Sri.P.Chandra Sekhara Prasad

IN THE COURT OF THE XII ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURT: AT: SECUNDERABAD

THURSDAY THIS THE SIXTH DAY OF JUNE, 2019

Present:P.Chandra Sekhara Prasad, XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. 

OS No.78 of 2012

Between:­

1. Kasturi Vijaya Lakshmi, W/o Kasturi Laxminarsaiah, D/o Dusa Laxmaiah, aged about 50 years, Housewife, R/o H.No.13­1­239, Mettewada, Warangal District, 

2. Chilivery Sharufa @ Shantha, W/o Chilivery Umashanker, D/o Dusa Laxmaiah, aged about 47 years, Housewife, R/o Type ‘4’ , 501­B, NH4, BHEL, Ramachandrapuram, Medak District, 

3. Panuganti Kasturi, W/o Panuganti Poorna Chander, D/o Dusa Laxmaiah, aged about 40 years, Housewife, R/o Flat No.501, Parimala Homes­4, Above Spencer Super Market, Road No.10, Chaitanyapuri, Dilsukhnagar, Hyderabad, 

4. Gopa Padmaja, W/o Gopa Anand Kumar, D/o Dusa Laxmaiah, aged about 37 years, Housewife, R/o H.No.1­9­20/A, Flat No.211, Kartik Apartment, Ramnagar, Hyderabad, …Plaintiffs 

And

1. Dusa Krishna, S/o Laxmaiah, Aged about 54 years, Railway Employee,

2. Dusa Vinesh, S/o Krishna, Aged about 23 years, Private Employee,

3. Dusa Praveen, S/o Krishna, Aged about 22 years, Private Employee,

4. Dusa Rahul, S/o Krishna, Aged about 21 years, Student,

5. Dusa Vanaja, D/o Krishna, Aged about 24 years, Student ,

All are R/o H.No.12­11­1111, 

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Warasiguda, Secunderabad, …Defendants

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This suit coming before me on 03.05.2019 for final hearing in the presence of Sri.D.Madhava Rao, Advocate for the plaintiffs; and of Sri.R.Yogender Singh,advocate for the defendants; and upon perusing the material papers on record and on hearing and having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:

:: J U D G M E N T::

1.This is a suit filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties and for cancellation of registered gift deeds document Nos.1477/2009, 1478/2009, 1479/2009 and 1480/2009 dated 12.08.2009.

The averments of the plaint in brief are, as follows:

The plaintiffs and the defendants are joint owners and possessors of the suit schedule properties i.e., plot Nos.d/35 and d/36 in Sy.No.168, bearing Municipal No.12­11­1111, admeasuring 382 square yards, situated at Warasiguda,

Secunderabad­500 061. The plaintiffs are sisters of the 1st defendant and that the defendants 2 to 4 are sons and the 5th defendant is daughter of the 1st defendant. Dusa Laxmaiah, who is father of the plaintiffs and 1st defendant, had purchased the suit schedule property in the name of his wife­Narasamma under a registered sale deed document No.1366/1968 dated 24.06.1968 from its previous owner Mohd.Ghaisuddin Khan,

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S/o Haji Mohd Waris Khan for a valuable sale consideration and thereafter, he has constructed RCC building in said premise. He has also purchased 26 tulas of gold to his wife.

During their life time, parents of the plaintiff and 1st defendant performed marriages of their children as per Hindu customs and their parents promised to give share in the properties.

Their father died on 15.03.2008 by leaving his wife and children as his successors. Their mother also died on 27.07.2011, due to ill health. After attending 1st month ceremony of their mother, the plaintiffs asked the 1st defendant to give share in the property and gold ornaments, for which he refused stating that he is vacating the premises as death time was bad on the advice of pandiths and after six months he will call and decide the matter. Six months thereafter, the plaintiffs asked the 1st defendant for partition of property, in presence of elders and community people. But, the defendants refused to give share. On 14.02.2012, the plaintiffs got issued legal notice to the 1st defendant and on receipt of the same; he got issued reply notice stating that their mother executed gift settlement deeds in favour of the defendants 1 to 4. Dusa Narsamma executed gift settlement deed document No.1479/2009 dated 12.08.2009 in favour of the 1st defendant to an extent of 82 square yards, gift settlement deed document No.1477/2009

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dated 12.08.2009 in favour of the 2nd defendant to an extent of

100 square yards, gift settlement deed document

No.1478/2009 dated 12.08.2009 in favour of the 3rd defendant to an extent of 100 square yards and a gift settlement deed document No.1480/2009 dated 12.08.2009 in favour of the 4th defendant to an extent of 100 square yards, out of 382 square yards. The plaintiffs are not parties to said gift settlement deeds and as such they are null, void and not binding on the plaintiffs. In the month of October, 2012, the plaintiffs demanded the defendants to affect the partition of the suit schedule property, but, they bluntly refused. Hence, the suit.

2.On receipt of summons, the 1st defendant has appeared and filed written statement by denying the plaint averments. He denied that the plaintiffs are joint owners and possessors of the suit schedule property. It is admitted about the relationship of the parties, date of death of their parents. The property was purchased by their mother­Narasamma with her savings. It is denied that the suit schedule property and gold was purchased by their father in the name of their mother. It is admitted that the marriages of the plaintiffs were performed during life time of their parents. It is denied that their father assured to give share to the plaintiffs. At the time of marriage of the 3rd plaintiff, their

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father fell down and during his sick period, the defendants alone looked after him and the plaintiffs never visited to see him. In the year, 1981, the 1st defendant joined in service, and also contributed amounts to perform marriages of the plaintiffs 3 and 4. Subsequent to death of Laxmaiah, Narsamma out of love and affection gave 82 square yards to the 1st defendant, 100 square yards each to the defendants 2 to 4 under registered gift deeds and the same is in the knowledge of plaintiffs and everyone in the locality. They became absolute owners and the plaintiffs have no manner of right over the same. No gold is lying with the defendants. On receipt of notice

dated 14.02.2012, the defendants got issued reply stating

about execution of gift deeds in favour of defendnts1 to 4. Since it is self­acquired property of Narsamma, she has every right to execute gift deeds in favour of the defendants 1 to 4. The plaintiffs ought to have pay court fee under Section 34 (1) instead of 34 (2) of Andhra Pradesh Court Fee and Suit

Valuation Act, 1956. Hence, prayed to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs.

 3.On appearance, the defendants 2 to 5 have filed a memo on 22.08.2012, by adopting the written statement of the 1st defendant. 

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4.Basing on the said pleadings, the following issues are settled for trial:

1. Whether the suit property was purchased by

Dusa Laxmaiah in the name of his wife –

Dusa Narsamma?

2. Whether the gift settlement deeds alleged to

have been executed by the late Dusa

Narsamma are null and void?

3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for

partition of the suit schedule property?

4. To what relief?

5.During course of trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws­1 and 2 were examined and A­1 to A­15 were exhibited. On behalf of the defendants, D.W­1 was examined and no documents were exhibited. This court heard the arguments on both sides.

The learned counsel appearing for the defendants also field written arguments.

6.ISSUE No.1:It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs are the sisters and the defendants 2 to 5 are children of the 1st defendant. It is also not in dispute that their father­Dusa

Laxmaiah died on 15.03.2008 and their mother­Dusa

Narsamma died on 27.07.2011, which is also evident by death certificates (Ex.A­10 and A­11). 

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7.It is also not in dispute that originally, the suit schedule property i.e., plot Nos.d/35 and d/36 in Sy.No.168, bearing

Municipal No.12­11­1111, admeasuring 382 square yards, situated at Warasiguda, Secunderabad­500 061 was purchased under a registered sale deed document No.1366/1968 dated 24.06.1968 from its previous owner Mohd.Ghaisuddin Khan,

S/o Haji Mohd Waris Khan, in the name of Dusa Narasamma and thereafter RCC building was constructed in said premise.

Ex.A­1 is the certified copy of said sale deed. Ex.A­12 is the encumbrance certificate and Ex.A­13 to A­15 are the market value certificates. 

8. The plaintiffs have filed the present suit for partition claiming share in the suit schedule property stating that their father had purchased the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed document No.1366/1968 dated 24.06.1968 in the name of their mother­Dusa Narsamma and that they being legal heirs are entitled for share in the suit schedule property. 

9.Per contra, the contention of the defendants is that the suit schedule property is self­acquired property of their mother­

Dusa Narsamma and as such she is having right to execute

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registered gift deeds in favour of the defendants 1 to 4 in respect of the suit schedule property and that the plaintiffs have no right over the suit schedule property. 

10.Now, it is to be seen, whether the suit schedule property was purchased by their father­Dusa Laxmaiah in the name of his wife­Dusa Narsamma or whether it is self­acquired property of their mother­Dusa Narasamma.

11.On behalf of the plaintiffs, the 1st plaintiff was examined as P.W­1. She has filed an affidavit in lieu of her chief examination, as contemplated under Order­XVIII, Rule­4 (1) of

CPC. Her evidence is nothing but replica of plaint pleadings. 

12.It is in the evidence of P.W­1 that their father was working in railways, since 1954 or 1955 and that their maternal side was in poor financial condition and that their mother was home maker. Ongoing through the entire cross­examination of P.W­1, it is clear that no suggestion was put to P.W­1, by the learned counsel for the defendants to the effect that the suit schedule property is the self­acquired property of Narsamma and that it is not the property of Laxmaiah. More particularly there is no cross­examination regarding financial status of Narsamma. 

