smt. K. V. Maha Lakshmi

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IN THE COURT OF XI ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, KRISHNA,

GUDIVADA.

PRESENT:­ SMT.K.V.MAHALAKSHMI.,

XI­ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, GUDIVADA.

MONDAY, THIS THE 21st DAY OF MARCH, 2022.

A.S.29 OF 2016 

Between:

Abhinadana Groups Pvt. Ltd., Rep.by its Managing Director Kommalapati Sridhar (as shown in plaint) Abhinandana Housing Pvt. Ltd., Rep.by its Authorised Signatory …APPELLANT

A N D 

1. Challagulla Vijaya Lakshmi

2. Dandamudi Venkata Krishna Kishore Babu...RESPONDENTS

Appeal filed by the appellants U/s.96 and Order 41 Rule 1 of C.P.C. against the decree and judgment in O.S.98/2009 on the file of Prl.Senior

Civil Judge’s Court, Gudivada dated 31.03.2016.

Between:

Challagulla Vijaya Lakshmi… PLAINTIFF

A N D

1. Dandamudi Venkata Krishna Kishore Babu

2. Abhinadana Groups Pvt. Ltd., Rep.by its Managing Director Kommalapati Sridhar…DEFENDANTS

This appeal is coming for final hearing before me on 07.03.2022 in the presence of Sri Ch.Bhanu Prasad, B.Sarath Babu and Smt.K.P.Geetha, Advocates for Appellant and of Sri V.V.Varadarajulu, Advocate for 1st Respondent and of Sri Ch.Krishna Rao, Advocate for 2nd Respondent and upon perusing the material on record, and on considering the connected material papers and submissions of both side counsel and the matter having been stood over till this day for consideration, this Court delivered the following:

J U D G M E N T

1) This is an appeal preferred by the unsuccessful 2nd defendant/appellant against the impugned judgment and decree dated 31.03.2016 passed by the learned Prl.Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada, in O.S.98/2009 seeking to set aside the same, allow the appeal and dismiss O.S.98/2009.

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2)In the grounds of appeal, it is urged that, the decree and judgment passed by the Lower Court is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case; the lower Court failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence in proper perspective and came to erroneous conclusion on assumptions and presumptions; the lower Court ought to have seen that the plaintiff admitted the execution of agreements of sale and registration thereof; the lower Court ought to have seen that the plaintiff miserably failed to prove the alleged fraud or misrepresentation pleaded by her; the lower Court ought to have seen that the plaintiff and her husband are highly educated and her contention that they did not know the contents of the document cannot be believed; the lower Court failed to appreciate the admissions of P.Ws­1 and 2 during their cross­ examination; the lower Court ought to have seen that admissions of

P.Ws­1 and 2 in their cross­examination are sufficient to hold that the plaintiff having received the consideration mentioned in the agreements and knowing the contents therein executed and registered the agreement of sales and there is no fraud and misrepresentation as alleged by the plaintiff; the lower Court erred in believing Ex.B­1 and ought to have seen that P.W­1 admitted the execution of Ex.B­1 during her cross­examination and P.W­3 also admitted execution of Ex.B­1; the lower Court erred in holding that the plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule property and erred in granting permanent injunction; the lower Court ought to have seen that the plaintiff was not in possession of the plaint schedule property since the date of execution of agreements of sale; the lower Court ought to have seen that the 2nd defendant is a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without knowledge of the alleged disputes and no decree can be passed against the 2nd defendant; the lower Court erred in observing that non­examination of 1st defendant is fatal to the case of defendants; the lower Court ought to have disbelieved the evidence of 3 plaintiff and ought to have believed the evidence of 2nd defendant and ought to have dismissed the suit with costs; and hence, prayed to allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower Court and to dismiss the suit.

3) The parties as arrayed in the trial court will be referred as parties hereinafter for the sake of convenience and brevity.

4) This is a suit filed to cancel the registered sale agreement­cum­

General Power of Attorney dated 30.07.2007 in favour of the 1st defendant as illegal, invalid and vitiated by misrepresentation and fraud, for consequential relief of declaration that the sale deed dated 01.08.2007 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant is illegal, invalid and not binding on the plaintiff, for permanent injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from trespassing into plaint schedule property or interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff therein and for costs and for such other reliefs.

5)The factual matrix of the plaint: 

It is averred that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and possessor of the wet land of Ac.2­08 cents in two items situated in Gurajada village,

Pamidimukkala Mandal, which is the plaint schedule property and the plaint schedule property is part of the property purchased by the plaintiff under different registered sale deeds from Tata Ramaswamy under

Doc.No.1905/2005ofVuyyuruSubRegistrar,Jampana

Subrahmanyeswara Rao under registered sale deed vide

Doc.No.1670/2004 of Vuyyuru Sub Registrar and from Mareedu Krishna under Doc.No.3084/2001 of Vuyyuru Sub Registrar and obtained possession of the same and ever since she has been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property. The plaintiff being a lady and residing at Secunderabad offered to sell the said property. The 1st defendant came forward to purchase the same for a consideration of 4

Rs.4,68,000/­. Instead of paying the entire amount and obtained sale deed from the plaintiff, only a sum of Rs.1,000/­ was paid to the plaintiff and represented that if the land is divided into plots and offered for sale, it would fetch higher price and the plaintiff executes an agreement­cum­

General Power of Attorney, he would undertake to get the land divided into bits and pay her a sum of Rs.4,67,000/­ within one month and obtained

Registered General Power of Attorney­cum­Agreement of Sale dated 30.07.2007 vide Doc.No.3887/2007 and at the time of execution of said agreement­cum­General Power of Attorney, the 1st defendant paid only

Rs.1,000/­ to the plaintiff promising to pay the balance of Rs.4,67,000/­ either by demand draft or cheque within one month. Believing the representation made by the 1st defendant, without knowing the contents, the plaintiff executed Agreement of Sale­cum­General Power of Attorney, but did not deliver possession of the land to the 1st defendant.

It is further submitted that the plaintiff waited one month to receive the balance amount from the 1st defendant as agreed upon. When the 1st defendant failed to pay the amount, plaintiff made demands with the 1st defendant to pay the same and obtained possession of the property, but the 1st defendant postponed the same. Finally, the plaintiff suspected the bonafidies of the 1st defendant and learnt that the 1st defendant played fraud on her by getting a false recital incorporated in the aforesaid Sale

Agreement­cum­General Power of Attorney, as though a sum of

Rs.4,67,000/­ is paid. Thereupon the plaintiff informed 1st defendant that she is cancelling the Sale Agreement­cum­General Power of Attorney and in fact presented a document of cancellation dated 26.08.2008 before the

Sub Registrar, Vuyyuru cancelling the same. The Sub Registrar without giving an opportunity to the plaintiff, unjustly and illegally refused to register the document and gave an endorsement on 27.09.2008, against which the plaintiff preferred appeal before the District Registrar, 5

Vijayawada East and the same is pending. Irrespective of orders in the appeal, her title and possession to the property is not lost by mere execution of sale agreement. Taking advantage of the sale agreement­ cum­General Power of Attorney, the 1st defendant is making clandestine attempts to alienate the plaint schedule property to third parties to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. Plaintiff obtained an encumbrance certificate and came to know that the 1st defendant illegally sold away the suit property to the 2nd defendant on 01.08.2007 and obtained a public copy of the same on 30.10.2008, when for the first time she came to know that the 1st defendant and 2nd defendant colluded and 2nd defendant obtained a fraudulent and collusive sale deed from the 1st defendant to cause loss to the plaintiff and to defeat her rights in the suit property and the said sale deed dated 01.08.2007 is illegal, invalid and not binding on the plaintiff and is result of misrepresentation and fraud made by the 1st defendant on her. The 2nd defendant never enquired with the plaintiff about passing of consideration or delivery of possession to the 1st defendant. The plaintiff got issued a registered legal notice on 09.11.2008 to both the defendants.

The defendants received the same and kept quiet. As the said Agreement of Sale­cum­General Power of Attorney itself is vitiated by misrepresentation or fraud and liable to be set aside, the consequential sale deeds executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant are equally illegal and invalid. The cause of action for the suit arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the suit.

6)The 1st defendant is remained exparte. A written statement is filed on behalf of the 2nd defendant, denying the material averments of the plaint, submitting that as per narration of General Power of Attorney

No.3887/2007 dated 31.07.2007 at Vuyyuru Sub Registrar Office executed in favour of the 1st defendant by the plaintiff clearly show that 6 that the consideration of Rs.4,67,000/­ out of Rs.4,68,000/­ was paid by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff and the remaining balance is only

Rs.1,000/­ is payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff, within the stipulated period of one month and the plaintiff willing to General Power of

Attorney holder sold the property to various persons and executed ant sale deeds in favour of any person. The General Power of Attorney Holder obtained A Chellu Raseedu from the plaintiff after paying the balance amount of Rs.1,000/­ as on and there is no due payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff under the said General Power of Attorney. After clearing the due by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff, the 2nd defendant purchased the said property from the 1st defendant on 01.08.2007 under a registered sale deed and possession was delivered to the 2nd defendant.

So, the 2nd defendant is a bonafide purchaser and enjoying the same. The so called cancellation of General Power of Attorney presented by the plaintiff on 26.08.2008 is only creative litigation to harass the defendants 1 and 2 to have an unlawful gain. The plaint schedule property is now in possession of the 2nd defendant and 2nd defendant is enjoying the same. 

In the additional written statement filed on behalf of the 2nd defendant, the material contents of the plaint are denied, submitting that the 2nd defendant never purchased the suit schedule property from the 1st defendant in individual capacity. This defendant purchased the suit schedule property from the 1st defendant in official capacity i.e., on behalf of Abhinandana Housing Private Limited as Managing Director, Gayathri

Nagar, Vijayawada, and the said sale deed dated 01.08.2007 clearly show that the 2nd defendant purchased the property from the 1st defendant in the official capacity. So, the 2nd defendant is not proper party in the above suit and the plaintiff unnecessarily impleaded the 2nd defendant and sought for dismissal of the suit with costs in the interest of justice.

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7)Basing on the strength of the pleadings of both parties to the suit, the following issues were settled for trial before the trial court:

1. Whether the registered sale agreement­cum­General Power of Attorney dated 30.07.2007 is illegal, invalid and vitiated by misrepresentation and fraud as alleged by the plaintiff?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declare that the sale deed

dated 01.08.2008 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd

defendant is illegal, invalid and not binding on the plaintiff?

3. Whether the 1st defendant is entitled to cancel the registered sale agreement ­cum­GPA, dt.30.07.2007?

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction against the defendant No.2 in respect of plaint schedule property as prayed for in the plaint?

5. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled?

8) To substantiate the case of the plaintiff, P.Ws­1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A­1 to A­5 were marked. On behalf of the 2nd defendant, D.Ws­1 to 3 were examined and Ex.B­1 was marked.

9) Considering the above evidence, the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment, the 2nd defendant preferred the present appeal.

10) Now the point for consideration is:

Whether the impugned Judgment dated 31.03.2016 passed in

O.S.No.98/2009 by the learned Prl.Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada,

suffers from any legal infirmity and liable to be set aside? or not?

11) Heard both sides. Written arguments filed on behalf of the appellant and 1st respondent. 

12)POINT: Evidently,there is no dispute whatsoever regarding the initial title over the plaint schedule property vesting with the plaintiff herein. It is also evidently clear about the execution of the original of

Ex.A­1 by the plaintiff in favour of the 1st defendant herein. It is also an evident fact about the execution of the registered sale deed by the 1st 8 defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant under the original of Ex.A­3 for the self same property. 

13)According to the contention of the counsel for plaintiff/1st respondent, plaintiff is the absolute owner of an extent of Ac.2­08 cents of land, having purchased it under three different sale deeds from three different vendors from 2001 to 2005. However, the said sale deeds are not single item, but they are in different survey numbers. It is the admitted contention of the counsel for plaintiff that as the plaintiff is a lady and residing at Secunderabad, she offered to sell the same and 1st defendant agreed to purchase the same for a consideration of Rs.4,68,000/­. It is the interesting contention of the counsel for plaintiff that instead of paying the entire amount and obtaining a sale deed from the plaintiff, the 1st defendant paid only Rs.1,000/­ and represented that if the land is divided into plots and offered for sale, it would fetch higher price and the plaintiff executed an Agreement of Sale­cum­General Power of Attorney under the original of Ex.A­1. It is further the specific contention of the counsel for plaintiff that the 1st defendant also undertook to pay the amount of

Rs.4,68,000/­ within one month from the date of original of Ex.A­1. It is also agreed to pay an amount of Rs.4,67,000/­ by demand draft or cheque.

It is further the interesting contention of the counsel for plaintiff that believing the representation made by the 1st defendant and without knowing its contents, she executed the original of Ex.A­1 and did not deliver possession to the 1st defendant and went to the extent of categorically contending that the plaintiff awaited one month from the date of execution of Ex.A­1 for receiving amount of Rs.4,67,000/­ from the 1st defendant, but the 1st defendant failed to pay the same and postponed.

So, the plaintiff suspecting the bonafidies of the 1st defendant caused 9 enquiries and came to know that the 1st defendant played fraud by getting false recital incorporated in the original of Ex.A­1 as if Rs.4,67,000/­ is paid and Rs.1,000/­ is balance amount. So, the plaintiff vehemently contends that she informed the 1st defendant about cancelling of original of Ex.A­1 and presented a document of cancellation dated 26.08.2008 i.e., under the original of Ex.A­2. However, it is conceded by the plaintiff that the Sub Registrar, Vuyyuru, refused to register the original of Ex.A­2, gave endorsement on 27.09.2008 to that effect and contended inter alia that the Sub­Registrar, Vuyyuru without hearing the plaintiff refused to register the original of Ex.A2 and aggrieved by the said endorsement, she preferred an appeal before the District Registrar, Vijayawada East and finally contends that irrespective of the said orders of appeal, the title and possession over the plaint schedule property is still intact with the plaintiff.

However, it is further case of the plaintiff that taking advantage of the original of Ex.A­1, the 1st defendant is making clandestine attempts to alienate the schedule property to defeat the rights of the plaintiff and further interestingly contends that a search made in the Sub Registrar

Office, Vuyyuru and later plaintiff obtained encumbrance certificate and came to know about the existence of the original of Ex.A­3 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant for the said property covered by the original of Ex.A­1. So, the plaintiff contends that after obtaining

Ex.A­3 on 30.10.2008 for the first time, the plaintiff came to know about the fraud played by the defendants 1 and 2 in collusion to defeat the rights of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property. So, the plaintiff vehemently contends that Ex.A­3 is illegal, invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. Due to the misrepresentation and fraud played upon her by the defendants and the 2nd defendant never enquired with her to know about the transaction under Ex.A­1 and finally she got issued the original of 10

Ex.A­4 to the defendants 1 and 2 and the same was received under

Ex.A­5, but the defendants kept quiet. So, the plaintiff further contends that as the original of Ex.A­1 itself is vitiated by fraud and mis­ representation, consequently Ex.A­3 is illegal, invalid and not binding on the plaintiff and she is entitled to both the reliefs and also sought for permanent injunction against the 2nd defendant from trespassing into the suit schedule property and interfere with her possession and enjoyment.

14)On the other hand, the 1st defendant remained exparte and the 2nd defendant alone contested the matter. It is the specific contention of the counsel for 2nd defendant/appellant that as per recitals in Ex.A­1, the remaining balance payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff is only

Rs.1,000/­ within the period of one month as stipulated and went to the extent of contending that the 1st defendant and General Power of Attorney

Holder obtained Ex.B­1 Chellu Raseedu/receipt by paying balance amount of Rs.1,000/­. So, there is no outstanding due payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff under the original of Ex.A­1 and after enquiry, the 2nd defendant purchased the plaint schedule property from the 1st defendant under the original of Ex.A­3 and the possession was delivered by the 1st defendant to the 2nd defendant on the very same day and ever since, the 2nd defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the same. It is further the specific contention of the counsel for the 2nd defendant that the property was not purchased in the personal capacity of the 2nd defendant, but it was purchased on behalf of the company and the contention of the counsel for plaintiff in respect to the cancellation deed dated 26.08.2008/Ex.A­2 is only an invented story to defeat the rights of the 2nd defendant in the plaint schedule property and further contends that the 2nd defendant is a bonafide purchaser for valid consideration and the suit is filed by the plaintiff by playing fraud and cheating to have an unlawful 11 gain from the 2nd defendant and further contends that the 2nd defendant is not a proper and necessary party to the suit filed by the plaintiff and the plaint schedule property is in possession of the 2nd defendant. So, the plaintiff is not entitled to any reliefs as sought for.

15) Taking the respective rival contentions into consideration, it is obvious to say that, the initial onus is undoubtedly on the plaintiff to clinchingly establish that the 1st defendant obtained Ex.A­1 by playing fraud and misrepresentation on the plaintiff. In this scenario, it is to be observed as to how far the plaintiff had succeeded in substantiating and establishing that the 1st defendant obtained Ex.A­1 by playing fraud and misrepresentation on the plaintiff.

16)The plaintiff herself deposed as P.W­1. The husband of plaintiff was examined as P.W­2 and the attestors­cum­identifying witnesses to Ex.A­1 were examined as P.Ws­3 and 4. It is to be observed as to how far the evidence of P.Ws­1 to 4 are suffice to prove the case of the plaintiff.

17)A perusal of the affidavit­in­chief of P.W­1 cogently go to show that, it is quite reiterating the averments contained in the plaint. In the beginning of the cross­examination, P.W­1 admitted that the 1st defendant is not related to her. She admitted of having executed the original of

Ex.A­1 in favour of the 1st defendant to sell the plaint schedule properties and unequivocally admitted that it is recited in Ex.A­1 that the plaint schedule properties were sold for Rs.4,68,000/­ and she received

Rs.4,67,000/­ and that a sum of Rs.1,000/­ was due from the 1st defendant. While admitting these suggestions, no care is evinced by P.W­1 at least to supply any emphasis, despite it is the specific case of the plaintiff that only Rs.1,000/­ was received by her from the 1st defendant under the original of Ex.A­1 and that Rs.4,67,000/­ is still payable, 12 though it is recited as such in Ex.A­1. It is her categorical evidence that she do not know whether the 1st defendant sold away the plaint schedule properties to the 2nd defendant as per Ex.A­1 and Ex.B­1. It is her evidence that P.Ws­2 to 4 were present at the time of execution of Ex.A­1 and there is no such recital in Ex.A­1 about the presence of P.W­2 at the time of transaction of Ex.A­1.

18)A perusal of evidence of P.W­2 cogently go to show that, he happens to be the husband of P.W­1. His version is quite corroborating the version of P.W­1 in all material aspects of the case of the plaintiff. In the beginning of the cross­examination he also admitted that the 1st defendant is not related to him and he got acquaintance with 1st defendant at the time of transaction under Ex.A­1 and he is deposing at the request of

P.W­1. He categorically admitted that he mentioned in his affidavit­in­ chief that since the 1st defendant and other purchasers, who are none other than his relatives have obtained number of signatures of the plaintiff on several papers like 5 Sale Agreements­cum­General Power of Attorneys and other papers on 30.07.2007. He categorically deposed that he was present at the time of Ex.A­1 and at the time of registration and he is a graduate and he do not know whether the 2nd defendant purchased the plaint schedule properties from the 1st defendant under Ex.A­3, since there is Agreement­cum­General Power of Attorney/Ex.A­1.

19)A perusal of evidence of P.W­3 cogently go to show that, he happens to be the first attestor in Ex.A­1 and the second identifying witness to

Ex.A­1. His version is quite corroborating the version of P.W­2 rather than P.W­1. He categorically deposed that at the request of P.W­1, he is deposing and he is a post graduate in M.Com and attesting witness to

Ex.A­1. He admitted of having mentioned in his affidavit­in­chief that the 1st defendant paid only Rs.1,000/­ out of the total sale consideration of 13

Rs.4,68,000/­ to P.W­1 and went to the extent of categorically admitting that in Ex.A­1 it is mentioned that out of sale consideration of

Rs.4,68,000/­, a sum of Rs.4,67,000/­ was paid as an advance and it is his interesting evidence that without perusing the contents in Ex.A­1, he attested Ex.A­1 and the 1st defendant paid Rs.1,000/­ only to the plaintiff at the time of Ex.A­1 and the Registrar did not read the contents of Ex.A­1 to him. It is his interesting evidence that he do not know whether the plaintiff received the balance of Rs.1,000/­ from the 1st defendant and passed a receipt and the 1st defendant paid the entire sale consideration to the plaintiff under Ex.A­1 and the 2nd defendant purchased the schedule properties from the 1st defendant.

20)A perusal of evidence of P.W­4 cogently go to show that, he happens to be the second attestor in Ex.A­1 and the first identifying witness to

Ex.A­1. His version is quite replica to the contents of the affidavit­in­chief of P.W­3. For the first time, he categorically deposed in his affidavit­in­ chief in para 3 that the 1st defendant and other purchasers, who are none other than his relatives have obtained number of signatures of the plaintiff on several papers like five Sale Agreements­cum­General Power of

Attorneys and other papers on 30.07.2007, as they intended to produce the same for registration on the same day in the Office of the Sub

Registrar, Vuyyuru due to lack of sufficient time, the contents of those documents were not verified and at the time of registration of the documents, plaintiff, her husband, himself and D.Koteswara Kumar and others were also present in the evening hours. He also happens to be a graduate and deposing at the request of P.W­1 and he knows the transaction under Ex.A­1. He further deposed that his full name is

Challagulla Satya Venkata Sudharkar.

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21)A combined reading of the testimonies of P.Ws­1 to 4 in a gamut clinchingly go to show that P.Ws­1 and 2 are related by affinity and for the first time through the evidence of P.W­1, it came to light about the presence of P.Ws­2 to 4 at the time of transaction under Ex.A­1 and P.W­2 categorically pleaded ignorance regarding the transaction between the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant under Ex.A­3 and likewise, for the first time, it came to light through the affidavit­in­chief of P.W­2 about the 1st defendant obtaining signatures of the plaintiff on five Sale Agreements­ cum­General Power of Attorneys and other papers in respect of other properties including Ex.A­1, as such, due to lack of sufficient time, the contents of those documents were not verified, on which the plaintiff subscribed her signatures and they were presented for registration.

Having stated in his affidavit­in­chief about Ex.A­3 transaction, pleading ignorance in the cross­examination is quite astonishing and coming to the evidence of P.Ws­3 and 4, the recitals in Ex.A­1 are admitted as contained therein, except as to deposing that without verifying the contents in

Ex.A­1, he (P.W­3) attested Ex.A­1, no care is evinced to supply any emphasis that in his presence the consideration of only Rs.1,000/­ was passed, but not Rs.4,67,000/­, though he volunteered to say at later part of his evidence, he pleaded ignorance about Ex.B­1, but as seen from the evidence of P.Ws­1 and 2, it is clear that there is no relationship existing between P.W­1, P.W­2 and the 1st defendant and interestingly P.W­4 though stated to be present at the time of transaction under Ex.A­1, he interestingly denied the suggestion in respect to the recitals in Ex.A­1 that the plaint schedule properties were sold for Rs.4,68,000/­ to the 1st defendant by the plaintiff and sale consideration of Rs.4,67,000/­ was paid and only Rs.1,000/­ is due. If really he was present at the time of transaction under Ex.A­1, certainly the most expected answer should be a categorical admission as done by P.W­3.

15

22)On one hand P.Ws­3 and 4 deposed of having present at the time of transaction under Ex.A­1 between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant along with P.Ws­1 and 2 and in equal breath, categorically deposing the recitals by P.W­3 and denying the same by P.W­4 and P.W­3 went a little further to depose that due to lack of sufficient time, he did not go through the recitals and he simply attested, but the fact remains through the evidence of P.Ws­1 to 4 on record that the plaintiff subscribed her signature on

Ex.A­1 along with other five documents that were presented for registration on the very same day in respect of the other properties of the plaintiff in the evening hours. P.Ws­2 to 4 categorically in one voice deposed that due to lack of sufficient time, they did not go through the recitals in Ex.A­1. If that is so, it is highly doubtful to understand about the narration made by P.Ws­2 to 4 in their affidavits­in­chief in respect to the recitals contained in Ex.A­1.

23)Anyway, as the 2nd defendant is claiming to be a purchaser of the plaint schedule property from the 1st defendant, in whose favour there was

Agreement of Sale­cum­General Power of Attorney by the plaintiff and also contending to be a bonafide purchaser for valid consideration, it is worth discussing the evidence placed by the 2nd defendant on record for better appreciation of the matter.

24)The authorized person from the 2nd defendant company was examined as D.W­1 and the attestors to Ex.B­1 receipt were examined as

D.Ws­2 and 3. It is to be observed as to how far the evidence of D.Ws­1 to 3 is suffice to substantiate the case of the 2nd defendant.

