in his evidence affidavit is false and he is deposing falsehood at the instance of the plaintif for his monetary gain.
18.In support of the case of the defendant, the defendant herself examined as D.W.1. D.W.1 filed her evidence affidavit in lieu of her chief- examination by reiterating the averments of the written statement filed by her. During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, it was elicited that she has one elder sister and three brothers. One of her brothers, Venkatarao is no more. She has cordial relationship with her brothers and sister, except in relation to sale of the schedule property as her wish of purchasing the schedule property was denied by them. Orally she ofered her brothers and
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)22 sister for purchasing the schedule property without specifying the consideration amount and by the date of her proposal, civil suit among their family members for partition was pending. She does not know as to whether or not, the plaintif herein was shown as one of the respondents in her final decree petition on the file of the Hon’ble District Court, Vizianagaram. She did not so far launch any proceeding seeking her separate schedule in the schedule property. She did not file any case against Suryarao, her brothers and sisters alleging that the sale transaction where under the schedule property was sold to the plaintif is null and void as it is in derogation of her interest and by seeking right of pre-emption. She denied the suggestion that in February, 2014, a meeting was convened by P.W.2 in the schedule property in the presence of her, her brothers and sister, in the said meeting, herself, her brothers and sister orally agreed for selling the schedule property to the plaintif for an amount of Rs.25,00,000/-, on that day, an amount of Rs.1,116/- was paid by the plaintif to each of the sharers. She has visiting terms to the house of her brother Rama Rao and similarly he has, to their house. She denied the suggestion that in pursuance of oral agreement of sale, the plaintif deposited her 1/8th share consideration amount into the Court, she knew about the said fact and deliberately she is suppressing the same. The possession of the schedule property was delivered to the plaintif. In the road widening process, the Municipality of
Vizianagaram got demolished the front portion of their building. The structure approximately 12 x 12 feet was demolished in the road widening process. She did not get valued the schedule property so far.
19.In support of the case of the defendant, the defendant also examined one Akundi Jagannadha Sarma, who is third party to the proceedings, as D.W.2. D.W.2 filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of his chief- examination, stating that he is a Purohit and he is acquainted with the family of defendant and also her brothers and sister for the last more than 25 years.
He also knows the family house of the defendant, her brothers and sister
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)23 which is situated on M.G. Road, Vizianagaram in the lane of Soundary Shop.
When all the family members were residing in the said house, they used to perform annual ceremonies in his house and other Poojas and auspicious functions in the said house. He is, therefore, acquainted with the family of the defendant. At present, the defendant is residing at Visakhapatnam along with her family members. D.W.2 further deposed that the defendant used to inform him that it was her ambition to set-up a hospital in the said residential house at Vizianagaram either with the consent of her brothers and sister or to purchase from their sharers in the said house and to bring her eldest son once in a week or so as visiting specialist Doctor. The defendant and her family members have financial capacity to purchase the shares of her brothers and sister. Hence, she never intended to sell her share in the said house though number of visiting purchasers approached her. He is also informed by the defendant that the said residential house is now in the unlawful possession of one Yedla Suryarao (P.W.1) against her will and that the said Yedla Suryarao (P.W.1) is acting detrimental to her lawful rights in the said residential house and making illegal gains.
20.During the course of cross-examination of D.W.2, it was elicited that Appalanarasayya alone used to perform death anniversary of his late father Gunnayya Pantulu in his house every year till 2014. Rama Rao, the another brother of Appalanarasayya also used to perform death ceremony of his late father. in the year 2014, the defendant lastly informed him that she was intending to purchase the plaint schedule property. For the first time, in the year 2010, the defendant stated him that she was intending to purchase the plaint schedule property. The brothers of the defendant never stated him that they were going to sell the schedule property to the defendant. The father of the defendant died when he was 30 years old. He denied the suggestion that he does not know anything about the case, what he specified in his chief examination is false and he is deposing falsehood at the instance
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)24 of the defendant by taking some amount from her. Venkatarao, the brother of the defendant is alive still.
21.In view of the above pleadings and evidence of both parties, now, it is to be seen that whether the oral agreement of sale as contended by the plaintif is true, valid and enforceable and if so, whether the plaintif is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale.
22.As seen from the evidence available on record, the contention of the plaintif is that in or about February, 2004, the defendant, her brothers and sisters, in the presence of P.W.2, orally agreed for selling the plaint schedule property to the plaintif for an amount of Rs.25,00,000/-, but the specific time, date and place of meeting in which the sharers of the plaint schedule building were alleged to have been agreed for selling the plaint schedule property to the plaintif were not revealed by the plaintif. P.W.1 categorically admitted in his cross-examination that he could not remember date, month and year of his deliberations with the defendant and her brothers and sister, but it took place in the schedule property. According to the plaintif, he agreed to purchase the plaint schedule property for
Rs.25,00,000/-. Admittedly, there is no written agreement in between the plaintif and the defendant, her brothers and sister. During the course of cross-examination of P.W.1, he also stated that by the date of settlement of sitting, a proceeding pertaining to schedule property was pending before the
Hon’ble High Court of A.P., but he cannot say particulars of the same and he
further stated that subsequently the said proceeding was cancelled by defendant’s sister and he can file into the Court documentary proof to that efect. It is pertinent to note that the plaintif knows the fact that a very high degree of proof is required in case of oral agreements. In the absence of the said material aspects in the pleadings of the plaintif, it shows that the said failure or abstinence of the plaintif leaves an adverse inference and had the said contention of the plaintif been correct, being an ordinary prudent man he would have pleaded and proved time, date, place, etc., facts pertaining to
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)25 the meeting in which the sharers including the defendant were alleged to have agreed for selling the plaint schedule property to the plaintif for an amount of Rs.25,00,000/- after receiving a very meager advance amount of
Rs.1,116/- which is not claimed by the plaintif to have been received by any named sharer. If really the plaintif gave a sum of Rs.1,116/- each to the defendant, brothers and sister of the defendant towards token advance for purchase of plaint schedule property, what prevented him to obtain written agreement from them, being a business man. Even an illiterate and a layman would obtain a written agreement while purchasing the properties from others, but being a businessman why P.W.1 could not obtain written agreement from the defendant and her family members, if he really gave the alleged token advancement amount to them as contended by him, in respect of plaint schedule property, to the reasons best known to him, and moreover, the defendant and her family members are not relatives to the plaintif to believe them without executing any written agreement.
23.It is the further contention of the plaintif that he prepared and agreed to purchase the property from each sharer after withdrawal of appeal preferred to the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., against the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.114/96 on the file of the Hon’ble District Court,
Vizianagaram, and after withdrawal of appeal, initially Appalanarasayya, thereafter D. Satyavathi, thereafter wife and son of late Venkatarao and thereafter Ramarao registered their respective shares in favour of the plaintif. In view of the said contention of the plaintif, he is bound to prove that an appeal against the Decree in O.S.No.114/96 of the Hon’ble District
Court, Vizianagaram was preferred to the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., it was subsequently withdrawn, subsequent to the said withdrawal of appeal, some of the sharers registered their respective shares in favour of the plaintif after receiving their respective sale consideration amounts. When the plaintif relied on the above contention, the burden is on him to prove the same by adducing cogent and convincing evidence.
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)26
24.It is pertinent to note that despite existence of the above referred legal mandate, the plaintif neither succeeded nor evinced interest in discharging his said legal obligation consequently the contention of the plaintif that the appellant who preferred appeal against the decree in
O.S.No.114/96 of the Hon’ble District Court, Vizianagaram to the Hon’ble
High Court of A.P., withdrew the appeal, subsequent to withdrawal of the appeal and in strict adherence of the terms and conditions of the oral agreement of sale, initially Appalanarasayya, thereafter D. Satyavathi, thereafter wife and son of late Venkatarao and thereafter, Ramarao registered their respective shares in favour of the plaintif through valid registered documents after receiving their respective sale consideration amounts and except the defendant, all the sharers registered their respective shares in the name of the plaintif, remained on the record unproved.
25.In respect of Ex.A.4 paper publication is concerned, P.W.1 admitted in his cross-examination that as seen from Ex.A.4, it cannot be perceived as to in which news paper and on which date, it was published.
P.W.1 denied the suggestion that for the purpose of case, he got made paper publication under Ex.A.4. The plaintif contended that a paper advertisement was also given in a circulated Telugu daily newspaper by the sharers ofering the schedule property for sale, however he filed Ex.A.4 clipping, it does not reveal whether it was issued by all the sharers or one of the sharers on behalf of the other sharers, depicts to have been issued by Deenavathi
Ramarao alone on his behalf un-concerning with the consent or concurrence of the remaining sharers and further Ex.A.4 does not reveal as to in which newspaper it was published as the full length news paper or at least it’s complete sheet which covered the captioned clipping was not filed into the
Court not justification for non-filing of the same was assigned by the plaintif consequently the contention of the plaintif that a paper advertisement was
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)27 given by the sharers ofering the schedule property for sale cannot be accepted.
26.During the course of cross-examination of P.W.1, he categorically admitted that prior to his purchasing the property, he did not try to know about the disputes pertaining to the schedule property. P.W.2 also admitted in his cross-examination that he did not personally try to know about the said litigation even by the date of their sitting. It is pertinent to note that generally a purchaser would invariably venture to know the good and bad qualities of title of the property proposed to be purchased with either his own skill or by taking aid and assistance of a person having knowledge and skill in the said field for avoiding future unforeseen consequences connected thereto and though general usage is as such the plaintif who was alleged to have agreed to purchase the schedule property at a very huge amount of
Rs.25,00,000/-, deposed that prior to his purchasing the property, he did not try to know about the disputes pertaining to the schedule property, which shows that the portion of testimony of the plaintif itself improbablizes his version that he orally agreed to purchase the schedule property. The contention of the plaintif that in pursuance of oral agreement of sale, some of the sharers registered their respective shares upon him is unbelievable for want of filing of the original or certified copies of the sale deeds concerned into the Court.
27.In order to prove the alleged oral agreement in between the plaintif and defendant along with her co-sharers, the best piece of evidence available to the plaintif is, examination of one of the persons who were alleged to have registered their respective shares in the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintif and despite the said fact and despite his specific contention that in furtherance of the oral agreement of sale,
Ramarao, Appalanarasayya, D.Satyavathi and wife and son of late
Venkatarao executed registered sale deeds in his favour in respect of their respective shares, the plaintif neither succeeded nor evinced interest in
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)28 examining all or some or any of them as his witnesses nor did he ofer legitimate reason or legal excuse for his said failure or abstinence however it shows that, had the contention of the plaintif that there was an oral agreement of sale among the sharers, some of the sharers registered their respective shares in his favour and some of the sharers including the defendant failed in comply their obligation covered under the said oral agreement of sale which forced him to file the present suit been correct, the plaintif would have ventured in examining one of the sharers as his witness.
