MS.N.Saswatha

1 O.S.No.369 of 2013

IN THE COURT OF THE ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER CUM XVI

JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE : CITY SMALL CAUSES COURT :

SECUNDERABAD

PRESENT :: Ms. N. Saswatha

Principal Rent Controller­cum­

XVII Junior Civil Judge FAC. Addl. Rent Controller­cum­ XVI Junior Civil Judge Secunderabad.

Dated this the 11th day of August, 2023

O.S.No.369 of 2013

Between:

Anjana Taggarse Motupalli D/o. Kishore Taggarse, aged about 43 years, Occ. Lawyer Residing at Plot No.265 N, Road No.10

Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad – 500 033. .. Plaintiff

And

1. Secunderabad Club Rep. By its Managing Committee through President, Picket, Secunderabad 500 026. 

2. The President and Managing Committee Secunderabad Club, Picket, 

Secunderabad 500 026. .... Defendants

 This suit is coming before me for final hearing in the presence of Ms.Anjana Taggarse Motupalli, Advocate (Party­in­person) for the Plaintiff and of Sri Zeeshan Adnan Mahmood, Advocate for the Defendants and the matter having stood over for consideration, till this day, the court made the following:

J U D G M E N T

This is a suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendants under Order VII Rule 1 r/w Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code praying 2 O.S.No.369 of 2013 the Court for declaration of rules of defendant No.1 club as illegal and void on the grounds of gender discrimination and opposed to public policy and consequential relief of perpetual injunction.

2.The brief averments of the plaint are that:

(a)The defendant No.1 club is 131 years old and is the oldest social and cultural club in Hyderabad. It has not been registered as a society, a trust or a company. It is an association of persons, the same is continued and it is sued in such title and capacity. Being an ‘association of persons’, it is recognized as such entity, viz.,

Secunderabad Club, for various statutory purposes such as Income Tax

Act, Sales Tax Act, Shops and Establishment Act, etc. 

(b)The plaintiff is a member of defendant No.1 club with membership No.AML 231. The plaintiff’s father late Dr. Kishore

Taggarse was a permanent member (No.K­95) of the defendant No.1 club. The plaintiff by virtue of the rules of the defendant No.1 club, automatically became a junior dependent member on 01.02.1970, her date of birth and on attaining 16 years of age on 01.02.1986, she became a subscribing senior dependent member of defendant No.1 club.

The plaintiff became an independent member, pursuant to the acceptance of her application for membership to defendant No.1 club being made on her attaining 25 years of age on 01.02.1995. Her 3 O.S.No.369 of 2013 application was accepted on payment of the admission fee etc. as per

Rule XIV (1) (Entrance Fees) of the Rules. Her membership number is

AML 231 and her membership is subsisting and continuing.

(c)The plaintiff mentioned the extract of the rules in the plaint pleadings since the club rules has already been marked as Ex.A.1 for avoiding the lengthy pleadings of paragraphs it has not been mentioned in the plaint pleadings.

(d)That while members admitted as permanent members under Rule

V of the Rules of defendant No.1 club, are entitled to all the rights and privileges associated with being a member as such the members admitted into the categories of Associate Member Ladies, Lady Members and Lady Member Widow Spouses under Rules VI and VII are not entitled by virtue of Rule XVII (2) to participate in meetings of general body, participate in elections, request EGMs or make proposals for

AGMs. That the existing rules governing the members of 131 years old defendant No.1 club are opposed to public policy, Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution and Rights guaranteed by all the

International Conventions pertaining to equality, removal of gender discrimination and equal protection of the law. That the statutory provisions declaring illegal, all acts of gender discrimination and acts of gender oppression are read into ‘Public Policy’. Basic Rights to vote, contest elections, be part of the managing committee and participate in self governance are denied as the rights of equality, respect, freedom 4 O.S.No.369 of 2013 against gender discrimination etc. Women are given second class treatment and are shutout from the benefits of the club while all the liabilities are imposed upon them and they are oppressed as persons incapable of thinking or acting on their own behalf. That the pre­ amended rules of defendant No.1 club were as under which were challenged in this suit as failing foul of public policy and public order, opposed to law and in violation of Section 23 of the Contract Act, inasmuch as membership of defendant No.1 is a matter of contract as established by statute and precedent law including the decision in T.P.

Daver v. Lodge Victoria No.363, SC Belgaum, AIR 1963 SC 1144.

(i) Rule V which relates to permanent members and stipulates that it shall consist of only gentlemen and thus disables lady members from being permanent members and thus constitutes invidious discrimination and oppression of lady members solely on the basis of gender.

(ii)Rule VI pertaining to admission to membership for daughters of permanent members in so far as restricting her rights and making her a non­permanent member thereby depriving her of all her rights as a member, including those enumerated under Rule XVII(2) which are available to men since it is based on gender discrimination and oppression of women members, in contra distinction to men members who are entitled to those rights under Rule V(3).

(iii)Rule VII (3) pertaining to admission to membership for

Lady Members who are daughters of permanent members and 5 O.S.No.369 of 2013 restricting their membership to only being AMLs thereby subjecting them to denial of the rights of men members available under Rule XVII(2) of the Rules, since it is based on gender discrimination and oppression of women members.

(iv)Rule XVII pertaining to Rights and obligations of members inasmuch as a separate category and exclusive rights and privileges in contra­distinction to women members, is provided to men members as under, since it is based on gender discrimination and oppression of women members.

(v)Only permanent members are entitled to participate in meetings, ballots and elections of General Body, stand for office or membership of committee,propose or second the name of any candidate for admission or election, request the convening of an

EGM and make any proposal for consideration of the General

Body and women are discriminated and oppressed on the ground of gender.

(vi)Entitled married dependent sons between age of 21 to 25 to use the club facilities along with their wives, as dependent members, while only unmarried daughters are entitled to use the club as dependent members of the father.

(e)The existing rules are steeped in oppression, gender discrimination and gender bias, are demeaning to Associate Member ladies and lady members and are opposed to public policy:

(i)Existing Associate Member ladies and Lady members (AMLs and

Lady Members of both categories) are not entitled to:

6 O.S.No.369 of 2013

(a) Take part in any meeting of the General Body or any ballot or election;

(b) Stand for any office, or membership of the Committee 

(c) Propose or second the name of any candidate for admission or election;

(d) Request the convening of an Extra ordinary General Meeting and;

(e) Make any proposal for consideration of the General Body including any proposal to amend the Rules or Bye­laws made under them. For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that a Corporate nominee shall not be entitled to any of the rights enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) above. 

(ii)Only men can be permanent members (PM) and move resolutions and take decisions on issues governing all the members, including women and children. Since women are not entitled to vote, contest elections, be part of the Managing Committee, etc. they are not entitled to participate in self governance in the defendant No.1 club and the voting power given to the men has been used as an instrument of abuse and oppression to the extent that they are infringing upon a woman’s right to marriage/remarriage.

(iii) Children of Associate Member ladies and Lady members are barred from membership but children of male members have a right of membership in the defendant No.1 club.

(iv)While women pay the same admission fee, monthly subscriptions and fees and are subject to the same liabilities, they are denied basic rights of voting and being involved in self governance or being treated with respect absent gender bias in the defendant No.1 club.

7 O.S.No.369 of 2013

(v)Daughters of permanent members who are made AML members are subject to balloting by the Managing Committee who decide whether they are “fit” to become members of the defendant No.1 club. Sons of permanent members get the membership automatically and are not subject to balloting.

(vi)Lady members who get membership independently and lady members who are widows of permanent members are subject to losing their membership if they get married or remarried. Rules which impinge on a woman’s right to marriage or widow remarriage are illegal.

(vii) While only unmarried daughters can accompany their father and are included as dependent members, dependent sons between the age of 16 and 25 and the wives of the dependent sons between the age of 21 to 25 under Rule XVII of the Rules.

(f)That the plaintiff learnt that the Managing Committee of defendant club, circulated new proposals published in the annual report which is sent only to the permanent members as such the proposals add to the gender discrimination, bias and are persecutory in nature. That the plaintiff and many other people have been striving to have the rules amended to remove gender discrimination and have been facing difficulties with the Managing Committee thwarting such efforts.

That the proposals, Annual Reports, Proposed Amendments etc. are dispatched only to permanent members (male) of defendant No.1 club and are not sent to the Associate Member Ladies or Lady Members. So to attribute notice to such women members of action being taken by 8 O.S.No.369 of 2013 defendant would be incorrect as neither are the AML and LM members given notice and nor are they permitted to participate in the meetings, governance etc. of defendant No.1 club. 

(g)That an EGM by a permanent member Mr. Annam Dilip was moved in 2009 for gender equality but the same was thwarted first by defendants by preventing voting from taking place at that EGM and appointing a committee to go into the matter and thereafter by some permanent members by filing O.S.No.258 of 2010 against defendant

No.1 club without impleadng AML members, questioning the membership of all the AML members. Some of the AML members including the plaintiff got impleaded in the said suit. That the defendant

No.1 club has contested the claim of AMLs more vociferously than the plaintiff in that suit and continues to do so. The pendency of that suit is also being used as a fait accomplice by defendant to prevent converting them from AML members to permanent members or removing the gender bias. 

(h)That the defendant No.2 is claiming that the matter is ‘subjudice’ even though there is no order injuncting defendant No.1 from removing gender inequality against the AML and other lady members. While claiming that the matter is subjudice and hence no action can be taken to remove the gender bias, in the same breach the defendant No.2 has introduced demeaning proposals, interalia, disqualifying an AML 9 O.S.No.369 of 2013 member from membership in the event of her remarriage to be considered on 31st July, 2013.

(i)The plaintiff mentioned the extract proposal Rule III Membership and Category of Members of the rules in the plaint pleadings since the proposal Rule III Membership and Category of Members has already been marked as Ex.A.5 for avoiding the lengthy pleadings of paragraphs it has not been mentioned in the plaint pleadings.

(j)That under existing Rules, the Women AML and LM categories are not being permitted to become permanent members of defendant No.1 club and hence cannot vote on these illegal proposals. The permanent members/male are using the Rules as an instrument of oppression and abuse against the women members. That while the existing Rules are demeaning, discriminatory and opposed to public policy, fundamental rights and all international conventions, the present proposals are persecutory and constitute an aggravated form of discrimination and degradation on the basis of gender.

(k)That while there is an appearance that defendant No.1, through proposals introduced by defendant No.2 in the present AGM is attempting to remove gender inequality, the reality of the situation is as under:

i.Adult lady members (both AML and LM) are being phased out without any voting rights or rights to contest elections or participate in 10 O.S.No.369 of 2013 the General Body; and the possibility of losing their membership on remarriage.

ii.While the proposed Rules stipulate that any person can become a permanent member and that a woman can apply directly for permanent membership, the wait period is as long as 15 to 20 years even before her application will come up for consideration. Then there is also the possibility of balloting.

iii.The permanent members are attempting to benefit themselves on the one hand by ignoring 957 AML members, 212 lady members and 328 widows of permanent members and refusing to remove gender discrimination and treat them as permanent members thereby ensuring that there is no representation in the vote bank from them and on the other hand, proposing to amend the Rules so that their daughters who are approaching the age of 25 years will be admitted to the category of permanent members. The daughters of permanent members will most likely be under their immediate control or supervision and suffrage issues will be controlled by them.

iv.The practical import of the amendments made to the Rules of defendant No.1 club will be as follows if the Rules are enforced as existing on the rule book from 01.08.2013:

11 O.S.No.369 of 2013 a.Only existing made permanent members and their sons and daughters who made application after 29.04.2010 will be entitled to vote and contest for elections etc. and no women will be entitled to contest for elections for the next seven years as per the Rules. So for the next seven years, i.e. till the year 2021, only men will be in the

Governing Committee. AML and LM members will not be entitled to exercise right of suffrage i.e. voting and self governance. 

b.After 2021, only daughters of permanent members, who will then have standing as permanent members and entitlement to contest after seven years will be entitled to contest for elections, after their father have supported their applications for permanent membership and undertaken to pay their bills in the event of their default, and the likelihood of such daughters effectively standing their ground against the seasoned Managing Committee members and their fathers, is questionable. 

c.Ladies who make fresh application for membership in permanent member category will be wait listed for a period of 18­20 years, then their application will come up for balloting by a Managing Committee and if they are granted membership, they will not be entitled to contest for elections for seven years thereafter. Hence, no independent woman not under the influence of a ‘father member’ will be entitled to contest for elections until the year 2041. (year 2014+20 years+7 years). AML 12 O.S.No.369 of 2013 members and LM members are now being informed by the defendants to make fresh application for permanent membership, if they seek gender equality, despite being existing full members discharging all liabilities and responsibilities on par with made members for such a long length of time (from the year 1992). In such event the dis­ entitlement to contest for elections applies to them as it does to new members standing in the waiting list and queue and they will not be entitled to contest till the year 2041.

The children of AML and LM members will not be entitled to membership as they would have crossed the age of 25 years and will not have eligibility required as under the Rules. 

(l)That the plaintiff herein was impleaded in the suit OS.No.258 of 2010 but could not appear and was placed exparte. An application for setting aside of such exparte order has been filed and the same has been allowed. That for the first time the plaintiff came to know of the interim injunction orders in O.S.No.258 of 2010 on reading the counters filed in O.S.No.384 of 2013 and steps will be taken now to contest the IA filed in O.S.No.258 of 2010. That both the defendants being the association/club and the managing committee who are to protect the rights of the members of the club, have not made any attempts to have the said interim orders vacated in the said suit for over a period of three years. That the defendants No.1 and 2 having intentionally permitted the interim orders to continue without any valid 13 O.S.No.369 of 2013 reason for three years leads to a presumption that their purpose is to disentitle the AML women members from equality in participation and management of the affairs of the defendant No.1 club and prevent their children from getting membership. The sole reason for such discrimination and oppression is that they are women and are not to be treated on par with men. 

(m)That the defendants in their pleadings in various suits pending against them in the issue pertaining to AML membership, appear to be sailing along with the plaintiffs in O.S.No.258 of 2010 and supporting the claim of the plaintiffs therein. O.S.No.258 of 2010 was filed by permanent members of defendant No.1 club questioning the membership of all AML members without impleading such members.

Suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone i.e. non impleadment of affected and proper/necessary parties and such suit ought to have been contested by the defendants herein as representative of the club and the AML members.

(n)That while the defendants are claiming that they had no intention of preventing the AML members from becoming permanent members and that they have been making serious attempts to rally the permanent members of the club and misinform them that the logistics of the club cannot support the intake of the AML members as permanent members etc. which belies comprehension since there is no numeric increase by converting the AML members into permanent 14 O.S.No.369 of 2013 members. The falsity of the claim of the defendants is exposed by their averment that the AML members can now make an application for permanent membership which could entail waiting in the wait list queue for a period of 18­20 years, paying the high admission fee at that point of time (rate of inflation for 20 years added to present fees) and not being able to contest for elections for another period of seven years (as the rules stand today). That the AML members as daughters of permanent members having paid the same admission fee as the sons of permanent members having fulfilled all the criterion required for permanent members having contributed to the club all these years are being kept out of the management of the club as well as having their children treated as pariahs and not being admitted to membership.

That the claim of the defendants in various suits that AML members have been enjoying all rights except that of voting and participation in club management, make it appear like the right of participation and self governance are insignificant matters. The AML members are paying the same admission/entrance fee, discharging the same liabilities etc. as permanent members but are denied voting and participation rights and rights of entitlement of their children on the ground of gender. That the children of AML or lady members cannot become members of the club while children of the permanent members (male) can become members and this discrimination is solely based on gender.

15 O.S.No.369 of 2013

(o)That on 31.07.2013, a proposed Rule V(3) was introduced and voted into being a Rule by the required majority of defendant No.1 club.

By virtue of this new Rule, all the children of the permanent members become entitled to file an application for membership on attaining age of 25 years. By virtue of this Rule from 01.08.2013 even daughters of the permanent members become entitled to membership. However,

Associate Member Ladies members are also daughters of permanent members such as the plaintiff herein. But defendant No.2 Managing

Committee intentionally did not add the AML category (daughters of permanent members) into the category of those entitled to become permanent members, citing the pendency of an injunction in a miscellaneous petition in O.S.No.250 of 2010 before the XI Junior Civil

Judge, Secunderabad without seeking vacation of the interim

injunctions to protect AML members rights. The defendants have intentionally chosen to use the pendency of a case, where all the AML members were not impleaded as a fair accompli to justify its own action.

(p)That the defendants have committed further illegality by entitling such of those daughters of permanent members to permanent membership, who are only entitled to membership as AML members between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013, since the present rules are prospective and are to be in operation from 01.08.2013. 

(q)That the daughters of permanent members referred to in Rule

V(3)(i) and eligible for membership between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013, 16 O.S.No.369 of 2013 should have been made AML members at the relevant point of time.

Defendant No.2 chose to keep them as ‘continuing senior dependent members’ for the reasons best known to them and without any legitimate reason and the said action is against the Rules and the interests of such dependent members. There is no category of ‘continuing’ senior dependent members. That the status of daughters of permanent members is no different from the status of the plaintiffs herein or other AML members. The oppressive, discriminatory and self serving nature of the defendants is evident from this action as well.

Defendant No.2 has decided to call them ‘continuing senior dependent members’ and entitle them with permanent membership for extraneous reasons. If such illegality is permitted there will be irreparable loss to the plaintiff as well as other lady members both AML and LM categories.

(r)That the interim orders in O.S.No.258 of 2010 where no attempts were made by the defendants to get the same vacated, are not being relied on to justify two illegal actions of the defendants, firstly, their attempt to make those eligible as AML members (daughters eligible as

AMLs between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013) into permanent members and secondly, to justify their action of persecution and oppression against the AML members and create discrimination within a class itself, of women. That the daughters of permanent members who became AML members, paid all admission amounts, subscriptions etc.

shared in the liabilities of defendant No.1 club and were discriminated 17 O.S.No.369 of 2013 against on the ground of gender are being excluded from permanent membership inspite of their seniority, ability and entitlement over such dependent members. Such persons who have only made applications for AML membership and are not yet independent/subscribing members have been conferred with entitlement to permanent members the possible fait accompli pleaded being the deletion of the AML category itself.

(s)That the Rule VII (c) of the unamended old Rule was re­worded in

Rule VII (1)(c) of the Rules amended on 31.07.2013 w.e.f. 01.08.2013 and the said Rule continues to disentitle the Lady Members from continued membership of respondent No.1 club from the date of their marriage/remarriage as the case may be. The associate members who are the widow/widower members of deceased permanent members under Rule VII(3) of the Rules amended on 31.07,2013 w.e.f.

01.08..2013 are also subject to a similar disqualification under Rule VII (3) That the Rules which impose liabilities including such disentitlement from continued membership to respondent No.1club on their marriage or remarriage is contrary to Section 26 of the Contract

Act. The disqualification may be directly expressed or indirectly expressed but if any agreement or a Rule results in the restraint of marriage of any person, other than a minor, the same is void under the

Contract Act. 

18 O.S.No.369 of 2013

(t)That the rules of the club do not provide for automatic membership or entitlement of use and enjoyment of the facilities of respondent No.1 club by the spouse of a lady member and hence a marriage per se has no effect to the membership or use of respondent

No.1 club. The membership when granted to the lady member was for her individual use alone and her marriage does not affect such participation and use and does not automatically entitle her spouse or her children from using the respondent No.1 club. That the respondents have clearly in para 5 of their counter in I.A.No.84 of 2013, reserved the right to reintroduce a proposal disentitling the AMLs from continued membership on their remarrige, such proposal being contrary to law and public policy. 

(u)That the right to participate in all the activities of defendant No.1 club, flows from the fundamental right of the plaintiff under Article 19(1)(c) on compliance with all the secular and neutral restrictions and entitlement to such rights and privileges is not opposed to ‘public order’ or ‘morality’ of the society. That in the absence of any enabling law empowering the defendant No.1 club to practice such discrimination based on gender, any action imminent in this case to practice discrimination solely on the above ground, is opposed to public policy and unenforceable. Public policy does not empower or entitle the defendant No.1 club to classify members based on gender and limit or 19 O.S.No.369 of 2013 grant rights and privileges based on the gender of the member unless it is for affirmative action/protective discrimination. Hence, this suit. 

3.The defendants filed his written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint.

a)The suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and is liable to be dismissed. That the defendant No.1 i.e. the Secunderabad Club is an unregistered voluntary association of like­minded persons.

Defendant No.1 club is essentially a sports club and is one of the most elite and oldest clubs in India and the same was established in the year 1878 and has reciprocal arrangements with other elite clubs both in

India and Abroad. That the plaintiff not being a permanent member of defendant No.1 has no right to seek an amendment of the rules of defendant No.1 which she has sought in the form of a mandatory injunction against defendant No.1 on alleged grounds of discrimination.

That the declaratory reliefs sought for in the suit also cannot be granted by this Court on alleged grounds of gender discrimination, oppression degradation and oppression to woman members and as such being opposed to public policy. The right to amend rules is the prerogative of the permanent members of the club. That the allegation of the plaintiff that the ladies are being discriminated as against the men is a false and baseless allegation. The membership of the club is open to both men and women under different categories of membership. 

20 O.S.No.369 of 2013

(b)That the allegations of any infringement of fundamental right or any alleged discrimination against women cannot be questioned before this Court. That the plaintiff cannot style herself as a self­appointed spokesperson for the Associated Member Ladies (AML) and Lady

Members (LM). Since the rights, obligations and privileges of 970 AML members are involved and the suit ought to have been filed as a representative suit under the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the Civil

Procedure Code, 1908. That the plaintiff cannot bind the other members belonging to the AML and LM categories without making them a party to the suit. Hence, the suit is, therefore, bad for non­joinder of proper parties. That the general body of members of defendant No.1 had passed a resolution to amend Rule 5 of the Club Rules by virtue of such amendment the permanent membership of the club has now been thrown open to both ladies and gentlemen who can apply for the same and seek membership as per the Rules. That there is no obligation to follow any statute in the matter of internal management and governance of the 1st defendant. That the plaintiffs seek retrospective effect being given to a certain resolution, which relief could not have been granted even against the state by the superior Courts in exercise of extraordinary constitutional powers. That the defendant No.1 with a view to ensure gender equality has introduced amendments to its rules which were approved in the Annual General Meeting (AGM) dated 31.07.2013 (Rules V and V(3) by virtue of which ladies have been made 21 O.S.No.369 of 2013 eligible to become permanent members and permanent members can participate in meetings and elections of defendant No.1. That the defendant No.1 is a voluntary association of like­minded persons. It is governed by its own rules and the bye­laws that have been framed.

(c)That the rules of the club had been suitably amended by the general body on 31.07.2013 so as to entire that ladies are on equal footing with men in terms of applying for the permanent membership of the club. That Rule V of the rules of the club has been suitably amended to include both men and women. The persons so admitted as members (as per the rules of the club) would be entitled to all the rights and privileges of a permanent member including the right to participate in meetings of the general body, elections to the Managing Committee stand for the post of President, Vide President to the membership of the

Managing Committee, propose, second names of candidates for admission or election, request for convening of an EGM or to make any proposal for consideration of the general body. That the admission of ladies into the categories of Associate Member Lady (AML) Lady

Members and lady members widows has been stopped, as the ladies including the existing Associate Members Lady, Lady Members and

Lady Members Widows are free to apply for the permanent membership of the club and get admitted as per the Rules of defendant No.1 if they should so choose.

22 O.S.No.369 of 2013

(d)That the defendants cannot be accountable for the action of some permanent members who had filed OS.No.258 of 2010 against defendant No.1 which is pending adjudication assailing the grant of membership under the AML category to the daughters of permanent member, on the premise that the admission of some AML members was not in conformity with the Rules of the Club. The issue of AML membership is therefore sub­judice. I.A.No.162 of 2010 in O.S.No.258 of 2010 had ordered an ad­interim injunction restraining the defendant

No.1 club, from passing any resolution altering or changing the status of the AML or that of their children. That the said order is subsisting.

The matter is being unnecessarily protracted by the plaintiff and the other Associate Member Ladies who has been filing impleading party petition is in a frivolous and cavalier fashion.

(e)That the plaintiff herein had filed I.A.No.175 of 2010 and

I.A.No.176 of 2010 to implead herself in the suit being O.S.No.258 of 2010 and the aforesaid interlocutory petitions being I.A.Nos.162 and 163 of 2010. The interlocutory application being I.A.No.176 of 2010 filed in I.A.Nos.162 and 163 of 2010 was allowed on 25.10.2010. The plaintiff miserably failed to file her counters in the said IA and was set exparte on 03.05.2011. That the plaintiff has also implead herself in the main suit on 25.10.2010. She was thereafter set exparte on 03.05.2011, she has now filed a belated petition to set aside the order by virtue of which she was set exparte after two years three months of 23 O.S.No.369 of 2013 being set exparte. It is evident from the said proposals that defendant

No.2 has made history by amending the rules of 131 year old

Gentlemen’s Club by throwing open its membership to ladies. 

(f)That there is absolutely no bar for the lady members (Associate

Member Lady (AML), Lady Members (LM) and Lady Members Widows) to apply for permanent membership as the Rules of the permanent membership have been suitably amended to include both ladies and gentlemen, the waiting period for permanent membership cannot be a grouind to nullify a rule, the resolution on the AML membership can be passed only after appropriate orders from the Court, where the matter is subjudice and to brand the defendant No.1 has a public place is false and baseless. Defendant No.1 it is reiterated is a voluntary association of like­minded persons. It is a private body and has its own Rules to govern its functioning.

(g) That the defendant No.1 is a private club and is governed by its own Rules and the Bye­laws framed. That the defendant No.1 has every right to frame the Rules that govern it. The Rules of the defendant No.1 are absolutely valid and sustainable. That the Annual General Body

Meeting of defendant No.1 has been held as per its rules on 31.07.2013.

The agenda for the meeting was duly completed and the resolution passed accordingly. It is denied that there exists a relationship in the nature of a contract between defendant No.1 and its members. Section 23 of Indian Contract Act 1872 has no application to the relationship of 24 O.S.No.369 of 2013 defendant NO.1 with its members. Being a woman is no disqualification for being a member of defendant No.1. The Rules of defendant No.1 by no stretch of imagination can be dubbed as contrary to law. The members of defendant No.1 are bound by its Rules which are lawful and enforceable. 

(h)That the plaintiff comes under the category of membership known as Associate Member Lady. She is entitled to all the activities of defendant No.1. As per the Rules of defendant No.1 Club only permanent subscribing members have the right to participate in the

Annual General Body meeting and contest elections. The plaintiff is at absolute liberty to apply for permanent membership of defendant No.1 club if she so desires as per the rules of defendant No.1, for which there is no bar. That defendant No.1 has thrown up its membership to woman by amending its Rules. Both men and women are entitled to seek permanent membership of defendant No.1 as per its Rules. By the amendment to its Rules women can now participate on equal footing in every sphere, including its decision making. Hence, the defendants prayed the Court to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs. 

4.Almost all the averments of the written statement originally filed are of the same and the pleadings now taken in the additional written statement dated 11.11.2016 are as follows:

(a)Defendant No.2 is the Managing Committee of defendant No.1 and is constituted in accordance with Rule XXII of the Rules of 25 O.S.No.369 of 2013 defendant No.1 club. The powers of defendant No.2 committee are prescribed under XXIII of the Rules. This rule states that committee is responsible for the entire management of the club. That there is no obligation to follow any statute in the matter of internal management and governance of the 1st defendant. That the plaintiff seek retrospective effect being given to a certain resolution, which relief could not have been granted even against the state by the superior Courts in exercise of extraordinary constitutional powers. That defendant No.1 with a view to ensure gender equality has introduced amendments to its rules which were approved in the Annual General Meeting dated 31.07.2013 (Rules V and V(3) by virtue of which ladies have been made eligible to become permanent members and permanent members can participate in meetings and elections of defendant No.1. 

(b)That a perusal of the amendments brought in during the AGM held on 31.07.2013 would clearly show that there was affirmative action taken by defendant No.1club to ensure that there is gender equality in defendant No.1 club. That the defendant No.1 had introduced Rule V(3)

(i) with regard to daughters of permanent members who are eligible and have applied for AML membership between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013 to be continued as subscribing senior dependents who would be treated as being eligible to apply for permanent membership as per the amended rules. Therefore, the submissions of the plaintiff in attributing 26 O.S.No.369 of 2013 ulterior motives to defendant No.1 are completely unwarranted and unjustified. 