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13.From the evidence on record, it is an undisputed fact that

Dusa Narsamma was household lady and that she was not doing any job. When the plaintiffs have categorically contended that their father­Laxmaiah purchased the suit schedule property in the name of his wife­Narsamma, the defendants ought to have adduced evidence to show the source of income of Narsamma and her capacity to purchase the suit schedule property.

14.On the other hand, on behalf of the plaintiff, K.Saraswathi, who is none other than cousin of Dusa Laxmaiah, was examined as P.W­2. She is aged about 83 years. She deposes that her father­Dusa Mallaiah and Dusa Laxmaiah are real brothers. Her evidence reveals that Dusa Laxmaiah was a carpenter and worked in SC railways, at Kazipet and Kachiguda and that around 1950, Dusa Laxmaiah married Dusa

Narsamma and he got job in the year 1956. She categorically deposes that she witnessed the wedding of Dusa Laxmaiah and

Dusa Narasamma and that no gold or gifts were given to Dusa

Narsamma and that their uncle­Dusa Vittalaiah had incurred entire marriage expenditure, as parents of Dusa Narsamma were very poor. 

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15.It is in the evidence of P.W­2 that Dusa Laxmaiah purchased the suit schedule property in the name of Dusa

Narsamma, with his earning of his employment and that her father was the witness to said document. She further deposes that her cousin­Dusa Laxmaiah constructed entire structure in the said plot and that the entire sale consideration was paid by

Dusa Laxmaiah. 

16.P.W­2 admitted that she did not file any document to prove that D.Laxmaiah had purchased the suit schedule property with his own income. P.W­2 is not party to the suit proceedings. Be the case, no one can expect that P.W­2 has to file a document to prove that D.Laxmaiah had purchased the suit schedule property with his own income. P.W­2 denied the suggestions that the contents of her chief examination are false and that she is deposing false. Admittedly, P.W­2 is close relative of the both the parties. Nothing has been elicited to show that P.W­2 is interested in the plaintiffs. 

17.Except above three vague suggestions nothing has been elicited to impeach the testimony of P.W­2. Further, no suggestion was put to P.W­2, by the counsel for the defendants that it is self­acquired property of Dusa Narsamma and that she purchased the same with her own savings. Absolutely,

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there is no cross­examination regarding financial capacity of

Dusa Narsamma.

18.D.W­1 deposes in his chief­examination that his mother purchased the suit schedule property with her stridhan and savings during her life time and as their family was big, her mother used to work from home by stitching cloths and she was getting substantial income. But, the pleadings of the defendants are silent that Dusa Narsamma got stridhan from her parents and that she used to earn by stitching cloths. Even in the written arguments, the defendants did not whisper about the asserted stridhan of Dusa Narsamma. It is an improved version which is not find place in the pleadings of the defendants. Therefore, there is no need to consider the said aspects of stridhan and earning on asserted stitching of cloths. 

19.D.W­1 deposes in his cross­examination that he does not know what was given to her mother at the time of her marriage.

He deposes that his mother was not given any immovable properties on her wedding and that she was housewife. Even these aspects are clear enough that Dusa Narsamma was not having any source of income and that nothing was given to her by her parents at the time of her marriage.

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20.D.W­1 deposes that his mother told him that the property under Ex.A­1 was purchased for Rs.4,000/­. But, Ex.A­1 reveals that the total consideration was Rs.1,000/­ only. The evidence of D.W­1 is contrary to the contents of Ex.A­1.

21.Once, the above aspects are not believable and as there is no whisper as to how Dusa Narasamma saved money and what was her source of income, in the pleadings of the defendants, it is not safe to believe the version of the defendants. As matter of fact, all most all the contents of chief­examination affidavit of

D.W­1 are improved version, which are not find place in their pleadings.

22.Simply because the suit schedule property is in the name of Dusa Narsamma, it cannot be taken for granted that it is her self­acquired property, more particularly in absence of any iota of evidence to show source of income of Dusa Narsamma. It is well known to everybody, in our society most of the people used to purchase properties in the name of wife. Further, many people feel it is tradition and to see that their wives should feel secured. Similarly, Dusa Laxmaiah also might be purchased in the name of his wife­Dusa Narsamma. 

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23.Ongoing through the material on record, this Court is of the view that the evidence of D.W­1 did not inspire confidence of this court on any aspect. Hence, this Court is not inclined to accept the version of the defendants that the suit schedule property is the self­acquired property of Dusa Narsamma. 

24.Under these circumstances, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that the defendants have miserably failed to establish that the suit schedule property is the self­acquired property of Dusa Narsamma. On the other hand, there is nothing to disbelieve the contention of the plaintiffs that their father­Dusa Laxmaiah purchased the suit schedule property under Ex.A­1 in the name of his wife­Dusa Narsamma.

25.The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs have placed reliance on a citation in Cheedella Padmavathi (Died)

per LRs. And others V. Cheedella Lashminarasimha Rao

(died) per LRs. And others reported in 2015 (5) ALT 634, wherein it was held that “in the absence of pleadings, any evidence produced by parties generally cannot be considered”. 

26.As stated above, admittedly, the defendants did not take plea that their mother­Dusa Narasamma got stridhan from her parents and that she used to earn money by stitching cloths in

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home. Therefore, the evidence of D.W­1 regarding asserted stridhan and stitching of cloths by their mother cannot be taken into consideration and is unbelievable.

27.In Cheedella Padmavathicase as referred supra, it was further held that “Rules of justice require that the party cross­ examining must put the crucial and important part of his case to the witness of the other side in his cross­examination with regard to a certain fact challenging the same, then such fact has to be presumed to be true”. 

28.In the instant case on hand also, the defendants have failed to put suggestions on crucial and important aspects of their case to P.Ws­1 and 2, as already stated above. Since no questions are put to P.Ws­1 and 2, whether the suit schedule property is self acquired property of Dusa Narasamma or Dusa

Laxmaiah, it has to be presumed that the suit schedule property is the self­acquired property of Dusa Laxmaiah and that he purchased the same in the name of his wife­Dusa

Narasamma.

29.The defendants contend in their written arguments that the burden lies upon the person who asserts that a particular property is joint family property to establish that fact. They

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have relied upon a citation in Rukma Bai V. Lakshminarayana reported in 1960 AIR SC 335

30.In Rukma Bai case referred supra, it was also held that “but if he proves that there was sufficient joint family nucleus from and out of which the said property could have been acquired, the burden shifts to the member of the family setting up the claim that it is his personal property to establish that the said property has been acquired without any assistance from the joint family property”.

31.In the case on hand, the plaintiffs have clearly shown that their father was an employee and that their mother has no mean or capacity to purchase the property and thereby the plaintiffs have established that the suit schedule property is their joint family property. Further, the burden is shifted on the defendants who set up their claim that it is the self­acquired property of their mother­Dusa Narsamma.

32.There cannot be any dispute that initial burden is on the plaintiffs to show that the property is joint family property and then it shifts on the defendants to show that the same was not purchased from out of the joint family nucleus and it was

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purchased independent of them as held in Cheedella

Padmavathi case, referred supra. 

33.In the instant case, the plaintiffs are able to discharge their initial burden to show that the suit property is their joint family property. But, the defendants have failed to discharge their burden that the suit schedule property was purchased by their mother­Dusa Narasamma with her own savings.

34.P.W­2 who is none other than cousin of their father­Dusa

Laxmaiah is a material witness, supported the case of the plaintiffs that her cousin­Dusa Laxmaiah purchased the suit schedule property in the name of his wife­Dusa Narasamma.

35.The contention of the 1st defendant is that he has contributed amounts for the marriages of plaintiffs 3 and 4.

P.W­1 deposes in her cross­examination that the 1st defendant started earning from 1984. Except self­serving testimony there is nothing to believe the contention of the 1st defendant.

According to the plaintiffs, their mother­Dusa Narsamma was having gold ornaments. The defendants contend that no gold is lying with them. The plaintiffs have failed to place any convincing evidence to show that their mother’s gold was lying with the defendants.

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36.It is not in dispute that after death of their parents, on 14.02.2012, the plaintiffs got issued legal notice to the defendants and that on receipt of notice, the defendant got issued reply notice on 21.02.2012 which is also evident by office copy of legal notice (Ex.A­6), postal receipt (Ex.A­7), postal acknowledgment card (Ex.A­8) and reply notice (Ex.A­9).

Mere issuance of reply notice will not render any help to the case of the defendants. 

37.In view of the citations referred supra and facts of the case on hand, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that the defendants have miserably failed to establish their case that the suit schedule property is the self­acquired property of their mother­Dusa Narsamma. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have clearly established their case that the suit schedule property was purchased by their father­Dusa Laxmaiah, in the name of his wife­Dusa Narasamma, beyond preponderance of all probabilities. Hence, this issue is answered in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.

38.ISSUE No.2: The plaintiffs have filed the suit for partition and to declare the registered gift deeds executed by Dusa

Narasamma in favour of the defendants 1 to 4 as null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. Admittedly, Dusa Narasamma

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died on 27.07.2011. It is not in dispute that, Dusa Laxmaiah died intestate, in respect of the suit schedule property.

Therefore, all the legal heirs are having share in the suit schedule property. The plaintiffs being daughters and the 1st defendant being son of Dusa Laxmaiah are having equal shares in the suit schedule property.

