Sri G.Subrahmanyam

1 APKR0E0004432015

IN THE COURT OF XI ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,

KRISHNA DISTRICT AT GUDIVADA

Present: Grandhi Subrahmanyam,

XI Additional District & Sessions Judge,

Monday, this the 6 th day of April, 2026

SESSIONS CASE No.44/2016

(PRC.No.74/2015 on the file of the Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Gudivada in

Crime No.110/2015 of Gudivada Taluka Police Station)

Prosecution : Sri K.Ravi,

Additional Public Prosecutor

Defence Counsel : Sri M.Rajesh, Advocate for Accused Nos.1 to 7 Sri B.Kranthi, Advocate for Accused No.8

Name(s) of the Accused : 1. Bollavarapu Subhakar Rao @ Subhakar, S/o Bhaskara Rao, 30 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada Mandal.

2. Bollavarapu Bhaskara Rao, S/o Israel, 55 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada mandal. (Died case abated on 15.11.2023)

3. Bollavarapu Maremma, W/o Bhaskara Rao, 45 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada Mandal.

4. Bollavarapu Prabhakara Rao, S/o Bhaskara Rao, 25 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada Mandal.

5. Bollavarapu Subhashini @ Suhasini, D/o Bhaskara Rao, 32 years, Srikalahasti colony, Gudivada.

6. Geera Sumanjali @ Chanti, W/o Jayant, 26 years, Srikalahasti Colony, Gudivada.

2 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

7. Ballavarapu Sudhanjali @ Sudha, D/o Bhaskara Rao, 21 years, Srikalahasti Colony, Gudivada.

8. Kota John Paul Chowdary @ Jaya Paul Choudary, S/o Prakasam, 49 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada Mandal. (Died case abated on 03.02.2026)

Charges under section(s) : U/s 498-A, 306, 304-B r/w 34 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

Plea of the Accused : Pleaded not guilty

Finding of the Court : A3 to A7 are found not guilty of the offences u/s 498-A, 304-B, 306 of IPC and Secs.3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Accused No.1 is found not guilty of the offences u/s 304-B and Secs.3 & 4 of D.P. Act. He is found guilty of the offences u/s 498A and 306 of IPC.

Result of the case : In the result, the Accused Nos.3 to 7 are found not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 306, 304-B of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and accordingly, they are acquitted of the said charges under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C. The bail bonds of Accused Nos.3 to 7 shall be in force for a period of six months under Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., Accused Nos.2 and 8 died and the case against them was abated. Accused No.1 is found not guilty of the offences punishable under Section 304-B of IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and accordingly, he is acquitted of the said charges under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C. Accused No.1 is found guilty of the 3 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 offences punishable under Sections 498- A and 306 of IPC and accordingly, he is convicted of the said charges under Section 235 (2) of Cr.P.C. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that it is a fit case to impose lesser punishment than the punishment prescribed. Accordingly, Accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of Five (05) Years and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall suffer Simple Imprisonment for a period of six months, for the offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C. He is further sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment for a period of Two (02) years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall suffer Simple Imprisonment for a period of three months, for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. Accused No.1 was in judicial remand from 27.07.2015 to 13.11.2015 and the sameshall be givenset off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. Order relating to case property:

M.O.1/Nylon rope and other un- marked non-valuable case property, if any, shall be destroyed, after expiry of appeal time.

The above numbered Sessions Case came on 23.03.2026 before me for final hearing in the presence of Sri K.Ravi, Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State/Complainant and of Sri K.Rajesh, Advocate for the Accused Nos.1 to 7 and of Sri B.Kranthi, Advocate for Accused No.8, upon hearing both sides, perusing the material papers on record and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, the Court delivered the following:- 4 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

J U D G M E N T

The State represented by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer,

Gudivada filed Charge Sheet against accused Nos.1 to 8 in Crime

No.110/2015 of Gudivada Taluka Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 306 and 304-B r/w 34 of the Indian

Penal Code (for brevity, ‘IPC’) and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for brevity ‘D.P.Act’.)

2. The brief contents of the charge sheet are as follows:-

The defacto-complainant/L.W.1-Chimmasatti Mariyamma in this case is the mother of the deceased, Bollavarapu Anusha, who is wife of Accused No.1. Deceased is the 3rd daughter to her parents.

The scene of offence is situated in the house of Accused

Nos.1 to 3 at Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada Mandal.

The deceased fell in love with Accused No.1 and they married each other on 03.07.2013 in the Registrar Office, Mudinepalli, which is an inter-caste marriage. Her parents did not accept the said marriage. On that, the village elders of Valivarthipadu assured her parents for the security of the deceased. During their wed-lock, the deceased and Accused No.1 were blessed with a son and the deceased 5 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 was carrying 2nd pregnancy by the time of her death. Accused No.1 addicted to liquor, not taking care of the deceased and her son and himself and Accused Nos.2 to 7 and the juvenile in conflict with law (Ballavarapu Sirisha @ Ammulu) started harassing her to bring dowry from her parents as she did not bring any dowry. The deceased informed the same to L.W.1, L.W.2/Chimmasatti Subba Rao, L.W.3./Matangi

Aruna, L.W.4/Kota Aasha, L.W.5/Kota Prasad, L.W.6/Chimmasatti Anitha,

L.W.7/Kanuri Soma Raju, L.W.8/Kanuri Kumari and L.W.9/Chunduri

Durga. L.Ws.1 and 2 and other family members questioned the accused about their harassment for dowry, but they paid deaf ear and the elder

John Paul Choudary @ Jay Paul Choudary supported the accused. The family members of the deceased advised her to adjust and lead marital life. On 23.07.2015 the deceased visited her maternal house and watched a movie along with L.W.4. On the same day, at about 6.00 p.m.,

Accused No.1 came and took the deceased to his house. On the following day the accused tortured the deceased for dowry and as the torture of the accused was unbearable, the deceased committed suicide by hanging with a nylon rope on 24.07.2015 at 5.00 p.m., at the house of

Accused No.1.

On 25.07.2015 at 1.30 p.m., L.W.1 came to Gudivada Taluka

Police Station and lodged a report. Based on the report of L.W.23/

J.Srinivasa Rao, HC 1230, Gudivada Taluka Police Station registered a 6 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 case in Cr.No.110/2014 u/s 304-B IPC and submitted copies of FIR to all authorities concerned. L.W.24/D.Surya Sravan Kumar, S.D.P.O., took- up investigation, visited the scene of offence, examined the same in the presence of the mediators L.W.17/Mudikoti Lakshmeeswara Rao, VRO,

Valivarthipadu and L.W.18/Remalli Yerakaiah, VRA of Valivarthipadu, prepared rough sketch, drafted scene observation report, seized nylon rope from the scene of offence, examined the witnesses i.e., L.Ws.1 to 9 and L.W.10/Gunde Lavanya, L.W.11/Remalli adam, L.W.12/Remalli

Bhujanga Rao, L.W.13/Bhattu Bhart Babu, L.W.14/Gudapati Danielu and

L.W.15/Kandavalli Ravi Teja Kumar and recorded their statements.

L.W.22/K.Ravi Shankar, Mandal Executive Magistrate, Gudivada conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased. On 26.07.2015

L.W.24 arrested the accused 1 to 8 and sent them for judicial custody.

Accused Nos.2 and 5 to 8 were enlarged on bail and Accused Nos.1, 3 and 4 were in judicial remand. On 03.11.2015 the juvenile was taken into custody and produced her before the II Addl. Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate-cum-Juvenile Court, Vijayawada. L.W.20/Dr.G.Lakshmi

Narayana, CAS and L.W.21/Dr.Y.Roja, CAS conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and issued a certificate opining that the cause of death was due to ‘Asphyxia due to hanging’. Basing on the evidence collected during investigation, Sections 498-A and 306 r/w 34 of IPC and

Section 4 of D.P.Act were added. Thus, the accused created 7 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 circumstances to the deceased by their willful conduct and compelled and impelled her to commit suicide within seven years of her marriage.

Hence the charge-sheet.

3.On appearance of the accused 1 to 8 before the Court, they were furnished with copies of documents relied on by the prosecution in compliance with Section 208 of Cr.P.C. Having heard the Addl. Public

Prosecutor for the prosecution and the counsel for the accused, the accused were examined u/Sec.228 Cr.P.C., and charges under Sections 498-A, 306 and 304-B r/w 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of D.P.Act were framed against them, read-over and explained the contents of the charges to them in Telugu, for which they denied the same and claimed the case to be tried.

4. On behalf of the prosecution, P.W.1 to P.W.19 were examined and marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P11 and M.O.1. Exs.D1 to D8 were marked on behalf of the defence. The Addl. P.P, has given up evidence of the evidence of L.W.3/Matangi Aruna, L.W.10/Gunde Lavanya,

L.W.14/Gudapati Danielu, L.W.18/Remalli Yerakaiah, VRA,

L.W.19/Sayana Anasuyamma and L.W.21/Dr.Y.Roja. The prosecution evidence was closed. During the course of trial, Accused No.2 died on 16.07.2021 and the case against him was abated on 15.11.2023.

Subsequently, Accused No.8 died on 25.09.2025 and the case against him was abated on 03.02.2026. Further, two Ex.D2 was marked twice by 8 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 mistake in the cross-examination of P.W.1 and P.W.3. Thus, Ex.D2 marked during the cross-examination of P.W.3 is renumbered as Ex.D2A.

5. On closure of prosecution side evidence, the accused 1 and 3 to 8 were examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., for which they denied the offence and Accused No.1 stated that as Baby Shower was not performed to the deceased, she committed suicide due to annoyance,

Accused No.3 stated that on the date of the incident she was not present there, Accused No.4 stated that he did not know anything, Accused No.5 stated that she has been residing in a separate village and she is no way connected, Accused No.6 stated that her marriage took place before the marriage of her elder brother and residing separately and she is no way concerned, Accused No.7 stated that she never resided in Valivartipadu village and she has knowledge about the case and Accused No.8 stated that he belongs to Moparru Village, he has no relationship with A1 to A7, his name is wrongly mentioned and that he is falsely implicated in this case. Accused did not choose to adduce any evidence on their behalf.

6. Heard both sides. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor filed

Written Arguments. During the course of arguments, the accused filed

Certified Copies of depositions of P.Ws.1 to 12 and Calendar and

Judgment, dt.16.02.2018 in J.C.C.No.1/2017 on the file of II Addl. Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate Court-cum-Juvenile Justice Board, Vijayawada along with a Memo dt.08.07.2025. Having heard the learned Addl. Public 9 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the accused, the points that arises for determination are as follows:-

1. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that prior to 24.07.2015 accused Nos.1 to 8 subjected the deceased-Bolavarapu Anusha to cruelty physically and mentally for additional dowry and thereby committed an

offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC?

2 . Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that on 24.07.2015 at about 5.00 p.m., accused Nos.1 to 8 abetted the deceased-Bolavarapu Anusha to commit suicide and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC? 3. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that on 24.07.2015 at about 5.00 p.m., accused Nos.1 to 8 caused the dowry death of the deceased-Bolavarapu Anusha within seven years of her marriage and before her death subjected her to cruelty or harassed her as she did not bring dowry and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC?

4. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that prior to and on 24.07.2015 accused Nos.1 to 8 harassed the deceased-Bolavarapu Anusha for dowry and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act?

7. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor argued that the evidence led by the prosecution proved the offences charged against the accused and prayed to convict him of the said charges, the Court may proceed as per the material available on record. He further submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 7 and 12 is corroborating to each other and nothing was elicited to discredit the truth and veracity of the evidence of prosecution witnesses. Non-mentioning of the name of the one of the 10 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 accused in the FIR is not fatal to the case of prosecution. Once the accused failed to rebut the presumption u/s 113-B of Indian Evidence Act, the defence taken by the accused is proved as false, unbelievable and the accused are liable for conviction. When the deceased was done to death within four walls of her matrimonial home, independent evidence need not be necessary. Merely because some of the prosecution witnesses turned hostile, the evidence of the remaining witnesses cannot be doubted. Some general questions were put to the doctor, but he was not cross-examined particularly with regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The evidence of the relative- witnesses is found to be truthful, it can be made as basis for conviction.

In support of his arguments he relied on the following case-law:-

a) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Jogendra & Another, reported in 2022 SAR (Cri) 167.

b) Satbir Singh and Another vs. state of Haryana, reported in 2021 AIAR (Criminal) 736.

c) The State of Bihar (now State of Jharkhand) & Ors., Vs.

Ram Sahay Mahto, reported in 2021 Supp. SAR (Cri) 1166.

d) Abdul Javeeth Vs. State by Inspector of Police, Crl.A.No.140 of 2009, dt.09.08.2019 of Hon’ble Madras High Court.

e) Gurunath Donkappa Keri and others vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2009 0 Supreme (SC) 957.

11 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

f) Ashok Debbarma @ Achak Debbarma Vs. State of Tripura, reported in 2014 AIAR (Criminal) 209.

g) M.G.Eshwarappa and others vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2017 0 Supreme (SC) 210.

h) Karulal & Ors., Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2020 0 Supreme (SC) 582.

i) Virender Pal @ Vipin vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2025 0

Supreme (SC) 849.

j) Mritunyoy Biswas Vs. Pranab @ Kuti Biswas and another, reported in 2013 (131) AIC 135 (S.C.).

k) Kamla Kant Dubey and State of U.P. and others, reported in 2015 (152) AIC 19 (S.C.).

l) Shaik Abdul Khadar Vs. Shaik Johny Basha & Ors., Etc., reported in 2025 0 Supreme (SC) 184.

8.The learned Defence Counsel argued that, the accused persons did not commit any offence and they are no way concerned with the alleged offence, there were falsely implicated in this case taking advantage of the deceased committing suicide due to the annoyance caused by her parents as they did not perform Baby Shower ceremony to her and there were dissimilarities in treating the deceased and the other daughters. Accused Nos.5 to 7 got married and they were living separately away from the house of Accused No.1 and their names were 12 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 falsely implicated in the case. The accused are no way concerned with the case as they never harassed the deceased and due to the harassment made by her parents, she committed suicide and the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused and prayed for acquittal. In support of his arguments, he relied on the following case- law:-

a) Challa Sathyavathi v. State of Telangana and another, reported in 2019 (1) ALD (Crl.) 920 (TS)

b) Nelaturi Chandra Sekhar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 2018 92) ALD (Crl.) 575.

c) Baijnath and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2017 (1) ALD (Crl.) 23 (SC).

d) Bibi Parwana Khatoon @ Parwana Khatoon and another v. State of Bihar, reported in 2017 (2) ALD (Crl.) 269 (SC).

e) Shaik Jani Pasha and another v. State of Andhra

Pradesh, reported in 2017 (2) ALD (Crl.) 1034.

9. The case of the prosecution is that on 03.07.2013 Accused

No.1 and the deceased married each other against the will and wish of her parents and it is an inter-caste love marriage and none from the side of her parents attended the marriage. After one year they begot a male child and after the birth of the male child, all the accused started harassing the deceased both physically and mentally demanding dowry.

13 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

The deceased used to visit the house of her parents and informed about the said harassment made by the accused to her parents and others.

Due to the unbearable harassment in the hands of the accused, the deceased used to express that she would commit suicide. Accused No.1 did not give his income to the deceased to meet the household expenses and he used to give his income to one Ammulu. When her parents and others questioned the accused, they stated that if they give dowry, then accused No.1 will lead family life with the deceased. Inspite of the request made by her parents to give some time for payment of dowry, the accused did not accept the same and stated that they will hear the words of Accused No.8 only. On one occasion, Accused No.8, in the presence of accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 called the deceased and demanded to bring dowry from her parents’ house. One day before her death i.e., on 23.7.2015 the deceased came to her parents’ house, spent happily, she went to a movie along with her 2nd elder sister/P.W.2 and at about 6.00 p.m., Accused No.1 came and took back the deceased to his house. On 24.07.2015 at 5.00 p.m., the villagers of Valivarthipadu informed P.W.3 over phone while he was in Vijayawada about the death of the deceased by hanging and in turn he informed the same to P.W.1 over phone. On receipt of information, the parents of the deceased and others went to the house of Accused No.1, saw the dead body of the deceased laying in the house, nobody available in the house, the father-in-law of the deceased, 14 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 who was available outside the house, left the house on seeing them by leaving the son of the deceased. Later, P.W.1, who is the mother of the deceased, has set the criminal law into motion, by giving Ex.P1 report to the Gudivada Taluka Police. Therefore, the prosecution party suspected that accused 1 to 8 have abetted the deceased to commit suicide by subjecting her to cruelty soon before her death for the demand of dowry.

10.In order to prove the case of the prosecution, it has as many

as 19 witnesses. P.W.1, the mother of the deceased is the defacto-

complainant. In her chief examination she deposed that Accused No.1 married the deceased and it is a love marriage, after one year they begot a male child, after the birth of male child the accused harassed the deceased both physically and mentally demanding dowry, accused No.1 used to beat the deceased in a drunken state, the deceased used to inform her about the harassment made by the accused, the accused used to send the deceased to our house by demanding dowry and they used to pacify the matter and send her back to her conjugal home, six months prior to the death of the deceased, on one day Accused No.8, who is neighbor of Accused No.1 called the deceased to his house where

Accused Nos.1, 2, 4 were present and consuming alcohol, in their presence accused No.8 demanded the deceased to bring dowry from her parents’ house, in turn the deceased informed the same to the witness, later P.W.1 along with her family members went to the house of accused 15 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

No.1 to pacify the matter and requested Accused Nos.1 to 7 some time for payment of dowry and not to harass the deceased, by that time the deceased was carrying 6th month pregnancy, but the accused No.1 paid deaf ear and stated that they will obey the words of Accused No.8, who is their elder. P.W.1 further deposed that later, the accused sent the deceased to her house demanding dowry, the deceased expressed that she was not in a position to tolerate the unbearable torture of the accused and she would commit suicide due to the said harassment, P.W.1 gave counselling to the deceased and advised her not to take such decision.

She further deposed that on 23.07.2015 the deceased came to her house, went to a movie along with P.W.2, on the same day evening accused No.1 came to their house and took her back to his home, on the next day i.e., 24.07.2015 P.W.3 received information from the villagers of

Valivarthipadu that the deceased died by committing suicide, then P.W.3 informed the same to them and then herself and her family members and other relatives went to the house of in-laws of the deceased, found the house locked from outside, accused No.2 was carrying her grandson, on seeing them, accused No.2 left the boy and flee away, then she opened the doors and found the dead body of the deceased laying on the floor.

P.W.1 deposed that thereafter she reported the matter to the S.H.O.,

Gudivada Taluka P.S., by giving Ex.P1 report, police shifted the dead body of the deceased to the Government Area Hospital, Gudivada, the 16 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

Tahsildar, Gudivada examined P.W.1 at the hospital and recorded her statement, on the same day P.W.18 examined her, the deceased committed suicide due to the harassment made by the accused and that the deceased informed her that accused No.1 not provided minimum needs to her and used to give money to one Ammulu.

11.Second elder sister of the deceased is examined as P.W.2 and she deposed that the deceased married accused No.1 and their marriage is love marriage, initially they opposed the marriage thereafter with intervention of elders they accepted the said marriage, after one year the deceased begot a male child, thereafter the deceased again conceived and while she was carrying 6th month pregnancy, all the accused harassed the deceased both physically and mentally for demand of dowry, several times the deceased informed her about the harassment made by the accused, on that they consoled her and sent her back to her conjugal home, the deceased further informed her that accused No.1, 2 and 4 used to beat her indiscriminately, several times she expressed her opinion that she want to commit suicide unable to tolerate the torture of the accused, then, she consoled the deceased not to take such decision, thereafter, on one day P.W.2 and her family members went to the house of accused No.1, requested all the accused not to harass the deceased and if some time is given they will pay the dowry amount as per their demand, accused Nos.1 to 7 bluntly refused their request and replied that 17 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 they will oblige the words of accused No.8 only, on that they returned back to their house, accused No.1 never give any money to the deceased for household purpose and he used to give his entire money to one

Ammulu. P.W.2 further deposed that on 23.07.2015 the deceased came to their mother’s house, on that day P.W.2 and the deceased went to movie for a matinee show, on the same day evening at 6.00 p.m., accused No.1 came to the house of her mother and took back the deceased to his house, on the next day i.e., on 24.07.2015 at about 7.30 p.m., her husband/P.W.3 came to know about the death of deceased through the villagers of Valivarthipadu over phone, immediately he informed the same to P.W.1 over phone, after knowing the same they rushed to the house of accused No.1, by that time the house was bolted from outside and accused No.2 was standing with son of deceased, on that they opened the door of house and found that the deceased was died and she was laying on floor, accused No.2 without giving any reply by leaving the son of deceased fled away. P.W.2 further deposed that the deceased committed suicide due to the harassment made by all the accused and that the Mandal Thasildar and Sub Divisional Police Officer examined her and recorded statement.

12.Husband of P.W.2 is examined as P.W.3 and he deposed that Accused No.1 married deceased and their marriage is a love marriage, they lived happily for a period of one year and begot one male 18 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 child, after the birth of male child, accused No.1 to 8 harassed the deceased by demanding dowry, several times the deceased informed about the harassments made by the accused to P.W.1, he also heard some times while the deceased informing to her mother about the harassments, on one day he along with P.W.1 and 2 and other family members of P.W.1 went to the house of accused No.1 and requested some time for payment dowry and not to harass the deceased for want of dowry, but the accused No.1 to 7 bluntly refused their request and replied that they will hear only the words of accused No.8, at that time the deceased was carrying 6th month of pregnancy. P.W.3 further deposed that thereafter he came to know accused No.1 to 8 are intensified their harassment for the demand of dowry, accused No.1 also not provided minimum needs to the deceased and also not given any amount to the deceased for household purpose and he used to give all his money to one Ammulu. He further deposed that on 23.07.2015 the deceased came to the house of P.W.1, went to movie along with PW.2, on the same day evening accused No.1 came to the house of P.W.1 and took the deceased back to his house, on 24.07.2015 he went to Vijayawada for attending his work, at that time he received phone from a villager of

Valivarthipadu informing about the death of deceased by committing suicide by hanging herself, immediately he informed the same to P.W.1, thereafter, P.W.1 along with her family members and relatives went to the 19 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 house of accused No.1, he also went to the house of the deceased after 1½ hour, found dead body of deceased was laying on floor and only accused No.2 was present along with male child of deceased, he came to know that he (A2) left the place by leaving male child on seeing the P.W.1 and others, the deceased committed suicide as she unable to bear the torture and harassment of accused, he was present at the time of inquest of deceased and the Thasildar and police examined him and recorded his statement.

13. Younger sister of the deceased is examined as P.W.4 and she deposed that the deceased is her 3rd elder sister, she got married accused No.1 on 03.07.2013 at Sub Register Office, Mudinepalli and their marriage was love marriage, initially they opposed the said marriage with accused No.1, but with the intervention of elders they accepted the same, after the one year the deceased begot a male child, the deceased used to visit the house of P.W.1 now and then and used to inform that the accused No.1 to 8 used to harass her demanding dowry, by saying that if accused No.1 got married another women, he would get more dowry, the deceased informed her about the harassment made by accused No.8, who is neighbour of accused No.1, accused No.1, 2 and 4 used to visit the house of accused No.8 for consuming liquor, while consuming liquor accused No.8 used to call the deceased to his house and demands for dowry by saying that the marriage of deceased is love marriage, so she 20 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 need to bring dowry, accused No.1 to 8 used to abuse the deceased in filthy and vulgar language, the deceased informed that she wants to commit suicide as she is unable to tolerate the torture and harassment of the accused. P.W.4 further deposed that the deceased became pregnant and carrying 6th month, nevertheless the accused harassed the deceased, then, they used to console the deceased to wait for good days, they along with their relatives went to the house of accused No.1 and requested the accused not to harass the deceased and sought some time for payment of dowry, accused No.1 to 7 bluntly refused their request and said that they will obey the words of accused No.8 only, on that they returned back to their home. P.W.4 further deposed that accused No.1 never provided minimum needs to the deceased and he never gave any amount to the deceased for household purposes, he used to give all his amount to the one Ammulu. She further deposed that on 23.07.2015 the deceased came to the house of P.W.1, she went to movie along with

P.W.2, on the same day evening accused No.1 came to the house of

PW.1 and took back the deceased to his house, on the next day at about 7.30 p.m., they came to know about the death of deceased through

P.W.3, immediately all of them proceeded to the house of accused No.1, noticed the house of accused No.1 was bolted from outside and the dead body of deceased was laying on floor, accused No.2 was present outside the house of accused No.1 carrying male child of deceased, on seeing 21 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 them he left the place by leaving the child, the deceased died due to the harassment made by the accused No.1 to 8. She further deposed that she was present at the time of inquest of the dead body of deceased and that she was examined by the police and Thasildar and recorded her statements and that she scribed Ex.P1/report on the dictation of P.W.1.

14.Junior paternal aunt of the deceased is examined as P.W.5 and she deposed that the deceased entered into a registered marriage with Accused No.1 at Mudinepalli and theirs was a love marriage, she begot a male child, thereafter again she conceived and became pregnant, the deceased used to attend the house of her parents frequently and used to inform her that the accused No.1 to 7 used to harass her for the demand dowry, P.W.5 used to console her and informed her that her parents will take care of the things, the parents and family members of deceased went to the house of accused No.1 and requested some time for payment of dowry and not to harass the deceased meanwhile, but the accused No.1 to 7 bluntly refused their request by stating that they will obey the words of accused No.8 only. P.W.5 further deposed that thereafter the parents and family members of deceased returned back to their home, the deceased used to inform that accused No.1 never provided needs to her and not to give any money for household purpose and P.W.5 came to know that on one day the deceased was called by accused No.8 to his house and demanded dowry by saying that her 22 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 parents might have saved some amounts for purpose of dowry and asked her to bring said amount as dowry, the deceased used to inform her that the accused ill-treated her in her conjugal home, about 9 years back on one day she came to know that P.W.3 informed to PW.1 about the death of the deceased, the parents of deceased informed her about the same, on that she went to the house of accused No.1 at Valivarthipadu along with parents and family members of deceased, by that time she saw accused No.2 was carrying with male child of deceased at outside of house of accused No.1 and on seeing them accused No.2 left the house by leaving the male child on the road without informing anything, the house of accused No.1 was bolted from outside, they found the dead body of the deceased was laying on floor in the house of accused No.1.

P.W.5 further deposed that the deceased died due to harassment made by accused No.1 to 8 and that she was present at the time of inquest of deceased and she was examined by the Police and Thasildar and recorded her statements.

15. Father of the deceased is examined as P.W.6 and he deposed that Accused No.1 married the deceased at Mudinepalli and their marriage was love marriage, after one year the deceased begot a male child, thereafter again the deceased became pregnant, the deceased used to visit their house frequently, she used to inform P.W.1 about the harassment made by the accused for the demand of dowry, 23 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 meanwhile the deceased became pregnant and while carrying 6th month pregnancy she came to their house and informed P.W.1 about the harassment made by the accused, on that he along with his family members went to the house of accused No.1 and requested the accused not to harass the deceased for demand of dowry and they sought some time for payment of dowry, but the accused No.1 to 7 bluntly refused their request and replied that they will hear the words of accused No.8 only, then they returned back to their house. P.W.6 further deposed that thereafter, the deceased came to their house and informed that all the accused intensified their harassment with the demand of dowry, on one day the deceased again came to their house and she went to movie, on the same day accused No.1 came to their house and took back the deceased to his house, thereafter on one day P.W.3 came to know about the death of deceased through a phone call, then, he informed the same to P.W.1, then all of them went to the house of accused No.1, by the time of their the house of the accused was closed and bolted from outside, by opening the door they found the dead body of deceased laying on floor with oozing of liquid from her mouth at the house of accused No.1. P.W.6 further deposed that the deceased died due to the harassment made by the accused and that he was examined by the police.

16. Junior paternal uncle of the deceased is examined as P.W.7 and he deposed that in the year 2013 the deceased fell in love with 24 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 accused No.1, initially P.W.1 opposed for the marriage of the deceased with accused No.1, the village elders of Valivarthipadu assured P.W.1 for the marriage of deceased, thereafter, the deceased married the accused

No.1 at Sub Register office, Mudinepalli, after the marriage the deceased used to visit the house of P.W.1 frequently and the deceased begot a male child, thereafter, the deceased became pregnant for 2nd time, from that time all the accused used to harass the deceased for demand of dowry, the deceased used to inform about the harassment made by the accused to the P.W.1 and to P.W.7, on that he enquired about accused

No.8 and why was demanding dowry to the deceased, then, P.W.1 informed him that accused Nos.1 and 2 used to consume liquor in the house of accused No.8, on one occasion when accused No.1 and 2 were consuming liquor in the house of accused No.8, the deceased was called by accused No.8 to his house and in the presence of accused Nos.1 and 2, accused No.8 demanded the deceased to bring dowry from her parents’ house, the deceased informed him about the said demand.

P.W.7 further deposed that he along with other family members of deceased went to the house of accused No.1 and requested the accused not to harass the deceased and sought some time for payment of dowry, on that accused Nos.1 to 7 bluntly refused their request and abused them and replied that they will hear the words of accused No.8 only, by that time the deceased was carrying 6th month pregnancy, thereafter, the 25 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 deceased informed P.W.7 that the accused continued their harassment for demand of dowry without considering her pregnancy and their requests, thereafter, they sent back the deceased to her conjugal home by consoling her. P.W.7 further deposed that on 24.07.2015 at about 7.30 p.m., he heard some cries from the house of P.W.1, then P.W.1 informed him that the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself, on that they along with other family members of deceased went to the house of accused No.1, by that time they found the house of accused No.1 was closed and bolted from outside and accused No.2 was standing with male child of deceased at the outside of the house, on seeing them he left the place by leaving the male child, they opened the door and found dead body of deceased was laying on floor. P.W.7 further deposed that the deceased committed suicide due to the harassment made by the accused and the accused are responsible for the death of deceased and that he was examined by the police and Thasildar.

17. A neighbor to the house of P.W.1 deposed is examined as

P.W.8 and deposed that about 7 to 8 eight years back, he came to know about the death of the deceased, he went to the house of Accused No.1 to see the deceased. As this witness deposed that he does not know anything about this case, he was treated as a hostile witness.

18.Another neighbor of P.W.1 as P.W.10 deposed that the deceased married accused No.1 and their marriage is love marriage, 26 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 thereafter the deceased begot male child, later she again conceived and became pregnant. P.W.10 further deposed that he came to know disputes arose in between accused No.1 and the deceased regarding the demand of dowry, by that time he was Vice Precedent of his village, on coming to know about the said disputes, he called accused No.1, questioned him about the harassment and admonished him not to harass the deceased for demand of dowry, but accused No.1 bluntly refused to obliged his words and replied that he will hear and obey the words of accused No.8 only. P.W.10 further deposed that on 24.07.2015 he came to know about the death of deceased, visited the house of accused No.1, saw the dead body of deceased and that due to the harassment made by the accused No.1 with his family members, the deceased committed suicide and that he was examined by the police.

19. Junior maternal aunt of the deceased is examined as P.W.12 and she deposed that about 10 years back on one day the deceased informed her that she fell in love with accused No.1, initially PW.1 did not accept for the marriage, thereafter, the village elders of Valivarthipadu

Village assured for the marriage of deceased with accused No.1, on that they accepted for the marriage proposal of the deceased with accused

No.1, the elders performed the marriage of deceased with accused No.1 at Mudinepalli Village, during the wedlock the deceased begot a male child, the deceased used to visit the house of PW.1 frequently, the 27 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 deceased again became pregnant and while she was carrying 6th month pregnancy, she came to her house on that occasion she enquired the deceased about her conjugal life. P.W.12 further deposed that the deceased replied that all the accused were harassing her for the demand of dowry and the deceased further informed that she wanted to commit suicide as she was unable to bear the harassments of the accused, on that she gave counseling to the deceased and requested not to take such decision, then P.W.1 also informed P.W.12 about the harassment made by the accused towards the deceased and that accused No.1 was not giving any money to the deceased for her daily needs and he used to give his income to one Ammulu. P.W.12 further deposed that on the request made by P.W.1 to attend for mediation at the house of accused No.1, she along with other family members of P.W.1 went to the house of accused

No.1 and requested the accused not to harass the deceased for demand of dowry and they sought some time for payment of dowry as demanded by the accused, but the accused bluntly refused to oblige their request and replied that they will obey words of accused No.8 only, on that occasion also she enquired the deceased about accused No.8, she replied that the accused No.1, 2 and 8 used to consume alcohol together at the house of accused No.8 and on one occasion while they were drinking they called the deceased and abused her in filthy language and demanded her to bring dowry from her parents’ house, about 9 years 28 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 back on one day P.W.3 received a phone call from the villager of

Valivarthipadu informing him about the death of deceased, then P.W.3 informed the same to P.W.1, who informed the same to her and immediately P.W.12 along with other family members of P.W.1 went to the house of accused No.1, by that time they found the house of accused was bolted from outside, they entered into the house by opening the bolted door and found the dead body of deceased laying on floor in the house, accused No.2 was present at the outside the house along with male child of deceased and on seeing them left the place by leaving the male child of deceased without informing anything and that the deceased died due to dowry harassment made by all the accused and that she was examined by the Police and the Tahsildar.

20. P.W.13 was the village Revenue Officer of Valivarthipadu

Village and he acted as one of the mediators along with L.W.18 at the time of observation of the scene of offence under Ex.P5, seizure of nylon rope/M.O.1, at the time of inquest held over the dead body of the deceased under Ex.P6.

P.W.14 is the Head Master of Sri Hari Hindu Aided Upper

Primary School, 3rd Ward, Gudivada, who issued a Study Certificate of child in conflict with law stating that her date of birth is 11.02.2001. The evidence of P.W.14 is no way related to the present case, because the child in conflict with law is not an accused before this Court.

29 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

P.W.15 was the Civil Assistant Surgeon, Area Hospital,

Gudivada, who conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased and found one contusion of 10 x 1 ½ cm., from right mastoid process to left mandibular angle high up in the neck caused may be of rope, fracture of hyoid bone on left side. He also found 24 to 26 weeks size dead fetus present in the uterus and he issued Ex.P7 post mortem certificate opining that the deceased died due to asphyxia due to hanging approximately about 21 to 24 hours before the examination.

P.W.16 was the Tahsildar, Gudivada, who conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the case, in the presence of the parents, relatives and panchayatdars under Ex.P6, examined and recorded the statements of P.Ws.1 to 7 and 12.

P.W.17 was the Head Constable of Gudivada Taluka P.S., who received a written report from P.W.1 on 25.07.2015 at 1.30 p.m., and registered a case in Cr.No.110/2015 u/s 304-B r/w 34 of IPC and issued printed FIR as in Ex.P8 and submitted copies to all the higher officials and the Court concerned.

P.Ws.18 and 19 were the Sub-Divisional Police Officers,

Gudivada, who conducted the investigation and filed a charge-sheet against the accused in this case.

30 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

POINT No.1 to 4:-

21.Before going to appreciate the evidence on record to answer the above points framed for determination, I would like to extract Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 of IPC for the sake of ready reference, which are as follows:- “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” “304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

31 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” “Section 306. Abetment of suicide.

If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

In a recent case Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh Vs. State of Haryana 1 has set out the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, which are as follows:- “6. The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B;

a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

b) The death must have been caused within seven years of her marriage;

c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband; and

d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.”

If the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death of the deceased can be called as a dowry death and the husband and her relatives shall be deemed to have caused the dowry death.

1 2025 INSC 133 32 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

In this case, there is no dispute that the death of the deceased was occurred within seven years of the marriage and a charge u/s 304-B of

IPC is framed against the accused, so it would be appropriate to refer the operation of presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which reads thus:

"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death - When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

The said presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is established by the prosecution that soon before her death, the woman has been subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry. Therefore, even for attracting

Section 113-B, the prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. Unless these facts are proved, the presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked. Now, the evidence on record is going to be appreciated to examine whether it could prove the ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC as mentioned supra.

33 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

In this regard the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of

Madhya Pradesh v . Jogendra and another 2 is noteworthy which is reproduced hereunder:- "The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions of Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman must be a dowry death. Four prerequisites for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC are as follows:

(i) that the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstance;

(ii) that such a death must have occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her husband, soon before her death; and

(iv) that such a cruelty or harassment must have been for or related to any demand for dowry. The law on Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act has been pithily summarised in the follow:

(1) Section 304-B IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

(2) The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304- B IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operates against the accused.

(3) The phrase "soon before" as appearing in Section 304-B IPC cannot be construed to mean "immediately before". The prosecution must establish existence of "proximate and live link" between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

(4) Section 304-B IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorising death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason 2 (2022) SAR (Cri) 167 34 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 for such non- categorisation is due to the fact that death occurring" otherwise than under normal circumstances" can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental."

22.In the present case, all the prosecution witnesses i.e.,

P.Ws.1 to 7 and 12 are the parents, sisters, brother and near relatives of the deceased. As it is a case of dowry harassment and abetted the deceased to commit suicide with such harassment, the family members and the relatives of the deceased are considered to be the natural witnesses, but their evidence should be seen with much care and caution whether their evidence is merged with any interestedness. It is pertinent to refer on the decisions relied on by the prosecution in the case of Abdul

Javeeth & Another v. State by Inspector of Police, Crl.A. No. 140 of 2009 (Aug 9, 2019) Hon’ble High court of Madras, wherein it is held as follows:

“27. As stated above, PW.1 to PW.4 are the mother, father and brothers of the deceased. It is well settled proposition of law that merely because a witness happened to be the close relation of the deceased, the evidence of such witness cannot be discarded. It is true that the learned counsel for the Appellant has brought to the notice of the Court, certain discrepancies available in their evidence, but these discrepancies are minor and trivial in character, which in the considered opinion of this Court will not tilt the truth or rigour of the prosecution case.” 35 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

The learned Additional Public Prosecutor relied upon a decision reported in the case of Gurunath Donkappa Keri v . State of Karnataka 3 wherein it is held thus:

“All the prosecution witnesses are natural witnesses. The essential ingredients to prove the crime against the accused have categorically been stated by them. Both the courts below have placed implicit reliance on their testimonies. Our attention has not been drawn to any major contradiction in the, deposition of the witnesses so as to disbelieve the entire prosecution case. The very fact that they had been taking the deceased who were grievously injured at mat point of time from hospital to hospital is itself a pointer to show the state of mind they were having at the relevant time. It is, therefore, too much to expect that they would not only state the details of the manner in which the occurrence had taken place but also the names of all the persons who witnessed the same.”

He also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karulal & Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,4 wherein in

Paras 23 & 24, observed as under:-

23. The appellant's counsel also submitted that few of the witnesses had not supported the prosecution case and were declared to be hostile. But there are enough material evidence and trustworthy testimonies which clearly support the case against the accused and the prosecution need not fail on this count alone. Some witness may not support the prosecution story for their own reasons and in such situation, it is necessary for the Court to determine whether the other available evidence comprehensively proves the charge. In this case, it is seen that the prosecution version is cogent and supported by three eyewitnesses who have given a consistent account of the incident. Their testimonies are corroborated by the medical evidence. The learned Trial Judge had elaborately discussed the evidence of both sides and came to a logical conclusion which 3(2009) 13 SCC 34 42020 0 Supreme (SC) 582 36 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 inspires confidence. We are therefore of the view that the hostile witnesses will not affect the conviction of the appellants.

24. Proceeding on the above basis and on careful examination of the manner in which the learned Trial Judge analysed the evidence and rendered his verdict, the conviction of the appellants according to our assessment, was rightly ordered and correctly upheld by the High Court. It is declared accordingly."