(c)That the amended rules cannot be considered to be forbidden by any law or to be of such a nature that they would defeat the provisions of any law or as being fraudulent or involving or implying injury to any person or as being immoral or being opposed to public policy. The amendments that were made to the rules were made in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the rules of defendant No.1 club. The contention of the plaintiff that the daughters of permanent members who are over the age of 25 years are ineligible for permanent membership is false and misleading. That they can apply for permanent membership if they wish to and, if they are eligible as per rules, they would be made permanent members in accordance with the Rules. That the defendant No.1 is a club and the decision taken by its members with regard to its own membership cannot be challenged as being opposed to public policy especially when there is no gender discrimination involved, contrary to what is being portrayed by the plaintiff.

(d)That AMLs can now become permanent members in the general category after the amendments that have been introduced. That AMLs can participate in all the activities of defendant No.1 club which are the objects of the club and utilize all the club facilities and if they become permanent members can contest in elections etc. That the decision to 27 O.S.No.369 of 2013 create a category of ‘Extended Senior Dependent Members’ was taken in view of the injunction granted in O.S.No.258 of 2010 which has been granted on 16.04.2010. The general body of defendant No.1 had unanimously approved this proposal. That the person who was the

President of defendant No.1 club at the time of passing of resolution, has no daughter. The daughter of the person who was the Vice

President at the time of passing of the resolution does not feature in the list of AMLs between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013.

(e)That the AMLs and LMs will continue as such and would continue to have all the benefits and privileges that they were entitled to before the amendments were made. In addition thereto, they are now eligible to become permanent members in the general category and if eligible would be made permanent members in accordance with the rules. The said amendments have been approved by the general body in the AGM held on 31.07.2013 in accordance with the procedure provided under the rules of defendant No.1. The defendant No.1 has acted strictly in accordance with law. That the AMLs do not lose their membership on remarriage. The plaintiff is an AML and the rules do not contemplate that they lose their membership on remarriage. 

(d)That the proposals/resolutions were displayed on the notice boards at the premises of defendant No.1 club and other prominent places for about a month. That the plaintiffs are free to apply for permanent membership and the said applications will be considered in 28 O.S.No.369 of 2013 accordance with the amended rules. The plaintiff made a mischievous attempt to obtain permanent membership through an interim direction in the present case and the same was rightly rejected by this Court as the plaintiff was unable to make out a prima facie case and was attempting to obtain final relief in the suit under the garb of an interim relief. That the defendant club filed its counter in a catena of petitions filed by the plaintiff and third parties and finally ensured that the suit in O.S.No.258 of 2010 resulted in dismissal.

(e)That the relationship between the member and the defendant

No.1 club is not in the nature of a contract. Even assuming but not admitting that it is in the nature of a contract and that the amended rules cannot be considered to be forbidden by any law or to be of such a nature that they would defeat the provisions of any law or as being fraudulent or involving or implying injury to any person or as being immoral or being opposed public policy. That as there were subsisting injunction orders relating to AML members as existing as on filing of

O.S.No.258 of 2010, the said category was not disturbed by the club

management acting in prudence. It is only spinsters and widows who under the said category had become eligible for lady membership under general category and widow category, their membership ceased on remarriage. That it is the practice in all the organizations, it is the permanent members who are entitled to attend annual general body meeting as per the rules of the club. That the daughters of permanent 29 O.S.No.369 of 2013 members after attaining age of 25 years if eligible as per the rules, can be made permanent members with effect from 01.08.2013 according to the rules. From 01.08.2013, ladies in general and daughters of the permanent members became permanent members in general category and members children category, since daughters of permanent members who were eligible in all respects for membership between 29.04.2010 to 31.07.2013 have made applications, which had to be dealt with. However, in view of subsisting injunction orders in

I.A.No.162 of 2010 and 163 of 2010 in O.S.No.258 of 2010 and in pursuance of amended rule position as amended on 31.07.2013, the club management had permitted them to continue to enjoy the club facilities which has been unanimously approved by the general body on 31.07.2013. There is, therefore, absolutely no reason to find fault with the club management by the plaintiff. That the decision taken by the general body is the supreme body in so far as club management has to be honoured by the plaintiff and the club management is bound to implement the same. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit with exemplary costs. 

5.Almost all the averments of the written statement originally filed are of the same and the pleadings now taken in the additional written statement dated 31.01.2019 are as follows:

(a)The defendant No.1 had introduced Rule V(3)(i) with regard to daughters of permanent members who are eligible and have applied for 30 O.S.No.369 of 2013

AML membership between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013 to be permitted to be continued as subscribing senior dependents who would be treated as being eligible to apply for permanent membership as per the amended rules. That as per the club rules the women have same rights like the men, they can vote, stand for elections and take part in the

AGM etc. 

(b)That in the AGM held on 31.07.2018 a lady permanent member by the name Arnaz Jahangir Bisney spoke against the proposal to implement the Aadhar as the mandatory proof at the time of making application for permanent membership. That the amendments that were made to the rules were made in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the rules of defendant No.1 club. The plaintiff only to avoid the payment of membership entrance fee has come up with the present suit with false and untenable grounds. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit with exemplary costs. 

6.Basing on the above pleadings the following issues are settled for trial on 23.04.2018:

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration that the Rules of defendant No.1 club including the existing Rules Nos.III, IV, V, VII and XVII of defendant No.1 as void and illegal?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of proposed Rules contained in Annexure­II in so far the limit the rights and privileges to women members (AML and LM) as void, illegal and opposed to public policy?

31 O.S.No.369 of 2013

3. Whether a Mandatory Injunction be granted directing the defendant No.1 Club to amend the impugned rules of defendant No.1 club so as to entitle the plaintiff to be made permanent member of the Club as prayed for?

4. Whether consequential declaration be granted that the plaintiffs be construed as being permanent members and accord the plaintiff all the rights and privileges admissible to permanent members, with all consequential rights therefrom at part with permanent members of the club, in all future meetings as prayed for? 

5. To what relief?

7.On 01.04.2019 the following additional issues are framed:

1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?

2. Whether the suit is barred by Limitation?

3. Whether the suit is barred for non­joinder of proper and necessary parties?

8.As per orders in I.A.No.72 of 2018 dated 17.07.2018 the following issues are re­casted as follows:

1. Are the amended Rules Nos.III, V,VI, VII of the Rules of the defendant No.1 Club, oppressive and discriminatory against Associate Member Ladies and Lady Members are illegal?

2. Are the unamended Rules Nos.III,V, VI, VII of the Club Rules, discriminatory against the Associate Member Ladies and Lady members on the basis of gender and void abintio as violative of Section 23 of the Contract Act?

3. Is the denial of the rights of franchise and self representation under Rule 17 of the Rules of defendant No.1 Club to Associate Members Ladies of the defendant No.1 Club, only on the ground of gender, opposed to public policy?

4. Are the present rules V and V(3), granting permanent membership only to daughters of permanent members making application at age 25 years and excluding those daughters of 32 O.S.No.369 of 2013

Permanent Members who are over the age of 25 years as oppressive, discriminatory and opposed to law, in the present fact situation as designed to exclude Associate Member Ladies?

5. Are the present Rules granting permanent membership status to those daughters of permanent members who are only entitled to membership as AML members (eligible for AML membership between 29th April, 2010 and 31st July 2013, but permitted to continue as extended subscribing senior dependents) self serving, discriminatory and opposed to law and Rules of the Club and liable to held as such?

6. Has the plaintiff been discriminated against by denying her the rights of franchise and right to equality on par with permanent members, on the ground of gender alone and is such discrimination and oppression opposed to law and public policy?

7. Is the plaintiff entitled to the offending Rules of the Club being declared void and the plaintiff be deemed to be a permanent member of the Club with effect from the date of the admission into the Club as AML Member or from the date of suit, and and possessing all rights of a permanent member on par with men and permanent members of the defendant No.1 Club?

8. Are the Amended Rule VII and Rule V, in so far as they disentitle the Lady Members and Associate Members from continued membership of the respondent No.1 club on their remarriage, void, illegal and opposed to public policy?

9. Is the proposed Rule III (c) in the year 2013, and the right reserved by the defendants, to amend the Rules of the defendant No.1 club to enable the disentitlement to continued membership of the club, on remarriage of an AML member opposed tolaw and public policy and are the respondents to be restrained from introducing Rules in the nature of the proposed Rule III (c) of the Rules?

10. To what relief?

9.To prove the case of the plaintiff herself got examined as PW1 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.15. Ex.A.1 is the Secunderabad Club Rules 33 O.S.No.369 of 2013

Book (Re­printed) October, 2008, prior to the year 2013, the same are applicable to him and also to all the AML members of defendant No.1 club. Ex.A.2 is the copy of membership card of PW1. Ex.A.3 is the copy of membership card of Sreekriti Taggasre. Ex.A.4 is the Copy of membership card of Anusreeya Taggasre.(The original identity cards of

PW1 and her two daughters are produced by PW1, the above copies of identity cards are compared with the original cards and found correct, marked as Exs.A.2 to A.4 and returned back the original identity cards of PW1. Ex.A.5 is the Secunderabad Club 31st Annual Report 2012­ 2013, proposals were made by defendant No.2 for amendment of rules to grant membership to the existing permanent member daughters who are below 25 years and special provision for the daughters between 25 to 28 years. Ex.A.6 is the copy of Secunderabad Club amendment to club rules after the AGM dated 31.07.2013 incorporating the proposals in Ex.A.5. Ex.A.7 is the office copy of affidavit with petition in

I.A.No.1092 of 2014 in O.S.No.258 of 2010 to reject the plaint in

O.S.No.258 of 2010. Ex.A.8 is the served copy of counter affidavit filed

by respondents 1 to 8 in I.A.No.1092 of 2014 in O.S.No.258 of 2010.

Ex.A.9 is the certified copy of order in I.A.No.1092 of 2014 in

O.S.No.258 of 2010 dated 02.06.2015 passed by XI Junior Civil Judge,

Secunderabad. Ex.A.10 is the Secunderabad Club News letter of defendant No.1 club omitting the names of the fathers of all the daughters under the age of 28 years who were granted membership on 34 O.S.No.369 of 2013 22.07.2017 under the amended rules. Ex.A.11 is the Secunderabad

Club 133rd Annual Report 2014­2015 was the proposal by defendants

No.1 and 2 for AMLs to be made permanent members and the proposals were rejected by the general body. Ex.A.12 is the office copy of proposals submitted by him for marking AML members into permanent members along with covering letter. Ex.A.13 is the all newsletters issued monthly are posted along with the subscription bills to every member of the club voting or non­voting temporary or permanent.

Ex.A.14 is the news letter of September­October, 2015. Ex.A.15 is the newsletter of September­October, 2018. One Brig Chandra B. Shukla the Former Secretary of defendant No.1 club got examined as DW1 and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.3. Ex.B.1 is the Rules book reprinted in the month of March, 2016. Ex.B.2 is the extract of minutes of the meeting of the Managing Committee of Secunderabad Club held on 03.09.2018 at Secunderabad Club. Ex.B.3 is the certified copy of common order in

CMA.Nos.38, 39, 40 and 41 of 2013 and CMA.Nos.10, 11, 12, 13 of 2014 dated 19.06.2015 passed by the Hon’ble 1st Addl. Chief Judge,

City Civil Court, Secunderabad.

10.The plaintiff sought the relief of declaration of rules of defendant

No.1 club as illegal and for permanent injunction against the defendants. The counsel for defendant vehemently argued that the suit is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. Both the parties adduced the arguments at great length and also relied on several 35 O.S.No.369 of 2013 citations. This Court basing on the pleadings and documents produced framed the issues based on question of fact, law and mixed question of fact and law. Before deciding the question of fact this Court is inclined to decide the question of Law and mixed question of fact and law in the first instance. Hence, additional issues are answered accordingly.

Additional Issue No.1:

1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?

11,The contention of the plaintiff is that she is a member of defendant No.1 club since 1970 as a junior dependent member and senior dependent member in the year 1986 and later became an independent member in the year 1995. That the Rules III, V, VI and VII of defendant No.1 club are discriminatory on the basis of gender and against public policy. The rules of the club are contractual in nature and the provisions of the Indian Contract Act will apply. That law of estoppel applies only to the facts and not to the law and as such Civil

Court has jurisdiction to try the suit.

12.The contention of the defendant is that the Secunderabad Club is an unregistered voluntary association of a like­minded persons and that the plaintiff not being a permanent member of defendant No.1 club she has no right to seek amendment of the rules of defendant No.1 club and the relief sought by the plaintiff are not maintainable in the Court of law. That defendant No.1 is a private club and the rules are framed by 36 O.S.No.369 of 2013 the general body as such the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to compel the defendant No.1 club to change or frame its rule.

13.The burden lies on the defendant to prove that the suit is not maintainable in the present form. To prove the same the counsel for the defendant has extensively cross examined the plaintiff. PW1 in her cross examination deposed that defendant No.1 club is a unregistered association of persons and it is not a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Indian Constitution and it is not governed by the provisions of

Society Registration Act and the rules of the defendant No.1 club do not constitute a statute. That the rules are challenged because it disentitled the women from voting.

14.PW1 further deposed that she is using the defendant No.1 club as an AML member even today. That for the last 137 years of defendant

No.1 club, no rule of the club has ever been struck down as illegal. PW1 admitted that there is no rule in the rules of defendant No.1 club which terminates the membership of an AML member on her remarriage. PW1 further deposed that one of the reason for filing the suit is that she did not personally benefited from the amended rules and as the rules of the club violates her constitutional rights and human rights. PW1 admitted that as per the amended rules, any man or woman is entitled to apply for permanent membership under general category. She even admitted that from the year 2010, the daughters of permanent members have been brought on for with son of permanent members. That lady 37 O.S.No.369 of 2013 membership at defendant No.1 club is a special category of membership available to single women who were spinster, separated and widows.

Later this category was removed and women can apply for permanent membership under general category since 2013. She further deposed that all the Subordinate Courts are having jurisdiction to enforce constitutional rights and human rights by virtue of Section 23 of

Contract Act. She denied the suggestion that only Hon’ble Supreme

Court and Hon’ble HIgh Court can enforce fundamental and constitutional rights. That Articles 13, 141, 142 and 144 of the

Constitution r/w Section 23 of the Contract Act empower the Civil

Courts to protect constitutional and fundamental rights. She denied the suggestion that defendant No.1 club is a private members club and the decision taken by the members by democratic process from time to time is relating to the internal management of the club cannot be interfered by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. She admitted that she has no right under the club rules to become a permanent member without following the rules as prescribed under the permanent membership as such she filed this suit.

15.The counsel for the defendant predominantly relied on the decision in Zorastrian Housing Cooperative Society Limited and

another vs. District Registrar Cooperative Societies and others

38 O.S.No.369 of 2013 reported in 2005(5) Supreme Court Cases 632 the sum and substance of the judgment is that:

“a member of a society has no independent right qua society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provision of the Act, Rules and the Bye­laws as he has his right under the

Act, Rule and the Bye­laws.

The bye­laws of the society do not have the states of a statute and are only the rules which govern the internal management of a society. But so long as there is no legislative intervention it is not open to the Court to coin a theory that a member by law is not desirable and would be opposed to public policy as indicated by the constitution. A right to enforce a fundamental right against the state action, cannot be extended to challenge a right to enter into a contract giving up an absolute right in oneself in the interest of an association to be formed or in the interest of the members in general of that association. 

A person becoming a member of a society cannot seek to get out of the obligation undertaken by him while becoming a member of such a society by resort to the principles of public policy based on constitutional protections given to an individual as against the state action. The 39 O.S.No.369 of 2013 fundamental rights are enforced against the state action or other authority who may come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution and it is not possible to argue that a person as a fundamental right to become a member of a voluntary association or of a Cooperative Society governed by its own bye­laws. When a person accepts the membership by submitting himself to its bye­laws he has voluntarily submerged his rights of the society.”

(b) The counsel for the defendant further relied on Chennai

Kancheepuram Tiruvelore District vs. Chinthamani S.

Murugesan and others 2001 Supreme Court Cases online

Madras 466 wherein it was held that:

“the natural justice in the conduct of such association would not have the same degree of rigour, as those principles would have in matter which are required to be adjudicated upon before

Courts and Tribunals. A voluntary association is entitled to carry on its affairs in accordance with its own rules. A person becoming member of a such a body contracts to be bound by those rules and by the actions taken by those in whom power is vested under the Rules.”

16.DW1 to rebut the contention of the plaintiff in his cross examination deposed that defendant No.1 club is an unregistered association of person formed for the purposes of social, sports and cultural activities where men and women are both entitled to use the 40 O.S.No.369 of 2013 club premises. The defendant No.1 club was started by British as a men’s club in 1878. That the club being a private association of members is managed and operated solely by the rules framed by the general body of the club and that all the persons are bound by the law and no private arrangement in the defendant No.1 club can supersede the law. That from the year 1950’s the defendant No.1 club has been used by eligible men, women and children. DW1 denied the suggestion that the rules of the club amount to an agreement between the members and defendant No.1 club. He also denied the suggestion that the rules of the club prior to 1992 are discriminatory and deposed that the rules were accepted by all the members and as the time caused various amendments were incorporated in the rules by the general body as approved by the members.

17.Both the plaintiff and counsel for defendant relied on the decision in T.P. Daver vs. Lodge Victoria reported in AIR 1963 Supreme

Court 1144 this case deals with the expulsion of a member from a lodge as per the rules laid down and the Court held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the decision given by a private association. The contention of the plaintiff basing on this reported citation is that the source of power of association like clubs are contractual in nature and the provisions of Indian Contract Act will apply and hence Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. The counsel 41 O.S.No.369 of 2013 for the defendant also relied on the above referred citation stating that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. On reading of the reported citation the Hon’ble Supreme Court made certain observations that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is limited and it cannot obviously sit as a

Court of appeal from the decision of such body and it can set aside the order of such a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not acting good faith or action of violation of principles of natural justice and further held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the decision given by a private association.

18.Further the counsel for the plaintiff also relied on Premchand vs.

Secunderabad Club and others 2012(2) ALD 474 and also Capt. D.K.

Giri vs. Secunderabad Club 2017 Supreme Court Cases online

Hyderabad 410. The facts in the above two reported citations are different from the facts on hand in the present case. In all the above reported citations referred by the plaintiffs, the Court exercised its jurisdiction where the rules of the club are violated. The case of the plaintiff is not that the club rules are violated by the defendant but certain rules of defendant No.1 club are discriminatory on the basis of gender and against public policy and as such the rules to be declared as null and void. Hence, the citations relied by the plaintiff are not relevant to the present case.

42 O.S.No.369 of 2013

19.On reading of the entire pleadings and cross examination and the citations referred by both the counsels it is an undisputed fact that the defendant No.1 club i.e. Secunderabad Club is an unregistered voluntary association formed for sports and cultural activities. Club means an unincorporated association and has no legal identity of its own, unlike company or a partnership or a registered society. The defendant No.1 club is not open to the public and the membership of the club are selected on some reasonable basis. The rules of the club are the constitution which determines the internal affairs of the club.

PW1 in her cross examination admitted that the defendant No.1 club is an unregistered voluntary association and it is not a state and the rules of the club do not constitute a statute. When admittedly the unregistered defendant No.1 club was formed for the larger benefit of its beneficiaries vis a vis its members with certain prescribed rules with an option either to subscribe or not, the plaintiff having voluntarily and admittedly subscribed herself to the rules of unregistered private club is estopped from challenging the rules of defendant No.1 club. There is no compulsion or fetter to be bound by the rules of defendant No.1 club.

20.Freedom of association is a fundamental right. The right to associate freely with other for social, religious and cultural etc. are recognized in a democratic society. The Defendant No.1 club being a private body and constituted for its members it does not serve the 43 O.S.No.369 of 2013 public nor perform the public functions. PW1 in her chief affidavit stated that she took membership as AML at the age of 25 years and after meeting the necessary requirements under the Rules of Club her application got accepted. This shows that the initial process of admitting its members in the club is selective by categorizing its members into several groups as such the element of public interest does not exist in defendant No.1 club. The same can also be inferred from Ex.A.1 and also through cross­examination of PW1 where she stated that there are various categories of membership at defendant

No.1 club. The capability and restriction for certain degree of a membership in a private club like defendant No.1 cannot be a ground for challenging the rules of the club as discriminatory on the basis of gender. The Courts also cannot take the legislative role in a private club like defendant No.1 club by ordering them to change its rules by converting a AML membership into permanent membership by giving them voting rights which is against defendant No.1 club rules. The prayer sought by the plaintiff to declare the rules of defendant No.1 club as void and illegal on the basis of gender discrimination and opposed to public policy in the suit is also not maintainable as they are beyond the scope of this Court which seek interference with the internal management of defendant No.1 club. Thus, the suit is not maintainable in the present form. Hence, additional issue No.1 is answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff.

44 O.S.No.369 of 2013

Additional issue No.2:

2. Whether the suit is barred by Limitation?

21.The burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that the suit is filed within the limitation period. It is pertinent to note that the plaintiff has not mentioned the limitation para in the plaint which is essential under

Order VII Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code for a suit to be numbered. The plaintiff in her oral and written arguments submitted that the cause of action is a continuous one and the suit is not barred by limitation as per Section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963 and that the limitation runs every moment when there is an infringement of her legal and constitutional rights based on general discrimination. The cause of action for the suit arose on the dates when the rules of defendant No.1 club were made and amended from time to time on 13.11.2009 when

AML to remove general discrimination was called on 14.07.2013 when the proposal to delete AML category of members and to impose disqualification of AML membership on remarriage was introduced. The defendant contention is that the suit is barred by limitation as the plaintiff became a member of defendant No.1 club in the AML category in the year 1995 and after enjoying the facilities of defendant No.1 club for eighteen years, she cannot come to the Court and challenge the rules under which she became a member.

45 O.S.No.369 of 2013

22.The counsel for the defendant relied on Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai

Kalyanji Bhanusali (2020) 7 Supreme Court Cases 366 wherein it explains that “a period of limitation under Articles 58 and 59 of the

Limitation Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right sue first accrued. The counsel for the defendant further relied on

Katri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2011(9) Supreme Court

Cases 126 wherein it was held that “use of the word firstly between words “sue” and “accrued” would mean if a suit is based on multiple cause of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues that is if there are successive violation of rights, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrues.” The counsel for the defendant also relied on the decision reported in Basawaraj vs. Special

Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 Supreme Court Cases 81

wherein it was held that:

“It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. The Statutory 46 O.S.No.369 of 2013 provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”

23.As per Article 58 of the Limitation Act a suit for declaration can be filed within three years when the right to sue first accrues. PW1 in her plaint averments pleaded that the first cause of action arosed on the date when the defendant No.1 club rules were formed and as per her the club is a 131 years old. PW1 admitted in her cross examination that when she applied for AML membership she agreed to be abide the rules and bye­laws of the defendant No.1 club and that she is aware of the specific rights of the AML members in the year 1995 itself and that she protested in the same year with defendant No.2. It clearly establishes that the plaintiff first accrued the right to sue in the year 1995. It can be seen that the plaintiff by clever drafting of the plaint created a illusionary cause of action and deliberately did not mention the limitation in her plaint averments since it would be evident that there is no cause of action and the suit was barred by limitation.

Section 3 of the Limitation Act lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period shall be dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence. The plaintiff failed to prove that the suit is 47 O.S.No.369 of 2013 filed within the limitation period. Hence, additional issue No.2 is answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff.

Additional issue No.3:

3. Whether the suit is barred by non­joinder of proper and necessary parties?

24.The defendant has taken the plea that the plaintiff failed to make all the AML members as parties to the suit and she has not filed the suit as per Order I Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code.

25.For a party to be necessary party, it is essential that Court cannot pass effective order without bringing the interest of the necessary parties into the purview of the judgment. The effectiveness of the judgment is challenged if the non­inclusion of a necessary party hits upon final outcome of the judgment. It can be seen from the cross examination of PW1 that AML membership is given to 986 members and that she has no authority on behalf of other AML members and no

GPA to represent the other AML members and that she has not filed any application to file the suit in a representative capacity. PW1 added that she filed the suit in person. Even if we assume that the suit in person is sustainable, the relief sought for declaring the existing and proposed amended rules of defendant No.1 club relating to AML and

LM members on the basis of gender discrimination and against public policy, the decision of the Court will bind the AML and LM members and it will definitely intrigue the rights of the other AML and LM 48 O.S.No.369 of 2013 members of defendant No.1 club. Hence, these members are considered to be a proper and necessary parties to the suit.

26.PW1 deposed that she challenged the resolution of senior subscribing dependent member (extended category) in the suit but the member under the senior dependent extended category had not been made as parties to the suit and that the said category any daughter of a permanent member who come within its ambit was entitled to its benefit. PW1 in her cross examination further admitted that defendant

No.2 have no power to amend or alter the rules and that as per the rules of the club, the general body is supreme to amend or alter the rules and that the amendment to the rules are circulated to the general body of the members and only after due deliberations and discussions if the majority of the members of the general body approve the same, the same is passed as an amendment and that only permanent members of defendant No.1 club have voting rights and right to participate in the general body meetings.

27.It can be concluded from the oral testimony of PW1 that the defendant No.2 i.e. the President and the Managing Committee of defendant No.1 club has no power to alter or amend the rules and only general body as the power to do so. Since defendant No.1 is an unregistered society and it is not a legal person, it has to be sued only in the name of its members. Hence, the members of the general body who has the power to alter or amend the rules are considered to be the 49 O.S.No.369 of 2013 proper and necessary parties to the suit. Since the plaintiff failed to implead all the proper and necessary parties of defendant No.1 club to the suit, the suit is bad for non­joinder of such parties. Hence,

additional issue No.3 is answered in favour of the defendants and

against the plaintiff.

28.In view of my findings given regarding maintainability of the suit, limitation and non­joinder of parties there is no need to discuss the issues of fact and accordingly the suit is liable to be dismissed.

Additional issue No.4:

4.To what relief?

29.In the result, the suit is dismissed with costs. 

Dictated to the Stenographer, transcribed and typed by her, corrected

and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 11 th day of August, 2013.

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER CUM

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE

 FAC. ADDL. RENT CONTROLLER­CUM­ 

XVI JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE 

SECUNDERABAD. 

Appendix of Evidence

Witnesses Examined

For Plaintiff: For Defendants:

P.W.1 Anjana Taggarse Motupalli DW1 Brig. Chandra B. Shukla

Documents marked on behalf of plaintiff:

Ex.A.1 Secunderabad Club Rules Book Ex.A.2 Copy of membership card of PW1 Ex.A.3 Copy of Membership card of Sreekriti Taggasre 50 O.S.No.369 of 2013

Ex.A.4 Copy of Membership card of Anusreeya Taggasre Ex.A.5 Secunderabad 31st Annual Report 2012­2013 Ex.A.6 Copy of Secunderabad Club amendment to Club Rules after AGM dated 31.07.2013 Ex.A.7 Office copy of affidavit with petition in IA.No.1092 of 2014 in O.S.No.258 of 2010 Ex.A.8 Served copy of counter affidavit in IA.No.1092 of 2014 in 

OS.No.258 of 2010

Ex.A.9 CC of order in I.A.No.1092 of 2014 in OS.No.258 of 2010 

dated 02.06.2015

Ex.A.10 Secunderabad Club newsletter of defendant No.1 Ex.A.11 Secunderabad Club 133rd Annual Report 2014­2015 Ex.A.12 Office copy of proposal with covering letter Ex.A.13 Newsletters Ex.A.14 Newsletter of September­October,2015 Ex.A.15 Newsletter of September­October, 2018

Documents marked on behalf of defendants:

Ex.B.1 Rules Book reprinted in the month of March, 2016 Ex.B.2 Extract of minutes of meeting dasted 03.09.2018 Ex.B.3 CC of common order in CMA.Nos.38, 39, 40 and 41 of 2013 and CMA.Nos.10,11, 12, 13 of 2014 dated 19.06.2015

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER­CUM­

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE: FAC. ADDL. RENT CONTROLLER­CUM­

XVI JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE 

SECUNDERABAD. 

1 O.S.No.384 of 2013

IN THE COURT OF THE ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER CUM XVI

JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE : CITY SMALL CAUSES COURT :

SECUNDERABAD

 PRESENT :: Ms. N. Saswatha

Principal Rent Controller­cum­

XVII Junior Civil Judge FAC. Addl. Rent Controller­cum­ XVI Junior Civil Judge Secunderabad.