39.It is not in dispute that Dusa Narsamma executed gift settlement deed document No.1479/2009 dated 12.08.2009 in favour of the 1st defendant to an extent of 82 square yards, gift settlement deed document No.1477/2009 dated 12.08.2009 in favour of the 2nd defendant to an extent of 100 square yards, gift settlement deed document No.1478/2009 dated 12.08.2009 in favour of the 3rd defendant to an extent of 100 square yards and a gift settlement deed document No.1480/2009 dated 12.08.2009 in favour of the 4th defendant to an extent of 100 square yards, out of 382 square yards, which is also evident by certified copies of gift deeds (Ex.A­2 to A­5).

40.In view of findings and conclusions on the above issue

No.1, Dusa Narasamma was not absolute owner of the suit schedule property and she has no right to execute gift deeds in favour of the defendants 1 to 4. Therefore, the said registered

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gift deeds (Ex.A­2 to A­5) are null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. 

41.Even though the plaintiffs sought relief for declaration, they did not pay court fee and they are liable to pay the same as required under the law. The office is directed to issue check slip to the plaintiffs to pay required court fee for the said relief within ONE month from this day. Failing which, the suit for the said relief of declaration shall stand dismissed. Accordingly, this issue is answered.

42.ISSUE No.3:In view of findings and conclusions on the above issues, the plaintiffs are entitled for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule property except the schedule regarding gold ornaments. Accordingly, this issue is answered in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.

43.ISSUE No.4:In view of findings and conclusions on the above issues, the plaintiffs are entitled for the reliefs sought for.

Accordingly, this issue is answered in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.

IN THE RESULT:The suit of the plaintiffs is decreed as under;

1.A preliminary decree is passed for partition of the suit schedule property into five equal shares

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by allotting 1/5th share each to the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant; 

2.The claim in respect of gold ornaments is dismissed.

3.The registered gift deeds (Ex.A­2 to A­5) documents i.e., gift settlement deed document No.1479/2009 dated 12.08.2009 of the 1st defendant to an extent of 82 square yards, gift settlement deed document No.1477/2009 dated 12.08.2009 of the 2nd defendant to an extent of 100 square yards, gift settlement deed document No.1478/2009 dated 12.08.2009 of the 3rd defendant to an extent of 100 square yards and gift settlement deed document No.1480/2009 dated 12.08.2009 of the 4th defendant to an extent of 100 square yards, executed by Dusa Narsamma are null and void and not binding on the plaintiff, subject to pay required Court fee for the said relief;

4.The Office is directed to issue check slip to the plaintiff, to pay required Court fee within in ONE month from this day, for the relief of declaration. Failing which the suit for said relief shall stand dismissed. 

5.Further, Office is directed to prepare preliminary decree after paying such deficit Court fee by the plaintiffs;

6.Equities, if any, shall be worked out in the final decree proceedings;

7.However, both parties are directed to bear their own costs.

Typed to my dictation, corrected and pronounced by me, in the open court, on this the 6 th day of June, 2019.

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad

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::APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE::

WITNESSES EXAMINED ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS

P.W­1Kasturi Vijayalakshmi 01.09.2016 P.W­2K.Saraswathi28.12.2018

WITNESSES EXAMINED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS

D.W­1Dusa Krishna 16.04.2019

DOCUMENTS EXHIBITED ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS

Ex.A­1Certified Copy of sale deed document24.06.1968 No.1366/1968

Ex.A­2Certified Copy of Gift Deed document12.08.2099 No.1477/2009

Ex.A­3Certified Copy of Gift Deed document12.08.2099 No.1478/2009

Ex.A­4Certified Copy of Gift Deed document12.08.2099 No.1479/2009

Ex.A­5Certified Copy of Gift Deed document12.08.2099 No.1480/2009

Ex.A­6Office copy of Legal Notice14.02.2012 Ex.A­7Postal Receipt 14.02.2012 Ex.A­8Postal Acknowledgment Card 16.02.2012 Ex.A­9Reply Notice 21.02.2012 Ex.A­10Death Certificate of Laxmaiah 01.03.2012 Ex.A­11Death Certificate of Narsamma 29.02.2012 Ex.A­12Encumbrance Certificate 02.02.2012 Ex.A­13Market Value Certificate 13.03.2012 Ex.A­14Market Value Certificate 13.03.2012 Ex.A­15Market Value Certificate 13.03.2012

DOCUMENTS EXHIBITED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS

­Nil­

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad

IN THE COURT OF XII ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURT: AT: SECUNDERABAD

WEDNESDAY THIS THE THIRD DAY OF APRIL, 2019 

Present:P.Chandra Sekhara Prasad, XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. 

AS No.65 of 2018

Between:­

Secunderabad Club, Represented by its Secretary D.Kawarana, Having its office at Secretary’s Office, Secunderabad Club, Picket, Secunderabad ­500 026,

...Appellant/Defendant 

And

V.Ramchander Goud, S/o Justice Sri.V.Eswaraiah (Retired), Aged about 38 years, Advocate, R/o H.No.1­8­161/7 [179], P.G. Road, Secunderabad­ 500 003,

...Respondent/Plaintiff

Against Judgment and decree passed in OS No.19 of 2016 dated

12.10.2018 by XI Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad

Between:

V.Ramchander Goud, S/o Justice Sri.V.Eswaraiah (Retired), Aged about 38 years, Advocate, R/o H.No.1­8­161/7 [179], P.G. Road, Secunderabad­ 500 003

...Plaintiff

And

Secunderabad Club, Represented by its Secretary D.Kawarana, Having its office at Secretary’s Office, Secunderabad Club, Picket, Secunderabad ­500 026,

...Defendant

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This Appeal is coming on 27.03.2019 before me for hearing in presence of Sri.Hrishikesh Ganu, advocate for the appellant and of Sri.Dharmesh D.K. Jaiswal, advocate; and upon perusal of the material papers on record and the case having been heard and stood over for consideration till this day, this court delivered the following judgment:

::J U D G M E N T::

1.The unsuccessful defendant in OS No.19 of 2016 preferred this appeal against the judgment and decree dated 12.10.2018 passed by the learned XI Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,

Secunderabad wherein the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit of the respondent/plaintiff, with costs by declaring that the letter dated 24.06.2013 bearing No.SE/MSHIP2013/312 addressed by the defendant to the plaintiff as null, void and the defendant was directed to restore the application of the plaintiff for permanent membership at waitlist serial No.2714 by receiving the present applicable enhanced entrance fee as per the Rules in vogue and to complete the entire exercise within 2 weeks failing which the plaintiff is entitled to execute the same in accordance with the law.

2.The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit in OS No.19 of 2016 against the appellant/defendant for declaration to declare the letter dated 24.06.2013 bearing No.SE/MSHIP2013/312 addressed by the defendant as null, void, ultra­wires and

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arbitrary and in violation of principles of natural justice as the same has been amended subsequent to the application of the plaintiff and consequently to restore the application of the plaintiff for permanent membership of the defendant club to its original file and number in the waiting list as per allotted waiting list number 2714 and for costs of the suit.

The case of the plaintiff, as seen from the plaint averments in brief is, as follows:

The plaintiff is a practicing advocate and on 11.09.2006, he applied for permanent membership in the defendant club.

His application was approved by the Managing Committee and he was called upon to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/­ towards deposit for membership. The plaintiff paid the said amount and on 13.09.2006, he was allotted waitlist No.2714 and the permanent membership of the defendant club under General

Category is granted in seriatim as per waiting list, as and when vacancy arises in the said category. On 24.06.2013, the plaintiff received a communication from the defendant club stating that:

“the plaintiff has paid an amount of Rs.25,000/­ at the time of making application as per the then existing Rules. The Rules of the defendant were amended and an

additional amount of Rs.25,000/­ was to be paid by the

plaintiff by 30.04.2007. The amendment to the rules was informed to the plaintiff, his proposer and seconder.

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Since the plaintiff did not pay the additional amount his name was struck off from the waitlist and his deposit amount of Rs.25,000/­ as being returned vide cheque No.104056 dated 26.06.2013.”

The plaintiff contended that he did not receive such communication from the defendant prior to letter dated 24.06.2013 and that the change in the Rule position was not informed to the plaintiff or his proposer or Seconder. The conduct of the defendant club in recalling the application in 2013, seven long years after amendment to the Rules vide the impugned notice dated 24.06.2013 is highly deplorable, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. The

additional enhanced amount of Rs.25,000/­ is prospective and

cannot be applied to the plaintiff’s case and as such removal of the plaintiff name from waitlist is perse illegal and liable to be set aside. Hence, the suit. 

3.On appearance the defendant club filed written statement and contended that the suit is barred by limitation as the notice dated 07.03.2007 issued by the defendant club is the starting point for limitation. The plaintiff received the letter

dated 07.03.2007 and did not comply with the same. Removal

of name of the plaintiff from waitlist is attributable to the plaintiff alone for non­payment of enhanced entrance fee within

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the stipulated time. Hence, prayed to dismiss the suit.

4.Basing on the said pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration

to declare the letter dated 26.04.2013 bearing

No.SE/MSHIP2013/312 addressed by the

defendant as null and void?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for

consequential injunction to restore the

application of the plaintiff for permanent

membership of the defendant club?

3. Whether the present suit is barred by limitation?

4. To what relief?

5.During the trial, the plaintiff got examined himself as P.W­ 1 and exhibited A­1 and A­6. On the other hand, the defendant got examined its Secretary as D.W­1 and exhibited B­1 to B­4.