25)A perusal of the affidavit­in­chief of D.W­1 cogently go to show that it is quite corroborating the contents in the written statement. It is interestingly suggested to D.W­1 by the counsel for plaintiff that there are 16 three defendants in the suit, however it is denied by D.W­1. He categorically deposed that an extent of Ac.1­48 cents was purchased by the 2nd defendant company from the 1st defendant and it is situated at

Gurajada village. He admitted that Ex.A­1 is non­possessory agreement­ cum­General Power of Attorney dated 30.07.2007 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the 1st defendant and Ex.B­1 is a typed document and he know the contents of Ex.B­1, which relates to Ex.A­1 and he cannot say whether there are any handwritings in Ex.B­1. He unequivocally admitted that two witnesses were present in Ex.B­1 and he was not present at the time of execution of Ex.B­1 and he had no personal knowledge of the same and Ex.A­1 covers Ac.2­08 cents which was later purchased by the 2nd defendant under Ex.A­3 and the total consideration under Ex.B­1 is

Rs.3,33,000/­ and the value of Ex.A­1 was Rs.4,68,000/­. He admitted that as per Ex.A­1, the total extent is Ac.2­08 cents and as per Ex.B­1, it is Ac.1­48 cents and there are variations in Ex.A­1 and Ex.B­1 and the witnesses in Ex.B­1 are land brokers and the schedule property is being looked after by the 2nd defendant till date and the meaning of the word ‘non­possessory’ is that the property is not delivered to the purchaser. In

Ex.A­3 and in Ex.B­1, it is not mentioned that the property was delivered to the 1st defendant by the plaintiff. He admitted that there are handwritings in Ex.B­1 at date column and document number column and on behalf of the 2nd defendant, they purchased the company lands and he deposed that it is not necessary to obtain no objection certificate or affidavit from the original owner under non­possessory agreement of sale­ cum­General Power of Attorney, while registration of sale deeds in the Sub

Registrar Office and he had no personal knowledge about mode of payment i.e., either through cheque or demand draft or by way of cash under Ex.A­1 by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff and the witnesses, who subscribed their signatures on Ex.A­3 are not the persons/witnesses in 17

Ex.B­1 and the scribe of Ex.A­3 is not the scribe of Ex.B­1 and Ex.B­1 was executed in the house of the 1st defendant.

26)A perusal of the affidavit­in­chief of D.W­2 cogently go to show that, he happens to be the second attestor of Ex.B­1 and the rest of the version is quite corroborating the version of D.W­1 so far as Ex.B­1 is concerned.

In the cross­examination, he categorically deposed that plaintiff was present at the time of execution of Ex.B­1 and he is working as an agent in real estate business and the meaning of the word ‘non­possessory’ is that the property is not delivered to the executee of the document. He admitted that generally when the document is presented for registration

before the Sub Registrar, it is necessary to file an affidavit from the

General Power of Attorney Holder and he is the second attestor in Ex.B­1 and two persons attested Ex.B­1 and admitted that there are three attestors on Ex.B­1 and no handwriting appeared in Ex.B­1, except the signatures and he did not observe whether there were handwritings in

Ex.B­1. Ex.B­1 was first filled­up and later he signed and there are dealings in landed properties between him and the 2nd defendant and he subscribed his signature on Ex.B­1 in Vuyyuru and he cannot say the name of the scribe of Ex.B­1 and besides him D.W­3 was also present, who attested Ex.B­1 and at the time of execution of Ex.B­1, along with him, D.W­3 and two or three persons were present and he cannot say how much amount was passed between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant under Ex.A­1 and cannot say the extent of the property covered under

Ex.B­1.

27)A perusal of the affidavit­in­chief of D.W­3 cogently go to show that, he happens to be the third attestor of Ex.B­1. His version is quite corroborating the version of D.Ws­1 and 2 so far as the receipt under

Ex.B­1 is concerned. He also happens to be an agent in the real estate 18 business and he is looking after the business affairs of the 2nd defendant company and Ex.B­1 was prepared in the company of the 2nd defendant and it is a typed document. No pen was used in Ex.B­1 for preparing it and the signatories in Ex.B­1 used their pens to put their signatures in

Ex.B­1. He admitted that the transaction under Ex.B­1 took place in the 2nd defendant company and the word ‘non­possessory’ means the property was not delivered and he is in the habit of getting documents registered and he kept his signature on so many receipts for 2nd defendant company and he is in the habit attesting sale deeds for the 2nd defendant and except on Ex.B­1, he had not sign on any other document relating to schedule property.

28)Taking the factual matrix coupled with the evidence placed on record, it goes without saying that P.W­1 had executed the original of

Ex.A­1 in favour of the 1st defendant herein and it is also clear that the 1st defendant herein had executed the original of Ex.A­3 in favour of the 2nd defendant herein and it is also clear that Ex.B­1 is issued by P.W­1 herein to the 1st defendant. 

29)According to the contention of the counsel for plaintiff right from the inception that the 1st defendant played fraud and misrepresentation and obtained Ex.A­1 and without knowing the contents, subscribed her signature in the presence of P.Ws­2 to 4. However, scribe was left unexamined by the plaintiff and it is the evidence on record that P.W­2, is graduate in Automobile Engineering and P.Ws­3 and 4 were also educated and P.Ws­1 and 3 are related. However, apart from the original of Ex.A­1,

P.W­1 had also executed four agreements of sale like that of the original of

Ex.A­1 relating to other suits and it is clear from the evidence placed by the plaintiff on record that on 30.07.2007 five agreements of sale­cum­

General Power of Attorneys were executed for the total extent of the 19 holding of P.W­1 in favour of different persons, who are 1st defendants in all the suits/appeals and it is the vehement contention of the counsel for plaintiff that it is recited in Ex.A­1 that the total consideration is

Rs.4,68,000/­ and a sum of Rs.4,67,000/­ was given on the date of

Ex.A­1 with a clear recital that Rs.1,000/­ shall be paid within one month from the date of original of Ex.A­1 and it is the specific contention of the counsel for plaintiff that only Rs.1,000/­ was paid on the date of execution of original of Ex.A­1 with an understanding to pay balance amount of

Rs.4,67,000/­ within one month and as the 1st defendant did not respond, she caused enquiries suspecting his bonafidies and came to know about the existence of original of Ex.A­3 in favour of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant for the plaint schedule property. So, she executed the original of Ex.A­2. However, it is conceded by P.W­1 that the Sub Registrar,

Vuyyuru refused to register the document. So a cancellation of Ex.A­1 can only be by registered instrument. When the Sub Registrar, Vuyyuru refused to register Ex.A­2, it can be said that Ex.A­2 is non­est in the eye of law as it is a compulsorily registerable document in the eye of law as per section 17 of The Indian Registration Act and when it is the specific case of the plaintiff that against the endorsement of the Sub Registrar,

Vuyyuru she preferred appeal before the District Registrar, Vijayawada

East. No iota of evidence is placed by the plaintiff in that end to know the outcome of the said appeal. Anyway, Ex.A­2 is much subsequent to the date of original of Ex.A­1. So, on the date of execution of original of

Ex.A­3 by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant, the original of

Ex.A­2 is not in existence and when execution of Ex.A­1 is admitted and when the plaintiff contends that the recital as to the consideration is not to her knowledge, it can be said that onus is very heavy on the plaintiff to substantiate the same. In order to substantiate the veracity of her case, she got examined P.Ws­2 and 3, who are her husband and the first 20 attestor to Ex.A­1 and P.W­4, who is said to have been present at the time of transaction of original of Ex.A­1 and the evidence of P.W­2 cogently go to show that he was present at the time of transaction under the original of Ex.A­1 and what is deposed by P.W­1 is negatived by P.W­2 and so is the evidence of P.Ws­3 and 4.

30)On the other hand, it is the specific contention of the counsel for 2nd defendant that as the 2nd defendant purchased the property after going through the recitals in the original of Ex.A­1 and original of Ex.B­1 receipt which was handed over by the 1st defendant to the 2nd defendant on the date of transaction under the original of Ex.A­3, the property was purchased. A perusal of Ex.B­1 go to show that there was an acknowledgement to the effect of reception of Rs.3,33,000/­ on the date of registration of Ex.A­1 i.e., 31.07.2007 and the balance was paid on 25.08.2007 i.e., within the stipulated time in the original of Ex.A­1 and as such, the receipt was passed in the presence of D.Ws­2 and 3 and the possession was delivered on the date of Ex.B­1 i.e., 25.08.2007. When such is the case, it is highly difficult to receive the contention of the counsel for plaintiff that possession was still intact with the plaintiff.

When it is the material on record as other batch suits/appeals are also pending adjudication and it is clear from the evidence on record that the 2nd defendant apart from plaint schedule property, had purchased other properties and after getting necessary approval had laid into plots and had sold some of the plots and the purchasers are in possession of the property.

31)Anyway, the subsequent events cannot be taken into much consideration and the only point which is to be seen is whether Ex.A­1 is vitiated by any fraud or misrepresentation as contended by the plaintiff and it is evidently clear that the 1st defendant is stranger to P.Ws­1 and 2 21 as deposed by them. So, when such is the case, it is further doubtful to understand the very case of the plaintiff as to how a stranger can play fraud or misrepresentation on P.W­1 for the purpose of getting the original of Ex.A­1 from her and even assuming that the 1st defendant has played fraud, it is further doubtful to receive the evidence of P.Ws­1 to 4 to the effect in or around 30.07.2007 five such agreements were executed by them and coming to the evidence, it is crystal clear that the parties to original of Ex.A­1 were literates, so also, P.Ws­2 to 4 and when all are literates. So, eventually there cannot be any room to plead ignorance about the recitals contained in the original of Ex.A­1 and the recitals in the original of Ex.A­1 were not disputed by P.W­1 since the day of inception. Only the consideration is being disputed, while admitting the execution of original of Ex.A­1 and no other recital is disputed or challenged by P.W­1 and it is also the evidence on record that P.W­2 is looking after the entire transactions and P.W­2 being a graduate, it is quite astonishing to receive the evidence to appreciate that he is not aware of the contents and when it is also the evidence of P.W­2 on record that

before P.W­1 was made to sign on the original of Ex.A­1, the contents were

already gone through by P.W­2 and P.W­2 is not a stranger to P.W­1, evidently he is the husband of P.W­1 and when he is said to have been looking after all the affairs of P.W­1, in common parlance, much is expected from P.W­2 to guide his wife.

32)If such a recital as to the consideration as crept in the original of

Ex.A­1 as contended by the plaintiff, certainly the plaintiff would not have sign and P.W­2 would not have allowed P.W­1 to subscribe her signature on the original of Ex.A­1. So, it goes to impliedly infer that as Ex.A­1 is a registered document, more so in the light of Ex.B­1 being admitted by

P.W­1 during the course of her cross­examination that the signature on 22 stamp on Ex.B­1 belong to her, certainly lend enough credence to the contention of the counsel for the 2nd defendant/appellant that as the entire consideration was paid by the 1st defendant to P.W­1 prior to the date of sale by the 1st defendant to the 2nd defendant, on thorough enquiry, the 2nd defendant purchased the property and when the 2nd defendant is a ‘persona designata’, certainly much care would be exercised as they deal with the property and the evidence of D.Ws­1 to 3 certainly probablise the execution of Ex.B­1 by P.W­1 in favour of the 1st defendant and by any stretch of imagination, it is too remote to understand as to the nature of the fraud played or the misrepresentation made and when the original of Ex.A­1 is dated 30.07.2007 and the registration occurred on the succeeding day according to P.Ws­1 and 2 i.e., on 31.07.2007, the very evidence of P.Ws­3 and 4 that due to lack of sufficient time, as all the five documents are to be presented for registration in the evening hours on 30.07.2007, they did not go through the recitals, certainly cannot be believed as there is ample time for scrutiny before presenting Ex.A­1 for registration on the very succeeding day of its execution. So, in common parlance, it can be said that P.W­1 for the reasons best known had come up with these suits, having sold it to the 1st defendant under Agreement of

Sale­cum­General Power of Attorney and when the recitals in the original of Ex.A­1 go to show that the 1st defendant was authorized to sell the property and execute sale deeds on her behalf and also to take up the legal matters touching the plaint schedule properties and in the capacity of General Power of Attorney Holder of P.W­1 when the 1st defendant executed original of Ex.A­3 in favour of the 2nd defendant on 01.08.2007 and when that is the registered sale deed, there is no forth coming explanation from the plaintiff as to what prevented her till 2009 to file this suit, having issued original of Ex.A­4 on 09.11.2008.

23

33)At the same time fraud and misrepresentation are two different components under the Indian Contract Act and the cancellation of

General Power of Attorney­cum­Agreement of Sale is also covered by a separate act and Indian Contract Act clearly specifies as to when the

General Power of Attorney can be cancelled and likewise, when an agreement can be cancelled is dealt with and in the instant case on hand, if really steps were taken by P.W­1 on the endorsement based on the original of Ex.A­2, certainly if a favourable order is passed in her favour, she would have filed it at least at the time of her evidence, but her evidence is conspicuously silent in that end, except contending that irrespective of the result of the appeal on the original of Ex.A­2, Ex.A­1 is vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation, consequently Ex.A­3 convey no better title on the 2nd defendant, does not hold any water.

34)On the other hand, the 1st defendant remained exparte, but simply because, the 1st defendant remained exparte, it does not go to show that there is collusion either between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant or between the defendants inter se. However, the 2nd defendant, who is said to be in possession of the property had tried to establish Ex.B­1 receipt, having filed it and the evidence of D.W­2 and the D.W­3 is free from any blemish and no concrete elicitations were found in the cross­examination of D.Ws­1 to 3 to tilt the case in favour of the plaintiff side.

35)Anyway, before parting with the judgment, it is worth to mention the authorities relied on by the counsel for 1st respondent/plaintiff here under: 

1. In the case of Veena Hasmuk Jain and another, Appellant Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, Respondents, reported in 1999 SAR (Civil) 226, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: 

24 “In agreement it was mentioned that possession to be handed over within a stipulated period. Therefore, this agreement to sell property amounts to a conveyance even without executing any conveyance deed. Then it is open to the legislature to levy duty as different kinds of agreement. In such cases levy of duty is open even on the agreement for sale when possession to be given is mentioned therein.

Hence, the notice received by appellants is quite legal as agreement amounts to be a ‘conveyance’ and stamp duty is leviable. Appeal, therefore, is dismissed and no error is notice.”

2. In the case of Greater Bombay Co­operative Bank Limited and

Nagraj Ganeshmal Jain and others, reported in 2017 (177) AIC 206 (SC), wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: 

“It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be trans­ ferred.

Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of TP Act and will not confer any title nor trans­ fer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under section 53A of TP Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts that sale of im­ moveable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject matter.

We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of con­ veyance.

Transactions of the nature of `GPA sales' or `SA/GPA/will transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be rec­ ognized or valid mode of transfer of immovable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers 25 or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognised as deeds of ti­ tle, except to the limited extent of Section 53A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in municipal or revenue records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered assignment of lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/will transactions known as GPA sales.”

3. In the case of Aruna Sagar and others Vs. Shrushti Infrastructure

Corporation, Hyderabad and others, reported in 2016(2) ALD 403, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at

Hyderabad held as follows: 

“In view of the specific language of section 35, it cannot be said that the bar of admissibility of instruments, which are insufficiently stamped is confined only such documents, which are sought to be marked/admitted in evidence.”

4. In the case of Sri Sriram Ramanaiah, Chittiprolu Sai Baba and

Solleti Satyanrayana, Respondent, in Civil Revision Petition

No.3566/2012, wherein his Lordship of the Hon’ble High Court of

Judicature at Hyderabad held as follows: 

“But, so far as the mode of proof is concerned, it is well settled that, if an objection as to the mode is not raised at the stage when the document is marked as evidence in the case U/o.XIII Rule 4 of C.P.C., such an objection cannot be raised at any subsequent stage.”

5. In the case of Suraj Lamp & Industries Private Limited through

Director Vs. State of Haryana and another, reported in 2011 SAR (Civil) 973, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: 

“Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey any title nor create any interest in an immovable property. The observations by the Delhi High Court, in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank ­ 94 (2001) DLT 841, that the "concept of power of attorney sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction" when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/WILL are unwarranted and not justified, 26 unintendedly misleading the general public into thinking that

SA/GPA/WILL transactions are some kind of a recognized or accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a valid substitute for a sale deed. Such decisions to the extent they recognize or accept

SA/GPA/WILL transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement to transfer, are not good law.”

6. In the case of Hindu Public and Another Etc., Appellant Vs.

Rajdhani Puja Samithee and others Etc., Respondent, reported in 1999

AIR (SCW) 582, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: 

“Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 91 ­ Oral evidence could be adduced to show that recitals in deed of registration of society were nominal or were not intended to be acted upon or that they were not meant to alter the existing state of affairs.”

7. In the case of Krishna Mohan Kul @ Nani Charan Kul and another

Vs. Pratima Maity and others, reported in 2003 SAR (Civil) 760, wherein their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: 

“According to High Court, the courts below wrongly placed the onus on the plaintiffs to prove the validity of the deed. Jurisdiction of High

Court U/s.100 of C.P.C. Where the trial Court and/or the First

Appellate Court misdirected themselves in appreciating the question of law and placed the onus on the wrong party there is a scope for interference U/s.100 C.P.C. after formulating a substantial question of law.” “When fraud, misrepresentation is alleged by a party, normally, the burden is on him to prove such fraud, but where an active, confidential or fiduciary relation exists between the parties, there the burden of proof is on the donee. It is always obligatory for the beneficiary under a document to prove due execution of the document in accordance with law.”

8. In the case of Jannuchander Babu, Appellant Vs. Manchikatla

Satyanarayana, Respondent, reported in 2003 (2) ALD 640, wherein his

Lordship of the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court held as follows: 

“After paying the balance due from him to the vendor as per the 27 agreement, the purchaser took possession of the property agreed to be sold and obtained an endorsement to that effect on the reverse of the agreement. Answering the question whether such endorsement of delivery of possession need be stamped as a sale deed as contemplated by Article 47­A of Schedule 1­A of Stamp Act.” “While approving that view the Division Bench clearly held that whenever a document contains a recital that "possession" is given to, or "retained with" the purchaser, "in pursuance of an agreement of sale", such document is amenable to stamp duty as a sale deed as per Article 47­A of Schedule 1­A of Stamp Act. If the contention of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner that a receipt evidencing payment of balance due under the agreement of sale containing a recital that possession of the property agreed to be sold earlier was delivered, need not be stamped as a sale deed as contemplated by Article 47­A of Schedule 1­A of Stamp Act, is accepted, the object of amending Schedule 1­A of Stamp Act by introducing Article 47­

A would be frustrated, because agreements of sale without containing a recital relating delivery of possession can be executed on one day and on the very next day receipts evidencing payment of balance amount due under the agreement can be passed contains a recital that possession was delivered on receipt of the balance of sale consideration. It is only with a view to avoid such practice Schedule 1­A of Stamp Act was amended.” “The contention that a document evidencing receipt of money need be stamped only as a receipt in spite of the fact that it contains a recital recording delivery of possession of property in pursuance of an agreement of sale, cannot be accepted in view of Sections 5 and 6 of

Stamp Act. A document evidencing receipt of the balance of sale consideration due and payable as per the agreement, coupled with a recital recording delivery of possession of property agreed to be sold, also has to be stamped as a sale deed. In view thereof the contention that collecting stamp duty on a document [receipt] containing a recital recording delivery of possession of property subsequent to the agreement of sale, in cases where the possession of the property is not delivered on the date of agreement of sale, tantamounts to collecting stamp duty on the 'transaction' but not the 'instrument' has 28 no force.”

However, the said authorities are not applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case on hand. 

36)On the other hand, the learned counsel for appellant/2nd defendant had drawn attention to the following authorities:

1. In the case of Mahender Kehar Vs. Skyland Builders Private Limited and others, reported in 2019 DELHI 145, wherein his Lordship of

Hon’ble Delhi High Court held as follows:

“a mere mention of fraud in a pleading is not sufficient; (ii) a party pleading fraud is obliged, under Order VI Rule 4 of CPC, to give particulars of the pleaded fraud, with dates and items in the pleadings; (iii) the defendant having admitted knowledge that he was executing the sale deed, it was not open to the defendant to claim that the instrument of sale was hit by fraud because according to the defendant, the intention of the parties was to create a security in favour of the plaintiffs for the loan granted to the defendant; (iv) the spirit and purpose of enacting Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 is to render the written contract, grant or other disposition the sole repository of the terms contained therein;

(v) if the intention of the parties was, as was claimed by the defen­ dant, then that intention, objective and purpose should have been so spelled out in the instrument; (vi) to permit a party to plead contrary to the terms of the Sale Deed to which he is a party, would be to put premium on dishonesty.” “As far back as in Kedar Nath Motani Vs. Prahlad Rai AIR 1960 SC 217 it was reiterated that the principle of public policy is ex dolo malo non oritur actio i.e.no court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act; if, from the plaintiff ‟ s own stating or otherwise the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the

Court says he has no right to be assisted. Similarly, in Surasaibalini

Debi Vs. Phanindra Mohan Majumdar AIR 1965 SC 1364 it was held that if the plaintiff seeks the assistance of the Court to effectuate an unlawful transaction, the Courts will refuse to assist him. In Nais 29

Service Society Vs. Rev Father K.C. Alexander AIR 1968 SC 1165, it was held that in a case in which the plaintiff must rely on his own illegality, the Court may refuse him assistance. In Bhartiya Seva

Samaj Trust Vs. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel (2012) 9 SCC 310 relying on the legal maxim allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus, it was held that a person alleging his own infamy cannot be heard at any forum. It was further held that if a party has committed a wrong, he cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own wrong.”

2. In the case of Ms.Priya Dayaldas Jethani Vs. Hitesh Ghanshyamdas

Sawlani, reported in AIR 2019 BOMBAY 108, wherein their Lordships of

Hon’ble Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench held as follows:

 “Regarding dissolution of the first marriage being the material facts were required to be pleaded specifically. These material facts, how­ ever, were not pleaded. Therefore, as per the settled law, the evi­ dence tendered without material pleadings having been raised by the appellant ought not to have been taken on record and if it was taken, it required to be ignored. So, such evidence of the appellant which went beyond the pleadings deserves to be ignored and was rightly ig­ nored by the trial Court. Even if the evidence adduced by the appel­ lant beyond her pleading is considered, just for the sake of argument, still, this evidence being deficit in material facts necessary for proving the case of customary defence would not help the appellant in any manner. This would suggest that a custom which stands as an ex­ ception to the general law of divorce assumes form of a material fact, as it constitutes cause of action, and, therefore, it is required to be pleaded specifically and also established by the party propounding it.” 

3. In the case of Savithramma, Petitioner Vs. H.Gurappa Reddy and

Others, Respondents, reported in AIR 1996 KARNATAKA 99, wherein his Lordship of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court held as follows:

“It is a well settled law that even within the province of civil litigation when an allegation of misrepresentation or fraud is made, that the level of proof required is extremely high and is rated on par with a criminal trial. On the basis of the material before the Court here, it 30 would therefore be impossible to uphold the charge that the compromise decree stood vitiated on grounds of either misrepresentation or fraud. To my mind, therefore that contention cannot be upheld. before asking for a review, it would be necessary for the applicant to demonstrate that there has been an error apparent on the face of the record which is not the case here in so far as that has not even been pleaded. Secondly, the learned counsel has relied on another decision of the Supreme Court , in the case of M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Govt. of Andhra

Pradesh. That was a case in which the Court had occasion to consider the subtle distinction between an erroneous decision and a decision which is vitiated by error apparent.”

4. In the case of Purna Nand Puri, Appellant Vs. Kamala Sinha and another, Respondents, reported in AIR 1965 PATNA 39, wherein their

Lordships of Honble Patna High Court held as follows:

“Normally a person, who subscribes to a deed must be bound by all the recitals contained therein. Nevertheless, a lessee is not precluded from showing that, despite the recitals to the contrary effect 

5. In the case of R.Durairaj, Appellant Vs. Seethalakshmi Ammal and others, Respondents, reported in AIR 1992 MADRAS 242, wherein his

Lordship of Hon’ble Madras High Court held as follows:

“It is the fundamental principle in the law of pleadings that no amount of evidence can be looked upon in support of a plea having no foundation in the pleading, and a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings. Apart from there being no pleadings, the evidence also is not sufficient to come to a conclusion that she has spent any definite amount either for jewels or for other expenses.” 