Firstly, this court would like to examine the essential ingredients of

Section 304 B IPC in the present case;

a) Whether the death of a woman must have been caused by any

burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than

under normal circumstances;

23. According to the version of the prosecution witnesses the deceased died on 24.07.2015 in between 5.00 and 7.30 p.m., by committing suicide by hanging. P.W.1 deposed that she came to know about the death of the deceased on 24.07.215 at about 7.00 p.m., to 7.30 p.m. P.W.2 deposed that on 24.07.2015 at about 7.30 p.m., her husband/P.W.3 came to know about the death of the deceased and he informed the same to P.W.1 over phone. P.Ws.3 and 7 deposed that on the said date the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself.

P.Ws.4 to 6 deposed that the deceased died due to the harassment caused by the accused persons. P.W.15/Doctor in his evidence testified that on 25.07.2015 he received requisition from P.W.16 to conduct post mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased and accordingly he conducted post mortem and found one injury i.e., contusion 10 x 1 ½ 37 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 cm from right mastoid process to left mandibular angle high up on the neck, the cause of the death may be with rope and he issued Ex.P7 post mortem report opining that the death of the deceased was due to asphyxia due to hanging. Perusal of the contents of Ex.P7 goes to show that left hyoid horn present and it corroborates the evidence of P.W.16 in all respects. The deceased was said to be aged approximately by the time of her death having normal physique and she was carrying 24 to 26 weeks pregnancy as per the post mortem report. No injuries were found on the person of the deceased to say that she was strangulated to death by any of the accused persons and that during the struggle to save her life she received any injuries. Even though it was mentioned in

Ex.P6/inquest report that the deceased might have died by committing suicide due to the harassment meted out by the accused or the accused murdered her by strangulation, it is only an opinion expressed by the

Panchayatdars during inquest proceedings. But, after adducing evidence by the prosecution the said opinion lost its significance and generally it can be considered for corroboration but not as a substantive piece of evidence. Even as per the defence taken by the accused, the deceased committed suicide by hanging in view of the annoyance caused by her parents due to the discrimination in treating her on par with the other daughters because of the inter-caste love marriage contracted by her with accused No.1. Thus, the above evidence clearly established that the 38 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 deceased died an unnatural death and death of woman is otherthan under normal circumstances at her young adult age. In this connection, it is aptful to refer the judgment relied on by the prosecution in the case of

Virender pal @ vipin v. The state of Haryana 5 wherein the Hon’ble

Supreme Court held as follows:- "27. Upon going through the post-mortem report13, it is clear that the death of Punita was caused by ante-mortem injuries caused by mechanical violence and hence, her death was definitely otherwise than under natural circumstances within the meaning of Section 304- B IPC.”

b) The death must have been caused within seven years of her marriage

24. In the present case on hand, there is no dispute that the marriage of the deceased with Accused No.1 took place on 03.07.2013.

Regarding the mode of marriage, there is no consistent evidence adduced by the prosecution. P.W.1 deposed in her cross-examination that the marriage of the deceased was held in a Church at Mudinepalli and the same was registered in the Registrar Office, Mudinepalli, P.Ws.4 and 5 in their evidence deposed that the deceased got married accused

No.1 at Sub-Registrar Office, Mudinepalli and it is their love marriage and

P.W.12 deposed that the elders performed the marriage of the deceased with accused No.1. A cumulative reading of the evidence on record it appears that initially the parents of the deceased did not agree for the 52025 0 Supreme (SC) 849 39 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 marriage of the deceased with accused No.1, but after negotiations on the assurance given by the villagers of Valivarthipadu village, they agreed for the same, however none from the side of her parents attended the marriage. Thus, the prosecution party did not know in exact manner of the marriage of the deceased with accused No.1. However, the evidence on record proved that the elders performed their marriage in a Church at

Mudinepalli and registered the same in the Office of Registrar Office,

Mudinepalli. At the outset the accused are not disputing the date of marriage and the date of death of the deceased. As per the evidence on record the date of marriage of the deceased with Accused No.1 is 03.07.2013. Further, all the prosecution witnesses, except P.Ws.8, 9 and 11, who turned hostile to the case of the prosecution, deposed that the death of the deceased occurred on 24.07.2015, which is within seven years of her marriage.

c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty

or harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband,

d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry

25. For the offence under Section 304-B IPC the deceased must be subjected to cruelty and harassment soon before her death in connection with the demand for dowry. In this connection it is appropriate to refer relevant decisions relied on by the prosecution:- 40 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

(a) In the case of Satbir Singh v . State of Haryana6, while dealing with Section 304B IPC and the word “soon before death”, Apex

Court at paras-14, 15 observed as under:

“14. Considering the significance of such a legislation, a strict interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was enacted. Therefore, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature used the words, “soon before” they did not mean “immediately before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the courts. The factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite varied, as it can range from physical, verbal or even emotional. This list is certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore be laid down by this Court to define what exactly the phrase “soon before” entails. The aforesaid position was emphasized by this Court, in the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, wherein the three-Judge Bench held that: "15. ... "Soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. ... In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. .... Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough." (emphasis supplied) A similar view was taken by this Court in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477.

15. Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if the period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim would come within the term "soon before". What is pivotal to the above determination, is the establishment of a "proximate and live link" between the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim.” 6 2021 AIAR (Criminal) 736 41 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

(b) In Parvati Devi Vs . State of Jharkhand 7 the Hon'ble

Supreme Court was pleased to consider applicability of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, relevant paragraphs in the reported judgment are set out as follows:

“16. The import of the aforesaid provisions has been explained in several decisions of this Court. In Bansi Lal v. State Of Haryana. (2011) 11 SCC 359, it has been held that:

“17. While considering the case under Section 498-A (Sic. Section 304-B), cruelty has to be proved during the close proximity of time of death and it should be continuous and such continuous harassment, physical or mental, by the accused should make life of the deceased miserable which may force her to commit suicide.”

17. In Maya Devi v. State of Haryana (2015) 17 SCC 405, it was held that:

“23. To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty or harassment “for, or in connection with the demand for dowry”. The expression “soon

before her death” used in Section 304-IPC and Section 113-B of the

Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. In fact, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we shall advert to while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the language used is “soon

before her death”, no definite period has been enacted and the

expression “soon before her death” has not been defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come within the term “soon before her death” is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the women concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 7 2021 Supp. SAR (Cri) 1166 42 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 [Also refer to G.V Siddaramesh v. State Of Karnataka . (2010) 3 SCC 152 and Ashok Kumar v. State Of Haryana . (2010) 12 SCC 350]

18. Section 304B IPC read in conjunction with Section 113B of the Evidence Act leaves no manner of doubt that once the prosecution has been able to demonstrate that a woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry, soon before her death, the Court shall proceed on a presumption that the persons who have subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry, have caused a dowry death within the meaning of Section 304B IPC. The said presumption is, however, rebuttable and can be dispelled on the accused being able to demonstrate through cogent evidence that all the ingredients of Section 304B IPC have not been satisfied.”

(c) In the case of Kamla Kant Dubey Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 8 in reference to conviction based on evidence of a single witness it has been observed in para 18 as follows:- "17. It is settled principle that a conviction can well be founded on the testimony of a single witness if the court finds his version to be trustworthy and corroborated by record on material particulars. We found on the touchstone of these principles, the testimony of PW-1 is completely trustworthy. Out of three infirmities found by the High Court, one regarding place of occurrence is not correct at all. So far as other two infirmities are concerned, it is a well accepted principle that the first information report need not contain every single detail and every part of the case of the persecution. However, assuming them to be improvements, in our view the basic substratum of the matter does not get affected by such improvements at all. Even after segregating the part which appears to be introduced as improvement, the testimony of PW-1 is clear and creditworthy."

With regard to the term ‘soon before death’ the learned counsel for the accused placed reliance on the decision in the case of Challa

Satyavathi v. State of Telangana 10 wherein the Hon’ble

Apex Court considered the essentials to constitute the offence under 82015 (152) AIC 19 (S.C.) 43 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

Section 304-B of IPC, with reference to paragraph 12, to point out the ingredients of the offence as follows:

“12. The Apex Court in Hiralal v. State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi (2003) 8 SCC 80, observed that the expression ‘soon before’ is a relative term that depend upon circumstance of each case for no straight jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute period of ‘soon’

before the occurrence and it would be hazardous to indicate any

fixed period and that brings in importance of a proximity test both in the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113B of Evidence Act. Section 114(1) of Indian Evidence Act to some extent is relevant of the Court may presume that a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession and the expression there under also observed of what is meant by ‘soon after’ to be determined by Courts depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. The expression indicates that either ‘soon before’ or ‘soon after’ the occurrence would normally imply that the interval should not be much between cruelty or harassment and unnatural death. There must exist proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty or harassment based on dowry demand and the unnatural death thereby for alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the women concerned it would be of no consequence. In Sher Singh Alias Partapa v. State Of Haryana. 2015 1 SCALE 250, the Apex Court observed that the word ‘soon’ finds place in Section 304 B IPC not in terms of days or months or years to interpret but has necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be a continuing cause of the unnatural death. Now coming to the expression placed reliance on Maya Devi (supra) it has also reiterated the position of law referred supra in its observation particularly at para 19 that as per Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633 para 21 - thus there are three occasions related to dowry, one is ‘before marriage’ second is ‘at the time of marriage’ and the third is ‘at any time’ after the marriage and the third occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the crucial words are ‘in connection with the marriage of the said parties’. This means giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties. The customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies prevalent in different areas are thus not enveloped within the ambit of dowry. For attracting dowry death under Section 304B IPC, it is not enough that harassment or cruelty caused to the women with a demand for dowry at some time as it should have happened ‘soon

before her death’ which is an elastic expression referred to period

44 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 either immediately before her death or within few days or even few weeks before it. But proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words ‘soon before her death’ is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the after math of such cruelty or harassment. There should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her death is wide, the Court would be in a position to gauge that in all probabilities the harassment or cruelty would not have been the immediate cause of her death. It is hence, for the Court to decide on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept ‘soon before her death’. It is further observed in para 16 of the expression that the language used is ‘soon before her death’ and no definite period has been enacted and the expression is not been defined in the Evidence Act and IPC and it is to be determined by the Court depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of proximity and live link between effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned as also observed in Bansilal Agarwal v. Haryana Trading Co. Ltd., Ramavathar (2011) 11 SCC 359 and Mustafa Shahadal Shaik v. State of Maharastra (2012) 11 SCC 397 besides Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu (2004) 9 SCC 157 , AIR 2003 SC 3828, Yashoda v. State of M.P. (2004) 3 SCC 98 , AIR 2005 SC 1411 and Ramesh Vithal Patil v. State of Karnataka (2014) 11 SCC 516.”

On the same aspect, the learned counsel for the accused placed the reliance on the Judgment of Hon’ble High Court of

Andhra Pradesh in the case of Shaik Jani Pasha v. State Of A.P., 9 wherein it is held as follows:-

31. Since we have acquitted the appellants for the offence under Section 302 IPC, we need to consider whether the appellants are liable for the offence under Section 304-B IPC. On a careful analysis of the provisions of Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act and as explained by the Supreme Court in 92017(2) ALD (Cri) 1034.

45 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

Bakshish Ram (5 supra), it is evident that in order to convict a person for the offence under Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution must prove that there was cruelty or harassment of the victim "soon before the occurrence". The phrase "soon" must be construed as proximate in point of time to the death. Even if any occurrence has taken place in a distant past, the same cannot be brought under the expression 'soon before the occurrence'. While there is no credible evidence to show that there was any harassment of the deceased by the appellants at any point of time, in our opinion, the prosecution has singularly failed to establish that such harassment even if taken place earlier was not caused by the appellants 'soon' before the death of the deceased. In our opinion, the Court below has erroneously held the appellants guilty of the offence under Section 304-B IPC. For the very same reasons and the findings, the convictions and sentences imposed against the appellants for the offences under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Act, are also not sustainable.

With regard to prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith the learned counsel for Accused No.1 to 7 has placed reliance on the Judgment of Hon’ble Apex court in the case of

Baijnath and Others versus State of Madhya Pradesh 10 at Para Nos.

29 and 30 as follows:- "Para:- 29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith.

Para:-30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the 10 2017 (1) ALD (Cri) 23 (SC) 46 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 ingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113-B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent, coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof.”

26.It is evident from the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 7 and 12 that the deceased fell in love with accused No.1 and they intended to perform marriage, but initially the same was not accepted by her parents, but later, on the assurance given by the villagers of Valivarthipadu Village for the marriage, their marriage was performed by the village elders in a

Church and later the same was registered in the Office of the Registrar of

Marriages at Mudinepalli. Though the marriage certificate is not produced

before this Court, the marriage of the deceased with accused No.1 is not

disputed by the defence. As stated supra, their marriage is an inter-caste love marriage. The said marriage was not attended by the parents and other relatives of the deceased, but they came to know about the same.

As their marriage was a love marriage, no dowry or other customary articles were exchanged between the parties. It appears from the evidence of P.W.4 that for a period of 2 to 3 months the deceased did not visit the house of P.W.1 and later she used to visit the house of her parents and P.W.2 deposed that for every three to four days the deceased used to visit their house and sometimes she used to visit her 47 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 also. In this connection P.W.1 deposed that the deceased used to visit her house frequently after her marriage. P.W.6 admitted in his cross- examination that they performed formalities with regard to the other four daughters after their marriage.

But, P.W.1 in her cross-examination deposed that prior to delivery accused No.1 and the deceased shifted their residence to Nandigama village and he/A1 admitted the deceased in a hospital at Vijayawada for delivery as such she could not bring the deceased to her house for

Sreemantam, but after delivery she brought the deceased to her house and she stayed for a period of one month and thereafter she left to her in- laws house as per her wish. The above evidence shows that though the parents of the deceased were not interested in the marriage of the deceased with accused No.1 at first, but subsequently, they accepted the same. Though they did not attend the marriage, subsequent to the marriage they permitted the deceased to visit their house.

27. It is deposed by P.Ws.1 to 4 in their evidence that on 23.07.2015 the deceased came to their house, she along with P.W.2 went to a movie in Gudivada and at about 6.00 p.m., accused No.1 came to their house and took back the deceased to his house on his TVS moped.

In this connection P.W.1 deposed that the deceased was in happy mood on 23.7.2015. Here, it is pertinent to mention about the defence of the accused that as the parents of the deceased showed discrimination 48 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 towards her and not treated her on par with her other sisters, the deceased developed displeasure and due to the mental agony she committed suicide by hanging. If the said defence of the accused is true, the deceased would not have visited her parents’ house frequently and she would have resorted to take such an extreme step when her parents did not perform Sreemantam (traditional baby shower function) when she was carrying 1st pregnancy, but she did not do so. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, more particularly P.Ws.1 to 7 and 12 goes to show that the deceased had been visiting her parents’ house frequently.

The marriage of the deceased took place about two years prior to the date of her unfortunate death. If the deceased had anyincur towards her parents, she would not have visited their house and on the other hand, as she loved and married the accused No.1 according to her wish and volition, generally if her husband take care of herself with love and affection, no wife/woman had any purpose to go to her parents’ house frequently, except occasionally or now and then and she accustomed to lead happy marital life in her marital home. The fact that after death of the deceased, the boy of the deceased is in the care and custody of

P.Ws.1 and 6 is an example to evaluate that accused No.1 is having love and affection towards the deceased and their child. Except giving some suggestions to the prosecution witnesses, which were denied by them, no evidence is adduced by the accused in support of their defence that the 49 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 deceased committed suicide in view of the humiliation from her parents.

Further, if the defence of the accused is accepted as true, it is for accused No.1 to give a report/complaint to the police concerned when her wife committed suicide due to the humiliation triggered by his in-laws because of their love marriage, but he failed to do so and escaped from the scene of offence without attending anything and even without intimating about the death of the deceases to her parents.

When the witnesses denied the suggestions put by the defence, the burden is on the accused to prove the same by adducing cogent and convincing evidence. To discharge the said burden, the accused has to examine his neighbouring persons, but he failed to do so. Hence, the defence taken by the accused remains unproved. In this context the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor placed the reference of the judgment of

Virender pal @ vipin v. The state of Haryana (supra), wherein it was held as follows:- “28. The accused has taken alternative defences for explaining the death of Punita. The two defences which are totally divergent are (a) that the deceased accidently fell down from the terrace and received the injuries, or (b) that the deceased-Punita committed suicide by jumping from the terrace as she was perturbed because of the knee issue which was plaguing her. We feel that this diametrically opposite defence taken by the accused-appellant does not have any legs to stand and we have strong reasons to observe so." 50 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

28. P.Ws.1 to 7 and 12 in one voice deposed that as the deceased did not bring any dowry, after the birth of a male child the accused started demanding and harassing the deceased to bring dowry from her parents’ house. The above witnesses further deposed that whenever the deceased visited their house, she used to inform them about the harassment made by the accused for the demand of dowry. In this connection P.W.1 deposed that after the birth of male child the accused harassed the deceased both physically and mentally for demanding dowry and prior to six months of death of the deceased, on one day Accused No.8 called the deceased to his house and in the presence of accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 while all of them were consuming liquor, and demanded the deceased to bring dowry from her parents’ house, then she sent the deceased to her in-laws house and thereafter she along with her family members went to the house of accused No.1 to pacify the matter, they requested the accused 1 to 7 some time for payment of dowry amount and not to harass the deceased, but the accused refused her request and stated that they will obey the words of accused No.8 only, thereafter the accused used to harass and used to send the deceased to her house by demanding dowry, the deceased informed her all the harassment made by the accused and she expressed that she was not in a position to tolerate the unbearable torture of the accused and expressed that she would like to commit suicide due to the 51 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 harassment made by the accused, then she gave counselling and advised her not to take such decision and while carrying pregnancy it was not good and requested her to tolerate for some time. The said evidence of P.W.1 is corroborated by P.Ws.2 to 7 and 12 in the evidence.

29. In this context it is relevant to discuss the evidence of

P.W.10, who was the Vice President of Valivartipadu Village, who deposed that he came to know about the disputes arose in between accused No.1 and the deceased regarding the demanding of dowry, he called accused No.1, questioned him about the harassment and admonished him not to harass the deceased for the demand of dowry, but accused No.1 bluntly refused to oblige his words and replied that he will hear and obey the words of accused No.8 only. He further deposed that on 24.7.2015 he came to know about the death of deceased, on that he saw the dead body and that due to the harassment made by accused

No.1 with his family members, the deceased committed suicide.

The defence tried to elicit political rivalry between him and accused

No.8 and in view of said rivalry, as accused No.1 never supported him and belongs to his opposition group, he is deposing false evidence, but he denied the suggestions put to the witness. In his cross-examination he deposed that he came to know about the disputes between the deceased and accused No.1, through the deceased. He further deposed that he was an active politician in his village, there were two groups one is 52 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 his supporting group and the other is his opposition group. He further deposed that accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 were residing in his village and the other accused were residing in Srikalahasti colony. If this witness has any animosity towards the accused in view of the political rivalry with accused No.8, he must have deposed that all the accused were residents of his village, but he did not depose like that. He further deposed that by the time of his visit to the house of accused No.1, 10 to 15 people of his village were gathered there and the house of accused No.1 was in open condition.

30. P.Ws.1 and 2 in their evidence deposed that except giving

Ex.P1 report after the death of the deceased, there was no prior report to the police against the accused about their illegal demand of dowry from the deceased. P.W.1 admitted that either the deceased or herself never gave any report to the police regarding the harassment made by the accused prior to Ex.P1. P.W.1 further admitted that she did not specifically mention in Ex.P1 about the specific overt acts of each accused in harassing the deceased. P.W.2 admitted that they did not specifically state to the police and Tahsildar about the dates and instances of harassment made by the accused to the deceased and that prior to the death of the deceased they failed to report anything to the police and they did not place the matter before any elders. P.W.3 deposed that about 2 to 3 times he head the conversion of deceased with 53 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

P.W.1, but he did not remember when he heard the same about the harassment made by the accused and that he did not remember when himself, P.W.1 and other family members went to the house of accused

No.1 to request the accused not to harass the deceased. P.W.4 deposed that she came to know about the harassment on hearing the deceased conversation with her parents, she admitted that they did not mention any specific dates of harassment made by the accused, she further admitted that they did not mention the date on which they visited the house of accused No.1 for mediation. P.W.5 deposed that she did not know the exact dates when the accused harassed the deceased and when she informed about such harassment to her and that she did not remember when she along with parents and relatives of the deceased went to the house of accused No.1 to request the accused not to harass the deceased. P.W.6 deposed that he did not state any names of accused

Nos.2 to 8 to the police at the time of his examination, he cannot say the dates as to when the deceased came to their house and when she informed P.W.1 about the harassment made by the accused. P.W.10 deposed that he did not state before the police that on which he came to know about the disputes in between deceased and accused No.1 and that he did not state before the police on which date he called accused

No.1 and admonished him. P.W.12 deposed that she cannot say the date on which the deceased informed her about the harassment of the 54 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 accused and that she cannot say the exact dates when the deceased came to the house of P.W.1.

31. It is the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, more particularly the parents and family members of the deceased that they used to console and advised the deceased to tolerate the harassment and time will bring change in the mind of the accused and they further attempted to pacify the dispute by approaching the accused and requested them for some time to give dowry and not to harass the deceased, but they did not heed the said request. The learned counsel

for the accused contended that the prosecution witnesses failed to

depose the names of the villagers of Valivartipadu who assured for the marriage of the deceased with accused No.1. In this connection P.W.1 admitted that she did not mention the names of elders of Valivarthipadu village in her statement or in her report. P.W.2 deposed that she cannot say the names of elders who intervened and made promises to them for the marriage of the deceased. P.W.3 deposed that he did not remember the names of elders who promised for the marriage of the deceased.

P.W.4 deposed that she did not know the names of elders of

Valivarthipadu village. P.W.6 deposed that he did not know the names of elders who performed the marriage of the deceased and that he did not contact any of the elders who performed the marriage. P.W.12 deposed that she did not remember the date on which the village elders of 55 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

Valivarthipadu came to the house of accused No.1 and harassed for the marriage of the deceased, she did not know the names of village elders of

Valivarthipadu.

32.Perusal of the evidence of the material witnesses in their cross-examination goes to show that except making omnibus and general allegations against the accused that they harassed the deceased for and in connection with the demand for dowry, none of the prosecution witnesses deposed about the particulars of the dowry i.e., cash, jewelry, vehicles, household appliances and in the form of property, specific amount of dowry, exact or approximate date, month and occasion when such dowry harassment was made, when the deceased informed the same to P.W.1 and other relatives and the date on which the parents and other relatives went to the house of accused No.1 requesting for some to provide dowry and not to harass the deceased. P.W.10, who alleged to have called and questioned accused No.1 for the demand of dowry also gave vague evidence without mentioning the date, month and the occasion on which he called and questioned accused No.1.On a careful examination of the above evidence established the said contention raised by the learned defence counsel can be accepted to that extent.

Furthermore, except stating that the deceased was harassed mentally and physically, no specific occurrences were deposed by the witnesses.

Thus, none of the statements made by the witnesses before this Court 56 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 contained any specific instances of cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry.

To prove the offence u/s 304-B IPC, it must be preceded by immediate cruelty and harassment by the accused and that cruelty or harassment must be in connection with dowry and that should be the reason for the unnatural death. Theprerequisite of cruelty can be a specific instance or a continuous conduct consisting of a series of acts or omissions. The specific instance or the series of instances consisting of multiple acts have to be proved specifically, clearly and coherently. The general, ambiguous and omnibus allegations without specifying any particular incident and specific role played by each accused individually shall not be sufficient to prove the requisite cruelty in a criminal case. In other words, the cruelty which ultimately led to the unnatural death of the deceased has to be proved specifically like any other fact and there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the accused, it can be held that the prosecution could not able to establish the ingredients (c) and (d) as mentioned supra to prove that soon before the death of the deceased she was subjected to cruelty in connection with the demand for dowry, consequently prosecution failed to prove the charge under Sections 3 and 4 of D.P.Act. Since the 57 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 prosecution failed to establish that soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the presumption under Section 113B of Indian Evidence Act cannot be invoked and said provision cannot come in the aid of the prosecution case.

33. The learned counsel for the accused further contended that

P.W.15/doctor in his cross-examination deposed that the contusion he noticed on the dead body of the deceased was only possible with rope having diameter of 1 ½ cm., and that he examined the entire body of the deceased, but he did not notice any oozing of blood from the dead body of the deceased. In the photographs as in Ex.P9 as well as in the post mortem report as in Ex.P7 it is evident that there was some froth coming from the mouth and nostrils of the deceased, but the doctor did not depose about the same in his evidence. In this case the death of the deceased took place in between 5.00 to 7.30 p.m., on 24.07.2015 and

P.W.15 conducted post mortem examination from 3.45 p.m., on 25.07.2015 i.e., 21 to 24 hours after the death of the deceased. It is evident from the evidence of P.W.3 that they shifted the dead body of the deceased to the Government Area Hospital, Gudivada during the midnight of 24/25.07.2015. P.W.4 in her cross-examination deposed that they shifted the dead body of the deceased to the Government Area 58 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

Hospital about 2.00 a.m. Since the doctor conducted post mortem examinationapproximately 21 hours after the death of the deceased and the dead body was shifted by her relatives, in the meantime the froth said to have come from the mouth and nostrils of the deceased might have wiped off or disappeared due to passage of time or the prosecution witnesses being the rustic villagers might have sponged the same.

However, the photographs and the post mortem report clearly and categorically speak of the availability of froth at the mouth portion of the deceased. Further, it is evident from the inquest report under Ex.P6 that there was bleeding from the private part of the deceased and that the deceased was carrying 6th month pregnancy. The doctor in his evidence deposed about noticing a dead fetus aged 24 to 26 weeks in the uterus of the deceased. Since the fetus in the uterus of the deceased died consequent upon the death of the deceased, certainly there was bleeding from the private part of the deceased. Since the deceased died by committing suicide by hanging, the doctor may not observe the said bleeding and it will not cause any prejudice to the accused.

34. With regard to the evidence of the doctor that the contusion on the dead body of the deceased is only possible with rope having diameter of 1 ½ cm., is concerned, the investigating officer has seized the nylon rope under M.O.1 in the presented of P.W.13/VRO and

L.W.18/VRA at the time of observation of the scene of offence under the 59 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 cover of Ex.P5 mediators report and he further deposed that the police photographed the scene of offence in their presence and the said fact is mentioned in Ex.P5. The prosecution produced the nylon rope through

Form-60. In the said form except mentioning the length of the rope, there is no measurement with regard to the diameter. When this Court measured the M.O.1, it contained 1 ½ cm., diameter as deposed by the doctor and further perusal of the photographs, in two photographs the ligature mark on the neck of the deceased is visible and with M.O.1 nylon rope there is every possibility of causing such ligature mark. It is pertinent to note that with regard to diameter of M.O.1, the defence did not put any question to the investigation officer/P.W.18.

Therefore, the contention of the defence that the death of the deceased cannot be possible with the M.O.1 nylon rope cannot be sustained.

Furthermore, in the present case the accused are not disputing the manner of death of the deceased and even according to the defence of the accused that the deceased committed suicide by hanging due to the embarrassment because her parents were showing discrimination towards her among the other sisters. So, the view of the defence of the accused, the said contention raised by the accused cannot be taken into consideration.

35. In the present case the deceased died unnaturally in the house of Accused No.1.In the circumstances of the case, it is pertinent 60 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 to note here that the position of law as per the provision of Section 101 to

Section 105 of the Evidence Act is very explicit wherein the burden will lie upon the prosecution to prove the charge beyond all shadow of doubt but in certain circumstances where there is no eyewitness of the alleged crime and accused has to explain the circumstances in which death was caused, then the onus will shift upon the accused to disprove the commission of crime. In the aforesaid context, it also requires to refer herein that onus to disprove the guilt lies on the accused persons in view of provision as contained under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972, which reads as under:

Section 106 - Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.

When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

In this context, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in

Joshinder Yadav Vs. State of Bihar 11 held at paragraphs 14, 15, 16 considering the implication of the provision of Section 106 of the Evidence

Act has held as under:- “14. In our opinion, the prosecution having established that the accused treated the deceased with cruelty and that they subjected her to harassment for dowry, the accused ought to have disclosed the facts which were in their personal and special knowledge to disprove the prosecution case that they murdered Bindula Devi. Section 106 of the Evidence Act covers such a situation. The burden which had shifted to the accused was not discharged by them. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court in Shambu Nath Mehra v. State Of Ajmer . AIR 1956 SC 404, 1956 Cri LJ 794 wherein this Court explained how Section 101 and Section 11(2014) 4 SCC 42 61 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 106 of the Evidence Act operate. Relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus: (AIR p. 406, paras 10-11) “10. Section 106 is an exception to Section 101. Section 101 lays down the general rule about the burden of proof. ‘101. Burden of proof.—Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.’ Illustration (a) says— ‘A desires a court to give judgment that B shall be punished for a crime which A says B has committed. A must prove that B has committed the crime.’

11. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are ‘especially’ within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience.”

15. In Balram Prasad Agrawal v. State of Bihar (1997) 9 SCC 338 the prosecution had established the cruel conduct of the accused i.e her husband and members of his family and the sufferings undergone by the deceased at their hands. The unbearable conduct of the accused ultimately resulted in her death by drowning in the well in the courtyard of the accused's house. This Court observed that what happened on the fateful night and what led to the deceased's falling in the well was wholly within the personal and special knowledge of the accused. But they kept mum on this aspect. This Court observed that it is true that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. But once the prosecution is found to have shown that the accused were guilty of persistent conduct of cruelty qua the deceased spread over years as was well established from the unshaken testimony of father of the deceased, the facts which were in the personal knowledge of the accused who were present in the house on that fateful night could have been revealed by them to disprove the prosecution case. This Court observed that the accused had not discharged the burden which had shifted to them under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. While coming to this conclusion, 62 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 this Court relied on Shambhu Nath Mehra AIR 1956 SC 404, 1956 Cri LJ 794.

16. In the present case, the deceased was admittedly in the custody of the accused. She disappeared from their house. As to how her dead body was found in the river was within their special and personal knowledge. They could have revealed the facts to disprove the prosecution case that they had killed Bindula Devi. They failed to discharge the burden which had shifted to them under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution is not expected to give the exact manner in which the deceased was killed. Adverse inference needs to be drawn against the accused as they failed to explain how the deceased was found dead in the river in one foot deep water."

At this juncture, it is relevant to refer the recent judgment of Hon’ble

Supreme Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Balveer Singh 12, wherein it is held as follows:- “77. Section 106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution nugatory. If in such a situation, the accused offers an explanation which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation. But if the accused in such a case does not give any explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this by itself is a circumstance which may well turn the scale against him. In the language of Prof. Glanville Williams:

"All that the shifting of the evidential burden does at the final stage of the case is to allow the , jury (Court) to take into account the silence of the accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing from his evidence." (Emphasis supplied)

78. To recapitulate the foregoing : What lies at the bottom of the various rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence in proof of one's case as opposed to the persuasive burden 122025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 63 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 or burden of proof, i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution and which never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly convincing evidence on certain issues from its own hand and it is therefore for the accused to give evidence on them if he wishes to escape. Positive facts must always be proved by the prosecution. But the same rule cannot always apply to negative facts. It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate an accused. Again, when a person does not act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not for the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions. If the accused had a different intention that is a fact especially within his knowledge and which he must prove (see Professor Glanville Williams-Proof of Guilt, Ch. 7, page 127 and following) and the interesting discussion-para 527 negative averments and para 528 - "require affirmative counter-evidence" at page 438 and foil, of Kenny's outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958.

82. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding guilt of the accused.

83. The presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved.

84. To explain what constitutes a prima facie case to make Section 106 of the Evidence Act applicable, we should refer to the decision of this Court in Mir Mohammad (supra), wherein this Court has observed in paras 36 and 37 respectively as under:

"36. In this context we may profitably utilize the legal principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows: "When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden ofproving that fact is upon him."

37. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving, facts , from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other , facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer 64 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference." (Emphasis supplied)”

According to the above section and the legal position, when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving the said fact is upon that person. In the case in hand the prosecution proved the foundation facts for application of Section 106 of Indian

Evidence Act against the Accused No.1 that the deceased is wife of the accused No.1 and she died unnaturally within 7 years of her marriage in her matrimonial home, where she was residing along with Accused No.1 and their only son.

36.It is the allegation of the prosecution that all the accused harassed the deceased in connection with the demand for dowry and thereby abetted the deceased to commit suicide by hanging herself.

Admittedly, P.Ws.1 to 7 and 12 did not give specific overt against each of the accused in their evidence. P.W.1 deposed in her cross-examination that the house of accused Nos.2 and 3 was situated in Srikalahasti

Colony and their houses were intervened to his house by 3 to 4 houses, accused No.2 got second marriage. P.W.2 in her cross-examination deposed that Accused Nos.3 to 7 were residing at Srikalahasti colony near the house of P.W.1. P.W.4 in her cross-examination deposed that deceased, accused No.1 and the male child alone had ration card at

Valivarthipadu village, and she admitted that accused Nos.2 to 7 were having separate ration card and they were residents of Srikalahasti 65 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 colony of Mallaiahpalem village. P.W.5 in her cross-examination deposed that accused Nos.2 to 7 were residents of Srikalahasti Colony,

Mallaiahpalem. P.W.10, who is a villager and the then vice President of

Valivartipadu village deposed in his cross-examination that accused

Nos.1, 2, and 4 only residing in his village and the remaining accused

Nos.3, 5 to 7 were residing in Srikalahasti colony. Thus, the above evidence clearly and categorically established that accused No.1, deceased and their child were only residing in the house of accused No.1 and the other accused Nos.2 to 7 were residing in Srikalahasti colony of

Mallaiahpalem. Since accused Nos.2 to 7 were not residing along with the accused No.1, the presumption u/s 106 of Evidence Act is applicable only to accused No.1, but not to the other accused and the entire burden is on accused No.1 to explain as to what happened within the four corners of his house and in between him and the deceased. Except taking the defence that the deceased committed suicide due to the mental agony caused by her parents, he did not explain how the deceased committed suicide. Generally, in a criminal trial the accused shall remain as a silent spectator until the prosecution proves their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. But, when the presumption under Section 106 of

Evidence comes into operation, the accused No.1 himself has to explain the circumstances what happened in between the couple after the 66 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 deceased was taken back from the house of her parents and till the she committed suicide.

36. According to the prosecution, the death of the deceased took place in between 5.00 p.m., to 7.30 p.m., At the first instance, one of the villagers of Valivartipadu informed the same over phone to P.W.3 while he was in Vijayawada and in turn he passed on the information to P.W.1 over phone. P.W.3 in his evidence deposed that the person who informed about the death of the deceased, did not disclose his name.

According to the evidence of P.W.5, herself, P.Ws.1 to 4, 6, 7, 12 and

L.W.3/Matangi Aruna went to the house of accused No.1 through an auto at about 10.00 p.m., All the prosecution witnesses deposed that when they reached the house of accused No.1, the house was bolted from outside, accused No.2 was present outside the house along with the male child of the deceased and on their arrival he left the place by leaving the said child. P.W.10 in his evidence deposed that he went to the house of accused No.1 at about 7.30 p.m., saw the dead body and he noticed 10 to 15 villagers and the house was in open position. From the above evidence, it appears that soon after noticing the death of the deceased, some villagers rushed there, saw the dead body and gave information to

P.W.3 over phone and later the house was bolted from outside. It is further evident from the record that when the said witnesses went into the house of accused No.1, the dead body of the deceased was laying on the 67 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 floor. When it is the defence of the accused that the deceased committed suicide by hanging, who got down the dead body which was hanging to the wooden-log of the house of accused No.1 is not explained by the accused, though the burden is heavily rests on the accused No.1. He also failed to explain whether accused No.2 was already in his house at the time of her death or he was called by accused No.1 to look after the child giving scope for him to escape from the scene of offence.

37.In the present case the accused are not disputing the scene of offence and the manner in which the deceased died. Further, either accused No.1 or accused No.2 failed to inform about the death of the deceased either to her parents or to any of her relatives, for the reasons best known to them. It is not the defence of the accused No.1 that he was not available in his house at the time when the deceased committed suicide. If for a moment, for arguments sake, accused No.1 was not in his house at the time of the death of the deceased, soon after receipt of information he must have come back to his house, but none of the prosecution witnesses noticed his presence at his house after occurrence of the unfortunate incident. According to P.W.18/I.O., P.W.17 arrested the accused on 26.07.2015 and brought them to the Police Station and then they were sent for judicial custody. If the defence of the accused is true, what prevented accused No.1 from coming to his house after knowing about the death of the deceased or what prevented him from 68 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 informing about the death of the deceased to her relatives or the police, are not explained by the accused. If really the defence of the accused is true that the deceased died due to the discrimination of her parents, certainly accused No.1 would report the matter to the police immediately after knowing about the death of the deceased, but in the instant case he did not do so. When accused No.1 failed to discharge the onus shifted on him in view of the above presumption, the guilt of the offence pointing towards him. At this stage, it is relevant to refer a decision relied on by the prosecution in the case of Shaik Abdul Khadar V. Shaik Johny

Basha 13wherein it was held as follows:- “9. Be that as it may, even without going into this aspect, the fact of the matter is that Section 113-B of the Evidence Act will come into play once it has been established that there was a demand of dowry soon before the death of the victim. This demand has clearly been made out on the part of Accused No. 1- husband, though there is no evidence that such a demand was made by the father-in-law and mother-in-law. This evidence is only there against the husband of the deceased.”

The learned counsel for the accused relied on the decision in Bibi

Parwana Khatoon Alias Parwana Khatoon and another v. State of

Bihar 14wherein it is held that, “11. We have gone through the judgment and order passed by the trial court (copy Annexure P-9) in which the trial court has mentioned the name of the defence witnesses but not discussed as to why their testimony as to the fact that married sister-in-law (of the deceased) 132025 0 Supreme (SC) 184 142017(2) ALD (Cri) 269 69 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 and her husband used to live in Village Sabutar, is not believed. The High Court has also committed the same error.

12. Apart from the above, in support of their plea, there are three documents filed on behalf of the appellants, which are copies of public documents, to show that they are residents of Village Sabutar in District Purnea. Copy of the residence certificate is Annexure A-1, which shows that Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Purnea, has certified on 31-10-2008 that Hasan Raja (Appellant 2) used to live in Village Sabutar, PS K. Nagar, District Purnea. Another document (Annexure A-2) is copy of PAN issued by the Income Tax Department of the Government of India, which appears to have been sent on the address of the account holder Parwana Khatoon (Appellant 1) on her address of Sabutar, Purnea, Pin Code 854205. Not only this, copy of service book (Annexure A-3) of Appellant 1 Parwana Khatoon shows that she was Panchayat teacher in Primary School, K. Nagar (Purnea). This document also shows that address of Appellant 1 is Village Sabutar, PO Kajha, Police Station K. Nagar, District Purnea. All these public documents read with the oral testimony adduced

before the trial court, create serious doubt in the prosecution story,

so far it relates as against the present appellants. (We are not commenting on the evidence as against the husband of the deceased.)

13. In view of the above discussion of oral and documentary evidence, we find that both the courts below have erred in law in holding that the charge under Section 304-B read with Section 34 IPC stood proved as against the present appellants. In our opinion, in view of the evidence discussed above, it cannot be said that it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the present appellants, who are sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased, tortured the victim for any demand of dowry. In our opinion, in the present case which is based on circumstantial evidence it cannot be said that the appellants had any common intention with the husband of the deceased in commission of the crime. It is sufficiently shown on the record that they used to live in a different village. Therefore, we are inclined to allow the present appeal.”

Following the principle laid down in the above decision and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the guilt of the accused 2 to 8 70 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 cannot be established, because theyall were residing separately away from the Accused No.1 and never said to have resided in the family abode of accused No.1 and no specific overt acts were deposed against them.