6.The learned Trial Judge, on completion of trial and on hearing both sides and upon perusal of the evidence both oral and documentary as adduced by both the parties, decreed the suit of the plaintiff by its judgment and decree dated 12.10.2018 by declaring that the letter dated 24.06.2013 bearing No.SE/MSHIP2013/312 addressed by the defendant to the plaintiff as null, void and the defendant was directed to restore the application of the plaintiff for permanent

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membership at waitlist serial No.2714 by receiving the present applicable enhanced entrance fee as per the Rules in vogue and to complete the entire exercise within 2 weeks failing which the plaintiff is entitled to execute the same in accordance with the law.

7.Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, the defendant therein preferred this appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court on the following grounds:

1. The judgment under appeal is contrary to law and facts of the case and as such deserves to be set aside;

2. The findings of the Trial Court on issue No.3 as to suit being within limitation is wholly perverse;

3. The Trial Court has lost sight of the fact that in really, there was no dispute as to the Rule being amended and in fact the plaintiff himself had paid the amount under Ex.A­3 on 03.09.2013, but the same having not been paid within time etc., his name has been struck off from the waiting list and as such issuance of letter dated 19.09.2013 or Ex.a­6 dated 24.06.2013 did not have any relation to the actual cause of action that the arose for filing the suit;

4. The Trial Court therefore ought to have seen that the plaintiff’s attempt ingeniously denying the receipt of Ex.B­3 and thereafter claiming cause of action under Ex.A­6 is a mala fide attempt to mislead the Court. The Trial Court therefore, ought to have held that the suit as filed was hopelessly barred by limitation. The Trial Court on this aspect has failed to take into consideration that

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subsequent denials once again cannot renew a cause of action when the limitation has already set in motion.

5. The Trail Court ought to have seen that as seen from Ex B­4, the Respondent/Plaintiff had issued notice that he is interested to pay the additional amount and as such the cause of action, if any, had arisen way back and therefore, the suit as filed is hopelessly barred by limitation.

6. The findings of the Trial Court on issues 1 and 2 holding as if Ex.B­4 was not received by the Respondent/Plaintiff is per se, per verse. The Trial Court failed to take into consideration that admittedly the address at which the said communication was sent was the correct address of the Respondent/Plaintiff and it was for the plaintiff to plead and prove that Sri. Jagdish who received the communication was not connected with the Respondent/Plaintiff not evidence furnished.

7. The Trial Court has therefore, failed to take into consideration the true purport of the decisions cited of Honourable Supreme Court in this respect as reported in AIR 1981 SC 1284 and A.P. 2005 SC 109 and as such the findings of the trial court on issues 1 and 2 are also therefore, grossly erroneous and deserve to be set aside.

8. The Trial Court has also lost sight of the fact that even as on the date of filing of the suit, the Respondent/Plaintiff has shown the same address and as such his contention that he has shifted elsewhere is per se false and the same was taken only as an excuse to deny the receipt of Ex. B­3 which is per se mala fide.

9. The findings arrived at by the Trial Court are therefore, per se perverse and therefore, deserve to be set aside as prayed for.

10. The findings of the Trial Court that the amendment was prospective is per se incorrect and false.

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11. The Trial Court has also lost sight of the fact that in a suit for declaration, the burden squarely lies upon the plaintiff and the Respondent/Plaintiff has to stand or fall on his own. The alleged defects in the case of the Appellant/defendant cannot have any bearing and the Trial Court has to thoroughly peruse and appreciate the factual matrix for such decision to be arrived at by the Trial Court. The Trial Court has thoroughly misappreciated the factual matrix and the legal principles put before it in this respect thus leading to the erroneous judgment being pronounced.

8.This court heard both sides on record. Both the parties did not choose to adduce any evidence on their behalf in the appeal. Both of them have filed written arguments.

9.Both the parties are referred as plaintiff and defendant as arrayed in the suit, for the sake of convenience and discussion.

Upon hearing both sides, the points that arise for consideration are:

1. Whether the letter (Ex.B­3) dated 07.03.2007

was communicated to the plaintiff, to his

proposer and to his seconder?

2. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation?

3. Whether the judgment and decree passed by

the learned Trial Judge needs any

interference?

4. To what relief?

10.POINTS 1 TO 3:As seen from the evidence of both

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sides, both oral and documentary, there is no dispute with regard to the tenancy between the plaintiff and defendant. The defendant is not disputing the plaintiff as landlord of the suit schedule property and all the rental deeds were signed by the defendant as the trustee of the Good News Books Centre Trust and not in his individual capacity. 

11.The learned counsel appearing for the defendant club contends that the plaintiff was aware of the communication (Ex.B­3) dated 07.03.2007 and that the limitation to file the suit would run from 07.03.2007 and that the suit was filed on 06.02.1016 beyond the period of limitation of three years. 

12.It is the specific case of the plaintiff that he never received the communication (Ex.B­3) and that his proposer and seconder also did not receive the same. He contends that in the year 2007, their building at P.G. Road was demolished and that the plaintiff was staying with his father in Viqar Manzil,

Banjara Hills. He denied postal acknowledgment (Ex.B­4) signed by one Jagadeesh Singh, in his cross­examination.

13.The learned counsel appearing for the defendant contends that once the communication is sent by a post to the relevant address it is presumed that the addressed persons has received

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the same. He has relied upon following citations:

1. Harcharan Singh V. Smt. Shivrani And Ors. reported in AIR 1981 SC 1284;

2. V. Raja Kumari V. P. Subbarama Naidu & Anr reported in AIR 2005 SC 109;

14.Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic­'Meaning of service by post' and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre­paying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus arises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, pre­paying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to

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have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act where under it is stated that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by pre­paying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. 

15.In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on

November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to

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accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed, with the knowledge of the contents thereof and in our view, this follows upon the presumptions that are raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.

16.The address on letter (Ex.B­3) shows as under:

“V.Ramchander Rao, H.No.1­8­161/7, PG Road, 

13

AS No.65 of 2018 

in 

OS No.19 of 2016 

Secunderabad­500 003”

As seen from postal acknowledgment card (Ex.B­4), it was received by one Jagadeesh Singh. There is no whisper or even a suggestion as to who is said Jagadeesh Singh. What way he is connected to the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that their building was demolished and that he was staying with his father at Banjara Hills, which is also not disputed by the defendant. 

17.When the plaintiff categorically stated that he did not receive letter (Ex.B­3), the defendant club ought to have examine the postman or said Jagadeesh Singh, whose mobile number was also mention on postal acknowledgment card (Ex.B­4). 

18.The defendant contends that intimation was given to the proposer and seconder of the plaintiff. But, no piece of paper is filed. There is nothing to believe that there was communication about Ex.B­3 to the proposer and seconder of the plaintiff. Even

Ex.B­1 is silent about marking of the same to them as admitted by D.W­1.

19.As seen from his application (Ex.B­1) of the plaintiff, there is clear address. But, the addressed shown on Ex.B­3 is silent

14

AS No.65 of 2018 

in 

OS No.19 of 2016 

about father’s name and occupation of the plaintiff.

Undoubtedly, on seeing address on Ex.B­3, it is apparent that it is incomplete address of the plaintiff. 

20.Added to it, in his cross­examination D.W­1 deposes that

Ex.B­3 was addressed to one ‘ B.Ramchander Rao’. As seen from record, the name of the plaintiff is ‘ V.Ramchander Goud’.

When the name of addressee on Ex.B­3 was mentioned as ‘ B.Ramchander Rao’, it cannot be said that the notice (Ex.B­3) was sent to the correct address of the plaintiff. Therefore, the question of presumption in favour of the defendant does not arise. 

21.Ongoing through the available material on record, it is clear that the learned Trial Judge rightly gave finding that in absence of postal receipts or acknowledgments to the proposer and seconder an adverse inference was drawn against the defendant to the effect that no such intimation was given to the proposer or seconder of the plaintiff and that there was no communication under Ex.B­3 to the plaintiff.

22.It is also not in dispute that the letter (Ex.A­6) dated 24.06.2014 bearing No.SE/MSHIP2013/312 issued by the defendant club to the plaintiff does not bear any reference

15

AS No.65 of 2018 

in 

OS No.19 of 2016 

about Ex.B­3. If really Ex.B­3 was served on the plaintiff, the defendant would have referred the same in Ex.A­6. 

23.As seen from Ex.B­2, the plaintiff addressed a letter to the defendant club in which the plaintiff categorically stated that while he was staying at PG Road, Secunderabad he has applied for permanent membership and he was staying in his own house at Kowkoor and that on 02.12.2009, when visited the office of the defendant to know status of his application he was informed that a communication was sent to his old address to pay certain amount and he informed that he did not receive such communication and requested to receive enhanced amount. 

24.If the defendant would have communicated the information about enhanced amount to the plaintiff or to his prosper or seconder, it would have been different. But, there is nothing to accept the version of the defendant club that they sent intimation to the plaintiff.

25.Further, Ex.B­2 is sufficient to show bona­fides of the plaintiff that when he came to know about enhanced amount, he prepared to pay the same and send sent a cheque for balance (difference of enhanced amount) to the defendant club.