Dated this the 11th day of August, 2023

O.S.No.384 of 2013

Between:

1. Melanie Gabriel W/o. Gerard Gabriel aged about 52 years, Occ. Household residing at 15/1 (481), Behind Dena Bank, East Marredpally, Secunderabad 500 026.

2. Vineeta Chainani W/o. Lakshman Chainani aged about 42 years, Occ. Household Residing at H.No.19, Polisetti Enclave 

Vikrampuri, Secunderabad 500 059. .. Plaintiffs

And

1. Secunderabad Club Rep. By its Managing Committee through President, Picket, Secunderabad 500 026. 

2. The Managing Committaee rep. By President Secunderabad Club, Picket Secunderabad 500 026. 

3. Smt. Anita Ahuja W/o. Sri Anil Ahuja aged about 55 years, Occ. Professional Attorney, Residence cum office at Flat No.201, Sri Anjana’s Solitaire Apts. Street No.1 Umanagar Colony, Begumpet

Secunderabad. .... Defendants 

(Defendant No.3 is added as per orders dt. 02.12.2015 passed by this Court in IA.No. 286 of 2015).

2 O.S.No.384 of 2013

 This suit is coming before me for final hearing in the presence of Ms.Anjana Taggarse Motupalli, Advocate (Party­in­person) for the Plaintiff and of Sri Zeeshan Adnan Mahmood, Advocate for the Defendant No.1, Sri Uma Shanker, Advocate for defendant No.2, Smt. Anitha Ahuja, Advocate (Party­in person) and the matter having stood over for consideration, till this day, the court made the following:

J U D G M E N T

This is a suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendants under Order VII Rule 1 r/w Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code praying the Court for declaration of rules of defendant No.1 club as illegal and void on the ground of gender discrimination and opposed to public policy and consequential relief of mandatory injunction. 

2.The brief averments of the plaint are that:

(a)The defendant No.1 club is 131 years old and is the oldest social and cultural club in Hyderabad. It has not been registered as a society, a trust or a company. It is an association of persons, the same is continued and it is sued in such title and capacity. Being an ‘association of persons’, it is recognized as such entity, viz.,

Secunderabad Club, for various statutory purposes such as Income Tax

Act, Sales Tax Act, Shops and Establishment Act, etc. 

(b)The plaintiff No.1 is a member of defendant No.1 club with membership No.AML 127 and her membership is subsisting and continuing. The father of plaintiff No.1 late Col. L.M. Nazareth was a permanent member (No.N65) of the defendant No.1 club. The plaintiff 3 O.S.No.384 of 2013

No.1 became an Associate Member Lady (AML), pursuant to the acceptance of her application for membership to the defendant No.1 club being made and being accepted on payment of the admission fee, etc. as per Rule XIV (1) (Entrance Fees) of the Rules.

(c)The plaintiff No.2 is a member of defendant No.1 club with membership No.AML 158 and her membership is subsisting and continuing. The father of plaintiff No.1 late Mr. Ashok Kumar Patny was a permanent member (No.A204) of the defendant No.1 club. 

(d)The plaintiff mentioned the extract of the rules in the plaint pleadings since the club rules has already been marked as Ex.A.1 for avoiding the lengthy pleadings of paragraphs it has not been mentioned in the plaint pleadings.

(e)That while members admitted as permanent members under Rule

V of the Rules of defendant No.1 club, are entitled to all the rights and privileges associated with being a member as such, the members admitted into the categories of Associate Member Ladies, Lady Members and Lady Member Widow Spouses under Rules VI and VII are not entitled by virtue of Rule XVII (2) to participate in meetings of general body, participate in elections, request EGMs or make proposals for

AGMs. That the existing rules governing the members of 131 years old defendant No.1 club are opposed to public policy, Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution and Rights guaranteed by all the

International Conventions pertaining to equality, removal of gender 4 O.S.No.384 of 2013 discrimination and equal protection of the law. The basic rights to vote, contest elections, be part of the managing committee and participate in self governance are denied as the rights of equality, respect, freedom against gender discrimination etc. women are given second class treatment and are shutout from the benefits of the club while all the liabilities are imposed upon them and they are oppressed as persons incapable of thinking or acting on their own behalf. 

(f)That the pre­amended rules of defendant No.1 club were as under which were challenged in the suit in O.S.No.369 of 2013 as fall as failing foul of public policy and in violation of Section 23 of the Contract

Act, inasmuch as membership of defendant No.1 is a matter of contract.

(i) Rule V which relates to permanent members and stipulates that it shall consist of only gentlemen and thus disables lady members from being permanent members and thus constitutes invidious discrimination and oppression of lady members sole on the basis of gender.

(ii) Rule VI pertaining to admission to membership for daughters of permanent members in so far as restricting her rights and making her a non­permanent member thereby depriving her of all her rights as a member, including those enumerated under Rule

XVII(2) which are available to men since it is based on gender discrimination and oppression of Women members, in contra distinction to Men members who are entitled to those rights under

Rule V(3).

5 O.S.No.384 of 2013

(iii) Rule VII (3) pertaining to admission to membership for Lady

Members who are daughters of permanent members and restricting their membership to only being AMLs thereby subjecting them to denial of the rights of men members available under Rule XVII(2) of the Rules, since it is based on gender discrimination and oppression of women members.

(iv) Rule XVII pertaining to rights and Obligations of members inasmuch as a separate category and exclusive rights and privileges in contra­distinction to women members, is provided to men members as under, since it is based on gender discrimination and oppression of women members.

(v) Only permanent members are entitled to participate in meetings, ballots and elections of General Body, stand for office or membership of committee, propose or second the same of any candidate of admission or election, request the convening of an

EGM and make any proposal for consideration of the General Body and women are discriminated and oppressed on the ground of gender.

(vi) Entitled married dependent sons between age of 21 to 25 to use the club facilities along with their wives, as dependent members, while only unmarried daughters are entitled to use the club as dependent members of the father.

(g)The Rules are steeped in oppression, gender discrimination and gender bias, are demeaning to women and are opposed to public policy:

6 O.S.No.384 of 2013

(a)Existing women members (AMLs and Lady Members of both categories) are not entitled to:

(a) Take part in any meeting of the General Body or any ballot or any election;

(b) Stand for any office, or membership of the Committee;

(c) Propose or second the name of any candidate for admission or election;

(d) Request the convening of an Extra ordinary General Meeting and;

(e) Make any proposal for consideration of the General Body including any proposal to amend the Rules or Bye­laws made under them. For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that a

Corporate nominee shall not be entitled to any of the rights enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) above.

(ii) Only men can be permanent members (PM) and move resolutions and take decisions on issues governing all the members, including women and children. Since AML and LM category women members are not entitled to vote, contest elections, be part of the Managing Committee, etc., they are not entitled to participate in self governance in the defendant No.1 club and the voting power given to the men has been used as an instrument of abuse and oppression to the extent that they are in­ fringing upon a woman’s right to marriage/remarriage.

(iii) Children of AML (women) members are barred from membership but children of male members have a right of membership in the defendant No. club.

7 O.S.No.384 of 2013

(iv) While AML and LM category women members pay the same admission, fee monthly subscriptions and fees and are subject to the same liabilities, they are denied basic rights of voting and being involved in self governance or being treated with respect absent gender bias in the defendant No.1 club.

(v) Daughters of permanent members who are made AML members are subject to balloting by the Managing Committee who decide whether they are “fit” to become members of the defendant

No.1 club. Son of permanent members get their membership automatically and are not subject to balloting. (pre 31.07.2013).

(vi) Lady members who get membership independently and Lady members who are widows of permanent members are subject to losing their membership if they get married or remarried. Rules which impinge on a woman’s right to marriage or widow remarriage are illegal.

(vii) While only unmarried daughters can accompany their father and are included as dependent members, dependent sons between the age of 16 and 25 and the wives of the dependent sons between the age of 21 to 25 under Rule XVII of the Rules.

(h)That an EGM by a permanent member Mr. Annam Dilip was moved in 2009 for gender equality but the same was thwarted first by defendants by preventing voting from taking place at that EGM and appointing a committee to go into the mater and thereafter by some permanent members by filing O.S.No.258 of 2010 against defendant 8 O.S.No.384 of 2013

No.1 club without impleadng AML members, questioning the membership of all the AML members. Some of the AML members, including the plaintiff No.2 got impleaded in the said suit. That the defendant No.1 club has contested the claim of AMLs more vociferously than the plaintiff in that suit and continues to do so. The pendency of that suit is also being used as a fait accomplice by defendant to prevent converting them from AML members to permanent members or removing the gender bias. 

(i)That the defendant No.2 is claiming that the matter is ‘subjudice’ even though there is no order injuncting defendants from removing gender inequality against the AML and other lady members. While claiming that the matter is subjudice and hence no action can be taken to remove the gender bias, in the same breach the defendant No.2 has introduced demeaning proposals for the AGM on 31.07.2013, interalia and including disqualifying an AML member from membership in the event of her remarriage.

(j)The voting on the above proposals resulted in the following rules, which are under challenge as being in continuation of oppression, being in violation of public policy and therefore void under Section 23 of the

Indian Contract Act, 1872:

(i)Rules V(3) as amended on 31.07.2013: Permanent

Membership to daughters (under 25 years) of only permanent members is being offered and a resolution passed on 31st 9 O.S.No.384 of 2013

July, 2013 by the AGM. Thus AML members who are also daughters of permanent members and otherwise entitled to permanent membership on the same norm were not granted the same, and are now being sought to be phased out. AML members are over 25 years of age and should have priority and seniority in terms of entitlement, age etc. to be made permanent members, having paid all entrance fees, subscriptions and contributed to the club for creation of amenities, etc. A class within a class is being created and discrimination being practiced to benefit the present permanent (male) members.

(ii) The rule stating that hereinafter there will be no admission to the category of AML members and does not make provision for children of AML members while exhaustive provisions are made for the children of permanent member (male) even in the event of his demise. The children of existing AML members are not protected and will not get membership whey they turn 25 years of age. The proposed rule was not debated in view of the ad interim injunction granted by this Hon’ble Court vide order dated 30.07.2013 in

I.A.No.841 of 2013 in O.S.No.369 of 2013.

(iii) Rule V(3)(i) of the Rules as amended on 31.07.2013)

Daughters of permanent members who were eligible for membership as Associate Member Ladies between 29th April, 2010 and 31st July, 2013, are illegally being made permanent members. The Rule V(3)(i) can only be prospective and not made retrospective by the defendants.

10 O.S.No.384 of 2013

(k)That the pre­existing Rule V(3) relating to sons of permanent members was proposed to be, and in fact, amended on 31st July, 2013, to entitle upto three children of the permanent member would be eligible for permanent membership on attaining 25 years of age and fulfilling other eligibility criterion. That Rule V(3)(i) provided that daughters of permanent members who are eligible and have applied for

AML membership between 29th April, 2010 and 31st July, 2013 were permitted to continue as subscribing Senior Departments, and will be treated as Senior dependents eligible to apply for permanent membership under the new amended Rule V(3). That on 31st July, 2013, a proposed Rule V(3) was introduced and voted into being a Rule by the required majority of the defendant No.1 club. By virtue of this new Rule, all the children of the permanent members become entitled to file an application for membership on attaining the age of 25 years. 

(l)That the defendants have committed further illegality by entitling daughters of permanent members to permanent membership who are only entitled to membership as AML members between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013, since the present rules are prospective and are to be in operation from 1st August, 2013. That the admissions for General

Category of permanent members have been opened up to non members who can make application. Women, who have never been members of the defendant No.1 club, are now being given preferential treatment over women who have been members of the club since their childhood 11 O.S.No.384 of 2013 and have paid entrance fee and assumed all liabilities of the defendant No.1 club as AML members. That under existing Rules, the

Women AML and LM categories are not being permitted to become permanent members of the defendant No.1 club and hence cannot vote on these illegal proposals. That the permanent members/male are using the Rules as an instrument of oppression and abuse against the women members. That while the pre­amended Rules are demeaning, discriminatory and opposed to public policy, Fundamental rights and all international conventions, the amended Rules are a continuation of and constitute an aggravated form of discrimination and degradation, on the basis of gender. 

(m)That while there is an appearance that defendant No.1, through amended Rules introduced by defendant No.2 in the AGM held on 31.07.2013 is attempting to remove gender inequality, the reality of the situation is as under:

i. Adult lady members (both AML and LM) are being phased out without any voting rights or rights to contest elections or participate in the General Body; and the possibility of losing their membership on remarriage.

ii. While the proposed Rules stipulate that any person can become a permanent member and that a woman can apply directly for permanent membership, the wait period is as long

as 15 to 20 years even before her application will come up for

consideration. Then there is also the possibility of balloting.

12 O.S.No.384 of 2013 iii.The permanent members are attempting to benefit themselves on the one hand by ignoring 957 AML members, 212 lady members and 328 widows of permanent members and refusing to remove gender discrimination and treat them as permanent members thereby ensuring that there is no representation in the vote bank from them and on the other hand, proposing to amend the Rules so that their daughters who are approaching the age of 25 years will be admitted to the category of permanent members. The daughters of permanent members will most likely be under their immediate control or supervision and suffrage issues will be controlled by them.

(n)That ‘A gentleman’s club’ or a ‘private club’ defence is not available to circumvent a meaningful inquiry into the issues of degrading, demeaning, discriminating behaviour of the respondents and to avoid the hard questions of boundaries of freedom of association and refusal to adhere to public policy and public order. That the Rules of defendant No.1 club are akin to an agreement between the members of the club and any agreement which is opposed to public policy is void to that extent. The source of the power of to regulate its members is the contract on the basis of which they become members, i.e., the Rules of defendant No.1 club. That the Rules which automatically disentitle

Women members (AMLs and Lady Members, whether single or windowed) from membership, on her remarriage, is degrading and 13 O.S.No.384 of 2013 demeaning to women and contrary to public policy. An agreement in restraint of marriage is void and an attempt to enter into such an agreement is illegal and against public policy. 

(o)That the impugned rules, in so far as they disqualify AMLs and lady members from elections and also the right to vote, or being on the committee, solely on account of gender is clearly contrary to Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. That the right to participate in all the activities of defendant No.1 club, flows from the fundamental right of the plaintiff under Article 19(1)(c) on compliance with all the secular and neutral restrictions and entitlement to such rights and privileges is not opposed to “public order” or “morality” of the society. That the plaintiffs are eligible in all respects to be permanent members. They are senior to and more entitled to being permanent members as against the senior subscribing daughters of permanent members and new applicants. Hence, this suit.

3.The defendant No.1 filed his written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint.

a)The suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts of the case.

In fact a meaningful perusal of the reliefs sought for in the plaint itself would show that the same are not entitled by the plaintiffs. Plaintiff

No.2 in fact is a party to the earlier suit which is also pending before this Court being O.S.No.258 of 2010 have impleaded herself and as 14 O.S.No.384 of 2013 such is very well aware about the controversy in respect of the existing

AML members. Inspite of the said fact the plaintiffs have chosen to file the present proceedings by making misleading statements solely with an intention to forestall a bonafide attempt by the club management to remove gender discrimination amongst members of the club. The suit as filed is therefore filed on misconceived, nonexistent and imaginary cause of action. 

(b)That the matters relating to internal management governance of 1st defendant club have to be dealt with under the basic principles of natural justice and fair play and the same are not governed by any statue per­se. That curiously the plaintiffs and especially plaintiff No.2 who is party to O.S.No.258 of 2010 who is aware about the said proceedings has gone to the extent of seeking relief of declaration so as to set at naught the proceedings pending since much earlier relating to

AML, without awaiting disposals of the said suit. That the plaintiffs have not approached the Court bonafide and there is no cause of action to seek relief of declaration as sought for. In the above circumstances when the main relief itself would not be available to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs would naturally be not entitled for any interim relief which have been independently sought for by the plaintiffs by filing interlocutory applications solely with an intention to unsettle and frustrate proper and bonafide amendments brought in by the club management protecting itself of ladies.

15 O.S.No.384 of 2013

(c)That a meaningful perusal of the proposals which were put forth

before the general body on 31.07.2013 would clearly show that in fact

the managing committee was acting bonafide so as to remove gender inequality in toto and any other interpretation is not possible of the proposed amendment. That by way of of the present amendment passed by the general body of the club basic discrimination alleged against ladies prohibiting them from becoming permanent member of the club and entitling them to participate in the election etc. has been removed.

(d)That the daughters of permanent members or other ladies intending to become permanent members are now entitled to apply to become permanent members of the club if they conform to the requirements of the rule and pass through the ballot which is compulsory for all and they would stand on part with the male members of the club. It is, therefore, apparent that in effect gender inequality alleged has now been removed by the club management in toto. The said benefit could not be made available to the existing AML in view of O.S.No.258 of 2010 and the subsisting injunction orders therein. The very category of AML would have ceased to exist and the lady members who have been on AML category would have been absorbed among general members of the club, but for challenge of the said amendment then proposed in OS.No.258 of 2010. That the club management never had any intention to deny such entitlement to the 16 O.S.No.384 of 2013 existing AML but for pendency of the proceedings in O.S.No.258 of 2010 and not otherwise.

(e)That the club management has now made available all rights to the AML including right to vote, contest elections to be a part of the managing committee and to participate in self governance of ladies. The existing AML have to await disposal of OS.No.258 of 2010 and vacation of the subsisting injunction orders therein. That the subject controversy relating to AML being pending in O.S.No.258 of 2010 which is within the knowledge of the plaintiffs and especially plaintiff No.2 being a party defendant to the said suit, it is uncalled for on the part of the plaintiffs to find fault with the club management in this respect, especially keeping in view the subsisting injunction orders in

O.S.No.258 of 2010. 

(f)That a meaningful examination of resolution put forth for consideration of the general body in the meeting dated 31.07.2013 would clearly show that bonafide efforts made by the club management to remove gender inequality and to treat daughters on part with sons.

That the injunction orders in O.S.No.258 of 2010, the issue relating to the existing AML members could have not been dealt with by any stretch of imagination. That merely because the club management has acted prudently so as to make available AML members their rights which are otherwise available to the male members of the club by the said amendment, except to the existing AML members in view of the 17 O.S.No.384 of 2013 subsistence of the injunction orders in O.S.No.258 of 2010 cannot be a ground to maintain the present proceedings and to seek injunction to give effect to the resolution passed unanimously in the general body meeting of 31.07.2013.

(g)That the proposals in the annual general body of 31.07.2013 are in any such way demeaning and disqualifying an AML member from membership in the event of her remarriage is incorrect and false. That the club management while removing gender inequity and while bringing in amendments to rules so as to make daughters of permanent members and other ladies as permanent members of the club, could not deal with the existing AML members only in view of the subsisting injunction orders in O.S.No.358 of 2010 and the same cannot be a reason to deny removal of basic gender inequity which was earlier claimed to be existing.

(h)That the daughters of permanent members after attaining age of 25 years if eligible as per the rules, can be made permanent members with effect from 01.08.2013 according to the rules. From 01.08.2013 ladies in general and daughters of the permanent members became permanent members in general category and members children category, since daughters of permanent members who were eligible in all respects for members between 29.04.2010 to 31.07.2013 have made applications which had to be dealt with. The very fact that the club management has now brought in amendment to the existing rules 18 O.S.No.384 of 2013 permitting ladies to become permanent members on par with male members itself goes to show the true facts as to gender equality which has been brought in the club.

(I)That under the amended rules, permanent members is available to all the eligible ladies and other categories of members who conform to the existing rules and as such there is no such discrimination or disregard to the defendants of Rule XXX as alleged. That daughters of permanent members were eligible for membership even otherwise. They have been subscribing senior dependent members and have been paying subscription for utilization of facilities of the club. That all the ladies are now eligible to apply for permanent membership of the club and as such there is no discrimination whatsoever. That the plaintiffs are free to apply for permanent membership in general category and such application if any wold be considered in accordance with the amended rules.

(j)That there is absolutely no cause of action or justification for filing the present suit. That the plaintiffs have become AML members as per the then rule position and the plaintiffs have been enjoying all the facilities of the club as permanent members of the club except voting right and participation in the management. Bonafide attempt made by the club management even in respect of the existing AML members could not be fructified due to filing of O.S.No.258 of 2010 and subsisting injunction orders in respect of AML members category from 19 O.S.No.384 of 2013 this Court. Inspite of the same when the club management has brought in amendment to rules bringing in gender equality and bringing daughters of permanent members and other ladies on par with any other male who would seek to become permanent members of the club.

Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit with exemplary costs.

4.The defendant No.2 filed his written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint.

a)That the defendant No.2 is the Managing Committee of defendant

No.1 Club and is constituted in accordance with Rule XXII of the Rules of the defendant No.1 club. That the suit is misconceived and is based on non­existent and imaginary grounds. That the 1st defendant is a private members club and is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the

Civil Court. That the plaintiffs are Associate Member Ladies. That the defendant No.1 with a view to ensure gender equality has introduced amendments to its rules which were approved in the Annual General

Meeting dated 31.07.2013 (Rules V and V(3)) by virtue of which ladies have been made eligible to become permanent members and permanent members can participate in meetings and elections of defendant No.1. This clearly shows that the plaintiffs contentions concerning gender discrimination hold no water. 

(b)A perusal of the amendments brought in during AGM held on 31.07.2013 would clearly show that there was affirmative action taken 20 O.S.No.384 of 2013 by defendant No.1 club to ensure equality. That the case of the plaintiffs is not that women in general are being discriminated against by defendant No.1. The plaintiffs grievance is limited to a particular class of members in the defendant No.1 club as is evident from the plaint.

That the defendant No.1 had introduced Rule V(3)(i) with regard to daughters of permanent members who are eligible and have applied for

AML membership between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013 to be permitted to be continued as subscribing Senior Dependents who would be treated as being eligible to apply for permanent membership as per the amended rules. 

(c)That the defendant No.1 has, in fact, brought in new amendments at the Annual General Meeting held on 31.07.2013 which promote gender equality. That as per the new Rules, both men and women are eligible to become permanent members through the process prescribed under the Rules. It is denied that Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is applicable to the present case. That the amendments that were made to the Rules were made in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Rules were made in defendant No.1 club. That even going by the argument of the plaintiffs that the relationship between the members and the defendant No.1 club is the nature of a contract, the plaintiffs are bound by procedure prescribed under the

Rules and, the amendments, having been approved by the requisite 21 O.S.No.384 of 2013 majority in accordance with the Rules, cannot be challenged by the plaintiffs.

(d)That the defendant No.1 is a club and the decisions taken by its members with regard to its own membership cannot be challenged as being opposed to public policy especially when there is no gender discrimination involved, contrary to what is being portrayed by the plaintiffs. That the relationship between the member and the defendant

No.1 club is not in the nature of a contract. That it is not as if the daughters of permanent members who are over the age of 25 years are eligible for permanent membership. They can apply for permanent membership if they wish to and, if they are eligible as per rules, they would be made permanent members in accordance with the rules.

(e)That the decision to create a category of “Extended Senior

Dependent Members” was taken in view of the injunction granted in

O.S.No.258 of 2010 which has been granted on 16.04.2010 and is

subsisting even as on today. That the General Body of defendant No.1 had unanimously approved this proposal. That the person who was the

President of the defendant No.1 club at the time of passing of the resolution, has no daughters. That the daughters of the person who was the Vice­President at the time of passing of the resolution does not feature in the list of AMLs between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013. 

(f)That the defendant No.1 is a club and the decisions taken by its members with regard to its own membership cannot be challenged as 22 O.S.No.384 of 2013 being opposed to public policy especially when there is no gender discrimination involved, contrary to what is being portrayed by the plaintiffs. That AMLs can now become permanent members in the ‘general category’ after the amendments that have been introduced.

Therefore, the plaintiffs grievance is misplaced. That earlier AMLs can become permanent members by applying for permanent membership and the membership would be granted to them if they are eligible and in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Rules.

(g)That the AMLs can participate in all the activities of defendant

No.1 club which are the objects of the club and utilize all the club facilities and, they become permanent members can contest in elections etc. That the AMLs and LMs will continue as such and would continue to have all the benefits and privileges that they were entitled to before the amendments were made. That in addition thereto they are now eligible to become permanent members in the general category and if eligible would be made permanent members in accordance with the

Rules. The waiting period for becoming permanent member cannot be the basis for challenging the rules. That the AMLs do not lose their membership on remarriage. The plaintiffs are both AMLs and the Rules do not contemplate that they lose their membership on remarriage. That the plaintiffs contention about women members not being able to attend meetings and vote on proposals is misplaced as the rules have now been amended to make lady permanent members eligible to vote and 23 O.S.No.384 of 2013 attend meetings, provided that they are eligible as per the rules. That the rule pertaining to recording the name of “declared spouse” is applicable to both male and female members.

(h)That AML and LM (general) category have now become redundant in view of the amendment that any lady can become a permanent member if eligible as per the Rules of defendant No.1 club. That the

AMLs are not being denied permanent membership. They can also become permanent membership, if the wish to, in accordance with the

Rules. That the plaintiffs may apply to become permanent members by making an application in accordance with the amended rules and if eligible they would become permanent members. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit with exemplary costs. 

5.The defendant No.3 filed his written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint.

a)That the general body not only 31.07.2013 but even earlier clearly proved that managing committee was acting bonafide so as to remove gender inequality in toto and any other interpretation of the proposed amendment is absolutely false and hence denied. That due to pendency of O.S.No.258 of 2010 in I.A.No.162 of 2010 and I.A.No.163 of 2010 and subsisting injunction orders neither the defendant nor the club management could have dealt with its proposals, recommendations or expert committee report. That by way of the present amendments 24 O.S.No.384 of 2013 passed by the general body of the club, basic discrimination alleged against ladies prohibiting them from become permanent member of the club and entitling them to participate in the elections etc. has been removed as in view of the rules, the daughters of permanent members or other ladies intending to become permanent members, hence in effect, gender inequality alleged has now been removed by the club management except the fact that due to arbitrary action of a few members, the said benefit could not be made available to the existing

AML.

(b)That the circumstances under which the general body in 2009 had appointed a committee to go into the matter is a matter of record, in fact the committee had submitted its report favouring AMLs be absorbed as permanent members to remove gender bias. However, only 10 permanent members filed O.S.No.258 of 2010 against the club questioning the membership of AML without any right, the said suit was pending adjudication before XI Junior Court, hence, the AMLs could not be absorbed as permanent members. That the plaintiffs have chosen to make such irresponsible submissions which are per se incorrect and false. That the defendant NO.2 is claiming that the matter is sub­judice even though there is no order injecting the defendants from removing gender inequality is subject to proof of the same

(c)That the resolution for consideration of the general body not only in the meeting dated 31.07.2013 but since 2005, forming Special 25 O.S.No.384 of 2013

Committee and the evidence of the said meeting prove that bonafide efforts made by the club management to remove gender inequality and to treat daughters at part with sons. That the proposal in the annual general body of 31.07.2013 are in any such way demeaning and disqualifying an AML member from membership in the even of her remarriage is incorrect and false. That in fact, as confirmed by the general body of the club on 31.07.2013 remarriage does not disqualify an AML member from membership.

(d)That the club management while removing gender inequality and bringing amendments to rules to make daughters of permanent members and other ladies as permanent members of the club, could not deal with the existing AML members in view of the subsisting injunction orders in O.S.No.258 of 2010 and the same cannot be a reason to deny removal of basic gender inequality which was earlier claimed to be existing. That the very fact that the club management has now brought in amendment to the existing rules permitting ladies to become permanent members on par with male members itself goes to show the true facts as to gender equality which has been brought in, in the club.

That there can be departure of Rule XXX and XXXI only in the interest of one and all and that as the defendant had agreed for the relief of

AMLs, there is no issue whatsoever.

(e)That the daughters of permanent members referred under Rule V (3)(i) are eligible for membership between 29.04.2010 and 31.07.2013 26 O.S.No.384 of 2013 could also be made AML members at relevant point of time which by then was the rule is subject to proof however a way to implement the equality of genders was made as even now the Rule Book is amenable to change. It is pertinent to note that defendant No.1 club is in no way against AML members. That the allegations of gender discrimination have been denied by this defendant absolutely. 

(f)That it is true that there was complete discrimination on the basis of gender which is a violation of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 since ages but as and when necessity arises, the defendants are amending the rules. That it is pertinent to note that associate member lady (AMLs) and lady members general category (LMs) have become redundant, as any lady member can become permanent member if eligible as per the rules of defendant No.1 club. That there is absolutely no cause of action or justification for filing the present suit on basis of gender bias and the AMLs permanent membership could not be concluded due to the pendency of O.S.No.258 of 2010 and the other injunction orders which now is not the bone of contention. 

