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IN THE COURT OF THE II ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE
AT : KHAMMAM
Dated this the 18th day of May, 2026
Present :Sri Vasukula Sreenaiah, V Addl.District and Sessions Judge, Khammam. FAC-II Addl.District and Sessions Judge Khammam.
S.C.No. 70 of 2019
1. Name of the Complainant :The State Police, through the Circle Inspector of Police, Wyra
2. Name of the Accused: A1: Shaik Saleem S/o:Bajaru, Age:34 years, Occ:Private Teacher at Khammam Public School,Khammam R/o:Komatlagudem village of Chinthakani Mandal. A2: Shaik Yakub @Yakamma W/o:Bajaru, Age:50 years, Occ:Coolie, R/o:Komatlagudem village of Chinthakani Mandal.
A3:Shaik Bajaru [Died]
A4: Shaik Khaseem Vali S/O:Bajaru, Age:37 years, Occ:Auto Driver R/o:Komatlagudem village of Chinthakani Mandal.
3. Charges:U/Secs.498-A, 302, 201 r/w 34 of IPC Sec.3 and 4 of D.P.Act.
4. Crime Number and Name of:Cr.No.211/2017 of P.S. Chinthakani Police Station
5. Plea of the accused:Not Guilty
6. Finding of the coury:Not found Guilty
7. Prosecution conducted b: Smt P.Swapna, Public Prosecutor for II Addl. District Court, Khammam.
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8. Defence conducted by: Sri M.Saidewsara Rao
9. Sentence of Order: In the result, A1, A2 and A4 are found not guilty of the offences with which they are charged. Accordingly, acting under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C., A1- Shaik Saleem, A2-Shaik Yakamma and A4-Shaik Khaseem Vali are acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 302, 201 read with 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, as applicable to them. The bail bonds of A1, A2 and A4 shall stand cancelled after expiry of the appeal time. The case against A3 already stood abated due to his death. MO.1 motorcycle, if not required in any other case, shall be returned to the person entitled to lawful possession after expiry of appeal time. The material objects, if any, which are worthless, shall be destroyed after expiry of appeal time.
This case is coming on 06.05.2026 before me for final hearing in the presence of Public Prosecutor Sm P.Swapna, for the state and Sri M.Saideswar Rao, learned counsel
for Accused; upon perusing the material papers on record; upon hearing arguments and
having stood over for consideration till this day, this court delivered the following:
J U D G M E N T
1. The State through the Circle Inspector of Police, Wyra filed Charge-sheet against the A1 to A4 for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 302, 201 r/w 34 IPC, Sec.3 and 4 of D.P.Act against A1 and for the offences U/Section 498-A, 201
R/w 34 of IPC, Sec.3 and 4 of D.P. Act against A2 to A4 in Cr.No.211/2017 of P.S.
Chinthakani P.S.
2. The case of the Prosecution in brief is that: On 05.10.2017 at about 10:00 hours, the defacto complainant namely Shaik Hussain, lodged a report before P.S.Chinthakani stating that he performed the marriage of his elder
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3 of 30 daughter/Safiya with Shaik Saleem (A1) about (8) years ago. For some period after the marriage they led happy marital life and during their wedlock they were blessed with one male child/Sharuk and one female child/Shahini. After the birth of the female child, disputes arose between his son-in-law (A1) and his daughter. His son-in-law and his family members allegedly subjected his daughter/Safiya to mental and physical harassment and demanded for
additional dowry. Due to such harassment, the health of his daughter deteriorated, then he
brought her to his house and provided treatment for her ill-health.
2.1 It is further stated that one week after the arrival of his daughter at his house, his son-in-law (A1) came to his house and forcibly took his grandson and grand-daughter to his house at Komatlagudem Village by threatening his wife and daughter. Thereafter, his daughter underwent a stomach operation as she was suffering from ill-health. Subsequently, the stitches became infected and the doctors had to re-operate on her and made about 100 stitches. However, neither his son-in-law nor his relatives came to his house to see his daughter. His daughter requested them to send her children back, but they refused. In this regard, he approached the village elders and requested them to conduct a panchayat.
Accordingly, the village elders conducted a panchayat, and during the said panchayat, the matter was compromised and the children were sent with him to his house.
2.2Prior to (15) days to the incident, his son-in-law’s father i.e. A3 came to his house and taken his grand-son and grand-daughter to his house on the eve of festival. On 05.10.2017 at 3:30 hours he received a phone call from Sarpanch’s husband and informed that his grand-daughter/ Shahini was died, immediately, he along with Sadineni Kondal Rao,
Thullur Kondal Rao and Papineni Ravi went to the village of A1 i.e.Komatlagudem and
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4 of 30 enquired about his grand-daughter’s death during the enquiry came to know that some un- known persons kidnapped his grand-daughter who was sleeping with his son-in-law’s mother and taken her on his son-in-law’s motor cycle and killed her and thrown his grand- daughter’s dead body in their water tub. The LW1 further stated that Shaik Saleem, Shaik
Yakamma, Shaik Bajaru, Shaik Khaseem Vali, haik Munthanaz and Mucharla Paha have killed his grand-daughter as per their plan and thrown her dead body in water tub to disappear the evidence to take revenge against him and his daughter. Finally he requested to take necessary action against the said persons who killed his grand-daughter and disappear evidence and do justice.