6. In the case of Vinod Kumar Arora, Appellant Vs. Smt.Surjit Kaur,

Respondent, reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 2179, wherein their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“However, when the appellant entered the witness box, he gave up the case set out in the written statement and pro­ pounded a different case that the hall had been taken on lease only for non­residential purposes. Both the Authorities have failed to bear in mind that the 31 pleadings of the parties from the foundation of their case and it is not open to them to give up the case set out in the pleadings and propound a new and different case. Yet another factor which vitiates the findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority is that both of them have over­looked Section 11 of the Act, and the sustainability of any lease transaction entered in contravention of Section 11. The legislature, with a view to ensure adequate housing accommodation for the people, has interdicted by means of Section 11 the conversion of residential buildings into non­ residential ones without the written consent of the Rent Controller. It is true that in the said decision, it was held that when a leased premises was used by the lessee incidently for professional purposes and that too with the consent of the landlord, then the case would go out of the purview of Section 13(3)(e) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent

Control Act 1954. We do not therefore think the High Court has committed any error in law in ignoring the findings rendered by the

Statutory Authorities about the purpose for which the hall had been taken on lease.”

7. In the case of R.N.Gosani, Petitioner Vs. Yashpal Dhir, Respondent, reported in AIR 1993 S.C. 352, wherein their Lordships of Hon’ble

Supreme Court held as follows:

“Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid any thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. After taking an advantage under an order (for example for the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside."

8. In the case of Moran Mar Basselios Chatolicos, Appellant Vs.

Thukalan Paulo Avira and others, Respondents, reported in AIR 1959

S.C.31, wherein their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“Held that on the pleadings as they stood and on the issues as they had been framed, it was not impossible to permit the plaintiff­ respondent to go outside the pleadings and set up a new case that 32 the supremacy of the Patriarch had been taken away by the mere fact of the adoption of the new constitution or by any particular clause thereof other than those relating to matters specifically referred to in the pleadings. The issues could not be permitted to be stretched to cover matters which were not, on a reasonable construction, within the pleadings on which they were founded. 

“Therefore, the plaintiff cannot question the validity of the defendants' title as trustees of the church properties. Learned counsel for the defendant­ appellant also points out that even if the plaintiffs may in their individual capacity as members of the community maintain this suit with a view to dislodge the defendants from their office as trustees the onus is on the plaintiffs and not on the defendants who have not come to court for a declaration of title to prove that the defendants have no. title as trustees. The question of burden of proof at the end of the case, when both parties have adduced their evidence is not of very great importance and the court has to come to a decision on a consideration of all materials. Further although in the cause title or in the body of the plaint the plaintiffs do not claim to have instituted the suit for themselves and on behalf of all other members of community proceedings were taken under the provisions.” “The plaintiffs came to court charging the defendants as heretics or as having gone out of the church for having adopted a constitution (Ex. A. M.) which contains the several specific matters pleaded in the plaint. On the pleadings as they stand and on the issues as they have been framed, it is now impossible to permit the plaintiff­ respondent to go outside the pleadings and set up a new case that the supremacy of the Patriarch has been taken away by the mere fact of the adoption of the new constitution (Ex. A. M.) or by any particular clause thereof other than those relating to matters specifically referred to in the pleadings. The issues cannot be permitted to be stretched to cover matters which are not, on a reasonable construction, within the pleadings on which they were founded.”

9. In the case of Gouri Dutt Ganesh Lall Firm, Appellant Vs. Madho

Prasad and others, Respondents, reported in AIR (30) 1943 Privy

33

Council 147, wherein their Lordships held as follows:

“In India, however, as in England, the duty of a pleader is to set out the facts upon which he relies and not the legal inferences to be drawn from them. In India the Order is O. 6, R. 2, and their Lordships think sufficient circumstances have been set out in para. 10 to justify a finding that Madho by signing the document undertook liability to pay the sum now claimed. In their Lordships' view that is the natural and, indeed, the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the signing of the hatchita.” 

10. In the case of The Central Bank of India Limited, Appellant Vs.

Hari Prasad Jalan and others, Respondents, reported in AIR 1972

S.C.1274, wherein their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“The most striking feature about the whole matter is that at no stage the defendants either wrote or protested against the non­delivery of the goods. We are completely at a loss to understand how in these circumstances any oral evidence could be looked at for determining whether the admissions contained in all the aforesaid documents about the delivery of goods to the defendants were wrong. In our judgment in such circumstances oral evidence would be worthless and would be of no value even if it could be considered in spite of the serious infirmity in the whole case of the defendants on the point there being complete absence of pleadings and issues.”

11. In the case of Udhav Singh, Appellant Vs. Madhav Rao Scindia,

Respondent, reported in AIR 1976 S.C.744, wherein their Lordships of

Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“It is not permissible to call out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context, in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words, or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention' of the party concerned is to be gathered, primarily, from the tenor and terms of his pleading taken as a whole.” 34 “A pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context, in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words, or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered, primarily, from the tenor and terms of his pleading taken as a whole. All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his defence, are “material facts”. “Material facts” would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of the particular corrupt practice alleged, which the petitioner is bound to substantiate

before he can succeed on that charge. Whether in an election petition,

a particular facts and circumstances is material or not, and as such required to be pleaded is a question which depends on the nature of the charge levelled, the ground relied upon and the special circumstances of the case. “Material facts” which must be pleaded and failure to plead even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of Section 83 (1)(a). “Material

Particulars” therefore mean all the details which are necessary to amplify, refine and embellish the material facts already pleaded in the petition in compliance with the requirements of Clause (a).

“Particulars” serve the purpose of finishing touches to the basic contours of a picture already drawn, to make it.”

12. In the case of P.Arumugham Vs. P.Balasubramaniam, in

A.S.981/1993, wherein his Lordship of Hon’ble Madras High Court held

as follows:

"Order 6 Rule 2: Pleading to state material facts and not evidence.­ "All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of auction or his defence are material facts. The distinction between "material facts' and "particulars" cannot be overlooked. Material facts are primary and basic facts which must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him, either to establish his cause of auction or defence.

Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet, in absence of pleading a party cannot be 35 allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit and categorically set out that if material particulars are missing in the pleadings, then oral evidence cannot be entertained. It is also worthy and significant to note that even before the institution of the suit, in the reply notice the defendants have chosen to come forward with the plea.” 

13. In the case of Afsar Sheikh and another Vs. Soleman Bibi and

Others, reported in AIR 1976 S.C.163, wherein their Lordships of

Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“A general allegation in the plaint that the plaintiff was a simple old man of 90 years who had reposed great confidence in the appellant was totally insufficient to amount to an averment of undue influence of which the High Court could take notice.”

(i) Whether the party seeking relief on the ground of undue influence has proved that the relations between the parties.

(ii) it is not sufficient for the person seeking relief to show merely that the relations of the parties have been such that one naturally relied upon the other for advice and that the other was in a position to dominate the will of first in giving it.

(iii) if the transaction appears to be unconscionable, then the burden of proving that it was not induced by undue “The defendant's pleading could not be reasonably construed as an admission, direct or inferential, of the fact that he was in a position to dominate the will of the plaintiff. In spelling out a plea of undue influ­ ence for the plaintiff by an `inverted' construction of the defendants' pleading, the High Court overlooked the principle conveyed by the maxim secundum allegataet probata, that the plaintiff could succeed only by what he had alleged and proved. He could not be allowed to travel beyond what was pleaded by him and put in issue. On his fail­ ure to prove his case as alleged, the court could not conjure up a new case for him by stretching his pleading and reading into it something which was not there, nor in issue, with the aid of an extraneous doc­ ument.”  36 “to constitute 'undue influence' two basic elements must be cumulatively present. First, the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other. Second, the party in dominant position uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. Both these conditions must be pleaded with particularity and proved by the person seeking to avoid the transaction.”

According to this rule, if a person seeking to avoid a transaction on the ground of undue influence proves­

(a) that the party who had obtained the benefit was, at the material time, in a position to dominate the will of the other conferring the ben­ efit, and

(b) that the transaction is unconscionable, the burden shifts on the party benefitting by the transaction to show that it was not induced by undue influence. If either of these two conditions is not estab­ lished the burden will not shift. As shall be disused presently, in the instant case the first condition had not been established, and conse­ quently, the burden never shifted on the defendant.

"Error is almost sure to arise if the order of these propositions be changed. The unconscionableness of the bargain is not the first thing to be considered. The first thing to be considered is the relations of the parties. Were they such as to put one in a position to dominate the will of the other".

The failure of the plaintiff to prove this element of 'undue infuence', which was to be considered at the first stage, would itself lead to the collapse of the whole ground of "undue influence".

14. In the case of K.M.Mdhavakrishnan Vs. S.R.Sami and Others, reported in 1980(2) MLJ 398, wherein his Lordship of Hon’ble Madras

High Court held as follows:

“The general rule of law is that a party of full age and understanding is normally bound by his signature to a document whether he reads it or understands it or not. Equity does not save people from the conse­ quences of their own folly but will save them from being victimised by 37 other people. Sir Raymond Evershed, M..R. has observed in Tufton v.

Sperni (1952) 2 T.L.R. 516 at 519, as follows:

Extravagant liberality and immoderate folly do not of themselves pro­ vide a passport to equitable relief.

But, if however, a party has been misled in executing a deed or sign­ ing a document essentially different from that which he intended to execute or sign, he can plead non est factum in an action against him and the deed or writing is completely void in whomsoever hands it may come. As Byles, J., said in Foster v. Mackinnon (1869) L.R. 4.

C.P. 704 at 711.”

The doctrine of non est factum does not apply unless there is a misrepresentation inducing a mistaken belief as to the class or character of the supposed document and not a misrepresentation simply as to its contents. On the other hand, a mistake as to the contents of a deed or document is not sufficient.

(1) The plea of non est factum can only rarely be established by a person of full capacity; and, although it is not confined to blind or illiterate persons, any extension in the scope of the plea will be kept within narrow limits. (2) The burden of establishing the plea falls on the signatory seeking to disown the document; and he must show that, in signing the document he acted with reasonable care.

Carelessness which would preclude him from pleading non est factum is based on the principle that no man can take advantage of his own wrong and is not an instance of negligence operating by way of estoppel.

The House of Lords in Saunders v. Anglia Building Society (1971)

A.C. 1004, has over­ruled Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Co. v.

Bragg (1911) 1 K.B. 489, and has held that no matter what class of document was in question, negligence or carelessness on the part of the person signing the document would exclude the defence of "non est factum".

“The deceased first plaintiff has not pleaded what exactly was the nature of the document which the second defendant suggested her to execute. However one thing is clear that is what was suggested by 38 the second defendant to be executed by her, was a document in relation to the suit property and that the document should be executed in the names of defendants 1 and 2 in trust as the first defendant was said to be a very wealthy and influential person who could be trusted.”

Further, it is not stated in the plaint that she was prevented from reading and understand the contents of the document; nor has she stated that notwithstanding her request the document was not read over to her. On the other hand, she has clearly admitted that the doc­ ument was prepared by the second defendant and she acted without suspicion as per his instructions. This amounts to a clear admission of the execution of the document on her part. If she put her signature to the document without attempting to understand the nature and contents of the document and without being prevented by anybody from understanding the nature and contents thereof, she must be deemed to be guilty of carelessness and that would preclude her from pleading that her mind did not go with her signature when she signed the document. The correct rule as regards carelessness which emerges from the decision of House of Lords in Sounders v. Anglia

Building Society (1971) A.G. 1004, is leaving aside negotiable instru­ ments to which special rules may apply, a person who signs a docu­ ment, and parts with it so that it may come into other hands, has a responsibility, that of the normal man of prudence to take care what he signs, which if neglected prevents him from denying his liability under the document according to its tenor. The onus of proof in this matter rests upon him i.e., to prove that he acted carefully and not upon the third party to prove the contrary.

Whenever a person of full age and understanding puts his signature to a legal document without taking the trouble of reading it or without asking the document to be read and explained to him but signs it re­ lying on the word of another as to its character, content or effect, he cannot be heard to say that it is not his document. 

In Bishundeo v. Seogeni Rao , Bose, J., speaking for the Bench ob­ served thus:

39

Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be de­ cided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. A vague or general plea can never serve this purpose; the party pleading must therefore he re­ quired to plead the precise nature of the influence exercised, the man­ ner of use of the influence, and the unfair advantage obtained by the other. However, in view of the fact that a plea had been taken though without giving particulars and an issue has been raised and evidence has been let in, it is but fair that we should consider the question whether the agreement for sale is the result of undue influence exer­ cised by the second defendant on the deceased first plaintiff. Under common law was evolved in England to save people from being vic­ timized by others.” 

15. In the case of Rangammal Vs. Kuppuswami and another in Civil

Appeal No.562/2003, wherein their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines `burden of proof' which clearly lays down that whosoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or law dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Thus, the Evidence Act has clearly laid down that the burden of proving fact always lies upon the person who asserts. Since the High Court has misplaced burden of proof, it clearly vitiated its own judgments as also of the courts below since it is well established dictum of the Evidence Act. The onus is on the plaintiff to positively establish its case on the basis of material available and it cannot rely on the weakness or absence of defence to discharge onus. It is for the plaintiff to prove his title to the property.” 

37)The learned counsel for appellant/2nd defendant had also drawn attention to the following authorities: 

40

1. In the case of Santanu Kumar Das and others, Appellants Vs. Bairagi

Charan Das and others, Respondents reported in AIR 1995 ORISSA 300.

2. In the case of State of West Bengal, Appellat Vs. Subinmal Kumar

Mondal and another, Respondents reported in AIR 1982 CALCUTTA 251.

3. In the case of Chanan Kaur alias Chandan Kaur and another,

Appelalnts Vs Kartari (D) by L.Rs and others, Respondents reported in

AIR 2004 PUNJAB and HARYANA 331.

4. In the case ofGappulal, Appellant Vs. Thakuriji Shriji

Dwarkadheeshji and another, Respondents reported in AIR 1969

SUPREME COURT 1291.

5. In the case of Braham Parkash (In C.A.No.76 of 1961) 2.Jagdish

Chand and another (In C.A.Nos. 77 and 78 of 1961), Appellants Vs. Maji

Singh, Minor through Mst.Balwant widow of S.Mohinder Singh and others, Respondents reported in AIR 1963 SUPREME COURT 1607 (V50

C24).

6. In the case of Salig Ram, Appellant Vs. Munshi Rani and another,

Respondents reported in AIR 1961 SUPREME COURT 1374 (V48 C257).

7. In the case of Bondar Singh and others, Appellants Vs.Nihal Singh and others, Respondents reported in AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 1905.

8. In the case of Hardeep Kaur Vs Kailash and another in

RFA.No.648/2006 on the file of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi.

9. In the case of A.C.Anantha swamy and others Vs Boraiah (D) by L.rs in Appeal (Civil) No.3768/2000 on the file of Hon’ble Supreme Court of

India.

10. In the case of Addagada Raghavamma and another Vs. Adagada

Chenchamma and another reported in 1964 AIR 136.

11. In the case of D.R.Puri Vs.lKamlesh Sawhney and another reported in 2001(60) DRJ 738.

12. In the case of Union Bank of India and others Vs Vasavi Co­ operative Housing Society in Civil Appeal No.4702/2004 on the file of

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

13. In the case of Maya Devi Vs.Lalta Prasad in Civil Appeal

No.2458/2014 on the file of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

41

14. In the case of Padma Bewa Vs Krupasindhu Biswal and others reported in AIR 1986 Ori 97.

15. In the case of Ranganayakamma and another Vs. K.S.Prakash(D) by

L.rs and others in Civil Appeal No.3635/2008 on the file of Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India.

16. In the case of S.Chattanatha Karayalar Vs The Central Bank of

India and others reported in 1965 AIR 1856.

17. In the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries (P) Vs. State of Haryana and another in Special Leave Petition© No.13917/2009 on the file of

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

18. In the case of V.Chandramohan Vs. J.Venkatagopal and others in

Second Appeal No.406/2014 on the file of Hon’ble High Court of Andhra

Pradesh.

19. In the case of Vimal Chand Gherarchand Jain and others Vs.

Ramakant Eknath Jajoo in Civil Appeal No.1784/2009 on the file of

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

However, the said authorities are not applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case on hand. 

38)Taking the totality of the facts and circumstances into consideration, it goes without saying that the counsel for plaintiff vehemently contended that the original of Ex.A­1 is invalid in the light of execution of the original of Ex.A­3 and Ex.B­1 is inadmissible document as it is liable for registration and deficit stamp and as Ex.A­1 is vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation, it does not confer any valid right or title under the original of Ex.A­3 to the 2nd defendant/appellant.

39)A perusal of the recitals contained in Ex.A­1 cogently go to show that, it clearly reveals that an amount of Rs.4,67,000/­ was paid on its date and the balance of Rs.1,000/­ is to be paid within one month and the entire recitals in Ex.A­1 are conspicuously silent as to whether it is irrevocable non­possessory agreement of sale­cum­General Power of 42

Attorney or not and there is no recital in the document that the plaintiff had right to take back her possession.

40)Undoubtedly, Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act deals with as to when a Power of Attorney can be terminated. A plain reading of section 202 clearly postulates that in the absence of an express contract, where it is shown that agent himself had an interest in the property subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot be terminated to the prejudice of such interest. However, it is settled legal analogy that unilateral power of cancellation is not void and it is the specific case of the plaintiff that by execution of Ex.A­2, she cancelled Ex.A­1. However

U/s.206 of the Indian Contract Act, reasonable notice must be given on such revocation or renunciation; otherwise the damage thereby resulting to the principal or the agent, as the case may be, must be made good to the one by the other and U/s.208 of the Indian Contract Act, the termination of the authority of an agent, does not, so far as regards the agent, take effect before it becomes known to him, or so far as regards third persons, before it becomes known to them and the termination of agency comes into effect from the date of its knowledge by agent and third parties and action of the agent binding on the principal unless he establishes that agent and third parties and entire world had knowledge of termination of agency by him and interest and title in the sale deed in favour of third parties stands protected, if third party purchased the property on belief of the existence of the power of attorney and purchase of the suit property by the power of attorney.

41)In the instant case on hand, though much is harped upon by both counsel regarding these provisions of the Indian Contract Act, it is pertinent to make a specific mention that the document under the original of Ex.A­1 is not a mere General Power of Attorney. The nomenclature of 43 the document goes to show that it is styled as a non­possessory agreement of sale­cum­General Power of Attorney and much is harped upon by the counsel for the plaintiff that mere execution of the General

Power of Attorney in respect of an immovable property touching the rights does not create any valid title or right on the agent ignoring the factum that the nomenclature of the document is otherwise. When it comes out that it is a non­possessory agreement of sale­cum­General Power of

Attorney and Ex.B­1 goes to reveal that the balance sale consideration of

Rs.1,000/­ was received by P.W­1 and possession was delivered on that day and original of Ex.A­3 came into existence before the date of execution of Ex.A­2 and when the 2nd defendant categorically contends to be a bonafide purchaser for valid consideration and simply because, the 1st defendant remained exparte, it does not by itself give any added advantage to the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff that there is collusion between the defendants 1 and 2, as even though the 1st defendant remained exparte, the plaintiff shall invariably prove the case as pleaded in the plaint. When an interest is already created in the suit property in favour of the 1st defendant by execution of Ex.A­1, which remains an admitted fact on record through the evidence of P.W­1 and her pleadings in the plaint and disputing the quantum of consideration passed and simply contending that it was rescinded or cancelled as the case may be under the original of Ex.A­2. 

42)When Ex.A­2 itself is not a valid document in the eye of law in the light of the endorsement made by the Sub Registrar, Vuyyuru, it is highly doubtful to understand as to how the plaintiff can be permitted to turn around the table and contend that by virtue of execution of the original of Ex.A­2, Ex.A­1 stood cancelled and Ex.A­3 do not confer any right on the 2nd defendant, who is admittedly a third party to the plaintiff 44 as well as the 1st defendant and Ex.A­1 cannot be said to be a mere agreement of sale, but the recitals in the said agreement go to infer that it is more than an agreement of sale and the transaction can be said to be complete in all aspects as seen from the evidence of P.Ws­2 to 4. At the same time, when P.W­1 is not an illiterate, to reiterate again and when the contents are read­over, it is further doubtful to understand as to how the plaintiff can be permitted to contend that the quantum of consideration as recited in Ex.A­1 is in contra to her averments in the plaint and the averments in the plaint stands good. It can be said that generally documentary evidence prevail over the oral evidence. At the same time, it does not preclude the party from leading any oral evidence in contra to the recitals in any document and though it is the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff that the purchaser and her power of attorney are two different persons in the eye of law, the same cannot be countenanced at this stage, as both their interest are identical in the present suit touching the self same property and at the same time the interest always does not mean title and ownership over the property. It sometimes mean advantage of benefit or a legal enforceable right and the agreement of sale­cum­General

Power of Attorney was executed by P.W­1 under the original of Ex.A­1 only to facilitate the 1st defendant for execution of sale deed in favour of any third parties. This shows that the Power of Attorney Holder also has an interest in the subject matter of the suit i.e., plaint schedule property and it is not a mere General Power of Attorney as already observed free of consideration, here the document filed under Ex.A­1 is supported by consideration, irrespective of the quantum as contended by the parties to the suit. Undoubtedly, the initial ownership vesting with the plaintiff is not disputed by the defendants in any way. It is the specific stand of the 2nd defendant that it purchased the property from the 1st defendant after satisfying with the recitals contained in Ex.A­1 and Ex.B­1.

45

43)So, unless there is a misrepresentation inducing a mistake as to the character of the said document under Ex.A­1, the contract cannot be vitiated on the ground of misrepresentation as the misrepresentation pleaded by the plaintiff can only be attached to its contents, as it is all through the contention of the counsel for plaintiff that the quantum of consideration which is remaining balance was mentioned as the consideration already received by the plaintiff under Ex.A­1 and the consideration which is received by P.W­1 was recited as the balance of sale consideration. So, the misrepresentation as would contained in a document are different from a misrepresentation inducing a mistaken belief on the part and it is also clear that P.W­1 intended to sell away her property as she is residing at Secunderabad and it is difficult to maintain the property, which is far away from Secunderabad and it is not the case of the plaintiff that she executed Ex.A­1 alone. It is the evidence of the plaintiff and her witnesses that a series of documents i.e., as many as four other documents were executed on a very single day in respect of the entire property of Ac.8­00 and the registration as already observed, had taken place on the succeeding day. So, the burden of establishing the plea of fraud and misrepresentation squarely lies on the plaintiff and it can be said that it is to the narrow compass to establish the quantum of consideration passed.

44)When the signatory want to disown the document, it is for the plaintiff to plead that she signed without exercising any care. She must establish that she signed the document without knowing its contents. In the instant case on hand, it is not pleaded anywhere in the plaint that she simply subscribed her signature on the original of Ex.A­1 without going through the contents recited in Ex.A­1 and the evidence on record goes to show that she exercised reasonable care while signing the document and 46 at the same time, even assuming that the contention of the plaintiff is believable for the sake of arguments, it can be said that carelessness certainly precludes her from pleading the non­establishment of facts as it is said that no man can take advantage of his own wrong and is an instance of negligence, which operate by way of estoppel. When the plaintiff had exactly pleaded the nature of the document in the plaint, it is further astonishing to receive the contention of the counsel for plaintiff that fraud and misrepresentation was played by the 1st defendant on her in obtaining Ex.A­1.

45)When such is the case, she ought to have executed a mere General

Power of Attorney instead of styling the Ex.A­1 as a non­possessory agreement of sale­cum­General Power of Attorney and the recitals go to show that it is supported by consideration and however, when the contracting parties to Ex.A­1 are the plaintiff and the 1st defendant alone and when the plaintiff contends that possession is intact with her, the evidence of P.Ws­1 and 2 go to show that ever since the date of Ex.A­1, they are not cultivating the plaint schedule property and if really possession was not delivered to the 1st defendant, it is further doubtful to understand as to how the plaintiff incorporated the recital in Ex.A­1 empowering the 1st defendant to execute a sale deed in favour of third parties and the act of the 1st defendant by itself and with such recital in

Ex.A­1, the 2nd defendant contends to have purchased the property from the 1st defendant. Even ignoring Ex.B­1, still Ex.A­1 is a valid document in the eye of law and the property as passed on to a third party, who is no way related to the plaintiff and the 1st defendant and allegation of fraud or misrepresentation is easy to plead and difficult to prove and when it is the vehement contention of the counsel for plaintiff that the consideration as recited in Ex.A­1 is not paid by the 1st defendant and the contra recitals 47 are found in Ex.A­1, it is well settled legal analogy that no oral evidence can be adduced to rebut the contents in the registered document and it can only be in cases where the execution of document is disputed and sections 91 and 92 of Indian Evidence Act certainly attract the present case on hand and even if it is assumed that the plaintiff did not receive the total consideration or a part of consideration as mentioned in Ex.A­1 and the parts till remained unpaid only recourse open to the plaintiff is to pursue the remedy U/s.55 of the Act and being a party to Ex.A­1, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to dispute the transaction when it is supported by consideration. So, in the light of all these, it can be said that the frame of the suit is improper and the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as sought for and the 2nd defendant is a bonafide purchaser for valid consideration.