28.In the pleadings, the plaintif claimed that P.W.2 summoned him to the meeting place where the schedule property was ofered to him for sale for Rs.25,00,000/-, however in his evidence he stated that the said deliberation took place in the schedule property, but P.W.2, under whose touting the sale transaction was alleged to have come to a conclusion, by deposing that he had deliberation with the defendant’s eldest brother
Appalanarasayya after going through Ex.A.4 paper publication,
Appalanarasayya told him that the Court litigation pertaining to the said property between him and his sister Satyavathi was pending, he did not enquire with Appalanarasayya for knowing the nature of litigation, he did not try to secure the documents pertaining to the subject matter, within one week or ten days he informed about the information furnished by
Appalanarasayya to the plaintif, he advised the plaintif to verify about the pending litigation before purchasing the property, he does not know as to whether or not, the plaintif got verified about the pending litigation, he did not personally try to know about the said litigation even by the date of their sitting, as on the date of his giving evidence, the said litigation was not pending as it was withdrawn by Satyavathi, the plaintif possessed documents pertaining to the said withdrawal proceedings, he knew about the defendant and her family even before their sitting, four persons who are the defendant, Ramarao, Appalanarasayya and defendant’s deceased brother’s wife received an amount of Rs.1,116/- each towards advance from the
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)29 plaintif, made false the contention of the plaintif that a meeting was convened by P.W.2 among all the sharers, to the said meeting the plaintif was summoned, all these sharers got consensus in the said meeting, all the sharers orally agreed to sell the schedule property to P.W.1 for Rs.25,00,000/- while agreeing to withdraw the pending appeal, in pursuance of oral agreement, all the sharers together received advance sale consideration amount of Rs.1,116/-.
29.It is not the case of the plaintif that the defendant, Ramarao,
Appalanarasayya and the defendant’s deceased brother alone happened to be sharers of the plaint schedule property and that apart unmarked but filed copy of the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.114/96 discloses that the schedule property was ordered to be partitioned in six units/sharers as “1/4th share to the plaintif and defendants 1 to 7; 1/20th share to the 1st defendant; 1/4th share to the 2nd defendant; 1/8th share to the 4th defendant; 1 1/4th share to the 8th defendant and the remaining share to the 3rd defendant, however the plaintif claimed as if he gave advance amount of
Rs.1,116/- to a nameless person to be distributed among all the shares, whereas P.W.2 deposed that if the defendant, Appalanarasayya, Ramarao and the defendant’s deceased brother’s wife alone received advance amounts of Rs.1,116/- each and he did not make any whisper about the presence of other sharers and their receiving the advance amount consequently even according to the own testimonies of P.Ws.1 and 2, it is clear that there is contradictory version among the said witnesses in respect of the alleged oral agreement of sale consequently under the existing facts and circumstances of the matter, the plea of the plaintif that there was an oral agreement of sale among him and sharers of the plaint schedule property cannot be believed.
30.P.W.1 admitted in his cross-examination that as he does not know
English, he did not go through the sale deed where under he purchased the schedule property and he further stated that he was informed by his counsel
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)30 that earlier the defendant filed a suit, in the said suit, she obtained preliminary decree and subsequently, she filed petition seeking final decree, initially the said final decree was negatived, thereupon the defendant herein preferred a Civil Revision to the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., which remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh disposal according to law and the same is pending for disposal. P.W.1 further stated that he does not know as to whether or not, the defendant herein claimed in the final decree petition that she is interested to keep the schedule property even by participating in the auction, as a memorial to her late father. It is pertinent to note that a prudent man would naturally purchase a litigation free property or after getting cleared pending litigation, if any of such property generally in routine course and specially when value of such property is abnormally high however contra to the said usage, the plaintif was alleged to have entered into oral agreement of sale with the sharers of the plaint schedule property even after knowing the fact that a litigation pertaining to the said property was pending and as such, the alleged oral agreement of sale pleaded by the plaintif is unbelieved. For an arguments sake, if at all the proposed sale transaction pleaded by the plaintif is correct, he, while going to invest Rs.25,00,000/-, he would have certainly entered into an in writing agreement or receipts evidencing his giving advance amounts to the sharers unlike in the instant case in which both remained absent.
31.D.W.1 deposed in her evidence that the wife of her deceased brother by name Sundari Venkatarao filed a suit in O.S.No.114/1996 for partition of the plaint schedule property and in the said suit, the Hon’ble
District Court, Vizianagaram passed a preliminary decree directing her that she is entitled to undivided 1/8th share in the plaint schedule property and as per the preliminary decree in the said suit, she is entitled to undivided 1/8th share in the Building and site in the plaint schedule and in the said decree as direction was given that “if for any reason, the partition is not possible as per the above direction, auction be held between the parties and
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)31 highest bidder may be allotted the properties by working equities”. It is not the case of the plaintif that the sharers of the schedule property are ignorant of the observation given by the Hon’ble District Court in it’s preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.114/96 that in the event of non- possibility of partitioning the properties into shares as per the ratio given in the decree, the property be put to auction among the sharers and highest bidder be given with the property by working out equities consequently the parties to the said proceeding shall be deemed to have got full knowledge of the substance of the entire decree which is not proved or at least pleaded by anybody to have been set aside or modified consequently parties to the said proceeding are bound by the said decree and if at all, any of the sharers wants to have any adjustment among him and other sharers in distributing or alienating shares, such task can be taken up only and only after intimating to and obtaining permission from the decree delivered Court which would naturally compromise or some other permissible mode after getting consensus among the parties concerned, but in the present case, it is neither proved nor contended that the sharers got raised the riding clause in the preliminary decree by approaching the Court, which shows that due to subsistence of the said riding clause in the preliminary decree, none of the sharers has a right for selling though not gifting his share in the schedule property and as a result thereof the contention of the plaintif that even during subsistence of the riding clause in the preliminary decree, the sharers orally agreed for selling the schedule property to him at a very huge consideration amount of Rs.25,00,000/- cannot at any cost be believed for the reason that no person would dare enough in dealing with a property in uttering disregard or violation of a Court order. It is pertinent to note that if the plaintif filed the documents obtained from the other co-sharers of the defendant before the Court, the fact would have been elicited, but plaintif failed to file those documents, for the reasons best known to him.
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)32
32.The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintif submitted that when the suit is for specific performance of contract in view of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the defences available under Specific Relief Act and under the provisions of the Contract Act only are available to defend the suit.
If no defence is available like in the present case, the Court is not expected to refuse the relief of specific performance of contract when it is in respect of immovable property. In support of his contention, he relied on the following citation :
Maharu S/o Gaindhal Bhoi, Vs. Hemraj, S/o Waman Patil Died,
Through his Legal Representatives, reported in 2015(1) Civ. C.R. 194 (Bom.), wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court held that :
“Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Sections 9 and 20 – Agreement to sell – Specific performance – Defence of defendant that property being joint family property and no legal necessity existed to sell it – In view of Section 9 the defences available under Specific Relief Act and under the provision of Contract Act only are available to defend the suit – No such defence exist in the present suit – At the time of deciding such suit Court is not expected to consider and decide the issue of capacity of party to contract – There is bar of estoppal against the defendant to raise such issue – Both the Courts below committed serious error in refusing the relief – The suit of plaintif for relief of specific performance decreed”.
On perusal of the facts of the above cited case, in the said case, there is a written agreement dated 18.5.1977 in between the parties. In the cited
Judgment, his Lordship observed that the documentary evidence shows that the agreement was registered and in the presence of the Sub-Registrar consideration of Rs.10,000/- was given by the plaintif to the defendant and the execution of the document is not disputed. Whereas, in the present case on hand, there is no any written agreement in between the parties and the alleged oral agreement as contended by the plaintif, failed to prove the same by the plaintif by adducing any cogent and convincing evidence.
Hence, the facts of the above cited case are diferent from the facts of the present case on hand.
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)33
33.The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintif further submitted that the suit based on oral agreement is maintainable if all material facts, conditions and surrounding circumstances are made out and it is the discretion of the Court to grant relief has to be based on sound and reasonable judicial principles and not arbitrary. In support of his case, the learned counsel for the plaintif relied on the following citation :
Ameer Mohammed, Vs. Barkat Ali, reported in 2003 (1) A.P.L.J.
38 (DNC), wherein his Lordship of Rajasthan High Court held that :
“Specific Relief Act, 1963, Sec.20 – Specific performance of agreement to sell immovable property – Suit based on oral agreement – Maintainable if all material facts, conditions and surrounding circumstances are made out – court’s discretion to grant relief has to be based on sound and reasonable judicial principles and not arbitrary”.
On perusal of the above cited Judgment, his Lordship observed that if oral agreement was entered into between the parties then whether it was in presence of any person and if there was any mediator who was he and what negotiations took place and if the agreement was acted upon then all the material particulars, how it was acted upon which includes the writing of any document by the parties, including the payments, mode of payment, receipt it was executed or the transaction was entered into books of accounts and what are the entries which are in the handwriting of other party. But In the present case on hand, the P.Ws.1 and 2 failed to reveal such all the material particulars. In the present case on hand, P.W.1 categorically stated in his cross-examination that he could not remember date, month and year of his deliberations with the defendant and her brothers and sister. Hence, the facts of the above cited case are diferent from the facts of the present case on hand.
34.The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintif further submitted that the decision of the trial Court Judge, who did not record evidence and had not observed manner in which witnesses deposed and hence, the appellate Court has duty to examine if evidence taken as a whole justify
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)34 conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. In support of his contention, he relied on the following citation :
Ameer Mohammed, Vs. Barkat Ali, reported in AIR 2002
Rajasthan, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court held that :
“Civil P.C. (5 of 1908), S.96 – Scope – Decision of trial Court given by Judge who did not record evidence and had not observed manner in which witnesses deposed – Appellate Court has duty to examine if evidence taken as a whole justify conclusion arrived at by trial Court”.
On perusal of the facts of the above cited case, his Lordship observed that whether the suit was decided by the Judge of the trial Court who has not recorded the evidence of the parties, therefore, had no advantage of observing the manner in which the witnesses deposed in Court nor could he pass the finding on the basis of demeanor of the witnesses and further observed that it is the duty of the appellate Court to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion which the trial Court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising from proved circumstances which, in the opinion of the Court, outweighs such finding recorded by the trial Court, therefore, it is relevant to consider the evidence of the parties in detail. But in the present case on hand, the trial Judge recorded the evidence of the parties and passing the finding on correct lines and passed the Judgment by considering the evidence of the parties in detail. Hence, the facts of the above cited case are diferent from that of the present case on hand.
35.In view of the above discussion and in view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, since the appellant/plaintif failed to prove the alleged oral agreement of sale in respect of the undivided 1/8th share of the defendant in the schedule mentioned property, by adducing any cogent and convincing evidence, the alleged oral agreement is not true, valid and binding on the defendant and hence, the plaintif is not entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale and any other relief sought for by the
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)35 plaintif. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in favour of the respondent/defendant and against the appellant/plaintif.
36.Point No.2:- Whether the suit is valued properly and the Court
Fee paid is correct ?
With regard to the valuation of the suit schedule property and correctness of payment of court fee is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant submitted that the Court Fee paid on the 1/8th share of the defendant is not correct and the plaintif has to pay the Court Fee on the entire sale consideration said to have been agreed which is to the tune of
Rs.25,00,000/-. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintif submitted that the agreed consideration of the entire plaint schedule building being Rs.25,00,000/- and as the plaintif has already acquired 7/8th shares and the share of the defendant alone remain to be conveyed as per contract of sale, and her share being 1/8th share, the value of which comes to Rs.3,12,500/- and hence, the Court Fee paid in the trial
Court is correct and hence, the findings of the trial Court in respect of Court
Fee are not correct.