2.3On receipt of complaint, Pw24/S.I. of police, P.S Chinthakani registered a case in
Cr.No.211/2017 U/Secs.498-A, 302, 201 r/w 34 of IPC, Sec.3 and 4 of D.P.Act and issued express FIR and sent the copies of the same to the local jurisdiction court and he examined and recorded the statement of Lw1 in the police station itself, and the offence is grave in nature as such handed over the C.D file to Pw25/C.I of Police, who conducted further investigation.
2.4During the course of investigation, LW25 visited the scene of offence situated at the house of Shaik Saleem(A1), observed the scene particulars and prepared a rough sketch of the scene in the presence of LW18 and LW19. He seized a sample of water in a bottle under
CDF for a diatom test, he also secured a private photographer/LW6 and got photographed the dead body of the deceased and secured the presence of LW18 and LW19 to conduct the inquest over the dead body. Thereafter, the dead body was sent for postmortem examination.
During the investigation, he examined and recorded the statements of PW2 to PW7, LW9,
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PW8, LW11, LW12, and LW13. After completion of the postmortem examination, the dead body of the deceased was handed over to LW1 under proper acknowledgment for performing the final rites.
2.5 While the investigation was in progress, on 11.10.2017, LW25/CI of police, Wyra apprehended A1 to A4 at the outskirts of Repallewada Village, Chinthakani Mandal, and interrogated them separately in the presence of LW21 and LW22. He recorded their confession statements, during which A1 to A4 confessed to their involvement in the offence.
After effecting their arrest and after completion of legal formalities, he produced them before the concerned Court and sent them for judicial remand. Subsequently, he obtained the final report from RFSL, Warangal, wherein it was opined that “the cause of death of the deceased was due to asphyxia caused by drowning.” Further, as per the statements of LW14 to LW17, the involvement of A5 and A6 was not established in the case. Therefore, their names were deleted from the case as per the orders of the Commissioner of Police, Khammam, vide
C.No.201/CI-KMM/2018 dated 13.08.2017. After completion of further investigation the
Lw26 filed charge sheet against the A1 for the offences U/sec.498-A, 302, 201 R/w 34 of
IPC, Sec.3 and 4 of D.P.Act and for the offences U/Secs. 498-A, 201 r/w 34 of IPC, Sec.3 and 4 of D.P.Act against A2 to A4.
3. Basing upon the material available on record, the case was taken on file and the learned
III Addl.Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Khammam took cognizance for offence
U/Sec.498-A, 302, 201 r/w 34 of IPC, Sec.3 and 4 of D.p.Act against the accused Nos.1 to 4 and served the copies of documents to them in compliance of Sec.207 Cr.P.C in
P.R.C.No.13/2018. Since the offence U/Sec.302 of IPC is exclusively triable by the court of
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Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Hon’ble Prl.District and Sessions Judge,
Khammam U/Sec.209 Cr.P.C.
4.Basing on the material on record, the Hon’ble Prl.District and Sessions Court,
Khammam assigned S.C.No.70 of 2019 and made over the case to this Court for trial and disposal. At this stage the accused No.3 reported died. Hence, the case against A3 was abetted.
5.On appearance of accused before this Court and on hearing the learned Public
Prosecutor and the learned Counsel for accused, this Court framed charges against the accused No.1, 2 and 4 U/Sec.228 Cr.P.C, the offences U/Sec.498-A, 302, 201 r/w 34 of
IPC, Sec.3 and 4 of D.P.Act against the A1 and for the offences U/Sec.498-A, 201 r/w 34 of IPC, Sec.3 and 4 of DP Act against A2 and A4. The Charges were read over to Accused who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the trial schedule was fixed and was conducted.
6.The prosecution examined PWs.1 to 15 and got marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P12 and
MO.1. However, no witnesses were examined and Ex.D1 and Ex.D2 were marked on behalf of the accused.
7.After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 were examined U/Sec.313 Cr.P.C and the incriminating material appearing in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses was read over and explained to the accused in Telugu. Having understood the same, the accused denied the incriminating material appearing in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and reported no defence evidence. The A1, A2 and A4
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7 of 30 pleadedbefore this court with one voice that they have been been falsely implicated in this case with an intention to harass them and to take revenge against them.
8.Heard arguments on both sides. The learned Public Prosecutor for the state and the learned counsel for the accused have submitted written arguments and this court has given thoughtful consideration for the said written arguments.
9.Now the point that arose for determination is; 1 . Whether death of the deceased Shahini was Homicidal in Nature?
2 . Whether the Prosecution successfully brought home the guilt of the Accused
No.1 for the offences punishable under Sec.498-A, 302, 201 R/w 34 of IPC,
Sec.3 and 4 of DP Act and for the offences U/Sec.498-A, 201 r/w 34 of IPC
Sec.3 and 4 of DP Act against A2 and A4?
3 . Whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that
accused No.1 had killed Shahini?
10.There is no dispute that deceased Shahini died an unnatural death. The crucial question is whether the prosecution has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the death was homicidal and that the accused persons were the authors of the crime.