38. During trial, the defence got marked several contradictions from the witnesses under Exs.D1 to D8. Exs.D1 and D2 are marked through P.W.1 to the effect that she stated before P.W.18 that in between 5.00 p.m., to 7.30 p.m., P.W.3 informed her about the death of the deceased. P.W.1 in her cross-examination deposed that she came to know about the death at about 7.00 p.m., to 7.30 p.m., As per the evidence adduced by the prosecution the death of the deceased took place between 5.00 p.m., and 7.30 p.m., and they received information at about 7.30 p.m.,

In the evidence of P.W.3, the omissions as in Exs.D2A to D6 were marked, which are to the effect that P.W.3 stated before P.W.18 and

P.W.16 that when P.W.1 asked the deceased why accused No.8 involved in their disputes, she replied that accused Nos.1 and 2 used to consume liquor in the house of accused No.8; he stated before the police and

Tahsildar that when they went to the house of accused No.1, the house was bolted and when they entered into the house after opening the doors, they noticed that the deceased was laying on the floor; he further stated

before the police that by the time they reached the house of accused

71 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

No.1, accused No.2 was standing on the road with the son of the deceased and he left the place without saying anything to them. P.W.3 did not depose the said things in this evidence before the Court.

Though the evidence of P.W.6, Exs.D7 and D8 omissions were marked to the effect that he stated before P.Ws.18 and 16 that on 03.07.2015 they performed register marriage of the deceased with accused No.1, but in his evidence he deposed that the marriage of the deceased was performed with the intervention of the elders.

The evidence of the witnesses was recorded around 10 years after the incident and thus, such minor discrepancies, omissions and contradictions may likely occurand they are trivial in nature and they do not cut the root case of the prosecution, hence the said omissions and contradictions are no way helpful to the defence of the accused when the accused failed to probablise the defence set up by them. In this context it would be appropriate to refer the case relied by the learned Addl. Public

Prosecutor, wherein deficiency in the evidence of PWs., in the light of their earlier statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., is a matter of consideration in Ashok Debbarama v. State of Tripura15, and explained under para-18; “18. The mere fact that the Appellant was not named in the statement made before the police under Section 161 CrPC and, due to this omission, the evidence of PW10 and PW13 tendered in the Court is 152014 AIAR (Criminal) 209 72 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 unreliable, cannot be sustained. Statements made to the police during investigation were not substantive piece of evidence and the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC can be used only for the purpose of contradiction and not for corroboration. In our view, if the evidence tendered by the witness in the witness box is creditworthy and reliable, that evidence cannot be rejected merely because a particular statement made by the witness before the Court does not find a place in the statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC. Police officer recorded statements of witnesses in an incident where 15 persons lost their lives, 23 houses were set ablaze and large number of persons were injured. PW10 lost his real brother and PW13 lost his daughter as well as his wife and in such a time of grief, they would not be in a normal state of mind to recollect who were all the miscreants and their names. The witnesses may be knowing the persons by face, not their names. Therefore, the mere fact that they had not named the accused persons in Section 161 statement, at that time, that would not be a reason for discarding the oral evidence if their evidence is found to be reliable and creditworthy.”

In this context, a reference may be made to a judgment of

Hon'ble the Apex Court rendered in C.Muniappan and other v. State of

Tamil Badu 16, wherein it has been held as follows:- "85. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution's witness. As the mental abilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses." 16(2010) 9 SCC 567 73 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

39. It was elicited from P.W.1 that the name of accused No.8 and the role played by him are not mentioned in the report as in Ex.P1. It is a settled proposition of law that FIR is not an encyclopaedia to contain all the particulars of the case at the outset. Death of the deceased occurred other than under natural circumstances when she was aged 22 years old and they were in deep grief and at that time all the minute details may not reflect in the first information report. In this regard the learned Addl.PP placed the reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

Mritunjoy Biswas v . Pranab @ Kuti Biswas and another 17 ,has held as under:

“24. In the case at hand, the High Court has taken serious exception to the non-mentioning of the name of the accused in the FIR on the ground that the informant had the occasion to know the name of the assailant from the husband of the deceased as he had told the name of the accused to his nephew who had lodged the FIR and further the deceased had not mentioned the name of the accused though she was conscious and was able to speak. On a studied scrutiny of the evidence on record we are disposed to think that the reasons ascribed by the High Court on this score are unacceptable, for they do not really stand to reason: The husband, PW 8, had screamed about the gunshot and PW 1 had rushed to his house and thereafter immediately proceeded to get a vehicle to take the victim to a hospital. In such a situation, to expect that he should have heard PW 8 mentioning the name of the accused would be in the realm of hypertechnical approach. That apart, in the evidence brought on record, as we find, the accused has been named at the earliest opportunity and there is nothing brought on record to suggest that he has been falsely implicated by way of an afterthought.. Quite apart from the above, the exception taken to the fact that though the deceased was aware of the name of the accused and she was in a 172013 (131) AIC 135 (S.C.) 74 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 position to talk and further was administered an injection for amelioration of pain, yet she did not utter the name of the assailant and, therefore, the prosecution version does not inspire confidence, is inapposite. This approach, as we understand, is based on the principle that it is obligatory on the part of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt however complex and the intriguing may be the facts and circumstances of the case. Needless to say, the aforesaid test is not an absolute guidance in all circumstances for the court, for the doubts that are raised in the mind of the court must be reasonable:In this context, we may profitably refer to what has been stated by Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as His Lordship then was) in Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh (1990) 1 SCC 445, AIR 1990 SC 209:

“4. … The standard adopted must be the standard adopted by a prudent man which, of course, may vary from case to case, circumstances to circumstances. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law.

5. The conscience of the court can never be bound by any rule but that is coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of the judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated.”

In view of the above discussion the prosecution failed to prove the culpability of the accused for the offence u/S 304 B IPC and Sec.3 & 4 of dowry prohibition Act. Accordingly, point Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are answered against the prosecution.

40.With regard to charge under Section 306 of Indian Penal

Code concerned, P.Ws.1 to 4 and 12 deposed that accused No.1 used to harass the deceased by not providing minimum needs to her and he 75 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 failed to give any amount to the deceased to lead the family life and he used to give all his earnings to Ammulu, thereby accused No.1 harassed the deceased to cruelty. The accused did not deny the said evidence of the prosecution witnesses in this regard. No suggestions were put to them denying the said evidence. According to Explanation (a) of Section 498-A IPC, any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide amounts to cruelty. After marriage, accused No.1 is duty bound to provide all household items for the comfort living of his wife and children suitable to their standard of living in the society or he has to give some money out of his income to his wife to purchase the necessities of the house. But, humiliating and treating the deceased by not providing minimum needs to her and giving his entire income to Ammulu certainly amounts to cruelty towards the accused.

In the case of Bhupendra v . State of U.P18., the Hon'ble Apex

Court has observed that an offence of abetment of suicide punishable under Section 306 of IPC is much broader in scope than an offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC.

Moreover, the facts of the present case are clearly suggesting that although there may be no evidence of deceased having been abetted by accused No.1 to commit suicide, but the harassment that

Accused No.1 had created a situation over a sufficient period of time 18 (2014) 2 SCC 106, 76 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 whereby she was left with no option but to take her life. The accused No.1 not discharged the onus shifted on him under section 106 of Indian evidence Act. It is quite unlikely that a young lady, particularly one having a year old child and having another child in her womb, would take her life unless she had some mental health issues (which is not the case of the accused) or was compelled by circumstances to do so. The accused failed to lead any evidence to rebut the presumption u/s 106 of Indian

Evidence Act. When the accused No.1 failed to rebut the said presumption, the guilt of the accused for the death of the deceased by hanging otherwise than under normal circumstances pointing towards him. The ingredients for an offence to be made out under Section 498-A of IPC require that there has to be cruelty inflicted against the victim which either drives her to commit suicide or cause grave injury to herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, In the present case it is evident from the record that due to ill treatment and continuous harassment made by accused No.1 towards the deceased, she suffered lot of mental agony and she expressed her intention to commit suicide to her near and dear, finally in the house of

Accused No.1 i.e., matrimonial house the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself.

41. Having regard to the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs and on careful scrutiny of the evidence of the prosecution, this Court is of 77 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 the considered view that, the prosecution could able to prove the guilt of accused No.1 for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of IPC beyond all reasonable doubt and he is liable to be convicted of the said charges. Accordingly, this point is answered in favour of the prosecution.

42. In the result, the Accused Nos.3 to 7 are found not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 306, 304-B of IPC and

Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and accordingly, they are acquitted of the said charges under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C. The bail bonds of Accused Nos.3 to 7 shall be in force for a period of six months under Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., Accused Nos.2 and 8 died and case against them was abated. Accused No.1 is found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry

Prohibition Act and accordingly, he is acquitted of the said charges under

Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C.

Accused No.1 is found guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of IPC and accordingly, he is convicted of the said charges under Section 235 (2) of Cr.P.C.

Typed to my dictation by Stenographer Gr.I of this Court, corrected and

pronounced by me in the open Court, on this the 6 th day of April, 2026.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. Sessions Judge,

Krishna, Gudivada.

78 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

Accused No.1 is questioned with regard to the quantum of sentence going to be imposed against him. He stated that he is suffering from ill-health and he has to look after his aged mother and pleaded for mercy.

It is not a fit case to take a lenient view by applying Section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act.

43. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that it is a fit case to impose lesser than the punishment prescribed. Accordingly, Accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo

Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of Five Years and to pay a fine

of Rs.20,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall suffer Simple

Imprisonment for a period of six months, for the offence punishable under

Section 306 of I.P.C.

He is further sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment for a period of Two years (02) and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall suffer Simple Imprisonment for a period of three months, for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.

Accused No.1 was in judicial remand from 27.07.2015 to 13.11.2015and the sameshall be givenset off under Section 428 of

Cr.P.C.

79 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

44.A free copy of Judgment is furnished to accused No.1 and he is apprised of his right to avail free legal aid to prefer appeal against this

Judgment before the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati.

In the case of Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad Vs. State of 45.

Maharashtra, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 770, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that there exists a mandatory duty on the Court to apply its mind to the question of award of compensation under Sections 357 and 357-A of Cr.P.C., (Section 396 of BNSS 2023) after the Court records a conviction of the accused to take a view, both on the question of sentence and compensation that it may in its wisdom decide to award to the victim or his/her family. In Suresh and another Vs. State of Haryana reported in 2015 (3) SCC 227held where Section 357 and 357-A of Cr.P.C., to be applied, it is the duty of the Court to ascertain at every stage of criminal case to examine to award interim compensation, at final hearing obligation on the Court to record a finding, whether case for grant of compensation is made out, who is entitled for compensation and how much. Section 357 of Cr.P.C., provides payment of compensation from the accused on conviction. Section 357-A Cr.P.C., provides compensation from ‘victim compensation scheme’ including on conviction, acquittal or discharge etc.,

46.In the present case the deceased is survived by a male child.

When the Court posed a question about his son, he stated that since the 80 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 date of death of the deceased the child has been in the custody of his in- laws and they are not allowing him to see his child, which means that at present the boy is in the care and custody of her maternal grandparents.

Due to the death of the deceased, her son, who is aged about one year as on the date of incident lost his mother, then he lost valuable love and affection and caring of his mother. Hence, the boy of the deceased is considered to be a victim for the purpose of compensation in the present case.

47.Hence, in the light of the aforementioned decision and in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the son of the deceased is entitled to compensation under Section 357-A Cr.P.C., under the Victim

Compensation Scheme. Accordingly, the male child of the deceased is entitled to award adequate compensation which shall be payable by the concerned authority/DLSA, Krishna under the A.P Victim Compensation

Scheme, 2015, as per rules. The maternal grandparents of the boy, who is the victim, are at liberty to file an appropriate application before the

District Legal Services Authority, Machilipatnam for grant of victim compensation under the said scheme. On such application, the learned

Secretary, DLSA, Krishna, Machilipatnam is requested to look into the matter to provide adequate compensation to the male child of the deceased. Office is directed to send a copy of the Judgment to the 81 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

District Legal Services Authority, Krishna, at Machilipatnam for taking necessary action in this regard.

Order relating to case property:

M.O.1/Nylon rope and other un-marked non-valuable case property, if any, shall be destroyed, after expiry of appeal time.

Typed to my dictation by Stenographer Gr.I of this Court, corrected and

pronounced by me in the open Court, on this the 6 th day of April, 2026.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. Sessions Judge,

Krishna, Gudivada.

Form C

(Rule 67(3) of Criminal Rules of Practice

LIST OF PROSECUTION/DEFENCE/COURT WITNESSES

A. Prosecution:

RANK NAME NATURE OF EVIDENCE

P.W1 Chimmsatti Mariyamma Defacto complainant & Mother of Deceased. P.W2 Kota Aasha Elder sister of the deceased. P.W3 Kota Prasad Elder brother in law of the deceased. P.W4 Chimmasatti Anitha Younger sister of the deceased. P.W5 Chunduri Durga Paternal aunt of the deceased. P.W6 Chimmasatti Subbarao Father of the deceased. P.W7 Kanuri Soma Raju Junior Paternal uncle of the deceased. P.W8 Remalli Bhujanga Rao Neighbor of the deceased. P.W9 Remalli Adam Neighbor of the deceased. P.W10 Kandavalli Ravi Teja Kumar Neighbor of the deceased. P.W11 Battu Bharat Babu Neighbor of the deceased. P.W12 Kanuri Kumari Maternal aunt of the deceased. P.W13 M. Lakshmeswara Rao Village Revenue Officer. P.W14 Ch. Subhakara Rao Head Master. P.W15 G. Lakshminarayana Civil Assistant Surgeon. P.W16 K. Ravi Shankar Tahsildar. P.W17 J. Srinivasa Rao ASI of Police. P.W18 D. Surya Sravan Kumar Dy.S.P., P.W19 Y.B.P.T.A. Prasad Dy.S.P.,

B. Defence Witnesses, if any:

82 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

RANK NAME NATURE OF EVIDENCE

1. Nil.

C. Court Witnesses, if any:

RANK NAME NATURE OF EVIDENCE

1. Nil.

LIST OF PROSECUTION/DEFENCE/COURT

EXHIBITS

(Rule 67(3)

A. Prosecution Exhibits:

Sl.No Exhibit Description Number 1 Ex.P1 Report given by P.W.1to the SHO, Gudivada Taluka P.S., 2 Ex.P2 Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement of P.W.8. 3 Ex.P3 Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement of P.W.9. 4 Ex.P4 Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement of P.W.11. 5 Ex.P5 Scene observation report, dt.25.07.2015. 6 Ex.P6 Inquest report, dt.25.07.2015. 7 Ex.P7 Postmortem examination report. 8 Ex.P8 FIR in Cr.No.110/2015 of Gudivada Taluka P.S., dt.25.07.2015. 9 Ex.P9 Photographs (5 in number) along with CD. 10 Ex.P10 Two rough sketches dt.25.07.2015. 11 Ex.P11 Section of law adding memo, dt.16.11.2015.

B. Defence Exhibits:

Sl.No Exhibit Description Number

1. Ex.D1 Marked portion of Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement “ది 24.7.2015 వ తేదీనసాయంత్రం 5.00 గంటలనండి 7.30 నిమిషాలసమయంలోమారండో అల్లుడుత్రసాదరావుమాకుఫోన్చేసిమాఅమాా యిఅనూషఆమెభర్తఇంట్లు ఉరివేసుకొనిచనిపోయినట్లుగావలివరితపాడుత్గామసుతల్లచెప్పి నట్లుగామాకుఫోన్ చేసిచెరి గా…”

2. Ex.D2 Marked portion of statement of witness recorded by Tahsildar, dt.25.07.2015 “అదేరోజుసాయంత్రంమాఅల్లుడుసుభాకర్రావు సాయంత్రం 6.00 గంటలకువచ్చిమాఅమాా యిఅనూషనవాళ్ళఇంటికి తీసుకుపోయినాడుది.24.7.2015 వతేదీనసాయంత్రంఐదుగంటలనండి 7:30 గంటలసమయంలోమారండోఅల్లుడుత్రసాదరావుమాకుఫోన్చేసిమాఅమాా యి అనూషఆమెభర్తఇంట్లుఉరివేసుకునిచనిపోయినట్లుగావలివరితపాడుత్గామసుతల్ల చెప్పి నట్లుగా…”

3. Ex.D2A Marked portion of Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement of witness “నీభర్త అంటేఅంటారుకానీజైపాల్చౌదరికిఏమిసంబంధంఅనగాఅప్పి డుమామర్దల్ల శిరీషనాభర్త,మామభాసక ర్రావు,జైపాల్చౌదరిఇంటివదదతాగుతారు.” 83 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

4. Ex.D3 Marked portion of Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement of witness “అంరటమేమువెళ్ళళ సరికివలివరితపాడులోనిఅనూషవాళ్ళఇంటికిగొళ్ళ ం పెటటబడిఉందిగొళ్ళ ంతీసిచూడగామామర్దల్లకిందరడుకోబెటటబడిఉనన ది.”

5. Ex.D4 Marked portion of statement of witness recorded by Tahsildar “మేమువెళ్లుసరికివలివరితపాడులోనిఅనూషవాళ్ళఇంటికిగొళ్ళ ంపెటటబడిఉంది గొళ్ళ ంతీసిచూడగామామర్దల్లకిందరడుకోబెటటబడిఉనన ది.”

6. Ex.D5 Marked portion of Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement of witness “మా మర్దల్లఅనూషమామగారుభాసక ర్రావుఅనూషకొడుకునరోడుుమీదవదిలి ఎట్లవంటిసమాధానంచెరి కుండావెళ్ళళ పోయినాడు.”

7. Ex.D6 Marked portion of statement of witness recorded by Tahsildar “మామర్దల్లఅనూషమామగారుభాసక ర్రావుఅనూషకొడుకునిరోడుుమీదవదిలి మమా లినచూసిఎట్లవంటిసమాధానంచెరి కుండావెళ్ళుపోయినాడు.”

8. Ex.D7 Marked portion of Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement of witness “ది.3.7.2013 వసంవరస ర్ంలోముదినేరలిులోరిజిసాట ర్వివాహంమాఅమాా యి అనూషకిబొలువర్ప్పసుభాకర్రావుకిచేసినాము.”

9. Ex.D8 Marked portion of statement of witness recorded by Tahsildar “ది 3.7.2013వసంవరస ర్ంలోముదినేరలిులోరిజిసటర్వివాహంమాఅమాా యి అనూషకిబొలువర్ప్పసుభాకర్కిచేసినాము.”

C. Court Exhibits:

Sl.No Exhibit Number Description

1. Nil

D. Material Objects:

Sl.N Material Object Description. o Number

1. M.O1 Faded rose Coloured nylon rope.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. Sessions Judge, Krishna, Gudivada. Copy submitted to:-

The Hon’ble Registrar (Judl.,) Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Nelapadu, Guntur District. Copy to:-

1. The Addl. Public Prosecutor, XI ADJ Court, Krishna, Gudivada.

2. The Superintendent of Police, Krishna, Machilipatnam.

//True Copy//

XI Addl. Sessions Judge,

Krishna, Gudivada.

84 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

TABULAR FORM TO BE APPENDED TO THE JUDGMENT AS PER

RULE 67 OF THE CRIMINAL RULES OF PRACTICE

IN THE COURT OF XI ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS

JUDGE, KRISHNA, GUDIVADA

1 Serial Number 2 Sessions Case : Sessions Case No.44/2016 Number 3 Crime No. and : Cr.No.110/2015 of Gudivada Taluka name of the Police Police Station. Station 4 Description of : 1. Bollavarapu Subhakar Rao @ Accused Subhakar, S/o Bhaskara Rao, 30 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada Mandal.

2. Bollavarapu Bhaskara Rao, S/o Israel, 55 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada mandal. (Died case abated on

15.11.2023)

3. Bollavarapu Maremma, W/o Bhaskara Rao, 45 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada Mandal.

4. Bollavarapu Prabhakara Rao, S/o Bhaskara Rao, 25 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada Mandal.

5. Bollavarapu Subhashini @ Suhasini, D/o Bhaskara Rao, 32 years, Srikalahasti colony, Gudivada.

6. Geera Sumanjali @ Chanti, W/o Jayant, 26 years, Srikalahasti Colony, Gudivada.

7. Ballavarapu Sudhanjali @ Sudha, D/o Bhaskara Rao, 21 years, Srikalahasti Colony, Gudivada.

8. Kota John Paul Chowdary @ Jaya Paul Choudary, S/o Prakasam, 49 years, Valivarthipadu Village, Gudivada Mandal. (Died case abated on

03.02.2026)

5. Date of-

a) Occurrence : 24.07.2015

b) Report : 25.07.2015

c) Apprehension of : 27.07.2015 - A1 to A8 accused 85 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026

d) Release on bail : 13.11.2015 – A1, A2, A4 03.09.2015 – A3, A5 to A7 31.08.2015 – A8

e) Commencement of : 20.08.2024 trial

f) Closure of trial : 11.03.2025

g) Sentence or order : 06.04.2026.

6. Result :

In the result, the Accused Nos.3 to 7 are found not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 306, 304-B of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and accordingly, they are acquitted of the said charges under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C. The bail bonds of Accused Nos.3 to 7 shall be in force for a period of six months under Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., Accused Nos.2 and 8 died and the case against them was abated. Accused No.1 is found not guilty of the offences punishable under Section 304-B of IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and accordingly, he is acquitted of the said charges under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C. Accused No.1 is found guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of IPC and accordingly, he is convicted of the said charges under Section 235 (2) of Cr.P.C. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that it is a fit case to impose lesser punishment than life imprisonment. Accordingly, Accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo

Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of Five (05) Years and to pay a

fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall suffer Simple Imprisonment for a period of six months, for the offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C. He is further sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment for a period of Two years (02) and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall suffer Simple Imprisonment for a period of three months, for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. Accused No.1 was in judicial remand from 27.07.2015 to 13.11.2015and the sameshall be givenset off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. Order relating to case property:

M.Os.1 and 2 and the un-marked non-valuable case property, if 86 XI Addl. Sessions Court, S.C.No.44 / 2016, Gudivada. Dated 06.04.2026 any, shall be destroyed, after expiry of appeal time.

7. Explanation for delay :

This case was taken on file on 10.02.2016. On 18.02.2020 the accused 1 to 8 were examined u/Sec.228 Cr.P.C., and charges under

Sections 498-A r/w 34, 306 r/w 34 and 304-B r/w 34 of IPC and u/s 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act were framed the Accused and they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The trial was commenced on 20.08.2024 and it was concluded on 11.03.2025. P.Ws.1 to 19 are examined and Exs.P1 to Ex.P11 and M.O.1 are marked. On behalf of the defence, Exs.D1 to D8 were marked. On 24.01.2025 the accused 1 and 3 to 8 were examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., and they reported no defence evidence. On 23.03.2026 heard the arguments on both sides. On 06.04.2026 Judgment was pronounced. Hence, no delay in conducting trial of this case.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. Sessions Judge, Krishna, Gudivada.

Copy submitted to:

The Hon'ble Registrar (Judl.), High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Nelapadu- 522 237, Guntur District,

Copy to:

1) The Addl. Public Prosecutor, XI ADJ Court, Krishna, Gudivada.

2) The Superintendent of Police, Krishna, Machilipatnam.

APKR0E0002512012

THE COURT OF XI ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, GUDIVADA

Present: Sri Grandhi Subrahmanyam,

XI Additional District Judge

Friday, this the 20th day of March, 2026

O.S No.1/2013

Between:-

1. T.Krishna Mohan Rao. (died)

2. T.Sambasiva Rao. (died)

3. T.Naga Venkata Maha Lakshmi. (died)

4. T.Subbaraya Gurukul.

5. T.Pitcheswara Rao.

6. T.Srinivasa Rao.

7. T.Parijatha Kanaka Durga.

8. T.Chandra Sekhara Rao.

9. Murukupudi Syamala.

10. Kundurthi Sri Uma.

11. T.Ravi Satya Prasad.

12. T.Mahesh.

(Plaintiffs 11 and 12 were added as L.Rs., of deceased-2nd plaintiff As per the orders dt.22.02.2018 in IA.No.725/2018)

13. Tholeti Rajya Lakshmi.

14. T.Veerabhadra Sarma.

15. T.Siva Rama Krishna.

16. Illuri Charumathi.

17. Nandivelugu Pina Vani.

18. Ponnuru Revathi Devi.

19. Chandramouli Gayathri.

(Plaintiffs 13 to 19 were added as L.Rs., of deceased-1st plaintiff as per the orders dt.19.09.2022 in IA.No.503/2021) …Plaintiffs.

And

1. Sri Malleswara Swamy Temple, Kondiparru, Pamarru Mandal, Krishna District, rep. by its Manager.

- 2 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

2. The Asst. Commissioner of Endowments, Endowments Department, Opp. To Old Bus Stand, Vijayawada.

3. The Commissioner of Endowments, Endowments Department, Tilak Road, Nampalli, Hyderabad, A.P., …Defendants.

This Suit came on 23.01.2026 before me for final hearing in the presence of Sri N.Prabhakara Rao, Advocate for Plaintiffs and of Smt.V.Lalitha, Advocate for Defendant No.1 and of Asst. Government Pleader for Defendant Nos.2 and 3 upon hearing both sides, upon perusing the material papers on record and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:

J U D G M E N T

The Plaintiffs filed the suit against Defendants 1 to 3 for declaration, to declare them as absolute owners of their respective plaint schedule properties; for consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from ever interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties and for costs of the suit.

2. The brief averments of the plaint are as follows:-

(a) Deceased-1st plaintiff was the owner of plaint ‘A’ schedule property, deceased-2nd plaintiff was the owner of plaint ‘B’ schedule property, plaintiffs 3 to 7 are the owners of plaint ‘C’ schedule property, 8th plaintiff is the owner of plaint ‘D’ schedule property and plaintiffs 9 and 10 are the owners of plaint ‘E’ schedule property.

(b) Deceased-1st plaintiff’s father by name Venkateswarlu has four brothers by names (i) Tholeti Peda Seshaiah, (ii) Tholeti Ramaiah,

(iii) Thoelti Mallaiah; and (iv) Tholeti China Ramaiah and along with father of 1st plaintiff they are five brothers and they are the children of

Sambaiah. Sambaiah, who is the son of Mallanna, inherited the property. After his demise, the properties were equally partitioned on 01.01.1960 by taking into consideration of the value of properties. By - 3 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 the date of partition said Peda Seshaiah, Ramaiah, Mallaiah and

China Ramaiah were no more. Said Venkateswarlu effected the partition with their children i.e., Peda Seshaiah’s son Malleswara Rao,

Ramaiah’s son Mallikharjuna Rao, Mallaiah’s son Ramalingeswara

Rao and China Ramaiah’s son Chandrasekhara Rao. In the said partition, the branches of Malleswara Rao and Mallikharjuna Rao were given Ac.1.39 cents each and branches of Ramalingeswara Rao and

Chandrasekhar Rao were given Ac.1.86 cents each and the father of 1st plaintiff was given with Ac.1.86 cents, in total an extent of Ac.8.36 cents. Subsequent to the partition, all of them have been enjoying their respective shares and applied for pattadar passbooks.

(c) As the properties were ancestral, during the lifetime of

Mallanna, the documents relating to 18th century were not available and the properties can only be identified, but they are with the

Revenue authorities. Considering the said partition, revenue authorities issued pattadar passbooks. The deceased 1st plaintiff’s father was given pattadar pass book in respect of Ac.1.86 cents, the pattadar pass book given in the name of father of the deceased 2nd plaintiff in respect of B schedule property was given in the name of

Malleswara Rao for an extent of Ac.1.39 cents, so far as plaintiffs 3 to 7 are concerned the pattadar pass book was given in the name of the wife of Mallikharjuna Rao by name Tholeti Naga Maha Lakshmamma, who is 3rd plaintiff herein, the pattadar passbook of 8th plaintiff was given in the name of his mother Naga Mahalakshmamma, the pattadar passbook of plaintiffs 9 and 10 was given in the name of

Ramalingeswara Rao. Thus, the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of their respective schedule properties with title and enjoying the same since 1960 onwards. During pendency of the suit 2nd plaintiff died intestate on 20.03.2017 leaving behind him the plaintiffs 11 and 12 as - 4 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 his legal heirs to succeed his property. Similarly, during pendency of the suit, 1st plaintiff died intestate on 6.11.2021 leaving behind him the plaintiffs 13 to 19 as his legal heirs and after his death, his property devolved upon them.

(d) While the matter stood thus, the defendants were trying to interfere into the plaint schedule properties without any manner of right, title and possession. As there was no other option the plaintiffs filed O.S.No.74/1991 on the file of Prl. Junior Civil Judge’s Court,

Gudivada seeking permanent injunction and the same was dismissed on 30.09.1999. Main contest of the defendants herein was that the schedule properties were the temple properties. The family members of the plaintiffs are the Archakas and taking advantage of the same, 1st defendant is trying to knock away the properties in the name of the temple though they are not the temple lands. Against said dismissal, the plaintiffs preferred appeal in A.S.No.46/1999 on the file of Addl.

Senior Civil Judge’s Court (FTC), Gudivada, which was also dismissed

on 12.02.2004. Thereupon the plaintiffs filed Second Appeal in

S.A.No.992/2005 before the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., and the same was disposed of on 29.12.2011 with an observation in page 5 that the title of the plaintiffs was denied by the defendants, as such in a permanent injunction suit, title cannot be looked into, as such two options were opened to the plaintiff – “One is to institute proceedings

before the Endowments Tribunal, which is conferred with jurisdiction to

decide the nature and character of the properties held by Hindu

Religious Institutions. The Second is to file an independent suit for declaration of title and for consequential reliefs. It is for the Appellants to choose the Forum.” As such basing on the above observation, the plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of title and for consequential permanent injunction.

- 5 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

(e) In fact, each of the plaintiffs has to file separate suit, but as the order in Second Appeal was a common order, as per the provisions of Order II, Rule 2 of CPC a single suit is filed by the plaintiffs. The defendants have no right, title or possession over the plaint schedule properties. As the defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs are obliged to file the suit. Hence, the suit.

3. First defendant filed a Written Statement, which was adopted by defendant Nos.2 and 3, denying the averments of the plaint and contending as follows:-

(a) First defendant is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule properties in total an extent of Ac.8.36 cents of wet land i.e., Ac.1.75 cents in R.S.No.33/1, Ac.1.95 cents in R.S.No.33/2, Ac.1.98 cents in

R.S.No.33/3, Ac.1.34 cents in R.S.No.33/4 and Ac.1.34 cents in

R.S.No.33/5. The entire extent of Ac.8.36 cents as per Mashayat

Ac.8.80 cents of land in one plot and it has been in possession and enjoyment of 1st defendant since 2006 till date and public auctions were also conducted in respect of the said land. It was cultivated by

Allada Venkata Subba Rao for the years 2012-2013 and 2014-2015.

In view of the disputes raised by the plaintiffs, as per the orders of the

Court, Receiver took possession of the lands and deposited the rents into the Court upto 2006 and the same was in fixed deposit in the

Court of Junior Civil Judge, Gudivada and as per the orders in

O.S.No.74/1991 1st defendant is having right to withdraw the same.

(b) The plaintiffs filed suit in O.S.No.74/1991, which was dismissed on 30.9.1999. Now the legal representatives of the same parties filed the suit, therefore the suit is barred by res judicata. As the 1st defendant filed a petition to send for the amount lying in fixed deposit and when the Court sent notices to the plaintiffs, they filed the present suit to harass the defendants and to drag on the proceedings.

- 6 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

The temple is paying land revenue in respect of the plaint schedule properties and it is in possession and enjoyment of the lands. The plaintiffs filed the false suit by creating some false records. The suit filed by the plaintiffs, appeal suit and the second appeal were dismissed as the 1st defendant was owner of the land.

(c) After the death of 2nd plaintiff, D1 filed additional written statement on 7.8.2018 and it was further contended that plaintiffs 1 to 5 in O.S.No.74/1991 were archakas or poojaris in 1st defendant temple. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 and 5th defendant in O.S.No.74/1991 (8th plaintiff in this suit) left the temple and village long back to work as poojarees. Therefore, there was no need to add L.Rs.3 to 7 and 9 to 12 as plaintiffs herein. Fourth plaintiff in O.S.No.74/1991 was an employee of Cooperative Society at Pamarru, 8th plaintiff herein is a postal employee not connected with the temple affairs. First plaintiff locked the Temple for days together without conducting Dhoopa

Deepa Nyvedyams.

(d) The fathers of the plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No.235/1934 on the file of District Munsif Court, Gudivada for declaration that land in

R.S.No.33 is belonged to them. That suit was dismissed. The mother preferred Second Appeal before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in

S.A.No.714/1938, wherein it was decided as follows:-

i) the land of Ac.8.30 cents of Kondiparru Village i.e., the schedule land belonged to Sri Malleswara Swamy Vari Temple,

Kondiparru; ii) the Archakas were to perform the customary duties in the temple and enjoy the income from the land.

The Archakas are entitled to the benefits subject to their obligations to render the customary service in the Temple. There was no Trustee or Trust Board at that time. The land continued in - 7 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 possession of Archakas. The Trust Board was legally appointed on 23.9.1999 on the instructions of Asst. Commissioner of Endowments,

Vijayawada and all the properties of the Temple were vested with the

Trust Bond. There were number of written complaints from the villagers received by the Trust Bond and show cause notices were issued to the plaintiffs, which were returned by them. The temple was kept under lock and key round the clock by the plaintiffs in

O.s.No.74/1991. Second defendant authorized the Trust Bond to

break open the lock before the elders of the village. The Department got attended the daily Dhoopa Deepa Nivedyam through someone else through public contributions as no income was fetching from the properties.

(d) First plaintiff instituted number of Writs and in

W.P.No.8083/1989 on 16.6.1989 obtained stay orders in

M.S.P.13583/1989 for auction of the lease hold rights of the schedule land. First plaintiff also filed a petition before the Joint Commissioner of Endowments to dismiss the Trust Board, that petition was dismissed, then the matter was taken to the Hon’ble High Court in W.P.No.15704/1989. The Chairperson of the Trust Board i.e., 1st defendant removed the plaintiffs 1 to 5 in OS.No.74/91 from their services on 4.2.1989. The plaintiff in the previous suit filed a petition in

R.P.9/1989 before the Regional Joint Commissioner of Endowments,

Hyderabad challenging the termination and the same was allowed.

Aggrieved by the same, the Trust Board preferred appeal before the

Hon’ble Minister for Endowments, who pleased to allow the same and

found that termination of Archakas was legal and correct.

(e) The plaintiffs in previous suit filed W.P.No.7250/1991 before the Hon’ble High Court challenging the orders passed by the Hon’ble

Minister. The Hon’ble High Court found that termination of the - 8 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 plaintiffs was proper and upheld the orders of the Hon’ble Minister.

The Government of A.P., Revenue Department delivered order over the appeal preferred by the Trust Board on 09.05.1991 and intimated to all the parties. During 2nd week of May plaintiffs received the orders and understood that they cannot any more to enjoy the properties without working in the Temple. The plaintiffs could obtain temporary injunction orders. In I.A.No.664/1991 in O.S.No.74/1991 Prl. District

Munsif, Gudivada appointed Sri Y.V.Ramana, Advocate as Receiver on 6.2.1992 to take possession of the schedule land along with standing crop, if any, and to auction the lease hold rights of the schedule land year to year and to deposit the amount in Court. During pendency of previous suit, 1st defendant filed a petition before the

District Collector, Krishna to cancel the passbooks and title deeds issued in favour of the plaintiffs by the revenue authorities. The

District Collector after full-fledged enquiry, cancelled the pass books and title deeds. But the plaintiffs in previous suit did not choose to file any appeal against the said orders, and the plaintiffs in

O.S.No.74/1991 filed a petition in I.A.No.1532/1998 to add the District

Collector, Krishna as 6th defendant, as he cancelled the title deeds and pass books, but the said petition was dismissed on 18.11.1998.

(f) After the death of 1st plaintiff, D1 filed another additional

Written Statement on 21.10.2022 contending that 1st plaintiff was an employee in Cooperative Society, Pamarru. After retirement he settled at Singarayapalem, Mudinepalli Mandal and died there. Therefore, there was no need to add the L.Rs., of 1st plaintiff i.e., plaintiffs 13 to 19 herein. The plaint schedule properties have been in possession and enjoyment of 1st defendant and public auctions were also conducted to the said land and it has been cultivating by the bidders.

The Temple is paying land revenue in respect of the schedule - 9 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 properties. The plaintiffs filed false suits to have wrongful gain.

Hence, prayed to dismiss the suit with costs.

4.Basing on the above pleadings, my learned predecessor in office has settled the following issues for trial:-

1. Whether the plaintiffs have title to the plaint schedule property?

2. Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the schedule property by the date of the suit?

3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree as prayed for?

4. To what relief?

5. During the course of trial, 1st plaintiff was examined as

P.W.1 and he got marked Exs.A1 to A15 and during his cross- examination Ex.B1 was marked on behalf of the defendants, 2nd plaintiff was examined as P.W.2 (his evidence was eschewed on 14.3.2017), 8th plaintiff was examined as P.W.3 and 4th plaintiff was examined as P.W.4 and he got marked Exs.A16 to A26. On behalf of the Defendants, 1st defendant was examined as D.W.1, he got marked documents under Exs.B2 to B16, but his evidence was eschewed as he retired from service and did not turn up before the Court, the then

Executive Officer of 1st defendant was examined as D.W.2 and he got marked Exs.B17 to B19 and a lessee of 1st defendant was examined as D.W.3 and he got marked Exs.B20 and B21.

As D.W.1 did not turn up for cross-examination due to his retirement from service, his evidence was eschewed on 19.02.2020.

As the evidence of D.W.1 was kept aside and the documents under

Exs.B1 to B16 cannot be treated as exhibits on behalf of the - 10 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 defendants and hence, both the counsel consented to mark those documents through D.W.2 in his further chief-examination with the very same exhibit numbers in order to avoid confusion and to maintain seriatim. However, as Ex.B16 i.e., L.R. Receipt for the fasalies from 1406 to 1413 is a photocopy, the same is not admitted in evidence and hence, in the present suit, there is no document with exhibit number

Ex.B16.

6.Heard the arguments on both sides.

Submissions on behalf of the Plaintiffs:

7.Learned counsel for the plaintiffs argued that initially the plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No.74/1991 on the file of Prl. Junior Civil

Judge’s Court, Gudivada for permanent injunction against the

Managing Trustee of 1st defendant by name Mungi Nageswaramma and five others, but the said suit was dismissed. However, a direction was given to 1st defendant to take possession of the property after cutting the crop. All the plaint schedule properties are agricultural lands. Plaintiffs preferred appeal and the Appellate Court confirmed the Judgment of the trial Court. They preferred second appeal in

S.A.No.92/2005, which was disposed of on 29.12.2011, wherein his

Lordship in para No.8 gave two options to the plaintiffs, one was to file proceedings before the Endowments Tribunal or to file a suit for declaration before a Civil Court. In order to support the case of the plaintiffs, they examined P.Ws.1 to 4 and got marked documents under Exs.A1 to A30. Only 1st defendant adduced evidence and no evidence was adduced by defendants 2 and 3. In Ex.B4 it was stated that the plaintiffs are entitled to cut the remaining crop, thus, they were in possession of the property as on the date of 1991. When the

Endowments Department has taken over possession of the Temple - 11 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 properties and when the Executive Officer was appointed to the

Temple, are not proved by the defendants. Plaintiffs are priests in the

Temple. Even till today the plaint schedule property is standing in the name of the plaintiffs in the revenue records. Pattadar passbooks were issued to the plaintiffs in their names in the year 1999. The defendants did not take any steps to cancel the pattadar passbooks.