16

AS No.65 of 2018 

in 

OS No.19 of 2016 

26.There is no dispute that the plaintiff has paid Rs.25,000/­ along with his application (Ex.B­1) 11.09.2006. Even it is considered for a while, that Ex.B­3 was issued on 07.03.2007

27.The contention of the defendant club is that as per Ex.B­2, the period of limitation starts from 03.12.2009, if the same is considered as the date of accrual of cause of action. There is nothing to show that the defendant club gave response to Ex.B­ 2, till 2013. The record shows that in the year 2013 only, the defendant club issued Ex.A­6 about refund of deposit (WL

No.2714). 

28.Admittedly, the suit was filed on 06.01.2016 which is well within three years from the date of receipt of Ex.A­6 as rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff.

The learned Trial Judge also gave clear finding on the said aspect. Hence, this Court finds that there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the defendant club. 

29.It is not in dispute that on 11.09.2006, the plaintiff, submitted his application (Ex.B­1) and paid Rs.25,000/­ to the defendant club as per rules and that he was assigned a waiting

17

AS No.65 of 2018 

in 

OS No.19 of 2016 

list No.2714. 

30.The contention of the plaintiff is that he received Ex.A­6 on 24.06.2013 that he was removed from the waiting list as he has not paid additional amount of Rs.25,000/­, pursuant to amended rules and that the said rules are prospective in nature and not retrospective. 

31.In his cross­examination, D.W­1 admitted that the rules relating to enhancement of membership fee are not having prospective effect, but not retrospective effect. Thus, it is clear that the rules said to have been amended in the year 2007 which are prospective nature, the same cannot be applied to the case of the plaintiff as rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff.

32.The defendant also did not file any document to show any such existence of amended rules in the year 2007. In absence of such evidence, an adverse inference can be drawn that there are no such amendments to apply the same the plaintiff retrospectively. Therefore, on going through the available material on record, it can be safely concluded that the Rules which according to the defendant have been amended in the year 2007 are prospective in nature and that the same were

18

AS No.65 of 2018 

in 

OS No.19 of 2016 

never communicated to the plaintiff until issuance of Ex.A­6. 

33.The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff also informed this court that the plaintiff is ready and willing to pay present applicable enhanced application fee as the rules in vogue.

34.The learned Trial Judge rightly appreciated the evidence on both sides and contentions that were raised by both sides and came to a proper conclusion. The plaintiff has established that the letter (Ex.B­3) dated 07.03.2007 was not communicated to him or to his proposer and to his seconder and that the suit was filed well within the period of limitation and accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge needs no interference. Hence, the plaintiff is entitled for the relief sough for in the suit. 

35.Therefore, this Court does not find any reasons to interfere with the finding given by the learned Trial Judge. As such, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, these points are answered. 

19

AS No.65 of 2018 

in 

OS No.19 of 2016 

36.POINT No.4:In view of finding and conclusions on the above points 1 and 2, the appeal of the appellant is dismissed.

Accordingly, this point is answered. 

IN THE RESULT:The appeal filed by the appellant/ defendant is dismissed by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned XI Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,

Secunderabad in OS No.19 of 2016, dated 12.10.2018. 

The defendant club is directed to restore the application of the plaintiff for permanent membership at waiting list No.2714 by receiving the present applicable enhanced entrance fee as per the Rules in vogue and the entire exercise has to be completed within two weeks, from this day, as directed by the

Trial Court. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 

Typed to my dictation, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this the 3 rd day of April, 2019.

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad 

::APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE::

­Nil­

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad

IN THE COURT OF XII ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURT: AT: SECUNDERABAD

FRIDAY THIS THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF JUNE, 2019

Present:P.Chandra Sekhara Prasad, XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad.

OS No.157 of 2014

Between:-

N.Sudhakar, S/o N.Laxmaiah, Aged about 37 years, Business, R/o H.No.2-11-102, Bharathnagar, Uppal, Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad, …Plaintiff

And

M.Vijayalakshmi, W/o Babu Rao, D/o M.Appa Rao, Aged about 64 years, Housewife, R/o H.No.12-11-905, Warasiguda, Secunderabad, …Defendant

This case coming before me on 28.06.2019 for final hearing in the presence of Sri.Gajjala Venkat Reddy, advocate for the plaintiff; and of Sri.B.Balaiah, advocate for the defendant; and having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:

::J U D G M E N T::

1.This is a suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 20.07.2013 and to direct the defendant to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, in respect to the suit schedule property.

2

OS No.157 of 2014

The averments of the plaint in brief are, as follows:

The defendant had acquaintance with the plaintiff through his friend-Srinivas Naidu. The defendant is the mother-in-law of the said Srinivas Naidu by courtesy. Out of said acquaintance, in the first week of July, 2013, the defendant approached the plaintiff and offered to sell her house i.e., the suit schedule property bearing House No.12- 11-905, admeasuring 98.75 Square yards equivalent to 82.55 square meters, situated at Warasiguda, Secunderabad for a total consideration of Rs.36,00,000/- to meet her family legal necessities. The plaintiff agreed for the same to purchase suit schedule property for the said consideration of Rs.36,00,000/- and on 20.07.2013 the plaintiff paid an amount of

Rs.30,00,000/- towards part sale consideration, in cash and the defendant handed over all the link documents to the plaintiff. The defendant further agreed to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within six months by receiving the balance sale consideration of

Rs.6,00,000/- on production of other relevant documents pertaining to encumbrances of the above said property such as no P.T. Certificate, Pahani for the year 1950-1951 and other Pahanies up-to-date and also orally agreed to produce

3

OS No.157 of 2014

all the property tax assessment documents. The said terms and conditions were reduced into writing on 20.07.2013, in the presence of four witnesses viz., G.N.Giri, M.Appala Naidu,

D.Mallikarjun Reddy and M.Mallesh Goud, on receipt of part sale consideration. Thereafter, the plaintiff demanded the defendant orally since 01.09.2013 to produce all the above said documents as promised by him and to execute a regular registered sale deed in his favour by receiving balance of sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/-, by expressing his ready and willingness to perform his part of contract. But, the defendant dodged the matter on one pretext or the other. Ultimately, so far, the defendant failed to come forward to perform her part of contract in receiving the said balance sale consideration of

Rs.6,00,000/- and in producing the above said documents as promised by the defendant and to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Vexed with the attitude of the defendant, on 21.07.2014, the plaintiff got issued a legal notice by demanding the defendant to execute a regular registered sale deed in his favour expressing his ready and willingness to perform his part of contract to pay the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/- On receipt of the same, she got issued a reply notice dated 28.07.2014 to the plaintiff with all false and baseless

4

OS No.157 of 2014

allegations stating that the defendant does not know the plaintiff and that she had not executed any agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff with pre-mind set of equation to usurp suit schedule property and that the claim of the plaintiff is unlawful. The defendant is legally bounded to comply the terms and conditions of the agreement of sale dated 20.07.2013 and the defendant cannot escape from his liability, but the defendant is trying to escape from her liability by fabricating a false story.

2.On receipt of summons, the defendant has appeared and filed written statement stating that the suit is not maintainable either on law or on facts of the case. The suit is vexatious, false and frivolous and the same is filed to grab defendant property. The defendant never approached the plaintiff nor agreed to sell the defendant property, and the execution of agreement of sale does not arise. The defendant has no need to sale the property. There is no substance to say that the defendant was entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff. The plaintiff never paid any amount. The plaintiff knowing back profile of defendant who is an uneducated, elderly widow develop an evil eye and is a deliberate attempt by the plaintiff to grab the property with

5

OS No.157 of 2014

mala fide dishonest and deceitful intension. The plaintiff never paid money to the defendant. The defendant availed loan of Rs.9,00,000/- from one Thatha Rao who is her blood relative, for her family necessities by executing a registered simple mortgage without possession under document

No.2722/12 dated 03.12.2012 and that all the document of the said property are with the mortgagee along with blank paper to prepare Memorandum Of Understanding. The plaintiff in collusion with N.Thatha Rao fabricated documents to grab the suit schedule property. On receipt of legal notice from the plaintiff, the defendant got issued reply notices

dated 10.04.2014 and on 14.05.2014 to the counsel. There is

no contractual obligation in between the plaintiff and the defendant. On receipt of legal notices on 01.04.2014 and 02.04.2014, the defendant got issued reply notices dated 10.04.2014, 15.05.2014 and 28.07.2014. There is no cause of action to file present suit. This Court is not having jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Hence, prayed to dismiss the suit with heavy costs.

3.Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues are settled for trial:

1. Whether the agreement of sale dated

20.07.2013 is manipulated document?

6

OS No.157 of 2014

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for

specific performance of agreement of

sale dated 20.07.2013?

3. To what relief?

4.During course of the trial, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.Ws- 1 and 2 were examined and A-1 to A-5 were exhibited. On behalf of the defendant, D.Ws-1 and 2 were examined and B- 1 to B-12 were exhibited. This Court heard the arguments of the learned counsels appearing for the plaintiff and the defendant.

5.ISSUES 1 AND 2:It is the specific case of the plaintiff that the defendant offered and agreed to sell the suit schedule property i.e., house bearing No.12-11-905, admeasuring 98.75 square meters equivalent to 82.55 square meters situated at Warasiguda, Secunderabad, to the plaintiff for a valid consideration of Rs.36,00,000/- and that the plaintiff paid Rs.30,00,000/- as advance and that he agreed to pay balance of sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/- within six moths at the time of execution of registered sale deed. Per contra, the defendant denied the said transaction.