11.The case of the prosecution is not based on direct evidence. No witness claims to have seen any of the accused drowning, throttling, pressing, suffocating or killing the deceased. The entire prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, alleged motive, alleged conduct of accused, alleged extra-judicial confession, medical evidence and the plea of exclusive knowledge under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.
12.The learned Public Prosecutor contended that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused through a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. It is submitted that the marriage of PW2 with A1 was performed about eight years prior to the incident and, though
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8 of 30 they led happy marital life for some time, disputes arose after the birth of the female child. It is further contended that A1 and his family members harassed PW2 physically and mentally for additional dowry and, due to such harassment, PW2 was constrained to live in her parental house along with her children. According to the prosecution, the evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 8 establishes the background of matrimonial disputes, dowry harassment and custody disputes regarding the children.
13.The learned Public Prosecutor further contended that prior to the incident, the children were taken to the house of the accused on the pretext of Dussara vacation and while the deceased child was in the custody of the accused family, she died in suspicious circumstances in the early morning hours of 05.10.2017. It is argued that the accused alone were in a position to explain how the child died in their house and their failure to offer a satisfactory explanation is an additional link in the chain of circumstances.
14.It is further submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that the defence suggestion that the child accidentally fell into the water tub is only a suggestion and no independent evidence was adduced by the accused to prove such theory. The prosecution further contended that a five-year-old child could not have accidentally died in a cement water tub containing only about one foot of water and, therefore, the defence version is inherently improbable.
15.The learned Public Prosecutor also relied upon the evidence of PWs.6 and 7, who stated that the accused admitted before them that they killed the child by pressing her nose with a pillow and thereafter kept the body on the cot. The prosecution also relied upon the confession-cum-seizure panchanama spoken to by PW11 and the seizure of MO.1
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9 of 30 motorcycle, contending that the accused attempted to use the motorcycle and also altered the vehicle number to screen themselves from the offence.
16.The learned Public Prosecutor further contended that PW12, the doctor, opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to drowning, and that such medical evidence does not rule out homicidal drowning. It is argued that the absence of external injuries is not fatal because in cases of drowning or smothering, visible external injuries may not always be present. It is therefore contended that the prosecution has established motive, custody, suspicious conduct, extra-judicial confession, medical cause of death and attempted disappearance of evidence.
17.On the above submissions, the learned Public Prosecutor prayed to convict A1 for the offences under Sections 498-A, 302 and 201 r/w 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act and to convict A2 and A4 for the offences under Sections 498-A and 201 r/w 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
18.Per contra, the learned defence counsel contended that the prosecution case is purely based on suspicion and not on proof. It is submitted that there is no eyewitness to the alleged killing of the deceased. PW1 is admittedly not an eyewitness and his evidence shows that he came to know about the incident only through information given by others. It is further contended that PW1 lodged Ex.P1 complaint only on suspicion and that his own evidence contains material improvements and omissions.
19.The learned defence counsel further contended that PW2, the mother of the deceased, also has no direct knowledge of the incident. According to PW2, on reaching the scene, A1 informed her that the child died due to electric shock and that unknown persons had thrown
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10 of 30 the child into the water tub. Thus, the defence contended that the prosecution itself has placed different and inconsistent versions regarding the cause and manner of death, namely unknown persons, electric shock, smothering with pillow, pressing of throat, and drowning.
20.It is further contended that PWs.6 and 7 are interested witnesses, closely associated with PW1 and his family, and they admittedly went to the scene along with PW1 in a school bus along with many persons. Their alleged version of extra-judicial confession is unnatural, unsafe and inconsistent with medical evidence. The learned defence counsel contended that no prudent accused would make a confession before a group of persons gathered at the scene of offence, particularly when there was commotion and accusation against the accused.
21.The learned defence counsel also contended that PW4, who is a neighbour, did not support the prosecution. PW3 also stated that he did not know the cause of death. Therefore, the independent village witnesses did not support the prosecution version. The evidence of
PW9 and PW10 is limited to scene observation and inquest, and their opinion that the death was suspicious is not substantive evidence to prove murder.
22.The main case of the defence is the medical evidence of PW12. It is contended that
PW12 clearly opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to drowning. PW12 admitted that there were no external injuries on the body of the deceased. He further admitted that children who accidentally fall into water tubs or water containers may die due to drowning and that diatoms are seen due to ante-mortem inhalation of water. Therefore, according to the defence, the medical evidence supports drowning and does not support smothering, throttling or homicidal violence.
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23.The learned defence counsel further contended that the alleged confession before police spoken to by PW11 is inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, except to the limited extent of discovery under Section 27. Even the alleged seizure of MO.1 motorcycle does not connect the accused with the offence, because no incriminating material was recovered from the motorcycle. It is also contended that the prosecution failed to prove that the vehicle number was altered, as the Investigating Officer admitted that he did not obtain photographs to show such alteration.
24.It is further contended that the investigation is defective and unreliable. PW14 admitted that the water sample allegedly seized on 05.10.2017 was sent to FSL only on 16.10.2017, and that the charge sheet does not disclose how the water was preserved during the said period. PW14 also admitted that he did not examine material neighbours, did not examine the faculty of the school, did not collect the medical records of PW2 and did not obtain a certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act for Ex.P3 photographs and CD.
