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In The Court of The Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division) Tenali
PRESENT: Sri Marpu Sreedhar,
Prl. Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tenali
Friday, the 10th May 2024.
AS.No.49/2024 (Old Appeal No.80/2018)
Between:
1. Narla Koteswara Rao, S/o. Raghavaiah, Hindu, aged 70 years, Cultivation, R/o. Thondipalli village, Near Zakir Farm House, Shamshabad, Ranga Reddy District.
2. Narla Varadaiah alias Vara Prasada Rao, S/o. Koteswara Rao, Hindu, aged 50 years,
Cultivation, R/o. Amarthaluru village and mandal. ..Appellants/Defendants.
And
1. Narla Anitha Kumari, W/o. Late Srinivasa Rao, Hindu, aged 46 years, House-wife, R/o. Door No.2-58, Vetapalem village, Tsunduru mandal.
2. Narla Gopi, S/o. Late Srinivasa Rao, Hindu, aged 28 years, Milatary, R/o. Door No.2-58, Vetapalem village, Tsunduru mandal.
3. Votla Sahiti, W/o. Rama Krishna, Hindu, aged 28 years, House-wife, R/o. Near Babuji Ashramam, Shamshabad,
Hyderabad. ..Respondents/Plaintiffs.
Appeal against the judgment and decree, dated 14.06.2018 in O.S.No.430/2015 on the file of the learned 1st Addl. Junior Civil Judge’s Court, at Tenali.
In OS. No.430/2015
Between:
1. Narla Anitha Kumari, W/o. Late Narla Srinivasa Rao, aged about 42 years, Hindu, House-wife, R/o. Door No.2-58, Vetapalem village, Tsunduru mandal.
2. Narla Gopi, S/o. Late Narla Srinivasa Rao, Hindu, aged about 23 years, Employee in Army, Permanent R/o. Door No.2-58, Vetapalem village, Tsunduru mandal. Presently residing at Aambala, Haryana state.
3. Votla Sahiti, W/o. Rama Krishna, aged about 25 years, Hindu, House-wife, R/o. Near Babuji Ashramam,
Shamshabad, Hyderabad, Telangana state. ..Plaintiffs.
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And
1. Narla Koteswara Rao, S/o. Late Raghavaiah, aged about 66 years, Hindu, cultivation, R/o. Thondepalli village, Near Jakeer Farm House, Opp. Asharam Babuji Ashram, Shamshabad mandal, Ranga Reddy district.
2. Narla Varadaiah alias Vara Prasad Rao, S/o. Koteswara Rao, aged about 46 years, Hindu, cultivation,
R/o. Amarthalur village and mandal. ..Defendants.
This appeal is coming on 26.04.2024 for final hearing before me in the presence of Sri J. Siva Ram Kumar, Advocates for the appellants/defendants and of Sri P. Ravindra Babu, advocate for respondents/plaintiffs and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this court delivered the following:
J U D G M E N T
This is an appeal preferred by the appellant herein, who are the defendants 1 and 2 in Os.430/2015 on the file of learned I Addl. Junior Civil
Judge’s Court at Tenali, against the decree and judgment, dated 14.6.2018
passed in favour of the Plaintiffs, who are the Respondents herein.
2.The parties hereinafter referred as arrayed in the original suit for the sake of convenience.
3.The case of the plaintiffs in a nutshell is as follows:
The plaint schedule property i.e., item No.1 is the landed property an extent of 17 cents and item No.2 is the hose property with door No.6-77 are the ancestral properties. The 1st plaintiff is wife of Narla Srinivasarao and plaintiffs 2 and 3 are their children. The 2nd defendant and the said Narla Srinivasa Rao are children of the 1st defendant. The said Narla Srinvasa Rao died on 20.9.2013 leaving behind his legal heirs as plaintiffs 1 to 3. The plaint schedule property is in their joint possession and enjoyment of all the parties and they requested the defendants for partition of the plaint schedule properties into 3 equal shares and to allot one such share to the plaintiffs and the defendants did not acceded their 3 request while admitting the same. They came to know that the 1st defendant executed a gift deed in favour of the 2nd defendant on 9.4.2015 with respect of item No.2 of the plaint schedule property, without any manner of right to alienate the same. Therefore, the said gift deed is not valid and does not bind the plaintiffs. They have also issued a legal notice on 22.6.2015 to the defendants with a request to cooperate for partition and allotment of their share and the said notice was received by the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant intentionally avoided to receive the same. Hence, the suit is filed for partition of plaint schedule property into 3 equal shares and allot one such shares to plaintiffs and for separate possession.