Entries in 1A and 1B show that the plaintiffs are in possession of the plaint schedule property. First defendant could not able to establish how they acquired the plaint schedule property to the Temple. In the

Written Statement at para No.5, it was admitted that the entire extent of Ac.8.36 cents was in possession of the plaintiffs from 2006 onwards. After filing of the suit, the defendants paid cist, which are not to be considered. In Ex.A23 it was mentioned that acquisition of the property was ancestral i.e., from father. Adangals under Exs.A28 to

A30 pertaining to 2019 show that the plaintiffs are in possession of the plaint schedule property. The temple authorities did not file any documents or did not adduce any evidence how the plaint schedule property were acquired by Temple and the Trust Board has no locus standi to constitute. The Trust Board has no power to remove the plaintiffs. Receiver did not hand over the plaint schedule property to the Temple and the Temple did not file any document to show when they received the properties from the Receiver. How the property belongs to the Temple is not explained. So many documents are filed by the plaintiffs to show that they are the owners of the plaint schedule property. Adangals and other documents proved the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs. In Ex.A10 RSR the names of the plaintiffs are reflected in respect of the plaint schedule property. Hence, prayed to decree the suit.

- 12 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

Submissions on behalf of the defendants 8. Learned counsel for the defendant No.1 submitted that on behalf of the defendants D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and got marked documents from Exs.B1 to B21 (except Ex.B16) to prove the case of the defendants. On 23.9.1988 Trust Board was appointed. Notice was issued to the plaintiffs on 4.2.1989 to immediately appear before the Joint Commissioner. In RC.No.9/1989 Regional Joint

Commissioner of Endowments, Hyderabad allowed the petition filed by the plaintiffs challenging their termination by the Trust Board. Appeal filed by the Trust Board before the Hon’ble Minister was allowed and found that termination of Archakas was legal and correct. Writ Petition in W.P.No.7250/1991 was filed challenging the order of the Hon’ble

Minister, wherein it was found that termination of the plaintiffs was proper and upheld the order of the Hon’ble Minster. On 21.5.1991 a suit for permanent injunction was filed by the plaintiffs in

O.S.No.74/1991 and obtained ad-interim injunction. The defendants

received summons on 16.12.1991, the matter came up for hearing on 29.1.1992. After enquiry the I.A., was dismissed, which is marked as

Ex.B7. On 6.2.1992 Receiver was appointed. In the year 1998 the

District Collector cancelled the pattadar passbooks and title deeds issued by the revenue authorities in favour of the plaintiffs. Against said order, no appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are not entitled to seek for declaration. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiffs to establish that they came to the Court with clean hands and with clear title. Documents filed by the plaintiffs would not show that they are the owners of the plaint schedule property. They relied on the pattadar passbooks and title deeds, which were cancelled by the

District Collector. Plaintiffs are not in possession of the plaint schedule property. When the plaintiffs are not in possession of the plaint - 13 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 schedule property, they are not entitled for declaration without seeking the relief of recovery of possession. Entries in 38 Register confirm the possession with the Temple. Defendants paid taxes till 2020 and cist receipts are also filed. Approval of auction for the leasehold rights is also filed. Exs.B1 and B2 are the DCB for 2006-2007 and 2008-2009.

From the year 1989 D1 has been in possession of the properties. In support of their contention they marked Ex.B6 proceedings of the

Commissioner. Government passed Order on 9.5.1991. Said order was sent to Trust Board and against the said order Writ Petition was filed, but the same was dismissed. Defendants filed Vakalat on 2.11.1991, in the meanwhile Writ Petition was dismissed. On merits

I.A. was disposed of on 26.2.1992. Later the Court appointed

Receiver. P.W.1 admitted about the formation of Trust Board, till then the 1st defendant is in custody of the property, 1st defendant took possession of the property, District Collector cancelled the title deeds and no appeal was preferred against the said order. As per Ex.B6 one

Kutumba Rao handed over the land to the Temple. On 3.7.1989 new

Trust Board was appointed. In Ex.B8 reasons for removal of the plaintiffs were mentioned in the notice. Under Ex.B5 Writ Appeal was dismissed. Hence, they prayed to dismiss the suit. In support of their contentions, the defendants submitted a case-law of Hon’ble High

Court of Telangana in the case of Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary Vs.

The Government of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 2016 (2) ALD 236.

Learned Addl. Government Pleader for defendants 2 and 3 argued in the same lines.

9. Before going to discuss the above issue and to appreciate the evidence on record, it is appropriate to refer the chronological events occurred prior to filing of the present suit by referring the - 14 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 documents available on record, in order to know the history behind the litigation.

a) As evident from Ex.B10 - The President, Hindu Religious

Endowments Board, Madras preferred Second Appeal in

S.A.No.714 of 1938 against all the five brothers of father of 1st plaintiff and five others on the file of Hon’ble High Court of

Judicature at Madras. In the Judgment dt.22.07.1941, it was mentioned that the plaintiffs, who were pujaris of a temple filed a suit for declaration that certain land in their enjoyment is their exclusive property, the Temple has no manner of right to it and that they were entitled to refund of Rs.65/- collected by 1st defendant u/s 69 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, which was dismissed. In appeal the learned Subordinate

Judge rejected the inference drawn by the trial Court from the

documents filed on behalf of the defendants, gave finding that the land is the property of the plaintiffs, though learned

Subordinate Judge seems to think that there is some service connected with that property, but he did not give a definite finding to that effect. Finally, the said appeal was allowed as follows:- “In the result, therefore, I allow the appeal and modify the decree passed by the lower appellate Court. There will be a declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to the suit land subject to their obligation, to render the customary service in the Malleswaraswami Vari Temple of Kondiparru and that the contribution levied by the 1st defendant on the basis that the land is an endowment of the suit temple is illegal and there will be a decree that the 1st defendant do repay Rs.65/- to the plaintiffs. The order of the lower appellate Court regarding costs will stand and in this Court each party will bear his own costs.” - 15 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

b) Document under Ex.B6 - Basing on the application of Sarpanch dt.7.6.1986, the Asst. Commissioner, Endowments Department, Vijayawada issued a proceedings dt.7.7.1986, “…After having satisfied with the contents and on the strength of the verification certificate given by the Inspector, the subject institution is registered under Sub- section (5) of Section 38 of the A.P.Charitable and Hindu Religious Endowments Act 17 of 1966.

The Trustee of the subject institution or other person in management of the same shall report to this Office every year the alterations, omissions or additions in the particulars relating to the institution as required under sub-section 10 of section 38 of the act 17 of 1966.”

c) Document under Ex.B8 – Notice, dt.4.2.1989 the Chairman

Board of Trustee, Sri Nagamalleswara Swamivari

Devasthanam, Kondiparru, issued to 1st plaintiff herein and others terminating them from Archakatvam under Section 37 of

Act 30/87 and to hand over the Temple articles and vehicles to the Authorized person by name Mamillapalli Satyanarayana;

as 1st plaintiff herein has no certificate to be an Archaka and he

was working as Clerk in Co-operative Society, Pamarru and several complaints were received against him and inspite of three notices there was no reply from him;

Tholeti Mallikharjuna Rao, as he never resided in the village and did not perform archaka service in the temple and he gave the lands to one Vinodarao on lease and that as per the orders in A.S.No.714/38 he was not eligible to perform archakatvam and he was removed from service;

Tholeti Malleswara Rao, as he gave the lands to one

Vinodarao on lease and as per the Court order he was not - 16 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 eligible to enjoy the temple land and to do service and he was removed from service;

Tholeti Chandrasekhara Rao, as he was not having certificate to do Archakatvam and as he was working in Kondiparru

Postman, he leased out the lands to one Veerayya on lease and as per the order in A.S.No.714/38 he was not eligible to enjoy the land and to do service and he was removed from service;

Tholeti Ramalingeswara Rao, as he did not perform

Archakatvam in the Temple and he never resided in the village, he gave the temple land to one Sanjeevarao on lease, as he was not having certificate of Archakatvam and he was removed from service;

d) As evident from Ex.B4 – First plaintiff herein along with four others filed a Writ Petition in W.P.No.7250/1991 before the

Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, challenging the order of

1st respondent-The Principal Secretary to Govt. of A.P.,

Revenue (Endowments Department, dt.2.5.1991 reversing the order of 2nd respondent-The Regional Joint Commissioner

Endowments Department, MZ-I, Hyderabad in RP.No.9/89, dt.8.5.1989. In the said Judgment it was mentioned that the petitioners were recognized to be entitled to the lands in question, subject to the obligation to render customary service in Sri Malleswara Swamy Temple, by the Judicature of Madras, in SA No.714/38, dt.22.7.1941. According to the petitioners, who are five in number, they have to perform the temple service by turns and that they were working in some jobs while waiting for their turn to render service. The 4th respondent-

Chairman of the Trust Board of the aforesaid temple removed - 17 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 the petitioners from Archakatvam service of the temple by the order dt.4.2.81 holding that none of the petitioners were rendering archakatvam service to the temple, but leased out the lands and were enjoying the income thereof. None of the petitioners hold archakatvam certificate and are not qualified to be archakas. In the said Judgment, dt.24.12.1991 it was observed as follows:- “The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents Mr.Anand that the petitioners are not hereditary archakas is therefore upheld, and that removal of the petitioners is found to be in accordance with law. In JETHMAL VS. UNION OF INDIA (1970 SC 1310) it was held that when a party is asked to show cause and chosen not to reply, the authority can proceed exparte on materials before it and on the basis of allegations in the show cause notice and a further notice that the matter would be dealt with on certain day would be idle formality. Similar is the view expressed by this Court in

NARSINGARAO VS. AMADALAVALASA

CO.OP.LIMITED (1976(2) An.W.R.429.

The petitioners, who never worked as archakas of the temple have been squatting on the lands belonging to the temple and enjoying the properties to which they are not entitled. At last, the 4th respondent (Smt.M.Nageswaramma) took action and removed the petitioners and the said order was confirmed by the Government. This court will not exercise the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution in aid of persons who squat on the temple lands wityhout performing any service which is a condition precedent for their enjoying the temple lands. I do not find any merits in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee Rs.350/-.

It appears that the petitioners raised crop which is now standing on the land and have already harvested 2/3rd of the crop and 1/3rd of the crop is still to be cut. It is not denied that the crop was raised by the petitioners.

- 18 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

The petitioners are therefore permitted to cut the remaining standing crop for which the Devasthanam shall not object, within two weeks from the date of receipt of this order.”

e) Document under Ex.B5 shows that Challenging the order of the Hon’ble High Court in W.P.No.7250/1991, the five petitioners preferred Writ Appeal No.68 of 1992. In the

Judgment, dt.11.09.1997, it was observed and held as follows:- “In the face of this situation, an irresistible and unassailable finding could indeed be recorded as done by the learned single Judge that the petitioners- appellants were not rendering any archakatvam service and were not entitled to hold the lands belonging to the trust and, therefore, no cause exists to interfere with the impugned decision of the learned single Judge. Archakatvam services were not rendered by the appellants emerges as an undisputed fact. The only ground urged on behalf of the appellants in that regard was that the appellants were waiting their turn to render such services, which is not substantiated. The fact that the lands in question were leased out is also not disputed. The fact that sufficient opportunity was attempted to be given to the appellants is also amply borne out from the records as held by the learned single Judge and, therefore, everything which was required to be judicially reviewed in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been carefully examined by the learned single Judge before arriving at his conclusions. It was not necessary for the learned single Judge to go through the whole gamut of the controversies as raised in the writ petition. The findings recorded by the 4 th respondent with regard to the illegitimacy of the rights claimed by the appellants and upheld by the 1 st respondent were not such as could be interfered with as rightly observed by the learned single Judge in his impugned judgment. The appeal therefore, has no merits and the same is dismissed. No costs.” - 19 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

f) Document under Ex.B7 - First plaintiff herein along with four others filed I.A.No.664/1991 in O.S.No.74/1991 seeking temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1 of CPC against the 1st defendant temple herein and four others. In the Order, dt.06.02.1992, it was mentioned that an exparte temporary injunction was granted by the Vacation Court on 21.5.91.

Ultimately the said petition was rejected. However, Sri

Y.V.Ramana Rao, Advocate was appointed as Receiver to immediately take possession of the schedule land along with the standing crop if any. The receiver shall sell the standing crop in public auction and deposit the sale proceeds into Court.

The leasehold rights of the schedule land shall be auctioned from year to year and the amount shall be deposited into Court.

In the said order it was observed as follows:- “The petitioners are not the absolute owners of the schedule property, but their right is subject to rendering service to the Temple. As on today, the petitioners are not archakas and they cannot render any service to the temple. On the other hand, it is clear from Ex.A1 that the Temple is not the absolute owner of the schedule property. However, in the circumstances, the petitioners cannot claim usufruct from the schedule land as they are no longer Archakas.”

g) Document under Ex.B9 – Order in I.A.No.1532/98 in

O.S.No.74/1991 filed under Order-I, Rule 10 of CPC to implead

the Government of A.P., Rep. by Collector, Krishna,

Machilipatnam as 6th defendant in the suit. The said petition was dismissed by the order dt.18.11.1998 observing that “the Civil Court cannot sit as appellate Court on the orders passed by the M.R.O., or R.D.O., or the Collector as the case may be. U/s 8 of A.P. Rights in - 20 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971, no suit shall lie against the Government or any Officer of Government in respect of a claim to have an entry made or in relation to any entry made in any record of rights or to have any such entry omitted or amended. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that no suit shall lie against the 6 th respondent (proposed party).”

h) Document under Ex.B1 – Certified copy of the Judgment and decree in O.S.No.74/1991, dt.30.09.1999 on the file of Junior

Civil Judge, Gudivada. First plaintiff herein and 10 others filed

said suit against the 1st defendant temple, Asst. Commissioner,

Endowments Department, Vijayawada, two Trust Board members and other person (total – 5) seeking permanent injunction against the defendants etc., from interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule land. The said suit was dismissed. However,

Receiver was directed to put 1st defendant-Temple in possession of the land in question after it become vacant, 1st defendant was permitted to receive the amounts already deposited into the suit account on separate application after of appeal time, that 1st defendant was also permitted to receive the amount that may be deposited by the Receiver for the current year into the court account on separate application at the time of delivery. In the said suit it was observed that “In other words it can be said that the plaintiffs in this suit will be entitled to the land in question so long as they perform archakatvam service in the 1 st defendant temple. That is the effect of second appeal to which the plaintiffs herein are bound to follow it without any deviation. – As the plaintiffs herein were not rendering service in the 1 st defendant temple on the date of suit I have no hesitation to say that the plaintiffs are not in possession of the plaint schedule land as of their own - 21 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 by the date of the suit and accordingly, this issue is decided against the plaintiffs.”

i) Document under Ex.A3 – 1st plaintiff herein and 15 others filed

Second Appeal No.992 of 2005 against the Judgment dt.12.02.2004 in A.S.No.46 of 1999 on the file of Addl. Senior

Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), Gudivada. In the said Second

Appeal Hon’ble High Court of A.P., by the Judgment dt.29.12.2011 observed as follows:- “The record discloses that by the time the suit was filed, the appellants are not in possession of the land. In that view of the matter, very institution of the suit for the relief of injunction simplicitor becomes untenable. If the appellants are so advised, they have to institute proceedings for establishing their rights over the land and to seek recovery of possession. Two options are open. The first is to institute proceedings before the Endowments Tribunal, which is conferred with the jurisdiction to decide the nature and character of properties held by Hindu religious institutions. The second is to file an independent suit for declaration of title and for consequential reliefs. It

is for the appellants to choose the forum.”

Issue No.1:-

Whether the plaintiffs have title to the plaint schedule

property?

10.The case of the plaintiffs is that plaintiffs 1 to 10 are the absolute owners of the plaint schedule properties. Originally, the paternal grandfather of 1st plaintiff by name Sambaiah was the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property. After his death, the property devolved to his five sons i.e., Venkateswarlu, Peda Seshaiah,

Ramaiah, Mallaiah and China Ramaiah. The said property was partitioned on 01.01.1960, wherein Malleswara Rao and

Mallaikharjuna Rao were given Ac.1.39 cents each and the other three brothers were given Ac.1.86 cents each. Though, there was difference - 22 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 in the extents, but the division was effected basing on the value of the properties. Recognizing the said partition, the revenue authorities issued pattadar passbooks and title deeds in their favour. Thus, the plaintiffs became the absolute owners of the plaint schedule properties and in possession of the same since a long time. When the defendants tried to interfere with their possession and enjoyment, they filed a suit in O.S.No.74/1991 on the file of Prl. Junior Civil Judge’s

Court, Gudivada, which was dismissed and the Appeal Suit and

Second Appeal preferred by the plaintiffs were also dismissed, but in the second appeal in S.A.No.992/2005 Hon’ble High Court gave two options to the plaintiffs that as there was dispute with regard to their title, they have option to file proceedings before the Endowments

Tribunal to decide the nature and character of the properties held by

Hindu Religious Institutions or to file a suit for declaration of their title with consequential reliefs. Basing on the said order, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for declaration.

11.Case of the defendants is that, 1st defendant was the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property, in total an extent of

Ac.8.36 cents, but as per Mashayat it was Ac.8.80 cents in one plot and the possession of the same was also with 1st defendant from the year 2006 till now. Public auctions were being conducted for sale of the lease hold rights of the land and during the years 2012-2013 and 2014-2015 it was cultivated by the leaseholder by name Allada Subba

Rao. In view of the disputes raised by the plaintiffs and as the plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No.74/1991, the Court appointed a Receiver to take possession of the property and to deposit the income and 1st defendant was having right to withdraw the same. As the 1st defendant filed a petition to send for the deposit amounts to the Court account, the plaintiffs filed the present suit. Temple has been paying - 23 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 taxes in respect of the schedule properties. The suit filed by the plaintiff, Appeal Suit in AS No.46/1999 and second Appeal in

A.S.No.992/2005 were also dismissed. Plaintiffs in the previous suit

mentioned that they were appointed as Archakas of 1st defendant-

Temple. Tholeti Mallikarjuna Rao, Rama Lingeswara Rao, Malleswara

Rao, 8th defendant herein left the Temple and the village long back and they were residing in at a faraway place. Plaintiff No.1 herein was an employee in cooperative society at Pamarru and 8th plaintiff herein was a postal employee and not connected to the Temple affairs. The fathers of the plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No.235/1934 for declaration on the file of District Munsif, Gudivada, was dismissed and the appeal suit filed by them was also dismissed and then the plaintiff therein preferred Second Appeal before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in

SA No.714/1938, wherein it was decided that the land in Ac.8.30 cents

belongs to 1st defendant-Temple and Archakas were to perform the customary duties in the temple and to enjoy the income from the land.

On 23.9.1998 a Trust Board was appointed and all the properties of the Temple were vested with the Trust Board. As there was complaints against the plaintiffs in OS.74/1991 from the villagers, notices were issued to them, but they did not receive the notices. The

Endowments Department broke open the lock with the help of police and in the presence of village elders and performing poojas with the contribution of villagers. The plaintiffs in the previous suit filed a petition before the Joint Commissioner of Endowments to dismiss the

Trust Board, that petition was dismissed and the Writ Petition filed

before the Hon’ble High Court was also dismissed. The Chairperson

of the Trust Board removed the purohits of the Temple from services on 4.2.1989, for which they filed a petition before the Regional

Commissioner of Endowments, Hyderabad, which was allowed.

- 24 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

Against the said order the appeal preferred before the Minister was allowed and the Writ Petition filed against the said order was also dismissed. The Revenue Department delivered orders in the appeal preferred by the Trust Board and then they filed suit in

O.S.No.74/1991, obtained injunction and later when the injunction was

dismissed, the Court ordered the Receiver to take possession of the properties along with standing crop. Archakas were given the schedule lands to perform customary duties in the Temple and they have right to enjoy the income from the land only as long as they are rendering services to temple. The District Collector cancelled the

Pattadar pass books and title deeds issued by the Revenue Authorities and no appeal was filed against the said order. The plaint schedule properties are in possession of 1st defendant, public auctions were being conducted and the same has been cultivating by the highest bidders and the Temple is paying cists to the Department concerned.

The plaintiffs are filing false suits for wrongful gain.

12.In the present suit, the plaintiffs are seeking the relief of declaration apart from other relief. Before parting with the main point, it is to be noted that it is trite law that in a suit for declaration of title, burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. In this context it would be appropriate to refer judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in a case of Union of India and others vs.

Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others 1, wherein

Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:-

"15.In a suit for declaration of title, burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a 1(2014) 2 SCC 269 - 25 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not. We are of the view that even if the title set up by the defendants is found against, in the absence of establishment of plaintiff’s own title, plaintiff must be non-suited."

13.The plaintiffs are claiming that they are the absolute owners of the plaint schedule properties not acquired by themselves, but acquired through their forefathers. In the plaint pleadings it was averred that as the schedule properties are their ancestral properties during the lifetime of their grandfather Sambaiah, the documents relate to 18th Century are not available and the properties can only be identified, but they are available with revenue authorities. It is their contention that father of 1st plaintiff herein by name Tholeti

Venkateswarlu had four brothers by names Tholeti Peda Seshaiah,

Tholeti Ramaiah, Tholeti Mallaiah and Tholeti China Ramaiah. All of them are the sons of one Sambaiah, who is the son of Mallanna. The plaintiffs are altogether 19 in numbers. The plaintiffs did not mention their genealogy either in the plaint or in their evidence. But, as per para No.1 of the plaint, it appears that 1st plaintiff is the legal heir of

Tholeti Venkateswarlu, 2nd plaintiff is the legal heir of Peda Seshaiah through Malleswara Rao, plaintiffs 3 to 7 are the legal heirs of

Ramaiah through Mallikharjuna Rao, 8th plaintiff is the legal heir of

China Ramaiah though Chandrasekhara Rao and plaintiffs 9 and 10 are the legal heirs of Mallaiah through Ramalingeswara Rao. Further, plaintiffs 13 to 19 are the legal heirs of 1st plaintiff and on the death of 1st plaintiff during pendency of the suit, they were added as parties to the suit. Similarly, plaintiffs 11 and 12 are the legal heirs of 2nd plaintiff - 26 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 and on the death of 2nd plaintiff during pendency of the suit, they were added as parties to the suit.

14.According to the plaintiffs, said Sambaiah inherited the plaint schedule properties. P.W.1 in his evidence deposed that the plaint schedule properties were their ancestral properties. P.W.4 in his evidence deposed that they got the plaint schedule property from their forefather Mallanna and there was document in the name of

Mallanna and he already filed the same in the Court. In fact, no such document was filed by the plaintiffs as seen from the documents exhibited on behalf of the plaintiffs. How said Mallanna inherited the property is not deposed by the plaintiffs in their evidence. Contrary to the evidence of P.W.4, P.W.1 in his evidence admitted that they were not having the original title deeds in respect of the plaint schedule properties. But, a careful perusal of the judgment in O.S.No.74/1991 on the file of Prl. District Munsif, Gudivada under Ex.B1, in the plaint averments, it was mentioned that the plaint schedule land was granted to the ancestors of that Pujari Mallanna. Further, in the Order of

I.A.No.664/1991 in O.S.No.74/1991 filed under Order 39, Rule 1 of

CPC under Ex.B7 also it was mentioned in the allegations of the petition-affidavit that an extent of Ac.8.80 cents situated in Kondiparru village described in the schedule was the personal grant of Pujari

Mallanna. After the death of said Mallanna, his son Sambaiah inherited the schedule properties and after his death, his five sons alleged to have effected partition on 01.01.1960. By the time of said partition, said Peda Seshaiah, Ramaiah, Mallaiah and China Ramaiah were no more. As such, the father of 1st plaintiff effected the partition with the children of his brothers i.e., Peda Seshaiah’s son Malleswara

Rao, Ramaiah’s son Mallikharjuna Rao, Mallaiah’s son

Ramalingeswara Rao and China Ramaiah’s son Chandrasekhara Rao.

- 27 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

But, contrary to the said plaint pleadings, P.W.1 in his cross- examination denied the suggestion that by the date of oral partition on 01.01.1960 in between his father and his four brothers, his father alone was alive and his four brothers were not alive.

In the said partition the branches Malleswara Rao and

Mallikharjuna Rao were given Ac.1.39 cents each; and the branches of remaining three brothers, including the father of 1st plaintiff i.e.,

Ramalingeswara Rao, Chandrasekhar Rao and Venkateswarlu were given Ac.1.86 cents each. Of course, no partition list is filed before this Court. Whether that partition was oral or written is also not clearly mentioned in the plaint pleadings or in the evidence. P.W.3 in his evidence deposed that he cannot say in which year and under what document partition was effected by their forefathers and there was no documentary proof to show that there was a partition between their forefathers. In the previous suit of the year 1991 in O.S.No.74/1991, in the pleadings of the plaint and the temporary injunction petition as in

Exs.B1 and B7 there was no reference with regard to the said partition of the year 1960. D.W.1 in his cross-examination deposed that at the time of handing over the temple, the plaint schedule property stood in the name of archakas i.e., 1st plaintiff herein, Tholeti Mallikarjuna Rao, 8th plaintiff herein, 2nd plaintiff herein, and another. He did not file any document to show that how the schedule property was acquired by the temple. He admitted that they do not have any document, any registered sale deeds or gift deeds of plaint schedule properties, but they were having only approved property register, which belongs to 1966.

15.The plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of their title to the plaint schedule properties in a total extent of Ac.8.36 cents in four different sub-division numbers i.e., R.S.Nos.33/1 to 33/4. The - 28 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 defendants, more particularly 1st defendant in the written statement stated that the entire extent of Ac.8.36 cents, as per Mashayat Ac.8.80 cents of land in one plot. In some of the previous litigations the total extent was mentioned as Ac.8.36 cents and in some of the previous litigations it was mentioned as Ac.8.80, but it makes no difference and all of them are the plaint schedule properties. P.W.1 in his evidence deposed that the suit schedule property and the property covered in

O.S.No.74/1991 and the property covered in O.S.No.235/1934 is one

and the same. Further, P.W.1 in his evidence admitted that the parties in the suit and the parties in O.S.No.74/1991 are one and the same.

As stated supra, the plaintiffs are claiming title to the property through their forefathers.

16.As evident from Ex.B10, in the year 1935 itself the forefathers of the plaintiffs i.e., Tholeti Seshaiah, Mallikharjuna Rao,

Mallayya, Ramayya, Venkateswarlu and others filed a suit in

O.S.No.235/1934 on the file of District Munsif, Gudivada against the

President, Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras for the relief of declaration of their title. The said suit was dismissed by the trial Court.

In appeal, learned Subordinate Judge in A.S.No.10/1937 (A.S.No.208 of 1936 of District Court, Krishna) has rejected the inference drawn by the trial Court and came to a conclusion that the land is the property of the plaintiffs. In the second appeal in S.A.No.714/1938 Hon’ble High

Court of Judicature at Madras allowed the appeal preferred by the

Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, modified the decree passed by the lower appellate Court and gave a finding that there will

be a declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to the suit land

subject to their obligation to render the customary service in the

Malleswaraswami Varu Temple of Kondiparru and that the contribution levied by the 1st defendant on the basis that the land is an - 29 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 endowment of the suit temple is illegal and there will a decree that the 1st defendant do repay Rs.65/- to the plaintiff. The root cause to file the suit of the year 1934 appears to be for levying of contribution made by the Endowments Department against the forefathers of the plaintiffs herein in respect of the schedule land. The finding of the Hon’ble High

Court of Madras clearly shows that the plaintiffs are entitled to the suit land, subject to their obligation to render the customary service in the

Malleswaraswami Varu Temple of Kondiparru, but not as of their absolute individual right. The said finding became final as no further proceedings were initiated before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the same.

17. Subsequent to passing of the judgment in

S.A.No.714/1938, dt.22.07.1941 a Trust Board was formed on 23.9.1988. P.W.1 in his evidence deposed that Trust board was appointed for the first time in the year 1988 in respect of 1st defendant by the Endowment Department. By the time of establishment of Trust

Board, P.W.1 was working as Archaka in the Temple. By the time of filing of suit in O.S.No.74/1991 the D1 temple was under the custody of Trustees. P.W.3 corroborated the evidence of P.W.1 with regard to formation of Trust Board and he further deposed that till then the 1st defendant was in their custody. D.W.2 admitted in his cross- examination that Trust Board was constituted on 23.09.1988 to look after the affairs of 1st defendant temple by 2nd defendant. Trust Board consists of Munnangi Nageswaramma, Chairmen of the Trust Board and other four members taken over the plaint schedule properties.

Mjunnangi Nageswaramma was appointed as Chairman by the

Assistant Commissioner, Endowments, Vijayawada. The Endowments

Department handed over the temple in September, 1988. In the year 2018 Executive Officer was appointed in the place of Manager. He - 30 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 denied the suggestion that they did not have any power to appoint

Trust Board relating to private properties.

18. It is the pleading of the defendants and evidence of D.W.2 that Chairman of the Trust Board removed the plaintiffs from Archaka services on 4.2.1989 by giving a show cause notice. Ex.B8 is the notice, dt.4.2.1989 given by the Chairman of the Trust Board to 1st plaintiff herein, Tholeti Mallikharjuna Rao, Tholeti Malleswara Rao,

Tholeti Chandrasekhara Rao and Tholeti Ramalingeswara Rao were removed them from the service of Archakatvam and directed them to hand over the articles, vehicles etc., to one Mamillapalli

Satyanarayana, who was appointed as Archaka of the Temple by them.

19.The reasons for removing them from their service were clearly mentioned in the said notice, which was in detail mentioned in the chronological events. D.W.2 in his evidence deposed that in the year 1988 the plaintiffs discontinued their archaka service to the 1st defendant temple and locked the Temple without performing pujas, then the villagers of Kondiparru village complained to 2nd defendant against the plaintiffs. On such complaint, the Trust Board broke open the doors of 1st defendant in the presence of village elders and police and took control over the temple. In this connection, P.W.1 admitted that T.Mallikharjuna Rao did archakatvam in Sri Malleswara Swamy

Temple, Kurumaddali, 3rd plaintiff in O.S.No.74/1991 did archakatvam in Sri Malleswara Swamy Temple, situated in Kurumaddali village and he leased out the temple land to other persons, 8th plaintiff herein worked as Postman in Kondiparru village and 2nd plaintiff in previous suit was not residing in Kondiparru. P.W.1 deposed that he was having certificate to do archakatvam service. But no such certificate is filed before this Court. P.W.3 in his evidence admitted that with the - 31 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 permission of 2nd defendant the Trust Board broke open the lock of the 1st defendant temple and took possession of the same, P.W.1 used to work as clerk in Cooperative Society, Pamarru, he worked as village

Postman, they five members were removed from Archakatvam on 4.2.1989, in the month of May, 1991 and the Order copy was served on him. P.W.3 further deposed that he did not file any document to show that he was competent to do archakatvam in the 1st defendant.

He further admitted that Tholeti Mallikarjuna Rao and Malleswara Rao used to do archakatvan in Kurumaddali village and Tholeti

Ramalingeswara Rao used to do archakatvam at Baliway.

20.It is the contention of the defendants that challenging the said notice by which the plaintiffs were removed from Archakatvam, the plaintiffs filed a petition before the Regional Joint Commissioner of

Endowments, Hyderabad in R.P.No.9/1989, which was allowed and aggrieved by the same, the Trust Board preferred an appeal before the

Hon’ble Minister for Endowments, which was allowed by giving a

finding that termination of Archakas was legal and correct. Having aggrieved by the order of the Minister, the plaintiffs filed a Writ Petition in W.P.No.7250/1991 and under Ex.B4, Hon’ble High Court of

Judicature, Andhra Pradesh by the order dt.24.12.1991, dismissed the

Writ Petition, however the plaintiffs were permitted to raise the standing crop and to cut the same. By the said order in the Writ

Petition, termination of the plaintiffs as Archakas of 1st defendant became final.

So, as per the findings given by the Hon’ble High Court of

Madras in SA.No.714/1938 under Ex.B10, the plaintiffs lost their right of declaration over the plaint schedule properties, because they have limited right to enjoy the schedule property with possession, subject to their obligation to render the customary archakartvam service turn- - 32 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 wise in 1st defendant-Temple. The said direction was very clear that the plaintiffs have right over the schedule property so long as they continued as Archakas in the Temple and once they were removed or stopped the said services, they are not having any right over the plaint schedule properties.

21.The plaintiffs are claiming their right by virtue of the pattadar pass books and title deeds under Exs.A1, A2, A12, A16 to

A19 and A23 to A26 issued by the Revenue Department. On this aspect it is the contention of the defendants that the District Collector,

Krishna, after conducting enquiry cancelled the said pattadar passbooks and title deeds and the said order of the District Collector was not challenged by the plaintiffs and hence, they became final.

D.W.1 in his evidence deposed that on the requisition made by 1st defendant, the District Collector conducted enquiry and cancelled the

Pattadar Passbooks and Title Deeds of the plaintiffs. After such cancellation, plaintiffs filed I.A.No.1532/1998 on the file of Prl. Junior

Civil Judge Court, Gudivada to add the District Collector as a party to

the suit in O.S.No.74/1991 and the said petition was dismissed. No order of the District Collector is filed by the defendants in support of their said contention. But, a perusal of the Ex. B.9/order in

I.A.No.1532/1998 in O.S.No.74/1991, dt.18.11.1998 passed by the

Junior Civil Judge, Gudivada, said petition was filed under Order I,

Rule 10 of CPC to imlead the District Collector, Krishna, as 6th defendant in the main suit. In the petition averments of the said order, it was mentioned that unfortunately the M.R.O. capriciously, arbitrarily and perversely cancelled the Pass Book and Title Deeds and hence, they sought for adding the State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by the District Collector, Krishna as necessary and proper arty to the suit.

But the said petition was dismissed, by giving a finding that the Civil - 33 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

Court cannot sit as appellate court on the orders passed by the MRO or RDO or the Collector and as per Section 8 of A.P.Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1871 no suit shall lie against the

Government or any Officer of the Government in respect of a claim to have an entry made or in relation to any entry made in any record of rights or to have any such entry omitted or amended. In view of the above proviso no suit shall lie against the Government. As per the record, against the said order no appeal or revision was referred by the plaintiffs. Hence, the order of the District Collector became final, consequently the pattadar passbooks and title deeds filed by the plaintiffs cannot be taken into consideration in deciding their title to the plaint schedule properties.

22.The plaintiffs filed Form No.1 notices issued by the District

Collector under Exs.A11, A21 and A22, wherein Toleti Venkateswara

Rao, Toleti Malleswara Rao and Toleti Mallayya were demanded to pay yearly drainage cess in respect of the land situated in R.S.No.33 of Kondiparru Village. It is not in dispute that when the plaintiffs worked as Archakas in 1st defendant Temple, the schedule properties were in their hands and they did cultivation till they were removed from the service of Archaka and hence, the District Collector might have issued said notices to the father of 1st plaintiff for payment of drainage cess and that does not confer any title on the plaintiffs over the schedule properties, because, as on the date of filing the suit, the pattadar pass books and the title deeds in respect of the plaint schedule properties were cancelled by the District Collector, Krishna.

Apart from the pattadar pass books and title deeds, the plaintiffs filed

No.2 Adangal/Exs.A4 & A13, RSR/Exs.A5 & A10, Certificate issued by

Village Karnam/Ex.A6, 10(1) Adangal/Ex.A8, land revenue receipts/Ex.A9, Ex.A10/cist receipts, but all the documents were relate - 34 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 back to the year 1995 and prior to that year. Admittedly, during the said period the plaintiffs or their forefathers were in possession of the schedule properties and they were doing cultivation, because they were performing archakatvam services in 1st defendant temple by then. Merely because the District Collector issued those notices, they do not confer any right on the plaintiffs in respect of the plaint schedule properties and the plaintiffs cannot claim their title basing on the said documents. It is a well-settled law that revenue records are not documents of title. In this context it is appropriate to refer the judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of In Sawarni Vs. Inder Kaur 2 wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows:- “Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional

District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that

mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment.”

23.In this connection, it is the contention on behalf of the plaintiffs that the defendants failed to produce any document before the Court in order to show their right, title or ownership over the plaint schedule property. To answer the said contention, the defendant No.1 is mainly relying on the document under Ex.B6 and the decision in the case of Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (supra), wherein Hon’ble High

Court of Telangana, inter alia, observed as follows:- “9. As per Section 38 of the old Act and Section 43 of the new Act, it is mandatory to maintain register of any registered institution/endowment, which contain all the details of movable and immovable assets of the temple. The 6th respondent contended that in terms of the said provision, register is maintained and in the said register the property in 2 (1996) 6 SCC 223 - 35 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 issue is also included as belonging to the 6th respondent temple. This contention is not controverted. As per Section 46(3) of the new Act, until the contrary is established presumption is that all the entries made in the register maintained under Section 43 of the new Act are genuine. Thus, burden lies on the petitioner to disprove the stand of the 6th respondent temple that the subject land is not land belonging to the 6th respondent. Except filing of extract of pattadar pass book and title deeds, no material is filed to disprove the stand of the 6th respondent temple. As can be deduced from the narration of the facts in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, pattadar pass books and title deeds may have been issued by relying on the ryotwari patta granted to the petitioner.”

Per contra, it is the contention of the defendants that in terms of

Section 46 (3) of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious

Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 relevant register is maintained by the Temple and in the said register the schedule property was shown as the same belongs to the 1st defendant-Temple and until the contrary is proved the presumption is in favour of the defendants that all the entries made in the register maintained under Section 43 of the new Act are genuine. Perusal of the document under Ex.B6, the proceedings issued by the Asst. Commissioner of Endowments

Department is attached with a copy of particulars under Section 38 of

Act 17 of 1966, wherein it is clearly mentioned that the property of

Ac.8.36 cents situated in R.S.No.33 of Kondiparru Village under Patta

No.74 belongs to the 1st defendant-Temple and it was in possession of the Atchakas. In the said document in page No.2 it is further mentioned that the forefathers of the plaintiffs were doing Archakatvam service in the said Temple and it was further mentioned about the suit proceedings in O.S.No.235/1934 to the effect that if the Archakas were doing services, the property belongs to them and if they were not doing services, the property belongs to the Temple. So, as per the principle of law laid down in the said decision, as the schedule - 36 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 property is noted in the Register under Section 38 of the Act, the said property belongs to the Temple. In order to rebut the said presumption, the plaintiffs except filing the pattadar pass books and title deeds, no cogent material is filed to disprove the contention of the defendants. In the above-mentioned paragraphs this Court has already discussed that the District Collector has cancelled the said pattadar passbooks and the title deeds issued in favour of the forefathers of the plaintiffs and the some of the plaintiffs.

24.The gist of the above discussion is that right from 1934 the plaintiffs and their predecessors failed in all their battles made in respect of the plaint schedule properties. Initially they lost the suit for declaration, but they got right of declaration, but the said right of declaration was not an absolute one and it is attached with the obligation to render the service of Archakatvam in the 1st defendant-

Temple and subject to condition that so long as they continued in

Archakatvam service in the 1st defendant Temple, they have a right in the schedule property. In this regard it is appropriate to rely on the decision submitted by the defendant No.1 in the case of Vinjamuri

Rajagopala Chary (supra) wherein it si held that “…..In the facts of this case, as successfully contested by the 6th respondent-temple, as per the Resettlement Register of the Village, the land is classified as temple Adyapaka Service and as per the provision of Section 4(4) of the Act, 1956, no ryotwari patta can be granted and even if it is already granted, it is null and void and property continues to be vested in the institution. Thus, as per the material on record, the property continues to vest in the 6th respondent temple. Therefore, petitioner cannot claim, merely on the factum of his possession or the earlier inam granted to his ancestors for the service rendered by them, to contend that he is the owner and entitled to alienate. Thus, in the facts of this case, the petitioner is not entitled to relief prayed by him and writ - 37 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 petition is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed….” The legal position settled in the above mentioned judgment is squarely applicable to the present case. As per the Judgment of the

Hon’ble High Court in S.A.No.714/1938 the forefathers of the plaintiffs

are having right in the schedule property so long as they are continued as Archakas of the Temple. Trust Board was constituted and since then the temple properties were in the control of the Trust Board. The plaintiffs were removed from Archakatvam services and the fight made by the plaintiffs to get back the same has given adverse results. The permanent injunction suit filed by the plaintiffs ended against them even in the Second Appeal recording that by the tie of filing the suit, the plaintiffs were not in possession of the land and giving a finding that the very institution of the suit for the relief of injunction simplicitor becomes untenable. Further, the trial Court directed the plaintiffs to handover possession of the schedule properties to the Receiver appointed during pendency of the suit. In view of above discussion, it is evident from the record that the plaintiffs were not rendering the customary services to the 1st defendant/Temple, as such they do not have any right to claim the relief of declaration over the suit schedule properties. Hence, the plaintiffs failed to prove their right in the schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit, accordingly Issue

No.1 is answered against the plaintiffs.