Therefore, it is argued that the investigation has not collected the best available evidence.
25.On the above submissions, the learned defence counsel contended that the prosecution has failed to prove a complete chain of circumstances. It is further submitted that the charge under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained merely on suspicion, the charge under
Section 201 IPC fails when the main offence itself is not proved, and the charge under
Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is not proved as there are only general allegations without any specific demand or prior complaint.
26.In a case depending on circumstantial evidence, the law is well settled. In Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, the Hon’ble Supreme
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Court laid down the five golden principles, commonly known as the “panchsheel” of circumstantial evidence. The circumstances from which guilt is sought to be inferred must be fully established; the established facts must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt; the circumstances must be conclusive in nature; they must exclude every hypothesis except guilt; and the chain of evidence must be so complete that it leaves no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence.
27.Therefore, suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. If any important link in the chain is missing, or if two views are reasonably possible, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted.
28.PW12, the doctor, deposed that postmortem examination was conducted over the dead body of the deceased on 05.10.2017 at about 4.45 p.m. Ex.P9 is the postmortem report.
The sternum sample was sent for RFSL examination for diatom test. Ex.P10 is the RFSL report. On the basis of the RFSL report, final opinion Ex.P11 was issued stating that the cause of death was asphyxia due to drowning.
29.Thus, the medical evidence establishes that the deceased died due to drowning.
However, the medical evidence by itself does not establish whether the drowning was homicidal, suicidal or accidental. Considering the age of the deceased child, suicide is practically ruled out. The real question is whether the drowning was homicidal or accidental.
30.In cross-examination, PW12 admitted that there were no external injuries on the body of the deceased. He also admitted that if children accidentally fall into water tubs or water containers, there is possibility of drowning. This admission assumes significance in the
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13 of 30 present case because the prosecution theory itself refers to the water tub situated near the scene.
31.The inquest panchas also noticed no external injuries on the dead body. PW9 stated that there was about one foot of water in the cement tub and that they arrived at a conclusion that a person could not die by falling into the tub. But PW9 is not a medical expert. His opinion regarding possibility or impossibility of drowning cannot override the medical evidence of PW12, who admitted the possibility of accidental drowning in water tubs or containers.
32.Further, the prosecution did not obtain any scientific opinion to show that drowning in the particular tub was impossible. No measurement of the exact height, width, depth and water level of the tub was scientifically proved. No expert was examined to rule out accidental drowning. Therefore, the medical evidence proves death by drowning, but it does not conclusively prove homicidal drowning.
33.The prosecution sought to rely upon the theory that the child was killed by pressing her mouth or nose and thereafter placed in the water tub. However, the medical evidence does not support such theory. There were no injuries on the mouth, nose, face, neck or other parts of the body. There was no evidence of throttling, smothering or violent struggle.
Hence, the alleged version spoken by PWs.6 and 7 that the accused confessed to killing the child by keeping a pillow and pressing the nose is not corroborated by medical evidence.
34.Therefore, the first and foremost link in the chain of circumstances, namely that the death was necessarily homicidal, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
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35.The prosecution alleged that there were marital disputes between A1 and PW2 and that A1 and his family members harassed PW2 for additional dowry. It is alleged that in order to take revenge against PW1 and PW2, the accused killed the child.
36.PW1 and PW2 spoke about alleged harassment. However, PW1 admitted in cross- examination that no complaint was given to police prior to the incident regarding harassment. PW2 also admitted that she never gave any complaint to police prior to the incident regarding harassment by the accused. PW1 further admitted that A1 and PW2 were leading happy marital life till March, 2017.
37.The prosecution did not produce any prior complaint, panchayat record, medical record, letter, message, independent witness or other material to prove that PW2 was subjected to such cruelty as contemplated under Section 498-A IPC or that there was any demand for dowry soon prior to the incident.
38.PW8, who was examined as an elder, only stated about counseling and sending of children. He did not speak about any specific demand of dowry by any accused. He did not state the date, time and place of any such panchayat. His evidence is general in nature and does not establish a strong motive for murder.
39.Motive assumes importance in a case of circumstantial evidence. Though motive alone is not sufficient to convict, absence of strong motive becomes relevant when other links are weak. In the present case, motive is not proved with certainty. Even assuming that there were marital disputes between A1 and PW2, that circumstance by itself cannot lead to the conclusion that A1, A2 and A4 murdered the child.
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40.PW1 is the father of PW2 and maternal grandfather of the deceased. PW2 is the mother of the deceased. Their grief is natural and their presence after receiving information is also natural. However, their evidence must still be tested on the touchstone of legal proof.
41.PW1 did not witness the occurrence. He reached the scene only after receiving information. His allegation that the accused killed the deceased is based on suspicion. He stated that he came to know from villagers that some unknown persons killed the child by pressing her throat, whereas the accused stated that the child died by falling in the water tub.
However, no such villagers were examined to support this version.
42.PW1 further stated that he noticed no water in the tub. But PW9 stated that there was about one foot water in the tub. This is a material inconsistency regarding the condition of the alleged place of drowning.