4.The defendant No.1 filed written statement and the same was adopted by defendant No.2 and they denied the material allegations are all false and had inter-alia contended as follows:
a). The plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of 1st defendant’s father Narla Raghavaiah and after his death, his 3 sons who are the 1st defendant his two brothers namely Narla Peda Anjaiah and Narla China
Anjaiah got divided the property and in the said partition the 1st defendant got 17 cents wet land and about 125 sq. yards of site. Therefore, the said property became self acquired property of the 1st defendant and he got an absolute right and thereby he conveyed the same to the 2nd defendant by way of gift deed.
Hence, the plaintiffs have no right over the property to seek partition. Hence, the suit is liable for dismissal.
5.The trial Court framed the following issues upon considering the pleadings and documents submitted by the both parties :
1.Whether the suit schedule property is joint family property and available for partition?
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2. Whether the defendant No.1 is absolute owner of schedule property?
3. whether plaintiffs are entitled for partition as prayed for?
4. If so, to what relief ?
6.During the trial, the plaintiff No.1 was examined as P.W.1 and Ex.A.1 to A5 were admitted though her. Ex.A1 is Extract copy of the gift deed executed by 1st defendant in favour of 2nd defendant in respect of the item No.2 of the plaint schedule property, Ex.A2 is Office copy of the Registered notice got issued by
PW.1 and her children through her advocate to the defendants, Ex.A3 is Original postal acknowledge of the 2nd defendant, Ex.A4 is Original returned registered notice of the 1st defendant, Ex.A5 is Original death certificate of husband of PW.1,
Narla Srinivasa Rao. On behalf of defendants, the 1st defendant was examined as DW.1, and the 2nd defendant was examined as DW.2. No documents were marked on behalf of the defendants.
7.The 1st plaintiff, her brother as P.Ws.1 and 2 deposed that the plaint schedule property is ancestral property, no partition was affected among them and as such, they are entitled for share in the property. PW.3, who is the brother of the 1st defendant deposed that no partition was affected among himself, his brother, who is the 1st defendant and another brother and it is the ancestral property. The defendants 1 and 2 denied the case of the plaintiff about the nature of the property and deposed that it is the separate property of the 1st defendant after partition of self acquired property of their father Raghavaiah and about dis- entitlement to seek partition by the plaintiffs.
8.Upon considering the evidence and documents submitted by both parties, the trial court decreed the suit with a specific finding that the defendants failed to bring any evidence to say that it is the self acquired property of Raghavaiah and on the other hand the recitals in the gift deed itself shows that it is an ancestral 5 property, and as such, the plaintiffs are entitled for the share and according, the suit was decreed in their favour.
9.Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the present appeal was preferred by the defendants, as many as 9 grounds and out of which the ground
No.”e” and “f” is with regard to the conduct of the respondent in connection with the corrupt practices as a Sarpanch of the village, which is irrelevant and unconnected with the case. The remaining grounds which were canvassed by the appellant is that the trial court did not property appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and also proposition of law, without mentioning the specification about the grounds on which they relied,
10.The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the admission of the plaintiffs and evidence placed by the defendants clearly establish that there was partition among the 1st defendant and his brother for the self acquired property of
Raghavaiah and as such, the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief of partition by relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court between Uttam Vs.
Saubhag Singh and others.
11.Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contends that the trial court properly appreciated the evidence and relied upon the recitals in the gift deed executed in favour of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant and rightly came to conclusion that it is an ancestral property and the judgment relied by the appellants is not applicable to the present case, and as such, the appeal is liable for dismissal.
11.Now the points that arises for consideration are as follows:
1. Whether the suit schedule property is the ancestral property?
2. Whether the defendant No.1 is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property as pleaded by the defendants?
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3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition as prayed for?
4. Whether the judgment and decree, dated 14.06.2018 passed by the trial court warrants any interference ?
And
5. To what relief ?
12.POINT No.1 and 2:-
1. Whether the suit schedule property is the ancestral property?
2. Whether the defendant No.1 is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property as pleaded by the defendants?
a). The facts covered under points 1 and 2 are intertwined to each other and as such this court is inclined to decide both the points in one stretch to avoid redundancy of facts in discussion.
b). The case of the plaintiffs is that the plaint schedule property which is landed and house property, are ancestral properties, whereas the defendants pleaded and averred that the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of the father of the 1st defendant namely Narla Raghavaiah. It is an admitted fact that both the parties did not choose to disclose the nature of acquisition by the ancestors of the plaintiffs and defendants by whom and when as pleaded by plaintiff and nature of acquisition by Raghavaiah i.e., how and when he acquired as pleaded by the defendants.
c). However, it is an admitted fact that the suit schedule property inherited from Raghavaiah to the 1st defendant, after his death. It is an admitted fact that the father of the plaintiffs 2 and 3 and husband of plaintiff No.1 namely Narla
Srinivasarao and the 2nd defendant Narla Varadaiah are sons of Narla
Koteswararao, who is the 1st defendant herein. It is also an admitted fact that 7
Narla Srinivasarao died on 20.9.2013 and the plaintiffs alone are his legal heirs being his wife, son and daughter.