37.Considering the contentions of the both parties, now, it is better to refer what the provision of Sec.39 of A.P.C.F. & S.V. Act reveals :
Sec.39 of A.P.C.F. & S.V. Act, 1956 reveals as follows :
Suits for specific performance:- In a suit for specific performance, with or without possession, fee shall be payable:-
(a) in the case of a contract of a sale, computed on the amount of the consideration;
(b) in the case of a contract of a mortgage, computed on the amount agreed to be secured by the mortgage;
(c) In the case of a contract of lease, computed on the aggregate amount of the penalty or premium, if any, and of the average of the annual rent agreed to be paid;
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)36
(d) In the case of a contract of exchange, computed on the amount of the consideration, or as the case may be, on the market value of the movable property or three fourths of the market value of the immovable property sought to be taken in exchange;
(e) in other cases, where the consideration for the promise sought to be enforced has a market value, computed on the market vaue of the movable property or three-fourths of the market value of the immovable property or where such consideration has no market value, at the rates specified in Section 47.
38.On perusal of the provision of Clause (a) of Sec.39 of A.P.C.F. &
S.V. Act, it is clear that in a suit for specific performance, with or without possession, fee shall be payable in the case of a contract of a sale, computed on the amount of the consideration. It is pertinent to note that when the plaintif is contending that he is in possession of the entire plaint schedule property, it is the bounden duty of the plaintif to pay the Court Fee in respect of the entire suit schedule property.
39.The learned counsel for the appellant argued that valuation made by the appellant/plaintif in the above suit is correct. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following citation :
Athili Appalaswamy, Vs. State, reported in 1963 1 Andh WR 118, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh held at para-6 that :
“Consequently, I find on Point No.1 that the valuation made by the appellant is correct. Point No.2 – Shri Reddi Pantulu contends that costs have to be deemed to form part of the subject matter of the appeal and that the appellant need not value the relief of costs. For this purpose he relies on section 49 of the Act. Explanation 2 to section 49 runs thus : “costs shall not be deemed to form part of the subject-matter of the appeal except where such costs form themselves the subject-matter of the appeal or relief is claimed as regards costs on grounds
additional to, or independent of, the relief claimed regarding the
main subject-matter in the suit”.
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)37
40.it is pertinent to note that according to the plaintif, all the sharers including the defendant orally agreed for selling the schedule property for Rs.25,00,000/- and as per admitted and unmarked preliminary decree in O.S.No.114/96 which formed part of the record, there are six sharers to the said property, viz., (1) Dheenavahi Gunnayya Surya Prasad,
Dheenavahi Seetaramachandra Murthy and Dheenavahi Venkata Narasimha
Murthy as one sharer for 1/4th of the schedule property; (2) Dheenavahi
Appalanarasayya as one sharer for 1/20th of the schedule property; (3)
Dheenavahi Ramarao as one sharer for 1/4th of the schedule property; (4)
Vardhiparthy Shyamaladevi, who is the defendant herein, as one sharer for 1/8th of the schedule property; (5) Devagupthapu Narayanamurthy as one sharer for 1 1/4th of the schedule property; and (6) Devagupthapu
Satyavathi as one sharer for rest of the share in the schedule property.
41.It is the contention of the plaintif, that in pursuance of oral agreement of sale, initially the above mentioned 2nd sharer Appalanarasayya, thereafter the 6th sharer Satyavathi, thereafter the successors of the 1st sharer and ultimately the 3rd sharer registered their respective shares of properties in his favour after receiving their respective shares of consideration amount, however for the reasons best known to him, the plaintif did not file any documentary proof in support of his contention, and hence, this Court feels that for want of filing either original or certified copies of said sale deeds, no inference particularly in positive can be drawn and as a result therefor, it cannot be said that the above said sharers have complied their obligation covered under the alleged oral agreement of sale. Even if it is inferred that the afore referred sharers registered their respective shares in favour of the plaintif, yet there remains non-compliance of oral agreement of sale by two sharers they are the 4th sharer, who is the defendant herein and 5th sharer viz., Devagupthapu Narayanamurthy. Barring the value of shares of the sharers 1 to 3 and 6, there remains the shares of the 4th and 5th sharers consequently Court fee ought to have been paid on the total sale
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)38 consideration amount of Rs.25,00,000/- by impleading all the sharers since the plaintif could not place any material on record to show that acting on the oral agreement of sale, some of the sharers particularly sharers 1 to 3 and 6 registered their respective shares in favour of the plaintif after receiving their respective shares of consideration.
42.It is pertinent to note that even if the sharers 1 to 3 and 6 are assumed to have registered their respective shares in favour of the plaintif, yet the plaintif ought to have filed the suit against the sharers 4 and 5 by paying the Court fee based on the value of both of their respective shares unlike in the instant case in which the plaintif, without impleading all the sharers but by impleading the defendant alone who happened to be 4th sharer, filed the suit based on the value of the share of the 4th sharer alone un-impleading the 4th sharer and un-pleading that the 4th sharer in pursuance of oral agreement of sale complied his part of obligation covered under it.
Hence, the facts of the above citation are diferent from the facts of the present case on hand.
43.In view of the above discussion and the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that the suit is not properly valued and the Court fee payable on the suit is not properly paid.
44.In view of the above discussion and facts and circumstances of the case, since the plaintif failed to prove the alleged oral agreement by adducing any cogent and convincing evidence and hence, the alleged oral agreement of sale is not true and it cannot be enforceable and hence, the specific performance of agreement cannot be ordered. Accordingly, the Point
No.2 is answered in favour of the respondent/defendant and against the
Appellant/Plaintif.
45.Point No.3:- Whether there are any grounds to interfere with the decree and Judgment of the trial Court ?
Therefore, the trial Court answered the Issues rightly held in dismissing the suit of the plaintif, and this Court does not find any infirmity
Family Court cum III ADJ Court, VZM A.S. No.40/2016 (Specific Performance)39 or illegality in the said findings. The findings and observations of the trial
Court are according to material on record and it is well legal principles and there are no grounds to interfere with the findings of the trial Court. The decree and Judgment of the trial Court are in correct lines. Therefore, the appeal is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed.
46.Point No.4:- To What relief ?
In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs throughout, by confirming the decree and judgment passed in O.S.No.157/2006, dt.22.04.2016 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram.
Typed to my dictation, by the Stenographer Grade-I, corrected and pronounced by me in open Court, this the 26th day of June, 2019.
Sd/- E. BHIMA RAO,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional District Judge,
Vizianagaram.
Copy to the Senior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram.
IN THE COURT OF THE JUDGE, FAMILY COURT CUM III
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, VIZIANAGARAM
Present: Sri E. Bhima Rao,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional District Judge, Vizianagaram.
Friday, this the 03rd day of May, 2019
Original Suit No.103/2014
Between:
Basavala Rama Krishna, S/o Venkata Rao, R/o Prasad Nagar, Aged 44 years, R/o V.T. Agraharam, Vizianagaram. …Plaintif A n d:
1) M/s. Aditya Aggregates, Represented by its Proprietor Yelamanchi Jayadev, S/o Krishna Mohan, Aged 30 years, Alugubilli Village, S.Kota Mandal, Vizianagaram District.
2) M/s. Marthand Agencies, Represented by its Manager, Dealer: HPCL, S.No.44/14 & 15, Vizianagaram-Visakhapatnam Highway Road, Jonnada village, Denkada Mandal, Vizianagaram-04, (Died).
3) M/s. Shiridi Sai Agencies Represented by its Manager, Dealer, IOCL Mayuri Junction, Vizianagaram.
4) Simhambhatla Lakshmi, W/o late Hanumantha Rao, Aged about 50 years, Hindu, Resident of 3rd Lane, Kothagraharam, Vizianagaram.
5) Akella Srinivas Marthand, S/o Late Hanumantha Rao, Aged about 25 years, Hindu, Resident of 3rd Lane, Kothagraharam, Vizianagaram.
(Defendants 4 and 5 are added as per the Orders of this Court vide I.A. No.571/2018 dated 10.10.2018). …Defendants
This suit coming on 09.04.2019 for final hearing before me in the presence of Sri P. Venu Gopala Rao, Advocate for the Plaintif and of Sri L. Satyanarayana, Advocate for the 1st defendant, and since 2nd defendant having reported died; and of Sri K.V.N. Thammanna Setty,
Advocate for the defendants 3 and 4, and having stood over for consideration to this date, this Court delivered the following:
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)2
J U D G M E N T
This suit is filed by the plaintif against the defendants for recovery of a sum of Rs.10,41,656/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs, Forty One thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty Six only) together with subsequent interest @ 18% p.a., on the suit amount from the date of the suit till the date of realization of the same, and for costs of the suit.
2.The averments of the plaint in precise are that the plaintif is permanent resident of Vizianagaram. The 1st defendant had approached the plaintif and entered into an agreement with the plaintif orally regarding supply of Fuel and Lubricants and whereof, plaintif agreed to act as his agent, and the plaintif, as mutually agreed upon ‘Inter se’ both of them, has started the process of supplying Fuel and Lubricants from 08.07.2011 purchasing the same on Credit basis, from various filling stations of his choice and volition.
(a).The 1st defendant used to pay the amounts to the plaintif taking respective acknowledgements from him thereto and the plaintif in turn used to make payments to the filling stations, from which he takes the fuel and lubricants on credit basis particularly plaintif used to make payments to the defendants 2 and 3 to the credit of the respective amounts payable to them. Thus, the plaintif has been transacting with the 1st defendant by means of supplying fuel and lubricants through the defendants 2 and 3 on credit basis under the respective vouchers and has been continuing the said process though in fact, payments have been being made irregularly by the 1st defendant, out of good faith and having reposed confidence, plaintif went on supplying the Fuel and Lubricants as usual.
(b).The plaintif used to furnish the account from time to time to the 1st defendant as well as the outstanding amount due to him from the 1st defendant. In this connection, as there are outstanding dues payable in respect of the said Fuel and Lubricants supplied to 1st defendant,
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)3
through defendants 2 and 3, viz., M/s. Marthand Agencies, Dealer, HPCL,
S.No.44/14 & 15, Vizianagaram-Visakhapatnam High Way Road, Jonnada
Village, Denkada Mandal, Vizianagaram District; as well as M/s. Shiridi Sai
Agencies, Dealer, IOCL, Mayuri Junction, Vizianagarammore often, plaintif is being demanded to clear of the dues to them. In this connection, when the plaintif has recently issued notices against the defendants 2 and 3, requesting to furnish the computer data-Print outs containing the
Statement of accounts pertaining to the account of the 1st defendant in regard to the said Fuels and Lubricants supplied to the 1st defendant through their respective filling stations for which, the defendants 2 and 3 have furnished statement of Account-data-Printouts, showing the outstanding dues to them. Accordingly, there is an outstanding due of
Rs.12,85,159/- as on 08.3.2013 from the 1st defendant, which includes the amount debited and adjusted by the 1st defendant towards the building material reported to have been supplied by him to the plaintif, but in fact, the details of which have not been furnished to the plaintif so far, and however, the net outstanding due to M/s. Marthand Agencies (2nd defendant) is Rs.3,45,596/- (as per their statement of account supplied to the plaintif), while the net outstanding due to M/s. Shiridi Sai Agencies (3rd defendant) (as per their statement of account) is Rs.6,96,060-61 Ps, rounded of to Rs.6,96,060/- which in all comes to a total outstanding of
Rs.10,41,656-61 Ps., rounded of to Rs.10,41,656/- which is in turn payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintif.
(c).In this connection, despite the repeated demands made by the plaintif, since 1st defendant has failed to make any payment so far, plaintif has been constrained to issue registered Lawyer’s Notice, dt.09.07.2013 and of late another notice dated 12.7.2014 against the 1st defendant, calling upon to clear at least the net outstanding due of
Rs.10,41,656-61 Ps., and may continue the process of taking the Fuel &
Lubricants on credit basis, so that the plaintif also does not have the least
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)4
objection to carry on the business activity and relationship as usual, failing which plaintif will be constrained to initiate the necessary course of legal action seeking redressal in his favour through Court of law, but 1st defendant did neither respond for both the notices got issued by the plaintif in this regard nor did he make any payment thereof, to the plaintif, and more over, appears to have managed to return the said notices. Further since the 2nd defendant herein has expired, the defendants 4 and 5 are added as his legal heirs.