(g)That the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief of declaration that the amended rules passed on 31.07.2013 are in any way oppressive, discriminatory or opposed to law on gender basis and for mandatory injunction directing the club management to entitle the AML’s to be made permanent members of the club with effect from 2009. That the plaintiffs be considered as permanent members from the date of 27 O.S.No.384 of 2013 admission into defendant No.1 club as AML members is also not available to the plaintiffs. That the plaintiff have become AML members as per the then rule position and the plaintiffs have enjoying all the facilities of the club as permanent members of the club except voting right and participation in the management. That instead of permitting the club management to act upon the amended rules so as to ensure gender equality the plaintiffs are in effect stalling implementation of the amended rules, in effect the plaintiffs are supporting gender inequality and are holding the club management at ransom. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit with exemplary costs. 

6.Basing on the above pleadings the following issues are settled for trial on 06.02.2018:

1. Whether the Amended Rules proposed in the 131st AGM held on 31.07.2013, and the Rule Nos.III, VI, VII contained in Annexture II in limiting the Women members (AML and LM) be declared as void, illegal and opposed public policy?

2. Whether the amendment of rules and introducing Rule V and V(3) as illegal, discriminatory and opposed to law?

3. Whether the action of the defendants in amending the Rules as discriminatory and opposed to law?

4. Whether a Mandatory Injunction be granted directing the defendant No.1 Club to amend the impugned rules of the defendant No.1 club so as to entitle the plaintiff’s to be made permanent members of the Club as prayed for?

5. Whether a Mandatory Injunction be granted directing the defendant No.1 club to ensure equality of treatment between men and women members of the club and ensuring that men and women are accorded the same fair and equal treatment, from degradation, oppression and gender discrimination in the 28 O.S.No.384 of 2013 defendant No.1 club?

6. Whether the consequential declaration be granted that the plaintiffs be construed as being permanent members from the date of their admission into the defendant No.1 club as Associate Member Lady (AMLs) and accord the plaintiffs all the rights and privileges admissible to permanent members, with all consequential rights therefrom as with permanent members of the club, in all future meetings as prayed for?

7. Whether the AML members have also be given permanent membership along with their children? 

8. To what relief?

7.To prove the case of the plaintiffs, plaintiff No.2 herself got examined as PW1 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.6. Ex.A.1 is the Copy of

Rules/Bye­laws of first defendant club. Ex.A.2 is the Copy of report of managing committee for the year 2012­2013. Ex.A.3 is the copy of his identity card (witness produced the original identity card, the same is compared and return back to her in the open Court. Ex.A.4 is the newsletter of August and September 2013. Ex.A.5 is the newsletter of

September and October, 2015. Ex.A.6 is the newsletter of September and October, 2015. One Brig Chandra B. Shukla the Former Secretary of defendant No.1 club got examined as DW1 and defendant No.3 Anita

Ahuja herself got examined as DW2 and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.3.

Ex.B.1 is the membership form. Ex.B.2 is the letter dated 21.10.1995.

Ex.B.3 is the letter dated 10.11.1995. Ex.B.4 is the Rules Book. Ex.B.5 is the Authorization letter dated 03.09.2018 given by defendants No.1 and 2. Ex.B.6 is the served copy of written statement filed by defendant 29 O.S.No.384 of 2013

No.2 in O.S.No.258 of 2010. Ex.B.7 is the copy of common order in

CMAs.38 to 41 of 2013 and 10 to 13 of 2014 dated 19.06.2015 on the file of I Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. Ex.B.8 is the certified copy of order in I.A.No.1070 of 2014 in O.S.No.258 of 2010

dated 02.06.2015. Ex.B.9 is the copy of identity card with the

Secunderabad Club with AML 029. Ex.B.10 is the copy of emails.

8.Heard both sides and perused the record.

9.The plaintiffs sought the relief of declaration of rules of defendant

No.1 as illegal on the basis of gender discrimination and mandatory injunction against the defendants. The counsel for the plaintiff filed a memo vide S.R.No.167 of 2021 dated 01.09.2021 to adopt the written arguments filed in O.S.No.369 of 2013 on the file of this Court as both are similar suits. The counsel for both plaintiff and defendant also submitted common arguments in both the suits i.e. O.S.No.369 of 2013 as well as in this suit, since the pleadings, reliefs claimed, the evidence of the defendant No.1 and the oral and written arguments are common in both the suits.

10.Since the common arguments are adduced in both the suits the counsel for the defendant vehemently argued that the suit is not maintainable, as such even though the issue is not framed since it goes to the root of the case, this Court is inclined to decide the maintainability of the suit at the first instance.

30 O.S.No.384 of 2013

Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form?

11.The contention of the plaintiff is that she is an AML member in the defendant No.1 club and it is an association of persons and the rules of defendant No.1 club are illegal and are opposed to public policy and are violating her fundamental rights. The counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the rules of the club are contractual in nature as such Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit.

12.The contention of the defendant is that the Secunderabad Club is an unregistered voluntary association of a like­minded persons and that the plaintiff not being a permanent member of defendant No.1 club she has no right to seek amendment of the rules of defendant No.1 club and the relief sought by the plaintiff are not maintainable in the Court of law. That defendant No.1 is a private club and the rules are framed by the general body as such the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to compel the defendant No.1 club to change or frame its rule.

13.The burden lies on the defendant to prove that the suit is not maintainable in the present form. To prove the same the counsel for the defendant has extensively cross examined the plaintiff No.2. PW1 in her cross examination deposed that defendant No.1 club is an organization and it is not a society, company, trust nor partnership.

PW1 admitted that defendant No.1 is an unregistered association of a 31 O.S.No.384 of 2013 like­minded person and it is governed by its own rules and bye­laws framed under it. That defendant No.1 club is sports and cultural club.

14.PW1 further stated that her son is availing the facilities of the club as a dependent member and he will loose his membership when he attains the age of 25 years and it is one of the reason for filing this suit.

That her relief in the suit is to remove gender discrimination between son and daughters of permanent members of defendant No.1 club. She admitted that when she availed as AML members she agreed to abide by the rules of defendant No.1 club and the same applies to all the AML members. She further admitted that after the amendment in the rules of defendant No.1 club gender bias was removed and from 2013 onwards all the members daughters who complied with the club rules became permanent members and that both sons and daughters of permanent members who complied with the rules of members to defendant No.1 would avail its permanent membership. She admitted that even after being aware of the amendments brought in defendant

No.1 club, she did not mention the same in the plaint and also not carried out any amendment in the plaint. That as per the amended rules of defendant No.1 club any person can apply for a permanent membership if he cross the age of 25 years be it a male or female.

15.PW1 further admitted that she gave an undertaking before defendant No.1 that she will abide by the rules of the club and that she is availing all the facilities which are available to permanent members 32 O.S.No.384 of 2013 except right to vote and the rights available to the sons of permanent members. That she has not challenged the original rules under which she became an AML member and also the existing rules from 1995 to 2013. That she sought the relief of declaration only in respect of the amended rules. PW1 further admitted that except the permanent members no other category of defendant No.1 club have voting rights.

That she filed this suit for membership of his son since there is a discrimination on daughters above 25 years of age and AML members are not allowed to vote.

16.That earlier she and her son has been suspended by the club.

PW1 further admitted that she is aware of the restrictions in the several categories of membership and that the acceptance of the existing rules when she become member of AML category creates a contractual obligation upon her to honour the said rules.

17.She denied the suggestion that the suit is not maintainable in law or on facts and that she has no locus standi to challenge the amended rules of defendant No.1 club. She admitted that the amended rules were passed after due deliberations and discussions in the general body.

18.PW1 deposed that any person both men and women can apply for permanent membership if they have attained the age of 25 years and that she has not made any application for a permanent membership and added that if she applied now it takes 15 to 20 years to become a permanent member and she wants her status of AML membership to be 33 O.S.No.384 of 2013 converted into permanent membership. That she has not applied before the defendants with regard to change of her status. She further deposed that for the last 136 years no single rule of defendant No.1 was struck as illegal by the Court.

19.That she did not array the managing committee members as party to the suit even though she is claiming relief against the committee.

She admitted that if the AML marries or remarries they do not loose their membership. That the rules of the club are made by the members of general body and the managing committee has no right to amend the rules. That she is aware that if any body’s fundamental right is effected, the remedy is to file a writ and she has not filed any writ.

She denied the suggestion that since defendant No.1 is a private club and the decision taken by its members relating to the internal management cannot be questioned in a Court of law.

20.PW1 further deposed that defendant No.1 is a private member club and she became an AML member in the year 1995 and that she having the knowledge that the rules or amendments in defendant No.1 club would come into effect only after approval of the general body and defendant No.2 do not have authority to amend the rules by itself without approval of the general body. That she filed the suit against defendants No.1 and 2 for the relief of permanent membership from the date of her application by giving voting rights on par with the sons of permanent members of defendant No.1 club. PW1 deposed that she has 34 O.S.No.384 of 2013 not in seen the rule book with regard to the distinction between younger daughter and elder daughter as per the amended rules. 

21.The counsel for the defendant predominantly relied on the decision in Zorastrian Housing Cooperative Society Limited and

another vs. District Registrar Cooperative Societies and others

reported in 2005(5) Supreme Court Cases 632 the sum and substance of the judgment is that:

“a member of a society has no independent right qua society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provision of the Act, Rules and the Bye­laws as he has his right under the Act, Rule and the Bye­laws.

The bye­laws of the society do not have the status of a statute and are only the rules which govern the internal management of a society. But so long as there is no legislative intervention it is not open to the Court to coin a theory that a member by law is not desirable and would be opposed to public policy as indicated by the constitution. A right to enforce a fundamental right against the state action, cannot be extended to challenge a right to enter into a contract giving up an absolute right in oneself in the interest of an association to be formed or in the interest of the mem­ bers in general of that association. 

A person becoming a member of a society cannot seek to get out of the obligation undertaken by him while 35 O.S.No.384 of 2013 becoming a member of such a society by resort to the principles of public policy based on constitutional protections given to an individual as against the state action. The fundamental rights are enforced against the state action or other authority who may come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution and it is not possible to argue that a person as a fundamental right to become a member of a voluntary association or of a Cooperative Society governed by its own bye­laws. When a person accepts the membership by submitting himself to its bye­laws he has voluntarily submerged his rights of the society.”

(b) The counsel for the defendant further relied on Chennai

Kancheepuram Tiruvelore District vs. Chinthamani S.

Murugesan and others 2001 Supreme Court Cases online

Madras 466 wherein it was held that:

“the natural justice in the conduct of such association would not have the same degree of rigour, as those principles would have in matter which are required to be adjudicated upon before

Courts and Tribunals. A voluntary association is entitled to carry on its affairs in accordance with its own rules. A person becoming member of a such a body contracts to be bound by those rules and by the actions taken by those in whom power is vested under the Rules.”

22.DW1 to rebut the contention of the plaintiff in his cross examination deposed that defendant No.1 club is an unregistered 36 O.S.No.384 of 2013 association of person formed for the purposes of social, sports and cultural activities where men and women are both entitled to use the club premises. The defendant No.1 club was started by British as a men’s club in 1878. That the club being a private association of members is managed and operated solely by the rules framed by the general body of the club and that all the persons are bound by the law and no private arrangement in the defendant No.1 club can supersede the law. That from the year 1950’s the defendant No.1 club has been used by eligible men, women and children. DW1 denied the suggestion that the rules of the club amount to an agreement between the members and defendant No.1 club. He also denied the suggestion that the rules of the club prior to 1992 are discriminatory and deposed that the rules were accepted by all the members and as the time caused various amendments were incorporated in the rules by the general body as approved by the members.

23.Both the plaintiff and counsel for defendant relied on the decision in T.P. Daver vs. Lodge Victoria reported in AIR 1963 Supreme

Court 1144 this case deals with the expulsion of a member from a lodge as per the rules laid down and the Court held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the decision given by a private association. The contention of the plaintiff basing on this reported citation is that the source of power of association like clubs are 37 O.S.No.384 of 2013 contractual in nature and the provisions of Indian Contract Act will apply and hence Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. The counsel for the defendant also relied on the above referred citation stating that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. On reading of the reported citation the Hon’ble Supreme Court made certain observations that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is limited and it cannot obviously sit as a

Court of appeal from the decision of such body and it can set aside the order of such a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not acting good faith or action of violation of principles of natural justice and further held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the decision given by a private association.

24.Further the counsel for the plaintiff also relied on Premchand vs.

Secunderabad Club and others 2012(2) ALD 474 and also Capt. D.K.

Giri vs. Secunderabad Club 2017 Supreme Court Cases online

Hyderabad 410. The facts in the above two reported citations are different from the facts on hand in the present case. In all the above reported citations by the plaintiffs, the Court exercised its jurisdiction where the rules of the club are violated. The case of the plaintiff is not that the club rules are violated by the defendant but certain rules of defendant No.1 club are discriminatory on the basis of gender and against the public policy and as such the rules to be declared as null 38 O.S.No.384 of 2013 and void. Hence, the citations relied by the plaintiff are not relevant to the present case.

25.On reading of the entire pleadings and cross examination and the citations referred by both the counsels it is an undisputed fact that the defendant No.1 club i.e. Secunderabad Club is an unregistered voluntary association formed for sports and cultural activities. Club means an unincorporated association and has no legal identity of its own, unlike company or a partnership or a registered society. The defendant No.1 club is not open to the public and the membership of the club are selected on some reasonable basis. The rules of the club are the constitution which determines the internal affairs of the club.

PW1 also not disputed that the defendant No.1 club is an unregistered voluntary association and it is not a state and the rules of the club do not constitute a statute. When admittedly the unregistered defendant

No.1 club was formed for the larger benefit of its beneficiaries vis a vis its members with certain prescribed rules with an option either to subscribe or not, the plaintiff having voluntarily and admittedly subscribed herself to the rules of unregistered private club is estopped from challenging the rules of defendant No.1 club. There is no compulsion or fetter to be bound by the rules of defendant No.1 club.

26.Freedom of association is a fundamental right. The right to associate freely with other for social, religious and cultural etc. are recognized in a democratic society. The Defendant No.1 club being a 39 O.S.No.384 of 2013 private body and constituted for its members it does not serve the pub­ lic nor perform the public functions. PW1 in her chief affidavit stated that she took membership as AML after meeting the necessary requirements under the Rules of Club. This shows that the initial process of admitting its members in the club is selective by categorizing its members into several groups as such the element of public interest does not exist in defendant No.1 club. The same can also be inferred from Ex.A.1 and also through evidence of PW1 where she stated that there are various categories of membership at defendant No.1 club. The capability and restriction for certain degree of a membership in a private club like defendant No.1 cannot be a ground for challenging the rules of the club as discriminatory on the basis of gender. The Courts also cannot take the legislative role in a private club like defendant No.1 club by ordering them to change its rules by converting a AML membership into permanent membership by giving them voting rights which is against defendant No.1 club rules.

The prayer sought by the plaintiff to declare the rules of defendant No.1 club as void and illegal on the basis of gender discrimination and opposed to public policy in the suit is also not maintainable as they are beyond the scope of this Court which seek interference with the internal management of defendant No.1 club. PW1 admitted that the rules of defendant No.1 club are made by members of general body and managing committee has no right to amend the rules. Hence the suit is 40 O.S.No.384 of 2013 also bad for non­joinder of proper and necessary parties. Thus, the suit is not maintainable in the present form. Hence, this is answered in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff.

27.In view of my findings given regarding the maintainability of the suit there is no need to discuss the issues of fact and accordingly the suit is liable to be dismissed. 

28.In the result, the suit is dismissed with costs.

Dictated to the Stenographer, transcribed and typed by her,

corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 11 th day of August, 2023.

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER CUM

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE:

SECUNDERABAD. 

Appendix of Evidence

Witnesses Examined

For Plaintiff: For Defendants:

PW1 Vineeta Chainani DW1 Brig. Chandra B. Shukla DW2 Anita Ahuja

Exhibits marked

For Plaintiff:

Ex.A.1 Copy of Rules/Bye­laws of first defendant club. Ex.A.2 Copy of report of managing committee for the year 2012­2013. Ex.A.3 copy of his identity card Ex.A.4 newsletter of August and September 2013. Ex.A.5 newsletter of September and October, 2015. Ex.A.6 newsletter of September and October, 2015.

41 O.S.No.384 of 2013

Exhibits marked

For defendants:

Ex.B.1 membership form. Ex.B.2 letter dated 21.10.1995. Ex.B.3 letter dated 10.11.1995. Ex.B.4 Rules Book. Ex.B.5 Authorization letter dated 03.09.2018 given by defendants No.1 and 2. Ex.B.6 served copy of written statement filed by defendant No.2 in O.S.No.258 of 2010. Ex.B.7 copy of common order in CMAs.38 to 41 of 2013 and 10 to 13 of 2014 dated 19.06.2015 on the file of I Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. Ex.B.8 certified copy of order in I.A.No.1070 of 2014 in O.S.No.258 of 2010 dated 02.06.2015. Ex.B.9 copy of identity card with the Secunderabad Club with AML 029. Ex.B.10 is the copy of emails.

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER CUM

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE: FAC. ADDL. RENT CONTROLLER­CUM­

XVI JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE

SECUNDERABAD. 

IN THE COURT OF THE II ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER:

HYDERABAD.

Present: Smt. N. Saswatha,

Principal Rent Controller,

Secunderabad. (FAC) II Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad.

Dated this 16th day of April, 2026.

R.C.No.48 OF 2014

Between:

1.Shankar Lal Panwar (Died as per LRs)

2.Smt. Kantha Bai, W/o. Late Shankar Lal Panwar, Aged: About 56 years, Occ: Housewife.

3.Vikas Panwar, S/o. Late Shankar Lal Panwar, Aged: 38 Years, Occ: Business.

4.Vishal Panwar, S/o. Late Shankar Lal Panwar, Aged: 32 Years, Occ: Business.

2 to 4 are R/o. H.No.4-5-427, Badichowdi, Sulthan Bazar, Hyderabad.

5.Neetha Maali, W/o. Vikas Maali, Aged: About 36 years, Occ: Housewife, R/o. Flat No.401-3-4-12, Bomanna Line, Barkathpura, Hyderabad.

(Petitioners Nos.2 to 5 were brought on record as per the orders passed in I.A.No.67 of 2022, dated 05.01.2023)

.. Petitioners

2

R.C.No.48 of 2014

A n d

Nand Kumar, S/o. Late Mukunddas Loya, Aged: about 53 years, Occ: Business, C/o. Shop No.:4-5-427/1/2 & 3, Balaji Market, Badichowdi, Hyderabad. R/o. H.No.3-5-104, Narayanguda, Hyderabad-027.

... Respondent

This petition is coming for final hearing before me in the presence of Sri B. Gopal Krishna, Advocate for petitioners and of Sri S.K. Bang, Advocate for the respondent and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, the court passed the following:-

O R D E R

This petition is filed by the petitioners under Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(a)(iii)(a)&(b) of Telangana Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)

Control Act, seeking eviction of respondent in respect of property bearing

Mulgi No’s.4-5-427/1, 2 & 3, Ground Floor, Situated at Balaji Market,

Badichowdi, Sultan Bazar, Hyderabad, T.S., (hereinafter it is referred as petition schedule premises).

The brief averments of the petition are as follows:-

2.That the petitioner is the absolute owner of the petition schedule premises, having purchased the same through a Registered Sale

Deed, and initially the respondent is the tenant of premises bearing No.4- 3

R.C.No.48 of 2014

5-427/1, consisting of one mulgi, on a monthly rent of Rs.315/- payable on or before 5th of every succeeding month of english calendar year exclusive of electricity and municipal tax payable in the Bank Account with IDBI Bank Ltd., formerly known as United Western Bank Ltd., and the respondent had entered into a Rental Agreement, dt.01.02.1982 and the tenancy was initially for a period of 11 months from the date of execution of Rental Agreement and thereafter, the tenancy become month to month and the petition schedule property was let-out to the respondent for his own business of cloth and cut piece, subsequently the respondent had taken two more mulgies bearing premises No.4-5-427/2 & 4-5-427/3 on a monthly rent of Rs.360/- and Rs.365/- respectively in the year 2003 and continued to pay the total rent of Rs.1040/- per month for 3 mulgies and later failed to pay the monthly rent of RS.1040/- from 01.07.2006 to 28.02.2011, for a period of 65 months, amounting to a sum of Rs.67,600/- and the respondent has unilaterally deposited a sum of Rs.12,480/- on 29.03.2008, Rs.12,480/- on 28.03.2009, Rs.12,480/- on 29.03.2010 and

Rs.7,280/- on 22.11.2010 and Rs.4,160/- on 05.03.2011 respectively and the respondent deposited the monthly rents once in a year, which is against the agreed terms of the tenancy and the respondent failed to 4

R.C.No.48 of 2014

deposit the monthly rent in the bank account of the petitioner, as such, it is not a legal tender of rents and amounts to default.

3.The petitioner further submitted that, as per agreement, the respondent is liable to pay the municipal taxes to the Municipal

Corporation apart from the rent payable to the petitioner and the respondent failed to pay the arrears of Municipal Taxes to the tune of

Rs.7,918/- as on 31.03.2013 and the Municipal Corporation issued a

Notice under Sec.268 of HMC Act, and the same was informed the respondent and that the respondent promised to pay the municipal dues, but failed to do so, and payment of Municipal Taxes and Electricity

Charges forms a part and parcel of the agreement, and the respondent committed default in payment of Municipal Taxes.

4.The Petitioner further submitted that, he has let-out the petition schedule property to the respondent for his own purpose and shall not be use for any other purpose without obtaining the written permission of the petitioner and the respondent violated the terms of the lease by entering into partnership business with his brothers without obtaining the 5

R.C.No.48 of 2014

written permission from the petitioner, as such, the respondent is liable to be evicted.

5.The Petitioner further submitted that, he has an existing business under the name and style of M/s. Om Trading Company, which is being run in a tenanted premises bearing No.5-4-104/11, M.G. Road,

Ranigunj, Secunderabad on a monthly rent of Rs.7,000/-X 2= Rs.14,000/- and he is suffering loss of business due to lack of space, as such, he intend to shift and expand his business, for which, he requires the petition schedule premises for his business and the petitioner has got more than 20 years of experience in the said business and he requires the petition schedule premises for expansion of his business and the said premises is situated in the highly commercial area and is very much suitable and convenient for expansion, opening and shifting of his business and the need of the petitioner is genuine, pressing and fonafide. Hence, this petition.

6.The respondent filed counter denying the petition averments and stated that the petitioner intentionally not mentioned about the 6

R.C.No.48 of 2014

deposit amount of Rs.10,000/- and the premium amount of Rs.50,000/- received by him from the father of the respondent in respect of shop No.4- 5-427/1 and the petitioner passed receipt in the name respondent’s father for the deposit amount of Rs.10,000/-, but did not issue any receipt for the premium amount and further submitted that the respondent along with his family members constituted a partnership firm under the name and Style of M/s. Sri Hari Cut pieces for carrying on the cloth business in the premises No.4-5-427/1 and since the rental agreement is standing in the name of the respondent, he requested the petitioner to treat the said partnership firm as his tenant in respect of the said shop, for which the petitioner agreed and partnership firm became the tenant of the petitioner and later in the month of January, 1985 the petitioner has let-out shop

No.4-5-427/2 to the said partnership firm for carrying on the business by receiving a sum of Rs.11,000/- as deposit and Rs.80,000/- as premium and at the time of letting out the shop No.4-5-427/3, the petitioner received a sum of Rs.50,000/- as deposit and Rs.90,000/- as premium and passed receipts for the deposit amounts in the name of the said partnership firm, but did not issue any receipt for the premium amounts.

Thus, petitioner totally received a sum of Rs.36,000/- as deposit and 7

R.C.No.48 of 2014

Rs.2,20,000/- as premium from the partnership firm and no rental agreement was executed in respect of the shop No.4-5-427/2 & 3 in favour of the partnership firm and agreed that the rent will not be increased since premium is being paid, as such, the rents have not been increased since inception of the tenancy.

7.The respondent further submitted that, as per the demand of the petitioner, the partnership firm was depositing the rents every month in the bank account No.114, in The United WesternBankltd., furnished by the petitioner and thereafter, in the bank account No.2008 of the petitioner in The United Western Bank Ltd., and as per the request of the petitioner, the said partnership firm has been depositing the rent for the whole year i.e., from April to March, in the month of March in the above said bank account and intimating the same to the petitioner, and he has been receiving the same and the partnership firm issued cheques in favour of the petitioner for the period commencing from 01.04.2000 to 31.03.2011 and the same have been honoured and respondent began to pay the rents yearly as per the demand of the petitioner only, as such, he has not committed default in payment of rent.

8

R.C.No.48 of 2014

8.The respondent denied the contention of the petitioner and stated that the partnership firm has paid the property tax for the period upto 31.03.2013 to a sum of Rs.2048/- in respect of shop No.4-5-427/1 vide cheque no.141568, dt.29.03.2013 and Rs.2048/- in respect of Shop

No.4-5-427/2 vide cheque No.141567, dt.29.03.2013 and Rs.4572/- in respect of Shop No.4-5-427/3 vide cheque No.141571, dt.29.03.2013 and the mee seva has issued receipts for the said payment vide receipt

Nos.0228516 and 0228517, dated 29.03.2013 and the third receipt is misplaced and the said cheques were honoured and that the question of issuing notice by GHMC demanding to pay of property tax does not arise and further submitted that he has also paid the property tax upto the period of 2013-14 and 2014-15 and he came to know that the petitioner has informed the tax collector not to issue property tax bill to the partnership firm to make the respondent as a defaulter.

9.The respondent further submitted that, the respondent is carrying on the cloth business in the schedule property in partnership along with his family members since more than 30 years under the name and style of M/s. Sri Hari Cut pieces, to the knowledge of the petitioner 9

R.C.No.48 of 2014

and since the rental agreement is in the name of the respondent, and that he requested the petitioner to treat the said partnership firm as his tenant in respect of the shop No.4-5-427/1 and the said partnership firm became the tenant of the petitioner and the petitioner is receiving the rents and subsequently, the petitioner has let-out the shop Nos.4-5-427/2 & 3 to the said partnership firm and the said partnership firm is in possession and occupation of the property as a tenant and the petitioner never objected for the same at any point of time prior to filing of the present petition.

10.The respondent further submitted that, the petitioner is in possession of number of non-residential premises in the twin cities of

Hyderabad and Secunderabad including the non-residential premises in the complex known as Balaji Market and that he does not require the petition schedule property and it has become the habit of the petitioner and his brothers to file the petition for seeking eviction of the tenants, so that the same can be let-out on higher rents and and huge premium and he further submitted that there are several non-residential premises in possession of the petitioner in the Balaji Market which are vacant and the demised premises is not suitable and convenient and the access to it is 10

R.C.No.48 of 2014

through a small passage. The petitioner filed the present petition by creating false and flimsy grounds and the petition is devoid of merits and is not maintainable in law or facts and against the provisions of the Rent

Control Act, as such, prayed the Court to dismiss the petition with compensatory costs.

11.During the course of enquiry, the petitioner No.1 examined himself as PW1 and got marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P13 and in support of their contention, the petitioners also examined PW2 on their behalf and got marked Ex.P14. On the other hand, the respondent examined himself as

RW1 and no documents were marked on his behalf.

12.Ex.P1 is the Original Rental Agreement, dt.01.02.1982. Ex.P2 is the Original Agreement, dt.01.06.2013. Ex.P3 is the Bill, dt.31.03.2013 (2 in Nos). Ex.P4 is the Bill, dt.01.05.2013 (2 in Nos). Ex.P5 is the Bill, dt.01.06.2013 (2 in Nos). Ex.P6 is the Bill, dt.01.07.2013. Ex.P7 is the Bill, dt.16.09.2013 (4 in Nos). Ex.P8 is the Bill, dt.01.10.2013 (2 in Nos). Ex.P9 is the Bill, dt.01.11.2013 (2 in Nos). Ex.P10 is the Bill, dt.01.12.2013 (2 in

Nos). Ex.P11 is the online copy of property tax payment due details, 11

R.C.No.48 of 2014

dt.28.12.2023 (3 pgs). Ex.P12 is bank statement of account with IDBI bank, Kachiguda Branch, dt.04.08.2007 to 31.03.2011 and Ex.P13 is bank statement of account with IDBI bank, Kachiguda Branch, dt.01.04.2011 to 17.08.2013.

13.Heard both the learned counsel and perused the written arguments filed by petitioner.