d). The plaintiffs relied upon the documentary evidence in Ex.A1 i.e., the gift deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant in respect of item No.2 of the plaint schedule property to establish that the suit schedule is an ancestral property. Admittedly, the recitals in Ex.A1 clearly shows that the said property inherited from the ancestors of the 1st defendant as it is recited in following manner:- “Maa poorvikula Valana samapadinchabadi” at page No.2 of Ex.A1. If really, the same was acquired by Raghavaiah, it is not difficult for the defendants to bring any evidence to that effect unlike ancestral property where we cannot expect any evidence if at all the same was acquired long back. But, the defendants did not disclose the nature of acquisition of Raghavaiah and no such material is pleaded and averred by them. On the other hand, the recitals in
Ex.A1 clearly shows that it is an ancestral property.
e). In support of the contention of the plaintiffs, the 1st plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and her brother as PW.2, and deposed that it is an ancestral property. They admitted in their cross examination that the plaint schedule property originally belongs to Raghavaiah, who is the father of 1st defendant.
Based on the above said admission, we cannot say that it is the self acquired property of Raghavaiah, in absence of any positive evidence from the defendants. PW.3 namely Narla China Anjaiah, who is brother of the 1st defendant, also deposed that the plaint schedule property is the ancestral property and nothing was elicited nor suggested to him that it is the self acquired property of his father Raghavaiah. He is the material witness to speak about the said fact as he is one of the sons of Raghavaiah, but the defendants failed to suggest him about the said fact. On the other hand, the 1st defendant as DW.1 8 admitted in his cross examination that the item No.1 of the plaint schedule property is their ancestral property and it is also recited in Ex.A1 that it is an ancestral property. The 2nd defendant, who was examined as DW.2 also admitted that the properties are ancestral properties.
f). In the light of above discussion, the recitals in Ex.A1, the admission of
DW.1 and 2 coupled with the failure on the part of the defendants to disclose about the nature of acquisition by Raghavaiah, this court can safely come to conclusion that the plaint schedule properties are the ancestral properties in the hands of Raghavaiah and disprove the case of defendants that it is self acquired property of Raghavaiah.
g). The main flank of contention of the defendants is that this property became the separate and self acquired property of the 1st defendant as soon as the partition was affected among his brothers namely Peda Anjaiah and China
Anjaiah after death of their father namely Raghavaiah. In this regard the defendants relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court between the parties Uttam Vs. Saubhag Siungh and others, wherein it is held as follows:- “20. The law, therefore, insofar as it applies to joint family property governed by the Mitakshara School, prior to the amendment of 2005, could therefore be summarized as follows:-
(i) When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 , having at the time of his death an interest in
Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property will devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary (vide
Section 6).
(ii) To proposition (i), an exception is contained in Section 30
Explanation of the Act, making it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara 9 coparcenary property is property that can be disposed of by him by will or other testamentary disposition.
(iii) A second exception engrafted on proposition (i) is contained in the proviso to Section 6 , which states that if such a male Hindu had died leaving behind a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that Class who claims through such female relative surviving him, then the interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property would devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, and not by survivorship.
(iv) In order to determine the share of the Hindu male coparcener who is governed by Section 6 proviso, a partition is effected by operation of law immediately before his death. In this partition, all the coparceners and the male Hindu’s widow get a share in the joint family property.
(v) On the application of Section 8 of the Act, either by reason of the death of a male Hindu leaving self-acquired property or by the application of Section 6 proviso, such property would devolve only by intestacy and not survivorship.
(vi) On a conjoint reading of Sections 4 , 8 and 19 of the Act, after joint family property has been distributed in accordance with section 8 on principles of intestacy, the joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it as they hold the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants.
21. Applying the law to the facts of this case, it is clear that on the death of Jagannath Singh in 1973, the joint family property which was ancestral property in the hands of Jagannath Singh and the other coparceners, devolved by succession under Section 8 of the Act. This being the case, the ancestral property ceased to be joint family property on the date of death of Jagannath Singh, and the other coparceners and his widow held the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. This being the case, on the date of the birth of the appellant in 1977 the said ancestral property, not being joint family property, the suit for partition of such property would not be maintainable. The appeal is consequently dismissed with no order as to costs”.