(d).Therefore, the plaintif filed the suit against the defendants, seeking recovery of the suit amount due from the 1st defendant, whereas, ‘Ipso facto’ no relief is claimed against the defendants 2 and 3, but they have been impleaded since they being the necessary parties to the suit so as to substantiate the suit claim against the 1st defendant. Hence, the plaintif prays to decree the suit as prayed for.
3.The 1st defendant filed his written statement denying all the material averments of the plaint and further contended that there is no previty of contract between the 1st defendant and the plaintif and the defendants 2 and 3 and there is no agreement of any kind either oral or in writing between them. The 1st defendant never appointed the plaintif as its agent for the purchase of supply of Fuel and Lubricants from the defendants 2 and 3 and the 1st defendant never approached the defendants 2 and 3 at any point of time and the 1st defendant never opened any account with them for the supply of Fuel and Lubricants.
(a).The plaintif has no business concern or any business firm to deal in supply of Fuel and Lubricants and the plaintif has no such license to deal with the supply of Fuel and Lubricants. The plaintif approached the 1st defendant stating that he is the agent of the 2nd defendant and he would supply the fuel and lubricants to the work spot of the 1st defendant without the concern or any agreement with the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant has to pay the amounts to the plaintif directly for the Fuel and
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)5
Lubricants supplied to him. Accordingly the 1st defendant used to pay amounts to the plaintif periodically under receipts for the Fuel and
Lubricants supplied to it from the 2nd defendant’s Agency. The 1st defendant paid all the amounts to the plaintif for the Fuel and Lubricants supplied to it from the 2nd defendant and the plaintif passed receipts acknowledging the receipt of amounts from the 1st defendant. At times on the request of the plaintif, the 1st defendant also used to send some amounts to the 2nd defendant through R.T.G.S., on behalf of the plaintif and accordingly an amount of Rs.3,20,000/- was sent to the 2nd defendant on behalf of the plaintif. As per the statement of accounts of the 1st defendant, the balance amount due payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintif as on 31.3.2013 is Rs.2,12,678/- and after paying the total amount of Rs.11,56,074/- from 01.04.2013 to 18.5.2013 to the plaintif by cash and to the 2nd defendant through R.T.G.S., and after deducting an amount of Rs.44,074/- towards the cost of the metal supplied to the plaintif, the balance amount due payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintif is only Rs.573/- but not Rs.3,45,596/- as claimed in the plaint towards the amount payable to the 2nd defendant.
(b).There is nothing due payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintif except Rs.573/- for the Fuel and Lubricants supplied to it from the 2nd defendant. The plaintif never supplied the statement of account showing the supply of Fuel and Lubricants and the amounts received by him from time to time in spite of several requests made by the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant is not aware whether the plaintif is crediting the amounts received by him from the 1st defendant to the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant is not aware about the particulars of the account maintained by the 2nd defendant and the 2nd defendant also never approached the 1st defendant nor supplied any account said to have maintained by it as there is no previty of contract between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant.
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)6
(c).The plaintif has not supplied any Fuel and Lubricants from the 3rd defendant and there is no agreement or previty of contract between the 1st defendant and the 3rd defendant and the 3rd defendant never approached the 1st defendant nor demanded any amount from the 1st defendant by supplying any statement of account and the 1st defendant is no way connected about the supply of Fuel and Lubricants to the plaintif by the 3rd defendant and hence it cannot be said that the 1st defendant is liable to pay an amount of Rs.6,96,060/- to the plaintif towards the net outstanding balance due payable to the 3rd defendant. When the 1st defendant purchased the Fuel and Lubricants from the 3rd defendant, the said amounts were paid to the 3rd defendant directly through R.T.G.S., and the plaintif is no way concerned with the transaction of the 1st defendant with the 3rd defendant.
(d).The 1st defendant never received any of the lawyer’s notices
dated 09.07.2013 and 12.7.2014 and as such the question of the 1st
defendant responding for both the notices would not arise. There cannot be any outstanding balances of Rs.3,45,596/- to the 2nd defendant and an outstanding balance of Rs.6,96,060/- to the 3rd defendant when there is no amount due payable to the plaintif towards the Fuel and Lubricants supplied from the 2nd defendant and when there is no transaction of supplying Fuel and Lubricants to the 1st defendant by the plaintif from the 3rd defendant. The 1st defendant is not liable to pay the suit amount and the suit claim basing on the statement of accounts supplied by the defendants 2 and 3 to the plaintif is not maintainable under Law and even as per the averments in the plaint itself the plaintif has no cause of action to file this suit against the 1st defendant.
(e).When the plaintif is claiming the suit amount alleging that he supplied the Fuel and Lubricants to the 1st defendant and in such case, the defendants 2 and 3 are not the necessary parties to the suit and adding the defendants 2 and 3 as parties to the suit itself shows collusiveness
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)7
and mala fide intention of the plaintif that with a view to support his claim through them, the plaintif added the defendants 2 and 3 as parties to the suit and hence, the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties. This suit is a vexatious suit filed without any proof of debt and hence, the suit claim is only a vexatious claim. The 1st defendant is not liable to pay any amount much less an amount of Rs.10,41,656/- together with interest to the plaintif as claimed in the suit and this suit by the plaintif against the 1st defendant is not maintainable under Law since there is no cause of action to the plaintif to file this suit against the 1st defendant. Therefore, the 1st defendant prays to dismiss the suit with costs.
4.The 2nd defendant filed his written statement denying all the material averments of the plaint and further contended that it may be true that there was an agreement between the plaintif and the 1st defendant regarding supply of Fuel and Lubricants. But, to the best of his knowledge, the 1st defendant is the principal and the plaintif is his agent.
Since both the 1st defendant and the plaintif approached the 2nd defendant for supply of Fuel and Lubricants and accordingly the 2nd defendant supplied Fuel and Lubricants to them regularly on credit basis and some times by paying cash. The 2nd defendant is not aware to whom the plaintif is supplying the fuel after taking delivery of the Fuel and
Lubricants from the 2nd defendant.
(a).The 2nd defendant is nothing to do with the subsequent relationship between the plaintif and the 1st defendant inter-se. However at request of both the plaintif and the 1st defendant, the 2nd defendant furnished the copy of account statement to the plaintif and according to the said statement of account, the plaintif and as per it there is an outstanding amount of Rs.3,45,596/- due to the 2nd defendant as on 20.03.2014 payable by the plaintif and the 1st defendant jointly and severally. Whatever may be the subsequent relationship between the plaintif and the 1st defendant, but both of them are liable to pay the
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)8
amount due stated supra to the 2nd defendant with interest. Further, the 2nd defendant is nothing to do with the subsequent terms and conditions inter-se between the plaintif and the 1st defendant, since the liable to the 2nd defendant is joint and several. The 2nd defendant is suspecting that both the plaintif and the 1st defendant to evade their liability of due payment to the 2nd defendant intentionally colluded together and cropped up this type of unwarranted litigation and thereby wrongful cause loss to the 2nd defendant or to delay the payment for one reason or the other.
(b).There are no merits or bona fides in this suit against the 2nd defendant and therefore, liable to be dismissed. The 2nd defendant is not at all a necessary party to this suit and he was unnecessarily added as a party. This suit is filed by the plaintif in collusion with the 1st defendant just to avoid or delay the payment payable by them to the 2nd defendant.
The 2nd defendant reserves his right to take necessary legal action against the 1st defendant and the plaintif for recovery of the amount due to him with interest. Therefore, the 2nd defendant prays to dismiss the suit with costs.
5.The 3rd defendant filed his written statement denying all the material averments of the plaint and further contended that he is not aware about the payments made by the 1st defendant to the plaintif and the same was being paid by the plaintif to the Filling Stations, but the plaintif on some occasions was taking fuel from the 3rd defendant on credit basis and on some times by paying cash. The 3rd defendant is not aware to whom the plaintif is supplying the Fuel and taking delivery of the quantity of diesel and petrol from the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant has supplied a copy of the account data to the plaintif containing the details of quantity of fuel taken by the plaintif, but it is not mentioned in the account copy whether that fuel was meant for supply to the 1st defendant or not by the plaintif and therefore, the allegation mentioned in the plaint that the 3rd defendant has supplied the account
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)9
pertaining to the account of the 1st defendant in regard to the Fuel and
Lubricants through the 3rd defendant. The plaintif has to pay nearly
Rs.6,96,060/- by the date of giving the copy of the accounts to the plaintif. The defendants are not necessary parties to the suit as stated by the plaintif and therefore, no issues could be framed against the 3rd defendant and hence, the suit against the 3rd defendant is liable to be dismissed at the initial stage itself. The suit is filed beyond limitation and therefore it is liable to be dismissed. There are no merits or bona fides in the plaint and therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. Therefore, the 3rd defendant prays to dismiss the suit with costs.
6.Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues were framed for trial :
(1) Whether the plaintif is entitled for recovery of the suit amount of Rs.10,41,656/- from the 1st defendant with subsequent interest at 18% p.a., on the suit till the date of realization as claimed in the suit ?
(2) To what relief ?
7.During the course of trial, on behalf of the plaintif, the plaintif himself examined as P.W.1 and also examined one Kandi Gowri
Sankar, and one Kunchangi Ramana, who are the third parties to the suit proceedings, as P.Ws.2 and 3 respectively, and got marked Exs.A.1 to
A.14. On behalf of the defendants, the 1st defendant himself examined as
D.W.1, and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.34.
8.Heard both sides.
9.ISSUE No.1:
The case of the plaintif is, the 1st defendant approached him and entered into an agreement with him orally regarding supply of Fuel and Lubricants and he agreed to act as his agent, and as mutually agreed upon ‘Inter se’ both of them, he started the process of supplying Fuel and
Lubricants from 08.07.2011 purchasing the same on Credit basis from various filling stations of his choice and volition. The 1st defendant used
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)10
to pay the amounts to him taking respective acknowledgements from him thereto and thereby in turn he used to make payments to the filling stations, from which he used to take the Fuel and Lubricants on credit basis, particularly he used to make payments to the defendants 2 and 3 to the credit of the respective amounts payable to them. Thus, he had been transacting with the 1st defendant by means of supplying Fuel and
Lubricants through the 2nd and 3rd defendants on credit basis under the respective vouchers and he has been continuing the said process though in fact, payments have been being made irregularly by the 1st defendant, out of good faith and having reposed confidence, he went on supplying the Fuel and Lubricants as usual. He used to furnish the account from time to time to the 1st defendant as well as the outstanding amount due to him from the 1st defendant. In this connection, as there are outstanding dues payable in respect of the said Fuel and Lubricants and more often, he has been demanding to clear of the dues to them. In this connection, when he has recently issued notices against the defendants 2 and 3 requesting to furnish the computer data-print outs containing the statement of account pertaining to the account of the 1st defendant in regard to the said Fuel and Lubricants supplied to the 1st defendant through their respective filling stations, for which the defendants 2 and 3 have furnished statement of account-data-Print outs, showing the outstanding dues to them and accordingly, there is an outstanding due of
Rs.12,85,159/- as on 08.3.2013 from the 1st defendant, which includes the amount debited and adjusted by the 1st defendant towards the building material reported to have been supplied to him, but in fact, the details of which have not been furnished to him so far, and however, the net outstanding due to the 2nd defendant is Rs.3,45,596/- (As per their statement of account supplied to the plaintif), while the net outstanding due to the 3rd defendant (As per their statement of account supplied) is
Rs.6,96,060-61 Ps., rounded of to Rs.10,41,656/- which is in turn payable
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)11
by the 1st defendant to him. Despite the repeated demands made by him, since the 1st defendant failed to make any payment so far, he was constrained to issue registered lawyer’s notices dt.09.07.2013 and 12.7.2014 against the 1st defendant, calling upon to clear at least the Net outstanding due of Rs.10,41,656-61 Ps., but the 1st defendant did neither respond for both the notices got issued by him nor did he make any payment, hence he was constrained to file the present suit against the defendants for decree of the suit with costs as prayed for.