14.To consider the rival contentions of both the parties, the following points that arose for consideration are:

(i)Whether the respondent committed willful default in payment of the rents from 01.07.2006 to 28.02.2011 for a period of 65 months at the rate of Rs.1040/- per month amounting to Rs.67,600/- and municipal Taxes amounting to Rs.7,918/- as on 31.03.2013?

(ii) Whether the respondent used the petition schedule property for any purpose other than which it was let-out?

(iii)Whether the petitioners requires the petition schedule property for their bona fide requirement?

(iv) To what other relief?

12

R.C.No.48 of 2014

Admitted Facts:

1.There is a jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondent in respect of the petition schedule property.

2.The quantum of rent is Rs.1040/- per month.

3.The identity of the petition schedule property is not disputed.

P O I N T NO.1:

15.The contention of the petitioner is that the respondent is the tenant initially in the premises No.4-5-427/1 on a monthly rent of

Rs.315/- and later the respondent has taken two more mulgies bearing premises No.4-5-427/2 & 3 on a monthly rent of Rs.360/- and Rs.365/- respectively for which the total rent of Rs.1040/- for 3 mulgies. That the respondent entered into an agreement with the petitioner dt.01.02.1982, for the premises No.4-5-427/1, where the monthly rent to be payable on or

before 5th of every succeeding month excluding electricity and municipal

taxes payable in the bank account of IDBA Bank, Kachiguda Branch, and the respondent has unilaterally deposited an amount of Rs.12,480/- on 29.03.2008, Rs.12,480/- on 28.03.2009, Rs.12,480/- on 29.03.2010 and 13

R.C.No.48 of 2014

Rs.7,280/- on 22.11.2010 and Rs.4,160/- on 05.03.2011 respectively against the agreed terms of the tenancy and the respondent failed to deposit the monthly rent in the bank account of the petitioner, as such, it is not a legal tender of rents an amounts to default.

16.The contention of the respondent is that the respondent along with his family members constituted a partnership firm under the name and Style of M/s. Sri Hari Cut pieces for carrying on the cloth business in the premises No.4-5-427/1 and since the rental agreement is standing in the name of the respondent, he requested the petitioner to treat the said partnership firm as his tenant in respect of the said shop for which the petitioner agreed and partnership firm became the tenant of the petitioner and later in the month of January, 1985 the petitioner has let-out shop

No.4-5-427/2 by receiving a sum of Rs.11,000/- as deposit and

Rs.80,000/- as premium in the name of his partnership firm and at the time of letting out the shop No.4-5-427/3, the petitioner received a sum of

Rs.50,000/- as deposit and Rs.90,000/- as premium and passed a receipt in the name of the said partnership firm, but did not issue any receipt for the premium amount. Thus, petitioner totally received a sum of 14

R.C.No.48 of 2014

Rs.36,000/- as deposit and Rs.2,20,000/- as premium from the partnership firm and no rental agreement was executed for the shop No.4- 5-427/2 & 3 in favour of the partnership firm. The respondent further submitted that as per the demand of the petitioner, the partnership firm was depositing the rents in the bank account No.114 in the united bank western limited furnished by the petitioner and thereafter in the bank account No.2008 of the petitioner in the United western bank and as per the request of the petitioner, the firm has been depositing the rents for the whole year i.e., from April to March, in the month of March and intimating the same to the petitioner, who have been receiving the same and cheques have been issued for the period commencing from 01.04.2000 to 31.03.2011 and the respondent began to pay the rents yearly as per the request of the petitioner, as such, he has not committed default.

17.The burden lies on the respondent to prove that he has not committed willful default as alleged by the petitioner.

18.RW1, filed his chief affidavit reiterating the contents of the counter. RW1 in his cross-examination deposed that Ex.P1 bears his 15

R.C.No.48 of 2014

signature and the part of the petition schedule property is let-out by the petitioner on the terms and conditions mentioned in Ex.P1. He further deposed that under Ex.P1 it is mentioned that the rent will paid to the landlord in his bank account No.114, with United Western Bank on or

before 5th day of every succeeding month and shall notify the same to the

landlord. He further deposed that he has not stated date and month in his chief affidavit that, when he paid the security deposit and pagdi and he has no proof to show that he has paid pagdi. He further deposed that there is no mention in Ex.P1 that since premium is being paid there shall be no enhancement of rent and he do not remember that there was no agreement between him and Shankar Lal Ji that since premium is paid, there shall be no enhancement of rent. He further deposed that he do not have any proof to show that he used to inform Shankarlal Ji after depositing the rent in the bank and he has notified the payment reflected in his chief affidavit for ten years and there is no mention of date and cheque numbers for the period 01.04.2003 to 31.03.2004. He further deposed that he has not stated in his chief affidavit the date when Shankarlal informed him to deposit the monthly rent yearly in the bank account. He further deposed that he have no written permission from the landlord directing him to 16

R.C.No.48 of 2014

deposit monthly rent once in an year and added that he never objected for depositing monthly rents in an year and further deposed that he gave bank statement to Shankar Lal and do not have any evidence to show that he has given the bank statement every year to Shankar Lal. RW1 further deposed that he do not know whether he filed pagdi receipts, security deposit receipts in the Court. RW1 denied the suggestion that after payment of the rent in the bank account of the Shankar Lal he did not notify the same and denied that Shankar Lal never requested him to deposit rents yearly in his bank account and denied the suggestion that when he obtained the mulgi on rent, he did not have financial capacity to deposit the pagdi.

19.PW1 in his cross-examination deposed that, the respondent gave Rs.10,000/- towards deposit in respect of mulgi No.4-5-427/1, and he do not remember whether he has taken the deposit of Rs.11,000/- while letting out the premises No.4-5-427/2 and he do not remember whether he has taken the deposit of Rs.10,000/- by letting out the premises No.4-5- 427/3 and denied the suggestion that he has taken Rs.80,000/- as premium from M/s. Sri Hari Cut piece centre for the premises No.4-5- 17

R.C.No.48 of 2014

427/2 and Rs.90,000/- as premium while letting out the premises No.4-5- 427/3. He further deposed that prior to filing of this case, the respondent has paid the entire rent and no amount was due towards the rent as on the date of filing of the case and the witness added that as per the agreement, the respondent has to pay the rent every month and he did not pay and did not issue any notice to that effect.

20.The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per the rental agreement under Ex.P1 the respondent has to pay the rent every month in the bank account No.114 of United Western Bank, on or before 5th day of every succeeding month and notify the landlord about such payment of rent every month.

21.The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that on the request of the petitioner, the respondent has deposited the rents yearly in advance and the petitioner has received the same without any protest, as such, the respondent cannot termed as willful defaulter .

18

R.C.No.48 of 2014

In this regard the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the following decisions:

1. “Puppala Apparao Vs. Yelisetti Vasantha Kumari”, reported in 2004 (3) ALD 353, wherein it was held that, “Tenant paying the rent beyond the grace period prescribed in the Act. Tenant can be said to have committed default and therefore liable to be evicted, though the rent was paid before filing the eviction petition. There is no question of waiver on the part of the landlord in the circumstances.

2. “Urmila Devi (died) per LRs. Vs. Subhash Kumar”, reported in 2010 (4) ALD 317, wherein it was held that, “No requirement of issuing notice relating to willful default before filing of plea of tenant that there was a previous practice of collecting rents once in two or three months and landlord never protested. Not relevant for assessing ground of default, when tenant categorically pleaded in counter that he has paid rents even for default period. Further, there is no requirement of giving notice to tenant relating to willful default prior to filing of eviction petition in view of provisions of Act.

3. “Tuunuguntla Enterprises Vs. Majeti Venkata Ramakoti

Mutyalu”, reported in 2016 (2) ALD 763, wherein it was held that, “Tenant remitting amount to account of landlord before eviction petition filed by him. Such remittance by tenant, without giving prior notice to landlord, cannot amount to voluntary acceptance much less a waiver. More so in light of subsequent conduct of tenant in setting up untrue oral agreement for payment of rents only once in a year and when even that is not adopted but for remitting, as and when he likes 19

R.C.No.48 of 2014

intermittently, firstly in one year by D.D. and later thrice for 6 months not even at beginning, but in the middle of year. It showed conduct of willful default of tenant.

The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the following decisions:

1.“N. D. Thandani Vs. Arnavaz Rustom Printer”, reported in 2003

CJ (SC) 701, wherein it was held that, “Eviction of the tenant by the landlord on failure to pay or tender rent within the specified number of days on its becoming due – In spite of the tenant having defaulted in payment of rent for any period prior to the institution of the suit, if the arrears have been cleared (though belatedly) and the landlord has accepted the same, the default, if any, stands wiped out and the cause of action for seeking eviction of the tenant based on the preceding default does not survive.”

2.“Mohd. Abdul Waheeb Vs. Nethakari Padma”, reported in 2008 CJ (AP) 987, wherein it was held that, “Though the burden is on the tenant to prove that he is not a willful defaulter, but once the said burden is discharged by the tenant at least prima facie, the same shifts to the landlady and it is for her to explain the circumstances under which the said payment was received by her and to rebut the case of the tenant.”

3.“Mohanl Lal Vs. Shajjia Sultana”, reported in 2007 CJ(AP) 596, wherein it was held that, 20

R.C.No.48 of 2014

“Default is not a ground for eviction, but willful default is a ground for eviction. Therefore even before receiving notice from the Rent Controller if the tenant pays the rent for the default period, in my opinion, it would not amount to willful default.”

4.“Rayapuraju Venkatarama Rao and Another Vs. Gangadharan

Nair”, reported in 2011 CJ(AP) 600, wherein it was held that, “In this case, admittedly, the landlords have taken deposit of Rs.40,000/-. Even if one month premium is deducted towards advance, the landlord is deemed to be holding a deposit of Rs.39,050/- which is clearly a contravention of Section 7(2) of the Act. Therefore, the amount already in deposit with the landlord was rightly adjusted towards the arrears of due rents by both the Court below.” 5.“S. Sundaram Pillai Vs. V.R. Pattabiraman”, reported in 1985

CJ(SC) 260, wherein it was held that, “Though the tenant had committed a default but he had paid the entire rent well before the filing of the suit by the landlord. In fact, the suit for eviction was filed by the landlord not on the ground of pending arrears but to penalise the tenant for having defaulted in the past. Such a suit cannot be entertained because once the entire dues are paid to the landlord the cause of action for filing of a suit completely vanishes.”

22.The respondent in his counter mentioned the details of the cheque and the period and the amount deposited in the bank account of the petitioner from the period of 01.04.21003 to 31.03.2004 in the United

Western Bank, which is not disputed by the petitioner. The petitioner’s contention is that, since the respondent failed to deposit the rents monthly 21

R.C.No.48 of 2014

as agreed and the rents deposited yearly contravening the clause of rental agreement, the respondent to be treated as willful defaulter.

23.On perusal of Ex.P12 Bank statement of Shankar Lal Panwar shows that the respondent deposited the rents yearly once, amounting to

Rs.12,480/- dated 29.03.2008, 28.03.2009, 29.03.2010 and further

Ex.P13 Bank Statement, for the period 11.04.2011 to 17.08.2013 shows that the respondent has deposited the rents monthly at the rate of

Rs.1040/- per month. Further, RW1 deposed that he has not mentioned the date when the Shankar Lal informed him to deposit the monthly rents yearly in the bank account and he do not have the proof to show that he used to inform the Shankar Lal after depositing the rents into the bank account. Thus, admittedly the respondent has deposited the rents for the period of 2008 to 2010 yearly, and later from the year 2011 to 2013 he paid the rents monthly. However, from the oral admission of PW1, as on the date of filing of the petition, the respondent paid the entire arrears and there is no due of arrears of the rent and also admitted that rents were paid as mentioned in the counter by the respondent and also admitted that he received Rs.10,000/- towards deposit while letting out the 22

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premises No.4-5-427/1 and stated he do not remember whether he took deposit of Rs.11,000/- and Rs.15,000/- at the time of letting out the premises No.4-5-427/2 & 3. Thus, from oral and documentary evidence clearly establishes that prior to the petition, the petitioner was receiving the rents at their convenience and also no notice is given to the respondent objecting for the yearly payments in advance in contravention of the agreement under Ex.P1 and the petitioner received the rents without any protest. The petitioners further holding security amount in contravention of Section 7 of RC Act. Hence, from these circumstances, the rents deposited by the respondent cannot be termed as default much less, willful default, as the respondent had no deliberate intention to commit default, as such, the respondent is not liable for eviction on the ground of willful default.

24.Now coming with regard to Municipal Tax, the contention of the petitioner is that as per agreement, the respondent is liable to pay the municipal tax and failed to pay the arrears of the tax to Rs.7,918/- as on 31.03.2013.

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25.The respondent denied the contention and stated that the partnership firm has paid the property tax for the period upto 31.03.2013 to a sum of Rs.2048/- in respect of shop No.4-5-427/1 vide cheque no.141568, dt.29.03.2013 and Rs.2048/- in respect of Shop No.4-5-427/2 vide cheque No.141567, dt.29.03.2013 and Rs.4572/- in respect of Shop

No.4-5-427/3 vide cheque No.141571, dt.29.03.2013 and the mee seva has issued receipts for the said payment vide receipt Nos.0228516 and 0228517, dated. 29.03.2013 and that another receipt is misplaced and the said cheques were honoured by the GHMC and further submitted that he has also paid the property tax for the period of 2013-14 and 2014-15 and the respondent further contended that the petitioner has informed the tax collector not to issue property tax bill to the partnership firm to brand the respondent as a defaulter.

26.The burden lies on the respondent to prove that he has not committed default in payment of municipal tax.

27.RW1 in his cross-examination deposed that, he has to pay municipal tax and he do not know whether he filed property tax receipts in 24

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the Court to pay and that he has mentioned in his chief affidavit the details of the payment of tax but has not filed any payment receipts before the Court and deposed that he has the property tax receipts with him and that he has stated in his chief affidavit that the third receipts was misplaced and he has no idea whether he is in possession of the receipts as mentioned in Para No.9 of his chief affidavit. RW1 further deposed that he do not know whether the municipal tax collector will issue the demand notice to the occupier of the property and that he is paying the municipal tax regularly even after filing of the present case. He further deposed that after ascertaining and enquiring from the municipality he is paying the tax till date, and he can file the receipts with regard to the payment of municipal tax as on today and that he has not filed any proof to show that he has paid the municipal tax till date.

28.PW1 in his cross-examination deposed that he is not aware that whether any property tax is pending in respect of petition schedule property and he has not filed the notice received by MCH for the period mentioned in the petition and the witness added that the tax collector has orally informed him and he has not received any notice from MCH and he 25

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do not know the quantum of property tax of the petition schedule property and added that the respondent has to pay the property tax in respect of petition schedule property.

29.As stated supra, the burden lies on the respondent to prove that he has not committed default in payment of municipal tax.

The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision between “Laxminarayan Jhawar Vs. Badrivishal Pitti (died) by LRs.”, reported in 2002 (6) ALD 452, wherein it was held that, “When the tenant has agreed to pay the municipal tax it forms part of the rent and he is liable to be evicted for non-payment of the same.”

30.Admittedly, the respondent has to pay the municipal tax as per the rental agreement, under Ex.P1. From the oral testimony of RW1, the respondent has pleaded about the cheque numbers and the amount paid to the MCH, but no documentary evidence like cheques, bank statement or municipal tax receipts etc., are filed in support of his pleadings. As seen, the respondent has not filed any single document to 26

R.C.No.48 of 2014

prove that he has paid the municipal tax as alleged by the petitioner and failed to discharge his initial burden of proof. The respondent also failed to put questions or suggestions to PW1 with regard to payment of municipal tax through cheques as contended in counter. Thus, the respondent has committed default in payment of the municipal tax amounting to

Rs.7,918/- as on 31.03.2013 and liable to be evicted. Accordingly this point is answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondent.

P O I N T NO.2:

31.The contention of the Petitioner is that the petitioner has let- out the petition schedule property to the respondent for his own use and shall not be used for any other purpose without obtaining the written permission of the petitioner and the respondent had violated the terms of the lease by entering into partnership business with his brothers without obtaining the written permission from the petitioner, as such, the respondent is liable to be evicted.

32.The contention of the respondent is that the respondent is carrying on the cloth business in the schedule property as a partnership 27

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firm along with his family members since more than 30 years under the name and style of M/s. Sri Hari Cut pieces, to the knowledge of the petitioner and since the rental agreement is in the name of the respondent, he requested the petitioner to treat the said partnership firm as his tenant in respect of the shop No.4-5-427/1 and the said partnership firm became the tenant of the petitioner and the petitioner is receiving the rents and subsequently, the petitioner has let-out the shop No.45-427/2 & 3 to the partnership firm and the said partnership firm is in possession and occupation of the property as a tenant and the petitioner never objected for the same at any point of time prior to filing of the petition.

33.The burden lies on the petitioner to prove his contention.

34.PW1, in his cross-examination deposed that in the petition schedule property the business is run under the name and style of M/s.

Sri Hari Cut pieces and earlier the father of the respondent was doing business in the premises bearing No.4-5-427/1 and he do not know till date that M/s.Sri Hari Cut piece centre is partnership firm and added that he came to know before filing of the case and he do not know who are the 28

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partners in the said firm and did not enquire. He further deposed that after obtaining the premises No..4-5-427/1, the business is being carried on in that premises as well as in other two premises under the name and style of M/s. Sri Hari Cut pieces and that M/s. Sri Hari Cut piece centre is his tenant. He deposed that he did not give premises No.4-5-427/2 to

M/s.Sri Hari Cut piece centre directly on rent and the said premises was taken from Lakshmi Cut piece Centre and he consented for the same. He denied the suggestion that the firm is his tenant and also denied the suggestions that it was informed by the respondent to him that the firm has been constituted and the firm will be the tenant and that the firm will pay the rents and he agreed accordingly and that the firm became the tenant and he received the rents.

35.RW1 in his cross-examination deposed that he is running the business under the name and style of M/s. Hari Cut piece and he do not remember whether he mentioned in his chief affidavit that Hari cut piece centre is a registered partnership firm and that the rent for the premises was paid the by the firm since 1992 and he orally informed late. Shankar

Lal that he is paying the rents from account of the firm and he do not have 29

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any proof to show that he informed Shankar Lal about the payment of rents from the firm and Shankar Lal accepted it. He further deposed that there are four partners in the partnership firm i.e., Dinesh Loya, Shobha,

Sharavan and Nand Kumar Loya and he do not have idea that his elder brother Dinesh Loya used to run the business under the name and style of

M/s. Hari Cut piece centre and further deposed that there was no board in his premises and do not know whether his elder brother deposed that whether M/s. Hari Cut piece centre is a proprietary concern or partnership firm.

36.RW1 further deposed that under Ex.P1 as per clause-3 he has to use the mulgi for his own business purpose of cloth and cut piece and shall not be used for any other purpose and without obtaining the written permission of the landlord and will not sublet or transfer the possession of the premises in part or full to any person or persons without obtain the consent of the landlords. He further deposed that his brother

Vinod Kumar Loya was the tenant on the first floor of the petition schedule premises and there was staircase in his shop and he added he is not using the staircase and having separate access and staircase. He deposed that 30

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he do not remember the date and month when the partnership is registered, but added that it was registered in the year 1992, he do not know whether he filed partnership deed in this case.

37.The petitioner relied on Ex.P1 lease agreement executed in the name of Nand Kumar, i.e., the respondent, where clause-3 of the agreement speaks that tenant has obtained the above said premises let hereby for his own business purpose for cloth and cut pieces and shall not be used for any other purpose without obtaining the written permission of the landlord.

38. The respondent in his counter and chief affidavit averred that they are running the business as a partnership firm along with his family members since more than 30 years and the rents were being paid in the name of the firm and the petitioner Shankar Lal Panwar has accepted the same. To prove the said contention the petitioner has not placed any evidence on record to prove that he has informed Shankar Lal Panwar about the partnership firm and accepted the same. The respondent further failed to file his partnership deed document and rental receipts or proof 31

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showing that they paid the rents in the name of the partnership firm, but not in his individual capacity and the petitioners accepted the same.

Thus, from the oral testimony and Ex.P1, clearly establishes that the respondent, who obtained the petition schedule property in his individual capacity has changed into partnership firm and run the business without the written permission of the petitioners. Accordingly this point is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

P O I N T NO.3:

39.The contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner has existing business under the name and style of M/s. Om Trading Company, which is being run in a tenanted premises bearing No.5-4-104/11, M.G.

Road, Ranigunj, Secunderabad on a monthly rent of Rs.14,000/- and he is suffering loss of business due to lack of space, as such, he intend to shift and expand his business, for which, he requires the petition schedule premises for his business and the petitioner has got more than 20 years of experience in the said business and he requires the the petition schedule premises for expansion of his business and the said premises is situated in 32

R.C.No.48 of 2014

the highly commercial area and is very much suitable and convenient for expansion, opening and shifting of his business.

40.The contention of the respondent is that, the petitioner is in possession of number of non-residential premises in the twin cities of

Hyderabad and Secunderabad including the non-residential premises in the complex known as Balaji Market and that he does not require the petition schedule property and it has become the habit of the petitioner and his brothers to file the petition for seeking eviction of the tenants, so that the same can be let-out on higher rents and he further submitted that there are several non-residential premises in possession of the petitioner in the Balaji Market which are vacant and the demised premises is not suitable and convenient and the access to it is through a small passage.

41.The burden lies on the petitioner to prove the ground of bona fide requirement.

42.PW1 in his cross-examination deposed that he is carrying on the business of Iron and Steel Trading in the name and style of M/s. Om 33

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Trading and he is the proprietor in HUF capacity and not in the individual capacity and that he and his wife and two sons are the coparceners in

HUF family and he do not remember whether he has mentioned the same in his petition and further deposed that he has not mentioned the name of the proprietor as Shankar Lal Panwar (HUF) in the petition and that he and his elder son are carrying on the business in OM Trading and that he is carrying on the said business in the two places one at shop No.7, Kabra

Complex and second one is at M.G. Road, Ranigunj, Secunderabad and that he has not mentioned in his petition that he is also carrying on the business of M/s. Om Trading at Kabra Complex. He further deposed that he do not have any other commercial properties in his possession other than the petition schedule property and that he is the owner of shop No.7, in Kabra Complex and as per Ex.P2, the name of the proprietor is mentioned as Shankar Lal Panwar and that he is paying the rent for the premises at M.G. Road, as mentioned in para No.7 of the petition.

43.PW2, filed his chief affidavit, deposing that his father was running the business under the name and style of M/s. Om Trading

Company in a tenanted premises bearing NO.5-4-104/11, M.G. Road, 34

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Ranigunj, Secunderabad on a monthly rent of Rs.7,000/- X 2 =

Rs.14,000/- per month and the said business is a HUF business consisting of him, his mother and younger brother i.e., the petitioner No.4 herein and that he is running a business in his own premises bearing shop

No.7 on the ground floor in Kabra Complex, M.G. Raod, Secunderabad. He further deposed that, M/s. Om Trading Company is run and managed by petitioner No.2 with the assistance of the petitioner No.4 and his father’s business associate Radhe Shayam Tak, and his son Mukesh Tak, as such, they required the petition schedule property for shifting and expansion of the business, which is bona fide as the petition schedule property is located in a highly commercial area and suitable for shifting their business.

44.PW2, in his cross-examination deposed that, his father filed petition against Vinod Kumar Loya, on the ground of personal requirement for his younger brother Vishal Panwar, i.e., petitioner No.4 herein, for commencing the business in Novalities and he do not remember whether

RCA No.1 of 2024 is being looked after by him and that Vinod Kumar Loya is in possession of the first floor of the petition schedule premises and that 35

R.C.No.48 of 2014

he sought the relief of eviction of the respondent on the ground of bona fide requirement and he personally aware of the facts of the case and deposing only on his behalf and not on behalf of other petitioners. PW2, further deposed that except shop No.7 at Kabra Complex, Secunderabad, they are not having any other commercial properties in Hyderabad and

Secunderabad and that M/s. Om Trading Company is a proprietary concern and after the death of his father he became the proprietor.

45. He further deposed that they are doing M/s. Om Trading

Company business in two places one at Shop No.7, Secunderabad and another at Loha Bhavan in mulgi No.5-4-104/11, and he do not remember whether M/s.Om Trading Company is doing business in mulgi No.5-4- 104/12 and the mulgi number mentioned in Ex.P2 is 5-4-104/12 and in

Ex.P2 it is mentioned that M/s. Om Trading Company, represented by its proprietor Shankar Lal Panwar, obtaining the premises bearing No.5-4- 104/12, Ground floor, Loha Bhavan, Secunderabad. He further deposed that the premises under Ex.P2 is obtained on lease and he did not file rental agreement pertaining to the premises No.5-4-104/11 and he has filed Ex.P2 to Ex.P11 showing the payment of rents for the premises No.5- 36

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4-104/11 and that Ex.P2 pertains to the premises, but not to the furniture and fixtures. He further deposed that his mother is a housewife and petitioner No.4 is doing business of Iron and Steel in shop No.7,

Secunderabad and also in Loha Bhavan as a family business since 2015, but not in the capacity of owner and that he is doing business in shop

No.7, Kabra Complex since 2008 and that presently he is running the shop in capacity of owner and that his father filed eviction petition for his personal requirement and he do not know whether he mentioned in his chief affidavit that he is in need of the petition schedule property for his personal requirement and he further deposed that, he is having a godown at Kompally, in Sy. No.173 and 175, belonging to M/s. Om Trading company, of which he is the proprietor and he has not mentioned the said facts in the petition or in the chief affidavit and the premises No.2-2-220/A & B is of Kompally, belongs to his family, but he cannot say who is the owner of the property. He further deposed that the premises No.2-2-130/7,

Ramgopal Pet, Secunderabad belongs to his father and it is a commercial mulgi and he do not know whether he mentioned the said premises in his chief affidavit. He further deposed that the premises No.2-2-220/A & B is taken on rent and is paying the property tax for the said premises in the 37

R.C.No.48 of 2014

capacity of the tenant, but not at a landlord, and there is a rental agreement for the said premises and he can file it in the Court. He further deposed that international Steel Industries situated in Secunderabad belongs to him and he cannot say the premises No. and that he has taken the property on rent and he do not know the quantum of rent and he is not paying the rents from the said property and that he do not know whether he mentioned in his chief affidavit about the said property and he has a business of agriculture and vegetables at Shamshabad and they are the tenants in the premises No.5-4-104/11 and 5-4-104/12 and he can file the rental agreement. He further deposed that he do not know that personal need of his brother Vishal Panwar was negated in RCA No.1 of 2024 and he do not know whether his father let-out the area comprising 5 mulgies above the petition schedule property to Vinod Loya and he do not know whether his father admitted in RC.7 of 2014 that vertical portions are allotted to him in Balaji Complex and do not know that two mulgies were vacant adjacent to the petition schedule property and using it to the parking purpose. PW2 deposed that a portion is vacant on the other side of the petition schedule property and added that it belongs to Bhimraj

Panwar.

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46.PW2 denied the suggestion that they are not in need of petition schedule property and only to evict the respondent and letout to the new tenants on higher rents filed the present case and also denied the suggestion that he is the owner of the premises No.2-2-220/A and his brother for the premises No.2-2-220/B and denied the suggestion that his father admitted that the mulgi vacant adjacent to the petition schedule property belongs to them.

47.RW1, filed his chief affidavit reiterating the contents of the counter RW1 in his cross-examination deposed that Ex.P2 is the rental agreement of Shankar Lal Panwar where he is carrying on the business in the premises and the premises bearing No.5-4-104/11 & 12, situated at

Loha Bhavan, Ranigunj, Secunderabad is being run by the petitioner and added that the said premises is the own property of the petitioner and further deposed that Ex.P3 to P7 are the rental receipts pertaining to the tenanted premises No.5-4-104/11 & 12 of the petitioners and the petitioners are doing business in the premises shown under Ex.P14 in

Kabra Complex and he do not know whether Vikas Panwar is running the business in the premises No. shown in Ex.P14 separately and 39

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independently and that the petitioners are having factory in Kompally and he do not know who is the owner of the said land and he do not know the premises No.2-2-113/7, situated at Ramgopalpet, Secunderabad and that the premises No.2-2-130/7 mentioned in his chief affidavit is the same premises No. under Ex.P14 belongs to Vikas Panwar. He further deposed that he do not know whether the petitioners are having only one mulgi in

Kabra Complex and except that there are no other commercial complexes and as per Ex. R1 Sketch Plan they have shown Watchman Room, water storage room beside their mulgies. He further deposed that he filed photographs to show that the petitioners are having mulgies beside their mulgies and he do not know whether those mulgies belongs to Bhimraj

Panwar and not the petitioners and he do not know whether Shankar Lal

Panwar has other premise except his three mulgies and that the first floor premises of the Vinod Kumar Loya in the entire Balaji Market Complex and there were steps from his mulgi to the upper floor of his brother’s mulgi and he do not know whether he filed any document to show that he is runing M/s. Sri Hari Cut piece centre in the petition schedule property and further deposed that the petitioners family are residing in the upper floors of the Balaji Market and he is not willing and ready to vacant the 40

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premises even after giving sufficient time and denied the suggestion that after the death of Shankar Lal Panwar petitioner Nos.2 to 5 are in need of carrying on the business and also requirement of the petitioner No.2 to 5 are higher than his requirement and also denied that there is no comparative hardship for him if he vacates the property.

