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IN THE COURT OF SPL.SESSIONS JUDGE FOR TRIAL OF
OFFENCES UNDER SCS AND STS (POA) ACT, KADAPA.
Present: Sri G. Chakrapani, M.A., LL.M.,
Special Sessions Judge for Trial of Offences
under S.Cs. & S.Ts. (P.O.A), Kadapa
Friday, this the 21st day of December, 2018
Spl.S.C.No.28 of 2017
1.Name of the State Represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Complainant & Kadapa. accused
...Complainant
Vs.
Shaik Abdulla S/o Peer Basha, aged 35 years, Muslim, Business, D.No.14/409, Dasthagiripeta, Proddatur town, YSR District. … Accused
2.ChargesUnder Section Section 506 of IPC., and Sec.3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) Act as Amendment in 2015.
3.Finding of the In the result, the Accused is found not guilty for the
Judgeoffence punishable under Section 506 of IPC., and he is
acquitted under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C., for the said offence. However, the accused is found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) Act as Amended in 2015 and he is convicted under Section 235 (2) of Cr.P.C for the said offence.
4.Sentence or Heard the Accused regarding quantum of sentence. orderAccused submitted that he did not commit any offence and that a lenient view may be taken in the matter. The facts and circumstances of the case indicate the accused once was a close associate of the Defacto- complainant and as such his having such demeaning impression about the caste of the Defacto-complainant is highly doubtful. Moreover, the accused in his raze to demand the Defacto-complainant to do developmental works in his area also he lost control and committed the above offence. Under the above circumstances deserves minimum punishment only. The Accused, therefore, is sentenced to under go simple imprisonment for six months only and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default simple imprisonment for one month, for the offence punishable under Section 3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) Act as amended in 2015. The substantive sentence and default sentence shall run consecutively. The remand period if there is (NIL) shall be given set off from the substantive sentence under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. The unmarked case property if any shall be destroyed after the expiry of appeal time. Accused is appraised of his right to file Appeal before the Hon'ble High Court and Accused is also appraised of his right to seek legal aid also for filing appeal before the Hon'ble High Court.
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5.Prosecution Sri. S. Tarakeswarlu, conducted byAdditional Public Prosecutor, Kadapa.
6.Name of the Sri P. Raghunatha Reddy, Advocate, Kadapa. advocatefor accused.
7.Cr.No.and Cr.No.141 of 2016 of Proddatur II Town Police Station. name of the police station.
8.Committed by.--
This case coming on 18.12.2018 for hearing before me in the presence of Spl. Public Prosecutor for the prosecution and Sri P. Raghunatha
Reddy, Advocate for the accused and upon perusing the records, having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:
J U D G M E N T
The Deputy Superintendent of Police, SC & ST Cell-II, Kadapa filed charge sheet against the accused under Sections 506 of IPC., and Sec.3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) Act as Amendment in 2015 in Cr.No.141 of 2016 of Proddatur II Town P.S. Act as amended in 2015
2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is thus:-:-
The defacto-complainant C. Ramadas belongs to SC-Mala community. He worked in Indian Military for 18 years and thereafter worked as Security Guard in State Bank of India, Proddatur main Branch. Later in 2014 he was elected as councilor of 19th ward of Proddatur municipality on behalf of YSR Congress Party. The accused is a Muslim, he also belongs to 19th ward. Some road works were sanctioned to the said ward. The accused being jealous of the defacto complainant quarreled with him several times.