10.The plaintif filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of his chief examination, wherein, he reiterated the plaint averments in toto, In support of the case of the plaintif, he examined P.Ws.2 and 3 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.14.
11.P.W.2, who is the third party to the proceedings, filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of his chief-examination, stating that he is the owner of an Auto and previously he worked as worker while the plaintif worked as the Manager in Bharat Petroleum Corporation which is known as “Jami Bunk” situated at Jami under the supervision of plaintif for three years and during the said period, he used to attend the vehicles along with other vehicles belongs to Aditya Aggregates known as ‘Alugubilli
Quarry’, now and then in their vehicles on the instructions of Sri
Makrishna, for supervising the filling of fuel and lubricants to the said vehicles in the respective bunks particularly in Maathanda Bunk known as
HP. Bunk, Jonnada as well as Shiridi Sai Agencies known as I.O.C., Bunk at
Mayuri Junction, Vizianagaram and he also used to accompany the vehicles on the instructions of Sri Ramakrishna for supplying the material and fuel etc, at their quarry. It is a fact that Sri Ramakrishna used to act as an Agent to said parties named above and used to supply fuel and lubricants on credit basis to Aditya Aggregates (Alugubilli Quarry) Sri
Jayadev, and for which they used to make payments to him. He came to know that some amounts are due to Sri Ramakrishna from 1st defendant
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)12
through H.P. Bunk, Jonnada & I.O.C. Bunk, Mayuri, Vizianagaram. The said facts are personally known to him.
12.P.W.3, who is also third party to the proceedings, filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of his chief-examination, stating that he is a driver and he previously worked as Driver in Alugubilli Quarry belongs to
Jayadev of Aditya Aggregates, from March, 2012 to May, 2016. The plaintif worked as the Manager in Bharat Petroleum Corporation which is known on “Jami Bunk” situated at Jami. He worked as one of the drivers in the Lorries of 1st defendant and during the time of his employment he used to get the fuel and lubricants loaded to their vehicles from the Petrol
Bunks viz, Shirdi Sai Agencies known as Bhanoji Bunk, Marthanda Bunk, and Samanvitha Bunk etc, and that way he got acquainted with the plaintif. The plaintif who used to act as an agent of the said Jayadev,
Aditya Aggregates, used to supply the said Fuel and Lubricants to their vehicles through the said Bunks particularly from the three bunks stated above, for being supplied to his employer for their quarry. It is a fact that
Sri Rama Krishna used to act as an agent to said parties named above and used to supply Fuel and Lubricants on credit basis to Aditya
Aggregates (Alugubilli Quarry) Sri Jayadev, and for which they used to make payments to him. In these circumstances, he came to know that some amounts are due to Sri Ramakrishna from Jayadev through H.P.
Bunk, Jonnada & I.O.C. Bunk, Mayuri Junction, Vizianagaram for which he happened to have filed the present suit. The said facts are personally known to him.
13.The case of the 1st defendant is, there is no privity of contract in between him and the plaintif and there is no agreement of any kind either oral or in writing with the plaintif or with the defendants 2 and 3.
He never appointed the plaintif as his agent for the purchase of supply of
Fuel and Lubricants from the defendants 2 and 3 and the plaintif is not his agent, but he is the agent of the 2nd defendant. The plaintif has no
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)13
business concern or any business firm to deal in supply of Fuel and
Lubricants and the plaintif has no such license to deal with the supply of
Fuel and Lubricants. The plaintif approached him stating that he is the agent of the 2nd defendant and he would supply the Fuel and Lubricants to the work spot of him without the concern of any written agreement with the 2nd defendant and he has to pay the amounts to the 2nd defendant through the plaintif for the fuel and lubricants supplied to him.
Accordingly, the 2nd defendant used to supply oils and lubricants to them by way of credit bills issued by the 2nd defendant in the name of his firm
Aditya Aggregates, Alugubilli and he used to pay amounts to the 2nd defendant through the plaintif periodically under receipts for the fuel and lubricants supplied to them from the 2nd defendant’s Agency and the plaintif used to acknowledge the payments made to the 2nd defendant by signing on the vouchers as agent of the 2nd defendant. He also used to send some amounts to the 2nd defendant through R.T.G.S., and accordingly an amount of Rs.3,50,000/- was sent to the 2nd defendant through RTGS. As per the statement of accounts of the 2nd defendant, the balance amount due payable by him to the 2nd defendant as on 31.3.2013 is Rs.2,74,926/- and the total amount paid by them to the 2nd defendant through the plaintif in cash is Rs.7,92,000/- as per vouchers passed by the plaintif and the amount directly sent to the 2nd defendant through
RTGS is Rs.3,50,000/- and in total an amount of Rs.11,42,000/- was paid from 02.04.2013 to June, 2013 through the plaintif by cash and to the 2nd defendant through RTGS and besides that the plaintif personally liable to pay an amount of Rs.44,074/- towards the cost of metal supplied to him, and as such it cannot be said they are liable to pay an amount of
Rs.3,45,596/- as claimed in the plaint towards the amount payable to the 2nd defendant. There is nothing due payable by him to the 2nd defendant through the plaintif for the Fuel and Lubricants supplied to them from the 2nd defendant. The plaintif nor the 2nd defendant never supplied the
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)14
statement of account showing the supply of Fuel and Lubricants and the amounts received by him from time to time. He is not aware whether the plaintif is crediting the amounts received by him from him as Agent to the 2nd defendant and he is not aware about the particulars of the account maintained by the 2nd defendant in the name of their firm and as the 2nd defendant also never approached him directly nor supplied any account and maintained by it. The plaintif as an agent has not supplied any Fuel and Lubricants from the 3rd defendant and there is no agreement or privity of contract between him and the 3rd defendant and the 3rd defendant never supplied any fuel or lubricants to them through the plaintif and the 3rd defendant never approached him nor demanded him any amount by supplying any statement of account and he is no way connected about the supplying any statement of account and he is no way connected about the supply of Fuel and Lubricants to the plaintif by the 3rd defendant and hence, he is not liable to pay an amount of Rs.6,96,060/- to the plaintif towards the net outstanding balance due payable to the 3rd defendant. He never received any of the Lawyer’s notices dt.09.07.2013 and 12.7.2014 and as such the question of himself responding for both the notices would not arise. He is not liable to pay the suit amount and the suit claim basing on the statement of accounts supplied by the defendants 2 and 3 to the plaintif is not maintainable under law. The plaintif has no right to file the above suit against him in his individual capacity for recovery of the amounts said to be due to the defendants 2 and 3 and as such the plaintif has no cause of action to file this suit against him. Hence, he prays to dismiss the suit with costs.
14.The 1st defendant filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of his chief-examination by reiterating the written statement filed by him in toto.
In support of his case, he got marked Exs.B.1 to B.34.
15.The case of the 2nd defendant is that there was an agreement between the plaintif and the 1st defendant regarding supply of Fuel and
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Lubricants. Since both the 1st defendant and the plaintif approached the 2nd defendant for supply of Fuel and Lubricants and accordingly the 2nd defendant supplied Fuel and Lubricants to them regularly on credit basis and some times by paying cash. However at request of both the plaintif and the 1st defendant, the 2nd defendant furnished the copy of account statement to the plaintif and according to the said statement of account, the plaintif and as per it there is an outstanding amount of Rs.3,45,596/- due to the 2nd defendant as on 20.03.2014 payable by the plaintif and the 1st defendant jointly and severally. Further, the 2nd defendant is nothing to do with the subsequent terms and conditions inter-se between the plaintif and the 1st defendant, since the liable to the 2nd defendant is joint and several. The 2nd defendant is suspecting that both the plaintif and the 1st defendant to evade their liability of due payment to the 2nd defendant intentionally colluded together and cropped up this type of unwarranted litigation and thereby wrongful cause loss to the 2nd defendant or to delay the payment for one reason or the other. This suit is filed by the plaintif in collusion with the 1st defendant just to avoid or delay the payment payable by them to the 2nd defendant. Therefore, the 2nd defendant prays to dismiss the suit with costs.
16.The case of the 3rd defendant is that he is not aware about the payments made by the 1st defendant to the plaintif and the same was being paid by the plaintif to the Filling Stations, but the plaintif on some occasions was taking fuel from the 3rd defendant on credit basis and on some times by paying cash. The plaintif has to pay nearly Rs.6,96,060/- by the date of giving the copy of the accounts to the plaintif. The suit is filed beyond limitation and therefore it is liable to be dismissed. Therefore, the 3rd defendant prays to dismiss the suit with costs.
17.Perused the entire material available on record and the contents of both parties. The main case of the plaintif is, the 1st defendant approached him and entered into an oral agreement with him
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)16
regarding supply of Fuel and Lubricants and he agreed to act as his agent and as mutually agreed upon ‘Inter se’ both of them, he started process of supplying Fuel and Lubricants from 08.07.2011 purchasing the same on
Credit basis, from various filling stations of his choice and volition. The 1st defendant used to pay the amounts to him taking respect acknowledgements from him thereto, and thereby in turn he used to make payments to the filling stations, from which he used to take the Fuel and Lubricants on credit basis particularly he used to make payments to the defendants 2 and 3 to the credit of respective amounts payable to them. Thus, he had been transacting with the 1st defendant by means of supplying fuel and lubricants through the 2nd and 3rd defendants on credit basis under respective vouchers and he has been continuing the said process though in fact, payments have been being made irregularly by the 1st defendant, out of good faith and having reposed confidence, he went on supplying the Fuel and Lubricants as usual. He used to furnish the account from time to time to the 1st defendant as well as outstanding amount due to him from the 1st defendant. In this connection, as there are outstanding dues payable in respect of the said Fuel and Lubricants supplied to the 1st defendant, through the defendants 2 and 3. He has been demanding to clear of the dues to them. In this connection, when he recently issues notices against the defendants 2 and 3 requesting to furnish the computer data-print outs containing the statement of accounts pertaining to the account of the 1st defendant in regard to the said Fuel and Lubricants supplied to the 1st defendant through their respective filling stations for which, defendants 2 and 3 have furnished statement of account-data-print outs, showing the outstanding dues to them.