48.The burden lies on the petitioners to prove that they requires petition schedule property for their bona fide requirement.

49.PW1 in his chief affidavit stated that he requires the petition schedule property to shift and expand his business M/s. Om Trading

Company, from the tenanted premises No.5-4-104/11, M.G. Road,

Secunderabad.

50.After the death of PW1, PW2 filed his chief affidavit, seeking the relief of eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement stating that

M/s. Om Trading Company business is a HUF business consisting of his family members and requires the petition schedule property for shifting and expansion of the business, which is bonafide.

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The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the following decisions:

1. “Seshambal (dead) Through L.Rs. Vs. M/s. Chelur Corporation,

Chelur Building and Ors”, reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 1521, wherein it was held that, “Bona fide requirement of landlord, requirement pleaded in eviction petition by original petitioners was their own personal requirement and not requirement of members of their family whether dependant or otherwise. Death of original petitioner, right of original petitioners to seek eviction on ground of personal requirement for demised premises becomes extinct. Original petitioner not having any dependant member of family for whose personal requirement he could have sought eviction. No order could on basis of any such requirement be passed.”

2. “S.K. Sharma, Vs. A. Viswanath”, reported in 2005 (6) ALD 119, wherein it was held that, “No doubt there is some doubt whether the ground is bona fide personal occupation or it is by way of additional accommodation but the drawing line in between the two being very limited though these are separate grounds, even if the question of hardship is taken into consideration in the light of the evidence of PW-1 and RW-1 definitely the landlord’s hardship would outweigh the hardship of the tenant since he is a practicing Advocate on tax side and he requires the premises bona fide for his residence and practice and also for the purpose of accommodating his dependents.

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3. “Dunna Venkata Rao, Vs. Mootha Ramakoti”, reported in 2006 (4)

ALD 523, wherein it was held that, “It is peculiar case where the landlord it appears had accommodated his business in the hall of residential portion under the compelling circumstances and continuing the same for want of accommodation. It is no doubt true that in the pleading he had taken a stand that he has no other premises but the evidence appears to be contrary. It is pertinent to note that it is the choice of the landlord to choose his own premises for the purpose of accommodating his own business. In the light of the same, the contradictory stand if any taken in pleading and proof cannot come in the way of this landlord getting an order of eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement.

The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision between “Omkar Tele, Vs. Mohd Abdul Rahman and Ors”, reported in 2010 CJ(AP) 931, wherein it was held that, “Section 10(3)(a)(iii) Landlords suppressing material fact of being in possession of several mulgies render the order of eviction passed by the trial court liable be set aside.

51.As per the settled proposition when the landlord is in possession of several non-residential premises, he can seek an eviction of a tenant when the landlord plead that other non-residential premises are 43

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not suitable to him or location etc., for the purpose of his business in which is carrying.

Sec.10(3)(a)(iii)(a)&(b) reads as follows:

“3(a)A landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.

(iii)In case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise.

(a)for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or

(b)for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence: Provided that a person who becomes a landlord after the commencement of the tenancy by an instrument inter vivos shall not be entitled to apply under this clause before the expiry of three months from the date on which the instrument was registered; Provided further that where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under this clause he shall not be entitled to apply again under this clause -

(i)in case he has obtained possession of a residential building, for possession of another residential building of his own;

(ii)in case he has obtained possession of a non-residential building, for possession of another non-residential building of his own.”

52.The petitioners relied on Ex.P2, i.e., the lease deed executed in favour of the M/s. Om Trading Company, where the premises No.5-4- 104/12, is taken on lease and Exs.P3 to P10 are the rental receipts for the premises No.5-4-104/11, and Ex.P14 shows that PW2 is in possession of 44

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mulgi No.7, of Kabra Complex, M.G. Road, Secunderabad, the petitioners nowhere in the petition or in the chief affidavit stated that the premises which they own in mulgi No.7 of Kabra Complex is not suitable for their expansion of the business and furthermore the petitioners have suppressed the fact of possessing several non-residential premises in their possession.

53.PW2 categorically admitted in his cross-examination that a portion is vacant on the other side of the petition schedule mulgi and added that it belongs to Bhimraj Panwar, but no evidence is placed to prove that the said mulgi does not belong to them and belongs to Bhimraj

Panwar. He further deposed that he do not know whether there are two mulgi vacant adjacent to petition schedule property and they are using it for parking purpose. PW2, further deposed that international steel industries in Secunderabad belongs to him and has taken the property on rent, but he do not know the quantum of rent for that property and who is paying the rent and further premises No.5-4-104/11 and 12 of Kompally property belongs to him and stated that it is a godown, but no evidence is 45

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filed to prove that the said premises Nos.5-4-104/11 & 5-4-104/12 is of godown and not of commercial property.

54.PW2, in his chief affidavit deposed that M/s. Om Trading business is an HUF business and requires the petition schedule property for shifting and expanding the business. But no evidence is placed on record to show that M/s. Om Trading Business is an HUF business, consisting of his family members.

55.Thus, from the oral and documentary evidence, clearly establishes that the petitioners are the owners and in possession of several non-residential premises in the twin cities. The landlord who is in the possession of several non-residential premises, failed to plead and prove that the other premises are not suitable for his business then his claim cannot be accepted as his requirement cannot be treated as bona fide requirement. The petitioners has suppressed the fact of owning their other non-residential buildings in the twin cities and has not come to the Court with clean hands.

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This Court further relies on the decision of “Kunji Bhai G

Chugani Vs. Fashions Secunderabad”, reported in 2012 (3) ALD 132, wherein the Hon’ble High Court held that, “If the landlord is in possession of other non-residential premises, he must prove that other premises is not sufficient considering aspect of quality, size and suitability of the building, and if such, the landlord failed to plead and prove that other premises are not suitable for his business, his claim cannot be accepted and his requirement cannot be treated as bona fide requirement.

56.Thus, from the oral and documentary evidence on record, clearly establishes that the petitioners are in possession of vacant mulgies adjacent to the petition schedule property and also other non-residential properties in the twin cities. Hence, their requirement of the petition schedule mulgi is not bonafide. Accordingly this point is answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioners.

P O I N T NO.4 :

57.In view of the findings in points No.1 and 2, the petitioners are entitled for the relief of eviction of the respondent in respect of petition schedule property.

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58.In the result, the petition is allowed without costs. The respondent is directed to vacate the petition schedule premises and hand over the physical and vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the petitioners within two months from the date of the order. In case of failure, the petitioners are at liberty to evict the respondent by following due process of law.

Typed to my dictation, corrected and pronounced by me in open court this the 16th day of April, 2026.

Sd/-

(FAC) II ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER,

HYDERABAD.

Appendix of Evidence

Witnesses examined for

Petitioners: Respondent:

PW1: Shankar Lal Panwar RW1: Nand Kumar

PW2: Vikas Panwar 48

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Documents marked for

Petitioners:-

Ex.P1:Original Rental Agreement, dt.01.02.1982.

Ex.P2:Original Agreement, dt.01.06.2013.

Ex.P3:Bill, dt.31.03.2013 (2 in Nos).

Ex.P4:Bill, dt.01.05.2013 (2 in Nos).

Ex.P5:Bill, dt.01.06.2013 (2 in Nos).

Ex.P6:Bill, dt.01.07.2013.

Ex.P7:Bill, dt.16.09.2013 (4 in Nos).

Ex.P8:Bill, dt.01.10.2013 (2 in Nos).

Ex.P9:Bill, dt.01.11.2013 (2 in Nos).

Ex.P10: Bill, dt.01.12.2013 (2 in Nos).

Ex.P11: Online copy of property tax payment due details, dt.28.12.2023 (3 pgs).

Ex.P12: Bank statement of account with IDBI bank, Kachiguda Branch, dt.04.08.2007 to 31.03.2011.

Ex.P13: Bank statement of account with IDBI bank, Kachiguda Branch, dt.01.04.2011 to 17.08.2013.

Respondent:

- Nil -

Sd/-

(FAC) II ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER,

HYDERABAD.

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R.C.No.48 of 2014

SCHEDULE OF THE PROPERTY

All that Property bearing Mulgi No’s.4-5-427/1, 2 & 3, Ground Floor, situated at Balaji Market, Badichowdi, Sultan Bazar, Hyderabad, bounded by:

EAST: Sump and Watchmen Room

WEST: Mulgi No.4-5-437/3

NORTH: Neighbour’s Property bearing

No.4-5-439 to 445

SOUTH: Common passage open to sky

Sd/-

(FAC) II ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER,

HYDERABAD.

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OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

IN THE COURT OF THE PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER: CUM : XVII

JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE : SECUNDERABAD

Present: Ms. N. Saswatha

Principal Rent Controller­Cum­

XVII Junior Civil Judge, Secunderabad 

Monday the 24th day of July, 2023

O.S.No.1375 of 2007

(Old O.S.No.352 of 2006)

Between:

1. Sri K. Nagaraj S/o. Late Krishnappa aged 75 years, Occ. Business 

2. Sri N.Shiva Kumar S/o. Sri K. Nagaraj Aged 35 years, Occ. Business 

3. Sri N. Saibaba S/o. Sri K. Nagaraj Aged 42 years, Occ. Business 

4. Sri N. Raju S/o. Sri K. Nagaraj Aged about 38 years, Occ. Business 

5. Sri N. Ganesh S/o. Sri K. Nagaraj Aged about 36 years, Occ. Business 

6. Sri N. Mahesh Kumar S/o. Sri K. Nagaraj Aged about 33 years, Occ. Business 

All are R/o. H.No.1­19­63, Rasoolpura,

Secunderabad. .. Plaintiffs

And

1. P. Veeresham alias Babu S/o. Late Pentaiah

2. P. Krishna S/o. Late Pentaiah

3. P. Raju S/o. Late Pentaiah

4. P. Nagesh S/o. Late Pentaiah

5. P. Sadha S/o. Late Pentaiah

6. P. Gana S/o. Late Pentaiah

All are R/o.H.No.1­19­120, Rashoolpura 2

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

Secunderabad. .. Defendants

This suit is coming before me for final hearing on 06.07.2023 in the presence of Sri B.D.L. Nirmal Kumar, Advocate for the Plaintiffs and of Sri G. Maruthi Rao, Advocate for the Defendants and the matter having stood over for consideration, till this day, the court made the following:

J U D G M E N T

This suit is filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants under

Section 26 r/w Order VII Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code praying the

Court to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendants, from interfering or dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit schedule property except under due process of law.

2.The brief averments of the plaint are:

a)The plaintiff No.1 is the owner and possessor of house bearing No.1­19­63 admeasuring 318.15 sq. yards situated at

Rasoolpura, Secunderabad i.e. the suit schedule property. That plaintiff

No.1 father constructed a house and the house number was allotted as 1­19­63 since then they are in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff No.1 has executed a registered gift deed in favour of plaintiff No.2 vide document No.126 of 2005 dated 13.07.2005 and since then the plaintiff No.1 along with plaintiff Nos.2 to 6 are in continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.

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OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

b)That all the plaintiffs are carrying Potato Chips Manufacturing business under the name and style of Sri Saibaba Wapers since 1970 onwards. They are having trade license from the Secunderabad

Cantonment Board to carry out the chips business in the suit schedule property by renewing the trade license in the year 1985 which was granted earlier and also paid trade license fee to the Cantonment authority by plaintiff No.1. That plaintiff No.1 is a physical handicapped and was issued concession certificate by the competent authority. The suit schedule property is 1­19­63 admeasuring 318.15 sq. yards bounded by North: H.No.1­19­64, South: H.No.1­19­62, East: Road and

West: H.No.1­19­65. That the defendants who are the residents of

Rasoolpura without having any right, title or interest are trying to in­ terfere with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit sched­ ule property. 

c)That on 10.03.2006 there is an attempt from the defendants into the suit schedule property and the plaintiffs have resisted their illegal attempts and gave a complaint against the defendants before Begumpet

Police Station but they refused to entertain the complaint on the ground that it is a civil nature case. That on 12.03.2006 again the defendant threatened the plaintiff with dire consequences and tried to disposes the plaintiffs from the suit schedule property but the plaintiffs invained 4

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

with the help of locality people and resisted the same. That the plaintiff gave a complaint before Assistant Commissioner of Police, Begumpet on 12.03.2006 but they refused to entertain the complaint. That on 12.03.2006 at 7.30 P.M. again the defendants with the help of anti­social elements tried to trespass into the suit schedule property by using force but the plaintiffs with the help of the locality people resisted the illegal methods adopted by the defendants. That inspite of the police complaint given on 12.03.2006 before the Assistant Commissioner of

Police, Begumpet the defendants high handedly and in a rude manner tried to trespass into the suit schedule property by threatening and creating terrors in the mind of the plaintiffs. The complaint given on 12.03.2006 was acknowledged by the Asst. Commissioner of Police,

Begumpet and DCP and Commissioner of Police, Secunderabad.

d)The plaintiffs are carrying the business since three decades onwards over the suit schedule property and there was no threat from anybody at any point of time.

e)The defendants are trying to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property with an oblique motive to dispossess the plaintiff and to grab the suit schedule property without having any right, title or interest over the suit schedule property. Hence, this suit. 

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OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

3.The defendant No.2 filed his written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint. On 03.07.2006 the defendants No.1 and 3 to 6 filed a memo adopting the written statement of defendant No.2.

The brief averments of the written statement are that:

a)The house bearing No.1­19­63 was constructed by one Late

Pentaiah i.e. father of defendants. The father of these defendants was the owner and possessor of the suit schedule property. He constructed the house under the permission of the Cantonment Board, Se­ cunderabad, Resolution No.3(11) dated 12.01.1972 under Section 181(1) of the Cantonment Act. The defendants with their widow mother are in the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by letting two rooms to plaintiff No.1and one room each to other two tenants and the remaining house is in their possession and enjoyment.

The plaintiff No.1 is in the possession of two northern rooms as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.500/­ excluding electricity charges. The electricity connection is in the name of father of the defendants right from the date of obtaining the connection. These defendants denied that the plaintiffs are in the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property since the date of alleged gift deed executed by plain­ tiff No.1 on 13.07.2005 in favour of plaintiff No.2. The said gift deed 6

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

was created by the plaintiffs in order to put a clog upon the title, pos­ session and enjoyment of the defendants.

b)The plaintiff No.1 with the assistance of his sons is carrying on business of Potato Chips manufacturing and sale in the tenanted two rooms. These defendants denied that the plaintiff No.1 is carrying the business since 1970 onwards. The address where the business is carried will be stated for obtaining the necessary trade license as such the plaintiff No.1 might have given the door number of the suit schedule property. The licencee has to pay the requisite fees for obtaining the license and its renewal thereof as per the rules and regulations of the

Cantonment. The trade license is to be renewed every year but the plaintiffs have pleaded that they have renewed the trade license in the year 1985. This defendants denied that the documents filed by the plaintiffs have established their possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. The plaintiffs are in the possession as tenant of two northern side rooms only. The boundaries of the suit schedule property are not correctly shown by the plaintiffs. The Southern boundary is

H.No.1­19­61/A and H.No.1­19­60 only but not H.No.1­19­62.

c)That these defendants are having every title, interest and possession over the suit schedule property either personally or through tenants. These defendants denied that on 10.03.2006 these defendants 7

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

attempted to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs over the tenanted portion. The police never called or summoned any one of these defendants at any time as such the allegation of the plaintiffs of giving a police complaint against the defendants do not stand. These defendants denied that on 12.03.2006 again these defendants threatened and tried to dispossess the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs resisted the same with the help of local people. These defendants denied that the plaintiffs gave a complaint on 12.03.2006 at Begumpet

Police Station against these defendants.

d)The question of grabbing the suit schedule property by these defendants does not arise at all as they are the owners with all rights thereon. That the plaintiffs are carrying their business without any trade license which is against the established procedure. The plaintiffs are never in possession and occupation of the entire suit schedule property at any point of time but they are in the possession and occupation of two rooms of the suit schedule property. These defendants asked the plaintiffs to vacate the tenanted portion of two northern rooms of the suit schedule property for expansion of their business. This made the plaintiffs to file this suit with all false allegations claiming their possession and occupation over the entire suit schedule property.

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OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

e)The widow mother of these defendants has gifted the suit schedule property to defendant No.2 vide registered gift settlement deed document No.851 of 2005 on 16.05.2005. The plaintiff No.1 after having such information was paying monthly rents to defendant No.2 at the rate of Rs.500/­ per month for the two rooms till December, 2005 and committed willful default by not tendering the monthly rent thereafter.

f)The defendant denied the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of injunction as they have not approached this Court with clean hands and real facts. The plaintiff No.1 has created a gift deed on 13.07.2005 in favour of plaintiff

No.2 without possessing any title over the suit schedule property. The said gift deed executed by plaintiff No.1 without title and possession will not create any right or interest to the beneficiary of the said gift deed.

g)The widow mother of these defendants handed over the possession of the suit schedule property to defendant No.2 in the presence of her sons and also plaintiff No.1 and the settler also attorned the tenancy by informing the plaintiff No.1 and his sons. Hence, prayed to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs. 

4. Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues have been settled for trial on 02.09.2006:

1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?

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OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

2) Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit?

3) Whether the suit schedule property as mentioned by the plaintiffs is not correct?

4) To what relief?

5.The plaintiffs to prove their case examined PWs.1 to 3 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.7 through PW1. The defendants to prove their contention examined DWs.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.138.

6.The written arguments filed on behalf of plaintiffs and defendants are taken on record. Heard both the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants at length through DW1.

Issue Nos.1 to 3:

1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?

2) Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit?

3) Whether the suit schedule property as mentioned by the plaintiffs is not correct?

7.Since issue Nos.1 to 3 are inter connected and for better appreciation of evidence are combined and answered as one.

8.In a suit for permanent injunction the burden lies on the plaintiffs to prove that he was in actual and physical possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of suit.

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OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

9.According to the plaintiffs, the plaintiff No.1 was the owner and possessor of house bearing No.1­19­63 admeasuring 318.15 sq. yards situated at Rasoolpura, Secunderabad i.e. the suit schedule property and that he constructed the house and since then all the plaintiffs are in the possession. Later the plaintiff No.1 executed a gift deed in favour of plaintiff No.2 vide document No.126 of 2005 dated 13.07.2005 and ever since all the plaintiffs are in the possession of the suit schedule property. All the plaintiffs are carrying the Potato Chits manufacturing business since 1970 onwards. The defendants on 10.03.2006 and 12.03.2006 interfered with the possession of the plaintiffs.

10.The plaintiff No.2­N. Shiva Kumar is examined as PW1 reiterated the averments of the plaint in toto in his chief examination. In the cross examination PW1 stated as under:

“ I do not know how many electricity meters are there and in whose name the electricity meters are there in the suit schedule property. I do not know whether the suit schedule old municipal number was 5­103. I do not know whether my grand father by name Krishnappa constructed the house in the suit schedule property by taking permission from the Cantonment Board. 

11. PW1 further deposed in the cross examination that the last rites of plaintiff No.1 that his father took place at H.No.1­19­69/70 11

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

which belongs to his mother Parameshwari. The suit schedule property is admeasuring 318.15 sq. yards and the distance between the suit schedule property and house number is 1­19­69/70 is about ten feet.

12.PW1 further deposed as stated as under:

“The plaintiff No.1 used to carry on business at the suit schedule property in the name and style of

Saibaba Wafers. I can file Income Tax assessment copy pertaining to plaintiff No.3 for the year 2006­ 2007 onwards. It is true we have mentioned in

Income Tax assessment for the year 2004­2005 under Ex.A.6 as plaintiff No.4 is the proprietor of

Saibaba Wafers. I am not paying property tax to the suit schedule property. The boundaries mentioned in Ex.B.1 are true and correct. I do not know whether I filed the link document to Ex.A.1 in

Court. I do not know whether the police Begumpet called the defendants on 10.03.2006 and 12.03.2006 as mentioned by me in the plaint.

13.PW1 further deposed that:

“I can file the documents to show that I am residing in the suit schedule property since several years. There are five rooms in the suit schedule property. It is true that in Ex.A.3, it is mentioned that the suit schedule property consists of two asbestos rooms and the same is used for residen­ tial purpose. I do not know whether I have men­ 12

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

tioned in plaint that how many rooms are there in the suit schedule property. Witness adds that the same two rooms used for commercial purpose also and it is not mentioned in Ex.A.3. I can file the re­ newal of trade license from Secunderabad Canton­ ment Board along with the receipts for present pe­ riod also. It is true we have not mentioned in

Ex.A.1, regarding existing of how many number of rooms in suit schedule property.

14.PW1 in his cross examination denied the suggestions that all the plaintiffs stay in H.No.1­19­69/70 and that all the Aadhar Cards and Electoral Cards of plaintiffs contains the H.No.1­19­69/70. He further deposed that he can file the Aadhar Card and Electoral card containing the house address as the suit schedule property before the

Court. PW1 further deposed that as per Ex.A.4/1 contains the room on northern side of suit schedule property and as per Ex.A.4/2 is used for commercial purpose and residential purpose and his family used to stay in the said rooms.

15.PW2­S. Pandu an independent witness filed his chief examination affidavit that he is resident of Rasoolpura and he knows the plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiff father Nagaraj was carrying on Potato

Chips business in the suit schedule property and the plaintiffs are residing and are in the possession of the suit schedule property.

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16.PW2 in his cross examination deposed that since 20 to 30 years he is residing at Rasoolpura and that the plaintiffs are in the possession of the suit schedule property. He do not know about how many rooms are there in the suit schedule property. He do not know how many rooms are occupied by the plaintiffs to do his chips business. PW2 further deposed that it has been closed after the death of plaintiff No.1.

That the suit schedule property is having water connection and he has no idea regarding electricity connection. That he has not seen defendant

No.2 residing in H.No.1­19­63 since his childhood. The plaintiff was carrying chips business in shutter and since 2007 plaintiff not carrying the chips business and the shutter is closed since 2007. Again deposed that earlier there was an electricity connection but he do not know whether it is still existing or not. That he do not know whether plaintiff

No.1 has obtained the shutter on rent from defendant’s mother E.

Bayamma.

17.PW3­Md. Shareef an independent witness filed chief examination affidavit that he knows the plaintiffs and defendants. That plaintiff

No.1 was carrying on chips business in the suit schedule property. On 25.03.2006 the plaintiffs and defendants quarreled with each other and also sustained head injuries and was shifted to Gandhi Hospital for treatment. That the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule 14

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

property and defendants are residing away from the suit schedule property.

18.PW3 in his cross examination deposed that he used to run a mutton business in shop No.1­19­120 which belongs to the defendant father Pentaiah. He vacated the mulgi in the year 1984 after the death of the father of the defendant. The suit schedule property is having two rooms and is about 50 sq. yards. The plaintiff used to carry chips business in shop No.1­19­63. About 15 years back he used to visit the premises of plaintiff No.1. He further deposed that his brother sons have told him that on 25.03.2006 quarrel took place between the plaintiffs and defendants and he do not know prior to 25.03.2006 whether any quarrel took place between them as he left the area in the year 2010. That at present there is no chips shop in the suit schedule property and he do not know in which year it has been closed. He cannot say the names and particulars of house owner existing between his shop and plaintiff shop. He has not seen any document with plaintiff No.1 pertaining to the suit schedule property.

19.The plaintiffs relied upon Exs.A.1 to A.7. Ex.A.1 is the registered gift deed vide document No.1126 of 2005 executed by plaintiff No.1 in favour of plaintiff No.2 over the suit schedule property. Ex.A.2 is the encumbrance certificate dated 16.06.2005 and 13.03.2006. Ex.A.3 is 15

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

the original copy of the complaint dated 12.03.2006 along with the postal receipt. Ex.A.4 are the original photographs 12 in Nos. along with negative copy. Ex.A.5 is the application dated 27.03.1985 and 11.04.1986 made to the Cantonment Board, Secunderabad for renewal of the trade license by plaintiff No.1 along with receipt dated 23.03.1985. Ex.A.6 is the original form No.2D application form (income tax return) filed by plaintiff No.4 for the assessment year 2004 to 2005 and 2005 to 2006. Ex.A.7 is the certified copy of the complaint dated 25.03.2006.

20.On the other hand, the case of the defendants is that the father of the defendant i.e. Pentaiah who was the owner and possessor of the suit schedule property constructed the house under the permission of the

Cantonment Board in the suit schedule property. That the defendants along with his widow mother are in the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by letting out two northern rooms to the plaintiff

No.1 as tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.500/­. That the plaintiffs are never in the possession of the entire suit schedule property. That his mother executed a registered gift deed vide document No.851 of 2005

dated 18.05.2005 in favour of defendant No.2 and handed over the

possession of the suit schedule property.

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OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

21.The defendant No.2 is examined as DW1 and reiterated the averments of his written statement in his chief examination affidavit.

DW1 in his cross examination deposed that they have mentioned the same address which is mentioned in the plaint in their vakalat. DW1 stated in his cross examination stated as under:

“ It is true that that in Ex.B.1 at page No.2 it was mentioned the H.No.1­19­120 as my mother’s house.

It is true that it is also mentioned in Ex.B.1 that the suit schedule property is 1­19­63 admeasuring 320 sq. yards as our ancestral property of my father. It is true that the said H.No.1­19­63 was acquired through his father late Veeraiah and after the death of his father the suit schedule property was suc­ ceeded by his mother.

22. DW1 further deposed in his cross examination that all the docments under Exs.B.7 to B.136 are from 2006 onwards i.e. after execution of Ex.B.1. The father of the plaintiff was tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.500/­ and he has not filed any documentary proof that the father of the plaintiff paid the rents. They have not issued any notice to the plaintiff calling upon them to vacate the suit schedule property.

Ex.B.38 i.e. in electricity bill the door number is mentioned as 1­9­63 where DW1 added that it was a printing mistake and the service num­ ber belongs to the suit schedule property. That on 25.03.2006 they 17

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

gave a complaint against the plaintiff. That as per Ex.A.7 the plaintiff address mentioned as H.No.1­19­63 and the defendant address as

H.No.1­19­120. The plaintiffs are in the possession as tenant of the two

Northern side rooms. The plaintiff No.1 is not carrying the business since 1970 onwards.

23. DW1 denied the suggestion that the photographs filed along with the advocate commissioner report reveals that the entire building of H.No.1­19­63 is of RCC building. DW1 further denied the suggestion that the plaintiffs are in the possession of the suit schedule property and added that the defendants are in the possession suit schedule property. 

24. DW2­A. Vasantha who is an independent witness filed his chief examination affidavit in support of DW1 by stating that she is the resident of Rasoolpura and defendant No.2 is the absolute owner of

H.No.1­19­63 admeasuring 320 sq. yards. The defendant No.2 is in physical possession of the suit schedule property and carrying tent house business and he dumped some of the tent house articles in

H.No.1­19­63. That the defendants father has let out two northern side rooms to the plaintiffs father for carrying the chips business. On 12.03.2006 the plaintiffs tried to interfere into the remaining portion of 18

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

defendant No.2 and that she along with other persons pacified between the plaintiffs and defendants.

25. Defendant No.2 in her cross examination deposed that the plaintiff is doing chips business. That defendant No.2 son Praveen was carrying tent house business in the suit schedule property from long time and after his death defendant No.2 is carrying the said business.

That she witnessed plaintiff No.1 son and defendant quarreling and filed police complaint against each other. That she does not know whether the plaintiff No.1 has executed any rental agreement in favour of the defendant’s father Pentaiah. That she had quarreled with plaintiff No.2 and filed criminal case against him. She denied the suggestion that defendant No.2 is not in physical possession of the suit schedule property and carrying tent house business and dumped some of the tent house articles in the suit schedule property.