46)A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court cogently go to show that the trial Judge did not appreciate the evidence on proper lines and went on to believe the version of P.Ws­2 to 4 in respect to the quantum of consideration without considering the recitals in Ex.A­1 and the nature of the document and went on to conclude that mere putting signature by the parties on a document and admitting the same do not amount to execution unless it is admitted by the concerned party and had came to an erroneous conclusion by observing that the entire burden in this case on the defendants to disprove the case of the plaintiff and also failed to notice that the onus did not shift on the 1st defendant, who remained exparte and went on to conclude that when the 1st defendant is the competent person to speak about the truth regarding Ex.A­1 transaction, but he remained exparte. Undoubtedly, in a suit for title certainly the onus is heavy on the plaintiff to substantiate and it is settled legal analogy that the plaintiff shall win or lose on the strength of its own case, without 48 depending on the weakness of the defendant, but in the instant case on hand, though the onus did not shift on the defendants, the trial Court erroneously came to a conclusion by observing the evidence of P.Ws­2 to 4 to the effect they testified that the signatures of P.W­1 were obtained on several blank papers for utilizing in future. However, this part of observation by the trial Judge as in the evidence of P.Ws­2 to 4 is not fortified with any pleading in the plaint and it is not the case of the plaintiff that her signatures were obtained on several papers for utilizing in future and it is the evidence of P.Ws­1 to 4 to the effect that apart from

Ex.A­1, four other agreements were also executed by the very same plaintiff on the very same day and all were registered on the very succeeding day and simply because the developed version was introduced by P.W­2, being the husband of P.W­1, who is said to have looked after the affairs on behalf of P.W­1 and the same was corroborated by P.Ws­2 to 4 without considering the cross­examination of these witnesses, the trial

Court erroneously came to a conclusion that signatures of P.W­1 were obtained on several papers for using in future and further, relying on the authority cited by the counsel for plaintiff in the case of Suraj Lamps and

Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana and another reported in AIR 2012 SC 206 wherein, it was observed that “making of declaration that General Power of Attorney sales and SA/GPA/Will transfers are not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of persons without entering into such transactions and however they continued to be treated as existing agreement of sale.”

47)However, in the instant case on hand, Ex.A­1 is not a mere General

Power of Attorney for sale of immovable property. It is an agreement of sale­cum­General Power of Attorney and this authority is not applicable to the instant case on hand. However it is painful to observe the manner in 49 which the trial Court found it to be applicable and held that ‘a person cannot convey better title than what he had’ and observed that the 1st defendant had no title under Ex.A­1. Here, the 1st defendant was empowered to sell the plaint schedule property to third parties and also the entire consideration stood paid by virtue of Ex.B­1 and at the same time, it may not be out of context to make a specific mention that Ex.A­1,

Ex.A­3 and Ex.B­1 are to be considered as contemporaneous documents executed for the same transaction and Ex.A­1 and Ex.B­1 have to be treated as single transaction, which emerged into Ex.A­3 and much reliance is placed on the evidence of P.Ws­1 to 4 and further observed that

D.W­1 had no personal knowledge about Ex.A­1 ignoring the factum that

D.W­1 is not a party to Ex.B­1 and at the same time, the 2nd defendant itself is not a party to Ex.B­1. Ex.A­1 and Ex.B­1 are between same contracting parties, whereas the original of Ex.A­3 is between the defendants 1 and 2 and simply because D.W­1 deposed that he had no personal knowledge, it does not per se go to vitiate the defence as he is not a party to Ex.B­1 and simply because, the attestors are working in the company of the 2nd defendant, it does not vitiate Ex.B­1 and there are many inconsistencies in the evidence of P.Ws­1 to 4 rather than

D.Ws­1 to 3.

48)It is painful to observe the finding of the trial Court that there is a lot of inconsistency in the evidence of D.W­2 and D.W­3 regarding the place of execution of Ex.B­1 and it is also a typed document and there is no bar in the eye of law to say that a receipt should invariably be in the manuscript or in type and except the date, month, number of the registered document and signatures, nothing is in manual writings and so, the trial Court erroneously came to a conclusion that as Ex.B­1 is in type and the date, month and document number are in manual hand 50 writings and if really Ex.B­1 is prepared on type writer at a stretch, there cannot be any room for any blanks to be filled up and so, did not consider

Ex.B­1 and most of the observations of the trial Judge are in respect to the 1st defendant not entering witness box to speak on these documents, when the 1st defendant is the competent person to speak about Ex.A­1 and Ex.B­1 and failed to consider Ex.B­1 document. When P.W­1 herself admitted her signature on Ex.B­1, it is further doubtful to understand as to how the trial Judge failed to notice the same and went on to conclude that the evidence of P.Ws­1 to 4 establish the case of the plaintiff, ignoring the factum that the there are inconsistencies in the evidence of P.Ws­1 to 4 and the very nature of the suit itself is misconceived and the recitals in

Ex.B­1 does not empower the plaintiff to take back the possession.

49)So, in the absence of any such recital in Ex.A­1 that it is revocable at the instance of the plaintiff or 1st defendant and when Ex.A­2 is non­est in the eye of law, it can be said that Ex.A­1 is still valid in the eye of law and the right of the third party has to be protected, as the 2nd defendant is a bonafide purchaser for valid consideration and as the plaintiff sought for an injuctive relief trial Court erroneously came to a conclusion that the possession is intact with the plaintiff, ignoring the factum that the 2nd defendant has already laid plaint schedule property into plots and some of them were also sold away. When such is the case, if really for the time being, it is assumed that the possession is intact with the plaintiff, the plaint schedule property must lie vacant, but even according to P.W­1, possession is with the 2nd defendant. When such is the case, it can be said that the trial Court erroneously came to a conclusion that the possession of the plaint schedule property is vested with the plaintiff and granted injuctive relief against the 2nd defendant. So, there are many inconsistencies and legal infirmities in the judgment passed by the trial 51

Judge, warranting interference by this Court to set aside the same.

50)In the result, appeal is allowed, by setting aside the judgment and decree passed in O.S.98/2009 dated 31.03.2016 on the file of Principal

Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Gudivada and consequently, the suit in

O.S.98/2009 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Gudivada

is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

Dictated to the Grade­I Stenographer of this Court, transcribed by

him, corrected and pronounced by me in open court, on this the 21st day of March, 2022.

Sd/- K.V.Mahalakshmi,

XI ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE,

GUDIVADA.

 APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

­NIL­

Sd/- K.V.Mahalakshmi,

XI ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE,

GUDIVADA.

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SC107of 15 dated 11.11.2020XI-Addl.Sessions Judge’s Court, Gudivada

IN THE COURT OF THE XI-ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, KRISHNA, GUDIVADA

PRESENT: Smt. K.V.MAHA LAKSHMI.,

XI-ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE.

WEDNESDAY, THIS THE 11 th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2020.

SESSIONS CASE No.107/2015

Between:

State: rep.by the Inspector of Police, Kaikaluru Circle. … COMPLAINANT.

A N D

Ghantasala Marthamma W/o Nagaraju 28 years, Vaddeelu, Penumaka Lanka Village, Mandavalli Mandal. …ACCUSED.

Charges : u/s.302 and 201 IPC

Plea of the Accused : Not guilty.

Finding of the Court : Accused found not Guilty.

Sentence or order: In the result, the accused is found not guilty for the offences u/Ss. 302 and 201 of IPC., accordingly she is acquitted under Sec.235(1)Cr.P.C. The bail bonds of the accused shall remain in force for a period of six months as contemplated under Sec.437-A of Cr.P.C. M.Os.1 and 2 are ordered to be returned to the Committal Court with a direction to dispose of the same according to law after expiry of appeal time.

This Sessions case is coming on 5.11.2020 for final hearing before me in the presence of Addl. Public Prosecutor on behalf of the prosecution and of Sri K.Harinath and Sri R.Ravi Kumar., Advocates for accused and upon hearing arguments on both sides and upon perusing the material papers on record and this case having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:

J U D G M E N T

1)The Inspector of Police, Kaikaluru Circle laid the charge sheet against the above named accused for the offences u/Ss.302 and 201 of IPC in

Cr.No.60/2013 of Mandavalli Police Station.

2) The case of the prosecution in brief as set out in the charge sheet is thus:

The accused is wife of the deceased Ghantasala Nagaraju. The scene of offence is a thatched hut of the accused on the bank of leased prawn tank in Nandigama lanka village of Mandavalli Mandal. The accused and deceased are wife and husband and natives of Penumaka lanka village of Mandavalli 2

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Mandal. The marriage of the deceased was held about ten years back and they were blessed with two girls and one boy. About two years back the deceased took prawn tanks of L.W.17-Busanaboyina Radhakrishna on lease and he erected a thatched hut on the bank of prawn tanks and residing along with the accused. Both the accused and the deceased were quarrelled with each other, about giving of share in the leased tank to the elder brother of the deceased i.e. L.W.9-Ghantasala Chatarji. For that the accused strongly objected and picked picked up quarrel with the deceased.

The deceased started cultivating the prawn tanks with the amount procured by the deceased and the amount given the accused by pledging her gold ornaments and the accused insisted the deceased to give share in the prawn tanks to her father, but the deceased objected and refused for the same.

Since then because of disputes the accused kept her children at her parents house. At this juncture the accused expecting that the prawn crop might have given to his parents and brothers and felt anguish and the accused decided to kill the deceased and hatched a plan to give sleeping tablets to her husband to do away his life.

ii) Basing on the pre-plan the accused procured fifteen sleeping tablets by purchasing several times from the medical shop of Bolla Rambabu (L.W.15) to intend to do away the life of the deceased by mixing the sleeping pills in the kheer (semiya payasam) for the deceased. On 27.05.2013 morning the accused came to Nandigamalanka village and purchased semiya, milk packet from the sundry shop of L.W.8 (B.Venkata

Buji) and came to their hut. At that time the deceased went out side of the house, the accused is presumed that it is the right time to eliminate the deceased and she prepared semiya payasam at their hut and mixed ten sleeping pills. After arrival of the deceased the accused gave said kheer containing sleeping pills. The neighbours L.Ws.2 and 3 (Divakar and

Peddiraju) noticed the accused while bringing semiya and milk packets.

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(iii) After consumption of kheer the deceased went into deep sleep and subsequent died. The accused came to a conclusion that the deceased died and kept quite till in the evening and she attended the work on prawn tank for some time and later raised cries calling neighbouring owners L.Ws.2 and 3 i.e. (Divakar and Peddiraju respectively), they came and informed that he died. Immediately the accused left the spot saying that she has to inform her parents. Later on coming to know about the incident L.Ws.4 to 7 i.e.,

G.Hemanth Deepthi, G.Somaraju, G.Rambabu and G.Hanumantha Rao respectively) came to the scene of offence and noticed the accused escaped from the spot. All the witnesses strongly came to the conclusion that the accused killed the deceased by giving kheer by mixing poisonous substance.

(iv) On 27.5.2013 at 20.30 hrs. L.W.1 (Penumala Mariyanna) presented a written report to LW.22(P.Sudhakara Rao) in turn he registered the same as

FIR in Cr. No.60/2013 u/s.174 Cr.P.C., of Mandavalli Police Station and submitted the copies of FIRs to all the concerned and took up investigation in this case, During the course of investigation L.W.22-P.Sudhakara Rao examined the witnesses and recorded their statements, visited the scene of offence, prepared rough sketch of scene of offence and got drafted an scene observation report by the mediators and they seized some brown colour food item i.e. payasam available in a vessel, and L.W.22-P.Sudhakara Rao conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of mediators and sent the corpse for postmortem examination. Subsequently basing on the available evidence adduced at the time of inquest L.W.22

P.Sudhakara Rao altered the section of law into Sec.302, 201 IPC and took up investigation. Later during the course of investigation L.W.23-E.Ashok Kumar examined the witnesses and recorded their statements and the accused was arrested on 29.5.2013 in the presence of mediators and L.W.23-E.Ashok

Kumar seized five sleeping pills from the hut belongs to the parents of the accused situated back side of the scene of offence. L.W.20 Panduranga 4

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Prasad conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and preserved some viscera contents for sending the same to chemical analysis.

Later the investigating officer sent the items preserved by him to the Forensic

Science Laboratory, Hyderabad, for chemical analysis and after receiving chemical analysis report and after completion of investigation the Inspector filed the charge sheet. Hence, the accuse is liable for punishment for the offence u/s.302 and 201 IPC. Hence, the charge sheet.

3)The Inspector of Police, Kaikaluru Circle filed the charge sheet against the accused before the Judicial I-Class Magistrate, Kaikaluru. After filing of the charge-sheet the learned Magistrate having prima facie satisfied has taken cognizance of the case against the accused for the offences u/Ss.201 and 302 of IPC and issued summons to the accused. The accused appeared before the learned Judicial I-Class Magistrate, Kaikaluru on receipt of summons and copies of documents are supplied to her as required u/s.207

Cr.P.C. The accused is duly represented by her advocate.

4)The learned Judicial I-Class Magistrate, Kaikaluru has committed the case to the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Krishna,

Machilipatnam U/s.209(a) Cr.P.C. after following the procedure as contemplated under law, since the offences u/s.Sec.302 and 201 of IPC are exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The Hon’ble Principal District and

Sessions Judge, Krishna, Machilipatnam made over the case to this court for

trial and disposal according to law.

5) The accused appeared before this Court on receipt of summons and she was examined U/s.228(2) Cr.P.C. On consideration of the material on record charges u/Ss.302 and 201 of IPC were framed against the accused, read-over and explained to her in Telugu. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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6) During the trial in order to establish the case of prosecution the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 18, got marked Exs.P1 to P17 and M.Os.1 and 2. On behalf of accused no oral evidence is adduced, but Ex.D1 was marked.

7) After closure of the evidence of prosecution, the accused was examined U/s.313 Cr.P.C., explaining the incriminating material appearing against her as deposed by prosecution witnesses. The accused denied the evidence.

8) Heard arguments on both sides.

9)The point for consideration is:

Whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt ?

Point:

10) It is an admitted fact that the accused and the deceased were related by affinity. It is also an evident fact that the deceased during his life time was cultivating prawn tank on lease belonging to P.W.11. It is also an evident fact that, the marriage between the accused and the deceased took place more than ten years ago and they were blessed with three children.

11)The case as unfolded by the learned prosecution is such that, the accused and the deceased are residents of Penumakalanka village living in a hut erected on the bank of prawn tank and the children were residing with their maternal grandmother and there were disputes between the accused and the deceased in respect to giving share in the prawn tank to P.W.7. It is further the admitted case of prosecution that previously when the deceased tried to give a share in the prawn tank to P.W.7 i.e., brother of the deceased, the accused strongly objected and picked up quarrel and the elders P.Ws.14, 15 and 18 pacified the dispute. As such the deceased did not give any share to P.W.7. It is further admitted case of learned prosecution that in the month of March 2013 the deceased started cultivation of prawn tank again with the 6

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amount procured by the deceased and also with the amount brought by pledging gold ornaments of the accused. It is further contended by the prosecution that the accused insisted to give share in the prawn tank to her father and again disputes arose and the family members pacified the matter.

The accused felt anguish and when the prawns are ready for catchment the accused with a thought that the deceased might part with the money to his brother decided to kill the deceased by mixing sleeping pills in kheer. In order to execute her plan she brought sleeping pills from the shop of P.W.10 and waited for an opportunity. It is the strenuous case of prosecution that on 26.5.2013 during evening hours the accused left the thatched hut stating that she is going to Penumakalanka village for getting treatment to her ailment to P.W.9 R.M.P. Doctor and stayed in the night in her parents house and later on 27.05.2013 the accused came to Nandigamalanka village went to the sundry shop of P.W.6 and purchased vermicelli and milk packets and prepared kheer and mixed ten sleeping tablets in it and gave the same to the deceased after his arrival, without any suspicion. P.Ws.2 and 3 who are neighbours noticed the accused bringing vermicelli and milk packets and giving it to the deceased, while working on their fish tanks without any suspicion. The prosecution further contends that thereafter the accused pretending to work as usual in the prawn tank, later the deceased went into deep sleep and subsequently died and after confirming the same she raised cries and called P.W.2 and P.W.3 who observed and declared that her husband is no more. She left the dead body stating that she is going to church to inform her parents. P.Ws.4, 5, L.Ws.5 and 7 (Ghantasala Somaraju and

Ghantasala Hanumantha Rao respectively) came to know about the same through P.Ws.2 and 3 rushed to the scene of offence and found the deceased lying dead and the accused escaped from the scene. It is further contended that on receiving the information from an unknown caller P.W.1 presented

Ex.P1 written report at 20.30hrs on 27.5.2013 to P.W.16 who registered the 7

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same under Ex.P14 the original FIR and transmitted the copies of FIR, Ex.P14 to all the concerned and took up investigation. It is further contended that

P.W.16 during the course of his investigation visited the scene of offence prepared Ex.P16 rough sketch, Ex.P20 the scene observation report, in the presence of P.W.1 and L.W.18( B.Venkata Raju) seized MO.1 and MO.2 and held inquest on the corpse of the deceased in the presence of P.W.1 and mediators, prepared Ex.P3 the inquest report and later sent the corpse for autopsy and basing on the evidence of witnesses examined and the opinion of the inquestdars P.W.16, altered the section of law into 302 and 201 IPC and issued altered FIR under Ex.P15 to all the concerned and took up further investigation and during the course of investigation P.W.17 verified the investigation done by P.W. 16, examined P.W.7 to P.W.10, P.W. 12 and P.W. 15 and recorded their statements and arrested the accused on 29.5.2013 in the presence of same mediators. It is further the case of prosecution that basing on the confession of the accused before P.W.17 she led them to a thatched vacant house of Mungara Hamsaraju situated near the house of the parents of the accused. P.W.13 conducted autopsy and issued final opinion under Ex.P13 opining that the death of the deceased is due to ‘alprazolam poison’. Subsequently P.W. 18 took up further investigation, verified the investigation done by P.Ws.16 and 17 and filed the charge sheet.

It is further the case of the prosecution that as the accused administered poison to the deceased in the kheer prepared by her resulting into the death of the deceased and tried to screen away the evidence, so the accused is liable for the offence under the charged sections.

12) On the other hand the defence is a total negation of all the allegations levelled by the prosecution. It is the contention of learned counsel for defence that the accused is not responsible for the death of the deceased 8

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and the medical evidence falsifies the story of prosecution and further contended that the accused is falsely implicated in this case and there is no motive on the part of the accused to kill the deceased and further contends that there is variation in the time of death and the seizure and arrest and the circumstantial evidence also do not establish the prosecution case and as such the accused is entitled to a benefit of doubt and liable to be acquitted.

13) Taking the respective rival contentions into consideration, it is obvious to say that, the initial onus is undoubtedly on the prosecution to clinchingly establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt for the offences under the charged sections. It is to be observed as to how far the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt for the offence under the charged sections.

14)The defacto-complainant was examined as P.W.1, the neighbours to the scene of offence, who are said to be eye witnesses to the alleged incident were examined as P.Ws.2 and 3, the elder daughter of the deceased and the accused was examined as P.W.4, the brothers of the deceased were examined as P.Ws.5 and 7, the owner of the provision shop was examined as

P.W.6, elders of the village were examined as P.Ws.8, 14 and 15, the R.M.P.

doctor was examined as P.W.9, the Medical shop owner was examined as

PW.10, one of the independent witness was examined as P.W.11, the photographer was examined as P.W.12, the Medical Officer was examined as

P.W.13, the Sub Inspector who registered the FIR was examined as P.W.16, the investigating officer was examined as P.W.17 and the Inspector of Police, who filed the charge sheet, was examined as P.W.18.

It is to be observed as to how far the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 18 are suffice to establish the case of prosecution in bringing home the guilt of the accused for the offences under the charged sections.

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15)A perusal of the evidence of P.W.1 cogently go to show that, he is senior assistant in Mandal Revenue Office, Mudinepalli and his version is quite corroborating the version of prosecution in all material aspects of the case as he is responsible for giving Ex.P1 and he also participated at the time of preparing Ex.P2 and P3 and seizure of M.Os.1 and 2. It is his candid evidence that to catch fish from the tank the farmers go at 7.00a.m. and return back at 11.00a.m. He candidly admitted that in Ex.P5 there is no mention that the house is lying vacant from where the alleged seizure is made. He further candidly admitted that he did not mention in Ex.P1 that he received phone call from an unknown caller on 29.7.2013 or stated the same before the police.

The omissions were rightly elicited from the cross examination of P.W.1. He further deposed that he prepared Ex.P1 in MRO office after seeing the dead body in the scene of offence. He did not mention in Ex.P1 about the information given by the neighbours to the tank on 29.07.2013. He unequivocally admitted that vermicelli will remain intact without transforming into liquid and he mentioned in scene observation report about all the objects which are noticed by him in the scene of offence alleged, and as per Ex.P1 and his statement before the police he mentioned that he alone went to the scene of offence alleged on his motor bike.

16) A perusal of the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 cogently go to show that, these two witnesses did not support the story of prosecution and totally resiled from their earlier statements under Ex.P6 and P7.

17)A perusal of the evidence of P.W.4 cogently go to show that, she is elder daughter of the deceased and accused. It is her evidence that, when she went to see the corpse of her father her mother was not there, and P.W.3 and 4 told her that her mother killed her father by mixing poison in kheer. It is her evidence in unequivocal terms that her other sister and brother used to reside with her mother and she was informed about the death of her father at about 12.00noon.

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18) A perusal of the evidence of P.W.5 cogently go to show that he happens to be the one of the brother of the deceased and the deceased is his last brother, his version is quite corroborating the version of prosecution. He categorically deposed that he came to know about the death intimation of the deceased in the evening but he cannot say the exact time and he go to catch fish and return by 9.00am. and he do not know the details of the lease of the fish tank taken by the deceased. He admitted that, his brothers have no financial capacity to invest Rs.5,00,000/- to Rs.6,00,000/-on fish tank and the father and brothers of the accused and her sisters are having fish tanks.

According to his evidence the accused was arrested in the afternoon on the succeeding day of incident when the dead body of the deceased was being taken to the burial ground.

19) A perusal of the evidence of P.W.6 cogently go to show that, he is running a kirana shop and his version is quite corroborating the version of prosecution so far as purchase of vermicelli and milk packets concerned. He resiled from a part of his earlier statement under Ex.D1. He deposed that he cannot say the details of other customers who came to his shop on 27.5.2013. It is his candid evidence that the house of the accused is in the middle of the village and his provisional store is in the outskirts of the village and the distance between his shop and the house of the accused is two furlongs. He admitted that there are two provisional stores in the street where the accused was residing.

20) A perusal of the evidence of P.W.7 cogently go to show that, he is also one of the brother of P.W.5. His version is quite corroborating the version of prosecution. He categorically deposed that on 27.5.2013 he received a phone call between 4.00 to 5.00p.m. informing the death of the deceased. According to his evidence, he told the accused and the deceased not to quarrel among themselves and he did not want a share in the tank and the matter was settled even according to his version there are fish tanks to 11

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the father of the accused and her brothers and they were let out on lease and the omissions were rightly elicited from the cross examination of P.W.7. It is his evidence that one month after the death of the deceased the crop is sold and the sale proceeds are with him and he did not know the quantum of lease payable to the fish tank of the deceased.

21) A perusal of the evidence of P.Ws.8 to 12 cogently go to show that, they did not choose to support the case of prosecution and they totally resiled from their earlier statements under Ex.P8 to P11.

22) A perusal of the evidence of P.W.13 cogently go to show that, he is a medical officer, conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased.

His evidence reveal that he found abrasions on the elbow and back and found the sense of poison in the esophagus and the time of death is 12 to 24 hrs.

prior to postmortem examination and he issued postmortem certificate under

Ex.P12 and after receiving RFSL report he gave final opinion under Ex.P13 opining that the deceased died due to ‘alprazolam poison’. He unequivocally admitted that he preserved viscera for chemical analysis to know whether there is any poisonous substance which might have caused the death of the deceased and went to the extent unequivocally admitting that those items were marked as items 1 to 5 by the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory. He unequivocally admitted that the items 1 to 6 were analysed and no poisonous substance was found in items 1 to 5 as per observation of Regional Forensic

Science Laboratory and item No.6 contained poisonous substance but the tablet which referred as item No.6 in Regional Forensic Science Laboratory report do not emanate any poisonous smell.

23) A perusal of the evidence of P.W.14 cogently go to show that, he happens to be a coolie, his version is quite corroborating the version of prosecution and according to his evidence there are many fish tanks for lease in his village.

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24)A perusal of the evidence of P.W.15 cogently go to show that, he happens to be a coolie, his version is quite corroborating the version of prosecution and deposed that he was in the scene of offence for about two hours.