18.In support of the case of the plaintif, he got marked Exs.A.1 to A.14. Ex.A.1 is Registered Lawyer’s notices, dt.09.07.2013 got issued to the 1st defendant. On perusal of Ex.A.1 registered Lawyer’s notice, it clearly reveal that according to the oral mutual agreement dated
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)17
08.07.2011 in between the plaintif and the 1st defendant, regarding supply of Fuel and Lubricants, the plaintif used to supply Fuel and
Lubricants on credit basis to the 1st defendant out of good faith and confidence, and plaintif maintaining account regularly and details of which are also being furnished to the 1st defendant from time to time obtaining necessary signatures and endorsed thereto and there is an outstanding due of Rs.12,85,159/- as on 08.03.2013 from the 1st defendant and demanding to pay the same within a week of receipt of said notices. Ex.A.2 is legal notice, dt.10.4.2014 got issued by the plaintif to the 2nd defendant stating that some amounts are falling due to the plaintif from 2nd defendant in the recent past in respect of supply of
Fuel and Lubricants on credit basis as per mutual oral agreement in between them and demanding the 2nd defendant to supply ledger extract containing upto-date data/details of supply of fuel and lubricants made by 2nd defendant to the 1st defendant through the plaintif, as early as possible. Ex.A.3 is acknowledgement, dt.16.4.2014 from the 2nd defendant. Ex.A.4 is registered lawyer’s notice, dt.10.4.2014 got issued by the plaintif against the 3rd defendant, requesting to supply the ledger extract containing upto-date data/details of supply of fuel and lubricants made by the 3rd defendant to the 1st defendant through the plaintif.
Ex.A.5 is acknowledgement, dt.16.4.2014 from the 3rd defendant. Ex.A.6 is registered lawyer’s notice, dt.20.5.2014 got issued by the plaintif to the 2nd defendant, requesting to supply the ledger extract containing upto-date data/details of supply of fuel and lubricants made by the 2nd defendant to the 1st defendant, through the plaintif. Ex.A.7 is acknowledgement, dt.28.5.2014 from the 2nd defendant. Ex.A.8 is reply notice, dt.08.07.2014 and Statement of Account/Ledger Account from the 2nd defendant. Ex.A.9 is Statement of Account/Ledger Account, dated 14.4.2014 from the 3rd defendant, in which closing balance is shown as
Rs.11,67,060-61 Ps. Ex.A.10 is Registered Lawyer’s notice dt.12.7.2014
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got issued by the plaintif against the 1st defendant, calling upon to clear net outstanding due of Rs.10,41,656-61 Ps., within a week of receipt of said notice. Ex.P.11 is returned cover with acknowledgement dated 24.7.2014, got issued by the plaintif, addressed to the 1st defendant.
Ex.A.12 is letter, dt.25.5.2013 issued by the 1st defendant to the 2nd defendant, thanking for their interest to supply HSD & Lubes to them.
Ex.A.13 is receipt, dt.26.2.2014 issued by the 2nd defendant, for
Rs.1,00,000/-, and Ex.A.14 is credit bill amount statement, dt.12.2.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant, for Rs.1,94,902/-. The above legal notices got issued by the plaintif to the defendants show that he demanded the defendants to supply the ledger extract containing upto-date data/details of supply of fuel and lubricants made by the defendants 2 and 3 to the 1st defendant through the plaintif.
19.The main case of the 1st defendant is that he is the Managing
Partner of the 1st defendant firm and there is no privity of contract between him and the plaintif and there is no agreement of any kind either oral or in writing with the plaintif or with the defendants 2 and 3 and he never appointed the plaintif as his agent for the purchase or supply of Fuel and Lubricants from the defendants 2 and 3 and the plaintif is not his agent, but he is the agent of the 2nd defendant. The plaintif has no business concern or any business firm to deal in supply of
Fuel and Lubricants and the plaintif has no such license to deal with the supply of Fuel and Lubricants. The plaintif approached him stating that he is the agent of the 2nd defendant and he would supply the fuel and lubricants to the work spot of him without the concern of any written agreement with the 2nd defendant and he has to pay the amounts to the 2nd defendant through the plaintif for the Fuel and Lubricants supplied to him. He used to send some amounts to the 2nd defendant through RTGS and accordingly an amount of Rs.3,50,000/- was sent to the 2nd defendant through RTGS. As per the statement of accounts of the 2nd defendant, the
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)19
balance amount due payable by him to the 2nd defendant as on 31.3.2013 is Rs.2,74,926/- and the total amount paid by them to the 2nd defendant through the plaintif in cash is Rs.7,92,000/- as per vouchers passed by the plaintif and the amount directly sent to the 2nd defendant through
RTGS is Rs.3,50,000/- and in total an amount of Rs.11,42,000/- was paid from 02.04.2013 to June, 2013 through the plaintif by cash and to the 2nd defendant through RTGS and besides that the plaintif personally liable to pay an amount of Rs.44,074/- towards cost of metal supplied to him, as such it he is not liable to pay an amount of Rs.3,45,596/- as claimed in the plaint towards the amount payable to the 2nd defendant. There is nothing due payable by him to the 2nd defendant through the plaintif for the Fuel and Lubricants supplied to them from the 2nd defendant. The plaintif nor 2nd defendant never supplied statement of account showing supply of Fuel and Lubricants and the amounts received by him from time to time. In support of his case, the 1st defendant got marked Exs.B.1 to B.34 documents.
20.The 1st defendant relied upon Exs.B.1 to B.34 documents. On perusal of Exs.B.1 to B.34 documents, Ex.B.1 is credit bill, dt.30.04.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.2 is credit bills, dt.01.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.3 is credit bill dated 02.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.4 is credit bill dated 04.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.5 is credit bill dated 06.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.6 is credit bill dated 07.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.7 is credit bill dated 08.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.8 is credit bill dated 10.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.9 is credit bill dated 18.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.10 is credit bill dated 22.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.11 is credit bill dated 01.06.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant; Ex.B.13 is cash voucher dated 02.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.14 is cash voucher dated 15.04.2013 issued in the
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)20
name of plaintif; Ex.B.15 is cash voucher dated 20.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.16 is cash voucher dated 24.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.17 is cash voucher dated 29.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.18 is cash voucher dated 02.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.19 is cash voucher
dated 04.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.20 is cash
voucher dated 29.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.21 is cash voucher dated 14.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant;
Ex.B.22 is cash voucher dated 15.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.23 is cash voucher dated 18.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.24 is cash voucher dated 18.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.25 is cash voucher dated 22.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.26 is cash voucher dated 25.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.27 is cash voucher dated 25.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.28 is cash voucher
dated 25.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.29 is cash
voucher dated 25.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.30 is cash voucher dated 30.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant;
Ex.B.31 is cash voucher dated 30.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.32 is cash voucher dated 01.06.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; Ex.B.33 is cash voucher dated 12.06.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant; and Ex.B.34 is cash voucher dated 14.06.2013 issued in the name of 2nd defendant, respectively.
21.During the course of cross-examination of P.W.1, by the learned counsel for the 1st defendant, P.W.1 stated that he is supplier of 20mm and 40mm metal for construction purposes. There is a written agreement between him and 1st defendant to supply of fuel and lubricants under Ex.A.12. According to Ex.A.12 agreement in between the defendants 1 and 2, except oral understand the 1st defendant did not give undertaking in writing in supply of fuel and lubricants. He further stated
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that he has not maintained any account books to show that from 08.07.2011 he purchased oil and lubricants from 2nd defendant and same supply to 1st defendant. Ex.A.8 statement of account was maintained by 2nd defendant showing the details of payments and supplies of oils and lubricants to 1st defendant. The 1st defendant paid bill to him in cash and sometime sent to the 2nd defendant by RTGS. He did not pay the amount to the Bunk immediately after receiving the amount from 1st defendant.
There is no personal account with him to show that by 31.3.2013 how much amount due by him to the 2nd defendant. There is no personal account to him to show that by 31.3.2013 how much amount due to him by the 1st defendant. He has not personally noted how much amount received from 1st defendant. According to the vouchers, dated 04.05.2013 and 25.5.2013, 1st defendant paid to him to be paid to the 2nd defendant. He admitted that he received amount on behalf of 2nd defendant and issued three vouchers which are shown to him. He further admitted that the 2nd defendant did not file any suit against him alleging that there was an outstanding balance of Rs.3,45,596/-. He admitted that according to Ex.A.8 accounts, the transaction between the defendants 1 and 2 and he is only agent of 2nd defendant. He denied the suggestion that since he acted as agent of 2nd defendant, he has no right to file suit against the 1st defendant for recovery of amount due to the the 2nd defendant by 1st defendant. According to Ex.A.9, it shows that the 3rd defendant supplied oil to him. He has not filed any credit bills that 3rd defendant supplied oil to the 1st defendant. He has not maintained separate record to show that he supplied oil to the 1st defendant personally. He admitted that it was not mentioned in Ex.A.13 that the amount was paid on behalf of 1st defendant for what purpose. He admitted that under Ex.A.12 the business transactions continuing between defendants 1 and 2.
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22.During the course of cross-examination of P.W.1, by the learned counsel for the 2nd defendant, P.W.1 stated that he has to pay an amount of Rs.3,45,596/- to the 2nd defendant on behalf of 1st defendant.
He admitted that himself and 1st defendant have to discharge the said amount jointly liable to pay the same. He is acting as an agent on behalf of the 1st defendant.
23. During the course of cross-examination of P.W.2, by the learned counsel for the 1st defendant, P.W.2 stated that the plaintif worked in Petrol Bunk at Jami in the year 2013-2014. The plaintif worked in Petrol Bunk as Manager. He does not know about Marthanda Agencies.
Plaintif is agent of the Petrol Bunk who filled the Oil. He does not know financial transactions between plaintif and 1st defendant about the amount of payment. He denied the suggestion that he does not know anything about transaction about the plaintif and 1st defendant and he is deposing false at the instance of plaintif.
24. During the course of cross-examination of P.W.3, by the learned counsel for the 1st defendant, P.W.3 stated that except his oral evidence there is no document like salary slip to show that he worked in
Aditya Aggregates as a Driver. The plaintif used to work in Jami Petrol
Bunk. He admitted that there is account to 1st defendant in Jami Petrol
Bunk. Except his oral evidence, there is no documentary evidence to show that he used to get fuel and lubricants loaded to vehicles from defendants 2 and 3 and Samanvitha Agencies. After getting fuel and lubricants the plaintif issued bills in the name of 1st defendant’s company and he used to hand over the said bill to the 1st defendant after completion of his duty. The plaintif never handed over any money to him for paying the same to petrol bunk.
25. During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, by the learned counsel for the plaintif, D.W.1 stated that he used to pay the amount to the 2nd defendant through the plaintif. What all the
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correspondence acts and deeds done by their Manager E.Srinivasarao are binds on them. Their company is binding what the correspondence made with 2nd defendant. They gave payment to 2nd defendant through plaintif for that they obtained signatures of plaintif. Plaintif is only collection agent of 2nd defendant. Since there are no dues, 2nd defendant never demanded him for payment of amount. Their company did not issue any legal notice to the defendants 2 and 3 after filing the suit. He admitted that it is mentioned in written statement that when purchased the oils and lubricants from the 3rd defendant, the said amount was paid to the 3rd defendant directly through RTGS.
26. During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1, by the learned counsel for the 2nd defendant, D.W.1 stated that in Ex.A.8 it shows that cash payments and RTGS payments. Exs.B.13 to B.34 are not cash vouchers. He admitted that the material which was supplied to the plaintif is personal transaction between him and plaintif. Ex.B.21 does not bear the signature of the receiver. He denied the suggestion that he is deposing false in order to avoid the payments to 2nd defendant.
27.Exs.A.1 and A.2 legal notices got issued by the plaintif to the defendants 1 and 2 reveals that he requested them to clear of the outstanding due for supplied Fuels and Lubricants and also to supply ledger extract containing upto-date data/details of supply of fuel and lubricants by the 2nd defendant to the 1st defendant, respectively. Ex.A.4 legal notice shows that the plaintif requested the 3rd defendant to supply ledger extract containing upto-date data/details of supply of fuel and lubricants made by 3rd defendant to the 1st defendant through the plaintif.