ISSUE NO.2:-

Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the schedule

property by the date of the suit?

25.The contention of the plaintiffs is that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the schedule properties since the year - 38 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 1960 onwards by virtue of the partition effected among their fathers and subsequently pattadar passbooks and title deeds were issued in their favour. In support of the said contention the plaintiffs filed

Adangal Pahani, ROR 1B under Exs.A14, A15 and A28 to A30, which are relating to the years 2015 and 2019 respectively. It is their further contention that as the defendants herein were trying to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs over the schedule properties, they filed said suit in O.S.No.74/1991 on the file of Prl. Junior Civil Judge Court,

Gudivada.

26.Per contra, the defendants contended that the schedule properties were in possession and enjoyment of Trust Board of the 1st defendant-Temple from 1988 till filing of the Written Statement i.e., in the year 2013 and since 2006 they have been conducting auction for the lease hold rights of the schedule property. The document under

Ex.B7 shows that after dismissal of the Temporary Injunction petition filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.74/1991 vide I.A.No.664/1991, the Prl.

District Munsif, Gudivada appointed one Sri Y.V.Ramana Rao,

Advocate as Receiver on 06.02.1992 and as per the Court orders, the

Receiver took possession of the schedule properties and had been depositing the rents in the said Court up to 2006. It is their further contention that the Temple has been paying Land Revenue in respect of the plaint schedule properties and to show the same the defendants filed land revenue receipts under Exs.B15, B18, B19 relating to years 2003 to 2006, 2005 to 2008 and 2021. In this connection, it is the contention of the defendants that since long back litigation in respect of the plaint schedule property has been pending, the revenue authorities did not mutate their name in their records, but the fact that they have been paying the land revenue in respect of the schedule property in the name of 1st defendant, it appears that the revenue - 39 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 department recognized their right or title over the same and collecting land revenue from the 1st defendant. In the written statement itself, the defendants averred that the land continued in possession of Archakas as they were entitled to the benefits subject to their obligations to render the customary service in 1st defendant-Temple till the property has taken over the land from the plaintiffs. On 23.9.1988 a Trust

Board was appointed by the Asst. Commissioner of Endowments,

Vijayawada and all the properties of the Temple were vested with the

Trust Board. Further, in view of the written complaints from the villagers that the Temple was kept under lock round the clock, notices were issued to the plaintiffs, which were returned as refused and then with the Authorization given by 2nd defendant herein, the Trust Board broke open the lock before the elders of the village, officials of

Endowments Department and police, took possession of the Temple and started performing poojas and since then the Temple has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties.

27.P.W.1 in his cross-examination deposed that a receiver was appointed in O.S.No.74/91 and he took possession of the schedule property and auctioned the lease hold rights in respect of schedule properties and deposited the sale proceeds into Court.

Every year the receiver conducted an auction of the leasehold rights in respect of the schedule properties and deposited the sale proceeds into Court. At present, the plaint schedule properties are in possession and enjoyment of 1st defendant Temple as per the orders of the Court in O.S.No.74/1991. P.W.3 in his cross-examination deposed that after they were removed from Archakatvam they did not cultivate the plaint schedule property. He admitted that a receiver was appointed in O.S.No.74/1991 to auction the leasehold rights and deposit the amount in the Court. He said that the receiver deposited - 40 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 the amount in the Court for two or three years. He admitted that

O.S.No.74/91 was dismissed on 30.9.1999 and that subsequently the

plaint schedule property is in possession of 1st defendant temple till date. P.W.4 admitted that the plaint schedule property is not in their possession at present and that in O.S.No.74/1991 a receiver was appointed, who conducted auction of the lease hold rights of the plaint schedule property and deposited the amount in the Court.

28.In this connection, D.W.2 in his cross-examination admitted that prior to filing of this suit, the plaint schedule properties were in the possession and enjoyment of the fathers of 1st and 8th plaintiff and that 2nd defendant removed the plaintiffs from archakatvam services on 4.2.1989 after giving show cause notice and thereafter the Trust Board used to conduct auction of plaint schedule properties for every three years to lease out the same and the lease hold rights were given to the highest bidder. At present the plaint schedule properties are in possession of 1st defendant. He filed the document to show that they took possession of the plaint schedule property from said archakas. But no such document is filed by D.W.2.

The Asst. Commissioner issued an Order to the Temple to take possession of the plaint schedule property in the year 1989. He did not know who was in possession of the schedule properties prior to 1934. The entire extent of Ac.8.36 cents, as per Mashayat Ac.8.80 cents of land in one plot and it is in possession and enjoyment of 1st defendant-Temple since 2006 till now and public auctions were also conducted to the said land. They were paying land revenue for plaint schedule properties for an extent of Ac.8.36. Their temple authority took the plaint schedule properties after pronouncement of Judgment in O.S.No.74/1991 i.e., on 30.09.1999. He admitted that no revenue records of plaint schedule properties were reflecting their name. He - 41 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 admitted that as per the Mee-Seva copies of Adangal and R.O.R.

copies pertaining to survey Nos.33-1, 33-3, 33-4 shown to him the

Adangal and R.O.R. of Survey No.33-1/Ex.A28 was standing in the name of 1st defendant, the Adangal and R.O.R. of Survey No.33- 3/Ex.A29 is standing in the name of Tholeti Naga Maha Lakshmamma, the Adangal and R.O.R. of Survey Nos.33-3, 33-4/Ex.A30 is standing in the name of Tholeti Naga Maha Lakshmi.

29.D.W.3 deposed that the Temple conducted public auction of the lease hold rights of Ac.8.80 cents for the lease period 2024-25 to 2026-27, he became the highest bidder for an amount of

Rs.2,64,000/-, as per the auction conditions he took possession of that property and paid the advance rent of Rs.2,64,000/- on 29.04.2024 itself. In his cross-examination he deposed that the E.O., is having documents with regard to the auction conducted in May, 2024. He came to know about the auction through Tom Tom two months prior to the date of auction. He did not obtain any registered lease deed. He did not file original of Ex.B20 issued by D1. He paid the amount under

Ex.P20 for a period of one year.

30.Document under Ex.A4 No.2 Adangal shows that Tholeti

Venkateswarlu, Mallaiah, Naga lakshmamma, Mallikharjuna Rao were the encroachers of the schedule land. Document under Ex.A5 R.S.R.

shows the name of 1st defendant and Tholeti Peda Seshaiah,

Mallayya, Ramayya, Venkateswarlu. Ex.A6 is the Certificate issued by

Karnam, dt.7.3.1981 stating that the sub-division was made in respect of the land in an extent of Ac.8.36 cents of Tholeti Venkateswara Rao.

Ex.A7 10 (1) Adangal for fasali 1405 shows the names of Tholeti

Malleswara Rao, Venkateswarlu, Peda Mallayya, Naga Lakshmamma,

Mallikharjuna Rao. Ex.A9 land revenue receipts containing the name of Tholeti Venkateswarlu. Ex.A10 R.S.R. shows the names of Tholeti - 42 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

Peda Seshaiah, Mallayya, Ramayya, Venkateswarlu. Ex.A12

Ryotwari pass book issued in the name of Tholeti Venkateswarlu.

Ex.A13 No.2 Adangal shows the name of 1st plaintiff as encroacher.

Exs.A14 and A15 show the name of 1st plaintiff as owner of the property mentioned therein. Ex.A20 bunch of cist receipts 29 in numbers standing in the name of Tholeti Mallikharjuna Rao, Naga

Mahalakshmi and Naga Lakshmamma. Exs.A28 to A30 Adangal and

R.S.R. standing in the name of 1st plaintiff, Tholeti Naga

Lakshmamma, Naga Mahalakshmi. As stated supra, most of the revenue documents filed by the plaintiffs relate back to the year 1992.

Even as per the pleading of the defendants, prior to constitution of the

Trust Board, the schedule property was in possession of the plaintiffs and their forefathers and there is no dispute in it. Subsequently, the

District Collector has cancelled the pattadar pass books and title deeds and later the schedule properties were taken from their possession. Though, the plaintiffs filed Exs.A14, A15 and A28 to A30, which are relating to the years 2015 and 2019, the defendants also filed the land revenue receipts relating to the years 2019 and 2021.

Since both parties filed the land revenue receipts and other documents relating to the period subsequent to filing of the suit, they cannot be taken into consideration, because the plaintiffs have to prove their possession as on the date of filling of the suit.

31. Document under Ex.B2 is the D.C.B. (Demand, Collection and Balance) register for the years 2006-2007, wherein the name of one Pasupuleti Raja Rao is shown as Tenant under 1st defendant-

Temple. Ex.B3 is another D.C.B. for the years 2013-2014, wherein the names of one Allada Venkata Subba Rao and P.Raja Rao are shown under the 1st defendant-Temple. Exs.B15 and B16 are the cist receipts in respect of the plaint schedule property standing in the name - 43 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 of 1st defendant. B15 is dt.12.12.2019, which is subsequent to filing of the suit and B16 does not contain any date, but for the years from 1996 to 2003. Exs.B21 and B22 are the cists receipts dt.12.3.2021 and 19.3.2021 standing in the name of 1st defendant in respect of the plaint schedule property and these two documents also relating to the period subsequent to filing of the suit and hence, they cannot be taken into consideration to decide the issue. Exs.B11, B12, B14, B17 and

B21 are the approval orders of Asst. Commissioner of Endowments,

Vijayawada, wherein the auction conducted by 1st defendant with regard to the leasehold rights of the auction purchasers in respectof the plaint schedule properties relating to the years 2006-2007, 2009- 2010, 2011-2012, 2015-2016, 2017-2018, 2021-2022, 2023-2024, 2024-2025 to 2026-2027 were approved. Ex.B13 is the bid list showing the names of the bidders, participated on 28.5.2012 in respect of the lease hold rights for the year 2012-2013. Ex.B20 receipts book of 1st defendant also shows that the temple received the lease amount from the auction purchasers of the leasehold rights of the schedule properties.

32.In the above documents the names of the plaintiffs and the name of 1st defendant were seen as the possessors of the plaint schedule properties for different years. It is not in dispute that from the time of the forefathers of the plaintiffs herein till the Trust Board was appointed, the plaint schedule properties were in possession and enjoyment of the forefathers of the plaintiffs. In the Judgment in

S.A.No.714/1938 it was mentioned that “the land in question has clearly been in the possession of the pujari’s family registered in the name of the pujari for the time being so far as the records go back”. It is common ground that service in the temple is performed by the plaintiffs and there are three documents clearly indicating that the - 44 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 possession of the land was somehow connected with the performance of the service. In the Order passed in W.P.No.7250 of 1991, it was clearly mentioned in the operative portion that it appears that the petitioners raised crop which is now standing on the land and have already harvested 2/3rd of the crop, which was not denied by other side, therefore the petitioners were permitted to cut the remaining standing crop for which Devasrthanam shall not object. In the Order of the W.P.No.68 of 1992 it was clearly mentioned that the fact that the lands in question were leased out is also not disputed.

33.As above, the evidence on record discloses that previously the forefathers of the plaintiffs and some of the plaintiffs were in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties at the time they did service as pujaris of 1st defendant temple and when they failed to perform archakatvam in the Temple, they were removed and subsequently the Trust Board and the 1st defendant-temple has taken over the lands and started conducting auctions of the lease hold rights and the successful bidders have been doing agricultural operations in the schedule properties and remitting the lease amount to the 1st defendant. The evidence on record clearly and categorically shows that during pendency of the suit in O.S.No.74/1991, the Junior

Civil Judge, Gudivada appointed an Advocate-Receiver to take over

the schedule lands from the plaintiffs and to conduct auction of the leasehold rights and to deposit the sale proceeds into the Court and liberty was given to 1st defendant herein to withdraw the lease amount.

When the Temple filed a petition to withdraw the lease amount, the present suit came to be filed by the plaintiffs as a third round of litigation. It is pertinent to mention here that the plaintiffs lost their battle in the suit filed for permanent injunction vide O.S.No.74/1991 itself is found sufficient to come to a conclusion that the plaintiffs were - 45 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 not in possession of the plaint schedule property as on the date of filing of the said suit. Furthermore, the oral evidence adduced by the defendants coupled with the categorical admissions made by P.Ws.1, 3 and 4 clearly shows that the temple took possession of the plaint schedule properties and plaint schedule properties are not in possession of the plaintiffs prior to filing of the suit itself. Therefore, the plaintiffs were not in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties as on the date of filing of the present suit in the year 2013. Hence, Issue No.2 is answered against the plaintiffs.

Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs is hit by Res judicata under

Section 11 of CPC?

34.It is one of the contentions of the defendants that the plaintiffs filed suit in O.S.No.74/1991, which was dismissed on 30.9.1999 and the present suit is filed by the legal representatives of the same parties in respect of the very same property, therefore present the suit is barred by res judicata. Before going to deal with the issue on res judicata, it would be appropriate to refer Section 11 of

CPC, which reads as under:-

Section 11 - Res judicata.

No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and

substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue

in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties

under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same

title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.

What is meant by res judicata is now to be seen. In its decision of a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of

Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen Cotton and

- 46 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

Silk Mills Limited 3, it was observed in page 1134 that “it is well settled that in order to decide whether a decision in an earlier litigation operates as res judicata, the Court must look at the nature of

litigation, what were the issues raised therein and what was

actually decided in it……. It is indeed true that what becomes res- judicata is the ‘matter’ which is actually decided and not the reason

Which leads the court to decide the ‘matter’…….”

In yet another decision of the Apex Court in the case of

Lonankutty v. Thoman and another 4 , it was observed that by

Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code in so far as relevant, no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties and has been heard and finally decided. It was emphasised by the Apex Court that it must be borne in mind that it is not enough to constitute a matter res-judicata that it was in issue in the former suit. It is further necessary that it must have been in issue directly and substantially. It was observed that ‘a matter cannot be said to have been “directly and substantially” in issue in a suit unless it was alleged by one party and denied or admitted either expressly or by necessary implication by the other.’

In Sheodan Singh v. Darhyao Kunwar, reported in AIR 1966

SC 1332, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the law

relating to the essential elements that need to be satisfied before a plea of res judicata can be raised by party. It was held as under:

" (9) A plain reading of S. 11 shows that to constitute a matter res judicata, the following conditions must be satisfied, namely(I) the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must 3AIR 1963 SC 1128. 4AIR 1976 1645.

- 47 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (II) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim; (III) the parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit; (IV) the court which decided the former suit must be suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; and (V) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the court in the first suit. Further Explanation it shows that it is not the date on which the suit is decided, so that even if a suit was filed later, it will be a former suit if it has been decided earlier. In order therefore that the decision in the earlier two appeals dismissed by the High Court operates as res judicata it will have to be seen whether all the five conditions mentioned above have been satisfied."

To summarize the principles governing res judicata in the above decisions, the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim and must have been heard and finally decided; the parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit; and unless it was alleged by one party and denied or admitted either expressly or by necessary implication by the other and it is not enough to constitute a matter res-judicata that it was in issue in the former suit. Keeping in mind the above principles, now the evidence on record is to be considered.

35.Perusal of the material available in the record goes to show that firstly the forefathers of the plaintiffs filed a suit in

O.S.No.235/1934 on the file of District Munsif Court, Gudivada for the

relief of declaration of their title over the schedule property mentioned therein, the same was dismissed. The appeal preferred against the same in A.S.No.10/1997 on the file of Subordinate Judge Court,

Masulipatnam was allowed and against the same second appeal in

S.A.No.714/1938 was filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature - 48 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 at Madras. Secondly, the forefathers of some of the plaintiffs along with some of the plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No.74/1991 on the file of

Prl. Junior Civil Judge Court, Gudivada seeking for permanent injunction in respect of the property mentioned therein, which was dismissed and against the same, A.S.No.49/1999 was filed on the file of Addl. Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), Gudivada and challenging the judgment second appeal in S.A.No.992 of 2005 was filed on the file of Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh,

Hyderabad. Thirdly, the plaintiffs herein filed the present suit seeking the relief of declaration and for consequential relief of permanent injunction in respect of the plaint schedule properties herein.

36.The foundation to file the present suit is the findings given by the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Second Appeal No.992/2005. The origin to file S.A.No.992/2005 was, 1st plaintiff along with his paternal uncles and others filed a suit in

O.S.No.74/1991 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Gudivada as evident

from Ex.B1 seeking permanent injunction from interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule land. The said suit was dismissed on 30.09.1999. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs preferred appeal in A.S.No.46 of 1999 on the file of

Addl. Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), Gudivada, which was also dismissed on 12.02.2004 confirming the decree and judgment of the trial Court and challenging the same, the plaintiffs therein preferred the

Second Appeal, wherein Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Andhra

Pradesh, Hyderabad gave a finding that by the time of the suit was filed, the appellants are not in possession of the land and in that view of the matter very institution of the suit for the relief of permanent injunction simplicitor becomes untenable and if so advised, gave above-mentioned two options to the plaintiffs and utilizing the 2nd - 49 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 option, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for the relief of declaration without seeking the relief of recovery of possession.

37.Thus, the suit in O.S.No.74/1991 was filed for permanent injunction, whereas the other two suits were filed for declaration with or without consequential reliefs. The certified copies of Judgments in the

Second Appeals are filed before this Court vide Ex.A3 and Ex.B10, but the decrees and judgments in the connected original suits are not filed in the present suit in order to know about the title of the properties involved therein. However, P.W.1 in his evidence deposed that the suit schedule property and the property covered in O.S.No.74/1991 and the property covered in O.S.No.235/1934 is one and the same.

P.W.3 in his evidence admitted that the present plaint schedule property and the property in O.S.No.74/1991 are one and the same.

Though, the schedules of the property involved in the previous suits are not placed before this Court, the above evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 goes to show that the property involved in all the three suits is one and the same. But, as the nature of the suit in O.S.No.74/1991 and the issue substantially raised and decided therein and the issue substantially to be decided in the other two suits are not one and the same, the principle of res judicata is not applicable in between them.

38.But, coming to the suits in O.S.No.235 of 1934 and the present suit is concerned, the nature of the litigation is one and the same. As the judgment in Original Suit is not produced before this

Court, it cannot be decided whether the issues raised and decided in the former suit and the present one are both one and the same or different. As stated supra, the plaintiffs herein are not claiming the ownership over the schedule property as of their own directly, but they are claiming their right through survivorship from their forefathers.

Hence, the plaintiffs herein and the some of the plaintiffs in the former - 50 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 suit are one and the same, but either the 6th plaintiff viz., Kondiparti

Simhachalam or his legal representatives are not the parties to the present suit. Further, the defendant in the former suit is the President,

Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, but the defendants in the present suit are the 1st defendant-Temple and the Officers of the

Endowment Department. A.P.Endowments Act came into force by Act

No.30 of 1987. The evidence on record revealed that initially from the forefathers of the plaintiffs, the possession of the schedule property was taken over by the Trust Board and later by the Endowments

Department. No material is placed before this Court whether the

Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, the Trust Board and the

A.P. Endowments Departments were born from one another or separate entities. Thus, except the similarity in the subject matter of title of the property, as the defendants failed to place sufficient material to probablise their contention with regard to the issues raised and decided in the former suit and in respect of the similarity in the parties, the said contention of the defendants that the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present suit is not sustainable.

Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs for the relief of declaration

is maintainable without seeking the relief of recovery of

possession under Section 34 of Specific Relief Act?

39.It is another contention of the defendants that when the plaintiffs were not were in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, without seeking the relief of recovery of possession, the suit for declaration is not maintainable. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act explicitly bars a mere declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief, omits to do so. In this connection it is apt to refer Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:- - 51 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 “34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.—Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.”

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vasantha v.

Rajalakshmi, reported 5, while considering that whether the suit for declaration simpliciter was maintainable in the absence of further relief, in view of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 observed thus:- "49. We now proceed to examine the law on this issue. As submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, in Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra [Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 129] (two-Judge Bench), this Court while considering Section 42 of the erstwhile Specific Relief Act, 1877 to be pari materia with Section 34 of SRA, 1963 observed that the plaintiff's not being in possession of the property in that case ought to have amended the plaint for the relief of recovery of possession in view of the bar included by the proviso.

50. This position has been followed by this Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (two-Judge Bench), elaborated the position of a suit filed without the consequential relief. It was observed : (SCC p. 173, paras 55-58) "55. The section provides that courts have discretion as to declaration of status or right, however, it carves out an exception that a court shall not make any such declaration of status or right where the complainant, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.

56. In Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi [Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60] this Court had categorically held that the suit seeking for declaration of title of ownership but where possession is not sought, is hit by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and, thus, not maintainable. In Vinay Krishna v.

5(2024) 5 SCC 282 - 52 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

Keshav Chandra [Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 129] this Court dealt with a similar issue where the plaintiff was not in exclusive possession of property and had filed a suit seeking declaration of title of ownership. Similar view has been reiterated observing that the suit was not maintainable, if barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. (See also Gian Kaur v. Raghubir Singh [Gian Kaur v. Raghubir Singh, (2011) 4 SCC 567 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 366] .)

57. In view of the above, the law becomes crystal clear that it is not permissible to claim the relief of declaration without seeking consequential relief.

58. In the instant case, the suit for declaration of title of ownership had been filed, though Respondent 1-plaintiff was admittedly not in possession of the suit property. Thus, the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, ought to have been dismissed solely on this ground. The High Court though framed a substantial question on this point but for unknown reasons did not consider it proper to decide the same."

In the case of Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha

Swamy Koil Trust, Virudhunagar vs. Chandran and others 6 ,

Hon'ble Supreme Court while referring to the earlier decision in Ram

Saran v. Ganga Devi (1973) 2 SCC 60, AIR 1972 SC 2685 has observed as follows:- “35. The plaintiff, who was not in possession, had in the suit claimed only declaratory relief along with mandatory injunction. The plaintiff being out of possession, the relief of recovery of possession was a further relief which ought to have been claimed by the plaintiff. The suit filed by the plaintiff for a mere declaration without relief of recovery of possession was clearly not maintainable and the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit. The High Court neither adverted to the above finding of the trial court nor has set aside the above reasoning given by the trial court for holding the suit as not maintainable. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC could not have reversed the decree of the courts below without holding that the above reasoning given by the courts below was legally 6 (2017) 3 SCC 702 - 53 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 unsustainable. We, thus, are of the view that the High Court committed error in decreeing the suit.”

As stated supra, in the present suit, since the plaintiffs were not found to be in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties as on the date of filing of the suit, the suit for mere relief of declaration without seeking the relief of recovery of possession is not maintainable. In this connection it is the contention of the plaintiffs that the Hon’ble High Court under Ex.A3 gave option to the plaintiffs to file a suit for declaration and hence, the present suit is without seeking the relief of recovery of possession is maintainable. A perusal of the direction by the Hon’ble High Court in S.A.No.992/2005 in page No.4 it was clearly mentioned that “ If the appellants are so

advised, they have to institute proceedings for establishing their

rights over the land and to see recovery of possession .” In page

No.5, it was further stated that “The second is to file an independent suit for declaration of the title and for consequential reliefs.” In the last paragraph in page No.4 Hon’ble High Court has given a clear finding that the record discloses that by the time the suit was filed, the appellants were not in possession of the land and in that view of the matter, very institution of the suit for the relief of injunction simplicitor becomes untenable. From the above two sentences, it is very clear that the Hon’ble High Court while disposing the Second Appeal has clearly held that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the schedule property and indicated that the plaintiffs have to seek the relief of declaration along with the consequential reliefs, more particularly recovery of possession. So, in view of the clear option given by the

Hon’ble High Court, the said contention of the plaintiffs is not

sustainable. Further, it is for the plaintiffs to choose the reliefs which they want, in the circumstances of the case. But, the plaintiff along with the relief of declaration, only opted to choose the consequential - 54 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 relief of permanent injunction without the relief of recovery of possession, but it is settled law that without having possession the plaintiffs are not entitled for permanent injunction and instead of that they ought to have seek for recovery of possession along with the main relief of declaration.Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiffs for the relief of declaration is also not maintainable under law as the present suit is filed without seeking the relief of recovery of possession.

ISSUE NO.3 - Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree as

prayed for?

40.In view of the discussion held in Issue Nos.1 and 2 as the plaintiff failed to prove their right, title and possession over the plaint schedule property and having out of possession of the same, they failed to seek the consequential relief of recovery of possession of the schedule property, this Court is of the considered opinion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the decree of declaration and consequential relief of permanent injunction, as prayed for. Hence, this issue is answered against the plaintiffs.

ISSSUE NO.4 - To what relief?

41.In the result, the suit is dismissed, with costs.

Typed to my dictation by Steno.Gr.I, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court, on this the 20 th day of March, 2026.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. District Judge, Gudivada.

Appendix of Evidence

Witnesses examined

For Plaintiff:-

P.W.1Tholeti Krishna Mohana Rao.

- 55 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

P.W.2Tholeti Sambasiva Rao. (Eschewed)

P.W.3Tholeti Chandra Sekhara Rao.

P.W.4Tholeti Venkata Subbaraya Gurukul

For Defendants:-

D.W.1:B.Madhusudhana Rao. (Eschewed) D.W.2:Saladi Venkata Subba Rao. D.W.3:Marthy Ramesh.

Documents marked

For Plaintiffs:-

Ex.A1:Pattadar Pass Book in favor of 1st plaintiff. Ex.A2:Title Deed issued in favour 1st plaintiff. Ex.A3Certified Copy of Order in Second Appeal No.992/2005, High Court of A.P. Ex.A4:No.2 Adangal. Ex.A5:Certified Copy of R.S.R stands in the name of father of 1st plaintiff. Ex.A6:Certified Copy of Certificate issued by Karanam, dt.07.03.1981 in favour of father of 1st plaintiff.

Ex.A7:Certified Copy of Sale Deed, dt.06.04.1983 executed by T.Veeranjaneyulu in favour of P.Satyanarayana in order to show Northern Boundary of 1st plaintiff.

Ex.A8:10(1) Adangal for F.1405 issued in the name of father of 1st plaintiff. Ex.A9:Land Revenue collected during the period from 21.01.1941 to 29.01.1958 entered as white papers (three sheets). Ex.A10:R.S.R issued by District Collector, Krishna for the land in Kondiparru Village, dt.18.07.1989. Ex.A11:Form No.1 notice issued by District Collector, Krishna in favour of father of 1st plaintiff.

Ex.A12:Rytwari Pass Book issued in favour of father of 1st plaintiff, dt.30.05.1980 (four sheets). Ex.A13:No.2 Adangal issued in respect of the land of father of 1st plaintiff, dt.28.08.1989. Ex.A14:Adangal Pahani for Fasali 1424 obtained through Mee-Seva. Ex.A15:ROR 1B Namoona obtained through Mee-Seva, dt.21.02.2015.

- 56 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026

Ex.A16:Original Pattadar Pass Book bearing No.57151 in the name of T.Ramalingeswara Rao, dt.19.11.1994. Ex.A17:Original Pattadar Pass Book bearing No.57152 in the name of T.Malleswara Rao, dt.19.11.1994. Ex.A18:Original Pattadar Pass Book bearing No.57154 in the name of T.Naga Mahalakshmamma, dt.19.11.1994. Ex.A19:Original Pattadar Pass Book bearing No.57155 in the name of T.Nagalakshmamma, dt.19.11.1994. Ex.A20:Bunch of Original Cist Receipts-29 (Twenty Nine) in number, stands in the names of Tholeti Mallikarjuna Rao, Tholeti Naga Mahalakshmi and Tholeti Nagalakshmamma. Ex.A21:Form-I notice issued by the District Collector, Krishna district in favour of Tholeti Maleswara Rao. Ex.A22:Form-I notice issued by the District Collector, Krishna District in favour of Tholeti Mallaiah. Ex.A23:Original Title Deed Book bearing No.57151 in favour of Tholeti Ramalingeswara Rao, dt.24.05.1995. Ex.A24:Original Title Deed Book bearing No.57152 in favour of Tholeti Malleswara Rao, dt.24.05.1995. Ex.A25:Original Title Deed Book bearing No.57154 in favour of Tholeti Naga Mahalakshmamma, dt.24.05.1995. Ex.A26:Original Title Deed Book bearing No.57155 in favour of Tholeti Nagalakshmamma, dt.24.05.1995. Ex.A27:Attested Copy of auction approval proceedings, dt.15.12.2015. Ex.A28:Mee-Seva Copy of Adangal and R.O.R of Survey No.33-1. Ex.A29:Mee-Seva Copy of Adangal and R.O.R of Survey No.33-3. Ex.A30:Mee-Seva Copy of Adangal and R.O.R of Survey No.33-3 and 33-4.

For Defendants:-

Ex.B1:Certified Copy of the Judgment and Decree in O.S No.74/1991 on the file of Junior Cilvil Judge’s Court, Gudivada. Ex.B2:Extract of DCB for the year 2006-07. Ex.B3:Extract of DCB for the year 2013-14. Ex.B4:Original Order Copy in W.P.No.7250/1991. Ex.B5:Original Order Copy in W.A.No.68/1992. Ex.B6:Proceedings of the Assistant Commissioner, Endowment Department in R.C.No.15/3131/86 Adm, Dt.07.071986 along with - 57 - XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.1/2013, Gudivada. Dated 20.03.2026 particulars U/s.38 of Act 17 of 1966. Ex.B7:Certified Copy of the order in I.A No.664/1991 in O.S No.74/1991. Ex.B8:Certified Copy of the notice issued to the plaintiffs in O.S No.74/1991 by the Chairman, Trust Board on 04.02.1989. Ex.B9:Certified Copy of the Order in I.A No.1532/1998 in O.S No.74/1991. Ex.B10:Certified Copy of Judgment in O.S No.714/1938. Ex.B11:Original approval order 2006-2007 to 2008-2009. Ex.B12:Original approval order 2009-2010 to 2011-2012. Ex.B13:Original bid list 2012-13 to 2014-15. Ex.B14:Original approval order 2015-2016 to 2017-2018. Ex.B15:Original of L.R Receipt for 1415 fasli to 1428 fasli. Ex.B16:----- Ex.B17:Office Copy of Approval Oder of Lease for the years 2021-22 to 2023-24. Ex.B18:Original Land Revenue Receipt, dt.12.03.2021 for fasali 1429. Ex.B19:Original Land Revenue Receipt, dt.19.03.2021 for fasali 1430. Ex.B20:Duplicate Copy Receipt No.205, issued by the Defendant No.1, dt.29.04.2024. Ex.B21:Approval Order, dt.29.05.2024.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI A.D.J., GDV.,

APKR0E0001872015

IN THE COURT OF XI ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, GUDIVADA

Present: Sri Grandhi Subrahmanyam,

XI Additional District Judge

Tuesday, this the 21st day of April, 2026

O.S No.62/2015

Between:-

1. Nagamothu Venkata Teja, S/o (late) Suresh Babu, aged 23 years, Student, presently residing at USA, rep. by his General Power of Attorney agent, his sister, Nagamothu Anjani, D/o (late) Suresh Babu, Resident of Vijayawada.

2. Nagamothu Anjani, D/o (late) Suresh Babu, aged 21 years, Student, Resident of Vijayawada.

3. Nagamothu Vijaya Lakshmi, W/o (late) Suresh Babu, aged 50 years, Properties, R/o Vijayawada, being incapable of protecting her interest and mentally unsound rep. by her daughter as next friend Nagamothu Anjani, D/o (late) Suresh Babu, R/o Vijayawada. …Plaintiffs.

And

1. Kantamaneni Ratnamala, W/o Srinivasarao, aged 45 years, House-wife, R/o Akunuru Village, Vuyyuru Mandal, Krishna District.

2. Prathipati Sirisha, W/o Viswambar, aged 37 years, Resident of D.No.13-3/1, Flat No.303, Tonia Hights, Pinnamaneni Teachers’ Colony, Kanuru, Penamaluru Mandal, Krishna District. …Defendants.

This suit came on 31.03.2026 before me for final hearing in the presence of Sri G.L.N.V.Appaji, Advocate for Plaintiffs and of Sri Sunkara Venkata Suresh, Advocate for defendant No.1 and of Sri P.Rambabu, Advocate for defendant No.2, upon hearing both sides, upon perusing the material papers on record and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:

J U D G M E N T

The Plaintiffs filed the suit seeking for cancellation of sale deed dt.15.03.2015 executed by the Junior Civil Judge, Vuyyuru in 2

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

favour of 2nd defendant on behalf of the plaintiffs in pursuance of decree in O.S.No.265/2005 and execution proceedings which are void by reason of the fraud on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Gannavaram and to put the plaintiffs in possession of the plaint schedule property and for costs.

2. The brief averments of the plaint are as follows:-

(a) Plaintiffs are the absolute owners of an extent of

Ac.3.32 cents of land in R.S.No.6 of Akunuru Village, Vuyyuru Mandal of Sub-Registry, Vuyyuru. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the children of plaintiff

No.3 and late Nagamothu Venkata Suresh Babu. Plaintiff No.1 was born on 21.11.1991 and plaintiff No.2 was born on 12.09.1993 and they are majors. On 02.06.2004 said Venkata Suresh Babu met with a road accident and died on 03.05.2006 at Hyderabad. After the death of her husband, plaintiff No.3 became mentally unsound on some occasions and she used to attend work with utmost care and all of sudden her behaviour used to change. Doctors advised that plaintiff No.3 is not mentally fit. Now she was kept in the house of her natural sister

Tatineni Annapoorna under her care and protection and plaintiff No.2 used to attend her when she got holidays for her college. Late Suresh

Babu owned and possessed the plaint schedule property and other properties.

3

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

(b) On 11.07.2005 defendant No.1 got issued a legal notice through her Advocate, but as he was in coma by that time, the same was returned back to the addressee on 13.07.2005. Defendant

No.1 was aware of the fact of accident and he was hospitalized and in coma. Defendant No.1 filed a suit in O.S.No.265/2005 on the file of

Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Gannavaram for recovery of Rs.99,850/- due under a promissory note mentioning the wrong address particulars of

Suresh Babu. During that time, plaintiffs 1 and 2 were studying at

Hyderabad. In June, 2009 1st plaintiff joined B.E., in Chennai and 2nd plaintiff pursued her studies during 2009-10 and 2010-11 in Sri

Chaitanya College, Vijayawada by staying in hostel. Defendant No.1 having knowledge about all the circumstances intentionally furnished wrong address particulars. As such no notice was served to any one of the plaintiffs at any point of time with reference to the suit proceedings in O.S.No.265/2009. Defendant No.1 obtained exparte decree behind the back of the plaintiffs.

(c) Defendant No.1 after obtaining the decree in the said suit, filed E.P.No.54/2011 on 28.11.2011 on the file of Junior Civil

Judge’s Court, Gannavaram and since then till 04.03.2014 notices were

not served to the plaintiffs herein. Subsequently, said E.P., was transferred to the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Vuyyuru and renumbered as E.P.No.49/2013. As per the directions of the Court, the DHR filed a 4

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

paper publication, knowing well that 3rd plaintiff was not in sound mind and plaintiffs 1 and 2 were in USA and Vijayawada and Belgaum respectively. Attachment notice against the property was not served on any one of the JDRs/plaintiffs herein. But the learned Junior Civil

Judge, Gannavaram erred in noting that Rule 54 attachment was

effected on 03.12.2011. The property was not inspected by the Amin.

The adopted father of late Suresh Babu, by name Nagamothu

Venkataramaiah’s tomb was situated in the plaint schedule property.

Late Suresh Babu and his family members owned an extent of Ac.14.50 cents in the vicinity and to carry out the agricultural operations they dug four bore wells in the schedule site.

(d) The E.P. was filed for recovery of Rs.1,03,278/- and brought the plaint schedule property to auction by noting the value of the property as Rs.2,00,000/-. In fact the lands of Akunuru are very fertile and fetches good income and value per acre is about

Rs.60,00,000/-. Defendant No.1 knowing fully well about the family circumstances of the plaintiffs, intentionally brought the schedule property for auction to deprive their rights and to cause irreparable loss.

The property in an extent of Ac.0.69 cents of Akunuru Village is sufficient to satisfy the decree debt. In May, 2015 1st plaintiff came to

India and learnt that the plaint schedule property was taken by 2nd defendant forcibly from the cultivating tenant Kakani Srinivasa Rao 5

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. stating that they purchased the property in the Court auction and further came to know that the property was auctioned by the Junior Civil Judge,

Vuyyuru in E.P.No.49/2013 in pursuance of the decree in

O.S.No.265/2005, by obtaining certified copies. Without furnishing

correct particulars, 1st defendant brought the schedule property to auction. If bore facility is not provided, the rest of the land will become useless and not fit for cultivation as bore is situated in the plaint schedule property. As it is not possible for 1st plaintiff to prosecute the

Court litigation and as 3rd plaintiff is not in a fit mental state, he gave

GPA to 2nd plaintiff. Defendant No.2 came to know that the purchasers are trying to demolish the tomb and they are openly proclaiming that they will not permit the plaintiffs to use bore pumps in future. Hence the suit.

3.Defendant No.1 filed a Written Statement denying the averments of the plaint and contending as follows:-

(a) This defendant lent an amount of Rs.80,000/- to

Venkata Suresh Babu on 17.3.2004 at Akunuru Village for his business purpose on the foot of a promissory note with a condition to repay the same with interest @ 18% p.a., he failed to repay the same, 1st defendant got issued a legal notice on 11.07.2005, which was returned unserved. Later, he filed a suit in O.S.No.265/2005 on the file of Junior

Civil Judge Court, Gannavaram. While the suit was pending, said

6

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

Suresh Babu died and then his legal representatives were impleaded in the suit with their correct address particulars. Defendant No.1 paid batta several times for service of summons and notices to the plaintiffs, but they were returned with one or other endorsement. Later, paper publication was made in Janatha and Day to day daily papers for service of summons and notices by way of substitute service. Later, the

Court passed exparte decree on 16.06.2011.

(b) Subsequently, 1st defendant filed E.P.No.49/2013 in

O.S.No.265/2005, as notices were not served to the plaintiffs, again

paper publication was made and later the Court conducted auction by following the proper procedure laid down under law and 2nd defendant became the successful bidder and later the Court executed sale deed and got it registered. No document is filed to prove that 3rd plaintiff is unsound mind person. No fraud or misrepresentation was played by defendants 1 and 2 before the Court. The plaintiffs played fraud and misrepresentation by watching the Court proceedings till the end with an intention to cause wrongful loss to the defendants. The plaintiffs suppressed all the facts and filed the present suit. The plaintiffs evaded repayment more than a decade and successfully dragged on the proceedings. There was no cause of action to file the suit. Hence, prayed to dismiss the suit with costs.

7

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

4.Defendant No.2 filed a Written Statement denying the averments of the plaint and contending as follows:-

(a) The plaintiffs filed the suit in a speculative manner by abusing the process of law. This defendant purchased the plaint schedule property in the auction conducted by the Junior Civil Judge’s

Court, Vuyyuru for valid sale consideration. After elaborate enquiry and after filing of the Amin Report, the Executing Court fixed a date for auction and made paper publication. On knowing about the auction through paper publication, this defendant participated in the auction on 19.12.2014 in the open Court and became highest bidder for a total amount of Rs.38,00,000/-, paid the said amount and on 16.03.2015 the learned Junior Civil Judge, Vuyyuru issued sale certificate to this defendant. Thus, this defendant is a bona fide purchaser of the plaint schedule property.