43.PW2 also did not witness the occurrence. She stated that when she reached the scene,
A1 touched her feet and informed that the child died due to current shock and that some unknown persons threw the child into the tub. However, in cross-examination she admitted that she did not state before police that A1 touched her feet or gave such version. This is a material improvement. PW2 further stated that she understood that the accused killed her daughter to take revenge. Such statement is only an inference drawn by her and not a fact witnessed by her. Suspicion of a close relative, however genuine from her perspective, cannot substitute legal proof.
44.The evidence of PW1 and PW2 therefore proves that there were disputes between
PW2 and A1 and that the child died at the house of the accused. But their evidence does not prove that A1, A2 or A4 caused the death.
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45.PW3 was the husband of the Sarpanch. He stated that he received information that the grand-daughter of A3 died in suspicious circumstances and he informed PW1. He went to the scene and noticed the dead body lying on a cot. He clearly stated that he did not know the cause of death. Thus, PW3 does not support the prosecution case regarding homicidal death or involvement of accused. His evidence only proves that he passed on information to
PW1.
46.PW4, a neighbour, did not support the prosecution case. He stated that he came to know about the death but did not know the cause. He was declared hostile. Even in cross- examination by the learned Public Prosecutor, nothing useful was elicited from him to connect the accused with the offence.
47.The fact that a neighbour did not support the prosecution assumes importance because the incident allegedly occurred in a village house, and according to prosecution, many persons gathered at the scene. Yet no independent neighbour has spoken about any incriminating act of the accused.
48.PWs.6 and 7 are relied upon by the prosecution to prove that the accused admitted their guilt at the scene. They stated that after they reached the scene, they questioned the accused and the accused admitted that they killed the deceased by keeping a pillow and pressing her nose, and thereafter kept the dead body on the cot.
49.This evidence requires cautious scrutiny. Firstly, PWs.6 and 7 are not independent strangers. They belong to the village of PW1 and admitted that they have cordial relations with PW1. PW6 admitted that his children, PW2 and he himself studied in the school run by
PW1. PW7 also admitted that his children studied in the school run by PW1. They went to
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17 of 30 the scene along with PW1 and others. Secondly, their version of confession is not supported by the medical evidence. If a child was killed by pressing the nose or mouth with a pillow, ordinarily some corresponding signs, injuries, congestion, marks or other features may be expected. In the present case, PW12 admitted that no external injuries were found. The final medical opinion was asphyxia due to drowning, not death due to smothering. Thirdly, the alleged confession is said to have been made before a crowd of about 100 persons. It is inherently improbable that the accused would voluntarily confess before PW1’s group and villagers that they killed the child. No independent villager from such crowd was examined to support this alleged confession. Fourthly, if such confession was really made at the earliest point of time, the same would have been prominently reflected in Ex.P1 complaint and in the earliest investigation. However, Ex.P1 itself contains a different and uncertain version alleging that some unknown persons kidnapped the child, took her on A1’s motorcycle, killed her and threw the dead body in the tub. Such version is inconsistent with the alleged confession spoken by PWs.6 and 7. Therefore, the alleged oral extra-judicial confession spoken by PWs.6 and 7 is unsafe to rely upon. It does not inspire confidence and cannot form the basis for conviction.
50.The prosecution examined PW11 to prove Ex.P7 confession panchanama and Ex.P8 confession-cum-seizure panchanama. PW11 stated that on 11.10.2017 the accused confessed
before police in the presence of mediators. He also stated that MO.1 motorcycle was seized.
It is settled law that a confession made to a police officer or while in police custody is inadmissible except to the limited extent permitted by Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, namely discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from the accused.
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51.In the present case, no incriminating object was discovered pursuant to the alleged confession. MO.1 motorcycle was allegedly seized from the house of A1. But the motorcycle itself is not shown to have any connection with the death. No blood, biological material, fibres, fingerprints, mud, water marks or other incriminating material was recovered from
MO.1. There is no evidence that the deceased was transported on MO.1. No witness saw the deceased being taken on MO.1.
52.PW14 stated that the front side number and back side number of the motorcycle were different and that a sticker was affixed changing number 5 into 7. But he admitted that he did not obtain photographs to show such alteration. Further, such alleged number alteration, even if assumed, does not prove murder. Therefore, Ex.P7 and Ex.P8 do not advance the prosecution case. The confession portion is inadmissible and the seizure of MO.1 does not connect the accused with the death of the deceased.
53.PW9 spoke about Ex.P4 scene observation panchanama, Ex.P5 rough sketch and
Ex.P6 inquest. PW10 also spoke about inquest. These documents prove that the dead body was found at the house of the accused and that there was a water tub. However, they do not prove who caused the death. PW9 admitted that more than 100 persons gathered at the scene.
He also admitted that his wife and PW1’s family are distant relatives. PW10 admitted that
PW1 asked him to come to Komatlagudem and that he and PW1 were working together in
Dudekula Noorpasha Sangam association. Thus, even the panch witnesses are not wholly independent.