6.Since the defendant denied the execution of agreement of sale, it is to be seen as to how far the plaintiff discharged his burden in proving the execution of agreement of sale

7

OS No.157 of 2014

(Ex.A-1). The plaintiff has filed an affidavit in lieu of his chief examination affidavit as required under Order-XVIII, Rule-4 (1) of C.P.C. His evidence is nothing but replica of plaint pleadings.

7.It is in the evidence of P.W-1 that in the first week of July 2013, the defendant approached him and offered to sell her house for a valid consideration of Rs.36,00,000/- and that he agreed to purchase the same and that on 20.07.2013, the defendant executed an agreement of sale (Ex.A-1) in his favour by receiving cash of Rs.30,00,000/- and further she agreed to execute regular registered sale deed by receiving balance of sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/- within six months.

8.It is in the evidence of P.W-1 that the said agreement of sale (Ex.A-1) was executed in presence of four witnesses viz.,

G.N.Giri (son of the defendant), M.Appala Naidu,

D.Mallikarjuna Reddy and M.Mallesh Goud on receipt of above part of sale consideration.

9.The plaintiff got examined Meenampally Mallesh Goud who is one of the witness to Ex.A-1, as P.W-2. The evidence of

P.W-2 also corroborated the testimony of P.W-1 on all aspects. He categorically stated that the said transaction took

8

OS No.157 of 2014

place in their presence. Even though P.W-2 was examined at length, nothing could be elicited to impeach his testimony on any aspect. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff discharged his burden of execution of agreement of sale (Ex.A-1), by examining one of the witnesses as required under Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

10.Since the plaintiff has discharged his initial burden of execution of Ex.A-1, the burden shifted to the defendant to establish that she did not enter into any transaction and that her relative by name Thatha Rao took blank paper when she availed loan from and later the plaintiff in collusion with

Thatha Rao filed present suit by misusing the blank paper.

11.The defendant has filed an affidavit in lieu of her chief examination. Her evidence is also nothing but replica of written statement contents. Admittedly, her son who was examined as D.W-2 also signed as witness on agreement of sale (Ex.A-1). No doubt, the evidence of D.W-2 is also on the same footing as that of the evidence of D.W-1, who is none other than his natural mother. The undisputed signature of

D.W-2 is find place at serial No.1 of agreement of sale (Ex.A- 1). The defendant as well as her son (D.W-2) are not disputing, their signatures on agreement of sale (Ex.A-1).

9

OS No.157 of 2014

12.The main contention of the defendant is that when she availed loan by executing mortgage deed (Ex.B-1), Thatha

Rao obtained their signatures on blank paper. As seen from

Ex.B-1, it was executed on 03.12.2012 and the asserted transaction under agreement of sale (Ex.A-1) took place on 20.07.2013. There is gap about 7 months. Ex.A-1 is much earlier to Ex.B-1.

13.According to the plaintiff, the defendant handed over all the original link documents to him. Admittedly, the original sale deed (Ex.A-2) and original partion deed (Ex.A-2) were filed in the suit by the plaintiff. No doubt, the recitals of Ex.B- 1 reveal that the partition deed (Ex.A-2) dated 03.04.1990 was deposited with Thatha Rao. But, the contention of defendant is that she handed over Ex.A-2 and A-3 to Thatha

Rao. But, the recitals of Ex.B-1 did not disclose about depositing of original sale deed (Ex.A-2).

14.Further, there is no evidence to show that the asserted loan from Thatha Rao is not yet cleared and the mortgage is not yet redeemed. Admittedly, Thatha Rao is blood relative of the defendant. Even though the asserted loan not cleared, the defendant might have collected the partition deed (Ex.A-

2) from him to sell the property to clear the loan said to have

10

OS No.157 of 2014

been availed from Thatha Rao as rightly contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff.

15.Ongoing through the testimonies of D.W-1 and 2 it is crystal clear that the defendant has failed to adduce any acceptable evidence to substantiate her plea. The contention of the defendant is vague and baseless. Hence, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the defendant on any aspect.

16.The learned counsel appearing for the defendant contends that the agreement of sale (Ex.A-1) is inadmissible for want of registration. As per section 17 of Indian Evidence

Act, 1908, the agreement of sale is not compulsory registerable. Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 is widely accepted on its own merits that a suit for specific performance can be lie on the basis of unregistered agreement to sell and can be admissible as evidence. The proviso of Section 49, which was an unregistered document, could be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance. Section 49 makes it clear that a document which is compulsorily registrable, if not registered, will not affect the immovable property comprised therein in any manner. It will also not be received as evidence of any transaction affecting

11

OS No.157 of 2014

such property, except for two limited purposes. First is as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance. Second is as evidence of any collateral transaction which by itself is not required to be affected by registered instrument. Sale Agreement even not registered, is enforceable in Law. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the defendant has no force.

17.The leaned counsel appearing for the defendant also contends that there is no offer and acceptance in agreement of sale and as such Ex.A-1 is not a valid document. The unnumbered para No.2 at page number 2 of Ex.A-1 reads as under:

“Whereas the Vendor/s had/have offered and agreed to sell the above said property to the Vendee/s to meet/their his/her/family legal necessities for a sale consideration of Rs.36,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Six Lakhs only) and the Vendee/s has also agreed to purchase the same for the said consideration”.

18.The above recitals are crystal clear that the defendant offered to sell the suit schedule property for a valid consideration of Rs.36,00,000/- and the plaintiff accepted to purchase the same for the said consideration. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the defendant is vague and without any substance.

12

OS No.157 of 2014

19.The learned counsel appearing for the defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to show as to how he has secured cash of Rs.30,00,000/- on 23.07.2013. As seen from their written statement there are no pleadings on that aspect.

Even there is no cross-examination to P.W-1 as to how he secured such amount. Therefore, there is no need to consider the said aspect.

20.It is not in dispute that on 21.07.2014, the plaintiff got issued legal notice to the defendant and on receipt of the same the defendant got issued reply notice on 28.07.2014 which is evident by Ex.A-4 and A-5.

21.It is not in dispute that on 01.04.2014 and on 02.04.2014 also the plaintiff got issued legal notice to the defendant and that on receipt of the same the defendant got issued reply notice on 10.04.2014 and 15.05.2014 which is evident by

Ex.B-4 to B-10. Issuing the notice (Ex.A-4) by the plaintiff is crystal clear that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract.

22.Issuing the notice (Ex.A-4) by the plaintiff is crystal clear that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract.

Further, it is also clear that the plaintiff also proved that he

13

OS No.157 of 2014

was ready and willing to perform his part of specific performance. Simply because, the defendant got issued reply notice it does not mean that her case has to be accepted.

23.The evidence of P.Ws-1 and 2 is cogent and consistent and is corroborated with the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff and it inspires the confidence of the Court and as such the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance of the contract of sale as prayed for.

24.For the foregoing reasons, this court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale, by holding that Ex.A-1 is a genuine document, executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiffin respect of the suit schedule property. The defendant has failed to establish that the agreement of sale (Ex.A-1) dated 20.07.2013 is a manipulated document.

25.On scanning the material on record, this court holds that the plaintiff is able to establish his case beyond preponderance of all probabilities. Hence, these issues are answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

26.ISSUE No.3:In view of findings and conclusions on the above issues, this court held that the plaintiff is entitled for

14

OS No.157 of 2014

the relief sought for. Accordingly, this issue is answered.

IN THE RESULT:The suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs, as under:

(i)The Specific Performance of agreement of sale (Ex.A-1) dated 20.07.2013 is granted in favour of the plaintiff;

(ii)The plaintiff is hereby directed to deposit the balance of sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs only) into Court and inti- mate the same to the defendant by way of notice and the defendant is directed to exe- cute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within ONE month from the date of this Judgment;

(iii)The plaintiff has to bear the expenses of stamp duty and registration;

(iv)Failing which, the plaintiff is at liberty to take steps for execution of the decree by due process of law;

(v)The amount so deposited by the plaintiff, can be withdrawn by the defendant after execu- tion of sale deed in favour of the plaintiff;

Typed to my dictation, corrected and pronounced by me, in the open court, on this the 28th day of June, 2019.

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad

15

OS No.157 of 2014

:: APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE ::

WITNESSES EXAMINED ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

P.W-1N.Sudhakar21.01.2019 P.W-2 M. Mallesh Goud15.04.2019

WITNESSES EXAMINED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS

D.W-1Vijaya Lakshmi 03.06.2019 D.W-2G.N.Giri17.06.2019

DOCUMENTS EXHIBITED ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

Ex.A-1Agreement of sale 20.07.2013 Ex.A-2Registered sale deed document 27.07.1965 No.1474/1965 Ex.A-3RegisteredPartitiondeed document03.04.1990 No.906/1990 Ex.A-4Office copy of legal notice21.07.2014 Ex.A-5Reply notice 28.07.2014

DOCUMENTS EXHIBITED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS

Ex.B-1Certified Copy of Simple Mortgage without03.12.2012 possession document No.2722 of 2012

Ex.B-2Encumbrance Certificate22.04.2019

Ex.B-3Office copy of legal notice01.04.2014

Ex.B-4Office copy of legal notice02.04.2014

Ex.B-5Reply notice 10.04.2014

Ex.B-6Postal receipt 10.04.2014

Ex.B-7Postal Acknowledgment Card-

Ex.B-8Reply notice 15.05.2014

Ex.B-9Postal receipt 15.05.2014

Ex.B-10 Postal Acknowledgment Card-

Ex.B-11 Postal receipt 14.07.2014

Ex.B-12 Postal Acknowledgment Card16.07.2014

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad

IN THE COURT OF THE XII ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

 CITY CIVIL COURT::SECUNDERABAD

FRIDAY THIS THE TWENTY NINETH DAY OF MARCH, 2016

Present : P.Chandra Sekhara Prasad, Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal­ cum­XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad.