(b) After obtaining Sale Certificate, this defendant filed

E.A.No.98/2015 to obtain delivery of the plaint schedule property, on 25.03.2015 the Executing Court appointed an Amin and on 26.03.2015 the Amin handed over possession of the schedule property to this defendant and since then this defendant has been enjoying the schedule property with absolute rights having right and title by paying necessary taxes to the Revenue authorities, to the knowledge of one and all, including the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have no manner of right 8

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

either individually or collectively to seek any relief against this respondent pertaining to the schedule property. There is no cause of action to file the suit. Hence, prayed to dismiss the suit with costs.

5.Basing on the above pleadings, my learned predecessor has settled the following issues for trial:-

1. Whether the plea of the plaintiffs that the 1 st defendant obtained an exparte decree by playing fraud by filing a suit in O.S.No.365/2005 on the file of Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Gannavaram is true and correct?

2. Whether the 2 nd defendant is bona fide purchaser in respect of the plaint schedule property purchased in Court auction?

3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for cancellation of the sale deed dt.15.03.2015 executed by Junior Civil Judge, Vuyyuru in favour of 2 nd defendant on behalf of plaintiffs?

4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession of the plaint schedule property as prayed for?

5. To what relief?

6. During the course of trial, 2nd plaintiff was examined in chief and she got marked documents under Exs.A1 to A12, but later when she failed to appear before this Court for the purpose of cross- examination despite of several adjournments and imposing costs, this

Court finally eschewed her evidence on 10.10.2022.Plaintiff No.1 is examined as P.W.2 and got remarked Exs.A1 to A12. One third party, who is erstwhile tenant of the schedule property, is examined as P.W.3.

On behalf of the Defendants, 1st defendant is examined as D.W.1.

9

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

7.A careful perusal of the issues settled by my predecessor- in-office, in the 1st issue the previous suit number is wrongly mentioned as O.S.No.365/2005 instead of O.S.No.265/2005 and the said issue was not framed in tune with the pleadings of the plaintiffs and hence, the same is re-casted as follows:-

“Whether the plea of the plaintiffs that the 1 st defendant obtained an

exparte decree by playing fraud by giving wrong address

particulars in O.S.No.265/2005 on the file of Junior Civil Judge’s

Court, Gannavaram having knowledge that the plaintiffs were not

residing in the given addresses, is true and correct?”

8.Initially, the plaintiff and 1st defendant submitted arguments but 2nd defendant did not submit arguments inspite of giving sufficient opportunity and the matter was posted for Judgment. Later, the suit was reopened to hear further arguments. Subsequently, arguments submitted on behalf of the plaintiff, but despite giving adjournments and sufficient opportunity, defendants failed to attend before the Court and not submitted arguments on behalf of the defendants, hence the matter is posted for judgment. Perused the record.

9.The learned counsel for the plaintiff would argue that 1st defendant herein filed a suit in O.S.No.265/2005 on the file of Junior

Civil Judge, Gannavaram against the legal heirs of Nagamothu Venkata

Suresh Babu (deceased/borrower), who are the plaintiffs herein and one

Lakshmiswaramma, who is his adoptive mother, for recovery of money 10

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

of Rs.99,850/- due under a promissory note dt.17.03.2004 executed by him for Rs.80,000/- by showing wrong address particulars and obtained an exparte decree on 16.06.2011. In fact, prior to filing of the suit, on 2.6.2004 said Suresh Babu met with an accident at Byepass road,

Vuyyuru, initially he was admitted in Nagarjuna Hospitals, Vijayawada and later he was shifted to Appollo Hospitals, Hyderabad for better treatment. While he was taking treatment at Hyderabad, 1st defendant herein got issued a legal notice to said Suresh Babu on 11.7.2005 to the

Hyderabad address, which was returned unserved and later filed the said suit. He further argued that after obtaining the decree, 1st defendant filed E.P.No.54/2011 on the file of the said Court by giving wrong particulars for recovery of Rs.1,03,278/- and brought the plaint schedule property for sale, later said E.P., was transferred to the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Vuyyuru, where sale was conducted and in fact, summons in the suit, notices in the E.P., Rule 54 CPC attachment notice and sale notice were not served on the plaintiffs herein and said

Lakshmiswaramma and the entire proceedings went behind back of the plaintiffs. Further, it is argued that for the said due amount, the entire extent of Ac.3.32 cents was sold for Rs.38,00,000/- and in fact an extent of Ac.0.69 cents was sufficient to discharge the decretal debt together with interest. After the death of said Suresh Babu, 3rd plaintiff herein, who is his wife became a mentally ill-health person as she disturbed 11

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. due to the death of her husband and not in a position to prosecute the legal proceedings and the plaintiffs 1 and 2 were prosecuting their education at Chennai, Vijayawada and Belgaum and they have no knowledge about the suit and E.P., proceedings. It is further argued that in order to grab the plaint schedule property 1st defendant played fraud on the Court and obtained exparte decree and brought the plaint schedule property for sale and prayed to decree the suit.

In support of the above contentions, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied on the following case-law:-

(i) Amulya Ratan Mukherjee v. SM.Kanak Nalini

Ghose and others, reported in AIR 1950 Cal 30.

(ii) Duvvuri Rami Reddy v. Duvvudu Papi Reddy and others, reported in AIR 1963 AP 160.

(iii) Satyanarain Bajoria and another v. Ramnarain

Tibrewal and another, reported in 1993 (4) SCC 414.

(iv) Nalinikant v. Ramacharya Burli (Deceased) by

L.Rs., and another, reported in 2000 4 KarLJ 314.

(v) Neti Venkatanarayanamma and Others vs. Nune

Ramanna, reported in 1995 (3) ALT 575.

10.The learned counsels for defendants 1 and 2 argued that 1st defendant has knowledge about said Suresh Babu met with an accident, but she did not know that he went into coma, 1st defendant 12

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

before filing the suit got issued a legal notice, which was got returned

and subsequently she filed the suit by mentioning the correct address particulars, 1st defendant paid batta several times for service of summons and made paper publication, but the plaintiffs herein failed to make appearance and thus, the suit was decreed exparte and later she filed execution proceedings and brought the schedule property for sale, in which 2nd defendant became highest bidder, who is a bona fide purchaser, paper publications were made in the execution proceedings and the plaintiffs having knowledge about filing of the suit and E.P.

proceedings, they watched the entire proceedings but failed to appear

before the Court and as such the property was sold in the Court auction

and there was no fraud played by the 1st Defendant on the Court and prayed to dismiss the suit.

Issue Nos.1 & 3:-

1. Whether the plea of the plaintiffs that the 1 st defendant obtained an exparte decree by playing fraud by giving wrong address particulars in O.S.No.265/2005 on the file of

Junior C ivil Judge’s Court, Gannavaram having knowledge that the plaintiffs were not residing in the given addresses , is true and correct?

13

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for cancellation of the sale deed dt.15.03.2015 executed by Junior Civil Judge,

Vuyyuru in favour of 2 nd defendant on behalf of plaintiffs?

11.Keeping the above mentioned case-law in the mind of this

Court, now the evidence on record is going to be appreciated, to answer the above issues settled for consideration. As both the issues are inter- related to each other, this Court feels that it is better to answer both issues together to avoid the repetition of evidence.

12.The undisputed facts are that 1st defendant herein filed a suit in O.S.No.265/2005 against the deceased Nagumothu Venkata

Suresh Babu initially for recovery of Rs.99,850/- due under a promissory note dt.17.03.2004 executed by said Suresh Babu in favour of 1st defendant herein for an amount of Rs.80,000/-. Third plaintiff herein is mother of plaintiffs 1 and 2. But after the death of said Suresh Babu on 03.05.2006, the plaintiffs 1 to 3 herein and the adoptive mother of said

Suresh Babu, by name N.Lakshmiswaramma were impleaded as legal heirs of the deceased in the said suit. In the evidence, P.W.2 admitted that his father borrowed an amount of Rs.80,000/- from 1st defendant herein, but he failed to discharge the same and henvaluce, 1st defendant filed suit in O.S.No.265/2005. The defendants in the said suit were called absent and they were set exparte, consequently, on 16.06.2011 an exparte decree was passed for the said amount, as 14

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

evident from Ex.A4. Later, the 1stdefendant herein filed

E.P.No.54/2011 under Order 21, Rules 54, 66 and 64 of CPC for sale of

the immovable property mentioned in the schedule appended thereto, initially on the file of Junior Civil Judge Court, Gannavaram, which was transferred to the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Vuyyuru and renumbered as E.P.49/2017. In the said E.P., also the Judgment Debtors did not make their appearance and after issuance of paper publication, they were set exparte and proceeded with the sale, which was conducted on 19.12.2014, sale was confirmed on 18.02.2015 and Sale Certificate was issued on 16.03.2015. There is no dispute that deceased Suresh Babu indebted to several others and though, during his lifetime no suits were filed, but after his death number of suits were filed against the present plaintiffs being his legal heirs and some of them were decreed.

13.Now, the plaintiffs filed the suit for the relief of cancellation of the sale deed dt.16.03.2015 issued by the Junior Civil Judge’s Court,

Vuyyuru in favour of 2nd defendant on the ground of fraud contending that 1st defendant having knowledge about the correct address particulars, but by giving wrong address particulars of the plaintiffs in the plaint in O.S.No.265/2005 committed fraud with an intention to bring the

E.P. Schedule Property to behind their back in order to grab the property of their father. They further contended that 1st defendant was having knowledge that their father met with accident and in coma and 15

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. plaintiffs 1 and 2 were prosecuting their studies in Chennai, Vijayawada,

Belgaum and U.S.A., respectively in view of their education and job and 3rd plaintiff, who is their mother, after the death of their father mentally disturbed and became a mentally ill-health person and not in a position to prosecute the suit proceedings, got issued the legal notice, filed the suit and E.P., proceedings. It is their further contention that 3rd plaintiff being unsound mind on and off, she was kept in the house of her elder sister to look after her welfare and that they did not know the suit as well as E.P., proceedings and only in the month of March, 2015 1st plaintiff came to India and known about recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property by 2nd defendant from their lessee and later they obtained certified copies of the documents and came to know about the said proceedings.

14.Since the plaintiffs mainly based the substantial relief based on the ground of fraud, now it is appropriate to discuss the word ‘fraud’, which is defined under Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, which reads thus:-

17. 'Fraud' defined.— 'Fraud' means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent', with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:— (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; 16

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

(2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent. Explanation.—Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speaks, or unless his silence, is, in itself, equivalent to speech.

15. What is ‘fraud’ is clearly discussed by the Hon’ble High

Court of Andhra Pradesh and held that ‘fraud’ must be specifically pleaded and proved, in a recent judgment dt.22.01.2026 in the case of

Goriparthi Jhansi and others vs. Goriparthi Sriram Murthy and

another 1 in Appeal Suit No.512 of 2019, wherein it is observed as follows:- “In Merriam’s Webster Dictionary, the fraud has been defined as under:- “1 a: any act, expression, omission, or concealment calculated to deceive another to his or her disadvantage; specific: a misrepresentation or concealment with reference to some fact material to a transaction that is made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity and with the intent to deceive another and that is reasonably relied on by the other who is injured thereby b: the affirmative defense of having acted in response to a fraud.”

39. In the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath- (1994) 1 SCC 1 the Hon’ble Supreme Court vividly defined fraud as an act of deliberate deception with the desire of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another and held as below: “…Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal” observed Chief Justice 12026 ALD (2) 143 17

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and nonest in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree — by the first court or by the highest court — has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings.”

40. Subsequently, the Apex Court in A.V. Papayya Sastry Vs. Government of A.P.-2007 (4) SCC 221 23had held as under:- “……21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed: “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.”

22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by the first court or by the final court—has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.

23. ***

24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it was “misled”. There is an essential distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.

25. It has been said: fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent)……”

41. Further, the Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Nidhi Kaim Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh -2017 (4) SCC 1 24 discussed the fraud and its dimensions in the legal context.

42. It is worthwhile to note that the said factum of fraud must be asserted in the pleadings in the relevant provisions. In brief, the particulars to be given as per Order VI Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short ‘C.P.C’), read hereunder:

18

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

“4. Particulars to be given where necessary.— In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in whichparticulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.

43. Order VI Rule 4 of C.P.C lays down that in all cases where a pleading by the party relies upon fraud, particulars with respect to the date and item, if necessary, shall be stated in the pleadings. The fraud as alleged in the plaint must contain those facts together taken as a whole, if proved, the fraud has to be shown and established

44. It also emphasizes the requirement of disclosure of material details to give fair notice to the opposite party and prevent vague or bald allegations, mere use of the word “fraud” or general assertions is legally insufficient. The vital object of the provision is to ensure clarity, precision, and fairness in pleadings to enable effective adjudication, and prevent abuse of process. It is well settled that in the absence of specific and material pleadings constituting fraud, any evidence sought to be adduced in support of such a plea is wholly inadmissible.

45. It is well settled legal principle that fraud must be pleaded and proved. It is highly relevant to plead alleged fraud with all pre-requisite particulars & same must be proved with cogent and convincing evidence on record….”

16.As held above, Order VI Rule 4 of C.P.C lays down that in all cases where a party relies upon the plea of fraud, the particularsof fraud must be specifically mentioned in the pleadings and mere mentioning the word ‘fraud’ is not sufficient. Further, it is well settled legal principle that fraud must be pleaded and proved with all pre- requisite particulars and with cogent and convincing evidence. Thus, the entire burden rests on the plaintiffs to prove the fraud if any played 19

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. by 1st defendant and 2nd defendant is not a bonafide purchaser of the schedule property.

17.Initially, the present suit was filed by three plaintiffs, but plaintiffs 1 and 3 were represented by 2nd defendant, as 1st plaintiff has no sufficient time to prosecute the civil cases before the Courts and 3rd plaintiff was not mentally incapable of protecting her right as she became mentally unsound person due to the death of her husband and in that connection 1st plaintiff gave General Power of Attorney in favour of 2nd plaintiff vide document under Ex.A9 and got conducted the suit proceedings through 2nd defendant. But, coming to the evidence, though 2nd plaintiff filed her affidavit as P.W.1 in lieu of her chief- examination and got marked documents in support of their case, but later her evidence was eschewed on 10.10.2022 as she failed to turn up

before this Court for the purpose of cross-examination and then 1st

plaintiff was examined as P.W.2 and got marked the documents on their behalf. In this connection, it is the version of the plaintiffs that 1st plaintiff cancelled the GPA given in favour of 2nd plaintiff, but no such document is filed before this Court. In this connection, P.W.2 deposed that he cancelled the power of attorney executed in favour of his sister i.e., 2nd plaintiff, but the said document is not filed before the Court.

However, 1st plaintiff being a party to the suit, he is having every right to give evidence before the Court.

20

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

18.In the present case on hand, according to the plaintiffs their main contention is that the 1st defendant has played fraud, shehaving knowledge about their actual residence, but intentionally and purposefully shown wrong addresses, filed the suit, obtained an exparte decree and subsequently she filed the Execution Petition with the very same wrong address particulars and brought the immovable property of the principal borrower for sale with a fraudulent intention to grab his property. With regard to the alleged plea of fraud and lack of knowledge about the suit and E.P., proceedings, the relevant evidence on record i.e., Plaintiff No.1/P.W.2, who is crucial witness to the case, is as under:-

P.W.2/Plaintiff No.1 in his evidence deposed that he does

not know that whether D1 has either mislead the Court or played

fraud upon the Court. In OS No.265/2005 and E.P.No.49/2013 on

the file of JCJ, Vuyyuru, himself, his mother and his sister have

received summons by substitute service through paper

publication. But, contrary to the said evidence, he denied the suggestion that the pleading taken by him in the plaint and in the chief affidavit that Defendant No.1 has played fraud upon the Court is false and that the averments of the plaint were created for the purpose of filing the suit. Neither himself, nor his mother nor his sister have challenged the decree in O.S.No.265/2005, so also they did not challenge the E.P. proceedings under Ex.A5 nor they filed any 21

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. application in the E.P. He further deposed that they did not challenge the sale proceedings also in the Execution Petition before the trial

Court. Furthermore, he admitted that when the suit in OS

No.265/2005 was pending, himself, plaintiffs 2 and 3 and his

grandmother/Lakshmiswaramma were impleaded as parties.

Though, the plaintiffs alleged fraud against 1st defendant and they do not have knowledge about the suit and E.P., proceedings, the said evidence of P.W.2 in his cross-examination appears that they were aware about the suit and E.P., proceedings as they received summons and notice in the suit and in E.P., respectively through paper publication, but they did not challenge the exparte decree and E.P.

proceedings, except filing the present suit for cancellation of the sale deed. It is pertinent to note that by the date of issuing Rule 54 notice, plaintiffs 1 and 2 were not minors and they were set exparte after substitute service through paper publication .

19. The verymain contention of the plaintiffs is that 1st defendant gave wrong particulars to the Court at the time of filing suit in

O.S.No.265/2005. Except stating that the particulars given by 1st

defendant in the suit and in the E.P., are totally false, what are the correct particulars of their respective permanent and communication addresses and description at the relevant point of time are not mentioned either in the body of the plaint or in the evidence, except 22

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

simply mentioning in the cause title that they were residents of ‘Vijayawada’, without mentioning the other important particulars of their address like Door Number, name of the street, the locality etc., In

Ex.A8/Driving licence, which was issued in the year 2012 and in the sale deeds under Exs.A10 and A11, the address particulars of 1st plaintiff are noted at “SB-3, SVR Estates, Gurunanak Colony,

Vijayawada”. In Ex.A7 the address of 2nd plaintiff is noted as “10/149 –

F3, Rajendra Nagar, 2nd Lane Block – 10, Gudivada”. In Ex.A9 General

Power of Attorney, the address of 1st plaintiff is mentioned as “Door

No.26-32-90, Flat No. S 1, Vaibhava Apartment, Eluru Road,

Maruthinagar, Vijayawada”. The plaintiffs at least did not mention in the entire plaint or in the evidence what was their permanent residential address before said Suresh Babu met with accident, during the period of his treatment and after his death. Whether they settled at Hyderabad or they returned back to Akunuru Village or to Vijayawada is also nowhere mentioned by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed Exs.A7 and A8 to show their addresses during the relevant period. Ex.A8/driving licence of 1st plaintiff showed his address at “SB-3, SVR Estates,

Gurunanak Colony, Vijayawada, Vijayawada Urban, Krishna District-10.

Ex.A7/Identity card of 2nd plaintiff shows that she did Bachelor in Dental

Sciences from August, 2012 to 2017 at Belgaum of Karnataka State.

According to P.W.2, he joined B.E., course in Chennai in the year 2009 23

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. and he might have in said Town till 2013 as the B.E., course is of four years. As per the plaintiffs, 2nd plaintiff studied Intermediate education during the years 2009-2011 in Chaitanya College, Vijayawada and she took long term coaching during 2011-2012 in the same college. As above, except stating that they were not available in the address particulars mentioned in O.S.No.265/2005 at the relevant point of time to pursue the civil litigation, no information is furnished by them what was their permanent residence during that period. It is further mentioned by the plaintiffs in the plaint that by the time of filing the said suit they plaintiffs 1 and 2 were studying at Hyderabad. It appears that

before filing the said suit, 1st defendant made reasonable enquiries,

came to know that Suresh Babu met with accident and sent the legal notice as in Ex.A3 to the Hyderabad address of Suresh Babu, which is as follows:-

“Nagamothu Venkata Suresh Babu, S/o Venkataramaiah,

Plot No.1-6, B’ Block, Keerthi apartments, Behind Saradhi

Studios, Ameerpert, Hyderabad-73.”

But said notice was not served and same was returned.D.W.1 in her evidence admitted that as on the date of filing of the suit in

O.S.No.265/2005 said Suresh was undergoing treatment at Hyderabad,

but she did not know whether he was in coma or not. After going 24

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

through Ex.A2, she admitted that in Ex.A2 they have shown that Suresh was residing at Akunuru Village, which is as follows:-

“R/o Akunuru Village, Vuyyuru Mandal, Krishna District.”

She further deposed that they did not inform the Court that

Suresh was in coma and they did not file any petition seeking for appointment of Guardian for him. According to the plaint pleadings, by the time of said legal notice Suresh Babu was in coma and the said postal cover was returned with an endorsement “In coma back to addressee”. From a reading of the said pleading made by the plaintiffs is very clear that they have knowledge about issuance of legal notice by one Advocate, but they did not choose to receive the same in order to give information to the said Advocate about the coma status of Suresh

Babu or to know about the contents of the said legal notice, so that they could have contacted the 1st defendant or her counsel in order to sort out the money dispute said Suresh Babu had with 1st defendant. But, they did not take any steps in that regard and they simply got the legal notice returned with the above endorsement. In this connection, except the oral contention of the plaintiffs that Suresh Babu was in coma, no medical evidence is placed before this Court to substantiate that he was in coma pursuant to the accident he involved. Furthermore, no evidence is adduced by the plaintiffs to show where they have resided

before said Suresh Babu met with an accident and what was their

25

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. permanent residence after his death, to say that 1st defendant submitted wrong address particulars to the Court. However, according to 1st defendant, Suresh Babu borrowed amount and executed the suit promissory note in O.S.No.265/2005 in Akunuru Village. Certified Copy of the said promissory note is not filed by either party to know the ‘Halumakam’ of him in the year 2004 when the promissory note was executed. But, perusal of the documents under Exs.A4 and A5 appears that the family of Suresh Babu was residing in Akunuru Village, but as he met with accident, for the purpose of medical treatment they resided in Hyderabad during that particular period till his death. The record further shows that Akunuru Village is the permanent place of residence of the adoptive parents of Suresh Babu and Hyderabad is the place of residence of his natural parents. Another contention of the plaintiffs is that 1st defendant though she was residing in Rajahmundry by the time of filing the suit, she gave her address at Akunuru Village. In her evidence D.W.1 deposed that till construction of their house in Akunuru

Village about five years back, they never resided in Akunuru Village. In the present suit the presence of 1st defendant was obtained through paper publication. Further, 1st defendant denied her signature on the schedule attached to the Execution Petition. Though, the said contention of the plaintiffs is true and correct, but the said admission does not in any way helpful to the contention of the plaintiffs. If the 26

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

plaintiffs wanted to communicate 1st defendant, they ought to have consult her counsel for the purpose of the case.

20.Admittedly, in the suit in O.S.No.265/2005 plaintiffs 2 to 5 remained exparte and it is an exparte judgment. Further, the very same parties remained exparte in the E.P. proceedings. But, P.W.2 in his cross-examination deposed that neither himself, nor his mother nor his sister challenged the decree and judgment in O.S.No.265/2005.

Similarly, he further deposed that neither his mother nor his sister nor himself challenged the E.P. proceedings under Ex.A5 nor they filed any claim petition in the E.P. The plaintiffs are seeking cancellation of sale deed dt.15.03.2015 executed by the Junior Civil Judge, Vuyyuru in favour of 2nd defendant in pursuance of the decree in O.s.No.265/2005.

Admittedly, according to the evidence of P.W.3, the possession of the schedule property was delivered to the 2nd defendant by the Court Amin in pursuance of the said sale. So, the plaintiffs without seeking to set aside the exparte decree dt.16.06.2011 passed in O.S.No.265/2005 on the file of Junior Civil Judge Court, Gannavaram and the exparte order passed in E.P. proceedings before the Courts concerned, simply filed this suit for cancellation of the sale deed.

21.The evidence of P.W.3 is that he cultivated the schedule property from the year 2000 till the date of delivery of possession of the same by the Court Amin to the 2nd defendant. By the time of accident to 27

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. Suresh Babu, plaintiffs 1 and 2 were studying 8th and 6th classes respectively and by the year 2015 1st plaintiff left to USA for higher studies and not aware about any pending cases against his father or his family members. In the year 2015 2nd defendant came along with his men and forcibly occupied the schedule property stating that she purchased the same in Court auction. Defendant No.1 is his maternal uncle’s daughter by courtesy. None of the defendants informed him about the pending suit or execution proceedings at any point of time for settlement of the matter. Both of them collusively conducted the E.P.

proceedings to grab the valuable property of Suresh Babu. In his cross- examination he deposed that he did not file any document to show that he had taken the schedule property on lease. By the date of auction, he did not know about the details of the highest bidder but he came to know the same later.

22.The above evidence of P.W.3 discloses that he was a resident of Akunuru village, where the plaint schedule property is situated and that he was cultivating the same on lease and that he came to know about the sale of the property subsequently. But, P.W.3 did not make any attempt to inform the same any of the plaintiffs and according to the plaintiffs only in the year 2015 when the 1st plaintiff came to him to collect the lease amount, he informed the same to him.

Admittedly, in the suit in O.S.No.265/2005 and in the E.P., proceedings 28

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

the plaintiffs herein did not receive summons or notices directly and they received the same through paper publication. Further, before conducting the sale, in the ordinary course of process the Executing

Court generally ordered for beat of tom tom and also for publication of sale in the relevant newspaper. D.W.1 in her cross-examination categorically deposed that before conducting auction in E.P., Tom Tom and publication was made about the auction in the village and she was present also present in the village on the date of Tom Tom. D.w.1 specifically denied the suggestion given by the counsel for the plaintiffs that no Tom Tom and no Publicity was made before conducting of auction in the said E.P., So, despite of categorical denial of the said suggestion, the plaintiffs failed to examine any witness and failed to produce any evidence to prove their contention that Tom Tom was not made in the village before conducting auction. If any such irregularities were there in the auction proceedings, certainly the plaintiffs ought to have filed appropriate application before the Executing Court. But, no such attempt was made by the plaintiffs. From the year 2006 when the plaintiffs 1 to 3 herein and the adoptive mother of Suresh Babu were impleaded, publication must have been made in the suit and further in the year 2014 before conducting sale paper publication and beat of tom tom presumed to have made in Akunuru Village, but P.W.3 failed to inform about the same to any of the plaintiffs, appears to be unnatural.

29

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. Because, P.W.3 being the lessee of the plaintiffs since 2000 till the possession of the property was handed over to 2nd defendant. P.W.3 in his evidence clearly stated that 1st plaintiff while pursuing B.Tech., course he used to look after the properties and collect the rents.

According to the plaintiffs 1st plaintiff joined in B.Tech., course at

Chennai in the year 2009. By that time the suit was filed and may be even before completion of his Engineering Course, which is for a period of four years, by the year 2013, the suit was decreed exparte and the

E.P. proceedings were also pending before the Court at Vuyyuru. But, during that period having knowledge about the debt of 1st defendant by their father and about the legal notice under Ex.A3, the plaintiffs did not raise their little finger to settle the money dispute with 1st defendant and they chose to remain silent, as if ignoring the obvious, and let the law to take its own course.

23.D.W.1 in her evidence deposed that she know about

Suresh Babu met with accident and that might be the reason for her to get issue the legal notice under Ex.A3 to the Hyderabad address, but as the same was returned unserved, she might have filed the suit by showing the Akunuru address, where the suit promissory note was executed. It appears from the material available on record, having admitted that Suresh Babu borrowed loan from 1st defendant, after his death the plaintiffs did not take any steps to approach 1st defendant and 30

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

to negotiate with her for amicable settlement of the issue. But, the 1st defendant made reasonable enquiries about the address particulars of

Suresh Babu and got issued the legal notice to Hyderabad address and after knowing about the death of Suresh Babu she impleaded his legal heirs as parties to the said suit. This fact clearly shows that she made her efforts to know about the address of Suresh Babu. According to

D.W.1, after her marriage she was resided in Rajahmundry, Vijayawada and Khazipet due to the employment of her husband. D.W.1 appears to have filed the suit in O.S.No.265/2005 by showing the address of the plaintiffs as per the information given by Suresh Babu at the time of execution of the promissory note. The change in the address of the plaintiffs from time to time as per their convenience in view of the studies of plaintiffs 1 and 2 and necessity, there was no chance for the 1st defendant to know their address and it is not the case of the plaintiffs that they informed their addresses from time to time either to 1st defendant. Even though the plaintiffs did not receive the summons directly either in the suit or in the E.P. proceedings, giving summons by substitute service can be said as deemed service of summons under

Order V, Rule 20 of CPC, which was complied with during the stage of suit as well as in E.P. proceedings and this fact was admitted by P.W.2 in his evidence. Except making bald allegations of fraud, the plaintiffs failed to place any substantive material before this Court that the 1st 31

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. defendant knowing fully well about their addresses from time to time, intentionally gave wrong address particulars to the Court in the plaint and got obtained the exparte decree and thereafter she brought the E.P.

schedule property for sale by filing Execution Proceedings with wrong address particulars.

24.As per the case of the plaintiffs, 3rd plaintiff, who is the mother of plaintiffs 1 and 2, became mentally disabled person due to the shock after the death of her husband. It is no doubt true that Suresh

Babu met with a road traffic accident on 02.06.2004. Initially he was joined in Nagarjuna Hospitals, Kanuru, Vijayawada and later he was shifted to Appollo Hospitals, Hyderabad, where he took treatment as inpatient for 09 months and thereafter as the there was no improvement in the health condition of the patient, he was discharged with an advise to continue the treatment at home and he was there till his death on 03.05.2006. So, it is evident from the material on record that Suresh

Babu died nearly two years after he met with the accident on the

Byepass road, Vuyyuru. Generally, in such a condition there may not be any shock to become mentally a sick person. The plaintiffs except filing Exs.A7 and A8, they did not file any document to show the address of the 3rd plaintiff after the death of Suresh Babu till the present suit is filed. When the case of the plaintiffs is as mentioned above, as evident from Ex.A12, during the lifetime of after the death of Suresh 32

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

Babu, the plaintiffs filed a Claim Petition in O.P.No.786/2006 on the file of I Addl. Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-XV Addl. Chief Judge,

Hyderabad for compensation for the injuries sustained by Suresh Babu in the motor accident. In the said petition, 3rd plaintiff herein represented her husband as he was in coma by that time. In the said case 3rd plaintiff herein gave evidence before the Court as P.W.1.

Judgment was delivered in the said case on 22.11.2011. Till the disposal of the said Claim Petition she contested the same not only on behalf of herself but also on behalf of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 herein, because they were minors by then and she also represented her children also. Plaintiff No.1 born on 21.11.1991 and he became major on 21.11.2009 and 2nd plaintiff herein born on 12.09.1993 and she became major on 12.09.2011. Thus, Plaintiff No.3 represented her husband and children, but she was not represented by any other person on the ground that her mental health was not stable due to the shock of death of her husband. The above facts and circumstances appears to be that as the plaintiffs 1 and 2 were minors till the Execution Petition was filed and thereafter they prosecuted their studies in different places, they contended that they were away from Akunuru Village and they did not know about the suit and the E.P., proceedings, but in respect of plaintiff No.3 the situation is different, they brought up such a story of mental ill-health. But except taking such a bald pleading, no piece of 33

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. paper or document is placed before this Court to substantiate the said contention. P.W.2 also in his cross-examination admitted that he did not file any document to show that his mother (Vijaya Lakshmi) is of unsound mind. In this context, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied on the decision in the case of Amulya Ratan Mukherjee Vs.

Sm.Kanak Nalini Ghos 2 , wherein it was observed as follows:- “11. The next question is what is the result of this non- representation. Mr. Chakravartti cited before us the case of Mt. Rashid-un-nisa v. Muhammad Ismail Khan, 361. A. 168: (31 ALL. 372 P. C.) where the Privy Council pointed out that an objection as to non-representation is not one falling under Section 47, Civil P. C., and cannot be raised in any execution proceeding inasmuch as the party not represented cannot be deemed to be a party to the suit. It follows from this decision that a decree obtained without representation in a case where representation is necessary must be regarded as a decree against a person not a party to the suit and is therefore without jurisdiction and void. This, however, is a case of non-representation of a minor. The same principle was applied to the case of a lunatic in the case of Hakimulla v. Nobin Chandra Barua, 20 C. L. J. 291: (A. I. R. (2) 1915 Cal. 19) and by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Bondu Mal v. Thomas Skinner, . Our conclusion, therefore, is that the ex parte decree obtained by Kanak Nalini against Lakshmi Narayan in Title Suit No. 52 of 1940 was null and void.”

In Duvvuri Rami Reddi Vs. Duvvudu Papi Reddi and others 3, wherein it was observed as follows:- “18. In Amulya Ratan v. Kanak Nalini Ghose, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that to bring a case under Order XXXII Rule 15, it was 2AIR 1950 CALCUTTA 30.

3AIR 1963 Andhra Pradesh 160.

34

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he was absolutely insane, and that it was sufficient if it was proved that he was suffering from such mental infirmity as rendered him unfit to protect his own interests.

19. In Periaswami Goundan, in re, Ramaswami, J., reviewing the earlier cases held, that while the old section of the C. P. C. was applicable to persons of "unsound mind" the present rule (Order XXXII, Rule 15) applies to persons suffering from any mental infirmity in consequence of which he is incapable of protecting his own interests, and that a person who is not of unsound mind may yet be mentally infirm within the meaning of Rule 15 and relied on, . Following the decision in Nanak Chand v. Banarsi Das, AIR 1930 Lah 425, the learned Judge held that a deaf mute, who has been leading a family life with his wife and children and eaking his livelihood by grazing cattle, but who could not be understood by ordinary persons who are unacquainted with him, and not capable of understanding such persons is governed by Order XXXII, Rule 15, and that a next friend should be appointed for him. It was observed by the learned

Judge that if really he is mentally infirm, and a next friend or guardian

is not appointed even by mistake, the decree is void.”

The above referred case was in connection with the representation was necessary under Order 32, Rule 15 of CPC to prove that one Lakshmi Narayan was absolutely an insane person. But in the instant case 3rd plaintiff is not adjudged as of an unsound person, no medical evidence is placed before this Court to establish she was suffering from any mental ill-health after the death of her husband and further as she herself represented her husband and minor children in the Motor Accidents Claim Petition, she cannot be termed as a person of unsound mind and hence, the said decisions are not applicable to the present case on hand. Therefore, the said contention of mental ill- health of 3rd plaintiff cannot be believed and in such circumstances, she deemed to have known about the suit and E.P. proceedings in view of 35

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. the publications said to have made for service of suit summons and

E.P. notices through substitute service.

25. Another important circumstance is that 4th plaintiff in

O.S.No.265/2005 is the adoptive mother of Suresh Babu. She is not

added as party to the present suit proceedings. Since she is party to the exparte decree in the suit, E.P. proceedings and also a party to the

Sale Certificate, the plaintiff must have joined her as proper and necessary party to the present suit. No single word is mentioned in the entire pleadings of the plaint about said Lakshmiswaramma. It is not the case of the plaintiffs herein that she is no more now. No document is filed by the plaintiffs contending that she was also residing away from

Akunuru Village. If the plaintiffs went to Hyderabad from Akunuru

Village for the treatment of Suresh Babu, his adoptive mother should be residing in Akunuru Village, because she belongs to that village. In such circumstances, she must have knowledge about the suit summons, E.P.

notices, publications made in both the proceedings, including the beat of tom tom before conducting sale of the plaint schedule property. The plaintiffs did not offer any explanation as to why Lakshmiswaramma also had no knowledge about the suit and E.P. proceedings, including the sale of the schedule property, when she was residing in Akunuru

Village from 2005 till 2015.

36

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

26.In view of the foregoing discussion, the plaintiffs failed to substantiate their case that 1st defendant herein having knowledge about their address particulars, intentionally furnished wrong information in the suit in O.S.No.265/2005 and obtained the exparte decree behind the back of the plaintiffs herein and further she brought the property for sale in the public auction and that 1st defendant played act of fraud not only on them but also against the Court. The grounds urged by the plaintiffs that they have no knowledge about the suit and E.P., proceedings can betheconsiderable grounds for setting aside the exparte orders. Therefore, when the plaintiffs failed to probablise their contention by placing any cogent, convincing and reliable evidence, it cannot be said that the 1st defendant played fraud on the Court in obtaining the exparte decree in O.S.No.265/2005. Accordingly, Issue

Nos.1 and 3 are answered against the plaintiffs.

Issue No.2:-

Whether the 2 nd defendant is bona fide purchaser in respect of

the plaint schedule property purchased in Court auction?

27.It is an admitted fact that after obtaining the exparte decree, 1st defendant herein brought the plaint schedule property for sale in the

Court auction, in which 2nd defendant herein became highest bidder.

The sale was conducted on 19.12.2014, the same was confirmed on 37

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. 18.02.2015 and the sale certificate was issued on 16.03.2015, which was registered vide Document No.90/2015 on the file of Sub-Registrar,

Vuyyuru. According to the plaintiffs, the suit was decreed for

Rs.99,850/- and the E.P. was filed for recovery of Rs.1,75,770/- with interest and for costs of Rs.3,431/- as evident from Ex.A4. As per the plaint pleadings the schedule property was brought to sale quoting the value of the property as Rs.2,00,000/-, the Amin of the Court valued the property at Rs.25,00,000/-, upset price was fixed by the Court at

Rs.27,00,000/-. As seen from Ex.A1 the sale was knocked down for a sum of Rs.38,00,000/-. Here, it is the contention of the plaintiffs that the land situated in Akunuru Village is more fertile in the entire erstwhile

Krishna District and it fetches Rs.60,00,000/- per acre and thus, sale of

Ac.0.69 cents was sufficient for realization of the E.P. amount including interest, but the entire property of Ac.3.32 cents was brought to sale and thus, 2nd defendant is not a bona fide purchaser of the plaint schedule property. In this connection it is pertinent to refer the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs in Neti Venkatanarayanamma

Vs. Nune Ramana 4, wherein Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at

Hyderabad, observed as follows:- 41995 (3) ALT 572.

38

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

“5. Order XXI Rule l(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that in a money decree, the payment may be made "out of Court, to the decree-holder by postal money order or through a bank or by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing" and Rule 2(2A) states that "no payment or adjustment shall be recorded at the instance of the judgment-debtor unless-(a) the payment is made in the manner, provided in Rule 1". Thus, applying this principle, in the instant case, it appears that if the judgment debtors had got a receipt in their favour from the advocate of the decree holder in regard to the payment of Rs. 10,000/- it would be worthwhile to put it to actual proof so that it could come to light as to whether actually the alleged amount had been paid or not. But, no opportunity was given to the Judgment Debtors to prove this fact. Secondly, regarding the sale of the mortgaged property, it is worthwhile to note that, before the actual sale, it has got to be decided as to what portion and how much portion of the property was required to be sold so as to satisfy the E.P. amount and, in this connection, it is much relevant to first find out and pin-point as to what the actual E.P. amount is. Since the judgment debtors had raised an objection in this regard concerning the calculation of the interest, then, it was incumbent upon the executing Court, in view of the mandatory provisions laid down under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to reach to a conclusion as to what the actual E.P. amount is, and unless that is done, it cannot be ascertained as to which portion of the mortgaged property would be required to be sold in execution. Be that as it may, it is also curious to note that the executing Court has held that the question whether the entire property is to be put to auction or a portion thereof has to be put to auction could be decided at the time of the sale depending upon the bidders and the feasibility of bifurcation of the schedule property into different portions. I am afraid, prima facie, this is the erroneous approach adopted by the executing Court, obviously because it is incumbent upon the executing Court to dilate on these issues first and men only the property or a portion of the property would be put to sale. The approach of the executing Court is clearly against the provisions of Order XXI Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

In the above referred case despite objection raised by the of J.Dr the executing court without checking of feasibility of bifurcation of the 39

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. schedule property for conducting sale of small extent of the property but the Executing Court conducted sale of entire property for the debt of

Rs.10,000/-, in such circumstances the Hon’ble High Court find fault with the Executing Court for not following the provisions of Order 21 of

CPC. But, in the instant case, it is not the version of the plaintiffs that there was feasibility of bifurcation of the schedule property and inspite of bringing the said fact before the Executing Court, entire property was sold in the auction. Perusal of the schedule property, through it is in an extent of Ac.3.32 cents, but it is consisting of one item. Even if the contention of the plaintiffs is taken into consideration that whole property was sold for a meagre debt, it is within the purview of the Executing court to check the feasibility of bifurcation of the property, but it does not amount to fraud on the part of the 1st defendant herein.