25)A perusal of the evidence of P.W.16 cogently go to show that, he registered Ex.P11 and P14 and he observed the dead body and found scratch injuries on the right side neck and also on the right hand from the shoulder to the wrist and the rest of the version is corroborating the version of prosecution and he is also responsible for altered FIR, Ex.P14. He deposed that he did not investigate to know the number of the phone from which

P.W.1 received information as to the death of Nagaraju or the name of the informer and he do not know whether there is any possibility for the informer to be responsible for the death of the deceased and the basis of alteration of section of law is Ex.P3 and apart from that witnesses examined by him and altered FIR reached the concerned court at 7.30p.m. on 28.05.2013 and according to him the kheer was prepared with sago and vermicelli. He admitted that the shape of the sago and vermicelli will not change due to passage of time and by the time he went to the scene of offence, the neighbouring farmers are visiting their land and also left and he did not make any attempt to enquire from the said farmers to know about the cause of the death of Nagaraju.

26)A perusal of the evidence of P.W.17 cogently go to show that, it is quite corroborating the version of prosecution. He admitted that any material objects seized during the course of investigation shall be forthwith forwarded to Regional Forensic Science Laboratory and the death of Nagaraju came to light through the phone call received by P.W.1 and he did not enquire to know about the name of the informer or whether he is any way responsible for the death of the deceased and whether what interest he had for the death of the deceased. He further admitted that he cannot say whether there will be 13

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change of colour of the kheer due to passage of time and without prescription of the doctor the medical shop cannot sell medicine so also sleeping pills also shall not be sold without prescription of the doctor.

27) A perusal of the evidence of P.W.18 cogently go to show that, he is Circle Inspector of Police, who secured P.W.1 and P.W.11, examined them and recorded their statements and the reason for not recording the statement earlier is due to elections in 2014 and elections were completed by

May 2014.

28) A perusal of the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 18 in a gamut clinchingly go to show that the wife of the deceased with a pre-plan administered poison through kheer prepared with vermicelli and sago and caused the death of the deceased and it is also the case of prosecution that there were disputes between the accused and the deceased in parting with a share in fish tank cultivated by them on lease to P.W.7 and according to the prosecution the accused intended to give share to her father. So first of all it is to be seen whether there are such disputes existing between the accused and the deceased in order to rule out the motive on the part of the accused to do away with the life of the deceased, her husband.

29)So in this scenario the evidence of P.W.7 assumes significance and evidently P.Ws.5 and 7 and the deceased are natural brothers and P.W.4 is daughter of the deceased, where as P.Ws.2 and 3 are eye witnesses according to the story of prosecution, they witnessed the accused serving kheer to the deceased and in order to establish the case basing on the possibility of last seen theory, the accused is in the company of the deceased prior to his demise, the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 also assume significance.

But unfortunately these two witnesses, who are so called eye witnesses did not support the version of prosecution. As seen from the evidence of P.W.7 it is clear that he asked his deceased brother to part with a share in fish tank 14

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for which he agreed but the accused did not agree and an altercation had taken place between them and it is also the evidence of P.W.7 that he told both the accused and the deceased not to quarrel among themselves and he do not want a share in the tank and so the matter was settled. However, the entire version of prosecution is silent as to when the so called dispute regarding to part with a share to P.W.7 took place between the deceased and the accused in order to establish the proximate nexus between the so called dispute and the death of the deceased and even assuming that such a dispute arose between the accused and the deceased when P.W.7 himself told that he does not require a share and the dispute was settled then there cannot be any motive for the accused to kill the deceased and the evidence of P.W.1 who is Senior Assistant in Mandal Revenue Office and the first man to hear the news about the death of the deceased, only go to indicate that the

ASI observed a stove and a steel vessel with kheer in brown colour and Ex.P1 to P5 are silent as to any other incriminating material in the scene of offence alleged and according to the version of prosecution the accused and the deceased were residing in the hut in the scene of offence together and interestingly Ex.P5 is silent as to whether there is any material to show that it is fit for habitation and neither P.W.1 nor the investigating officers took any care about the informant, who really revealed about the death of the deceased in the scene of offence and even according to P.W.1 the basis for

Ex.P1 is on physical verification of the deceased and the opinion given by the unknown informant and according to the evidence of P.W.1 he did not mention in Ex.P1 the opinion given by the neighbours and the evidence of

P.W.1 is very inconsistent in all material aspects and when the father of the accused and so also the brothers of the accused are having fish tanks and they are cultivating the same, it is highly improper to expect a dispute regarding the request of the accused to part with a share in tank cultivating on lease by them to her father but the fact remains that for the purpose of 15

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cultivating fish tank, apart from amounts raised by pledging the gold ornaments of the accused the amount procured by the deceased was also used. When such is the case, if really she is not interested when the deceased refused her request to part with share in fish tank to her father in common parlance she will not come forward to pledge the gold ornaments and it is the evidence on record, that the accused was arrested while the body of the deceased was taken to burial ground. When such is the case, absconding of the accused from the scene of offence is also doubtful.

30) So far as the evidence of P.W.4, the daughter of the deceased is concerned, she categorically stated that she went to the scene of offence to see the body of her father, her mother was not there and the evidence as spoken by her is as heard through P.Ws.2 and 3 and the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 does not inspire any confidence as they remained hostile and the evidence of P.W.4 also cannot be said to be trust worthy. First of all, it is to be known whether there is any poison in the kheer consumed by the deceased, which is said to be the root cause for his death. So the medical evidence and the opinion of RFSL also play vital role in the present case on hand and it is the opinion of the medical officer who conducted autopsy that the death is due to ‘alprazolam poison’ sedative substance and it is the case of prosecution that the accused went to purchase tablets two in number on each occasion from the medical shop of P.W.10 and according to the evidence of P.W.10 he gave Citrizen tablets, to the accused as and when she came to his shop, as and when they fell sick and it is his categorical evidence that he did not sell sleeping pills to the accused except Citrizen tablets. However, the evidence of P.W.1 is also not useful, as he remained hostile. In order to show that the accused is in the habit of purchasing sleeping pills from the shop of

P.W.10, P.W.9 the RMP doctor was also examined according to him on 26.5.2013 on the even date the accused came to him complaining about sickness and he examined her and told her that she is healthy and according 16

SC107of 15 dated 11.11.2020XI-Addl.Sessions Judge’s Court, Gudivada

to the evidence of P.W.13 who gave final opinion under Ex.P13 opining that the deceased died due to ‘alprazolam poison’. He categorically admitted that the viscera preserved by him, was sent to RFSL and those items marked as

M.Os.1 to 5 and no poison was detected in item Nos.1 to 5 and poison was detected only in item Nos.6 which are nothing but tablets and according to the story of prosecution those tablets were seized from the accused, basing on the confession given to the police and from the place where the tablets were given. But it is the evidence of P.W.13 that the tablets referred in items

Nos. 1 to 6 did not contain any poisonous substance. When such is the case, and when the viscera did not emanate any poisonous smell and the death is said to be not an unnatural death and the FIR is registered u/s.174 of IPC, subsequently basing on the alleged confession of the accused the section of law was altered and when the tablets were examined by the Regional

Forensic Science Laboratory, certainly the tablets reveal its composition.

Unless and until the report is clear that the kheer which was sent to Regional

Forensic Science Laboratory for analysis also contained substance of poison, it is highly difficult to connect the accused with the death of her husband. So

Ex.P1, P14 and P15 if together seen, it goes without saying that after due deliberations Ex.P15 came into existence and it is interesting to observe from the evidence of P.W.16 that he did not investigate to know the phone number from which P.W.1 received information as to the death of the deceased or the name of the informer and he do not know whether there is any possibility for the informant to be responsible for the death of the deceased and when

Ex.P3 is basis for Ex.P15 and it is not the case of prosecution that the accused handed over the tablets and they were sent to Regional Forensic

Science Laboratory and the tenor of the evidence given by P.W.16 also makes the prosecution case, more doubtful and so also P.W.17 the DSP, who took up further investigation also did not take any enquiry about the name of the informer or whether he is responsible for the death of the deceased and 17

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P.W.17 admitted that the strip contains the name of the medicine but the same is not mentioned anywhere in the confessional statement.

31) A perusal of Ex.P4 cogently go to show that she procured 15-sleeping pills and used ten sleeping pills and she had hidden five sleeping pills in the house of her mother and a perusal of Ex.P5 mediators report go to show that the accused took them to the house of her mother and showed a paper packet and the same was opened and noticed five sleeping pills and the description and colour of the tablets are conspicuously silent in Ex.P4 and P5.

32) A perusal of Ex.P17 cogently go to show that item No.6 is five orange coloured tablets, which is said to have contained ‘alprazolam poison’ a sedative substance in it and in items 1 to 5 which also consisted of viscera interestingly no poisonous substance was detected in them. When such is the case, the final opinion said to have been taken by P.W.13 under Ex.P13 is also doubtful and the entire case of prosecution reveals that the death of the deceased is due to the consumption of the kheer mixed with poison given by the accused to the deceased. If really the deceased had consumed the kheer said to have been prepared by the accused administered with poison, when autopsy was conducted by the medical officer certainly some amount of damage would have caused to the body of the deceased, if really the story of the prosecution is to be believed that the kheer with poison was administered to the deceased by the accused. If such is the case, it is also highly difficult to separate kheer and poison. So when the viscera did not contain any poisonous substance so also M.Os.1 and 2 did not contain any poisonous substance as opined by the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, it can be said that the deceased died due to poisonous substance and even according to the report of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory the tablets when analyzed revealed the presence of alprazolam a sedative substance and when the tablets contained sedative substance in the absence of any solid evidence to show that the tablets when consumed cause death, it is highly 18

SC107of 15 dated 11.11.2020XI-Addl.Sessions Judge’s Court, Gudivada

doubtful to receive the story of prosecution to say that the death is due to alprazolam sedative substance. If really it contain a poisonous substance certainly M.Os.1 and 2 when chemically analysed reveal the fact and the same would have been mentioned in the report of Regional Forensic Science

Laboratory. So the death of the deceased though remain an admitted fact on record the entire material on record go to show that it is not due to poison said to have been given by the accused to the deceased through kheer.

However, the prosecution shall establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. First of all the prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused must invariably establish that the tablets were purchased by the accused from the shop of P.W.10 and it is the evidence of P.W.10 that she gave only Citrizen tablets which are generally used to control allergy for the ear, eyes and nose, it is inevitable on the part of prosecution to show that this Citrizen tablets also contain the sedative substance as found in item No.6 by the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory.

33)So the evidence of P.W.10 and the evidence of medical officer certainly makes the story of prosecution doubtful and first of all it is for the prosecution to establish the motive on the part of the accused to do away with the life of the deceased and according to the prosecution the motive on the part of the accused is two fold, one is, the deceased proposed to give a share to his brother i.e., P.W.7 for which the accused strongly opposed which emerged into an altercation between them and later pacified by the elders.

As seen from the evidence of P.W.7 he categorically stated that he doesn’t require any share in the tank and the other reason is the accused insisted the deceased to part with a share to her father and disputes arose and it is pacified and the children of the deceased and the accused are with the maternal grandmother. Generally when the tank which is said to be cultivated by the deceased and the accused is not owned by them and it is a tank being cultivated on lease which is evidently clear by the material placed 19

SC107of 15 dated 11.11.2020XI-Addl.Sessions Judge’s Court, Gudivada

by the prosecution. So giving a share in tanks for cultivating on lease is too remote to understand in prudent sense. If really that is ruled out, the only reason would be that there are disputes between the accused and the deceased and though such disputes have existed and according to the prosecution version itself they were pacified and they also relate to parting with a share in the tank. So there cannot be any motive to do away with the life of the deceased. So the question of feeling anguish by the accused is totally ruled out and it cannot be lost sight of the contention of the prosecution that the accused is under the impression that the deceased might part with the sale proceeds to his brothers so, she has made up her mind to kill the deceased by administering poison, does not hold any water, as there is no evidence placed by the prosecution in that end. So in the absence of any evidence or a solid proof these two motives attributed to the accused cannot be said to be established by the prosecution and on the contrary the evidence placed by the prosecution certainly lend ample credence to the contentions of the counsel for defence. So far as time of death is concerned according to the prosecution through the evidence of

P.W.1 the death might have occurred at 5.00p.m. on 27.05.2013 and the same is also clear in Ex.P13 FIR and the time of death is mentioned as 5.00p.m. But coming to the evidence, the time of death is spoken at various timings and the death took place in the evening and interestingly the evidence of P.W.4 is taken into consideration, she was informed about the death of her father about 12.00noon, and P.W.7 categorically stated that he received phone call between 4.00 to 5.00p.m. informing that the deceased died. If the evidence of P.Ws.1,4,7,8 and 14 are taken into consideration it goes without saying that the deceased died about 5.00p.m. as contended by the learned prosecution certainly gets falsified. So also the arrest of the accused is not established by the prosecution with cogent evidence and as per the version of prosecution immediately after the death of the deceased 20

SC107of 15 dated 11.11.2020XI-Addl.Sessions Judge’s Court, Gudivada

the accused left the scene of offence and she was arrested at 4.00p.m. on 29.5.2013 on the road leading to Kaikaluru and on the same day at 4.30pm.

the material objects i.e. five tablets were seized from her. If the confession and the statement and the seizure report are taken into consideration it clearly indicate that the accused did not disappear from the scene of offence.

As P.W.5, one of the brother of the deceased categorically deposed that she was arrested in the after noon on the succeeding day of 28.5.2013 while the corpse of the deceased was being taken to the burrial ground and if this part of the testimony is taken into consideration it certainly belie the version of prosecution regarding the confession and seizure also. The only items which can be seen in the scene of offence are the prawn feed and M.Os.1 and 2 if really the accused had prepared kheer after purchasing vermicelli, sago milk etc., in the scene of offence itself, certainly the empty sachets would have been found lying and interestingly even though the match box was not seen or found mentioned in the seizure report except M.Os.1 and 2 it is the evidence that there is no other incriminating material available at the scene of offence, atleast the used packet or empty packets of the vermicelli, sago and milk would have been found in the scene of offence and there is no match box or gas lighter or used match stick in the scene of offence as seen from the entire material on record which are expected to be lying there and the photographs only indicate the prawn feed and a cot and the accused lying dead on the floor. If really as contended by the prosecution the accused and the deceased were residing there itself certainly some cooking utensils and other belongings will be found in the hut. So in the absence of this essential incriminating material it is difficult to connect the accused to the death of the deceased,

34) It is further doubtful to understand as to how the accused can be said to have killed the deceased by administering poison to the deceased and at the same time when the kheer is prepared with vermicelli, sago, this two 21

SC107of 15 dated 11.11.2020XI-Addl.Sessions Judge’s Court, Gudivada

ingredients will not change the kheer or and the liquid said to have been traced in the scene of offence did not show any traces of vermicelli and if there is really vermicelli the same would have been mentioned in Regional

Forensic Science Laboratory report and the Regional Forensic Science

Laboratory report is crystal clear that the liquid did not contain any poisonous substance and in order to substantiate the veracity of the contention of the prosecution that the accused purchased these ingredients from the sundry shop, got examined P.W.6. Though in the chief examination P.W.6 supported the version of learned prosecution, the cross examination clearly indicate that on 27.5.2013 on which date the accused was said to have purchased vermicelli, sago and milk, from his shop and other customers also came he is no position to give the details of other customers or items purchased by them in his shop. When the house of the accused is said to be in the middle of the village and sundry store is in the out skirts and there are other kirana shops at a distance of two furlongs of the house of the accused, it is highly doubtful to understand as to what necessitated the accused to purchase the so called ingredients from the shop of P.W.6. The evidence of P.W.6 also do not inspire any confidence.

35) The other evidence given by P.W.6 in his cross examination also throws any amount of doubt on prosecution story and P.W.1 came to know about the death of the deceased at 6.00p.m. through a phone call and according to P.W.1 the death occurred at 5.00p.m. and as seen from the photographs, the scene of offence is a hut, which is at a considerable distance from the road intervened by the other fields, which are cultivated by other farmers and it is also the evidence on record, the scene of offence is not visible to the passers by on the road and interestingly, it is the evidence of P.W.7 that he sold away the crop and realised the amounts and did not pay the same to the accused. So interestingly in the light of this it appears that in order to save the real culprit from the clutches of law, the accused might 22

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have been implicated in this case and the entire gamut of evidence cogently indicate that the prosecution did not succeed in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt for the offences under the charged sections. Hence, the accused is certainly entitled to a benefit of doubt and is liable to be acquitted.

36) In the result, the accused is found not guilty for the offences u/Ss.

302 and 201 of IPC., accordingly she is acquitted under Sec.235(1)Cr.P.C. The bail bonds of the accused shall remain in force for a period of six months as contemplated under Sec.437-A of Cr.P.C. M.Os.1 and 2 are ordered to be returned to the Committal Court with a direction to dispose of the same according to law after expiry of appeal time.

Dictated to the Stenographer Grade-I of this Court, transcribed and typed by her,

corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court, this the 11th day of November, 2020.

Sd/- K.V.Mahalakshmi,

XI-ADDL.DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,

KRISHNA, GUDIVADA.

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE 

Witnesses examined for prosecution :

Prosecution Name of the witness Witness No. P.W.1Penumala Mariyanna P.W.2Ghantasala Divakar P.W.3Mungara Peddi Raju P.W.4Ghantasala Hemanth Deepthi P.W.5Ghantasala Rambabu P.W.6 Bale Venkata Bujji P.W.7 Ghantasala Chatarji P.W.8 Mungara Peda Nagaraju P.W.9Potnuri Sridhar P.W.10Bolla Rambabu P.W.11B.Radha Krishna P.W.12Ch.Vijay P.W.13Dr. T.panduranga Prasad P.W.14M.Venkateswara Rao P.W.15M.Subrahmanyam, P.W.16P.Sudhakara Rao P.W.17E.Ahok Kumar Goud P.W.18D. Venkataeswara Rao Witnesses examined on behalf of defence :­ Nil

Documents marked on behalf of prosecution: 

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Ex.P.1Report given by VRO Ex.P.2Scene observation report Ex.P.3Inquest Report. Ex.P.4Confessional statement excluding exclamatory Ex.P.5Mediators report dated 29.5.2013 Ex.P.6 Sec.161 Cr.P.C. statement of P.W.2 Ex.P.7 Sec.161 Cr.P.C. statement of P.W.3 Ex.P.8 Sec.161 Cr.P.C. statement of P.W.8 Ex.P.9 Sec.161 Cr.P.C. statement of P.W.10 Ex.P.10 Sec.161 Cr.P.C. statement of P.W.11 Ex.P.11 Sec.161 Cr.P.C. statement of P.W.12 Ex.P.12Postmortem examination report Ex.P.13Final opinion. Ex.P.14Original FIR Ex.P.15Altered FIR Ex.P.16Rough Sketch Ex.P.17 Regional Forensic Science Laboratory report

Documents marked for Defence: 

Ex.D.1Under Lined partition of 161 Cr.P.C. Statement of P.W.6 material objects marked on behalf of prosecution

M.O.1Empty glass bottle M.O2Steel container

Sd/- Smt.K.V.Maha lakshmi

XI Addl.Sessions Judge, Gudivada.

1

AS.133/10 dt.17.12.2020 XI-ADJ, Gudivada.

IN THE COURT OF XI ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, KRISHNA,

GUDIVADA.

PRESENT:- Smt.K.V.Maha Lakshmi.,

XI-ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, GUDIVADA.

THURSDAY, THIS THE 17th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2020.

A.S.133 OF 2010

Between:

1.Chintapalli Sithapathi @ Sitha Ramayya (died)

2. Adusumilli Jhansi Rani

3. Polavarapu Swarajya Lakshmi

4. Kolli Nagamani (appellants 2 to 4 are added as L.Rs. of deceased 1st appellant as per the orders in I.A.538/2018, dated 19.02.2019) …Appellants

A N D

1. Chintapalli Ramachandra Rao (died)

2. Chintapalli Atchaiah

3. Chintapalli Nageswara Rao

4. Chintapalli Veera Visweswara Rao

5. Satyanarayana Rice Mill, repr. By its Prop. Amaraneni Nageswara Rao

6. Konduru Rama Mohana Rao (died)

7. Cherukuru Rambabu

8. Navata Transort, repr.by Sri Jasti Janaki Ramaiah

9. Mandava Subba Dasu

10. Chintapalli Kasturamma

11. Chintapalli Rama Mohana Rao

12. Chintapalli Ranga Rao

13. Chintapalli Raghavendra Rao

14. Koduru Seethamma

15. V.Chukkamma

16. Chalasani Vijaya Lakshmi (16th respondent is added as L.R. of deceased 1st appellant as per the orders in I.A.538/2018, dated 19.2.2019 as 16th respondent is not co-operating with the appellants 2 to 4)

...Respondents

Appeal filed by the appellants U/o.41 Rule 1 and section 96 of C.P.C. against the decree and judgment in O.S.22/2000 on the file of Additional

Senior Civil Judge Court (FTC), Gudivada dated 30.3.2008.

Between:

Chintapalli Sithapathi @ Sitha Ramayya… plaintif

A N D 1Chintapalli Ramachandra Rao (died) 2Chintapalli Atchaiah 3Chintapalli Nageswara Rao 2

AS.133/10 dt.17.12.2020 XI-ADJ, Gudivada.

4Chintapalli Veera Visweswara Rao 5Satyanarayana Rice Mill, repr. By its Prop. Amaraneni Nageswara Rao 6Konduru Rama Mohana Rao (died) 7Cherukuru Rambabu 8Navata Transort, repr.by Sri Jasti Janaki Ramaiah 9Mandava Subba Dasu 10 Chintapalli Kasturamma 11 Chintapalli Rama Mohana Rao 12 Chintapalli Ranga Rao 13 Chintapalli Raghaendra Rao 14 Koduru Seethamma

15. V.Chukkamma ( defendants 10 to 15 are added as L.Rs. of 1st defendant as per the orders in I.A.1929/2005, dated 20.12.2006). …defendants

This appeal is coming for final hearing before me on 2.12.2020 in the presence of Sri B.Kama Raju., and Sri Rambabu., Advocates for appellants and of Sri GLNV Appaji., Advocate for respondents 3 to 5 and 7 to 15 , R1 and R6 died, case against R2 is abated and R16 set exparte and upon perusing the material on record, and on considering the connected material papers and submissions of both side counsel and the matter having been stood over till this day for consideration, this Court delivered the following:

J U D G M E N T

1) This is an appeal filed by the plaintiffs/appellants against the impugned Judgment and decree dated 30.3.2009 passed by the learned

Additional Senior Civil Judge(FTC), Gudivada, in O.S.No.22 of 2000 seeking to

set aside the same and allow the appeal.

2) In the grounds of appeal, it is urged that, the decree and judgment passed by the Lower Court is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case, the trial court ought to have seen that the defendants in O.S.22/2000 have categorically admitted in the written statement that the plaint schedule property in O.S.22/2000 was purchased by the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2, and the father of the defendants 3 and 4 under the document dated 17.01.1972 and the trial court that the contentions of the respondent that all the joint family properties partitioned orally in the summer of the year 1973 in which the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 and the father of the defendants 3 and 4 kept the land of Ac.1.00 rice mill and machinery therein joint between themselves, whereas the other properties including the landed properties at Peyyeru, Mudinepalli and the debts were 3

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divided; and the trial court ought to have seen that the bone of contentions of respondents in O.S.22/2000 is that the plaint schedule property in an extent of

Ac.1.00 was acquired jointly in the year 1972 by the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 and the father of defendants 3 and 4 and that there as rice mill constructed by defendants 1 and 2 with joint contributions and the defendant schedule property was kept joint amongst the four branches even though the other properties were partitioned; the trial court grossly erred in coming to a conclusion that the schedule properties in O.S.22/2000 were also divided along with the properties described in O.S.61/2001; the trial court wrongly observed that the plaintiff obtained pass book, title deed and sold away some of the properties are all related to the properties described in O.S.61/2001 but not in respect of the schedule properties in O.S.22/2000; the trial court ought to have seen that there was an oral partition in respect of plaint schedule properties in O.S.61/2001 and that there was no partition in respect of the plaint schedule properties in O.S.22/2000, even as per the contentions of the defendants and the documents Ex.B1 to B.14 are related to the plaint schedule properties in O.S.61/2001 and that the trial court ought to have decreed the suit instead of dismissing the same, and hence prayed to allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and to decree the suit.

3) The parties as arrayed in the trial court will be referred as parties hereinafter for the sake of convenience and brevity.

The appellant filed a suit for partition of plaint schedule property into four equal shares and allot one 1/4th share to the plaintiff and separate possession and for costs and such other reliefs.

4) At the out set it is pertinent to say that the parent plaint was amended by virtue of the orders in I.A.1929/2005 dated 20.12.2006 and the defendants 10 to 15 were impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased 1st defendant who died pendentelis. When the appeal is pending in 4

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this Court, 16th respondent is added as L.R. of deceased 1st appellant as per the orders in I.A.538/2018, dated 19.2.2019 as 16th respondent is not co- operating with the appellants 2 to 4.