26. The defendant relied upon Exs.B.1 to B.138. Ex.B1 is the certified copy of Registered Deed of Gift Settlement dated 18­05­2005 (already marked through PW1 during the cross examination). Ex.B2 is the form “A” Notice dated 20­09­1971. Ex.B3 is the For “B” dated 20­09­1971.Ex.B4 is the re­submission letter dated 09­11­1971. Ex.B5 is the building notice dated 30­10­1971. Ex.B6 is the Plan dated 04­02­1972 (subject to objection as there is no endorsement of 19

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

concerned authority in the plan). Ex.B7 is the Electricity Bill Cash

Memo. Ex.B8 is the Electricity Bill Receipt. Ex.B9 is the Electricity Bill

Receipt. Ex.B10 is the Electricity Cash Bill dated 16­01­2002. Ex.B11 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 21­03­2002. Ex.B12 is the

Electricity Payment Receipt dated 18­05­2002. Ex.B13 is the Electricity

Payment Receipt dated 21­03­2002. Ex.B14 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 18­07­2002. Ex.B15 is the Electricity Payment Receipt

dated 21­09­2002. Ex.B16 is the Electricity Bill dated 02­08­2022.

Ex.B17 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 23­10­2002. Ex.B18 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 16­11­2002. Ex.B19 is the

Electricity Payment Receipt dated 12­12­2002. Ex.B20 is the Electricity

Payment Receipt dated 15­02­2003. Ex.B21 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 18­01­2003. Ex.B22 is the Electricity Payment Receipt

dated 08­03­2003. Ex.B23 is the Electricity Bill dated 03­04­2003.

Ex.B24 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 22­05­2003. Ex.B25 is the Electricity Bill dated 03­06­2003. Ex.B26 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 10­06­2003. Ex.B27 is the Electricity Payment Receipt

dated 30­07­2003. Ex.B28 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated

31­08­2003. Ex.B29 is the Electricity Bill dated 09­08­2003. Ex.B30 is the Electricity Bill dated 05­09­2003. Ex.B31 is the Electricity

Payment Receipt dated 30­09­2003. Ex.B32 is the Electricity Bill dated 20

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

10­10­2003. Ex.B33 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 29­10­2003. Ex.B34 is the Electricity Bill dated 03­11­2003. Ex.B35 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 27­11­2003. Ex.B36 is the

Electricity Bill dated 10­12­2003. Ex.B37 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 23­12­2003. Ex.B38 is the Electricity Bill dated 19­01­2004. Ex.B39 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 28­01­2004. Ex.B40 is the Electricity Bill dated 17­02­2004. Ex.B41 is the Electricity Receipt dated 04­03­2004. Ex.B42 is the Electricity Bill

dated 19­04­2004. Ex.B43 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated

06­04­2004. Ex.B44 is the Electricity Bill dated 17­03­2004. Ex.B45 is the Electricity Bill dated 11­06­2004. Ex.B46 is the Electricity Bill

dated 14­07­2004. Ex.B47 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated

09­08­2004. Ex.B48 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 08­07­2004.Ex.B49 is the Electricity Bill dated 11­09­2004. Ex.B50 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 05­10­2004. Ex.B51 is the

Electricity Bill dated 11­10­2004. Ex.B52 is the Electricity Bill dated 08­11­2004. Ex.B53 is the Electricity Bill dated 07­01­2005. Ex.B54 is the Electricity Bill dated 08­02­2005. Ex.B55 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 05­03­2005. Ex.B56 is the Electricity Bill dated 07­03­2005. Ex.B57 is the Electricity Bill dated 13­04­2005. Ex.B58 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 19­04­2005. Ex.B59 is the 21

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

Electricity Bill dated 06­05­2005. Ex.B60 is the Electricity Bill dated 08­09­2005. Ex.B61 is the Electricity Bill dated 05­10­2005. Ex.B62 is the Electricity Bill dated 08­11­2005. Ex.B63 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 17­11­2005. Ex.B64 is the Electricity Bill dated 07­12­2005. Ex.B65 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 17­01­ 2006. Ex.B66 is the Electricity Bill dated 07­01­2006. Ex.B67 is the

Electricity Bill dated 07­03­2006. Ex.B68 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 17­03­2006. Ex.B69 is the Original Voter Identity Card of

Defendant No.2 dated 26­05­2003. Ex.B70 is the Original Voter Identity

Card of Defendant No.2’s wife dated 26­05­2003. Ex.B71 is the Original

House Hold Card vide No.PAP 167881200472 dated31­05­2006. Ex.B72 is the Original Voter Identity Card of Defendant No.2’s daughter dated 12­11­2008. Ex.B73 is the Original Voter Identity Card of Defendant

No.2’s son dated 12­11­2008. Ex.B74 is the New Phone Connection form dated 25­03­2006. Ex.B75 is the Telephone Bill dated 25­03­2006.

Ex.B76 is the BSNL Customer Copy dated 21­04­2007. Ex.B77 is the

BSNL Payment Receipt dated 21­04­2006. Ex.B78 is the Telephone Bill

dated 11­04­2006. Ex.B79 is the Telephone Payment Receipt dated

26­04­2006. Ex.B80 is the Electricity Bill dated 14­06­2006. Ex.B81 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 26­06­2006. Ex.B82 is the

Electricity Bill dated 07­12­2006. Ex.B83 is the Electricity Payment 22

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

Receipt dated 30­12­2006. Ex.B84 is the Electricity Bill dated 07­01­2011. Ex.B85 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 27­11­2011. Ex.B86 is the Electricity Bill dated 12­11­2011. Ex.B87 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­12­2011. Ex.B88 is the

Electricity Bill dated 05­01­2016. Ex.B89 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 30­01­2016. Ex.B90 is the Electricity Bill dated 10­12­ 2016. Ex.B91 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 27­12­2016.

Ex.B92 is the Electricity Bill dated 06­01­2022. Ex.B93 is the

Electricity Payment Receipt dated 13­01­2022. Ex.B94 is the Electricity

Bill dated 09­10­2022. Ex.B95 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 20­10­2022. Ex.B96 is the Electricity Bill dated 08­03­2015. Ex.B97 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 25­03­2015. Ex.B98 is the

Electricity Bill dated 08­12­2015. Ex.B99 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 28­12­2015. Ex.B100 is the Electricity Bill dated 05­01­2016. Ex.B101 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­01­2016. Ex.B102 is the Electricity Bill dated 06­11­2016. Ex.B103 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 22­11­2016. Ex.B104 is the

Electricity Bill dated 06­02­2016. Ex.B105 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 27­02­2016. Ex.B106 is the Electricity Bill dated 10­12­2016. Ex.B107 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 27­12­2016. Ex.B108 is the Electricity Bill dated 06­01­2022. Ex.B109 23

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 20­01­2022. Ex.B110 is the

Electricity Bill dated 09­10­2022. Ex.B111 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 23­10­2022. Ex.B112 is the Electricity Bill dated 09­06­2006. Ex.B113 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 26­06­2006. Ex.B114 is the Electricity Bill dated 07­12­2006. Ex.B115 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­12­2006. Ex.B116 is the

Electricity Bill dated 04­01­2010. Ex.B117 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 31­01­2010. Ex.B118 is the Electricity Bill dated 07­11­2010. Ex.B119 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­11­2010. Ex.B120 is the Electricity Bill dated 06­02­2016. Ex.B121 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 21­12­2016. Ex.B122 is the

Electricity Bill dated 10­12­2016. Ex.B123 is the Electricity Payment

Receipt dated 18­12­2016. Ex.B124 is the Electricity Bill dated 06­01­2022. Ex.B125 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 3­01­2022. Ex.B126 is the Electricity Bill dated 09­10­2022. Ex.B127 is the Electricity Payment Receipt dated 20­10­2022. Ex.B128 is the

Statement of Electricity Meter No.BZ 003015 dated 24­08­2021 for the year November, 2006 to August, 2021. Ex.B129 is the HP Gas Cus­ tomer Copies (Nos.9). Ex.B130 is the HP Gas Customer Copy dated 10­05­2022. Ex.B131 is the RTI Information Act. Ex.B132 is the

Property Tax Bill Payments Nos.5). Ex.B133 is the Original Aadhar Card 24

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

of Defendant No.2 dated 23­02­2011. Ex.B134 is the Original Aadhar

Card of Defendant No.2 wife dated 19­02­2011. Ex.B135 is the Original

Aadhar Card of Defendant No.2 daughter dated 19­02­2011. Ex.B136 is the Original Aadhar Card of Defendant No.2 son dated 19­02­2011.

Exs.B.137 and B.138 are photographs. 

27.The contention of the plaintiff is that he is the owner and possessor of the suit schedule property and carrying on the chips business since 1970 onwards and that defendants are interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit schedule property. On oral and documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff shows that except

Exs.A.1 to A.3 i.e. registered gift deed and encumbrance certificate no other document has been filed by the plaintiff to prove the plaintiff No.1 and after the death of plaintiff No.1, plaintiff Nos.2 to 6 are in the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff in his cross examination deposed that he can file documents to show that he is residing in the suit schedule property since several years and that he can file renewal of a trade license for the present period and also he can file Aadhar card and Electoral card to show that he is in the possession of the suit schedule property. However, the plaintiff has not filed any single piece of document to show that they are in the possession of the suit schedule property. Even if we assume the 25

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

contentions of the defendants that the plaintiffs are in the possession of two northern rooms in the suit schedule property as tenants, the plaintiffs are seeking the relief of perpetual injunction by claiming ownership and possession over the suit schedule property. The plain­ tiffs no where in his plaint averments or in his chief affidavit pleaded that he is the tenant in the northern side room of the suit schedule property but is claiming that he is the owner and possessor of the entire suit schedule property. It is very pertinent to note that the plaintiff on one part seeking the relief of perpetual injunction by claiming owner­ ship and possession over the suit schedule property and on the second part, in his relief portion prayed to grant permanent injunction restrain­ ing the defendant from interfering or disposing the plaintiff from the suit schedule property except under due process of law. This itself clearly shows that the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands and suppressed the material facts.

28. According to legal maxim of equity that he who seeks equity must do equity is applicable to this case. Since the suit schedule property is a residential house, the plaintiffs have not filed any document to show that they are in the possession of the suit schedule property since several years Ex.A.4 photos, Ex.A.5 renewal of trade license and Ex.A6 income returns cannot be considered to decide the 26

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

possession of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property when the defendant has brought on record very cogent evidence to show that they are in the possession of the suit schedule property.

29. This Court relies on the decision reported in Balakrishna

Datatreya Galande vs. Balakrishna Rambharosa Gupta and

another 2019 (2) ALT 7 (SC) (DB) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “in a suit for perpetual injunction the possession of the suit schedule property by the plaintiff cannot be based upon and inference drawn from the circumstances.” The party seeking injunction based on the averment that he is in possession of the property and seeking as­ sistance of the Court while praying for permanent injunction re­ straining the other party who is alleged to be disturbing the pos­ session of the plaintiff must prove his lawful possession of the prop­ erty.

30.To rebut the contention of the plaintiff, the defendant relied on

Exs.B.1 to B.138. On cumulative reading of oral and documentary evidence filed by the defendant clearly shows that the defendants are in the possession of the suit schedule property. It is a settled principle that the documentary evidence prevails over the oral evidence. The electricity bills under Exs.B.11 to B.68 stands in the name of Pentaiah i.e. father of defendant No.2 from the year 2002 to 2006, the identity 27

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

card of defendant No.2 and his family members under Exs.B.69 to B.73, the phone connection under Exs.B.74 to B.79 standing in the name of defendant No.2 for the year 2006 and electricity bills under Ex.B.80 to

B.128 from the year 2006 to 2021 standing in the name of defendant

No.2, and gas connection bills under Exs.B.129 and Ex.B.130 standing in the name of defendant No.2, the property tax bills under Exs.B.132 (5 Nos) stands in the name of defendant No.2 for the year 2018 to 2022 for Exs.B.133 to B.136 are the original Aadhar Cards of defendant No.2 and his family members showing that they are residing in the suit schedule property. All these documents clearly shows that the defendants are in the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.

31. The counsel for the plaintiff relied on decision reported in Rame

Gowda (D) by Lrs vs. M. Varadapa Naidu (D) by Lrs. 2003 0 Supreme

(SC) 1271 wherein it was held that “although the plaintiff had failed in proving his title, he had succeeded in proving his possession over the suit schedule property, he is entitled to protect unless dispossessed there from by due process of law.”

32.The counsel for the plaintiff further relied on a decision

Mogilipuvvu Annapurnaiah vs. Malampati Narasimha Rao 1981 0

Supreme (AP) 330 wherein in it was held that “the possession of a 28

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

tenant by sufferance is entitled to injunction against the law owner till he is vacated in due course of law.”

33.The counsel for the plaintiff further relied on a decision reported in A. Subramanian and another vs. R. Pannerselvam 2021(2) Indian

Civil Cases 159 (S.C.) wherein it was held that “a trespasser who is in established possession of the property can obtain injunction.”

34.The above referred citations relied by the plaintiffs does not support their case since the facts of the above mentioned cases are different from the present case.

35.On combined reading of the advocate commissioner report and

Exs.B.1 and Ex.B.11 to Ex.B.68 shows that the electricity meter

No.B­3015 stands in the name of father of defendant i.e. Pentaiah and later on defendant No.2 through Exs.B.128.

36.The counsel for the plaintiff in his argument submitted that since the defendant did not choose to examine the commissioner nor marked the photographs as such the advocate commissioner report cannot be looked into. This Court relies on the decision reported in Shaik Fatima vs. Shaik Nanne Saheb 2005(4) ALD 164 wherein it was held that “the report of the commissioner being part of the record can be considered as evidence irrespective of the fact whether the commissioner is examined as witness or not”.

29

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

37.The dissatisfied party has to challenge the evidence by cross examining the commissioner but the plaintiff did not choose to examine the commissioner.

38.In view of the above discussion, since the plaintiffs failed to prove his possession over the suit schedule property he is not entitled for the relief of perpetual injunction as prayed for. Hence, Issue Nos.1 to 3 are answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.

39.In the result, the suit is dismissed with costs. 

Dictated to the Stenographer, transcribed and typed by him, corrected

and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 24th day of July, 2023.

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER: CUM :

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE,

SECUNDERABAD. 

Appendix of Evidence

Witnesses Examined

For Plaintiffs: For Defendants:

PW1 N. Shiva Kumar DW1 P. Krishna PW2 S. Pandu DW2 A. Vasantha PW3 Md. Shareef 

Documents marked on behalf of the plaintiffs:

Ex.A.1 Original gift settlement deed dated 13.07.2005 vide document No.1126 of 2005 Ex.A.2 Original Certificate of Encumbrance on property dated 30

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

16.06.2005 and 13.03.2006 (2 in Nos.) Ex.A.3 Original copy of police complaint dated 12.03.2006 along with postal receipt dated 12.03.2006 Ex.A.4 Original Photographs 14 in No. along with negatives Ex.A.5 renewal of Trade License with Secunderabad Cantonment Board 

dated 27.03.1985 and 11.04.1986 (2 in Nos) with receipts dated 

23.03.1985 Ex.A.6 Original form NO.2D application form (Income tax returns) for the year 2004 to 2005, 2005 to 2006 (2 in Nos) along with statement by Chartered Accountant. Ex.A.7 is the certified copy of the complaint dated 25.03.2006.

Documents marked on behalf of defendants:

Ex.B1 certified copy of Registered Deed of Gift Settlement dated 18­05­ 2005 (already marked through PW1 during the cross examination) Ex.B2 form “A” Notice dated 20­09­1971. Ex.B3 For “B” dated 20­09­1971. Ex.B4 resubmission letter dated 09­11­1971. Ex.B5 building notice dated 30­10­1971. Ex.B6 Plan dated 04­02­1972 (subject to objection as there is no endorsement of concerned authority in the plan) Ex.B7 Electricity Bill Cash Memo Ex.B8 Electricity Bill Receipt Ex.B9 Electricity Bill Receipt Ex.B10 Electricity Cash Bill dated 16­01­2002 Ex.B11 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 21­03­2002 Ex.B12 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 18­05­2002 Ex.B13 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 21­03­2002 Ex.B14 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 18­07­2002 Ex.B15 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 21­09­2002 Ex.B16 Electricity Bill dated 02­08­2022 Ex.B17 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 23­10­2002 Ex.B18 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 16­11­2002 Ex.B19 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 12­12­2002 Ex.B20 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 15­02­2003 Ex.B21 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 18­01­2003 Ex.B22 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 08­03­2003 Ex.B23 Electricity Bill dated 03­04­2003 Ex.B24 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 22­05­2003 Ex.B25 Electricity Bill dated 03­06­2003 31

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

Ex.B26 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 10­06­2003 Ex.B27 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­07­2003 Ex.B28 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 31­08­2003 Ex.B29 Electricity Bill dated 09­08­2003 Ex.B30 Electricity Bill dated 05­09­2003 Ex.B31 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­09­2003 Ex.B32 Electricity Bill dated 10­10­2003 Ex.B33 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 29­10­2003 Ex.B34 Electricity Bill dated 03­11­2003 Ex.B35 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 27­11­2003 Ex.B36 Electricity Bill dated 10­12­2003 Ex.B37 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 23­12­2003 Ex.B38 Electricity Bill dated 19­01­2004 Ex.B39 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 28­01­2004 Ex.B40 Electricity Bill dated 17­02­2004 Ex.B41 Electricity Receipt dated 04­03­2004 Ex.B42 Electricity Bill dated 19­04­2004 Ex.B43 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 06­04­2004 Ex.B44 Electricity Bill dated 17­03­2004 Ex.B45 Electricity Bill dated 11­06­2004 Ex.B46 Electricity Bill dated 14­07­2004 Ex.B47 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 09­08­2004 Ex.B48 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 08­07­2004 Ex.B49 Electricity Bill dated 11­09­2004 Ex.B50 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 05­10­2004 Ex.B51 Electricity Bill dated 11­10­2004 Ex.B52 Electricity Bill dated 08­11­2004 Ex.B53 Electricity Bill dated 07­01­2005 Ex.B54 Electricity Bill dated 08­02­2005 Ex.B55 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 05­03­2005 Ex.B56 Electricity Bill dated 07­03­2005 Ex.B57 Electricity Bill dated 13­04­2005 Ex.B58 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 19­04­2005 Ex.B59 Electricity Bill dated 06­05­2005 Ex.B60 Electricity Bill dated 08­09­2005 Ex.B61 Electricity Bill dated 05­10­2005 Ex.B62 Electricity Bill dated 08­11­2005 Ex.B63 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 17­11­2005 Ex.B64 Electricity Bill dated 07­12­2005 Ex.B65 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 17­01­2006 Ex.B66 Electricity Bill dated 07­01­2006 Ex.B67 Electricity Bill dated 07­03­2006 32

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

Ex.B68 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 17­03­2006 Ex.B69 Original Voter Identity Card of Defendant No.2 dated 26­05­2003 Ex.B70 Original Voter Identity Card of Defendant No.2’s wife dated 26­05­2003 Ex.B71 Original House Hold Card vide No.PAP 167881200472 dated 31­05­2006 Ex.B72 Original Voter Identity Card of Defendant No.2’s daughter

dated 12­11­2008

Ex.B73 Original Voter Identity Card of Defendant No.2’s son dated 12­11­2008 Ex.B74 New Phone Connection form dated 25­03­2006 Ex.B75 Telephone Bill dated 25­03­2006 Ex.B76 BSNL Customer Copy dated 21­04­2007 Ex.B77 BSNL Payment Receipt dated 21­04­2006 Ex.B78 Telephone Bill dated 11­04­2006 Ex.B79 Telephone Payment Receipt dated 26­04­2006 Ex.B80 Electricity Bill dated 14­06­2006 Ex.B81 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 26­06­2006 Ex.B82 Electricity Bill dated 07­12­2006 Ex.B83 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­12­2006 Ex.B84 Electricity Bill dated 07­01­2011 Ex.B85 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 27­11­2011 Ex.B86 Electricity Bill dated 12­11­2011 Ex.B87 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­12­2011 Ex.B88 Electricity Bill dated 05­01­2016 Ex.B89 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­01­2016 Ex.B90 Electricity Bill dated 10­12­2016 Ex.B91 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 27­12­2016 Ex.B92 Electricity Bill dated 06­01­2022 Ex.B93 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 13­01­2022 Ex.B94 Electricity Bill dated 09­10­2022 Ex.B95 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 20­10­2022 Ex.B96 Electricity Bill dated 08­03­2015 Ex.B97 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 25­03­2015 Ex.B98 Electricity Bill dated 08­12­2015 Ex.B99 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 28­12­2015 Ex.B100 Electricity Bill dated 05­01­2016 Ex.B101 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­01­2016 Ex.B102 Electricity Bill dated 06­11­2016 Ex.B103 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 22­11­2016 Ex.B104 Electricity Bill dated 06­02­2016 33

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

Ex.B105 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 27­02­2016 Ex.B106 Electricity Bill dated 10­12­2016 Ex.B107 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 27­12­2016 Ex.B108 Electricity Bill dated 06­01­2022 Ex.B109 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 20­01­2022 Ex.B110 Electricity Bill dated 09­10­2022 Ex.B111 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 23­10­2022 Ex.B112 Electricity Bill dated 09­06­2006 Ex.B113 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 26­06­2006 Ex.B114 Electricity Bill dated 07­12­2006 Ex.B115 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­12­2006 Ex.B116 Electricity Bill dated 04­01­2010 Ex.B117 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 31­01­2010 Ex.B118 Electricity Bill dated 07­11­2010 Ex.B119 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 30­11­2010 Ex.B120 Electricity Bill dated 06­02­2016 Ex.B121 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 21­12­2016 Ex.B122 Electricity Bill dated 10­12­2016 Ex.B123 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 18­12­2016 Ex.B124 Electricity Bill dated 06­01­2022 Ex.B125 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 13­01­2022 Ex.B126 Electricity Bill dated 09­10­2022 Ex.B127 Electricity Payment Receipt dated 20­10­2022 Ex.B128 Statement of Electricity Meter No.BZ 003015 dated 24­08­2021 for the year November, 2006 to August, 2021 Ex.B129 HP Gas Customer Copies (Nos.9) Ex.B130 HP Gas Customer Copy dated 10­05­2022 Ex.B131 RTI Information Act Ex.B132 Property Tax Bill Payments Nos.5) Ex.B133 Original Aadhar Card of Defendant No.2 dated 23­02­2011 Ex.B134 Original Aadhar Card of Defendant No.2 wife dated 19­02­2011 Ex.B135 Original Aadhar Card of Defendant No.2 daughter dated 19­02­2011 Ex.B136 Original Aadhar Card of Defendant No.2 son dated 19­02­2011

Note: Both the counsels filed memo dated 04.07.2023 stating that during the cross examination of PW2 on 02.03.2022 on confrontation of Exs.B.2 and B.3 were marked and at the time of filing of the chief affidavit of DW1 Exs.B.2 and B.3 were not marked and prayed to mark Exs.B.2 34

OS.1375 OF 2007 (OLD O.S.No.352 of 2006)

and B.3 through PW2. Hence, considering the memo Exs.B.2 and B.3 i.e. photographs are given exhibit numbers Ex.B.137 and Ex.B.138 since Exs.B.2 and B.3 were given number in the chief affidavit of DW1. 

Ex.B.137 Photograph Ex.B.138 Photograph. 

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER: CUM :

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE,

SECUNDERABAD 

SUIT SCHEDULE PROPERTY

All that the House No.1­19­63, admeasuring 318.15 sq. yards or 265.97 sq. mts., situated at Rasoolpura Village, Secunderabad Cantonment and bounded on the:

North:: H.No.1­19­64 South:: H.No.1­19­62 East: Road West: : H.No.1­19­65 

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER: CUM :

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE,

SECUNDERABAD. 

1

IN THE COURT OF THE PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER: CUM : XVII

JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE : SECUNDERABAD

Present: Ms. N. Saswatha

Principal Rent Controller­Cum­

XVII Junior Civil Judge, Secunderabad 

Monday the 10th day of July, 2023

O.S.No.1328 of 2007

(Old O.S.No.809 of 2005)

Between:

1. V. Srinivasa Rao S/o. Ramchander Rao, aged about 58 years, Occ. Business R/o. H.No.6–2­253, New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad Telangana

2. Vemula Pradeep S/o. V. Srinivas Rao, aged about 38 years, Occ. Pvt. Employee Permanent R/o.H.No.6–2­253, New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad, Telangana. Presently residing at # 60, Colgate Drive, Manchester, Connecticut, USA Rep. By his GPA Holder, V. Srinivas Rao (Plaintiff No.2 is impleaded as per orders in 

I.A.No.5 of 2022 dated 10.11.2022) .. Plaintiffs

And

1. Ibrahim S/o. Baquer Saheb (Died per LRs)

2. Syed Chand, S/o. Late Ibrahim, aged 46 years, Occ. Business 

3. Syed Sajid S/o. Late Ibrahim, aged 43 years, Occ. Business 

4. Smt. Zarina Bee W/o. Late Ibrahim, aged 68 years, Occ. Business 

5. Kum. Meharjan D/o. Late Ibrahim, aged 2 31 years, Occ. Household, Defendants No.2 to 5 are R/o.H.No.6­2­494 New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad (Defendants Nos.2 to 5 are impleaded as per the orders in IA.No.474 of 2006 dt.05.07.2006) 

6. M.B. Kumar S/o. Late Balaiah (died per Lrs) (Defendant No.6 is impleaded as per orders in I.A.No.111 of 2007 dated:28.11.2007)

7. Makkala Arun Kumar S/o. Late M.B. Kumar aged about 55 years, Occ. Pvt. Employee R/o.H.No.6­2­324, New Bhoiguda, 

Secunderabad, Telangana .. Defendants

This Suit is coming before me for final hearing on 27.06.2023 in the presence of Sri G. Narasimha, Advocate for the Plaintiffs and of Smt S. Ameerunnisa Begum, Advocate for the Defendants and the matter having stood over for consideration, till this day, the court made the following:

J U D G M E N T

Back ground of the case:

a)Since the case has been remanded back twice to this Court it is important to know the factual back ground of the case. The plaintiff filed this suit against the defendant for eviction and arrears of rent along with consequential relief basing on landlord and tenant relationship. During the pendency of the suit I.A.No.680 of 2005 was filed by the plaintiff directing the defendants Nos.2 to 5 to deposit the arrears of rent and the same was allowed on 18.10.2005. Since the 3 defendant failed to comply the order in I.A.No.680 of 2005 the plaintiff was filed another I.A.No.112 of 2007 to struck of the defence of the defendant and the same was allowed on 29.11,2010 and the suit was immediately decreed on the same day. To which the defendant preferred an appeal vide A.S.No.69 of 2014 before the Hon’ble 1st Addl. Chief

Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad and the same was allowed by

setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 29.11.2010 and remanded the mater to his Court with a direction to take the evidence and decide the matter afresh by following the basic principles of trial ‘Avdi Alteram Partem’. 

b)In the said A.S.No.69 of 2014, the defendant filed I.A.No.1632 of 2011 with a prayer to stay the execution of the decree and the said

IA.No.1632 of 2011 was allowed on 19.09.2011 by imposing the

condition that they shall deposit the costs and no condition was imposed as to the payment of rents. The said I.A.No.1632 of 2011 was challenged by the plaintiff vide CRP.No.4705 of 2011 before the then

Hon’ble High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad and

the said CRP was dismissed on 21.12.2012 on the assumption that the defendant filed the suit. Then the plaintiff filed a Rev. CRP.No.1363 of 2014 which was allowed on 24.06.2013 directing the defendant to deposit the undisputed rent at Rs.2000/­ per month to the credit of the 4 appeal on or before 5th of every month commencing from July, 2013 and shall also pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/­ towards tentative arrears within four months. 

c)Then I.A.No.169 of 2018 has been filed by the defendants in the suit to reopen the case for the purpose of adducing their evidence and the same was dismissed on 27.11.2018. Aggrieved by the said order the defendant preferred CRP.No.522 of 2019 before the Hon’ble High Court for the State of Telangana, the Hon’ble High Court gave a finding that the defendant cannot be permitted to make submission on the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant as the defendant did not challenge the orders passed in I.A.No.112 of 2007 and permitted to limited extent to the defendant to raise the contention of the jurisdiction

before the Trial Court without adducing any evidence in that regard.

d)During the course of trial the defendant raised an objection on the ground of want of jurisdiction and the Trial Court dismissed the suit on 22.10.2019 stating that this Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree

dated 22.10.2019 the plaintiff preferred an appeal vide A.S.No.72 of

2019 on the file of Hon’ble XXVII Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court,

Secunderabad and the same was allowed and remanded back to this 5

Court by giving a finding that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.

e)After considering all the observations and directions given by the

Hon’ble Appellate Court this Court conducted the trial and delivered the

following judgment:

This is a suit filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants praying the Court ejecting the defendants from the suit schedule property, directing the defendants to pay an amount of Rs.46,000/­ towards arrears of rent and directing the defendants to pay the mesne profits for the schedule property at the rate of Rs.4000/­ per month till the date of vacation of the schedule property. 