28.Until the contrary is proved by the party who pleads otherwise, the Court proceedings, more particularly in E.P. proceedings the Executing Court is presumed to follow each and every steps in accordance with law. No contra evidence is produced by the plaintiffs to say that all the relevant steps as per law were not followed in bringing the schedule property for sale. In this context, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that it is mandatory for personal service of Order 21, Rule 54 CPC attachment notice on the plaintiffs herein and 40

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

Lakshmiswaramma, but no such notice was served and the 1st defendant played fraud in conducting sale of the schedule property.

In this learned counsel for the plaintiffs placed reliance of the

Judgemnt of Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka, Nalinikant s/o Ramdas,

Vs. Ramacharya s/o Narayanacharya Burli (dead) by L.Rs., Hon’ble

Karnataka High Court referred the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satyanarain Bajoria and another Vs. Ramnarain

Tibrewal and another5, which is also relied by the counsel for the plaintiffs, wherein it was held as follows:- “17. Learned Counsel for the decree-holder submitted that these are questions of fact since the High Court dismissed the revision petition in limine this Court should not interfere with the questions of fact. If it was merely a case of questions of fact proved on record, learned Counsel for the decree-holder would have been right. It appears lower appellate court had no knowledge whatsoever of how even notice under Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code was required to be served or the evidence in relation thereto being led in proceedings for setting aside of the sale at the instance of the judgment-debtor. The lower appellate court could not read the order sheet or proceedings purporting to be under Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code while dealing with proceedings under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code and hold that the notices have been served. Lower appellate court again was mixing up the service on judgment-debtor of notice under Order 21 Rule 54 of the Code and of proclamation of sale. The lower appellate court again was ignoring the importance of notice under Order 21 Rule 54 (1-A) and (2) to enable the judgment-debtor to have notice of proceedings for settlement of terms of proclamation under Order 21 rule of the Code. It is true that now it has been specifically clarified by the explanation to Rule 90 of Order 5AIR 1994 Supreme Court 1583.

41

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. 21 of the Code that "the mere absence of, or defect in, attachment of the property sold shall not, itself, be a ground for setting aside a sale under this rule". But if the judgment-debtor is kept totally ignorant of the execution proceedings rights from the date of execution application till sale, it cannot be merely called a mere irregularity in attachment and thus of no consequence. Proceedings under Order 21 Rule 66 of the Code for settlement of terms of proclamation of sale are very material for both the parties, much more for the judgment-debtor as it is well known that the decree- holder always tries to under value the property whereas the judgment-debtor tries to over-value the property. However, provisions are made in the Code in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 66 of Order 21 that the sale proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to both the decree-holder as well as the judgment-debtor and shall state the time and place of sale and other requirements mentioned therein. No notice was given under Order 21 Rule 54 (1-A) of the Code which was mandatory for the court. In any case no notice for settlement of terms of proclamation of sale was served on the judgment-debtor personally as contemplated by Sub-rule (2) of Rule 66 of Order 21 of the Code.”

In the above referred case, the judgment debtor paid almost all the decretal debt, but he fell due a petty amount, for which the DHr., filed E.P., and brought a decimal of property of the JDr., for sale by suppressing all notices and got served notice merely on papers without actual service and he published the notice showing incorrect number of the case and name of the Court to misguide the judgment debtor. But, in the present case on hand, such is not the case of the plaintiffs herein. It is not their case that publication was made with wrong particulars to mislead the plaintiffs herein and at the outset it is their case that 1st defendant herein having knowledge, she intentionally gave 42

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

wrong address particulars. Furthermore, the decision of the Hon’ble

Apex Court in the case of Satyanarain Bajoria (supra) was in connection with an application filed under Order 21, Rule 90 of CPC to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud as the Judgment debtor suffered substantial loss and injury due to the decree holder obtaining ex parte order of sale and he purchased the same for a petty sum. But, in the case on hand, the trial Court and the Executing Court after exhausting all modes, summons and notices were published in the newspaper and despite it the plaintiffs did not choose to even appeal.

In the referred case they filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90

CPC. But, in the present case on hand, the plaintiffs herein without resorting to such recourse filed the suit seeking cancellation of the sale deed. The grounds to file an application to set aside the sale under

Order 21, Rule 90 of CPC, are different from filing suit seeking for cancellation of sale on the ground of fraud. Therefore, the facts in the above decisions are distinguishable from the facts of the case on hand and hence, the said decisions are not going to help the case of the plaintiffs herein.

29.For service of Rule 54 attachment notice, there are other modes of service viz., service of the prohibitory order passed by the

Court by way of affixture on conspicuous place of the property, affixing a 43

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. copy of such order at the conspicuous place of the Court office and by beat of tom tom. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that any one of the modes as mentioned above were not followed by the Executing Court

before conducting sale of the schedule property and no material is

placed by the plaintiffs in support of their contention. Except the above, the plaintiffs are not disputing the proceedings conducted by the

Executing Court. If they found any irregularities in the E.P. proceedings, certainly they should have filed proper application before the Executing

Court seeking their remedies, but they did not do so. They filed the suit seeking cancellation of the sale deed only on the ground of fraud. It is the duty of the Field Assistant to enquire in the vicinity of the property for reporting the actual value of the property to the Court and basing on the report given by the Field Assistant and taking consideration of sale papers, encumbrance certificate and valuation certificate issued by the

SRO concerned the Executing Court will fix the upset price for conducting auction of the E.P. Schedule Property. No contrary evidence is brought on record by the plaintiffs that the Executing Court did not follow such procedure. Even if the plaintiffs found any deviation in conducting the auction proceedings, it amounts to irregularities which can be agitated by the plaintiffs before the Executing Court at appropriate time. The plaintiffs except stating that the value of one acre of the land situated in Akunuru Village was more than Rs.60,00,000/-, 44

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

no valuation certificate issued by the Sub-Registrar concerned for the contemporaneous period is filed. Even in the documents under

Exs.A10 and A11 value of the property per acre is mentioned as

Rs.18,50,000/-. The said transactions took place in the year 2017, but not in the year 2014 when the Court sale was held. Even if the said two documents are taken into consideration, the contention of the plaintiffs that the land per acre was valued about Rs.60,00,000/- at that relevant point of time cannot be sustained. Though P.W.3 in his evidence deposed that Defendants 1 and 2 are closely related to each other, how they are related is not explained by the witness except a bald statement.

No suggestion was given to D.W.1 during her cross-examination about alleged relationship with 2nd defendant. P.W.2 in his evidence deposed that he did not know personally whether there was any relationship between defendants 1 and 2. There is no restriction under law that any relatives to either DHR., or JDR., are not entitled to participate in the

Court auction. When the Court fixed the upset price as Rs.27,00,000/-, the sale was knocked down for Rs.38,00,000/-. If there was any fraud or collusion between the defendants 1 and 2, the sale amount could not have been raised from Rs.27,00,000/- to Rs.38,00,000/-. Thus, the plaintiffs failed to probablise the said contention by placing any cogent and trustworthy evidence. The plaintiffs filed certified copy of Execution

Petition along with docket proceedings in E.P.No.49/2013. Perusal of 45

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. the docket proceedings go to show that on 28.12.2011 it was clearly mentioned that Rule 54 attachment was effected on 3.12.2011, but rule 54(1A) notice to the JDRs., 2 to 5 unserved as they were not residing in the given address and several times Rule 54 (1A) notice was ordered and the same was returned with the very same endorsement by the docket order dt.9.4.2014 after filing steps petition, paper publication was ordered in Day to Day, which was made and filed on 9.6.2014 and thus, the Executing Court held that service of Rule 54 notice was sufficient and JDrs., 2 to 5 were set exparte and ordered for filing of Sale Papers and Encumbrance Certificate. The docket proceedings further show that the Executing Court followed all the procedural steps contemplated for sale of the property under Rules 54, Rule 66 and Rule 64 of Order 21 CPC, hence, the contention of the plaintiffs that 2nd defendant is not a bona fide purchaser of the schedule property in the Court auction has no legs to stand and as the 2nd defendant purchased the property in the

Court auction, she is a bona fide purchaser under law. Hence, Issue

No.2 is also answered against the plaintiffs.

Issue No.4:-

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession of the plaint

schedule property as prayed for?

46

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015, Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026.

30.Since this Court under Issue Nos.1 and 3 gave findings that the plaintiffs failed to establish that 1st defendant played fraud by giving wrong addressparticulars of the plaintiffs herein, the plaintiffs are not entitled for cancellation of the sale deed dt.15.03.2005, consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled for recovery of possession of the schedule property from the defendants, more particularly from 2nd defendant.

Hence, this Issue is also answered against the plaintiffs.

31.In view of the foregoing discussion, since the plaintiffs failed to probablise their case by adducing cogent, convincing and reliable evidence, the suit is liable to be dismissed, in the interest of justice.

ISSUE NO.8:- To what relief?

32.In the result, the suit is dismissed, with costs.

Typed to my dictation by Steno.Gr.I, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court, on this the 21st day of April, 2026.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. District Judge, Gudivada.

Appendix of Evidence

Witnesses examined

For Plaintiffs:

P.W.1Nagamothu Anjani. (Eschewed) P.W.2Nagamothu Venkata Teja.

P.W.3Kakani Srinivasa Rao.

47

XI Addl. District Court, O.S.No.62 of 2015 Gudivada. Dated 21.04.2026. For Defendants:

D.W.1:Kantamaneni Ratnamala.

Documents marked

For Plaintiffs:

Ex.A116.03.2015Certified Copy of Registered sale deed executed in favour of 2nd defendant.

Ex.A2 05.10.2009 Certified Copy of plaint in O.S.No.265/2005 on the file of Junior Civil Judge Court, Gannavaram. Ex.A3 13.07.2005 Certified Copy of returned cover of legal notice issued to N.Suresh in O.S.No.165/2005. Ex.A4 16.06.2011 Certified Copy of Decree and Judgment in

O.S.No.265/2005 on the file of Junior Civil Judge

Court, Gannavaram. Ex.A5 --- Certified Copy of Execution Petition in

E.P.No.49/2013 in O.S.No.265/2005 on the file of

Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Gannavaram and docket orders from 28.12.2011 to 16.3.2015. Ex.A6 15.02.1996 Registration Extract of registered sale deed Doc.No.194/1996 in favour of late N.Suresh. Ex.A7 --- Original Identity Card of plaintiff No.2 issued by KLE Viswanath Kanth Institute of Dental Sciences, Belgaum. Ex.A8 23.07.2012 Original Driving Licence of plaintiff No.1 issued by RTA, Vijayawada. Ex.A9 22.06.2015 Original notarized power of attorney executed by 1st plaintiff in favour of 2nd plaintiff.

Ex.A10 22.12.2017 Certified Copy of registered sale deed Doc.No.70/2018 executed by 1st plaintiff.

Ex.A11 03.11.2017 Certified Copy of registered sale deed Doc.No.11821/2017 executed by 1st plaintiff.

Ex.A12 22.11.2011 Certified Copy of Award passed in O.P.No.786/2006 on the file of I Addl. Chief Judge, Hyderabad.

For Defendants:- Nil

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI A.D.J., GDV.,

1 APKR0E0002372019

IN THE COURT OF XI ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,

KRISHNA DISTRICT AT GUDIVADA

Present: Grandhi Subrahmanyam,

XI Additional District & Sessions Judge

Tuesday, this the 24 th day of March, 2026

SESSIONS CASE No.122/2019

(PRC.No.33/2018 on the file of the Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Gudivada in Crime

No.4/2018 of Gudivada Taluka Police Station)

Prosecution : Sri K.Ravi,

Additional Public Prosecutor

Defence Counsel : Sri M.Rajesh, Advocate for Accused

Name(s) of the Accused : Masimukku Sai Charan, S/o Srinivasa rao, 21 years, D.No.1-1-5, Pamarru Road, Pedakalava Centre, Gudivada.

Charges under section(s) : U/s 436 and 307 of Indian Penal Code.

Plea of the Accused : Pleaded not guilty

Finding of the Court : Found not guilty

Result of the case : In the result, the Accused is found not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 436 and 307 of IPC and accordingly he is acquitted of the said charges under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C. The bail bonds of the Accused shall be in force for a period of six months under Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., 2

Order relating to case property:

M.Os.1 and 2 and the un-marked non-valuable case property, if any, shall be destroyed, after expiry of appeal time.

The above numbered Sessions Case came on 12.03.2026 before me for final hearing in the presence of Sri K.Ravi, Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State/Complainant and of Sri K.Rajesh, Advocate for the Accused, upon hearing both sides, perusing the material papers on record and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, the Court delivered the following:-

J U D G M E N T

The State represented by the Sub-Inspector of Police,

Gudivada Taluka Police Station filed Charge Sheet against the accused in Crime No.4/2018 of said Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 436 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (for brevity, ‘IPC’).

2. The brief contents of the charge sheet are as follows:-

L.W.1/Gunti Seetaravamma performed the marriage of her younger daughter/L.W.2-Burugula Mariyamma with L.W.3/Burugula

Elisha, who was a resident of Kaikaluru. L.W.2 came down to her house for delivery and in the month of December, 2017 she gave birth to a male child.

The accused and the child in conflict with law are own brothers. Both of them bagged bad reputation for their mischievous and heinous acts of violence and disturbing the local people with their high handed and aggressive behavior.

3

On 04.01.2018 L.W.3 came to his in-laws house, took his wife to the hospital for regular medical checkup and in their return journey at about 7.30 p.m., when they reached Pedakaluva Culvert, the accused and his brother misbehaved with the couple and L.W.3 who doesn’t know about the attitude of the accused raised objection and questioned them, for which they grew wild, pounced upon him, abused and threatened him with dire consequences and at that time L.W.2 took her husband tactfully and subsided the clash. Since then, the accused and his younger brother bore grudge against L.W.3 and his family and knowingly and intentionally on the early hours of 07.01.2018 at about 2.30 a.m, with intent to do away the life of L.W.3 and his family members, took petrol along with them, poured the same on the hut and set fire. Fortunately, L.Ws.1 to 3 having sensed the burns and noise woke up, rushed out, noticed the accused and their offence and attempted to catch them, but they managed themselves to escape from the spot by leaving the petrol bottle at the scene of offence. L.Ws.4 to 7/Katragadda Veera Raghavaiah, Neppalli

Venkateswara Rao, Vaarala Pakeeramma and Seethala Veera Venkata

Sai Kumar respectively rushed thee and extinguished the flames and prevented the damage.

On 07.01.2018 at 12.30 p.m., L.W.1 turned up to the Police

Station and presented her report. Base on the report of L.W.10/

M.V.K.Shanmukha Sai, Sub-Inspector of Police, Gudivada Taluka Police 4

Station registered a case in Cr.No.4/2018 u/s 436 and 307 of IPC and took up investigation. He inspected the scene of offence in the presence of the mediators L.W.8/Mudukoti Lakshmeeswara Rao, VRO and

L.W.9/Vangalapati Manikyala Rao, VRA, seized petrol bottle left by the accused at the scene of offence, burnt ash under the cover of an observation report, examined the witnesses and recorded their statements u/s 161 (3) of Cr.P.C. On 27.01.2018 at 12.30 p.m., he arrested the accused and produced him before the learned Addl. Judicial

Magistrate of I Class, Gudivada and arrested the child in conflict with law

on 29.01.2018 and produced him before the learned II Addl. Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada for judicial remand. Thus, the accused set fire to the hut of L.W.1 and attempted on the lives of L.Ws.1 to 3 and thereby committed the offences punishable u/s 436 and 307 of

IPC. Hence the charge-sheet.

3.On appearance of the accused before the Court, he was furnished with copies of documents relied by the prosecution in compliance of Section 208 of Cr.P.C. Having heard the Addl. Public

Prosecutor for the prosecution and the counsel for the accused, the accused was examined u/Sec.228 Cr.P.C., and charges under Sections 436 and 307 of IPC were framed him, read-over and explained the contents of the charges to him in Telugu, for which he denied the same and claimed the case to be tried.

5

4. On behalf of the prosecution, P.W.1 to P.W.9 were examined and marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P5 and M.O.1 and 2. Exs.D1 and D2 were marked on behalf of the defence. The Addl. P.P, has given up evidence of the evidence of L.W.9/Vangalapati Manikyala Rao, VRA, Mallayapalem

Village and L.W.11/P.Lova Raju, Sub-Inspector of Police, Gudivada

Taluka Police Station. The prosecution evidence was closed.

5. On closure of prosecution side evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., for which he stated that there was political rivalry between one Govada Chanti and his senior paternal uncle and due to that rivalry said Chanti got foisted this false case against him and that he did not commit any offence and that he has no defence witnesses.

6. Having heard learned Addl. Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the accused, the points that arises for determination are as follows:-

1. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that on 07.01.2018 at about 2.30 a.m., the accused set fire to the hut of P.W.1/Gunti Seetavaramma situated on the northern side bund of Pedakaluva of Lakshminagar Colony, H/o Mallayapalem Village, Gudivada Mandal by pouring petrol with an intention to cause damage to the house and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 436 of IPC? 2 . Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that on 07.01.2018 at about 2.30 a.m., the accused set fire to the hut of P.W.1/Gunti Seetavaramma situated on the northern side bund of Pedakaluva of Lakshminagar 6

Colony, H/o Mallayapalem Village, Gudivada Mandal by pouring petrol with an intention to commit murder of P.Ws.1 to 3 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC?

7. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor argued that the evidence lead by the prosecution proved the offences charged against the accused and prayed to convict him of the said charges, the Court may proceed as per the material available on record.

8.The Defence Counsel argued that, the accused persons did not commit any offence and they are no way concerned with the alleged offence, there were political disputes between the senior paternal uncle of the accused and one Govada Chanti and as said Govada Chanti and one

Mutta Satyanaryana helped the defacto complainant party in the rape case lodged by the niece of P.W.1/Yesumani against the son/brother of

P.W.1, she foisted a false case against the accused at the instance of said two persons and thus, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused and prayed for acquittal. In support of his arguments, he relied on the following case-law:-

a) Prabhatbhai Aatabhai Dabhi v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2023) 14 SCC 228.

b) Balaram vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2023

Livelaw (SC) 980.

.

7

POINT No.1 & 2:

9. The case of the prosecution is that the accused and his brother by name Ajay Kumar (CCL) are having bad reputation in the vicinity as they were indulging in mischievour, heinous, high handed, aggressive and violent activities causing disturbance to the local people.

P.W.1 is the mother of P.W.2 and P.W.3 is the husband of P.W.2. On 04.01.2018 at about 7.30 p.m., while P.Ws.2 and 3 were returning to their house in an auto, at Anjaneya Swamy Temple, Pedda Kaluva Centre, the accused stopped P.Ws.2 and 3, abused them in filthy language, warned not to raise their heads in front of them and threatened them that they will see their end. On that, when P.W.3 tried to question their high handed acts, P.W.2 took him to the house of P.W.1, where they intimated the same to P.W.1 and their neighbours, who advised them not to dispute with the accused as they are having bad character. Then, on the intervening night of 06/07.01.2018 at about 2.30 a.m., the accused and his brother set fire to the hut/house of P.W.1 by pouring petrol with an intention to do away the lives of P.Ws.2 and 3 and on hearing the sounds and burning smell, P.Ws.1 to 3 came out of their house, noticed the accused litting their house by pouring petrol, they raised hue and cries, on hearing the same the neighbours came there and put of the flames and on seeing the neighbours the accused fled away from the scene of offence by leaving the water bottle in which they brought petrol. On the 8 next day i.e., on 7.1.2018 P.W.1 reported the matter to the police, on that

FIR was registered and investigation was taken up.

10.This Court has perused the material available on record, verified the depositions of the witnesses, exhibits marked on behalf of the prosecution and has given thoughtful consideration to the matter.

In this case, the prosecution examined the defacto- complainant. In her chief examination she deposed that on 04.01.2018 while P.Ws.2 and 3 were returning to their house from hospital,. At

Anjaneya Swamy Temple, Peddakaluva Centre, the accused along with one child in conflict with law stopped them, warned them that they should bend their heads before them, abused and threatened that they will see the end of P.Ws.2 and 3 and beat them, then P.Ws.2 and 3 returned back to their house without any altercation, she informed the said incident to the neighbours, who informed her that the accused are not good persons and they used to misbehave with local residents. Later, on 06.01.2018 at about 2.00 a.m., she heard some sounds beside their house, they came out from the house and saw that the accused and the child in conflict with law lit fire to their house, at that time P.W.2 was also present in the house, when they tried to caught hold of them, the accused skulk away from the scene, neighbours gathered and extinguished the fire, the accused with an intention to kill them, lit fire to their house and that with the help of neighbours she prepared Ex.P1 report and reported to the 9 police. She further deposed that on the date of the incident the accused brought in one Kinley water bottle and she identified the said water bottle as in M.O.1.

11.Daughter of the defacto-complainant deposed as P.W.2 that on 01.04.2018 at about 7.30 p.m., while herself and her husband/P.W.3 were returning from hospital, at Anjaneya Swamy Temple, Peddakaluva

Centre, the accused and one Ajay Kumar (CCL) stopped them, warned that they should bend their heads before them, abused in filthy language and threatened them, then herself and her husband proceeded to the house of her mother and informed the same to P.W.1, P.Ws.4 and P.W.6 and in turn P.w.4 informed them that not to dispute with the accused as they are not good persons. She further deposed that on the intervening night of 06.01.2018/07.01.2018 at about 2.30 a.m., she heard some sounds, on that she came out from the house and saw that the accused and Ajay Kumar (CCL) lit fire to their house from southern side, on that they raised hue and cries, hearing which neighbours gathered and on seeing them the accused and Ajay (CCL) skulk away by leaving a petrol bottle, the neighbours gathered and extinguished the fire by pouring water, the accused with an intention to kill them lit fire to their house and that with the help of neighbours P.W.1 reported the matter to the police and that she was examined by the police.

10

12.Son-in-law of the defacto-complainant is examined as P.W.3 and deposed that on 04.01.2018 at about 7.30 p.m., when himself and his wife/P.W.2 were returning from hospital, at Anjaneya Swamy Temple,

Pedda Kaluva Centre, the accused and Ajay Kumar (CCL) stopped them, abused them in filthy and vulgar language and humiliated them, when he tried to question about their attitude, they warned that they should bend their heads before them and threatened them with dire consequences and they will see their end, then P.W.2 took him to the house of P.W.1 and they informed the same to P.W.1 and then P.W.1 and the neighbours stated that the accused were in the habit of abusing the people and not to dispute with them as they are not good persons. He further deposed that on the intervening night of 06.01.2018/07.01.2018 at about 2.00 to 2.30 a.m., the accused and Ajay Kumar (CCL) poured petrol and lit fire to the house of P.W.1 from southern side and due to fire her house was burnt, on hearing the sounds he came out from the house and when tried to caught hold the accused, they fled away, then the neighbours gathered at the scene of offence and extinguished the fire, the accused with an intention to kill them, lit fire to the house and that with the help of neighbours P.W.1 reported the matter to the police and he was examined by the police.

13. Neighbour to the house of the defacto-complainant is examined as P.w.4 and deposed that on 04.01.2018 while P.Ws.2 and 3 11 were returning from the hospital, at Anjaneya Swamy Temple the accused and his brother, who used to tease the by passers and comment the female persons, stopped them, quarreled with them stating that they should bend their heads before them and then P.W.2 took

P.W.3 to the house of P.W.1 and informed the same to them, on that he informed that the accused are in the habit of teasing the people and not to make galata with them. He further deposed that on 06.01.2018 at 2.00 to 2.30 a.m., the accused came to the house of P.W.1 and lit fire toher house by pouring petrol, on hearing the sounds they came out and noticed that the house of P.W.1 was burning with flames, then all of them gathered at the scene and extinguished the flames, on enquiry they came to know that the accused and his brother with an intention to kill P.Ws.2 and 3 they lit fire to the house of P.W.1 and that he was examined by the police.

14.Another neighbor is examined as P.W.5 and deposed that on 04.01.2018 while P.Ws.2 and 3 were returning from the hospital, at

Anjaneya Swsamy Temple, Pedda Kaluva Centre, the accused and his brother beat P.Ws.2 and 3. He also deposed that on the intervening night of 06.01.2018/07.01.2018 in the mid night at about 2.30 a.m., he heard some sounds, on that he came out from his house and noticed that the accused and his brother fled away by litting fire to the house of P.W.1, on 12 the date of his evidence also, the accused threatened P.W.2 outside the

Court and that he was examined by the police.

15. One another neighbor is examined as P.W.6 and deposed that on the intervening night of 06.01.2018/07.01.2018 in the mid night at about 2.30 a.m., he heard some sounds, on that he came out of the house and noticed that the house of P.W.1 was burning with flames and they all together extinguished the flames, on their enquiry P.W.1 informed them that two persons came and lit fire to their house, though they tried to caught hold of them, but they fled away and P.W.1 also informed them about the incident took place on 4.1.2018, P .W.2 informed the said incident to P.W.1 and themselves, on that they informed that not to dispute with the accused as they are not good persons and that they suspected that the accused might have borne grudge against P.Ws.2 and 3 and in order to kill them, they lit fire to the house of PW.1 and that he was examined by the police.

16. Another neighour is examined as P.W.7 and he deposed that the accused and his brother were in the habit to tease the by passers on the road, on 04.01.2018 at Pedda Kaluva Centre, Lakshminagar Colony,

Gudivada at about 7.30 p.m., while P.Ws.2 and 3 were returning from the hospital, the accused and his brother made galata with P.W.3, on that

P.W.2 brought P.W.3 to the house of P.W.1, informed the same to P.W.1 and the neighbours, on that they advised not to dispute with the accused 13 as they are not good persons. He further deposed that on the intervening night of 06.01.2018/07.01.2018 in the mid night at about 2.30 p.m., they heard some cries and they came out of the house, noticed the house of

PW.1 was burning with flames and they all extinguished the fire and on enquiry PW.1 informed that the accused and his brother came and lit fire to their house to kill them and that they were unable to caught hold of them and that he was examined by the police.

17. The then Village Revenue Officer of Mallayapalem Village,

Gudivada Mandal as P.W.8 deposed that on 07.01.2018 on the request of

SHO, Gudivada Taluk P.S., on the instructions of M.R.O., himself and

VRA/L.W.9 accompanied the police to Lakshminagar Colony, Gudivada, they observed the scene of offence, noticed the house of PW.1 was burnt on one side, prepared Ex.P2 scene observation report and at that time he seized ash and one bottle containing petrol, he identified the ash/M.O.2 and Kinley water bottle with petrol, police affixed identity slips containing their signatures and the police, police took photographs of the scene of offence as in Ex.P3 (5 number along with CD).

18.As seen from the evidence on record, there was no previous rivalry between the accused and the defacto complainant party.

According to P.Ws.1 to 3, the motive for the alleged incident of setting fire to the house of P.W.1, is the incident alleged to have taken place on 04.01.2018 at 7.30 p.m. P.Ws.1 to 3 are mother, daughter and son-in-law 14 and P.Ws.4 to 7 are the neighbours to their house, P.W.8 is the VRO who acted as one of the mediators along with another and P.W.9 is the investigation officer. Perusal of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses goes to show that P.Ws.2, 3 and 4 are the direct witnesses to the incident took place on 04.01.2018 at 7.30 p.m., and P.Ws.1 to 3 and

P.W.5 are the eye-witnesses to the incident on the intervening night of 06/07.01.2018 at 2.30 a.m. The other witnesses are the persons who came to know about the said two incidents from P.W.2 and P.W.1 respectively.

19. Before going to answer the points framed for determination, it is appropriate to refer the charges u/s 436 and 307 of

IPC, for ready reference:-

436. Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy house, etc.—Whoever commits mischief by fire or any explosive substance, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, the destruction of any building which is ordinarily used as a place of worship or as a human dwelling or as a place for the custody of property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

In Shanid T. v. State, 2012 1 , Hon’ble High Court of Kerala setout the following ingredients in order to attract Section 436 of the Indian

Penal Code, which ae as follows:-

i) There must be commission of mischief by fire or any explosive substance.

12011 SCC OnLine Ker 3795 15 ii) It should have been committed intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that the accused will thereby cause the destruction of any building.

iii) The building should be one which is ordinarily used as a place of worship or as a human dwelling or as a place for custody of property.

307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

In order to prove the offence u/s 307 of IPC, the following ingredients are necessary:- (1) The accused did an act. (2) The said act was done— (a) with the intention of causing death, or (b) with the intention of,— (i) causing such bodily injury as the accused knew to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm was attempted to be caused, or (ii) causing bodily injury to a person and the bodily injury intended to be caused would have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or (iii) the act, if committed, would have been so imminently dangerous that it would have in all probability caused death and the act was attempted without any justification for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

20.According to the version of the prosecution, the motive for the accused to set fire to the house of P.W.1 on the night of 6/7.1.2018 is the incident alleged to have taken place on 4.1.2018 at Anjaneya Swamy

Temple, Pedda Kaluva Centre, Gudivada. In this connection, P.Ws.2 16 and 3 deposed that while they were returning from the hospital, the accused stopped them, warned them by saying that they should bend their heads before them, abused them in filthy language and threatened them with dire consequences. P.W.3 in his cross-examination deposed that on 4.1.2018 they were returning from the hospital to the house of

P.W.1 in an auto. The said auto driver is the best person to speak about the said incident, but he was neither cited nor examined by the prosecution. P.W.5 is the person who is alleged to have witnessed when the accused abused P.Ws.2 and 3 on the above mentioned date. P.W.5 in his evidence deposed that the accused and his brother beat P.Ws.2 and 3, which is not the version of P.Ws.2 and 3. Thus, it appears that

P.W.5 exaggerated the version of the prosecution and deposed in the above lines to help the prosecution party. In his cross-examination P.W.5 deposed that he did not remember the exact day of the week on 04.01.2018, but on that day he was on weekly off. He was working as

APSRTC Conductor. To say that he was present near Anjaneya Swamy

Temple, except the oral evidence of P.W.5, no document issued by the authority concerned of APSRTC is produced by the prosecution. When the accused specifically taken a plea that he was on duty on that particular day, it is for the prosecution to produce relevant evidence to prove that he was not on duty and he was present at the said scene of offence. When P.W.5 failed to say the day of the week on 4.1.2018, how 17 he could depose that he was on weekly off is not explained by him. In his further cross-examination he deposed that as on 4.1.2018 P.W.2 was pregnant. But, according to the case of the prosecution as evident from

Ex.P1, P.W.2 already gave birth to a baby boy in the month of December, 2017 itself. P.W.5 further deposed that he stated before police that he came to know about the incident dt.4.1.2018 through P.W.1. P.W.7 in his cross-examination admitted that P.W.5 did not have any own house at

Lakshminagar Colony, Gudivada. P.W.2 in her cross-examination admitted that she did not state before the police that on 4.1.2018 she informed the same to P.Ws.4 and 6. Thus, in view of the above discrepancies in the evidence of P.W.5, his evidence appears to be unbelievable that he was an eye-witness to the said incident, consequently there is no independent corroboration to the evidence of

P.Ws.2 and 3 to prove the alleged incident dt.4.1.2018.

21.The evidence on record discloses that there was no previous enmity between the accused and the prosecution party. When there was no previous enmity between the prosecution party and the accused, what was the necessity for him to stop, abuse and threaten P.Ws.2 and 3 with dire consequences is not forthcoming from the evidence on record.

Though, the prosecution alleged that the accused is having bad character and he along with his younger brother used tease and causing disturbance to the by passers, but the prosecution witnesses, including 18 the investigation officer deposed that as on the date of FIR in the present case, there were no cases registered against the accused. Therefore, the prosecution failed to establish the bad character alleged against the accused. At this stage, it is pertinent to note Sections 53 and 54 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872. As per Section 53, in criminal proceedings, the fact that the person accused is of a good character, is relevant.

Perhaps as per section 54 of the Indian Evidence Act, evidence pertaining to the fact that the accused has a bad character is not relevant in criminal cases. The prosecution cannot present evidence of the accused's bad character. However, an exception has been carved by the law that when an accused has submitted any evidence of his good character in such a case to rebut, the prosecution can present evidence pertaining to the bad character of the accused. Also, as per Explanation 2 to Section 54 of Indian Evidence Act, a previous conviction is relevant as evidence of bad character. But, as stated supra, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence of previous conviction with regard to the accused persons and if any such evidence is adduced, that cannot be taken into consideration, because in the present case the accused herein did not adduce any evidence which is relevant under Section 53 of Indian

Evidence Act.

22.Regarding the incident of mischief is concerned, as per the prosecution P.Ws.1 to 3 and 5 are the eye-witnesses to the incident. All 19 of them deposed that on the intervening night of 06/07.01.2018 at about 2.30 a.m., they heard some sound, on hearing the same they came out of their respective houses and saw that the accused lit fire to the hut of the

P.W.1 by pouring petrol brought by them and when they tried to caught hold of them, they ran away from the scene of offence. In this connection, P.W.1 deposed that she heard some sounds from beside of their house, on that they came out and saw the accused and Ajay Kumar litting fire to their house. In her cross-examination she deposed that when they were coming out of the house, half of their house was burnt.

She admitted that herself or the neighbours not called the Fire Service on the date of the incident. She cannot say on the date of the incident whether there was any fog present or not. If half of the hut was burnt as deposed by P.W.1, certainly there must be heavy fog and either P.W.1 or the neighbouring house owners must have called the Fire Service to put- off the flames. But no such attempt was made by any one of them.

Further, the photographs under Ex.P3 show that a small portion of the house at one corner appears to have been damaged due to fire. P.W.6 in his evidence deposed that on enquiry P.W.1 informed him that two persons came and lit fire to their house and that they were suspecting that the accused might have borne grudge against P.Ws.2 and 3 and in order to kill them, they lit fire to the house of P.W.1. The above evidence of P.W.6, destroyed the version of P.W.1 that she witnessed the accused 20 litting fire to her house by pouring petrol. Furthermore, when the incident took place in the night at about 2.30 a.m., but she gave Ex.P1 report to the Police on 7.1.2018 at 12.30 p.m., There was delay of 10 hours in giving the report to the police. In Column No.8 of Ex.P4/FIR the said delay was not explained and moreover it was mentioned as ‘no delay’.

P.W.1 in her cross-examination deposed that Ex.P1 report got scribed by one of her neighbour in the afternoon hours, but she did not remember the name of the scribe who prepared it.

23.Perusal of the FIR as in Ex.P4 goes to show that when the

FIR was registered on 7.1.2018 at 12.30 p.m., it reached the jurisdictional

Magistrate concerned on 8.1.2018 at 12.45 p.m., thus, there is further

delay of 24 hours in reaching the FIR to the Court concerned, which is at a walkable distance to the Police Station. The said delays are certainly fatal to the case of the prosecution about its genuineness. Thus, there are some discrepancies in the evidence of P.W.1. In this context it is appropriate to refer the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dilawar

Singh v. State of Delhi2, inter alia, held as follows:- “9. In criminal trial one of the cardinal principles for the court is to look for plausible explanation for the delay in lodging the report.

Delay sometimes afford opportunity to the complainant to make deliberation upon the complaint and to make embellishment or even make fabrications. Delay defeats the chance of the unsoiled and untarnished version of the case to be presented before the court at 2AIR 2007 SC 3234 21 the earliest instance. That is why if there is delay in either coming

before the police or before the court, the courts always view the

allegations with suspicion and look for satisfactory explanation. If no such satisfaction is formed, the delay is treated as fatal to the prosecution case.”

In the present case on hand also P.W.1 did not give any explanation for the said delay of 10 hours in lodging the FIR. Similarly, the police concerned also did not submit any explanation for the delay of 24 hours in reaching the FIR to the Court, which is very near to the Police

Station. Therefore, the said delay gives rise to a suspicion around the

FIR under Ex.P4.

24.P.W.2 in her chief-examination deposed that on hearing the sounds she came out of the house and saw the accused litting fire to their house from southern side. In her cross-examination she deposed that she saw the accused from inside the house and when she was coming out of the house, the accused ran away. In this connection, P.W.1 deposed that P.W.2 was also present in the house. Hence, the evidence of P.W.2 that she saw the accused persons on the date of offence is surrounded with suspicion.

25. P.W.3 in his evidence deposed that on hearing the sounds, he came out from the house and when they tried to catch hold of the accused, they fled away. In his cross-examination deposed that when he came out of the house, he saw the accused present in a small lane. One 22 contradiction is marked by the defence in the evidence of P.W.3 as in

Ex.D2 to the effect that on the next day i.e., on 6.1.2018 morning while he was coming out, the accused and his brother were sat there, they saw him but they did not say anything to him. P.W.5 in his evidence deposed that on hearing some sound he came out from the house and noticed the accused and his brother fled away by litting fire to the house of P.W.1.

But, as stated supra, P.W.5 failed to adduce any evidence to show that he was present at the time of the incident in both the scenes of offences and that he was not on duty. So, the presence of P.W.5 at the scenes of offences is viewed with suspicion. In this context it is relevant to refer the decision cited by the learned counsel for the accused in the case of

Balaram (supra,), wherein Hon’ble Apex Court, inter alia, held as follows:- “If the witness is wholly reliable, there is no difficulty inasmuch as relying on even the solitary testimony of such a witness conviction could be based. Again, there is no difficulty in the case of wholly unreliable witnesses inasmuch as his/her testimony is to be totally discarded. It is only in the case of the third category of witnesses which is partly reliable and partly unreliable that the Court faces the difficulty. The Court is required to separate the chaff from the grain to find out the true genesis of the incident.”

As held in the above decision, in the present case on hand also the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is not free from doubt and 23 their evidence is not wholly reliable and there are some doubtful circumstances in their evicence.

26. P.W.1 in her evidence deposed that they found M.O.1/bottle beside their house on the date of incident and the accused left the scene of offence by leaving the same and police seized M.O.1. She denied the suggestion that the manufacturing date of said bottle is 11.4.2018 but the incident occurred on 4.1.2018. P.W.8 deposed that at the scene he seized ash/M.O.2 and one bottle containing petrol. Both these witnesses identified M.O.1 bottle. Police affixed identity slips duly containing the signatures of the mediators and the police. In his cross-examination

P.W.8 deposed that one unknown person drafted Ex.P2/scene observation report, he admitted that at present there is no identity slip affixed to M.O.1, he further admitted that on M.O.1/bottle neck the date of manufacturing was mentioned as 11.04.2018, he volunteered it may be expiry date, in Ex.P2 it is not mentioned anywhere that one tree was also burnt or any household articles of P.W.1 were burnt. P.W.9 deposed that he seized M.Os.1 and 2 under the cover of scene observation report/Ex.P2 from the scene and he affixed identity slips containing their signatures. In his cross-examination he deposed that they noticed M.O.1 at the scene of offence and seized. He admitted that M.O.1 is not visible in Ex.P3 photographs, M.O.1 does not contain any identity slips, on

M.O.1 bottle neck the date is mentioned as 11.04.2018 and it is also 24 mentioned on it date of manufacture, batch number, MRP and best before 12 months from the manufacturing date, he volunteered it may be expiry date. According to his evidence, when the bottle contain a description indicating ‘best before 12 months from the date of manufacture’ certainly, the said date ‘11.04.2018’ must be the date of manufacturing but not the date of expiry as deposed by P.Ws.8 and 9. Further, Ex.P2 does not contain any particulars of the bottle alleged to have been seized from the scene of offence. On perusal of M.O.1/bottle, it is a one liter Kinley water bottle containing some petrol. On the label affixed to the said water bottle, among other details, the relevant particulars with regard to date of manufacturing and expiry dateare mentioned as follows:-

“Best before twelve months from manufacture”

FOR DATE OF MANUFACTURE, BATCH NO. & M.R.P. (INCL. OF ALL TAXES): SEE

CAP/NECK

On the neck of the bottle, it is mentioned as follows:-

11/04/18 04.28

BN D10KBE11 Rs19/-

The evidence of P.Ws.8 and 9 that M.O.1 bottle contained the date 11.04.2018, when the offence took place on 06/07.01.2018, it clearly appears that M.O.1 is planted by the prosecution, as the same is not visible in Ex.P3 photographs, which is fatal to the case of the prosecution.