54.PW5, photographer, produced Ex.P3 photographs and CD. However, in cross- examination, he admitted that the photographs do not disclose the place, date and time. He
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19 of 30 also admitted that no camera details are reflected. PW14 admitted that he did not collect a
Section 65-B certificate regarding Ex.P3. Therefore, Ex.P3 has limited evidentiary value.
The inquest only records apparent circumstances and opinion of panchas regarding suspected death. It is not substantive proof of murder. It cannot establish the authorship of crime.
55.The defence pointed out several lapses in investigation. Every lapse in investigation does not automatically entitle the accused to acquittal. However, when the prosecution case is entirely circumstantial and the links are already weak, investigation lapses affecting material links become relevant.
56.PW14 admitted that he did not examine neighbouring residents of A1 where A1 and
PW2 last resided at Khammam. He did not examine faculty members of Chaitanya
Vidyalaya school run by PW1, though the prosecution projected school disputes also as part of the background. He did not collect medical records of PW2 though the alleged surgery and illness formed an important part of the prosecution story.
57.PW14 further admitted that though water was seized from the tub on 05.10.2017, it was sent to FSL only on 16.10.2017. The charge sheet does not disclose how and where the water sample was preserved during this period. This creates doubt regarding proper preservation of sample. PW12 admitted that final opinion Ex.P11 was dated 05.10.2017, though RFSL report was received only on 29.11.2017. PW15 also admitted that the final opinion is dated 05.10.2017. This discrepancy weakens the reliability of the manner in which the final medical opinion was obtained and placed on record.
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58.PW14 also admitted that Ex.D1 was not stated by PW1 before him and Ex.D2 was not stated by PW2 before him. These omissions and improvements affect the credibility of the prosecution version on material particulars.
59.The prosecution also deleted A5 and A6 during investigation. Originally, PW1 suspected A1 to A6. The deletion of A5 and A6 may not by itself demolish the case against
A1, A2 and A4, but it shows that the earliest suspicion was broad and not based on clear direct material.
60.The prosecution relied upon State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254, particularly on Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The principle laid down therein is that where certain facts are especially within the knowledge of the accused, failure to explain may provide an additional link in the chain of circumstances. However, the same judgment also makes it clear that Section 106 does not shift the general burden of proof, which always remains on the prosecution.
61.In the present case, the prosecution failed to first establish a complete and reliable chain of circumstances. It has not proved who last saw the deceased alive in the exclusive company of the accused, nor has it proved that the accused alone had exclusive opportunity to commit the offence. Hence, Section 106 cannot be invoked to cure the missing links in the prosecution case. The judgment in Kashi Ram is therefore distinguishable on facts and does not assist the prosecution.
62.The prosecution also contended that the defence suggestion of accidental fall cannot be treated as evidence. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a mere suggestion, when denied, does not amount to proof of the defence case. However, the prosecution cannot
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21 of 30 succeed merely because the defence has not proved accidental fall. The prosecution must independently prove homicide and the involvement of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the prosecution evidence itself, particularly PW12’s medical evidence, creates reasonable doubt regarding homicidal death.
63.The prosecution relied upon Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 on the aspect of motive. The principle is that motive may be relevant in a case based on circumstantial evidence, and if proved, it may strengthen the prosecution case. But motive by itself is not a substitute for proof of the crime.
64.In the present case, even assuming that there were matrimonial disputes between
PW2 and A1, such disputes do not automatically establish that the accused committed murder of the child. There is no clear proof of specific dowry demand, no prior complaint, and no independent evidence showing that the accused had a definite motive to kill the child.
Therefore, the decision in Rohtash Kumar does not advance the prosecution case. Motive, even if suspected, cannot replace proof of the actus reus and the participation of the accused.
65.The prosecution relied upon Balu Sudam Khalde and another v. State of
Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.1910 of 2010, decided on 29.03.2023, to contend that suggestions made in cross-examination and answers given thereto can be taken into consideration, and if incriminating, may bind the accused. The said principle is well settled.
66.However, the applicability of the said principle depends upon the nature of the suggestion and the answer. In the present case, the suggestions put to PWs.1 and 2 regarding accidental fall or false implication were denied. Such denied suggestions do not amount to admission of guilt. They do not establish that the accused killed the deceased. At best, they
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22 of 30 indicate the line of defence. Therefore, the prosecution cannot convert a denied defence suggestion into substantive evidence of murder.
67.Further, in Balu Sudam Khalde, the prosecution evidence was otherwise reliable and the Court considered the effect of suggestions along with other evidence. In the present case, the prosecution evidence itself is inconsistent and medically doubtful. Hence, the said judgment is distinguishable and does not help the prosecution to overcome the absence of a complete chain of circumstances.
68.The prosecution relied upon Nankaunoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 3 SCC 317, on the aspect of appreciation of consistent testimony and intention under Section 300
IPC. In that case, the evidence of witnesses was consistent and supported by medical evidence.
69.In the present case, the said principle is not applicable in favour of the prosecution, because there is no consistent eyewitness account. The oral versions are mutually inconsistent. PW1 speaks about unknown persons and pressing of throat. PW2 speaks about electric shock and unknown persons. PWs.6 and 7 speak about smothering with pillow.
PW12 gives opinion of death due to drowning. Thus, unlike Nankaunoo, the ocular and medical evidence are not in harmony. Therefore, the said judgment is distinguishable on facts.