Ex.A.6 legal notice got issued by plaintif to 2nd defendant requesting him to supply ledger extract containing upto-date data/details of supply of fuel and lubricants made by 2nd defendant to the 1st defendant, through the plaintif. The above notices probablizes the case of the plaintif that he
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used to supply Fuels and Lubricants to the 1st defendant by obtaining the same from the defendants 2 and 3.
28.Exs.B.1 to B.12 documents i.e., credit bills issued by the 2nd defendant in the name of the 1st defendant. Ex.B.13 is cash voucher issued in the name of 2nd defendant. Ex.B.14 is cash voucher issued in the name of plaintif. Exs.B.15 to B.34 are cash vouchers issued in the name of the 2nd defendant. The above documents show that some transactions were made through the plaintif and some transactions were made directly between the 1st defendant and defendants 2 and 3. D.W.1 also admitted in his cross-examination that he used to pay the amount to the 2nd defendant through the plaintif. D.W.1 admitted in his cross- examination that he has not maintained any account books to show that from 08.07.2011 he purchased oil and lubricants from the 2nd defendant and same supply to the 1st defendant. D.W.1 further stated that Ex.A.8 statement of account was maintained by the 2nd defendant showing the details of payments and supplies of oils and lubricants to the 1st defendant. The above admission of D.W.1 clearly shows that Ex.A.8 statement of account reveals the details of payments and supplies of oils and lubricants to the 1st defendant. D.W.1 further admitted that the 1st defendant paid bill to him in cash and sometime sent to 2nd defendant by
RTGS. D.W.1 further admitted that he received amount on behalf of 2nd defendant and issued three vouchers which are shown to him. D.W.1 further admitted that the 2nd defendant did not file any suit against him alleging that there was an outstanding balance amount of Rs.3,45,596/-. It is pertinent to note that when the plaintif dealing as an agent in between the 1st defendant and 2nd defendant, there is no necessity to file the suit directly by the plaintif against the 1st defendant.
29.The case of the 1st defendant is there is no privity of contract between him and the plaintif and there is no agreement of any kind either oral or in writing with the plaintif or with the defendants 2 and 3
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and he never appointed the plaintif as his agent for the purchase or supply of fuel and Lubricants from the defendants 2 and 3 and the plaintif is not his agent but he is the agent of the 2nd defendant. It is to be noted that if really the plaintif is not the agent of the 1st defendant, why the in the cash vouchers issued by the 1st defendant, it is mentioned as pay to “Ramakrishna”, who is the plaintif herein. What is the necessity to mention the name of the 1st defendant in cash vouchers issued by the 1st defendant, there is no explanation from him.
30.The entire material available on record and documents filed by both sides and admissions made by the witnesses shows that the plaintif acted as an agent under an oral agreement for supply of Fuel and
Lubricants and according to the said oral agreement, the plaintif used to purchase Fuel and Lubricants from the defendants 2 and 3 and others and supply the same to the 1st defendant on credit basis and the 1st defendant used to pay the amounts to the plaintif taking respective acknowledgements from him and thereto and in turn the the plaintif used to make payments to the filling stations, i.e., defendants 2 and 3 and others. There are outstanding dues payable in respect of the said Fuel and Lubricants supplied to the 1st defendant, through defendants 2 and 3 and plaintif got issued notices against the defendants 2 and 3 requesting to furnish computer data print outs and defendants 2 and 3 furnished statement of account-data-printouts, showing outstanding dues to them.
All the documents filed by both parties proves the same facts. According to the plaintif, he acted as an Agent in between the 1st defendant and defendants 2 and 3 for supply of Fuel and Lubricants.
31.It is pertinent to note that if really the plaintif is not the agent of the 1st defendant, why the defendants 2 and 3 furnished the statement of account copy to the plaintif. In respect of the said aspect, there is no explanation from the defendants 2 and 3. moreover, the 1st defendant also did not issue notice, nor made any dispute regarding that why the defendants 2 and 3 issued statement of account to the plaintif, when the plaintif is not agent of
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him. In that aspect also there is no explanation from the 1st defendant. The silence on the part of the defendants 1 to 3, probablises the plaintif’s contention that he is the agent of 1st defendant. It is also pertinent to note that if there are any other transactions in between the plaintif and the 1st defendant, other than the suit transactions, those contracts are their private and personal contracts, but the defendants 2 and 3 are no way concerned with those contracts.
32.It is pertinent to note that if really the plaintif is not the agent of the 1st defendant, why the defendants 2 and 3 furnished the statement of account copy to the plaintif. In respect of the said aspect, there is no explanation from the defendants 2 and 3. moreover, the 1st defendant also did not issue notice, nor made any dispute regarding that why the defendants 2 and 3 issued statement of account to the plaintif, when the plaintif is not agent of him. In that aspect also there is no explanation from the 1st defendant. The silence on the part of the defendants 1 to 3, probablises the plaintif’s contention that he is the agent of 1st defendant.
33.During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the 1st defendant argued that the the plaintif, being an Agent, he cannot personally enforce, nor be bound by, contracts on behalf of principal and in the absence of any contract to that efect, an agent cannot personally enforce contracts entered into by him on behalf of his principal, nor is the personally bound by them, as per the provision of Section 230 of
Contracts Act. Whereas, the learned counsel for the plaintif argued that an agent can personally enforce contracts on behalf of principal directly and hence, the plaintif is entitled to sue the case on behalf of the defendants 2 and 3.
34.In view of the above rival contentions raised by the learned counsels for the both parties, now it is better to see what the provision of
Sec.230 of Contracts Act says. On perusal of Sec.230 of Contracts Act, it reveals as follows :
“Agent cannot personally enforce, nor be bound by, contracts on behalf of principal – In the absence of any contract
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to that efect an agent cannot personally enforce contracts entered into by him on behalf of his principal, nor is he personally bound by them. In the absence of any contract to that efect an agent cannot personally enforce contracts entered into by him on behalf of his principal, nor is he personally bound by them.
“Presumption of contract to contrary. Such a contract shall be presumed to exist in the following cases:- (1) Where the contract is made by an agent for the sale or purchase of goods for a merchant resident abroad; (2) Where the agent does not disclose the name of his principal; (3) Where the principal, though disclosed, cannot be sued”.
On perusal of the above provision of Law, it clearly shows that an
Agent cannot personally enforce, nor be bound by, contracts on behalf of the principal and in the absence of any contract to that efect, an agent cannot personally enforce contracts entered into by him on behalf of his
principal, nor is he personally bound by them. In the absence of any
contract to that efect an agent cannot personally enforce contracts entered into by him on behalf of his principal, nor he is personally bound by them.
35.It is pertinent to note that in the present case, admittedly the plaintif is acted as an agent in between the 1st defendant and defendants 2 and 3, by purchasing Fuel and Lubricants from the defendants 2 and 3 and supply the same to the 1st defendant, as an Agent. Hence, being the agent, the plaintif is not entitled to recover the suit amount from the 1st defendant. It is to be noted that in the present suit, if the relief is granted in favour of the plaintif and against the 1st defendant, directing the 1st defendant to pay the suit amount to the plaintif, in turn, if the plaintif failed to pay the same to the suppliers of Lubricants and Fuels, i.e., defendants 2 and 3 and others, they will sustain irreparable loss. Hence, in view of the above discussion, the plaintif is not entitled for recovery of the suit amount as prayed for in the suit. Accordingly, Issue No.1 is answered against the plaintif.
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)28
36.Issue No.2:
In the result, the suit is dismissed without costs.
Typed to my dictation, corrected and pronounced by me in open Court, this the 03rd day of May, 2019.
Sd/- E. BHIMA RAO,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional District Judge,
Vizianagaram
APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE
Witnesses Examined
For Plaintif:For Defendants :
P.W.1: Basavala Ramakrishna. D.W.1 Yelamanchili Jaya Dev.
P.W.2: Kandi Gowri Sankar.
P.W.3: Kunchangi Ramana.
Documents Marked For Plaintif:
Exs.A.1: Registered Lawyer’s notice, dt.09.07.2013 got issued against the 1st defendant.
Ex.A.2 : Registered lawyer’s notice, dt.10.04.2014 got issued against the 2nd defendant.
Ex.A.3 : Acknowledgement dated 16.04.2014.
Ex.A.4 : Registered Lawyer’s notice dated 10.04.2014 got issued against the 3rd defendant.
Ex.A.5 : Acknowledgement dated 16.04.2014.
Ex.A.6: Registered Lawyer’s notice dated 20.05.2014 got issued against the 2nd defendant.
Ex.A.7: Postal acknowledgement dated 28.05.2014.
Ex.A.8: Reply notice and statement of Account/Ledger Account from 2nd defendant dated 08.07.2014. Ex.A.9: Statement of Account/Ledger Account from the 3rd defendant
dated 14.04.2014.
Ex.A.10: Registered Lawyer’s notice dated 12.07.2014 got issued against the 1st defendant;
Ex.A.11: Returned cover with acknowledgement dated 24.07.23014.
Ex.A.12: Letter, dt.25.5.2013 issued by 1st defendant.
Ex.A.13: Receipt, dt.26.2.2014 issued by 2nd defendant.
Ex.A.14: Credit Bill amount Statement, dt.12.2.2013 issued by 2nd defendant.
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)29
For Defendants:
Ex.B.1 : Credit bill, dt.30.04.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.2 : Credit bills, dt.01.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.3 : Credit bill dated 02.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.4 : Credit bill dated 04.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.5 : Credit bill dated 06.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.6 : Credit bill dated 07.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.7 : Credit bill dated 08.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.8 : Credit bill dated 10.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.9 : Credit bill dated 18.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.10 : Credit bill dated 22.05.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.11 : Credit bill dated 01.06.2013 issued by the 2nd defendant.
Ex.B.13 : Cash voucher dated 02.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant;
Ex.B.14 : Cash voucher dated 15.04.2013 issued in the name of plaintiff.
Ex.B.15 : Cash voucher dated 20.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant;
Ex.B.16 : Cash voucher dated 24.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.17: Cash voucher dated 29.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant;
Ex.B.18: Cash voucher dated 02.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.19: Cash voucher dated 04.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.20: Cash voucher dated 29.04.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.21: Cash voucher dated 14.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant;
Ex.B.22: Cash voucher dated 15.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant;
Ex.B.23: Cash voucher dated 18.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.24: Cash voucher dated 18.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.25: Cash voucher dated 22.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant;
Ex.B.26: Cash voucher dated 25.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant;
Judge, FC cum III ADJ, VZM O.S. 103/2014 (Money)30
Ex.B.27: Cash voucher dated 25.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.28: Cash voucher dated 25.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant;
Ex.B.29: Cash voucher dated 25.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.30: Cash voucher dated 30.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.31: Cash voucher dated 30.05.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.32: Cash voucher dated 01.06.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.33: Cash voucher dated 12.06.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant.
Ex.B.34: Cash voucher dated 14.06.2013 issued in the name of 2nd
defendant,
Sd/- E. BHIMA RAO,
Judge, Family Court cum
III Additional District Judge,
Vizianagaram.