Further, the ash under M.O.2 was not sent for FSL to find out whether it was the burnt ash of the house of P.W.1 or any other burnt ash. In the 25 case of mischief, chemical examination of the ash is necessary to find out the residues of accelerants used to initiate the fire. But, the prosecution, for the reasons best known to them, failed to send the ash to the FSL to prove their version that the accused set fire to the hut of P.W.1 by pouring petrol. In this connection, the learned counsel for the accused relied on the case-law in the case of Prabhatbhai Aatabhai Dabhi (supra), wherein Hon’ble Apex Court, inter alia, held as follows:- “ 9. The other circumstance against the appellant is that clothes on his person were stained with blood. However, we find from the

Serology Report on record that the clothes on the person of the deceased were having blood stains of ‘O’ group. Three clothes recovered from the appellant were having blood stains. As regards the trouser of the appellant, the opinion was inconclusive. But as regards the other two items of clothes, it was found that the blood was of ‘A’ group. This militates against the case of the prosecution that the blood stains on the clothes of the appellant were of the blood of the deceased. The recovery of the axe at the instance of the appellant is of no relevance, as according to PW-2 and PW-3, the appellant was carrying a stick.”

In the present case on hand, the recovery of M.O.1 is highly doubtful and the prosecution failed to send the ash for chemical examination, therefore, the prosecution failed to prove the material objects connecting to the present case on hand.

27. According to the prosecution, the accused bore grudge against P.Ws.1 to 3 after the altercation took place on 4.1.2018 and in 26 order to do away with their lives, they set fire to the thatched hut of P.W.1 in the mid night of 06/07.01.2018. As mentioned supra, P.Ws.2 to 4 are said to be the witnesses to the above incident. In this context, when the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is perused, P.W.2 deposed that the accused and his brother (CCL) stopped them, warned that they should bend their heads before them and abused in filthy language and threatened them and then herself and P.W.3 proceeded to her mother’s house. The said evidence is corroborated by P.W.3 and he further deposed that when he tried to question about their attitude, P.W.2 took him to the house of P.W.1. As per the evidence of prosecution witnesses there was no enmity between the accused and themselves. On the date of said incident on 4.1.2018 the accused stopped P.Ws.2 and 3, warned them, abused them and threatened them in filthy language, but there was no retaliation from either P.W.2 or P.W.3 and they just went away to the house of P.W.1. In such circumstances, what was the necessity for the accused to develop grudge against P.Ws.1 to 3 and lit fire to their house is not satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. Further, as per the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, P.W.1 was not present along with P.Ws.2 and 3 on 4.1.2018 at the time of the said incident and she was at her house.

When such is the situation, why the accused developed grudge against

P.W.1, is also not explained by the prosecution with convincing reasons.

27

28.As per the evidence of P.W.1 there were five persons in her house at the time of the incident and according to her they also allegedly saw the accused, but the prosecution failed to cite the two other persons of the house in the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet and failed to examine them. P.Ws.1 to 3 did not depose that any household articles were burnt in the mischief committed by the accused.

29. The prosecution cited one Neppalli Venkateswara Rao as one of the neighbor and alleged to have witnessed the flames to the house of P.W.1 and he was one of the persons who put-off the flames.

He was examined as P.W.6. In his evidence he deposed his name as

N.Venkatesh. According to his evidence his surname is ‘Nepparthi’. In his cross-examination he deposed that he had gone through the contents of his statement at the time of his examination, but he did not know whether his name was mentioned as Neppalli Venkateswara Rao in his statement or not. In this connection the prosecution filed a Memo requesting to consider the name of P.W.6 as Neparthi Venkatesh instead of Neppalli Venkateswara Rao. Except the said Memo, no evidence is produced by the prosecution to prove that Neparthi Venkatesh and

Neppalli Venkateswara Rao are one and the same persons. The defence counsel submitted that the prosecution examined an unknown person instead of the real witness. Since the accused contended that Venkatesh and Venkateswara Rao are not one and the same persons and different 28 persons, the burden is on the prosecution to establish that both are same person, but the prosecution failed to answer the said contention of the defence by exhibiting any convincing evidence.

30. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B.3 the Hon’ble Apex

Court held:

"28. It is also a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused."

31. Having regard to the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs and on careful scrutiny of the evidence of the prosecution, the Court is of the considered view that, the evidence of prosecution is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused and on the other hand the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt for the offences charged against him and this Court is impelled to pass an order of acquittal against the accused by giving benefit of doubt.

Accordingly, these points are answered.

32.In the result, the Accused is found not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 436 and 307 of IPC and accordingly, he is acquitted of the said charges under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C. The bail bonds of the Accused shall be in force for a period of six months under

Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., 3(2003) 12 SCC 377 29

Order relating to case property:

M.Os.1 and 2 and the un-marked non-valuable case property, if any, shall be destroyed, after expiry of appeal time.

Typed to my dictation by Stenographer Gr.I of this Court, corrected and

pronounced by me in the open Court, on this the 24 th day of March, 2026.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. Sessions Judge,

Krishna, Gudivada.

Form C

(Rule 67(3) of Criminal Rules of Practice

LIST OF PROSECUTION/DEFENCE/COURT WITNESSES

A. Prosecution:

RANK NAME NATURE OF EVIDENCE

P.W.1 G.Seetharavamma Defacto complainant P.W.2 B.Mariyamma Daughter of defacto complainant P.W.3 B.Elisha Son-in-law of defacto complainant P.W.4 V.Pakeeramma Neibhbour of defacto complainant P.W.5 K.Veera Raghavaiah Neighbour of defacto complainant P.W.6 N.Venkatesh Neighbour of defacto complainant P.W.7 S.V.V.Sai Kumar Neighbour of defacto complainant P.W.8 M.Lakshmi Narasimha Rao VRO, mediator scene observation report P.W.9 M.V.K.Shanmukha Sai Investigating Officer

B. Defence Witnesses, if any:

RANK NAME NATURE OF

EVIDENCE

1. Nil.

C. Court Witnesses, if any:

RANK NAME NATURE OF

EVIDENCE

1. Nil.

30

LIST OF PROSECUTION/DEFENCE/COURT EXHIBITS

(Rule 67(3)

A. Prosecution Exhibits:

Sl.No Exhibit Number Description 1 Ex.P1 Report given by P.W.1, dt.7.1.2018. 2 Ex.P2 Scene observation report dt.7.1.2018 3 Ex.P3 Photographs (5 in number) along with CD 4 Ex.P4 FIR in Cr.No.4/2018 u/s 436 and 307 of IPC of Gudivada Taluka P.S., dt.7.1.2018. 5 Ex.P5 Rough sketch of scene of offence, dt.7.1.2018.

B. Defence Exhibits:

Sl.No Exhibit Description Number

1. Ex.D1 Underlined portion of Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement of P.W.1 = “మసిముక్కుఖడ్గఅజయ్క్కమార్మసిముక్కుసాయిచరణ్ఇద్దరూమాఅమాా యి, అల్లుడినివెకిలిగాహేళనగామాట్లు డ్గావారిగురిించితెలియనిమాఅల్లుడు కలిప ించుకోగావారిద్దరూమాఅల్లుడినిఏరానాకొడ్కామాగురిించితెలియదామేము ఇకు డ్ఉింటేఎవరైనాతలదించుకొనివెళ్లు లిమమా లిిఎదరిస్తేనిన్నినీభారయ ని చింపేసాే ముఎవరినివదలిపెట్టింబ్రతకనివవ ింఅింటూబెదరిించినారనిమా అమాా యిమాఅల్లుడినివాళుతోగొడ్వపడ్వద్దనిలాక్కు నివచిి నట్లుగానాతో చెప్పప నారు”

2. Ex.D2 Underlined portion of Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statement of P.W.3 - “మరుసటిరోజుద 6.1.2018 వతేదఉద్యింనేన్నరయట్కివెళ్లువస్ేిండ్గా మసిముక్కుసాయిచరణ్మసిముక్కుఖడ్గఅజయ్క్కమారుుఅకు డేకూరుి ని ఉనాి రునన్నిచూసినారుఏమీఅనలేదు” C. Court Exhibits:

Sl.No Exhibit Number Description

1. Nil D. Material Objects:

Sl.No Material Description Object Number 1 M.O.1 Kinley water bottle with petrol. 2 M.O.2 Burnt ash.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. Sessions Judge, Krishna, Gudivada.

Copy submitted to:-

The Hon’ble Registrar (Judl.,) Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Nelapadu, Guntur District.

31

Copy to:-

1. The Addl. Public Prosecutor, XI ADJ Court, Krishna, Gudivada.

2. The Superintendent of Police, Krishna, Machilipatnam.

32

TABULAR FORM TO BE APPENDED TO THE JUDGMENT AS PER

RULE 67 OF THE CRIMINAL RULES OF PRACTICE

IN THE COURT OF XI ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS

JUDGE, KRISHNA, GUDIVADA

1 Serial Number 2 Sessions Case : Sessions Case No.122/2019 Number 3 Crime No. and : Cr.No.4/2018 of Gudivada Taluka Police name of the Police Station. Station 4 Description of : Masimukku Sai Charan, S/o Srinivasa Accused rao, 21 years, D.No.1-1-5, Pamarru Road, Pedakalava Centre, Gudivada.

5. Date of-

a) Occurrence : 06/07.01.2018

b) Report : 07.01.2018

c) Apprehension of : 27.01.2018 accused

d) Release on bail : 23.02.2018

e) Commencement of : 11.08.2025 trial

f) Closure of trial : 20.08.2025

g) Sentence or order : 24.03.2026.

6. Result : In the result, the Accused is found not guilty of the offences punishable under

Sections 436 and 307 of IPC and accordingly he is acquitted of the said charges under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C.

The bail bonds of the Accused shall be in force for a period of six months under

Section 437-A of Cr.P.C.,

Order relating to case property:

M.Os.1 and 2 and the un-marked 33 non-valuable case property, if any, shall be destroyed, after expiry of appeal time.

7. Explanation for delay :

This case was taken on file on 30.08.2019. On 30.01.2025 the accused was examined u/Sec.228 Cr.P.C., and charges under Sections 436 and 307 of IPC were framed against the Accused and he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The trial was commenced on 11.08.2025 and it was concluded on 20.08.2025. P.Ws.1 to 9 are examined and Exs.P1 to Ex.P5 and M.Os.1 and 2 are marked. On behalf of the defence, Exs.D1 and D2 were marked. On 06.10.2025 the accused was examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., and he reported no defence evidence. On 12.03.2026 heard the arguments on both sides. On 24.03.2026 Judgment was pronounced. Hence, no delay in conducting trial of this case.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. Sessions Judge, Krishna, Gudivada.

Copy submitted to:

The Hon'ble Registrar (Judl.), High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Nelapadu- 522 237, Guntur District,

Copy to:

1) The Addl. Public Prosecutor, XI ADJ Court, Krishna, Gudivada.

2) The Superintendent of Police, Krishna, Machilipatnam.

APKR0E0000622019

BEFORE THE CHAIRMAN : MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS

TRIBUNAL-CUM-XI ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE AT

GUDIVADA

Present: Grandhi Subrahmanyam,

XI Addl. District Judge

Friday, this the 10th day of April, 2026

M.V.O.P.No.7/2019

Between:-

1. Gulla Naga Lakshmi, W/o (late) Thambi, aged 31 years, House-wife, R/o D.No.1-70, Angaluru Village, Gudlavalleru Mandal.

2. Gulla Ratna Kumari, D/o (late) Thambi, aged 12 years, student, Mother’s protection,

3. Gulla Meghana Sravya, D/o (late) Thambi, aged 9 years, Student, Mother’s protection,

4. Gulla Ishwarya, D/o (late) Thambi, aged 7 years, Student, Mother’s protection,

Petitioners 2 to 4 being minors, rep. by their natural guardian, next friend mother i.e., 1st petitioner-Gulla Naga Lakshmi.

5. Gulla Veera Swamy. (Died) …Petitioners.

And

1. Kamineni Nancharaiah, S/o Swamy, aged 23 years, Driver of Crime Vehicle, R/o Vemanda Village, Unguturu Mandal.

2. Vallurupalli Rama Krishna Prasad, S/o Nageswara Rao, R/o D.No.1-605, RTC Colony, Gudivada.

3. National Insurance Company Ltd., Rep. by its Branch Manager, D.No.27-12-76, Garlapati Complex, Governorpet, Vijayawada. …Respondents.

This Petition came on 30.03.2026 before me for final hearing in the presence of Sri N.Prabhakara Rao, Smt.K.Rajani, Sri Ch.Sai Ganesh, Advocates for the petitioners and of Sri K.Siva Prasad, Advocate for Respondent No.3 and Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were set exparte, upon hearing, perusing the material papers on record and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court made the following:

2 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

A W A R D

This petition is filed under Sections 140 and 166 of Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988 read with Rule 455 of the A.P.M.V.Rules, 1989 claiming compensation of Rs.19,00,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization and for costs, for the death of deceased Gulla Thambi, S/o Veera Swamy, in a motor vehicle accident occurred on 13.07.2017 at about 1.10 p.m., at over bridge, Gudivada, Krishna District.

First petitioner is the wife, petitioners 2 to 4 are the minor daughters and 5th petitioner is the father of the deceased Gulla Thambi.

First respondent is the driver, 2nd respondent is the owner and 3rd respondent is the Insurer of the crime vehicle, i.e., Bus bearing No.AP 16 TF 6679 with Policy No.560500311610007621, which was valid from 25.01.2017 to 24.01.2018.

Bus bearing registration No.AP 16 TF 6679, herein-after, for convenience sake, will be referred to as an offending vehicle.

Said Gulla Thambi, herein-after, for convenience sake, will be referred to as the deceased.

2.The material averments of the petition, in brief, are as follows:- 3 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

a) The deceased was an Auto Driver, aged 31 years by the date of the accident, he used to earn an amount of Rs.20,000/- per month and used to spend the same towards the welfare of his family.

b) On 13.07.2017 the deceased went out for auto service and returning to home for lunch in the afternoon. While he was returning, he reached fly-over bridge at about 1.10 p.m., in his auto bearing No.AP 37 TC 8898 and at that time the driver of the APSRTC bus i.e., the offending vehicle drove the same in a rash and negligent manner with high speed and dashed the auto of the deceased, as a result of which the deceased sustained bleeding injuries over his face, neck, head and stomach. Neighbours shifted the deceased to the

Government Hospital, Gudivada. On receipt of information, the wife and relatives of the deceased rushed to the hospital and shifted him to

Government General Hospital, Vijayawada for better treatment and while undergoing treatment, he succumbed to the injuries in the morning of 14.07.2017 at 7.30 a.m.

Basing on the statement of 5th petitioner, Gudivada II Town

Police registered a case in Cr.No.124/2017 u/s 337 of IPC and later on receipt of death intimation, the Section of law was altered to Section 304-A of IPC. Police conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased and forwarded the same for post mortem examination.

Assistant Professor, Siddhardha Medical College, Government General

Hospital, Vijayawada conducted autopsy over the dead body of the 4 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 deceased and opined that the deceased died due to head injury. The

Motor Vehicles Inspector inspected the offending vehicle on 15.07.2017 and issued report opining that the said accident was not occurred due to any mechanical defects of the said vehicle. The said accident occurred only due to the rash and negligent driving of bus by 1st respondent.

c) First respondent was the driver having valid driving licence bearing No.395VYRK2012 issued by R.T.A. Vuyyuru, 2nd respondent was the owner of the offending vehicle insured the same with 3rd respondent vide policy No.560500311610007621, which was valid from 25.01.2017 to 24.01.2018, thus, all the respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation to the petitioners.

Hence the petition.

3. Third respondent filed a counter denying the material allegations of the petition and contending, inter alia, that the petitioners are not the dependents on the earnings of the deceased. First respondent was not having valid driving licence to drive the offending vehicle and the said vehicle was not having valid permit and fitness certificate to ply on the road. The accident if any occurred was only due to the negligence of the 1st respondent. The petitioners did not show the owner of the auto as respondent in this petition, as such the petition is not maintainable in the eye of law. The claim of compensation and the rate of interest claimed by the petitioners are excessive and therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition with costs.

5 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

4.Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial:-

1. Whether the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the crime vehicle No.AP 16 TF 6679?

2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to the

compensation, and if so, to what amount?

3. To what relief?

5. On behalf of petitioners, 1st petitioner, who is the wife of deceased herein, was examined as P.W.1 and through her Exs.P1 to

P7 were marked. Deputy Manager of 3rd respondent insurance company is examined as R.W.1 and the then Sub-Inspector of Police,

Gudivada II Town P.S., is examined as R.W.2.

6. Heard the arguments of both side counsels. Learned counsel for 3rd respondent filed written arguments.

The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the following case-laws:-

a) Madhu Joshi and another Vs. Rajesh Kumar alias Sonu and others, 2025 HHC 38505 of Hon’ble Himachal Pradesh High Court.

b) Shamanna and another Vs. The Divisional Manager, The

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., and others, AIR 2018 Supreme Court 3726.

c) S.Iyyapan Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd., and another, (2013) ACJ 1944.

6 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

d) HDFC ERGO General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs.

Rachakonda Yadagiri and another, MACMA No.448 of 2014, dt.29.01.2018 of Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent relied on the decision in the case of Lalitha and others Vs. N.Kedarnath and others, 2016 ACJ 1162.

ISSUE NO.1:

Whether the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the crime vehicle AP 16 TF 6679?

7. In respect of the rash and negligence, it is the contention of the petitioners that on 13.07.2017 the deceased, who was the owner of an auto bearing No.AP 16 37 TC 8898 went out for Auto Service and at about 1.10 a.m., while he was returning home for lunch, he reached

Gudivada fly-over bridge and at that time the 1st respondent being the driver of the offending vehicle, drove the same in the opposite direction in a rash and negligent manner with high speed and dashed the auto of the deceased, as a result of which, the deceased sustained injuries on his face, neck, head and stomach and initially the neighbours admitted him in Area Hospital, Gudivada and later the wife and relatives of the deceased shifted him to Government General Hospital, Vijayawada for better treatment.

8. In order to prove the contention of the petitioners, 1st petitioner herself examined as P.W.1 and she exhibited Exs.P1 to P7 7 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 documents on their behalf. Ex.P1 is certified copy of FIR dt.13.07.2017 registered for the offence u/s 337 of IPC, which reveals that after occurrence of the accident, 5th petitioner gave a statement to Gudivada

II Town Police and based on the same FIR in Cr.No.124/2017 was registered against the 1st respondent for the offence u/s 337 of IPC.

Ex.P4 certified copy of inquest report reveals that police held inquest over the dead body of the deceased after the death of the deceased, wherein the panchayatdars opined that the deceased died due to the injuries sustained in the accident. Ex.P5 certified copy of postmortem report shows that postmortem examination was conducted over the dead body of the deceased in Government General Hospital,

Vijayawada and the Assistant Professor noticed the following ante mortem external and internal injuries:-

1) Right side of face surgical 30 black sutures in situ.

2) Under the scalp of entire haematoma present.

3) Diffused sub-dural and sub-arachnoid haemorrge present with both cerebral hemispheres.

4) Liver and spleen ruptured.

5) Haemoperitoneum one liter present.

He opined that the deceased died due to Polytrauma. Ex.P6 is the Motor Vehicles Inspector’s report, which evident that the accident was not due to any mechanical defects of the vehicle involved in the accident. Ex.P2 is the certified copy of rough sketch of the scene of offence. Ex.P3 is the certified copy of the scene of offence observation 8 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 report. Ex.P8 certified copy of charge sheet reveals that after conducting investigation, the police laid charge sheet against 1st respondent for the offence u/s 304-A of IPC and Sections 134 (a) and

(b) r/w 187 of M.V.Act in this case. Thus, Exs.P1 to P7 prima facie established that on the date of accident the driver of the offending vehicle i.e., Respondent No.1 drove the APSRTC bus in a rash and negligent manner, with high speed and dashed the auto of the deceased, due to that the deceased sustained injuries and succumbed to the same while undergoing treatment in Government General

Hospital, Vijayawada on 14.07.2017 at 7.30 a.m.

9. The learned counsel for the respondent No.3 contended that the deceased drove the auto without having any driving licence in wrong route and thus, there is contributory negligence on the part of the deceased in causing the accident. In order to substantiate the said contention, the insurance company elicited during the cross- examination of P.W.1 that her husband did not have any driving licence.

Further, it examined the Deputy Manager as R.W.1, who in his evidence deposed that the accident was occurred due to the sole negligence of the deceased as he was not having any valid driving licence and he was not accustomed or not having driving skills and thus, the deceased contributed the accident. As per the charge-sheet, R.W.1 is not the eye-witness to the accident. R.W.2, the then Sub-Inspector of Police,

Gudivada II Town P.S., deposed that he filed charge sheet as in Ex.P7 9 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 and on the date of offence the offending bus was coming from

Vijayawada to Gudivada and running on the left side of the road and the auto was running towards Bethavolu from Gudivada near fly-over. He further deposed that the accident took place on the flyover bridge and the scene of offence is situated on western side of the flyover as per

Ex.P2. This witness clearly and categorically deposed that the auto was not running on wrong direction. However, he deposed that the offending vehicle sustained damages at left front part. In his cross- examination when confronted, he admitted filing of charge-sheet/Ex.P7 after coming to conclusion that 1st respondent drove the offending vehicle in rash and negligent manner with high speed and dashed the auto of the deceased, as a result the deceased sustained injuries and died due to the accident. In this connection, P.W.1 in her cross- examination deposed that her husband was an auto driver and he was running own auto, the bus was coming from Vijayawada to Gudivada and dashed the auto of her husband, previously her husband used to take auto on hire and she denied the suggestion that the deceased was not having driving skills and he contributed negligence in driving the auto in wrong direction as per Ex.P2/rough sketch and Ex.P3/scene observation report. The above evidence of P.W.1 reveals that the deceased was having driving skills as he had been driving the auto for a considerable period and thus, it is evident that the accident was not occurred due to lack of driving licence or driving skills by the deceased.

10 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

The contents of Ex.P1 disclose that while the deceased alone was coming in his auto from Gudivada towards Vijayawada on the flyover, 1st respondent came in the opposite direction while driving the offending bus in a rash and negligent manner with high speed and without blowing horn and dashed the auto of the deceased. The learned counsel for the 3rd respondent argued that if one has to go from

Gudivada towards Kankipadu, he has to go on left side i.e., East to

South, but in the present case the deceased was moving in wrong direction on right side i.e., West to South. A careful examination of the scene of offence as evident from Ex.P2/rough sketch of the scene of offence, the accident was occurred at almost fag end of the flyover towards Kankipadu. As per the directions in Ex.P2, if one has to go from Gudivada towards Kankipadu, he has to move from North to

South, which is also evident from Ex.P3, but not East to South as contended on behalf of the insurance company. It appears from the material on record, as the deceased was a resident of Bethavolu, while coming from Gudivada on flyover towards Kankipadu he might have taking a turning towards Bethavolu from left side of the road towards

Bethavolu i.e., East to West to go to his house for lunch and at that time, the 1st respondent dashed the auto in a rash and negligent manner and caused the accused and in that process the left side front portion of the bus sustained damage. In support his contention he relied on judgment of Hon’ble high court of Kerala in case of Lalitha 11 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 and others Vs. N.Kedarnath and others(Supra)Wherein Hon’ble High court found contributory negligence on the part of deceased. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that absence of a driving licence does not per se amount to contributory negligence.

In this context, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decision in Madhu Joshi and another (supra), wherein Hon’ble

Himachal Pradesh High Court, inter alia, observed as follows:- “11. So far as the second contention raised by the learned Senior counsel for the appellants with respect to deduction of 25% on account of contributory negligence is concerned, the said contention deserves acceptance for the reason that the deceased could not have been held liable to contribute for accident simply for the reason that he had no driving license. In case, the deceased

was not having the licence to drive the vehicle, he could be

inflicted with some penalty under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,

but his contribution towards the accident cannot be attributed

to him. In the present case, the Tribunal has returned the findings that the driver of the truck was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner which findings have not been assailed. Thus, the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal holding that since the deceased was driving the scooter without licence, he is liable for contributory negligence is wrong and further the finding to deduct 25% of the compensation amount is also wrong and illegal and these findings are set aside.”

In the above decision it was clearly held that merely because the deceased was not having driving licence, it cannot amount to contributory negligence on his part, but he is liable to some penalty for having driving the vehicle without valid driving licence.

12 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

Before going to discuss further on the plea of contributory

negligence or negligence of the deceased as raised by the counsel for 3rd respondent, it is pertinent to refer the defence taken by the 3rd respondent in the Counter filed before this Tribunal. In the counter, at paragraph No.7 it was stated that 1st respondent was not having valid licence to drive the crime vehicle and in paragraph No.8 it was clearly admitted that the alleged accident if any that was occurred only on the negligence of the 1st respondent…. For ready reference, I would like to extract paragraph No.8, which is as follows:- “8. It is submit that the alleged accident if any that was occurred only on the negligence of the 1 st respondent and the documents filed by the petitioners along with petition are not certified copies and that are not genuine documents.”

A perusal of the counter averments filed on behalf of the insurance company, there is no pleading with regard to the contributory negligence of the deceased and further, the insurance company admitted that the accident was occurred due to the negligence on the part of 1st respondent. In this context, it is relevant to refer the recent

Srinivas Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in

Raghavendrarao Desai (Dead) By LRs., Vs. V.Kumar Vamanrao @

Alok And Others1, wherein it was, inter alia, observed as follows:-

“ 15. There is no quarrel with the preposition of law that no

evidence could be led beyond pleadings……” 12024 INSC 165.

13 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

First respondent driver of the offending vehicle remained exparte.

Third respondent failed to summon him/R1 or any eye-witness to the accident in order to probablise its contention of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. However, in view of categorical admission of the respondent No.3 in the counter, the respondent No.3 cannot be allowed to take the plea of contributory negligence as the said plea is not taken in the pleadings. Furthermore, the charge sheet filed by police serves as prima facie evidence of negligence for claims seeking compensation under M.V.Act.

In this context, this Court relied on a recent judgment of

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ranjeet and another vs.

Abdul Kayam Neb and another 2 arising out of SLP (C)

No.10351/2019, wherein their Lordships held that, “It is settled in law that once a charge sheet has been filed and the driver has been held negligent, no further evidence is required to prove that the bus was being negligently driven by the bus driver. Even if the eye witnesses are not examined, that will not be fatal to prove the death of the deceased due to negligence of the bus driver”.

As per above decision of Hon’ble Apex Court it is settled law that filing of charge sheet itself is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence for the purpose of claim U/Sec.166 of Motor Vehicles Act.

Thus, the dictum of law laid down in the above decision and the 2AIR Online 2025 SC 273.

14 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 evidence of P.W.1, R.W.2 and the documents under Exs.P1 to P3 and

Ex.P7, coupled with the counter averments established that the accident was occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending bus by 1st respondent, but not due to the contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. Accordingly, Issue No.1 is held in favour of the petitioners.

Issue No.2:-

Whether the petitioners are entitled to the compensation, and if so, to what amount?

10. Now, it is to be decided what will be the quantum of compensation to which the petitioners are entitled to. Admittedly, 1st petitioner is the wife, petitioners 2 to 4 are the minor daughters and 5th petitioner is the father of the deceased. However, in view of the Memo filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on 30.01.2026, it is a fact that 5th petitioner died on 13.01.2019 i.e., soon after filing of the present claim application and the petitioners have given up the claim of 5th petitioner, as the petitioners 1 to 4 are the only legal heirs of the deceased in this case.

11. Now the loss of dependency is to be decided. The petitioners claimed that the deceased was aged about 35 years by the date of accident. The petitioners stated in their petition that the deceased was running his own auto and earning an amount of

Rs.20,000/- per month. P.W.1 in her cross-examination reiterated the 15 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 said contention in her cross-examination. But the petitioners did not file any income proof documents before this Tribunal or they even failed to produce an authenticated copy of the Certificate of Registration of said auto standing in the name of the deceased to prove their contention. It is settled law that when the claimants failed to file any income proof, it is the duty of the insurance company to furnish the Minimum Wages

Notification applicable to the facts of the case. In case of Hitesh

Nagjibhai Patel Vs. Bababhai Nagjibhairabari & Anr, 3theHon’ble

Supreme Court, observed as follows:- “It is now a well-entrenched and consistently reiterated principle of law that a minor child who suffers death or permanent disability in a motor vehicle accident, cannot be placed in the same category as a non- earning individual for the purposes of assessing the amount of compensation because the child was not engaged in gainful employment at the time of the accident. In such a case, the computation of compensation under the head of loss of income ought to be made by adopting, at the very least, the minimum wages payable to a skilled workman as notified for the relevant period in the respective State where the cause of action arises. ……..”

But, in this case, the insurance company failed to produce such notification and hence, this Tribunal is going to assess the income of the deceased by doing some guess work. In the absence of any supporting evidence, the avocation of the deceased can be taken as agricultural coolie. Taking into consideration the age, avocation of the deceased and the calculation made by 3rd respondent in the written arguments, the income of the deceased can be fixed at Rs.8,000/- p.m. As per the judgment in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi 32025 LiveLaw (SC) 871 16 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 and others 4 in case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, should be regarded as the necessary method of computation, that means to say in case the deceased is aged about 35 years, an addition of 40% can be taken into consideration towards his future prospects.

Therefore, the income of the deceased per annum comes to

Rs.10,000/- (Rs.8,000 x 4/100) per month and Rs.1,20,000/- per annum.

12. As the number of depending family members of the deceased are five in numbers, 1/4th of the monthly income of the deceased is to be deducted towards his personal and living expenses had he been alive and the balance amount will be per year is

Rs.90,000/-(Rs.1,20,000/- x 1/4 =Rs.30,000/-) ( Vide Sarala Varma Vs.

Delhi Transport Corporation and another (2009) 6 SCC 121). Thus, the annual income of the deceased is estimated at Rs.90,000/-. The deceased was shown aged about 35 years in the claim application, but in her evidence P.W.1 deposed that her husband was aged 33 years on the date of accident. Perusal of the documents under Exs.P4/inquest report and Ex.P5/postmortem report the age of the deceased was 4(2017) 16 SCC 680 17 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 mentioned as 35 years by the date of accident. Except the said documents, no document is produced by the petitioners to show the exact age of the deceased as on the date of his unfortunate death.

Hence, considering the said documentary evidence, the age of the deceased on the date of the accident can be taken into consideration as 35 years, thereby proper multiplier for the age group 30-35 is ‘16’ as per the decision in the case of Sarala Varma Vs. Delhi Transport

Corporation and another (2009) 6 SCC 121 and thus, the loss of income is estimated at Rs.14,40,000/- (Rs.90,000/-X16).

13.The judgment inPranay Sethi was rendered in the year 2017. the Hon’ble Supreme Court awarded reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively and the conventional heads namely have to be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years. .

Further the decisions in Magma General Insurance Company

Ltd. vs. Nanu Ram and Others 5 and United India Insurance

Company Limited v. Satinder Kaur alias Satwinder Kaur & Ors6 clarified that consortium is to be awarded under three separate categories: (i) loss of spousal consortium, (ii) loss of parental consortium, and (iii) loss of filial consortium to the spouse, children, and 5 (2018) 18 SCC 130 6 (2021) 11 SCC 780 18 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 parents of the deceased, respectively. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in National India Assurance Company Limited v. Somwati7 has affirmed that each eligible claimant is entitled to receive consortium individually and separately. In the present case, there were four claimants, who all fall within these categories being the wife, and three children of the deceased. Thus, a sum of Rs.18,000/- is awarded towards loss of estate and Rs.18,000/- is awarded towards funeral expenses to the petitioners 1 to 4 in total Rs.36,000/- is granted to the petitioners and each petitioner is awarded compensation of Rs.48,000/- under the head loss of consortium, following the law laid down in the above-mentioned Judgments.

14. The petitioners claimed a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- towards pain and suffering. Since it is a case of death, no amount can be awarded under the head pain and suffering. The petitioners also claimed a sum of

Rs.2,00,000/- towards loss of earning. Whether it is future loss of earnings or partial loss of earnings is not mentioned in the petition.

When the deceased died on the next day of the accident and the petitioners are granted some amount under the head loss of dependency, grant of additional amount under the head loss of earnings does not arise. Further, the petitioners claimed a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- under the head loss of love, affection and mental agony. In Magma

General Insurance Company Limited (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court 7 (2020) 9 SCC 644.

19 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 gave a comprehensive interpretation to consortium to include spousal consortium, parental consortium, as well as filial consortium and loss of love and affection is comprehended in loss of consortium. So, separate compensation cannot be granted under the head of loss of love, affection and mental agony when the petitioners have already been compensated for loss of consortium. Hence, the said amount can be granted to the petitioners towards medical expenses. Thus, the petitioners No.1 to 4 are entitled to total compensation comes hereunder: -

Sl.No. Head Amount (₹)

A. Monthly incomeRs.8,000-00 B. Future ProspectsRs.2,000-00 (40% on monthly income) C. Deduction towards personal & living Rs.2,500-00 expenses Rs. 10,000 X ¼ =

D. Age Multiplier 16

E. Loss of dependency Rs.14,40,000-00

F. Compensation under conventional heads Loss of EstateRs.18,000-00 Funeral ExpensesRs.18,000-00 Loss of Consortium Rs.48,000/- x 4Rs.1,92,000-00 Total compensation awarded Rs.16,68,000-00

15. It is the main contention of respondent No.3 that the deceased and the 1st respondent were not having required driving licences to drive the respective vehicles and hence, the insurance company is not liable to pay compensation to the petitioners. But, in view of the principle laid down in the above decision, the contention of the insurance company that since the deceased drove the auto without having any driving licence he contributed the accident, has no force.

20 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

Further, with regard to the contention that 1st respondent drove the offending vehicle without having a valid driving licence is concerned, the petitioners in the claim application furnished the details of driving licence of the 1st respondent i.e., DL No.395VYRK2012 issued by

R.T.A. Vuyyuru. The police after conducting thorough investigation filed charge sheet against 1st respondent for the offence u/s 304-A of IPC and Sections 134 (a) and (b) r/w 187 of M.V.Act. No penal provisions under Section 3 r/w 181 of M.V.Act was charged against the 1st respondent and there was no conclusion arrived by R.W.2 in the charge-sheet that 1st respondent was not having driving licence to drive the bus. Perusal of the M.V.I Report under Ex.P6, the Motor Vehicles

Inspector noted the driving licence particulars of 1st respondent as mentioned by the petitioners in the claim application. Except taking a bald plea, the insurance company failed to examine the R.T.A. Officials concerned to probablise their said contention. No notice was issued by

Respondent No.3 to the driver and owner of the offending vehicle to produce the driving licence of 1st respondent and no other stps are taken by the Respondent No.3. Hence, in the absence of any supporting evidence, the said contention of the 3rd respondent is not sustainable.

16. As far as liability is concerned, the 1st respondent appears to have possessed valid driving licence at the time of accident. It is not the defence of the insurance company that the offending vehicle was 21 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 not insured with them at the relevant point of time. R.W.1 in his evidence indirectly deposed that 2nd respondent, who was the policy holder of the vehicle AP 16 TF 6679 violated the terms and conditions of the policy. That means, the offending vehicle was having valid and subsisting policy of insurance as on the date of the accident in question.

Further, in the MVI report, the details of policy number and the period of validity is shown as insurance valid up to 24.01.2018. The accident in question took place on 13.07.2017, so, the policy of insurance was in force as on the date of accident. Therefore, the respondents 1 to 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the petitioners.

17. This Court taking into consideration of the Judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court from time to time, has no hesitation to hold that the petitioners No.1 to 4 are entitled for compensation of

Rs.16,68,000/-along with simple interest of 7.5% per annum thereon from the date of filing of the petition till date of realization from

Respondents No.1 to 3 jointly and severally, which is considered to be just and reasonable compensation for the death of deceased.

Accordingly, Issue No.2 is answered.

Issue No.3:-

To what relief?

18. In the result, the petition is allowed, in part, with proportionate costs awarding compensation of Rs.16,68,000/- to the petitioners 1 to 4 with subsequent interest thereon at 7.5% per annum 22 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026 from the date of petition till the date of realization against the respondents No.1 to 3 jointly and severally.

Apportionment

The compensation amount so awarded is apportioned among the petitioners 1 to 4 as follows:-

1) The 1st petitioner being wife of deceased is entitled for

Rs.4,68,000/-.

2) The petitioners 2 to 4, being the minor daughters of the deceased are entitled to Rs.4,00,000/- each.

By virtue of directions of Hon’ble Apex Court in Parminder Singh

Vs. Honey Goyal and others (2025 AIR (SC) 1713) and as per the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court issued in suo-moto WPC

No.7/2024 titled in “Re:Compehnsation amounts deposited with

Motor Accident Claims Tribunals and Labour Courts” and the

Circular of the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in ROC

No.349/SO/2025, dated 14.07.2025, the petitioner No.1 is directed to file the self-attested copy of her bank account pass-book, Aadhar Card and Pan card into this Court within ten days from the date of this Award.

On furnishing such particulars, the respondent No.3 is directed to deposit the compensation amount relating to the petitioner No.1 into her bank account within two months from the date of this Award and file proof of payment along with memo and obtain proper receipt. If the petitioner No.1 fails to file the said details within the time stipulated, respondent No. 3 shall deposit the said amount before this Tribunal.

23 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

On such deposit, petitioner No.1 is entitled to withdraw her share of amount at once along with entire costs and interest thereon, if any.

The respective share amounts of the petitioners 2 to 4 shall be deposited before this tribunal and the same shall be kept in FDR till they attain the age of majority and thereafter, they are permitted to withdraw the same along with the accrued interest thereon.

Since the petitioners obtained Court Fee exemption certificate, they shall pay the required Court fee of Rs.18,360/- in terms of the proviso to Rule 475 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. The decree shall be prepared after payment of Court fee by the petitioners.

This award is subject to any compensation already awarded

U/s.140 of the M.V. Act.

The petitioners are not entitled to any interest for the period during which the petition was dismissed for default and until it was restored, if any.

Advocate fee is fixed at Rs.10,000/-.

Rest of the petition claim is dismissed, without costs.

Typed to my dictation to the Stenographer, corrected and pronounced by me in Open Court, this the 10 th day of April, 2026.

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal -cum-IX Additional District Judge, Krishna, Gudivada.

24 XI Addl. District Court, MVOP No.7/2019 Gudivada. Dated 10.04.2026

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

WITNESSES EXAMINED

For the Petitioners: For Respondent No.3:

PW-1: Gulla Naga Lakshmi. R.W1: P.Rajesh Babu. R.W2: G.Srihari Babu, S.I.

DOCUMENTS MARKED

On behalf of the Petitioners:

Ex.A1: Certified copy of FIR in Crime No.124/2017 of Gudivada II town P.S., dt.13.07.2017. Ex.A2: Certified copy of rough sketch of scene of offence. Ex.A3: Certified copy of scene observation report, dt.14.07.2017. Ex.A4: Certified copy of inquest report, dt.14.07.2017. Ex.A5: Certified copy of Post mortem report, dt.14.7.2019. Ex.A6: Certified copy of Motor Vehicles Inspector report, dt.15.7.2017. Ex.P7: Certified copy of charge-sheet.

On behalf Respondent No.3:- Nil

Sd/- G.Subrahmanyam,

XI ADJ., GDV.,