70.The prosecution also charged the accused for cruelty and dowry demand. PW1 and
PW2 stated that after the birth of the daughter, the accused harassed PW2 mentally and physically for additional dowry. However, both PW1 and PW2 admitted that no complaint was given prior to the incident regarding dowry harassment. No independent witness has
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23 of 30 spoken about any specific demand of dowry. No date, time, place, amount or nature of demand has been clearly proved. No panchayat record, letter, message or other contemporaneous material has been produced. PW8 only spoke about counseling and sending of children. His evidence does not prove any demand of dowry. PW3 stated that he had no personal knowledge about the relationship between A1 and PW2. PW4 turned hostile. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC and
Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act beyond reasonable doubt. Mere marital disputes or separation between husband and wife cannot automatically amount to cruelty for dowry. The prosecution must prove wilful conduct of such nature as contemplated under law or harassment with a view to coercing dowry. Such proof is absent in this case. Hence, the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against A1, A2 and A4.
71.Further to establish an offence under Section 201 IPC, the prosecution must prove that an offence was committed, that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed, and that the accused caused disappearance of evidence or gave false information with intention to screen the offender from legal punishment. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove that the death of Shahini was homicidal. When the main offence itself is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the allegation under Section 201
IPC also becomes doubtful.
72.The prosecution alleged that the accused tried to project the death as accidental drowning. But there is no reliable evidence that the accused shifted the body, removed any material object, destroyed evidence, or gave false information to screen themselves. The
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24 of 30 body was found in the house and was available for inquest and postmortem. No incriminating article was recovered pursuant to any admissible information.
73.The alleged confession before police cannot be used as substantive evidence. The seizure of MO1 motor cycle does not prove disappearance of evidence. There is no scientific or independent evidence to show that the deceased was carried on MO1 or that MO1 was used in commission of any offence. Therefore, the prosecution has not established the ingredients of Section 201 IPC against A1, A2 or A4.
74.Tested on the anvil of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, the prosecution case fails to satisfy the five golden principles. Firstly, the circumstance that the death was homicidal is not fully established. The medical opinion is “asphyxia due to drowning”. The doctor admitted possibility of accidental drowning in water containers. There are no external injuries. Secondly, the circumstances are not consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused. The possibility of accidental drowning has not been excluded. Thirdly, the circumstances are not of conclusive nature and tendency. Motive is weak. Extra-judicial confession is doubtful. Recovery is not incriminating. Medical evidence does not support the alleged manner of killing. Fourthly, the prosecution has not excluded every possible hypothesis except guilt. The defence suggestion of accidental fall into water tub is not inherently impossible and receives some support from the medical admission. Fifthly, the chain of evidence is not complete. There is no proof as to who was with the child immediately before death, who caused drowning, whether death took place inside the tub or elsewhere, and whether the accused acted with common intention. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of A1, A2 and A4 beyond reasonable doubt.
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75.This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions and the entire evidence on record. At the outset, it is to be noted that the present case is not based on direct evidence.
There is no eyewitness who speaks to the accused killing the deceased. Therefore, the case of the prosecution must stand or fall on circumstantial evidence alone. In such a case, every circumstance relied upon by the prosecution must be proved firmly and all proved circumstances must form a complete chain pointing only to the guilt of the accused and excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
76.The prosecution contention regarding motive is not free from doubt. PWs.1 and 2 have stated about harassment and dowry demand. However, both of them admitted that no complaint was given to police prior to the incident regarding such harassment. The allegations are general in nature and no specific date, place, amount of dowry demanded or particular act of cruelty is proved. Therefore, the alleged motive may create suspicion, but it cannot by itself prove the offence of murder.
77.The prosecution contention based on Section 106 of the Evidence Act is also not acceptable in the facts of this case. Section 106 does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It only applies when foundational facts are first established by the prosecution and when the fact to be explained is especially within the knowledge of the accused. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove a complete chain of circumstances. Therefore, Section 106 cannot be used to fill the gaps in the prosecution case.
78.The contention of the prosecution that the defence theory of accidental fall is only a suggestion is correct only as an abstract proposition. But in a criminal trial, the accused is
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26 of 30 not required to prove an alternative theory beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if the accused shows a reasonable probability or creates doubt in the prosecution case. Here, PW12 himself admitted that children accidentally falling into water tubs or water containers may die due to drowning. Therefore, the defence is entitled to rely on the prosecution medical evidence itself to create reasonable doubt.
79.The evidence of PWs.6 and 7 regarding alleged extra-judicial confession is not safe to rely upon. Both are admittedly known to PW1. Their evidence shows that they went to the scene along with PW1 and others and that a large number of persons had gathered. Their version that the accused admitted before them that they killed the child by pressing her nose with a pillow is not supported by the medical evidence. PW12 found no external injuries and gave the final opinion as asphyxia due to drowning. Therefore, the alleged extra-judicial confession is not corroborated by independent and reliable evidence.