5)The factual matrix of the plaint is that:

6) The 1st defendant is the elder brother of 2nd defendant, plaintiff and one late Chintapalli Sri Ramulu and all are sons of Chintapalli Veerayya.

Chintapalli Veerayya died long back and ever since the death of their father, the 1st defendant had been managing the properties of the joint family as elder brother. Chintapalli Sri Ramulu died on 12.06.1982 leaving behind him, the defendants 3 and 4 as his legal representatives to represent his estate.

The plaintiff along with defendants 1 and 2 and late Chintapalli Sri Ramulu jointly purchased a land in an extent of Ac.1-00 out of Ac.1.35 cents in

R.S.No.180/1; an extent of Ac.0-06 cents in R.S.No.180/2; an extent of Ac.1.29 cents, from Smt.Kodali Baby Sarojini, W/o Pattabhi Ramayya, Sitharampuram,

Vijayawada under registered sale deed. Ever since they are in joint and construction possession of said property and it is managed by the 1st defendant and it is jointly cultivated by the all the brothers and improved the property with their hard earnings. In the meanwhile, the plaint schedule property became expensive. The 1st defendant constructed a rice mill in the part of schedule property and also constructed four shops in the remaining extent, leaving some space for the purpose of rice mill. The defendants 1 to 4 with the an evil advice of the family members conspire together and did not pay ¼ share of the properties to the plaintiff who had 1/4th share in the entire property. The plaintiff enchased and demanded the defendant for partition of plaint schedule property for his share and for payment of profits but the defendant evaded the same and did not co-operate for partition.

(ii) The 1st defendant leased out the rice mill to the 5th defendant and collecting the lease amount. Similarly four shops in the schedule property are leased out to the defendants 6 to 9 and the 1st defendant collected the rents 5

AS.133/10 dt.17.12.2020 XI-ADJ, Gudivada.

from the tenants. The 5th defendant paying annual lease of Rs.40,000/-, where as the defendants 6 to 9 are paying rents at Rs.500/- each. Initially the 1st defendant used to pay the share of profits acquired from the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff but for the past three years he failed to pay the same in spite of demands from the plaintiff. So the 1st defendant is bound to account for the profits on the schedule property and pay the same to the plaintiff and tentatively estimating his share as Rs.40,000/-. On 3.11.1999 the plaintiff issued a registered notice to the defendants 1 to 4 demanding for partition of plaint schedule property into four equal shares and to allot one share to him. The defendants received the same and issued a reply on 16.1.1999 with false contentions, for which the plaintiff got issued a rejoinder notice on 3.12.1999. Hence the plaintiff is constrained to file a suit seeking the partition of plaint schedule property and for allotment of 1/4th share therein.

The defendants 5 to 9 being the tenants in the schedule property they are proper and necessary parties to the suit as such they wee impleaded. The cause of action for the suit arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Hence, the suit.

7) A common written statement is filed on behalf of the defendants 1 to 4 by way of reply to the plaint. A memo of adoption is filed on behalf of defendants 7 to 9, 10 to 14 sating that the written statement of defendants 1 to 4 is being adopted. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendants 1 to 4 the material averments of the plaint are denied admitting that the relationship existing between he parties. It is submitted that there is no joint family or joint family properties as on the date of filing of the suit and joint family properties are partitioned orally, as early as in 1970. It is further submitted that originally the joint family consisting of 1st defendant, father of 3rd and 4th defendants, 2nd defendant and the plaintiff. Ch.Ramajogeswara

Rao last brother partitioned his share of property and the rest of the brothers were enjoying the property jointly as per regd. Document No.1496/1966 dated 6

AS.133/10 dt.17.12.2020 XI-ADJ, Gudivada.

10.08.1966 and the property is enjoyed jointly by the family members and with further acquisitions a rice mill was constructed in the year 1970 and the licence was obtained in the name of 1st defendant as eldest brother of the family. In the said partition the defendants 1, 2 and the father of defendants 3 and 4 kept Ac.1-00 with the rice mill jointly with themselves, while rest of the property including the landed property at Mudinepalli village, immovables and cash and debts were divided ever since they are enjoying the property paying tax separately and pattadar pass book, revenue title deed were issued accordingly in oral partition. Chintapalli Sri Ramulu the father of D3 and D4 passed away in the year 1981 and the properties were devolved on defendants 3 and 4 and they are enjoying the same and the factum of oral partition found took place in the registered document dated 9.5.1988 and in the said sale deed these defendants and plaintiff joined as vendors. Though the properties sold were that of the plaintiff and he received the entire sale consideration as there was no registered document evidencing oral partition, ever since the partition. The shops were constructed in the year 1990 by the defendants 1 to 4 with their own funds and ever since they are in possession and enjoyment of the same with absolute rights. Thus the entire schedule property belongs to the defendants 1 to 4, none else got right, title and interest over the schedule properties. The 5th defendant is nothing to do with the rice mill which is in the plaint schedule property and the present suit is filed to get wrongful gain and cause wrongful loss to the defendants. It is further submitted that after the oral partition the plaintiff never received any profits getting from the schedule property, defendants 1 and 2, late Chintapalli

Sri Ramulu and after him defendants 3 and 4 have been enjoying the plaint schedule property. It is further submitted that the management of the plaint schedule property and joint cultivation by the 1st defendant on behalf of joint family is only up to the date of oral partition only and the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the rice mill being run by the defendants 1 to 4 themselves. The plaintiff filed the suit with frivolous and false allegations.

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Hence, these plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in the schedule property and the plaintiff had no cause of action to file the suit and sought for dismissal of the suit with exemplary costs.

8)Basing on the strength of the pleadings of both parties to the suit, the following issues were settled for trial before the trial court:

1) Whether there was an oral partition of the family properties in 1973 as alleged by the defendants ?

2) Whether the suit is bared by the provisions of Order II, RuLe 2 of C.P.C. ?

3) To what relief ?

9) During the course of trial, on behalf of plaintiff P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A1 to A7 were marked, on behalf of contesting defendants,

D.W. 1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B14 were marked.

10) Considering the above evidence, the trial court dismissed the suit without costs. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment the plaintiff preferred the present appeal.

11) Now the point for consideration is:

Whether the impugned Judgment dated 30-3-2009 passed in

O.S.No.22 of 2000 by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court

(FTC), Gudivada, suffers from any legal infirmity and liable to be set aside? Or not ?

12)Heard both sides.

Point:

13)Admittedly there is no disputes what so ever regarding the relationship between the parties interse. It is an admitted fact that the father of plaintiff, D1, D2 and the father of D3 and D4 are no more. Evidently pendentelis one of the brother of the plaintiff Chintapalli Sri Ramulu died on 12.06.1982, leaving behind the defendants 3 and 4 as legal representatives to represent his estate.

14)According to the contention of counsel for plaintiff, the plaintiff and defendants1 to 3 and their deceased brother Chintapalli Sri Ramulu 8

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during his life time purchased the plaint schedule property under the original of Ex.A3 purporting to be the sale deed and ever since it was in joint possession of these four brothers and consequent to the demise of their father, the joint family properties were managed by the 1st defendant as elder of the family. It is further admitted contention of counsel for plaintiff/ appellant that the cultivation is looked after by all the brothers and they improved the land with their earnings. It is admitted case of plaintiff that the 1st defendant constructed a rice mill in a part of schedule property and four shops in the remaining extent of schedule property and it was developed from time to time with joint family investment. It is further the contention of counsel for plaintiff that the defendants 1 to 4 conspired together and did not cooperate for partition of plaint schedule property into four equal shares and allot 1/4th share to the plaintiff. It is further the admitted contention of counsel for plaintiff that the 1st defendant had let out the rice mill on lease to 5th defendant and four shop rooms were let out to the defendants 6 to 9 and rents are being enjoyed by the 1st defendant and went to the extent of contending that initially his share of profits acquired from the plaint schedule property was given to him and subsequently for the last three years his share of profits were not given to him and hence he filed the suit However, there is exchange of notices between the parties i.e. plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 4. So the counsel for plaintiff vehemently contended that the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/4th share.

15) On the other hand, apart from opposing the case of the plaintiff in toto, it is the specific contention of counsel for defendants that the defendants are not disputing the relationship between the parties and the plaintiff. It is admitted case of the defendants 1 to 4 that originally the joint family consisted of plaintiff, D1, father of D2 and D3 and Chintapalli Rama Jogeswara

Rao. It is further admitted contention of counsel for defendant that the said

Rama Jogeswara Rao, last brother of plaintiff, partitioned his share while the 9

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rest of the brothers kept in tact as joint family property and being enjoyed jointly. It is admitted of the 1st defendant that he constructed rice mill in 1970 for which licence was taken in the name of 1st defendant being the elder of the family. It is further the specific contention of counsel for defendants 1 to 4 that there was a verbal partition in 1973 during summer, whereby the defendants 1 to 4 kept an extent of Ac.01-00 of land with the rice mill and machinery therein jointly between themselves and accordingly pattadar pass book and revenue title deed were issued basing on the verbal partition. In order to substantiate the veracity of the contention of the virtual partition it is specifically contended by the counsel for defendants that there is clear recital in original of Ex.B1 the registration extract of sale deed dated 9.5.1988, the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 4 had joined as vendors though the property sold was that of plaintiff and figured their signatures as sale deed. So the defendants contend that there is no property left for partition and the plaintiff is estopped from questioning the partition, as verbal partition had occurred long back prior to the filing of the suit. It is further admitted contention of counsel for defendants that the shops were constructed somewhere in the year 1990 with their own funds by these defendants 1 to 4. So the entire property belongs to these defendants alone and the plaint schedule properties were managed by the 1st defendant only till the date of verbal partition. So the plaint schedule property is not partible and the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the schedule property.

16) Taking the respective rival contentions into consideration, it is obvious to say that, the initial onus is on the plaintiff to clinchingly establish by cogent evidence that the plaint schedule properties are partible in the light of verbal partition pleaded as a defence by the defendants. It is to be observed as to how far the plaintiff had succeeded in substantiating his case.

10

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17)The plaintiff himself deposed as P.W.1, and the another witness was examined as P.W.2. It is to be observed as to how far the evidence of

P.Ws.1 and 2 are suffice to substantiate the case of plaintiff.

18) A perusal of the affidavit in chief of P.W.1 cogently go to show that, it is quite reiterating the averments in the plaint. He categorically admitted that, Chintapalli Sri Ramulu is his brother. He had a wife, two sons and two daughters and the two daughters and wife are not shown as parties in this suit. He further categorically deposed that he had no documentary evidence to show that they acquired the properties by paying the amounts from their earnings and except the agricultural income the family had no other source of income and according to his testimony the properties were purchased in the year 1962/1972 with the agricultural income and the rice mill was constructed by the 1st defendant in the year 1973 and also a shopping complex in the year 1980 in front of the rice mill and he had no documentary proof to show that, he invested his earnings for construction of rice mill and the shopping complex. He further deposed that he had no documentary proof to show that he used to receive share in the income of the plaint schedule property till three years prior to filing of the suit. He unequivocally admitted that in the year 1973 he along with his brothers partitioned the properties and they have been enjoying their respective shares. He admitted of having sold Ac.1.48 cents situated in Mudinepalli which was allotted to him in the year 1973 to Ede Venkateswara Rao. He admitted of having purchased Ac.1-09 cents form his brother Rama Jogeswara

Rao under a registered sale deed dated 2.9.1973. He admitted that in the partition that occurred in the year 1973 he was allotted Ac.1.50 cents in

R.S.No.63, and Ac.1.90 cents in R.S.No.267 of Mudinepalli; Ac.05-11 cents in

R.S.No.110 of Peyyuru, in total Ac.8.51 cents were allotted to his share and he was given pattadar pass book for that land and he is paying land revenue. He admitted of having not filed any declaration under Land Cealing Act. He admitted that in the present suit except rice mill and shopping complex no 11

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other property was shown and no partition was sought. It is further deposed that his brothers were also given pattadar pass books, revenue title deeds for their respective shares and they are enjoying the same.

19) A perusal of the affidavit in chief of P.W.2 cogently go to show that, his version is quite corroborating the version of P.W.1 in all material aspects of the case of plaintiff. He categorically deposed that he had acquaintance with the plaintiff since 1980, as he is attending their masonary works. Prior to the year 1985 he worked as coolie and he do not know the family particulars of the plaintiff and he had no knowledge about the family properties of plaintiff or about the partition between the plaintiff and his brothers. He further deposed that he did not participate in any of the property disputes and except visiting site situated behind the rice mill and shop rooms.

He do not know anything about the properties of plaintiff and he signed in his affidavit-in-chief at Chevuru at his workshop on the request of plaintiff.

20) A combined reading of the testimonies of P.W.1 and 2 cogently go to show that the evidence of P.W.2 is no way helpful to the plaintiff and the cross examination of P.W.1 reveal a bunch of admissions. As the defendants have pleaded a prior partition done in the year 1973 in respect of their joint family properties, before going into actual crux of discussion it is worth mentioning the evidence placed by the defendants on record.

21)The 13th defendant deposed as D.W.1 and there is no forthcoming oral evidence from the defendant side.

22) A perusal of the affidavit in chief of D.W.1 cogently go to show that he deposed on behalf of all other defendants. He categorically deposed that his father died in the year 2005 and during his life time he looked after all the affairs personally. He admitted that his junior paternal uncle had some other lands which are not shown in plaint schedule filed in the court and according to him those lands were purchased subsequently and the extent will 12

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around AC.20-00. He admitted that in the year 1972 all the co-brothers jointly purchased Ac.1-00 of land and it was not included in the schedule. He admitted that his father used to manage the properties of their family.

23) Taking the sum and substance of the above evidence into consideration it goes without saying that there was only an oral partition in respect of joint family properties and the same is admitted even by P.W.1 during the course of his cross examination and furthermore, it is the evidence of P.W.1 that except rice mill and shopping complex, other property was not shown and no partition was sought for the remaining landed property situated in Mudinepalli. At this juncture it may not be out of context to make a specific mention that apart from the present suit against which the appeal is preferred, there is another suit in O.S.61/2001 for partition of property and both the suits were clubbed in the trial court and a common judgment was pronounced.

24)According to the contention of the counsel for plaintiff, there is a clear distinction between joint property and joint family property and the principles governed under joint family property and joint property are different and further contended that the plaint schedule property in O.S.22/2000 and the plaint schedule property in O.S.61/2001 are quite different and plaint schedule property in O.S.22/2000 which is subject matter in the present appeal is confined to the division of rice mill and the shops therein and went to the extent of further contending that the prior partition pleaded by the defendant is in respect to the agricultural lands. It is further contended that as the 1st defendant is elder son and the elder brother of plaintiff, he managed the properties and as such the licence for the rice mill is taken in the name of 1st defendant. It is further contention of counsel for appellant/plaintiff that the trial court had taken into consideration the documents relating to O.S.61/2001 in O.S.22/00 and at no point of time it is the contention of counsel for plaintiff that the plaint schedule property in the present appeal is joint family property.

It is all through the contention of counsel for appellant that the plaint schedule 13

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property is joint property and the so called partition admitted by the parties relate to joint family properties and it is strenuous contention of counsel for appellant that no partition occurred in respect of joint property which is plaint schedule property in O.S.22/2000 and went to the extent of contending that even the defendant did not file any documentary proof to show that there was a partition in respect of the property in O.S.22/2000 and had drawn the attention of this Court to Sec.44 of Transfer of Property Act.

25) On the other hand, it is the contention of counsel for defendants that Sec.44 of Transfer of Property Act is joint property and it is not applicable to the present case on hand as the entire property was dealt under joint family properties and drawn attention to the admissions made by plaintiff during the course of his cross examination which will be discussed infra and in the verbal partition that was admitted by the parties all the properties were divided and the other aspect of the contention of the counsel for contesting defendants is such that, the mode of acquisition of the property covered by Ex.A3 has to be taken into account and when there is no source of income to the parties to

Ex.A3 it has to be inferred that the property was purchased with the joint family fund and so there is joint nucleus in the property covered by Ex.A3 which is also divided in the verbal partition and further contended that the suit is barred under Or.II, R.2 of C..P.C.. However, that aspect cannot be considered in this appeal as it relates to O.S.61/2001 in respect of which no appeal is preferred. The only aspect which deserves consideration is, whether the plaint schedule property in O.S.22/2000 is partible or not and whether there is any legal infirmity in the judgment passed by the trial court. A curosary glance of the evidence of P.W.1 cogently go to show that the plaint schedule property is nothing but the property covered by Ex.A3 document which is jointly purchased by the 1st defendant, 2nd defendant and the father of D3,

D4 and the plaintiff. So by any stretch of imagination, it can be said that the property is joint property of the purchasers under Ex.A3 document and it is 14

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also clear from the evidence of P.W.1 that along with him his other brothers i.e.

1st defendant got Ac.8-38 cents, comprising Ac.1.50 cents in R.S.No.63 and

Ac.1.90cents in R.S.No.267 of Mudinepalli and Ac.5.04 cents in R.S.No.222 of

Peyyeru, and 2nd defendant got Ac.3-00 in R.S.No.44, Ac.3.83 cents in R.S.No.

in R.S.No.143 and Ac.2.25 cents in R.S.No.332 in total Ac.9-08 cents and deceased brother Chintapalli Sri Ramulu got Ac.3-00 in R.S.No.44, Ac.1.80 cents in R.S.No.267 and Ac.3.84 cents in R.S.No.143, and it is further the evidence of P.W.1 in the cross examination that except the agricultural income, the family had no other source of income and the property purchased in the year 1972 was purchased with the agricultural income and it is also his evidence that the 1st defendant constructed rice mill in the year 1973 and shopping complex in the year 1990 in front of rice mill and he categorically deposed that he has no documentary proof to show that he had also invested amounts for rice mill and shopping complex. When it is the contention of counsel for plaintiff that till three years prior to filing of this suit the plaintiff received amounts, it is the evidence of P.W.1 that he had no documentary proof to the effect that heh adshare in the income from the properties and while admitting that there was a partition in the year 1973 with his brothers no emphasis was supplied by P.W.1 to say that the property covered by Ex.A3 was kept intact joint amongst brothers and undoubtedly the tenor of the evidence given by P.W.1 clearly indicate that the partition occurred in respect of agricultural lands as contended by the learned counsel for plaintiff/appellant.

26)So far as the evidence of P.W.2 is concerned, as already observed though in the affidavit-in-chief he supported the case of plaintiff, the same certainly withies away in the light of the cross examination as he pleaded ignorance in every aspect. So the evidence of D.W.1, who gave evidence on behalf of all the contesting defendants and the 13th defendant in the present suit and D.W.8 in O.S.61/2001, and he happens to be the son of Rama Chandra 15

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Rao i.e. 1st defendant in both the suits. D.W.1categorically admitted about the property purchased under Ex.A3 and it was not included in the schedule may be this part of the testimony relates to O.S.61/2001 so the fact remains on record through the evidence of D.W.1 also that the property covered by

Ex.A3 was purchased by all the four brothers jointly and there is nothing on record to show that there was partition of the rice mill or the shops which was said to have been constructed by the 1st defendant and the evidence on record clearly go to indicates that the schedule properties covered by

O.S.22/2000 and that of O.S.61/2001 are quite different and pattadar pass

book and title deeds at best go to indicate that they are all agricultural lands and a perusal of Ex.B3 to B6 purporting to be the pattadar pass books of 1st defendant do not reflect the survey numbers of the plaint schedule property.

So also Ex.B4 do not reflect the survey numbers of the plaint schedule property. A perusal of Ex.B7 go to show that it is pattadar pass book issued in the name of D3 to D4 the children of deceased Chintapalli Sri Ramulu it also do not reflect the survey number of plaint schedule property and undoubtedly these pattadar pass books i.e. Ex.B3 to B7 are no way related to the plaint schedule property. Exs.A1 and A2 also do not relate to the schedule property.

Likewise Ex.B1 and B2 also do not relate to the plaint schedule property and the tax receipts filed under Ex.B9 to B11 also do not relate to the plaint schedule property. A perusal of Ex.B12 go to show that it is the property tax receipt for the rice mill and the demand receipt is in the name of 1st defendant and Ex.B13 is also no way related to the plaint schedule property and Ex.B14 is also the property tax receipt in the name of 1st defendant and the assessment No.is 143.

27) Undoubtedly there is subtle difference between joint property and joint family properties. Whatever may be the mode of acquisition. Even assuming that the contention of the counsel for contesting respondents is true, and the property covered by Ex.A3 relates to the subject matter of the 16

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appeal suit is purchased with the joint nucleus unless and until it is brought into common hotch pot it cannot be treated to be the joint family property and the entire evidence placed by both parties on record, cogently go to indicate that the agricultural lands are partitioned verbally in the year 1973. If really there was such a partition of plaint schedule property also in the year 1973 as the property under Ex.A3 was said to have been purchased in the year 1972, certainly there would have been some piece of evidence to establish the same, when right from the beginning the case of plaintiff is such that as the defendant is elder brother the entire properties were managed by him consequent to the demise of their father there is nothing in the demand of property tax to be in the name of 1st defendant and the demand being in the name of 1st defendant also probablise but to some extent the contention of plaintiff in respect of the jointness of the property covered by Ex.A3. The plaintiff is also conceading about the partition of other properties of the family which are joint family properties and so far as the property covered by Ex.A3 is concerned by any stretch of imagination it can be said to be only a joint property of the four brothers who actually purchased under Ex.A3 but not a joint family property but when there is nothing in the evidence of D.W.1 to show that these rice mil and shopping complex were also divided amongst the four brothers who purchased it under Ex.A3. In the absence of any crystal proof from the defendants in respect to the partition of the property covered under Ex.A3 in the present appeal, it is highly doubtful to conclude that the property under Ex.A3 is also partitioned amongst them and when a partition of the rice mill or the shops can only be by a registered instrument but not by verbal partition unlike agricultural lands. As in agricultural lands if there was such verbal partition it can be seen in the revenue record about the extent enjoyed by each of the sharers and to some extent the revenue record of rights i.e., pattadar pass book, revenue title throw some light in order to understand about the verbal partition amongst the family members. The 17

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counsel for plaintiff had also laid emphasis on Sec.44 of Transfer of Property

Act, 1882 which deals with Transfer by one or more co-owners.

28) A plain reading of the verbatim contained to Sec.44 of the said Act clearly envisages that when one or more co-owners of immovable property legally competent transfers his share of such property or any interest therein the transferee acquires as to such share or interest. However, this right is subject to conditions and liabilities effecting at the date of transfer or the share or interest of the transferor so transferred and the transferee is also entitled to seek for partition. However, there is an exception carved out to

Sec.44 of the said Act debarring the transferee from claiming joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the dwelling house.

29)The counsel for plaintiff vehemently contends that some alienations were made to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents of Mudinepalli to one Ede

Venkateswara Rao and according to him it was sold jointly. It is also clear that

P.W.1 purchased Ac.01.09 cents from his brother Rama Jogeswara Rao under a registered sale deed dated 2.9.1973 and interestingly pleaded ignorance about the boundaries mentioned in the said sale deed and that it is clear about the shares allotted to the remaining brothers in that partition. So the counsel for plaintiff vehemently contends that those alienations are protected u/s.44 of the Transfer of Property Act ignoring the factum that alienation or purchase was made by P.W.1 subsequent to the partition while enjoying his share separately and the evidence of P.W.1 coupled with the evidence of D.W.1 particularly the cross examination is suffice to lend credence that the agricultural lands were verbally partitioned between the siblings.

30)At the same time, there is nothing on record to show that the schedule property was enjoyed separately except the demand of the property tax in the name of 1st defendant, there is no iota of evidence or a solid proof to show that the plaint schedule property i.e. rice mill and shopping complex is also divided amongst four brothers and apart from these four brothers there 18

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are other brothers to plaintiff but a perusal of Ex.A3 go to indicate that it was purchased by defendants 1 and 2, the plaintiff and the father of defendants 3 and 4 and in the absence of any cogent evidence from the defendants to show that the rice mill was also divided it goes without saying that the version of the plaintiff is to be believed and the only inference which can be drawn is that there has been a partition in respect of agricultural lands of the parties and there was no such partition in respect of the property covered by Ex.A3 and even if it is assumed that it is also joint family property then there must be some cogent proof to evince a separate enjoyment and in the absence of such evidence it goes without saying that there is enough tenacity in the contention of counsel for plaintiff and the plaint schedule property is partible and the plaintiff/ appellant is entitled to 1/4th share and 1/4th share of the deceased 1st respondent to the respondent Nos.10 to 13 together, being the heirs of the deceased 1st respondent and 1/4th share to the 2nd respondent and 1/4th share together to the respondents 3 and 4 being the heirs of the deceased Chintapalli Sriramulu.