CMA No.92 of 2016

Between:

S.Venkataswamy, S/o Sailoo, Aged about 42 years, Occ: Driver, R/o H.No.10­4­C/281, Addagutta, East Maredpally, Secunderabad, … Appellant/Respondent/Plaintiff

And

M/s Shriram Transport Finance Company limited, Represented by its authorized person, S.Anand Rao, Regd. Office at Mookambika Complex, 3rd floor, Lady Desika Road, Mylapoone, Chennai, 600004, Branch Office at: 12­13­1274, II floor, Maspack House, Near St. Anna’s High School, Tarnaka, Secunderabad …Respondent/Petitioner/Defendant

An appeal against the order and decree of XI Junior Civil

Judge, Secunderabad passed in 

IA No.321 of 2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

M/s Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited, Rep. By its authorized person, Sri S. Anand Rao, …Petitioner/Defendant

And

S.Venkataswamy, S/o Sailoo, Aged about 42 years, Occ: Driver R/o 10­4­C/281, Addagutta, East Maredpally, Secunderabad, …Respondent/Plaintiff

2

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

This CMA is coming on 26.03.2019 before me for hearing in the presence of Sri.B.Simhachalam, advocate

for the appellant/respondent/plaintiff; and of

Sri.J.Srinivas Reddy,advocateforthe respondent/petitioner/defendant; and upon perusal of the material papers on record and the case having been heard and stood over for consideration till this day, this court delivered the following:

::O R D E R::

1.The unsuccessful respondent/plaintiff in IA No.321/2015 in OS No.88/2015 on the file of XI Additional Junior Civil

Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad preferred this CMA

against the order and decree passed by the learned Junior Civil

Judge dated 18.04.2016 wherein the learned Trial Judge

allowed the petition by referring the matter to sole arbitrator

Sr.K.L.Narsaiah, Hyderabad as per clause 15 of the Agreement

dated 30.01.2014 for proper adjudication of the dispute

between the parties under the provisions of Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996. 

The factual matrix leading to the filing of the CMA is as follows:

The petitioner/plaintiff filed the suit seeking perpetual injunction restraining the respondent/defendant,, his agents, henchmen, unsocial elements or any other person or persons

3

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

claiming through or under them from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of INNOVA maxi cab bearing No.AP 10W 0234 and not to seize the vehicle and that the sui tis based on loan­cum­hypothecation agreement dated 25.02.2010. During pendency of suit, the respondent filed IA

No.165/2015 under Section 8 (1) of Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 to refer the matter to the sole arbitrator stating that the plaintiff suppressed the clause­15 of Loan­ cum­Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014. The appellant filed counter stating that the said agreement is fabricated and that the original agreement dated 25.02.2010 is with the petitioner. The Trial Court observed that the plaintiff filed the suit on the basis of Loan­cum­Hypothecation

Agreement dated 25.02.2010, whereas the defendant filed petition basing on Loan­cum­Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014. It is not the case of the appellant that a fresh agreement was executed for the outstanding amount. The receipts dated 07.05.2010, 07.08.2014 an d 07.10.2013 shows the loan number as SECUN03010016 whereas the statement of account shows the loan number as SECUN0401290006 and the Trial Court dismissed the said application with a conclusion that the pleadings of the defendant are not sufficient for

4

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

compliance of the provisions of Section 8 (1) of Act and with an observation that he is at liberty to file fresh application under

Section 8 (1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by producing the original Loan­cum­Hypothecation Agreement

dated 25.02.2010 and the Statement of Account. Later, the

defendant filed petition in IA No.321/2015 for the same relief.

The appellant filed detailed counter stating that the Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement was executed on 25.02.2010 to pay 48 installments and the last installment was completed on 26.02.2014 and the said agreement was barred by limitation.

The defendant did not produce statement of account. The court observed that the loan agreement dated 30.01.2014 was executed for Rs.8,12,248/­ and the first EMI was commenced from 05.03.2014 and that last EMI was on 05.02.2019. The

Trial Court wrongly allowed the petition by considering the agreement dated 30.01.2014.

2.Aggrieved by the orders and decree passed by the learned

Trial Judge in allowing the petition, the unsuccessful respondent/plaintiff preferred this CMA stating that the order and decree of the lower court is untenable and the same is liable to be set aside. 

5

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

3.This court heard both sides during the hearing of the

CMA. 

4.The point that arises for consideration is whether the

order and decree of the trial court is sustainable or

liable to be set aside?

6.Both the parties are referred as petitioner and respondent as arrayed in the main petition for the sake of convenience and discussion. 

7.POINT No.1: It is not in dispute that on 25.02.2010, the appellant availed vehicle loan of Rs.11,35,803/­ payable in 48 equal monthly installments @ Rs.23,562/­. Later, the appellant filed the suit in OS No.88 of 2015 seeking perpetual injunction restraining the respondent/defendant,, his agents, henchmen, unsocial elements or any other person or persons claiming through or under them from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of INNOVA maxi cab bearing No.AP 10W 0234 and not to seize the vehicle and that the sui tis based on loan­cum­hypothecation agreement dated 25.02.2010. 

8.It is also not in dispute that on appearance, the respondent filed an application in IA No.165/2015 under

6

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

Section 8 (1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to refer the matter to the sole arbitrator stating that the plaintiff suppressed the clause­15 of Loan­cum­Hypothecation

Agreement dated 30.01.2014 and that the appellant filed counter stating that the said agreement is fabricated and that the original agreement dated 25.02.2010 is with the petitioner and that the Trial Court dismissed the said application with a conclusion that the pleadings of the defendant are not sufficient for compliance of the provisions of Section 8 (1) of Act and with an observation that he is at liberty to file fresh application under Section 8 (1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by producing the original Loan­cum­Hypothecation Agreement

dated 25.02.2010 and the Statement of Account. Later, the

respondent filed petition in IA No.321/2015 for the same relief. 

9.The learned Junior Civil Judge dated 18.04.2016 wherein the learned Trial Judge allowed the petition by referring the matter to sole arbitrator Sr.K.L.Narsaiah, Hyderabad as per clause 15 of the Agreement dated 30.01.2014 for proper adjudication of the dispute between the parties under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Aggrieved by the said order and decree, the appellant filed the present

7

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

appeal. 

10.The main contention of the appellant is that Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement was executed on 25.02.2010 with a validity to pay 48 monthly installments and 48the month was completed on 26.02.2014 and till then no arbitration proceedings were commenced and that the Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014 is fabricated and as such the said Loan­cum­Hypothecation Agreement was barred by limitation.

11.Admittedly, initially, on 25.02.2010 the appellant executed a Loan­cum­Hypothecation agreement in favour of the respondent while availing loan and as per said agreement it has to be repaid in 48 monthly installments commencing from 07.05.2010 and the last installment was on 07.08.2014. 

12. It is apparent that meanwhile the appellant obtained some more amounts, towards loan and at that time he executed a

Revival Agreement on 30.01.2014 for consolidated amount of loan which was outstanding as on that day. As seen from agreement dated 30.01.2014, the appellant entered into said agreement in respect of loan of Rs.8,12,248/­. Except vague

8

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

and bald assertion, the appellant did not place any iota of evidence to show that agreement dated 30.01.2014 is fabricated.

13.Added to it, it appears that the appellant also executed a promissory note signed by him and his guarantors for the said loan amount. The schedule shows that the first installment commenced from 05.03.2014 and the last installment was payable by 05.02.2019. The material on record is clear that the 1st agreement dated 25.02.2010 has been replaced by the 2nd agreement dated 30.01.2014 as contended by the respondent.

Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the loan based on 1st agreement is barred by limitation is not correct.

14.It is crystal clear that as per clause­15 of Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014, in case of any dispute in regard to the rights and liabilities of the parties tot eh agreement, then such dispute can be referred to the sole arbitrator.

15.Admittedly, the dispute arose between the parties regarding clearing the loan. Since, it is an arbitrable dispute in between the parties to the said agreement, as per clause­15 of

9

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

agreement dated 30.01.2014 such a dispute has to be referred to the sole arbitrator. The learned Trial Judge discussed at length covering each contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and also all the citations refereed in the said order, come to conclusion that it is dispute to be issue to be referred to the sole arbitrator and accordingly allowed the said application.

16.On perusal of the documents filed by the petitioner and respondents, as held by the learned Trial Judge, the documents filed by both the parties, it is a dispute to be issue to be referred to the sole arbitrator as per clause­15 of the Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014 and as such, this court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Judge having appreciated the documents rightly allowed the application by refereeing the matter to the sole Arbitrator.

Therefore, this Court finds no merits in the CMA and as such the same is liable to be dismissed. These points are answered accordingly against the appellants.

IN THE RESULT:The CMA is dismissed, by confirming the order passed by the XI Additional Junior Civil Judge, City

Civil Court, Secunderabad (Trial Court) in IA No.321/2015 in

10

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

OS No.88/2015 dated 18.04.2016. However there shall be no

order as to costs.

Typed to my dictation, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this 29 th day of March, 2019.

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad.

::APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE:

­Nil­

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad.