80.The medical evidence is the most important circumstance in the present case. PW12 has clearly stated that the cause of death was asphyxia due to drowning. He also admitted that there were no external injuries. The prosecution version is not consistent as to whether the child was killed by pressing the throat, by smothering with pillow, by electric shock, by unknown persons or by drowning. Such shifting versions create serious doubt regarding the very manner of death. Where the medical evidence makes the oral version doubtful, the
Court cannot base conviction on such unstable oral evidence.
81.The alleged confession-cum-seizure panchanama also does not advance the prosecution case. The alleged confession made before police is inadmissible, except to the limited extent permitted under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The seizure of MO.1
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27 of 30 motorcycle is not incriminating by itself. There is no recovery of any weapon or material object connecting the accused with the act of killing. There is no scientific evidence from
MO.1. The alleged alteration of number plate is also not proved by cogent evidence. Hence,
MO.1 cannot be treated as a strong incriminating circumstance.
82.The charge under Section 201 IPC also fails. To prove Section 201 IPC, the prosecution must establish that an offence was committed and that the accused, knowing or having reason to believe that such offence was committed, caused disappearance of evidence or gave false information to screen the offender. In the present case, the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the death was homicidal. The medical opinion itself is drowning. Therefore, the theory that the accused created a false scene of drowning is not established.
83.The charge under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act also remains unproved. The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 is general and not supported by prior complaint or independent evidence. The prosecution failed to prove any specific demand for additional dowry or any particular act of cruelty proximate to the incident.
Therefore, the accused are entitled to benefit of doubt on these charges also.
84.From the entire evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution case is surrounded by serious doubts. The medical evidence does not establish homicidal death. The cause of death is asphyxia due to drowning and accidental drowning is not ruled out. There are no external injuries on the body of the deceased. The alleged extra-judicial confession is unreliable and inconsistent with the medical evidence. The alleged police confession is inadmissible except to the limited extent of discovery, and no incriminating discovery was
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28 of 30 proved. The evidence regarding dowry harassment is vague, general and unsupported by independent corroboration. The investigation also suffers from material lapses.
85.The prosecution has failed to complete the chain of circumstances. The circumstances proved are not consistent only with the guilt of the accused. On the contrary, they leave open reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence. Therefore, A1, A2 and A4 are entitled to benefit of doubt.
86. In the result, A1, A2 and A4 are found not guilty of the offences with which they are charged. Accordingly, acting under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C., A1 - Shaik Saleem, A2 -
Shaik Yakamma and A4 - Shaik Khaseem Vali are acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 302, 201 read with 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, as applicable to them.
87.The bail bonds of A1, A2 and A4 shall stand cancelled after expiry of the appeal time. The case against A3 already stood abated due to his death.
88.MO.1 motorcycle, if not required in any other case, shall be returned to the person entitled to lawful possession after expiry of appeal time.
89.The material objects, if any, which are worthless, shall be destroyed after expiry of appeal time.
Typed to my dictation by Stenographer, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court, on this the 18 th day of May, 2026.
FAC- II ADDL.SESSIONS JUDGE,
KHAMMAM.
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-APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE-
WITNESSES EXAMINED ON BEHALF OF PROSECUTION
P.W1Shaik HussainComplainant
P.W2Shaik SafiyaMother of deceased/Circumstantial witness
P.W3Lakkireddy Babul reddyCircumstantial witness
P.W4Avuluri Kotamma Circumstantial witness
P.W5Kanneganti MalleshPhotographer
P.W6Sadhineni Kondal RaoCircumstantial witness
P.W7Thulluri Kondal RaoCircumstantial witness
P.W8Shaik Pulla SahebPanchayat elder
P.W9Shaik SaiduluMediator for the CDF
P.W10Shaik Khaza BeePanch witness for inquest
P.W11Bandi Srinivasa RaoPanch witness for confessional & recovery panchanama of A1 to A4 P.W12Dr.Ch.Vinay KumarDoctor who conducted Autopsy
P.W13V.Suresh1st Investigating Officer
P.W14N.Mallaiah2nd Investigating Officer
P.W15A.Ramakanth3rd Investigating Officer.
WITNESSES EXAMINED ON BEHALF OF DEFENCE
-None-
DOCUMENTS EXHIBITED ON BEHALF OF PROSECUTION
Ex.P1Complaint dt:05.10.2017
Ex.P2Sec.161 Cr.P.C. statement of Pw4
Ex.P3Photographs (7 Nos.) along with CD
Ex.P4Panchanama dt:05.10.2017
Ex.P5CDF dt:05.10.2017
Ex.P6Inquest panchanama
Ex.P7Confession panchanama of A1 to A4 dt:11.10.2017
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Ex.P8The confesison-cum-seizure panchanama dt:11.10.2017
Ex.P9Postmortem Examination
Ex.P10RFSL report dt:29.11.2017
Ex.P11Final Opinion
Ex.P12First Information Report
DOCUMENTS EXHIBITED ON BEHALF OF DEFENCE
Ex.D1Part portion of Sec.161 Cr.P.C. statement of Pw1
Ex.D2Part portion of Sec.161 Cr.P.C. statement of Pw2
MATERIAL OBJECTS MARKED ON BEHALF OF PROSECUTION
MO-1 Hero Glamour vehicle bearing No.AP20-AN-8935
FAC-II Addl.District and Sessions Judge, Khammam
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