31) A perusal of the judgment of the trial court cogently go to show that the trial court has come to an erroneous conclusion that the verbal partition done in the year 1973 also included in the plaint schedule property shown in the present suit. Even though D.W.1 categorically deposed about the purchase of the property by four brothers under Ex.A3 no emphasis is supplied by him, either to say that it was still kept intact joint or it was divided amongst brothers but ignoring the same the trial court had found that the partition of the properties in O.S.61/2001 also included in the present suit schedule property and there is no evidence to show about the investment for construction of rice mill and went on to dismiss the suit erroneously ignoring the fact that the plaint schedule property covered by present appeal is joint property and not the joint family property and that no partition was effected in 19

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respect of that property and hence, the judgment of the trial court suffers from legal infirmity and is liable to be set aside.

32) Issue No: To what relief ?

In the result, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the decree and judgment in O.S.22/2000 dated 30.03.2009 on the file of Additional Senior

Civil Judge, (FTC) Gudivada and the suit is decreed with costs all threw by

passing preliminary decree for partition of plaint schedule properties into four equal shares and for allotment of 1/4th share to the appellant/plaintiff, 1/4th share of the deceased 1st respondent/1st defendant to the respondents 10 to 13, being the heirs of deceased 1st respondent and 1/4th share to the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and 1/4th share together to the respondents 3 and 4.

Dictated to the Stenographer Grade-I of this Court, transcribed and typed by her,

corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court, on this the 17th day of December, 2020.

Sd/- K.V.Mahalakshmi,

XI-Addl.District Judge, Krishna, Gudivada.

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

-NIL-

Sd/- K.V.Mahalakshmi,

XI-Addl.District Judge, Krishna, Gudivada.

1

IN THE COURT OF THE XI-ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE,

KRISHNA AT GUDIVADA.

Present: Smt. K.V.Maha Lakshmi.,

XI-Addl. District and Sessions Judge,

Krishna, Gudivada.

Friday, this the 6th day of November, 2020

ORIGINAL SUIT No.43/2015

Between:

Saayana Subhashini and two others.... Plaintiffs

A N D

Yarramsetti Dhana Lakshmi and three others

.... Defendants

This suit is coming on 28.1.2020 for final hearing before me in the presence of

Sri M.Srinivasa Rao., Advocate for plaintiff and of Sri Sanaka Ram Kumar.,

Advocate for defendants 1 to 4 and upon perusing the material on record and after

hearing both sides, this court delivered the following:

//J U D G M E N T//

This is a suit filed for preliminary decree of partition of plaint schedule properties into four equal shares and allot one such share each to the plaintiffs and one such share to the defendants and for mesne profits from September 2012 to May 2015 to a tune of Rs.1,23,750/-i.e, three shares of plaintiffs, out of total mesne profits amount Rs.1,65,000/- and for costs of the suit.

2)The contents of the amended plaint in brief are as follows:

The plaintiffs are sister and daughter of late Yerramsetti Venkateswara

Rao and late Yerramsetti Rambai and Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao is son of said

Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao and Yerramsetti Rambai and the plaintiffs are his sisters. The 1st defendant is wife of late Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao and daughter-in-law of Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao and Yerramsetti Rambai and the defendants 2 to 4 are the daughters of D1. Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao during his life time purchased an extent of Ac0.08 cents of residential vacant site at nearest door No.15-25 at Kotireddy pet, Pamarru and the plaint schedule property was purchased from Bommareddy Krishna Reddy on 9.4.1987 under the registered sale deed and during his life time the said Yerramsetti 2

Venkateswara Rao constructed the R.C.C. roof building with his own funds as he worked in Andhra Bank and that he had good title, possession and enjoyment over the said property. The said Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao died intestate on 9.4.1990 and Yerramsetti Rambai died intestate on 31.01.2005. Consequent to their demise the plaint schedule property is looked after by Yerramsetti

Sudhakara Rao and during the life time of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao, the plaintiffs demanded him for partition of plaint schedule property into four equal shares and allot each such equal share to the plaintiffs and one share to him, but he postponed the same and leased out the R.C.C. roof building consisting of two portions and used to share the mesne profits from the schedule property to the plaintiffs and Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao. Later Yerramsetti Sudhakara

Rao died on 16.10.2020 without partitioned the plaint schedule property. After demise of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao, the plaintiffs demanded the defendants for partition of plaint schedule property and for mesne profits but in vain.

Further the plaintiffs came to know that the defendants are trying to alienate the plaint schedule property to third parties, without partitioning the same, by creating sham and nominal documents and he plaintiffs issued legal notice on 1.10.2014 and the defendants and tenants received the same on 5.09.2012 and approached the plaintiffs and informed that the plaint schedule property will be partitioned soon and agreed to pay rents @ Rs.2,500/- per month on each portion i.e. total Rs.5,000/- per month on each portion total Rs.5,000/- per month from September 2012 on wards on proportionate basis, but the defendants did not come forward for partition of schedule property. The cause of action for the suit arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Hence, the suit.

3)A common written statement is filed on behalf of D1 to D4. In the written statement filed on behalf of 1st defendant the material averments contained in the plaint are denied, admitting the relationship between the parties. It is also admitted that, the vacant site of the plaint schedule property was purchased by

Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao under a registered sale deed dated 9.4.1987. It 3 is submitted that the sale consideration was contributed by brother, father and son. After the demise of Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao, Yerramsetti Sudhakara

Rao joined in bank service in the place of his father and later with his own funds Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao constructed the schedule building after effecting the repairs and other necessary levels to the schedule site.

Consequently the plaintiffs have no share in the schedule property. Prior to the joining in Andhra Bank, Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao did money lending business and the marriages of all the plaintiffs were performed prior to the year 1985 and at the time of marriages all the plaintiffs were given suitable dowry under pasupu kumkuma and as such the demand for partition doesn’t arise. The plaintiffs are also not entitled for mesne profits. The said schedule property was alienated prior to filing of the suit and sought for dismissal of the suit with costs in the interest of justice.

4) Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues are settled for trial:

1. Whether the plaint schedule property is joint and constructive possession of the plaintiffs and the defendants ?

2. Whether the plaint schedule property is liable for partition ?

3. whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition of the plaint schedule propertyinto four equal shares and for allotment of one such share each as prayed for ?

4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for mesne profits as prayed for ?

5. To what relief ?

5) Heard both sides and perused the written arguments submitted by the counsel for defendants.

6) To substantiate the case of plaintiff P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A1 and A8 were marked. On behalf of contesting defendants D.Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B1 to B9 were marked.

7)Issues 1 to 4:

All these issues are being discussed conjointly as they are inter related and are intricate and more over to avoid repetition.

4

8)Admittedly the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are sisters and daughters of

Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao and Yerramsetti Rambai and it is also an admitted fact that the plaintiffs had a brother by name Yerramsetti Sudhakara

Rao and he is no more. Evidently the father of the plaintiffs died on 9.4.1990 and their mother died on 31.01.2005 and their brother Yerramsetti Sudhakara

Rao died on 16.10.2010. It is also admitted fact that the 1st defendant is widow of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao and sister-in-law to the plaintiffs and the defendants 2 to 4 are daughters of 1st defendant and late Yerramsetti

Sudhakara Rao. It is also admitted fact that Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao during his life time worked in Andhra Bank. It is also not in dispute about the initial title over the plaint schedule property vesting with Yerramsetti Venkateswara

Rao. It is also not in dispute that the plaint schedule site in which the plaint schedule property is existing is purchased by Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao under the original of Ex.A1 in the year 1987 or to put it more accurately the plaint schedule property was purchased as a vacant site by Yerramsetti

Venkateswara Rao. Admittedly there is exchange of notices between the parties to the suit.

9)According to the contention of the counsel for plaintiffs the house in the plaint schedule property was constructed by Yerramsetti Venkateswara

Rao during his life time with his own funds and he is in absolute possession of the same with clear title. It is further contended that consequent to the demise of parents of the plaintiffs, their brother Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao looked after the plaint schedule property. It is the admitted contention of counsel for plaintiffs during the life time of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao, the plaintiffs demanded for their share of plaint schedule property and requested for partition but the same was postponed. It is the categorical contention of the counsel for plaintiffs that the Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao during his life time leased out the plaint schedule property comprising two portions and used to pay the mesne profits to the plaintiffs also and Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao died without partition. It is further contended that consequent to the demise of 5

Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao the plaintiffs demanded the defendants personally and through mediators for partition of plaint schedule properties into four equal shares and allot one such share each to the plaintiffs and the remaining one share to the defendants but the defendants did not choose to come forward despite exchange of notices. So the plaintiffs are contending that they are in joint and constructive possession of plaint schedule property and it is partible and they are entitled to a share in the said property.

10) On the other hand, it is the specific contention of counsel for defendants that the marriage of the plaintiffs occurred even prior to 1985 and they were given suitable dowry besides pasupu kumkuma. It is further contended that consequent to the demise of father-in-law of 1st defendant

Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao, her husband joined in bank service and with his own earnings he constructed the schedule building and went to the extent of contending that even prior to joining service in Andhra Bank Yerramsetti

Sudhakara Rao used to do money lending business. It is further the case of defendants that the plaint schedule property is sold away even prior to the filing of the suit. So there is no property for partition.

11) Taking the respective rival contentions into consideration, it is obvious to say that the initial onus is undoubtedly on the plaintiffs to clinchingly establish that, the plaint schedule properties is partible into four equal shares and they are entitled to one such share each. Further it is for the plaintiffs to establish that the plaint schedule property belong to their father and the plaint schedule property is amenable for partition. In this back drop it is to be observed as to how far the plaintiffs have succeeded in substantiating their case.

12) The 1st and 2nd plaintiffs are deposed as P.Ws.1 and 2 respectively.

It is to be observed as to how far the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 are suffice to substantiate the case of plaintiff.

13) A perusal of the affidavit-in-chief of P.W.1 cogently go to show that, she is 1st plaintiff in the suit and her version is quite corroborating the 6 averments in the plaint. In the beginning of cross examination most of the admitted facts were elicited. It is the evidence of P.W.1 that prior to the purchase of schedule property her father resided in Hyderabad and by the date of death of her father her elder brother is aged about 29-years and she can say the property possessed by her father. It is her categorical evidence that her father had Ac05-00of wet land at Ekamuru of Vuyyuru Mandal and by the time her father purchased the plaint schedule property the said five acres of wet land was already sold. She admitted that her husband is not related to her prior to their marriage. She unequivocally admitted that her father performed the marriage of her two sisters and herself with all customary rights and the 2nd plaintiff is born after the birth of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao and 2nd plaintiff is younger to her and the marriage of her younger sister was performed on2.6.1982 and at present the suit schedule property stands registered in the name of her father Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao. The age of the son of 3rd plaintiff is approximately 28-years. She do not know one Tupakula Nancharaiah so also Vadlapati RaviKumar. She admitted that after the marriage the plaintiffs 1 to 3 settled at different places. She admitted that as per the reply given by the defendants they were not entitled to the claim share in the plaint schedule property, as the marriages were performed even prior to the year 1982. She categorically admitted that at present the defendants are paying tax to the schedule property and at the time of her marriage, her father gave Ac.01-00 of land situated at Pamarru. She admitted that the husband of 2nd plaintiff is an advocate by profession.

14) A perusal of the affidavit in chief of P.W.2 cogently go to show that, she is 2nd plaintiff in the suit and her version is quite corroborating the averments in the plaint. She admitted that, Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao had other properties including the property situated in Pamarru i.e., plaint schedule property and the grand mother of the 1st plaintiff gifted some land situated at

Yekamuru village of Thotlavalluru Mandal, to the 1st plaintiff at the time of her marriage and she do not know how much of land was possessed by Yerramsetti 7

Venkateswara Rao at Yekamuru village. She admitted that the Yerramsetti

Sudhakara Rao resided for some time in the plaint schedule property after the death of his father and prior to the death of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao no talks took place in between the plaintiffs and their father with regard to giving of land to them. She further deposed that she do not know in whose name the land revenue is being paid to the schedule property to the concerned authorities and she came to know that the landed property is situated in

Vuyyuru was sold by Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao. According to her the plaint schedule property was in the name of Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao and after the death of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao the plaintiffs did not give any legal notice to the defendants for partition of schedule property. She do not know

Thupakula Nancharaiah and also V.Ravi Kumar.

15) A combined reading of the testimonies of P.Ws.1 and 2 in a gamut clinchingly go to show that only admitted facts were elicited and consequent to the demise of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao no notice was issued by the plaintiffs demanding the partition of plaint schedule property.

16) Any way before going into the actual crux of the discussion as the defendants are categorically contending that the plaint schedule property is not amenable for partition, it is worth mentioning the evidence placed by the defendants on record for better appreciation of the matter. It is to be observed as to how far the defendants have succeeded in substantiating the defence.

17)The 1st defendant is deposed as D.W.1, the husband of 3rd defendant and son-in-law of 1st defendant is deposed as D.W.2, nearest relatives of defendants are deposed as D.Ws.3 and 4.

18) A perusal of the affidavit in chief of D.W.1 cogently go to show that, it is quite corroborating the contents in the written statement and she is the 1st defendant in the suit. It is her evidence in unequivocal terms that the marriages of plaintiffs 1 to 3 were performed prior to her marriage by her father-in-law. It is her candid evidence that during the life time of her father, he did not execute any Will in respect of plaint schedule property and he worked 8 as bank employee, and her marriage was performed with her husband after the death of her father-in-law and there are no properties in the name of her father- in-law at Hyderabad. She admitted that, her father-in-law is having Ac.05-00 of land at Ekamuru village of Vuyyuru Mandal. It is her unequivocal evidence that herself and her daughters partitioned their properties by executing a registered partition deed including the plaint schedule property and the 2nd defendant is not a party to the said partition deed.

19) A perusal of the affidavit in chief of D.W.2 cogently go to show that, he happens to be the son-in-law of 1st defendant and the husband of 3rd defendant, his version is quite corroborating the version of D.W.1, he happens to be an employee in Nellore District. The 3rd defendant had completed her education in Machilipatnam and by the time of his marriage with the 3rd defendant, his father-in-law Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao is no more and he did not remember the exact date of death of his father-in-law and nature of his death and after the marriage with 3rd defendant he never resided at Pamarru and he is one of the attestor on original of Ex.B1 partition deed dated 27.11.2014. He admitted that the schedule property was got registered in Sub

Registrar Office, Pedana and the property is at Pamarru.

20) A perusal of the affidavit in chief of D.W.3 cogently go to show that, his version is quite corroborating the version of D.Ws.1 and 2 in all material aspects of the case. He admitted that Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao did money lending business and with that earnings he constructed the plaint schedule house and except his oral evidence there is no documentary proof to show that the plaint schedule house was constructed by Yerramsetti Sudhakara

Rao and Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao worked in Andhra Bank, at Machilipatnam,

Pedana and Bantumilli branches. He further admitted that he had no documentary proof to show that Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao had given Ac.1- 00 of land each to the plaintiffs 1 and 2 towards their share.

21) A perusal of the affidavit in chief of D.W.4 cogently go to show that, it is quite corroborating the version of D.Ws.1 to 3 in all material aspects 9 of the case. He deposed that the 1st plaintiff is daughter-in-law of senior paternal uncle and Siva Ramakrishna is his elder son and Veera Raghavulu is the elder son of his senior paternal uncle. He admitted in his cross examination that Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao is having two portioned building on the back lane to Lakshmi Talkies at Machilipatnam.

22) A combined reading of the testimonies of D.Ws. 1 to 4 in a gamut clinchingly go to show that, the plaint schedule property was purchased by the father of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao i.e., father-in-law of 1st defendant and the plaint schedule house was also constructed by Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao during his life time. The other aspect of the contention of learned counsel for plaintiffs is such that, there was a partition among the defendants 1 to 4 in the year 2014 under Ex.B1. In order to substantiate Ex.B1 one of the attestor, who is son-in-law of 1st defendant, was also examined. According to the evidence of

D.W.1 it is crystal clear that her father-in-law died intestate on 9.4.1990 and consequent to the demise of her father-in-law Ex.B1 partition deed was executed on 27.11.2014 in respect of plaint schedule property. It is also evident that the plaint schedule property is also part and parcel of the properties of original of Ex.B1 partition deed and actually the plaint schedule property is situated in Pamarru and the registration of Ex.B1 partition deed had taken place at Pedana. So a perusal of the entire material on record clearly go to show that the purchase of plaint schedule property by the father-in-law of 1st plaintiff remained fact on record and it is also clear that the property was purchased subsequent to the marriage of the daughters by the father of plaintiffs. As seen from the evidence of plaintiffs the marriage of the last sister was performed in the year 1982 and it is also clear that the first notice emanated from the plaintiffs under Ex.A2 on 1.9.2012 and the rejoinder on 18.10.2014 and the reply notice was issued by the defendants on 13.11.2014 and interestingly Ex.B1 was dated 27.11.2014. So it goes to show that subsequent to the issuance of Ex.A6 reply notice Ex.B1 came into existence.

However, with regard to the possession of plaint schedule property with the 10 defendants remain an admitted fact on record and in order to substantiate the same they got filed the property tax receipts for the plaint schedule house and the property tax for the years 2010 to 2012 was demanded in the name of

Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao and the property tax for the years 2014 to 16 were in the name of 1st defendant and a perusal of Ex.B9 go to show that it is dated 18.02.1994 and it is also in the name of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao. Ex.A1 is

dated 9.4.1987 and according to the case of plaintiffs the plaint schedule house

was constructed by their father i.e., Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao during their life time. However, the father of plaintiffs died in the year 1990 and interestingly the defendant filed the tax receipts only subsequent to the year 1990 and according to the case of defendants the plaint schedule house was constructed by Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao, the husband of 1st defendant, with his own earnings and to substantiate the same, no cogent evidence is let in by the defendants. The tax receipts filed under Ex.B3 to B9 only establish the fact of possession of Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao in respect of plaint schedule property and simply because these demand receipts were in his name they do not confer any valid title over the plaint schedule property on Yerramsetti

Sudhakara Rao as by the date of these demand notices, the father of

Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao was no more, and there is no evidence forthcoming from the defendants as to the exact date of construction of plaint schedule house in order to confirm their contention that the plaint schedule house was constructed by the husband of 1st defendant. So far as Ex.B2 purporting to be the Encumbrance Certificate for the year 2015 is concerned, it only go to reflect the name of defendants 1, 3 and 4 and the 2nd defendant is not a party to the document and no explanation is forthcoming as to why no property was conferred on 2nd defendant, though she is one of the heir of the deceased

Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao and further more, Ex.B2 by itself doesn’t confer any valid title on the defendants in respect of the scheudle property except establishing the factum of possession. Even though the plaintiffs are not disputing the same, even according to the contention of the counsel for 11 plaintiffs the plaint schedule property is in possession of their brother and the defendants and it only appears that to deny the legitimate right of the plaintiffs in the said property, Ex.B1 must have been brought into existence followed by

Ex.B2 and non-fling of even a single demand in the name of Yerramsetti

Venkateswara Rao is suffice to speak volumes against the falsity of the defence.

23) However in a suit for partition initially the onus is on the plaintiff to substantiate the nature of the property in order to decide the status of the plaintiff in respect to a share in the plaint schedule properties. In the instant case on hand, the plaintiff has filed Ex.A1 which categorically establish that the site in which the plaint schedule house is situated, was purchased by their father under the original of Ex.A1 and it suffice to prove the case of plaintiff and evidently the father of plaintiffs’ is no more, and the demand for partition is dwelling house of their parents subsequent to the demise of their father.

However, prior to the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 there is clear embargo for a female child in Hindu coparcenery family to seek partition of a dwelling house. However the said embargo is removed by virtue of the

Amendment Act of 2005 and the only embargo under the present Act is such that, it is not applicable to the partition that has been effected before 20.12.2004 and in the instant case on hand Ex.B1 do not come to rescue of these defendants as it is much subsequent to the embargo created by the Act of 2005. However it is the contention of counsel for defendants that the plaintiffs are not in joint possession or constructive possession of the plaint schedule property as even prior to its purchase, their marriage was performed and the defendants are the original owners to the plaint schedule property and they are the absolute owners and it is alsothe contention of the counsel for defendants that the plaint schedule property existed even prior to the death of

Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao and went to the extent of contending that

Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao used to have Ac05-00of land at Ekamuru and the same was sold out. However, it is further the contention of counsel for 12 defendants that, as the marriages of the plaintiffs are performed even prior to 1982, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in the plaint schedule property and as P.W.1 admitted that her father gave Ac01-00of land at the time of marriage and it is situated in Pamarru and P.W.2 deposed that the grand mother of 1st plaintiff gifted the same land situated at Ekamuru of Thotlavalluru

Mandal and at the time of their marriages 1st defendant alone is in exclusive possession of plaint schedule property and his name is also mutated in panchayath records. So when the suit is filed in the year 2015 the counsel for defendants contended that there is no iota of evidence from the plaintiffs to show that they are in joint and constructive possession of plaint schedule house.

24) The other aspect of thecontention of counsel for defendants is such that the plaintiffs are not aware of the name of tenants and attention is also drawn to Sec.29-A of Hindu Succession Amended Act, 1986 and Sec.6 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 amended by the Central Act 2005 and went to the extent of contending that the Hindu Succession Amended Act is not applicable to the present case as the father of plaintiff died on 9.4.1990.

However as per the Amended Act 13 of 2005, if the father of plaintiffs died prior to the commencement of the Act 2005, the mandatory provision is not applicable and it was only the law applicable on the date of opening of

Succession which was applied and so the counsel for defendant vehemently contending that Amended Act 2005 is not applicable to the claim of plaintiffs as their father was a coparcener died prior to 9.9.2005 and under the Act 39 of 2005 the daughter of coparcener has become coparcener, her father should be alive on the date on which the amendment came into force. It is not the case of plaintiffs that they resided in plaint schedule house along with defendants. It is the case of plaintiffs that their father purchased the property under the original of Ex.A1 in the year 1987 and as such as per the Hindu Succession

Amendment Act 39 of 2005 they are entitled to a share in plaint schedule house and the counsel for defendants further contended that, it is the exclusive 13 property of defendants and their family members, as such the property is not partible and the suit is filed with a dishonest intention by the plaintiffs and the evidence of plaintiffs is not credible and trustworthy and had drawn attention of this Court to the authority reported in the case of :

B.Chandrakala Vs. A.Anuradha wherein it was observed that, “The law is consistent on the aspect of notional partition under Section 6 of HS Act,1956 from death of male coparcener, from a female heir intervenes there was succession opens by vesting of right with irreversible situation by the legal fiction of a logical partition with all its consequences and once the succession opened, the HS Amended Act,2005 has no application, from the wording of daughter of a coparcener and not sister of coparcener, but for to say once HS AP Amended Act applies for which notional partition is not a bar to claim by female as coparcener and therefrom any right vested, that does not divest after the HS Amended Act,2005. It is further observed that the plaintiff was a married daughter by the time HS AP Amended Act,1986 has come in to force and thereby not entitled to the benefits of it and even the HS Amended Act,2005 has no application as before that, the plaintiff`s father Rama Rao died in september,1997 where from succession opened and the plaintiff got only 1/6th share that was by notional partition determined and thus there is no question of continuation of the plaintiff later as coparcener with her brother-2nd defendant (from the wording of the Section 6 of the HS Amended Act,2005 of the daughter of a coparcener and not the sister of a coparcener) to take benefit of the Amended Act 2005. From that, when the cloud is cleared by the above referred expressions from reading of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act with Central and A.P. State Amendments and therefrom when the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any share by birth much less as a coparcener on par with 2nd defendant, there is nothing to rearrange or redefine the shares defined by the trial Court in the partition preliminary decree.”

25) In view of the above discussion it can be said that all the contentions advanced by the defendants and the authority relied on by the counsel for defendants are not applicable to the present facts of the case and it can be said that as the property covered by the original of Ex.A1 is the self acquisition of father of plaintiffs and brother of plaintiffs, Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao and as admittedly he died intestate and the same is also admitted by D.W.2 during his cross examination. Then certainly when the succession opens on the date of death of property holder, as rightly contended by the counsel for defendants it can be said that the succession opens on the death of father of plaintiffs 14

Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao. As seen from the contentions of the counsel for defendants it appears that the defendants are under the notion that the plaintiffs are claiming the property as coparceners contending it to be the joint family property and went to the extent of contending that the Amended Act of 2005 does not come to the rescue of the plaintiff, to reopen the succession as the right was already vested with the defendants on the demise of father of plaintiffs and even assuming that it is the joint family property or the coparcenery property the right of the plaintiffs cannot be taken away in the light of the status of the female heir being equated to that of male in the concept of coparcenery by the Amended Act of 2005 and undoubtedly in a suit for partition there is no limitation and it can be filed the moment the right of the plaintiff is denied by the other shares or the siblings as the case may be.