11

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

IN THE COURT OF THE XII ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

 CITY CIVIL COURT::SECUNDERABAD

FRIDAY THIS THE TWENTY NINETH DAY OF MARCH, 2016

Present : P.Chandra Sekhara Prasad, Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal­ cum­XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad.

CMA No.92 of 2016

Between:

S.Venkataswamy, S/o Sailoo, Aged about 42 years, Occ: Driver, R/o H.No.10­4­C/281, Addagutta, East Maredpally, Secunderabad, … Appellant/Respondent/Plaintiff

And

M/s Shriram Transport Finance Company limited, Represented by its authorized person, S.Anand Rao, Regd. Office at Mookambika Complex, 3rd floor, Lady Desika Road, Mylapoone, Chennai, 600004, Branch Office at: 12­13­1274, II floor, Maspack House, Near St. Anna’s High School, Tarnaka, Secunderabad …Respondent/Petitioner/Defendant

An appeal against the order and decree of XI Junior Civil

Judge, Secunderabad passed in 

IA No.321 of 2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

M/s Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited, Rep. By its authorized person, Sri S. Anand Rao, …Petitioner/Defendant

And

S.Venkataswamy, S/o Sailoo, Aged about 42 years, Occ: Driver R/o 10­4­C/281, Addagutta, East Maredpally, Secunderabad, …Respondent/Plaintiff

2

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

This CMA is coming on 26.03.2019 before me for hearing in the presence of Sri.B.Simhachalam, advocate

for the appellant/respondent/plaintiff; and of

Sri.J.Srinivas Reddy,advocateforthe respondent/petitioner/defendant; and upon perusal of the material papers on record and the case having been heard and stood over for consideration till this day, this court delivered the following:

::O R D E R::

1.The unsuccessful respondent/plaintiff in IA No.321/2015 in OS No.88/2015 on the file of XI Additional Junior Civil

Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad preferred this CMA

against the order and decree passed by the learned Junior Civil

Judge dated 18.04.2016 wherein the learned Trial Judge

allowed the petition by referring the matter to sole arbitrator

Sr.K.L.Narsaiah, Hyderabad as per clause 15 of the Agreement

dated 30.01.2014 for proper adjudication of the dispute

between the parties under the provisions of Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996. 

The factual matrix leading to the filing of the CMA is as follows:

The petitioner/plaintiff filed the suit seeking perpetual injunction restraining the respondent/defendant,, his agents, henchmen, unsocial elements or any other person or persons

3

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

claiming through or under them from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of INNOVA maxi cab bearing No.AP 10W 0234 and not to seize the vehicle and that the sui tis based on loan­cum­hypothecation agreement dated 25.02.2010. During pendency of suit, the respondent filed IA

No.165/2015 under Section 8 (1) of Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 to refer the matter to the sole arbitrator stating that the plaintiff suppressed the clause­15 of Loan­ cum­Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014. The appellant filed counter stating that the said agreement is fabricated and that the original agreement dated 25.02.2010 is with the petitioner. The Trial Court observed that the plaintiff filed the suit on the basis of Loan­cum­Hypothecation

Agreement dated 25.02.2010, whereas the defendant filed petition basing on Loan­cum­Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014. It is not the case of the appellant that a fresh agreement was executed for the outstanding amount. The receipts dated 07.05.2010, 07.08.2014 an d 07.10.2013 shows the loan number as SECUN03010016 whereas the statement of account shows the loan number as SECUN0401290006 and the Trial Court dismissed the said application with a conclusion that the pleadings of the defendant are not sufficient for

4

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

compliance of the provisions of Section 8 (1) of Act and with an observation that he is at liberty to file fresh application under

Section 8 (1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by producing the original Loan­cum­Hypothecation Agreement

dated 25.02.2010 and the Statement of Account. Later, the

defendant filed petition in IA No.321/2015 for the same relief.

The appellant filed detailed counter stating that the Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement was executed on 25.02.2010 to pay 48 installments and the last installment was completed on 26.02.2014 and the said agreement was barred by limitation.

The defendant did not produce statement of account. The court observed that the loan agreement dated 30.01.2014 was executed for Rs.8,12,248/­ and the first EMI was commenced from 05.03.2014 and that last EMI was on 05.02.2019. The

Trial Court wrongly allowed the petition by considering the agreement dated 30.01.2014.

2.Aggrieved by the orders and decree passed by the learned

Trial Judge in allowing the petition, the unsuccessful respondent/plaintiff preferred this CMA stating that the order and decree of the lower court is untenable and the same is liable to be set aside. 

5

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

3.This court heard both sides during the hearing of the

CMA. 

4.The point that arises for consideration is whether the

order and decree of the trial court is sustainable or

liable to be set aside?

6.Both the parties are referred as petitioner and respondent as arrayed in the main petition for the sake of convenience and discussion. 

7.POINT No.1: It is not in dispute that on 25.02.2010, the appellant availed vehicle loan of Rs.11,35,803/­ payable in 48 equal monthly installments @ Rs.23,562/­. Later, the appellant filed the suit in OS No.88 of 2015 seeking perpetual injunction restraining the respondent/defendant,, his agents, henchmen, unsocial elements or any other person or persons claiming through or under them from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of INNOVA maxi cab bearing No.AP 10W 0234 and not to seize the vehicle and that the sui tis based on loan­cum­hypothecation agreement dated 25.02.2010. 

8.It is also not in dispute that on appearance, the respondent filed an application in IA No.165/2015 under

6

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

Section 8 (1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to refer the matter to the sole arbitrator stating that the plaintiff suppressed the clause­15 of Loan­cum­Hypothecation

Agreement dated 30.01.2014 and that the appellant filed counter stating that the said agreement is fabricated and that the original agreement dated 25.02.2010 is with the petitioner and that the Trial Court dismissed the said application with a conclusion that the pleadings of the defendant are not sufficient for compliance of the provisions of Section 8 (1) of Act and with an observation that he is at liberty to file fresh application under Section 8 (1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by producing the original Loan­cum­Hypothecation Agreement

dated 25.02.2010 and the Statement of Account. Later, the

respondent filed petition in IA No.321/2015 for the same relief. 

9.The learned Junior Civil Judge dated 18.04.2016 wherein the learned Trial Judge allowed the petition by referring the matter to sole arbitrator Sr.K.L.Narsaiah, Hyderabad as per clause 15 of the Agreement dated 30.01.2014 for proper adjudication of the dispute between the parties under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Aggrieved by the said order and decree, the appellant filed the present

7

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

appeal. 

10.The main contention of the appellant is that Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement was executed on 25.02.2010 with a validity to pay 48 monthly installments and 48the month was completed on 26.02.2014 and till then no arbitration proceedings were commenced and that the Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014 is fabricated and as such the said Loan­cum­Hypothecation Agreement was barred by limitation.

11.Admittedly, initially, on 25.02.2010 the appellant executed a Loan­cum­Hypothecation agreement in favour of the respondent while availing loan and as per said agreement it has to be repaid in 48 monthly installments commencing from 07.05.2010 and the last installment was on 07.08.2014. 

12. It is apparent that meanwhile the appellant obtained some more amounts, towards loan and at that time he executed a

Revival Agreement on 30.01.2014 for consolidated amount of loan which was outstanding as on that day. As seen from agreement dated 30.01.2014, the appellant entered into said agreement in respect of loan of Rs.8,12,248/­. Except vague

8

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

and bald assertion, the appellant did not place any iota of evidence to show that agreement dated 30.01.2014 is fabricated.

13.Added to it, it appears that the appellant also executed a promissory note signed by him and his guarantors for the said loan amount. The schedule shows that the first installment commenced from 05.03.2014 and the last installment was payable by 05.02.2019. The material on record is clear that the 1st agreement dated 25.02.2010 has been replaced by the 2nd agreement dated 30.01.2014 as contended by the respondent.

Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the loan based on 1st agreement is barred by limitation is not correct.

14.It is crystal clear that as per clause­15 of Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014, in case of any dispute in regard to the rights and liabilities of the parties tot eh agreement, then such dispute can be referred to the sole arbitrator.

15.Admittedly, the dispute arose between the parties regarding clearing the loan. Since, it is an arbitrable dispute in between the parties to the said agreement, as per clause­15 of

9

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

agreement dated 30.01.2014 such a dispute has to be referred to the sole arbitrator. The learned Trial Judge discussed at length covering each contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and also all the citations refereed in the said order, come to conclusion that it is dispute to be issue to be referred to the sole arbitrator and accordingly allowed the said application.

16.On perusal of the documents filed by the petitioner and respondents, as held by the learned Trial Judge, the documents filed by both the parties, it is a dispute to be issue to be referred to the sole arbitrator as per clause­15 of the Loan­cum­

Hypothecation Agreement dated 30.01.2014 and as such, this court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Judge having appreciated the documents rightly allowed the application by refereeing the matter to the sole Arbitrator.

Therefore, this Court finds no merits in the CMA and as such the same is liable to be dismissed. These points are answered accordingly against the appellants.

IN THE RESULT:The CMA is dismissed, by confirming the order passed by the XI Additional Junior Civil Judge, City

Civil Court, Secunderabad (Trial Court) in IA No.321/2015 in

10

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015

OS No.88/2015 dated 18.04.2016. However there shall be no

order as to costs.

Typed to my dictation, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this 29 th day of March, 2019.

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad.

::APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE:

­Nil­

XII Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Secunderabad.

11

CMA No.92/2016

in

IA No.321/2015

in

OS No.88 of 2015