2.The brief averments of the plaint are:

a)That the plaintiff No.1 was the absolute owner of the entire building premises bearing H.No.6­2­253 situated at New Bhoiguda,

Secunderabad by virtue of registered sale deed vide document No.83 of 2003 dated 28.01,2002. That the defendant is the tenant in the occupation of two mulgies (Eastern one and Middle One) in the ground floor of the said building on a monthly rent of Rs.2000/­ for both the mulgies. The tenancy is oral and start from first of every month. The monthly rent is exclusive of electricity charges. There is no water connection to the schedule premises. 

6

b)That a notice is addressed to the defendant by the plaintiff No.1 calling upon him to pay the rents from 01.02.2002 for which the defendant was issued reply notice dated 27.06.2002 stating that the rents are being paid to Sri M.B. Kumar. Plaintiff No.1 again addressed another detailed legal notice dated 29.04.2002 by narrating his ownership over the said property and stated that M.B.Kumar has no right to collect the rents in respect of the premises belonging to plaintiff

No.1 and further called upon the defendant to pay the monthly rent of

Rs.2000/­ to plaintiff No.1 in respect of two shops which are under his occupation. After receiving the notice the defendant did not replied to the said notice nor paid the rents inspite of plaintiff No1 oral demands to pay the rents or to vacate the premises.

c)The defendant became defaulter in payment of rents. The defendant is due the monthly rents from May, 2003 to till date i.e. for 24 months at the rate of Rs.2000/­ per month totaling to Rs.46,000/­ towards arrears of rent. Under the said circumstances the plaintiff No.1 got issued a legal notice dated 18.03.2005 terminating the tenancy by 30.04.2005 and demanded to vacate the premises by paying the rents.

The defendant having received the legal notice got issued a reply notice

dated 30.03.2005 with false averments.

7

d)The defendant No.6 filed a suit vide O.S.No.28 of 2005 on behalf of M.G.R. Reetu and M.G.R. Gourav on the file of 1st Addl. Chief Judge,

City Civil Court, Secunderabad where defendant No.6 admitted that

M.G. Ramkrishna was the rightful owner of the suit schedule property and he has sold out the same to the plaintiff for a valid sale consideration. That a notice is issued to defendant Nos.1 to 5 for eviction and to defendant No.6 informing that he has purchased the property. The plaintiff No.1 has approached the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad to know if there is any existence of H.No.6­2­253/2, New

Bhoiguda, Secunderabad in their record. The Municipal Corporation issued a certificate attested by the Deputy Commissioner stating that as per their record there is no house No.6­2­253/2, New Bhoiguda,

Secunderabad. The defendant No.6 has no right over the suit schedule property and the defendant No.6 is having own house bearing No.6­2­ 324, New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad where he received the legal notice.

That only to harass the plaintiff and to extract money with collusion with defendant Nos.1 to 5, the defendant No.6 has filed impleading petition to avoid the order passed in I.A.No.680 of 2005.

e)The plaintiff No.1 gifted the suit schedule property to plaintiff

No.2 vide registered gift deed vide document No.628 of 2014 dated 06.05.2014 as such ownership in respect of the suit schedule property 8 is transferred during the pendency of the suit as such the plaintiff NO.2 became the owner and possessor of the entire schedule property and is entitled to the reliefs claimed against the defendants. Hence, prayed to decree the suit.

3.The defendant No.1 filed his written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint.

a)The defendant No.1 denies that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the entire building premises bearing No.6­2­253 situated at New

Bhoiguda, Secunderabad by virtue of registered sale deed vide document No.83 of 2002. He further denied that he is a tenant in occupation of two mulgies in the said building on a monthly rent of

Rs.2000/­ to both the mulgies; the tenancy is oral and start from first of every month. 

b)The defendant admits that a notice dated 01.02.2002 was received by the defendant and the defendant got issued a reply notice

dated 27.06.2002 stating that the rents are being paid to one M.B.

Kumar who is the owner of the premises. The plaintiff instead of taking steps to prove his ownership against M.B. Kumar, he filed the false case against this defendant with a view to harass him. This defendant denied that having been received the notice he did not replied nor paid the rents to him inspite of repeated oral demands to pay the monthly 9 rents or to vacate the premises and became a defaulter and he is due the monthly rents from 2003 to till 30.04.2005 of Rs.46,000/­ for 24 months towards arrears of rents. The defendant admits that the plaintiff got issued a legal notice dated 18.03.2005 to this defendant terminating the tenancy by 30.04.2005 to which this defendant gave a reply notice

dated 30.03.2005. The defendant denied that after terminating the

tenancy he is staying in the premises without vacating the schedule property or without paying rents as such the defendant is liable to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs.4000/­ per month with effect from 01.05.2005. 

d)The plaintiff has no cause of action and the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The defendant submitted that Mr.

M.B. Kumar is the landlord and this defendant has obtained two mulgies from him in the year 2001 and executed the rental agreement at the rate of Rs.2000/­ per month. This defendant is paying rents regularly to his landlord. The mulgi which are in the occupation of defendant are not the same as mentioned in plaint schedule property.

The plaintiff started harassing the defendant and his landlord with an intention to grab two mulgies which are in occupation of this defendant by taking advantage of the landlord old age, ill­health and helplessness.

10

e)This defendant admits that the plaintiff has purchased the plaint schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 28.01.2002 from

M.G. Ramakrishna but the plaint schedule boundary and the sale deed schedule boundary are different from each other. That his landlord has filed a case against the plaintiff vide O.S.No.28 of 2005 before the 1st

Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad for cancellation of the sale deed. As such this defendant is not due any rents to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has to proceed against Mr. M.B. Kumar with regard to the deposit of rents of Rs.46,000/­ which he has already been paid to M.B. Kumar. 

f)The plaintiff has no right to terminate the tenancy of this defendant and claim mesne profits at the rate of Rs.4000/­ per month with effect from 01.05.2005 and prayed to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs.

4.The defendant No.1 died on 01.02.2006 and defendant Nos.2 to 5 has come on record as legal representatives of defendant No.1 vide

I.A.No.474 of 2006 dated 05.07.2006. The defendants No.2 to 5 have not filed any additional written statement.

5.The defendant No.6 filed written statement denying that:

a)The plaintiff is the owner of the entire building bearing No.6­2­ 253 situated at New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad. The defendant further 11 denied that the defendants are the joint tenants in the occupation of two mulgies in the ground floor of the plaint schedule property on a monthly rent of Rs.2000/­; that the tenancy is oral, exclusive of electricity and water charges. That this defendant is not aware any notices received by defendant No.1. The deceased defendant No.1 was the original tenant of the mulgies obtained from this defendant and was paying regularly rents and obtained receipts from this defendant. This defendant is not aware that inspite of repeated oral demands to pay the rents to the plaintiff or to vacate the premises or that the deceased defendant No.1 became a defaulter in payment of rents and due monthly rents from 2003 to till 30.04.2005 of Rs.46,000/­ for 23 months towards arrears of rents.

b)The defendant denied that the plaintiff got issued a legal notice

dated 18.03.2005 terminating the tenancy by 30.04.2005 or to vacate

the premises or to pay the rents upto date. That this defendant is not aware whether the defendant No.1 got issued reply notice dated 30.03.2005. This defendant denied that the deceased defendant is liable to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs.4000/­ per month. The mulgies which are in the occupation are not the same as mentioned in the plaint schedule property. That the plaintiff harassing the defendant and the 12 deceased tenant with an intention to grab the two mulgies in his occupation taking advantage of the old age, ill­health and helplessness.

c)This defendant admits that the plaintiff has purchased the plaint schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 28.01.2002 from

M.G. Ramakrishna but the plaint boundaries and the mulgi boundaries are different from each other. That this defendant has taken steps against the plaintiff by filing a case vide O.S.No.28 of 2005 before the 1st

Addl. Chief Judge, Secunderabad for cancellation of the sale deed and prayed to dismiss the suit.

6.The defendant No.6 died on 23.05.2012 and defendant No.7 has been brought on record as legal representative vide I.A.No.84 of 2019

dated 23.09.2019, however, defendant No.7 remained exparte.

7 Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues have been settled for trial on 10.11.2005:

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for vacant and peaceful possession of the suit schedule property as prayed for?

2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for arrears of rent as prayed for?

3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits as prayed for?

4) To what relief?

8.Additional issue has been framed on 21.02.2008:

“Whether the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property having right, title and interest over it?

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9.On behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff No.1 examined himself as PW1 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.12. Ex.A.1 is the certified copy of sale deed dated 28.01.2002 vide document No.83 of 2002.

Ex.A.2 is the office copy of legal notice dated 29.04.2003. Ex.A.3 is the office copy of legal notice dated 18.03.2005. Ex.A.4 is the reply notice

dated 30.03.2005. Ex.A.5 is the office copy of legal notice dated

26.11.2007 got issued by me to the Deputy Commissioner, GHMC.,

Secunderabad. Ex.A.6 is the letter dated 04.08.2018 issued by the

Deputy Commissioner, GHMC., Begumpet to him. Ex.A.7 is the certified copy of plaint in O.S.No.28 of 2005 on the file of Hon’ble XII Addl. Chief

Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. Ex.A.8 is the certified copy of

order in O.S.No.28 of 2005 dated 15.03.2016 on the file of Hon’ble XII

Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. Ex.A.9 is the returned postal cover of caveatees 2 to 5 as no such person. Ex.A.10 is the certified copy of memo dated 17.06.2011 filed in I.A.No.4 of 2011 in

O.S.No.1328 of 2007. Ex.A.11 is the petition filed under Rule 188(2) of

Civil Rules of Practice, by me vide SR.No.6780 of 2018 dated 01.08.2018s, the same was returned with an endorsement that succession OP record destroyed as per the Hon’ble Addl. Chief Judge,

Secunderabad, along with CA Application under Rule 128 of CRP vide

CA.No.7027 of 2018 dated 01.08.2018. Ex.A.12 is the xerox copy of 14

Succession Certificate in OP.No.287 of 1992 dated 12.02.1993 (Petition in I.A.No.134 of 2018, under Section 65 of Indian Evidence Act, filed and allowed) and Exs.B.1 to B.3 i.e. Ex.B.1 is the certified copy of order in RC.No.180 of 2994 dated 28.11.2007. Ex.B.2 is the certified copy of judgment in RA.No.60 of 2008 dated 20.12.2010 and Ex.B.3 is the certified copy of decree in A.S.No.106 of 2008 dated 17.06.2009 were marked on confrontation and later he himself got examined as PW2 since he is a GPA holder of plaintiff No.2 who is son and got marked

Exs.A.13 to A.15. Ex.A.13 is the original GPA executed by Vemula

Pradeep/Petitioner No.2in favour of petitioner No.1/V. Srinivas Rao.

Ex.A.14 is the certified copy of judgment in O.S.No.194 of 2011 dated 29.06.2022 and Ex.A.15 is the certified copy of gift deed document

No.628 of 2014. Since the defence of the defendant Nos.2 to 5 was struck off, the defendants are not entitled to lead any evidence on their own.

10.Both the plaintiff and defendant submitted their oral and written arguments.

Issue No.1

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for vacant and peaceful possession of the suit schedule property as prayed for?

11.PW1 in his chief examination affidavit averred the contents of the pleadings of the plaint and the subsequent developments arised after 15 filing of the suit. The case of the plaintiff as per the plaint pleadings and his chief affidavit as PW1 that he was the sole and absolute owner of the entire building premises bearing H.No.6­2­253 situated at New

Bhoiguda, Secunderabad by virtue of a registered sale deed vide document No.83 of 2002 dated 28.01.2002 (Ex.A.1). The father of defendant Nos.2 to 5 was the tenant in occupation of two mulgies (eastern and middle one) in the ground floor on a monthly rent of

Rs.2000/­ for both the mulgies. PW1 further averred that he issued a notice to defendant No.1 calling upon him to pay the rents to him from 01.02.2002 to which the defendant replied through notice dated 27.06.2002 stating that the rents are being paid to defendant No.6.

PW1 further averred that he issued another legal notice dated 29.04.2003 (Ex.A.2) by narrating his ownership over the suit schedule property and informing that the defendant No.6 has no right over the suit schedule property to which the defendant No.1 neither replied nor paid rents or vacated the suit schedule property. PW1 further issued a legal notice dated 18.03.2005 (Ex.A.3) to defendant No.1 to vacate the suit schedule property by terminating his tenancy by 30.04.2005. The defendant No.1 got issued a reply notice dated 30.03.2005 (Ex.A.4) denying the title of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property.

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12.That the defendant No.6 filed a suit vide O.S.No.28 of 2005 on behalf of M.G.R. Reetu and M.G.R. Gourav on the file of Hon’ble 1st

Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad (Exs.A.7 and A.8) in which he categorically admitted that the vendor of the plaintiff M.G.

Ramakrishna has succeeded the suit schedule property from his father late M.B. Gandaiah who was the absolute owner and that it was a self acquired property. PW1 issued a notice to defendant Nos.1 to 5 for eviction and to defendant NO.6 informing his title and ownership over the suit schedule property. PW1 further averred that defendant No.6 never resided in H.No.6­2­253/2, New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad but he resided in H.No.6­2­324 where he received the legal notice. PW1 relied on Exs.A.5 and Ex.A.6 to prove that the house bearing No.6­2­253/2 and 6­2­253/3 are not existing in the locality of New Bhoiguda,

Secunderabad.

13.PW1 further averred in his chief affidavit evidence that the defendant Nos.2 to 5 have deposited tentative arrears of Rs.1,00,000/­ and also deposited monthly rents till June, 2018 at the rate of

Rs.2000/­ per month to the credit of appeal in A.S.No.69 of 2014 (AS.SR.No.673 of 2011) and still due a sum of Rs.1,30,000/­ towards arrears of rent. PW1 further averred that during the pendency of the suit the defendant No.6 has fraudulently transferred the schedule 17 property to defendant No.2 which is nonest in the eye of law and not binding on him. That the defendant No.2 has filed a suit vide

O.S.NO.194 of 2011 on the file of III Senior Civil Judge, Secunderabad

against him, defendant No.6 and one M.L. Laxminarayana for declaration, where the plaintiff filed the written statement and counter claim seeking cancellation of the sham sale deed vide document

No.1526 of 2009. PW2 filed his chief affidavit reiterating the contents of plaint and chief affidavit averments of PW1. 

14.To prove the jural relationship the burden is on the plaintiffs. The undisputed fact is that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 are the tenants in the suit schedule property and the rent amount is Rs.2000/­ per month.

The only disputed fact is that the plaintiff is not the landlord of the suit schedule property.

15.The defendant admitted that the plaintiff is the owner of house bearing No.6­2­253 situated at New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad under a registered sale dated 28.01.2002 but contended that the sale deed boundaries are different from the suit schedule property and that the defendant No.6 is the landlord of the suit schedule property as such the rents are being paid to defendant No.6. However, this defence of the defendant Nos.2 to 5 was struck off in view of the order passed in

I.A.No.112 of 2007 which attained finality.

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16.The case of defendant Nos.1 to 5 is that they are not claiming adverse title against the plaintiff but denying the title of the plaintiff contending that defendant No.6 is the owner of the suit schedule property. The defendant No.6 who got impleaded filed a written statement by taking the same defence. However, subsequent to his death his son defendant No.7 who was brought on record as LR of defendant No.6 choose to remain exparte and did not contest the case in so far as title of the plaintiff is concerned. Hence, an adverse inference can be drawn against the defendants.

17.To prove the jural relationship of PW1 relied on Exs.A.2 to A.5.

Ex.A.2 is the notice issued to defendants Nos.1 and 6 dated 29.04.2003 explaining his ownership over the suit schedule property and calling upon the defendant No.1 to pay the rents to him at the rate of

Rs.2000/­ per month to the suit schedule property. Ex.A.3 is the quit notice issued under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act to defendant

No.1 by terminating his tenancy by 30.04.2005 and to pay the arrears of rents. Ex.A.4 is the reply notice issued by defendant No.1 to plaintiff

No.1 dated 30.03.2005 disputing the title of the plaintiff and that he is paying the rents to defendant No.6 and refused to vacate the suit schedule property.

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18.The counsel for the plaintiff relied on the decisions reported in In

Hajee K. Assainar and Co., vs. Chacko Joseph (AIR 1984 Kerala

113) wherein it was held that:

“A transferee of the landlord’s rights steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. The section also protects payment of rent by the tenant to the transferor without notice of the transfer. The section does not insist that the transfer of the landlord’s rights can take effect only if the tenant attorns. Attornment by the tenant is unnecessary to confer validity to the transfer of the landlord’s rights. The attornment being unnecessary the tenant cannot dispute the right of transferee landlord to maintain application for eviction or to claim rent.”

The question of attornment was again considered in Dinesh

Kumar Purbey vs. Mahesh Kumar Poddar reported in 1991 (1) PLJR 650 (Patna) wherein it was held that “in a case of eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal necessity, an attornment by lessee is not necessary for creating a relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee of the landlord and the tenant and further observed as follows:

20 “In my considered opinion, attornment is not a necessary condition to create landlord tenant relationship between the parties. It has no bearing whatsoever in cases of eviction on the ground of personal necessity. The transfer takes place with all incidents of right, title and interest of the lessor and the transferee is entitled to sue the existing tenant on the ground of personal necessity even if the tenant has not attorned to his tenancy under him.”

19.PW1 in his cross examination stated as under:

“That he purchased the suit schedule property from M.G. Ramakrishna through Ex.A.1. The extent of the building is 152 sq. yards and the ground floor is mentioned as parking and the first floor is for residential purpose and the same is reflecting in the plan appended to Ex.A.1. PW1 added that the ground floor is converted into godown. That there are three shutters in the ground floor and three residential portions in the first floor of the suit schedule property. On the northern side there are three residential portions which are on the three mulgies of the ground floor.”

19.PW1 in his cross examination deposed that he got issued Ex.A.2 to defendants No.1 to 6 stating that he purchased the property under

Ex.A.1 and that he is the owner of the suit schedule property. He further deposed in his cross examination as stated under:

21 “It is true that under Ex.A.2 I have mentioned that M.B. Kumar has no right to collect the rents in respect of the premises purchased by me. It is true that I pleaded at para No.4 that I addressed a legal notice under

Ex.A.2 dated 29.04.2003 by narrating my ownership and the said M.B.

Kumar has no right to collect the rents in respect of the premises which belongs to me. It is true that I also pleaded in para No.5 of the plaint the defendant No.1 having received the legal notice under Ex.A.3 dated 18.03.2005 got issued reply notice under Ex.A.4 dated 30.03.2005 with all false averments with an ill motive.”

20.A cumulative reading of both the oral evidence of PW1 tested in cross examination and the documentary evidence it can be safely concluded their existence of jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendants Nos.1 to 5 in the absence of any defence in place. It is well settled principle that the tenant in a suit is estoped from questioning title of the landlord under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, the tenant cannot deny that the landlord had no title to the premises under a general law in a suit between the landlord and tenant. Hence, this issue No1 is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

Issue Nos.2 and 3:

2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for arrears of rent as 22 prayed for? 

3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits as prayed for?

21.PW1 in his plaint as well as chief affidavit averred that the defendant is the tenant in occupation of two mulgies (eastern one and middle one) in the ground floor on a monthly rent of Rs.2000/­ and that the tenancy is oral and starts from 1st of every month. The contents of

Exs.A.2 to A.5 shows that the rent amount is Rs.2000/­ per month for the suit schedule property which is not in dispute. Further PW1 averred that defendant No.1 neither gave reply to Ex.A.2 nor paid rents or vacated the suit schedule property as such defendant No.1 has become a defaulter in payment of rents and due from the month of May, 2003 to

May, 2005 i.e., for 24 months at the rate of Rs.2000/­ per month totaling upto Rs.46,000/­. That as per orders in I.A.No.680 of 2007 defendants Nos.2 to 5 failed to deposit the arrears of rents and as such the defence was struck off as per order in I.A.No.112 of 2007. He further averred that defendant Nos.2 to 5 have deposited tentative arrears of Rs.1 lakh and deposited monthly rent till June, 2018 at the rate of Rs.2000/­ per month to the credit of A.S.No.69 of 2014 and due to a sum of Rs.1,30,000/­ towards arrears of rents. PW2 also deposed that defendant No.1 was not paying rents from May, 2003 onwards as such he is claiming Rs.46,000/­ as arrears of rent.

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22.The counsel for the plaintiff relied on a decision reported in Asha

Rani Gupa vs. Vineet Kumar 2022 Supreme Court Cases Online SC

829 wherein it was held that “Mere denial of landlord – tenant relationship doesn’t grant tenant a holiday from duty to pay rent/damages and further held that in cases disclosing deliberate defiance and elective non­performance on the part of the tenant, the consequence of law remains inevitable, that the defence of a such a defendant would be struck off.

‘In the context of the proposition of denial of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant, such a denial simpliciter does not and cannot absolve the tenant of liability to deposit the due rent/damages for use and occupation, unless he could show having made such payment in a lawful and bonafide manner”. 

23.The defendant to rebut the evidence in the cross examination of

PW1 has not put any material questions or suggestions. The cross examination of the PW1 and PW2 went into the lines of destroying the title of the plaintiff by indirectly establishing their defence which was struck off. It is pertinent to note that nothing material has been elicited in the cross examination of PW.s 1 and 2 to rebut the jural relationship of landlord and tenant and arrears of rent in respect of the suit schedule property.

24

24.On one hand the defendant admits that he is tenant of the suit schedule property but raised a plea that it belongs to defendant No.6.

On the other hand, the defendant Nos.6 and 7 remained exparte. This itself demonstrate that the tenant admittedly enjoying the suit schedule property by not paying the rents. It can be safely inferred that no prudent landlord like defendant No.7 waives off the rents, right to collect suppose they are the owners of the suit schedule property. It can be inferred that defendants No.1 to 5 have not taken any steps for establishing their defence by depositing the rents in the Court and no prejudice would have been caused to defendants Nos.6 and 7 if they could have rebutted the title of the plaintiff. As such the plaintiffs are entitled to an amount of Rs.46,000/­ towards arrears of rent.

25.By the above observations it can be concluded that the defendant

Nos.2 to 5 are enjoying the occupation of the suit schedule property without paying the rents as such the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits and to that the plaintiff shall maintain a separate application.

Hence, these issues are answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 

26.The defendant No.2 filed his written arguments stating that this

Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. This same objection was raised by defendant No.2 during pendency of suit and the 25

Hon’ble XXVII Addl. Chief Judge Court, Secunderabad has given a

finding that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.

Hence, no further discussion needed on the point of jurisdiction. 

Additional issue:

“Whether the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property having right, title and interest over it?

27.As per the plaint pleadings and chief affidavit of PW1 that he was the sole and absolute owner of the entire building premises bearing

H.No.6­2­253, New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad by virtue of registered sale deed vide document No.83 of 2002 dated 28.01.2002. This additional issue has been framed on 21.02.2008 basing on the defence of the defendant that plaintiff No.1 is not the owner of the said premises.

Subsequent to it the defence of the defendant was struck off.

28.It is well settled principle that even though the defence of the defendant is struck off the defendant is entitled to cross examine plaintiffs case to limited objective. After going through the entire cross examination of Pws.1 and 2 the defendant tried to put their defence in the cross examination on the aspect of denying the title of the plaintiff which cannot be considered. When the defence is struck off in no circumstances the cross examination can be permitted to travel beyond the legitimate scope of pointing out the legal infirmities or patient legalities of the plaintiff where he would suffer from falsity of the case 26 itself. The defendant cannot be allowed to convert the cross examination into a virtual presentation of the case. If such a course is allowed, the order of striking of the defence is itself rendered infractuous, ineffective and meaningless. Sancity of the order has to be maintained at all costs and to convert itself virtually into presentation of the defendant’s case either directly or in the form of a suggestion put to the plaintiff witness.

29.This Court relied on the decision reported in Modula India vs.

Kamakshya Singh Deo AIR (1989) SC 162 wherein the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has laid down that defendant whose right has been struck off to defend the suit is permitted to cross examine and address arguments but the same is subject to certain safeguards. The defendant cannot be allowed to lead his own evidence and even if right to cross examination is permitted, the cross examination would not travel beyond the limited scope of pointing out the falsity or weakness of the plaintiffs case and in no circumstances should the cross examination be permitted to travel beyond this legitimate scope and to correct itself virtually into a presentation of defendants case either directly or in the form of suggestions put to the plaintiffs witness.”

30.The defendant Nos.1 to 5 have extensively cross examined the plaintiff witness only on the aspect of title without rebutting the evidence of jural relationship and the arrears of rent which are crucial 27 in a suit for eviction. Hence, the evidence which the defendant tried to bring in the cross examination travelled beyond the settled principles which the Court cannot look into. In view of the above discussion this

additional issue is answered in favouir of the plaitniff and against the

defendants.

Issue No.4:

4, To what relief?

31.Having regard to the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of my findings on issues 1 to 3 and additional issue, In the result, the suit is decreed with costs in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant:­

(a) the defendants shall vacate the suit schedule property within a period of two months from today and deliver vacant possession thereof to the plaintiff failing which the plaintiff is at liberty to seek recovery of possession of the suit schedule property through due process of law;

(b) directing the defendants to pay the arrears of rent an amount of Rs.46,000/­; and 

(c) the claim for mesne profits is left upon to be determined on a separate application by the plaintiffs under Order XX Rule 12 of Code

Civil Procedure. 

28

Dictated to the Stenographer, transcribed and typed by him, corrected

and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 10th day of July, 2023.

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER: CUM :

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE,

SECUNDERABAD 

Appendix of Evidence

Witnesses Examined

For Plaintiff: For Defendant

PW1 V. Srinivas Rao PW2 V. Srinivas RaoNIL

Documents marked on behalf of the plaintiffs: Ex.A.1 Certified copy of Sale deed dated 28.01.2002 Ex,A.2 Office Copy of Legal notice dated 29.04.2003 Ex.A.3 Office Copy of legal notice dated 18.03.2005 Ex.A.4 Reply notice dated 30.03.12005 Ex.A.5 Office copy of legal notice dated 26.11.2007 Ex.A.6 Letter dated 04.08.2018 Ex.A.7 Certified copy of plaint in O.S.NO.28 of 2005 dated 15.03.2016 Ex.A.8 Certified copy of order in OS.No.28 of 2005 dated 15.03.2016 Ex.A.9 Returned postal cover of Caveatees 2 to 5 Ex.A.10 Certified copy of Memo dated 17.06.2011 Ex.A.11 Petition filed under Rule 188(2) of Civil Rules of Practice vide SR.No.6780 of 2018 dated 01.08.2018 Ex.A.12 Xerox copy of Succession Certificate in OP.No.287 of 1992 

dated 12.02.1993

Ex.A.13 Original General Power of Attorney Ex.A.14 Certified copy of judgment in O.S.No.194 of 2011 

dated 29.06.2022

Ex.A.15 Certified copy of gift deed vide document No.194 of 2011 dated 06.05.2014

Ex.B.1 Certified copy of order in RC.No.180 of 2004 dated 28.11.2007 Ex.B.2 Judgment in RA.No.50 of 2008 dated 20./12.2010 Ex.B.3 Certified copy of decree in A.S.No.106 of 2009 dated 17.06.2009.

Documents marked on behalf of defendants:

29

NIL

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER: CUM :

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE,

SECUNDERABAD 

SUIT SCHEDULE PROPERTY

All that the two mulgies (Eastern mulgi and Middle Mulgi) in ground floor of premises bearing H.No.6­2­253, situated at New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad, and bounded by:

East: Road North:: Road West: Small mulgi leading to rear portion godown South: Godown under the occupation of the plaintiff. 

PRINCIPAL RENT CONTROLLER: CUM :

XVII JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE,

SECUNDERABAD.