As already observed it is right from the beginning the contention of the plaintiffs that in spite of repeated demands, their brother Yerramsetti

Sudhakara Rao, and after his demise the defendants did not cooperate for partition as such, they are constrained to file the suit and the said demand itself gives a cause of action to the plaintiffs to sue the defendants for their legitimate share in the property of their father. So all the contentions advanced by the counsel for petitioner touching the Amended Act 2005 have no application to the present case on hand as the succession of the plaintiffs is now governed in accordance with Sec.8 of Hindu Succession (amendment) Act, 2005 and they being the Class-I legal heirs being the daughters of the deceased Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao who is admittedly the father of plaintiffs. Certainly the plaintiffs cannot be denied their legitimate right and share in the plaint schedule property as it evidently belonged to their father.

As it is further clear from the case of plaintiff that nowhere it is averred that they are coparceners of Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao and they are claiming the property as a coparcener, when the title over the plaint schedule property vested with the father of plaintiffs and it is his self acquisition and succession and on his death, the succession goes in accordance with Sec.8 of Hindu 15

Succession Act of 1956 and undoubtedly the owner of the property i.e.,

Yerramsetti Venkateswara Rao left behind the plaintiffs and his son Yerramsetti

Sudhakara Rao (deceased). Evidently no partition occurred between the plaintiffs and their brother Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao. When such is the case, as per Sec.8 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the plaintiffs and Yerramsetti

Sudhakara Rao inherit the property in equal shares, as they took the property devolved upon them and undoubtedly under Sec.8 of the Act when a Hindu male dies intestate, the property initially shall devolve upon the heirs being relatives specified in Class-I of the schedule and a perusal of the schedule categorically indicate that son, daughter, widow, etc are Class-I heirs. As mother of the plaintiff is admittedly no more and the brother of the plaintiff is also no more, it can be said that the properties i.e. plaint schedule property is amenable for partition and it is liable for division into four equal shares and each of the plaintiff is entitled to 1/4th share equally and the remaining ¼ th share to their brother late Yerramsetti Sudhakara Rao and that share devolves on the defendants, who are his widow and children. Hence all these issues go in favour of plaintiffs and are decided accordingly.

26)Issue No.5: To What relief ?

IN THE RESULT, the suit is partly decreed with costs, by passing a preliminary decree for partition of plaint schedule property into four equal shares and to allot one such share each to the plaintiffs 1 to 3 and on such share to the defendants to which her deceased husband entitled to with metes and bounds . The rest of the claim is dismissed.

Dictated to the Stenographer Gr.I of this Court, transcribed by her, corrected and

pronounced by me in open court, this the 6th day of November, 2020.

Sd/- K.V.Mahalakshmi,

XI-Addl. District Judge, Krishna, Gudivada.

Appendix of Evidence Witnesses examined for plaintiff P.W.1: S.Subhashinni P.W.2:Seethala Vimala 16

Documents marked for plaintiff

Ex.A.1: Certified copy of registered sale deed Ex.A.2:Office copy of legal notice dt.1.9.2012 Ex.A3: Four postal acknowledgments dt.5.9.2012 Ex.A4:Office copy of registered notice dt.18.10.2014 Ex.A5: bunch of postal acknowledgements Ex.A6: Reply notice dt.13.11.2014 Ex.A7: Encumbrance Certificate dt.24.3.2015 Ex.A8:Original death certificate of Y.Sudhakara Rao dt.28.10.10

Witnesses examined for defendants

D.W.1: Y.Dhanalakshmi D.W.2: P.Nanda Gopal D.W.3: Y.Basavaiah D.W.4 S.Rama mohana Rao

Documents marked for defendants

Ex.B.1: 27.11.1914Certified copy of registered partition deed Ex.B.2: 19.08.1915Certified copy of encumbrance certificate Ex.B.3: 02.03.2016Original tax receipt Ex.B.4: 18.08.2012Original tax receipt Ex.B.5: 11.01.2012Demand notice issued by Grama Panchayat Ex.B.6:10.02.2011Tax receipt Ex.B.7: 16.01.2010Original tax receipt Ex.B.813.1.2010Demand notice issued by Gram Panchayat Ex.B.918.2.1994Demand notice issued by Gram Panchayat

Sd/- K.V.Mahalakshmi,

XI-Addl. District Judge,

Krishna, Gudivada.

1

IN THE COURT OF THE XI-ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE,

KRISHNA AT GUDIVADA.

Present: Smt. K.V.Maha Lakshmi.,

XI-Addl. District and Sessions Judge,

Krishna, Gudivada.

Tuesday, this the 24th day of November, 2020

ORIGINAL SUIT No.105/2014

Between:

Mukku Nancharamma.... Plaintiff

A N D

Kagitha Veera Sampurnamma.... Defendant

This suit is coming on 6.2.2020 for final hearing before me in the presence of

Sri S.V.Subba Rao., Advocate for plaintiff and of Sri S.V.Panduranga Rao., Sri

KVRK.Reddy., and Sri M.Madhu Babu., Advocates for defendant and upon perusing

the material on record and after hearing both sides, this court delivered the following:

//J U D G M E N T//

This is a suit filed for partition of plaint schedule properties into two equal shares and allot one such share to the plaintiff and deliver possession of the same and for costs of the suit.

2)The contents of the plaint in brief are as follows:

The defendant is younger sister of the plaintiff and both are children of late Pallem Krishna Murthy and Pallem Ramatarakam. The plaint schedule properties and some other properties were joint family properties of late Pallem

Krishna Murthy and his brothers and there was a oral partition between them on 25.04.1952. In the said partition the plaint schedule properties fell to the share of Pallem Krishna Murthy since then he has been in absolute possession and enjoyment of the schedule properties as an absolute owner. It is further submitted that evincing the said oral partition a partition list was got prepared and the partition list was totally eaten away by white ants few years back and it was not available. Item No.3 of schedule property fell to the share of her father and he obtained pass books in his favour only for item Nos.1 and 2 totally and part of item No.3 i.e. Ac.2.47 cents and obtained pattadar pass book in favour of his wife Ramatarakam for part of item No.3 of schedule property i.e., Ac.1.40 2 cents. Later plaintiff’s mother and father died intestate on 6.9.2006 and 2.2.2014 respectively leaving behind her and defendant.

ii) It is further submitted that after the death of her mother during the year 2008 the defendant attempted to take possession of the schedule properties then the plaintiff’s father Pallem Krishna Murthy filed a suit in O.S.232/2008 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Gudivada against the defendant, her husband and their two sons seeking relief of permanent injunction and the same was decreed granting permanent injunction and the said decree became final as no appeal was preferred against it. After the death of her father she requested the defendant to cooperate for partition of schedule properties into two equal shares and assume separate possession of respective shares, the defendant did not co-operate with her and further the defendant did not allow the plaintiff to cultivate any part of the schedule property and defendant also not cultivating the same and the land became idle, and she sustained huge loss, so the plaintiff is not interesting to continue the property in joint. The cause of action for the suit arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.

Hence, the suit.

3) The written statement is filed by the defendant by way of reply to the plaint. In the written statement filed by the defendant the material averments contained in the plaint are denied, admitting the relationship between the parties. It is submitted that, this defendant is not aware about the partition

dated 25.04.1952 effected between Pallem Krishna Murthy and his brothers

and the plaint schedule property fell to the share of her father. It is admitted that both parents died intestate leaving behind them as legal heirs. Though the husband of the plaintiff is native of Davajipalem of Pedana Mandal, both of them shifted to Chintalagunta village and started to live with the father of defendant for the last thirty years. The father of the defendant looked after the cultivation of the properties and got performed the marriages of the four children of the plaintiff with the expenses of the father of the defendant. All the properties are not included by the plaintiff in the schedule which are also 3 liable for partition. It is further contended that the plaintiff received an amount of Rs.1,45,000/- from the plaint schedule property after the death of Pallem

Krishna Murthy and the same is also liable to be divided into two shares.

Taking advantage of the fact that she has been living with her parents, she has taken all of them in her custody and as she suppressed some of the properties which are liable for partition. Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed in the interest of justice.

4) Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues are settled for trial:

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of the plaint schedule properties into two equal shares and for allotment of one such share to her as prayed for ?

2. Whether the plaintiff has included all the properties in the plaint schedule which are liable for partition ?

3. To what relief ?

5) Heard both sides and perused the written arguments submitted by the counsel for defendant.

6) To substantiate the case of plaintiff P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A1 to A10 were marked. On behalf of defendant no oral evidence is adduced and no documents were got marked.

Issues 1 and 2:

These two issues are being discussed conjointly as they are inter related and are condition precedents, more over to avoid repetition.

7) It is an admitted fact that the parties to the suit are natural sisters.

It is also an evident fact that their parents are Pallem Krishna Murthy and

Pallem Ramatarakam. It is also evident fact that the mother of the parties to the suit died on 6.9.2006 and their father died on 2.2.2014. A perusal of the schedule annexed to the plaint cogently go to indicate that three properties are shown for division. It is also an evident fact that during the life time of the father of the parties i.e., Pallem Krishna Murthy filed O.S.232/2008 on the file of

Principal Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Gudivada against the defendant and her

4 family members for the relief of permanent injunction and the same was decreed in favour of plaintiff therein. In order to substantiate the veracity of the said contention Ex.A1 purporting to be the certified copy of decree and judgment in O.S.232/2008 was filed. However, no interference is essential regarding Ex.A1. According to the contention of the counsel for plaintiff initial title over the plaint schedule property vested with the father of plaintiff, Pallem

Krishna Murthy. To substantiate the veracity of the said contention that the plaint schedule properties are absolute properties and are in possession and enjoyment of her father, it is contended by the counsel for plaintiff that there was an oral partition between Pallem Krishna Murthy and his brothers on 25.04.1952 and in the said partition the plaint schedule properties fell to the share of Pallem Krishna Murthy and in order to evince the same a partition list was also got prepared and it is the interesting contention of the counsel for plaintiff that the said partition list was eaten away by white ants and there are no traces of the said document were available. It is the admitted case of plaintiff that though the properties are in three items her father obtained pattadar pass book in respect of item Nos.1 and 2 and apart of item No.3 in an extent of Ac.2.47 cents and also obtained pattadar pass book in favour of his wife Pallem Ramatarakam for an extent of Ac.1.40cents. However, it is further contended that consequent to the demise of mother of plaintiff, the father of plaintiff cultivated the entire schedule properties. It is the vehement contention of counsel for plaintiff that in the year 2008 the defendant demanded to take possession of schedule properties with the support of her men, from the hands of father of plaintiff, which is the subject matter in

O.S.232/2008 for the relief of permanent injunction. It is further contended that

consequent to the demise of father of plaintiff, the plaintiff requested the defendant for an amicable partition of plaint schedule properties into two shares, but the defendant did not agree, and went to the extent of contending that the defendant and her men are not allowing them to cultivate the plaint schedule lands and as such the said lands were kept fallow resulting into 5 damage and huge loss. So the plaintiff contends that it is no longer safe to keep the properties intact and as the defendant is not cooperating with the plaintiff, the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit, for the relief of partition.

8) On the other hand, it is the contention of counsel for defendant that apart from the plaint schedule properties there are other properties to her parents and the same were not included in the schedule annexed to the plaint.

On that ground for suppressing the other properties the suit is liable to be dismissed. It is further contended that the plaintiff and her husband are residing in a portion of the house of her parents. It is further contended that the plaintiff received an amount of Rs.1,45,000/- from the plaint schedule property after the demise of her father and it is also liable for division into two equal shares and as the plaintiff suppressed the other properties in the schedule the suit is not maintainable.

9) Taking the respective rival contentions into consideration, it is obvious to say that the initial onus is undoubtedly on the plaintiff to clinchingly establish that, the plaint schedule properties are partible into two equal shares and she is entitled to one such equal share. Further it is for the plaintiff to establish that the plaint schedule property had a joint nucleus and the plaint schedule properties are amenable for partition. In this back drop it is to be observed as to how far the plaintiff had succeeded in substantiating her case.

10) The plaintiff herself deposed as P.W.1 and the another witness was examined as P.W.2. It is to be observed as to how far the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 are suffice to substantiate the case of plaintiff.

11) A perusal of the affidavit-in-chief of P.W.1 cogently go to show that, it is quite corroborating the averments contained in the plaint. The cross examination of P.W.1 was recorded by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Court. It is the evidence of P.W.1 that after shifting to Chintalagunta village she and her husband started to live with her parents in their house to look after them and by that time her husband possessed Ac.4-00 of land and house and she was having Ac.1-00 of land in the same village and she along 6 with her husband executed registered document in favour of the purchasers in respect of the said Ac.4-00 and Ac.1-00 and also one house site with house and they were blessed with two sons and two daughters. She admitted that the marriages of her sons were performed in the house of her father at

Chintalagunta village. She unequivocally admitted that the defendant used to take care of her parents and used to visit the house of her parents and went to the extent of unequivocally admitting that she did not take responsibility of her parents prior to shifting to Chintalagunta from Davojipalem. It is her categorical evidence that her mother had Ac.1.20 or Ac.1.40cents of land in Chintalagunta village and her father had Ac.4.00cents and odd of land along with a house and hayrick yard at Chintalagunta village and she do not know the properties described in the plaint schedule and further deposed that in the year 2006 her mother died and at that time her mother is having one Black beads chain, gold nanuthadu and ear studs and she had no chandra haram, bangles, rings and chains. Her father sold away the above gold ornaments during the life time of her mother. She admitted of having not mentioned the gold ornaments in the plaint schedule. She admitted that her mother possessed silver articles which were changed by her into a silver plate and handed over to the defendant. It is her interesting evidence that her mother presented to her sister when she suffered with leg pain. She admitted that the crops were thrashed prior to the death of her father and she cannot say the particulars of the documents filed by her along with suit.

12) A perusal of the affidavit in chief of P.W.2 cogently go to show that his version is quite corroborating the version of P.W.1 in all material aspects of the case. In the beginning of the cross examination he admitted that the plaintiff is his viyyanka and the father of the plaintiff is his junior paternal uncle and he had personal knowledge about the partition of properties between the father of plaintiff and brothers and he did not know about the extent of house sites. He admitted that the plaintiff and her husband are residing in the house of Pallem

Krishna Murthy by the date of his demise.

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13) A combined reading of the testimonies of P.Ws.1 and 2 in a gamut clinchingly go to show that except eliciting the admitted facts no elicitation is found regarding the receipt of Rs.1,45,000/- from the properties of parents of the plaintiff and no single elicitation is made touching the nature of property or character of the property sought for between them, since it is a suit for partition filed by the plaintiff. As seen from the contentions of the defendant, the defendant is also contending that there is no prior partition and both parents died intestate. So it is worth discussing the evidence placed by the defendant on record for better appreciation of the matter.

14) At this juncture it may not be out of context to make a specific mention that subsequent to the closure of plaintiffs’ evidence the matter was posted for the evidence of defendants. The contesting defendants did not choose to adduce any oral or documentary evidence, despite the conditional docket order therein for adducing evidence. As such, the court is constrained to close the evidence of the defendants for non-compliance of the condition already imposed. It is the contention of the defendant in the written statement that Rs.1,45,000/- was received by the plaintiff. However, no counter claim is set up by the defendant in the written statement but the defendant contend that apart from plaint schedule properties there are other properties to be partitioned between the parties which were suppressed by the plaintiff. So in the light of this, it is essential to go through the evidence of defendants. At this juncture it may not be out of context to make a specific mention that the defendant did not choose to adduce any evidence and willfully abstained to enter into the witness box and for non compliance of the condition for filing the affidavit-in-chief of defendant the evidence of the defendant was closed, as there is no representation from the defendant and the defendant did not chose to adduce any evidence, the court is left only with the evidence of plaintiffs and the pleadings of the defendant in written statement and as both P.Ws.1 and 2 were cross examined by the counsel for defendant, the same is being considered.

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15) Taking the sum and substance of the facts and circumstances coupled with the evidence on record into consideration it goes without saying that the title over the plaint schedule properties is not disputed by the defendant and so also the origin and the nature of the property is also not in dispute. However, the defendant had pleaded ignorance about the partition list and the partition of the property between the father of plaintiff and his brothers. As seen from the written statement the defendant had mentioned that the omitted property by the plaintiff in the schedule is a portion of a tiled house and a vacant site in an extent of Ac.00-05 cents used to store hay stack, gold ornaments, silver ornaments, brass utensils.

16) It is the evidence of P.W.1 in the cross examination that her mother used to have a black beads chain, nanuthadu and ear studs. She admitted of having not included these in the schedule annexed to the plaint and she simply denied the suggestion that her mother had haram, bangles, rings and chains by the time of her death. While deposing that the above articles were sold away by her father during the life time of her mother, but no cogent evidence is placed in that end. However, it is her evidence that her mother possessed silver articles and according to the evidence of P.W.1 her mother voluntarily got changed the silver articles and got a silver plate and it was handed over to the defendant and it is also clear that P.W.1 along with her family is residing in the house, which is not included in the plaint schedule and there is no iota of evidence from the plaintiff to show that it is self acquisition of the plaintiff or it is absolute property of the plaintiff. So the properties mentioned in the written statement are also possessed by the parents of the plaintiff. Apart from the plaintiff as P.W.1, P.W.2, who is no other than the junior maternal uncle of the father of plaintiff was also examined in order to substantiate the contention of the plaintiff that there was a verbal partition between her father and his brothers and the plaint schedule properties fell to the share of her father. At best it is contended that there was a partition list evincing partition between

Pallem Krishna Murthy and his brothers. It is the vehement contention of 9 counsel for plaintiff that the said partition list was eaten away by the termites and there is no single piece of paper and interestingly the defendant pleaded ignorance and the title over the plaint schedule property vesting with the parents of P.W.1 is not disputed. It can be concluded that the plaint schedule properties are the properties of parents of the plaintiff and the defendant and even according to the defendant both of them died intestate. It is not the case of defendant that there was a prior partition between them except as to taking objection that the other properties were suppressed by the plaintiff, which are mentioned in the written statement and the suit is liable to be dismissed. No serious objection is taken by the defendant.

17) A perusal of Ex.A1 cogently go to show that it is nothing but a certified copy of decree and judgment in O.S.232/2008 preferred by the father of plaintiff against the defendant herein and her husband for bear injunction and a perusal of the schedule attached to Ex.A1 cogently go to show that it is an extent of Ac.1-00 in R.S.No.310 as item No.1 and extent of Ac.1-18 cents in

R.S.No.312/1-A and 1-B and an extent of Ac.3.87 cents in R.S.No.831/1 and the properties shown in the paint schedule is in item Nso.1 to 3 are one and the same and there was injunction order from the Court against the defendant and her family members in respect of plaint schedule property. In order to further substantiate the contention of plaintiffs that the plaint schedule properties are the properties of her father and mother got filed Ex.A2 to A5 in respect of which no interference is essential. In order to substantiate the contention that her parents were no more, got filed Ex.A6 and A7 purporting to be the death extracts in respect of which no interference is essential and to further show that the properties stand in the name of her father got filed Ex.A9 and Ex.A10 purporting to be the tax receipt demanded in the name of father of plaintiff

Pallem Krishna Murthy.

18)Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, it goes without saying that the parents of the plaintiff and defendant died intestate leaving behind the plaint schedule properties and the plaintiff and 10 defendant alone are the legal heirs of the deceased Pallem Krishna Murthy and

Pallem Ramatarakam. No interference is essential regarding Ex.A8 to A10 being tax receipts as the defendant is not disputing the title of her father over the plaint schedule property and it is not the case of defendant that the properties were settled by her father during his life time or by her mother during her life time in respect of the properties owned by them and there is no reason assigned by the defendant to resist the case of plaintiff and the suit is sought for dismissal only on the sole ground that there is suppression of the properties by the plaintiff in the schedule annexed to the plaintiff. When these two issues are the children of Pallem Krishna Murthy and Pallem Ramatarakam and when they died intestate, it goes without saying that the plaintiff and defendant are equally entitled to the properties of their parents and the plaintiff had suppressed the properties and it is established by the counsel for defendant during the cross examination of P.W.1. It is the contention of the counsel for plaintiff that the properties which are mentioned in the written statement were not shown in the plaint for partition for the reason that the gold and silver articles belonging to the mother of plaintiff were sold away by the father of plaintiff during the life time of mother and purchased the houses along with site and they were already gifted by their father during their life time and the properties mentioned in the written statement were not in existence and further contends that the father of plaintiff had given large extent to the children of the defendant and very less extent to the children of plaintiff. So it is for the plaintiff to show that there was a partition between the parties in respect of the properties mentioned in the written statement by the defendant and simply because the defendant did not choose to enter into witness box to testify the contents in the written statement it does not by itself give any added advantage to the case of plaintiff and it is clear from the cross examination of P.W.1 that apart from landed property her father had a house and hayrick yard in the same village. However, it is also clear from her evidence that one black bead chain, gold sacred chain and ear studs are in 11 possession of her mother and there is no Chandraharam, bangles and by the time of her death, as her father sold away the articles during the life time of her mother and however no cogent evidence is placed by the plaintiff to substantiate the same. However, it is clear from her own testimony in unequivocal terms that black beads chain, gold sacred chain and ear studs were not shown in the plaint schedule though her mother possessed silver articles and they were converted into a silver plate, and handed over to the defendant no iota of evidence is placed by the defendants in that end and it is the evidence of P.W.1 that silver plate was given to the defendant, when she is suffering with leg pain, which is highly difficult to receive and appreciate. When it is the contention of the counsel for plaintiff that the house site and adjacent site, which is kept for the purpose of hay stack was gifted to the grand children i.e. children of the plaintiff and defendant by their father. No evidence is placed by the plaintiff to substantiate the same and when both these immovable properties can be gifted only by means of registered instrument. It is highly doubtful to understand as to why the plaintiff did not choose to file those documents, when the defendant had categorically pleaded in written statement about the existence of those properties mentioned in the written statement in the name of her father and the reason assigned by the counsel for plaintiff during the cross examination of plaintiff cannot be said to be of sound reason as there is nothing in the cross examination of P.W.1 to show that these two properties are gifted to the children of the parties to the suit by their father.

Unless and until cogent evidence is placed by the plaintiff it is difficult to consider the reason given by the plaintiff for not mentioning the properties which are mentioned in the written statement, in the schedule annexed to the plaint.

19)Undoubtedly it is for the defendant to show that those properties are partible but the same is established through the cross examination of P.W.1 regarding the existence of those properties. But the defendant had not entered into the witness box to substantiate her evidence but that itself does not give 12 any advantage to the case of the plaintiff to accept the reason assigned by her that those properties are not in existence, as such they are omitted. However, in a suit for partition no counter claim is essential if these properties shown by the defendant are in existence and when the plaintiff and defendant alone are the legal heirs to succeed the estate of Pallem Krishna Murthy and his wife and when there is nothing to show that these properties are in possession of the defendant and when the plaintiff herself admits that she is living in the house of her father certainly the house of the father being his property is partible and consequent to the demise of parents of plaintiff and defendant whether the property is joint property or ancestral property or self-acquisition, does not assume much significance. However when plaintiff and defendant are the only siblings certainly they are entitled to notional partition in equal shares.

Accordingly these issues are decided and the plaint schedule property is partible and is liable for division into two equal shares and plaintiff and defendant are each entitled to one such share and so also the property shown in the written statement by the defendant is also partible amongst the plaintiff and defendant and accordingly they are entitled to an equal share and all the properties are to be divided into two shares and the plaintiff is entitled to one such share and the defendant to the other one such share and for separate possession thereof.

20)Issue No.3: To what relief ?

In the result, the suit is decreed with costs by passing preliminary decree for partition of plaint schedule properties into two equal shares and for allotment of one such share to the plaintiff and one such share to the defendant by metes and bounds in relation to both plaint schedule properties and also the properties shown in the written statement.

Dictated to the Stenographer Gr.I of this Court, transcribed by her, corrected and

pronounced by me in open court, this the 24th day of November, 2020.

Sd/- K.V.Mahakshmi,

XI-Addl. District Judge, Krishna, Gudivada.

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Appendix of Evidence

Witnesses examined for plaintiff P.W.1: Mukku Nancharamma P.W.2:Pallem Mallikharjuna Rao

Documents marked for plaintiff

Ex.A.1: original decree and judgment in O.S.232/2008 Ex.A.2:original pattadar pass book in favour of Pallem Krishna Murthy Ex.A.3: original revenue title deed in favour of Pallem Krishna Murthy. Ex.A.4: original pattadar pass book issued in favour of Pallem Ramatarakam Ex.A.5: original revenue title deed in favour of Pallem Ramatarakam Ex.A.6: original death certificate of Pallem Krishna Murthy Ex.A.7: original death certificate of Pallem Ramatarakam Ex.A.8: original cist receipt dated 2.4.2012 Ex.A.9: original cist receipt dated 2.5.2012 Ex.A.10: original cist receipt dated 25.3.2014

Witnesses examined for defendants

none

Documents marked for defendants

nil

Sd/- K.V.Mahakshmi,

XI-Addl. District Judge,

Krishna, Gudivada.