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h). The defendants have categorically pleaded and averred that the 1st defendant and his 2 brother Peda Anjaiah and China Anjaiah divided the property which was inherited from their father and the plaint schedule property fell to the share of the 1st defendant. In that connection the defendants elicited admission from the evidence of PW.1 that the plaint schedule property fell to the share of the defendant No.1 during the partition among himself and his brothers. PW.2 also admitted in his cross examination that the father of the 1st defendant got 52 cents and 8 cents of house sites and 1st defendant got 17 cents out of 52 cents and 125 sq. yards of site out of 8 cents and remaining property is in the possession and enjoyment of his brothers. The plaintiffs got examined one of the brothers of the 1st defendant and he denied the earlier partition which was pleaded by the defendants. But he admitted that he has not filed any suit for partition and not acquired any property through his father. This court is unable to believe that he has been keeping silence without seeking for partition of the property, if it is joint and as such, his evidence cannot be believed as far as jointness of the property among the sons of Raghavaiah. Moreover, the plaintiff and her brother categorically admitted about the partition and the southern boundary in Ex.A1 also discloses the name of Narla Subbarao and as such, there is no inch of doubt to say that the suit schedule property fell to the share of the 1st defendant during the partition with his brothers.
i). Now the contention of the defendants is that since the partition was affected and the property fell to the share of the defendant No.1 and it became his separate property. Admittedly, the suit schedule property is an ancestral property as stated supra, the question of change of nature of the property does not arise whenever the 1st defendant gave birth to a son. Admittedly, there is no whisper in the pleadings and evidence about the date of the said partition which was affected among them to say that the said property is the separate property of 11 the 1st defendant. Upon perusal of the recitals in Ex.A1 which shows that the partition was affected at about 45 years back from the date of execution. It is not the case of the defendant that the 2nd defendant and Narla Srinivasarao were not born by the time of partition. Once, the 1st defendant gave birth to his sons, he cannot divest the property as if he has absolute right over the property and the plaintiffs who being the legal representatives of the deceased Srinivasarao, they are entitled to seek partition over the property as Srinivasarao is no more. The decision relied on by the defendants was delivered in the different context when the suit filed during the life time of the father and after partition of the properties and the same cannot be made applicable to present case. Moreover, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court clearly held at page No.3 of judgment in between Sheela Devi
And Others Vs. Lal Chand And Another reported in Indian Kanoon
http://Indian Kanoon Org/doc/420921 in the following manner in a similar circumstance of this case.
“The principle of law applicable in this case is that so long a property remains in the hands of a single person, the same was to be treated as a separate property and thus, would be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as the same were his separate property, but, if a son is subsequently born to him or adopted by him, the alienation whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations so made by his father before he was born or begotten. (See Krishna Prasad v. C.LT, Bangalore, [1975] 1 SCC
160. But once a son is born, it becomes a coparcenary property and he would acquire an interest therein”.
j). In view of the above proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and in view of the circumstances of this case, this court is unable to agree with the contention of the defendants that it is self acquired property of the 1st defendant to dis-entitle the plaintiffs to lay claim for partition. Accordingly, these two points are answered against the defendants.
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13.Point No.3:- Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition as prayed for?
a). In view of the findings of this court for points 1 and 2, the plaintiffs are entitled to seek partition of share of deceased Srinivasarao. There is no dispute with regard to the quantum of share which was claimed by the plaintiffs to an extent of 1/3rd of the plaint schedule. In fact, the 1st defendant executed gift deed in favour of 2nd defendant for item No.2 of the plaint schedule property. The said gift deed is not binding upon the plaintiffs as far as the share of Srinivasarao is concerned. The trial court determined share of all the parties as it is duty of court to determine the share of the all sharers in a suit for partition. Hence, this point is answered in favour of the plaintiffs.
14.Point No.4:- Whether the judgment and decree, dated 14.06.2018 passed in OS.430/2015 by the trial court warrants any interference ?
a). The trail court decreed the suit with the finding that the suit schedule property is the ancestral property and the defendants failed to establish that it is self acquired property of the 1st defendant and about entitlement of share of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property. No substantial grounds were alleged by the appellants by way of appeal grounds except relying upon legal aspect.
However, the finding of the trial court does not warrant any interference in view of findings of this court for points 1 to 3. Accordingly, this point is answered in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents.
15.Point No.5 :- To what relief?
a). In view of the findings of this court for points 1 to 4, the appeal shall be liable for dismissal. However, this court is not inclined to grant costs to avoid further strain in the relationship of both parties, who belongs to the same family.
16.In the result, this appeal is dismissed without costs by confirming the decree and judgment of the trial court dated 14.6.2018 passed in OS.430/2015 by 13 granting preliminary decree for partition of the plaint schedule property into three equal shares and allot one such share to plaintiffs 1 to 3 and the remaining two shares each to defendants 1 and 2.
Typed to my dictation by Stenographer Grade-I, corrected and pronounced by me in open court, on this the 10th day of May, 2024.
Sd/-xx,
Prl. Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Tenali. Appendix of evidence No oral or documentary evidence is by either party.
Sd/-xx,
Prl. Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Tenali.