Order Record 841 total
| Case No. | Parties | Date | Type | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OS/200045/2014 | Sunkari Tirupathi Atchimunaidu vs Adapa Seshukumar | 26 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/321/2018 | Reddy Lakshmana Rao vs Pinninti Satyanarayana | 26 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/195/2018 | M/s. Shriram Transport Finanace Company Limited vs Namburi.Rajesh | 25 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/64/2019 | M/s Shriram Transport Finance Co.Ltd vs Kona Krishna | 25 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| ADOP/2/2019 | The Project Director of Dist. Women and Child Developemnt Agency vs NIL | 25 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| ADOP/3/2019 | The Project Director of Dist. Women and Child Developemnt Agency vs NIL | 25 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| ADOP/4/2019 | The Project Director of Dist. Women and Child Developemnt Agency vs NIL | 25 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/20/2019 | Shriram City Union Finance Limited rept by Md.Paravarish vs Sunkara Bhanusurya Prakash | 24 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/128/2019 | M/s Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited vs P.Maheswara Rao | 24 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/241/2018 | Shriram City Union Finance Limited vs Macherla Appannadora | 23 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/200180/2016 | Ananthala Ramana vs Teegala Devendhar and two others | 22 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/198/2019 | Kanumuri Raghava Adithya vs Koyyana Vani | 22 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/118/2019 | Saketi Adinarayana vs Kattoji Eswara Rao | 22 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| CRLA/24/2018 | Perisetty Radha vs Vsthe public prosecutor and another | 22 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| CRLA/58/2017 | Mandala Srirama Murthy vs Vsthe public prosecutor | 22 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/30/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 22 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| CMA/7/2017 | Kona Demudu vs Tikkana Mahalaxmi and two others | 19 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/61/2019 | M/s Shriram Transport Finance Co.Ltd vs Karireddy Eswara Rao | 19 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/91/2016 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 19 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/246/2018 | Goddu Adinarayana vs Gudla Mutyulu Rao | 18 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/117/2018 | Shriram City Union Finance Ltd., vs Palavalasa Rajagopala Rao | 17 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/172/2017 | DURGASI PARVATHI vs MENDA SATYANARAYANA | 16 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/119/2018 | Jami Ramu vs B.Satyanarayana | 16 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/50/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 14 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/98/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 14 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/158/2018 | Mongam Ramu vs Tulasi Chiranjeevi | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/366/2018 | Kanakala Appayyamma vs Gannabathula Prasad | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/376/2018 | Pathivada Ramunaidu vs Vs1. Manathi Ramu | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/574/2018 | Pyla.Suribabu vs Pendyala.Eswara rao | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/117/2013 | Gunta Aruna kumari vs Kalluri Poliraju | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/160/2018 | Patnala Durgamma vs Putta venkata Rao and two others | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/336/2018 | Sirli Ananda Rao vs Pravin Jalindhar Panhalkar | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/442/2018 | Asakapalli Suramma vs Reddy Siva | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/532/2018 | Nayana Ramulamma vs Kammindi Appalanaidu | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/74/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/101/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 13 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/256/2017 | KANURU PARVATHI vs VOLI PRASAD | 12 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/481/2017 | S.V.ANarayana Ravi vs M.Giri Babu and 2 others | 12 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/482/2017 | SRUNGAVARAPU NAGAMANI vs M.GIRI BABU | 12 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/165/2018 | shriram City Union Finance Ltd., vs Sunitha Naik, | 11 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/94/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 11 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/553/2015 | Panduri Rama Lakshmi vs Tamarla Suri Demudu and 2 others | 10 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/200086/2017 | Sankarana.Gurunaidu vs Chandaka.Satyam | 09 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/116/2018 | Bandaru.Taraka Rama Rao vs Shriram City Union Finance Limited | 09 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/200265/2016 | Budida alias Challa Gowri vs Jafar Shaik | 09 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| OS/16/2017 | Ch.P.Venugopala Reddy vs Gottinukkala Suryanarayana Varma | 08 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/10/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 08 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/198/2019 | SRIRAM CITY UNION AND FINANCE vs Gavidi Satyanarayana | 05 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/305/2016 | Buddaraju Satyavathi and 2 others vs Vemala Kanna Babu and 2 others | 05 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/143/2018 | M/s. Shriram Transport Finanace Company Limited vs S.Tata Babu | 03 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/57/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 03 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/9/2019 | Shriram City Union Finance LTD, vs Kella Govinda Naidu | 02 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/492/2014 | Ch.Viswanadh Prakash vs Th.Eswararao | 01 Jul 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/524/2016 | Seela Appayyamma and 3 others vs Sudarshan Singha | 28 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/7/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 27 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| AS/40/2016 | Yedla Surya Rao vs Dr.D.Shyamala Devi | 26 Jun 2019 | Judgment | — |
| OS/88/2015 | Gotttimukkala Srinivasa Varma vs Aakula alies Aakali Rajamma and 4 others | 26 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| CRLA/54/2013 | Sanapala Satyanarayana vs Ashok kumar Mandhani | 25 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| CRLA/55/2013 | Sanapala Satyanarayana vs MS Jaisukh vinimoy Pvt ltd | 25 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| CRLA/56/2013 | Sanapala Satyanarayana vs MS Jaisukh vinimoy Pvt ltd | 25 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/15/2017 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 25 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/70/2018 | Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co.Ltd vs Pattigadi Srinivasa Rao | 24 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/178/2018 | Shriram City Union Finance Limited vs Patan Rahmankhan | 24 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/22/2018 | Sunkari Venkata Ramana @ Ramana and three others vs Bantupalli Rama Krishna and two others | 24 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/376/2017 | Mandapathi Suryanarayana Raju vs Pathivada krishna Rao alies Krishna | 21 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/702/2016 | Pogiri Ramana, vs Gutuku Ramamohan and 2 others | 21 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/56/2014 | Margadarshi Chit Fund Limited, vs Meer Latif Hussain | 20 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| EP/66/2017 | MARGADARSI CHITFUNDS PVT LTD vs P.B.V.S.M.Deekshita Sarma and seven others | 20 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/92/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 20 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/197/2016 | Chelluri Thirupathi Rao vs Battana Rama Krishna and one another | 18 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/371/2018 | Kakara Bheemalamma vs Buddiga Pola Rao | 18 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| AS/61/2016 | Masarapu Krishna Murthy and 4 others vs Masarapu Rama Lakshmi | 13 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/102/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 13 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/433/2014 | Chappa Apparao vs Doppa Srinivasarao | 12 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/15/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 12 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/215/2017 | Bangaaru Suryakantham vs Kaligi Bala Siva and two others | 11 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/40/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 10 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/23/2019 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 10 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/55/2018 | XXXXX vs XXXXX | 09 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| OS/62/2016 | Palla Laxmana Kumar vs Kondru Suri Babu | 07 Jun 2019 | Judgment | — |
| CRLA/54/2013 | Sanapala Satyanarayana vs Ashok kumar Mandhani | 07 Jun 2019 | Judgment | Appeal Dismissed |
| CRLA/55/2013 | Sanapala Satyanarayana vs MS Jaisukh vinimoy Pvt ltd | 07 Jun 2019 | Judgment | Appeal Dismissed |
| CRLA/56/2013 | Sanapala Satyanarayana vs MS Jaisukh vinimoy Pvt ltd | 07 Jun 2019 | Judgment | Appeal Dismissed |
| EP/134/2018 | Shriram Transport Finance Company Ltd., vs Kotla Ramakrishna | 06 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| MVOP/57/2019 | Bodasingi Sanyasi Rao vs Anaparthi Satyanarayana | 06 Jun 2019 | Order | — |
| OS/52/2013 | Kasireddi Satyavathi vs District Collector | 03 Jun 2019 | Judgment | — |
| CRLA/12/2019 | Korada Srinivasa Rao vs Marapaka Eswara Rao | 16 May 2019 | Order | — |
| CRLA/57/2018 | Penupothula Prakasa Rao vs Pentakotas Appalaswamy and another | 16 May 2019 | Judgment | Convicted |
| F.C.O.P/8/2018 | Gujjuru Vijaya Lakshmi vs Gujjuru Chandra Sekhar | 16 May 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/75/2018 | Bodasingi Pydinaidu vs NIL | 16 May 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/64/2016 | Jupudi Laxmi madhuri and another vs Jupudi Vijaya Raju | 15 May 2019 | Order | — |
| CRLRP/63/2018 | Sirlapu Satish Kumar vs Kutcherlapati Madhu Varma | 14 May 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/64/2017 | Akkireddi Srinivasa Rao vs Akkireddi Indira @ Anjali | 14 May 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/2/2018 | Bevara Thrinadha Rao vs Bevara Sridevi | 13 May 2019 | Order | — |
| MC/2/2016 | PANTLA KIRANMAI AND ANOTHER vs PANTLA KRISHNA MURTHY | 12 May 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/79/2018 | Vadda Rajesh Kumar vs NIL | 12 May 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/88/2018 | Bhamidipati Nageswara Rao vs NIL | 12 May 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/86/2018 | Dhavala Raju vs NIL | 11 May 2019 | Order | — |
| F.C.O.P/87/2018 | Dommeti(Basava) Nooka Ratnam vs NIL | 11 May 2019 | Order | — |
| CRLA/29/2017 | Kottana Venkata Rao vs Vsthe public prosecutor | 09 May 2019 | Judgment | Acquitted |
Monthly Orders (Last 12 Months)
| Jul 2019 | 53 | |
| Jun 2019 | 36 | |
| May 2019 | 27 | |
| Apr 2019 | 27 | |
| Mar 2019 | 36 | |
| Feb 2019 | 36 | |
| Jan 2019 | 32 | |
| Dec 2018 | 28 | |
| Nov 2018 | 18 | |
| Oct 2018 | 31 | |
| Sep 2018 | 34 | |
| Aug 2018 | 24 |
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Frequently Asked Questions
How many cases has Sri E Bhima Rao handled?
Sri E Bhima Rao has handled 861 court orders since 2017 at PDJ Court VIZIANAGARAM. The average disposal rate is 33 orders per month.
What types of cases does Sri E Bhima Rao hear?
Based on available records, Sri E Bhima Rao primarily handles Motor Accident matters (Motor Accident Claims) and Criminal matters (Criminal Cases, Criminal Appeals) and Civil matters (Execution Petitions, Original Suits) at PDJ Court VIZIANAGARAM.
Where is Sri E Bhima Rao currently posted?
Sri E Bhima Rao is posted as Prl. District Judge at PDJ Court VIZIANAGARAM, Vizianagaram, Andhra Pradesh.
Are judgments by Sri E Bhima Rao available online?
Yes. 20 judgments by Sri E Bhima Rao are available on Legistro with full text, outcome, and sections cited.
How fast does Sri E Bhima Rao dispose cases?
Sri E Bhima Rao disposes approximately 33 cases per month, based on 861 orders handled over their tenure at PDJ Court VIZIANAGARAM.
Since when is Sri E Bhima Rao serving?
Sri E Bhima Rao has been serving at PDJ Court VIZIANAGARAM since 2017.
Case Types
Posting History
-
Jul 2019 — Jul 2019Prl. District Judge · 1 orders
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Jul 2019 — Jul 2019I Addl. District Judge · 14 orders
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Jun 2019 — Jun 2019Spl. Judge -cum- IV Addl. District Judge
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Jun 2019 — Jul 2019Judge Family Court · 74 orders
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May 2019 — May 2019I Addl. District Judge
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May 2017 — May 2019Judge Family Court · 754 orders
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May 2017 — May 2017Judge Family Court · 17 orders
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May 2017 — May 2017I Addl. District Judge · 1 orders
Outcomes on Record
Other Judges at this Court