On 01.09.2016 at about 9.10 p.m., J. Suresh, G. Sumanth and B. Dowla who belong to the same ward went to the house of the defacto-complainant as boring there was not working properly and requested him to have it repaired. They also discussed about other development activities. Later they 3 came out. At about 9.30 p.m., while they were getting down from the house of the defacto-complainant the accused altercated with one C. Swaroopa
Rani who is the daughter of the defacto-complainant by asking her to call the defacto-complainant to come outside. Then she informed the same to the defacto-complainant and on that he came outside and asked the accused why he was raising cries. On that the accused questioned him about laying of a cement road in his street and abused him by touching his caste “EMIRA
RAMDAASUGAA NEEKU ENNI SAARLU CHEPPINNA MEE SC KAALANEE
NANDU MAATHRAME CEMENT RODDU PANULU CHEYINCHUKUNTUNNAVU
MAA VEEDHILO CEMENT RODDU VEYINCHAVA NEEKU YENNI SAARLU
CHEPPINAA ARTHAM KAAVADA LEDA Mala NAA KODUKUNU NINNU MEMU
COUNCELER GAA GELIPINCHADAM THAPPU MEE Mala NAAKODUKULA
ILLANU PETROLU POSI KAALACHI ANDULO NINNU KUDA VESI
KAALCHUTHAAMU LANJAKODAKA”. Thus he humiliated the defacto -complainant and his family in a public place. He also tried to attack him and however others intervened chastised the accused. They pacified him and sent him away. While leaving that place the accused threatened the defacto -complainant as “MAAALA NAAKODAKA NAAMANUSHULANU THEESUKUNI
VACHHI NEE ANTHU CHOOSTHAANU”. It was witnessed by others. Later at about 1.00 a.m., the defacto-complainant gave a report against the accused on 02.09.2016, basing on which a case in the above crime was registered and the copies of the FIR were sent to all the concerned officers. Later the
Superintendent of Police, Kadapa issued proceedings in C.No.143/C3/SC-ST-
I.O./DCRB/CDP/2016, dt.02.09.2016 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police,
SC & ST (POA) Amendment Act, 2015 to conduct investigation in this case.
Accordingly, he took up investigation on 06.09.2016. He visited the scene of offence and examined the witnesses there and drew its rough sketch. He 4 obtained the caste certificates of the accused and the defacto-complainant.
However, the Hon'ble High Court directed not to arrest him, by its orders in
WP.MP.No.46104 of 2016 in WP.No.37411 of 2016. Accordingly, notice was issued for the appearance of the accused. The investigation discloses that the accused committed the above offences for which he is liable to be punished. Hence, this case.
3. This case was taken on file under Section 506 of IPC., and Sec.3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) as Amendment Act, 2015 against the accused.
On his appearance copies of the documents were furnished to the accused.
Later the accused was examined under Section 228 of Cr.P.C., charge was framed against accused for the offences under Section 506 of IPC., and (3) (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) as Amendment Act, 2015. Read over and explained to the accused in Telugu. He pleaded not guilty and claimed for trial. He is defended by an Advocate.
4. During trial, on behalf of the prosecution P.W.1 to P.W.10 are examined and Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.8 are marked.
5. After closure of the prosecution’s evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., with reference to the incriminating material appearing against the accused in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The accused denied the said evidence and reported no defence evidence.
6. Heard both sides.
7. The learned counsel for the accused would point out several aspects claiming them to be the defects in the case of prosecution and urged for acquittal of the accused.
8. Now the points arise for determination are:
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1) Whether the defacto- complainant belongs to SC-
Mala community or not?
2) Whether the prosecution could bring home the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under
Section 3 (1) (r) (s) of S.Cs., & S.Ts., (POA), as
Amendment Act, 2015 beyond all reasonable doubt?
3) Whether the prosecution could bring home the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under
Section 506 of IPC., beyond all reasonable doubt?
4) To what relief?
9. P O I N T No.1:- This aspect is main one relied on by the learned defence counsel to argue that the defacto-complainant does not belong to SC caste and as such provisions of SC & ST (POA), as Amendment
Act, 2015 have no application to the facts of this case.
10. According to the prosecution the accused made only verbal abuse touching the caste of the defacto-complainant and threatened him. If the accused had not made any such abuse touching the caste of the defacto -complainant whereby he was insulted in public view, the mere verbal abuse or altercation would by itself be not a ground to call that the said accused committed any offence. Therefore, unless the accused belongs to SC-Mala caste, mere abuse of him would not make the incident an offence covered by the provisions of SC & ST (POA), as Amendment Act.
11. To prove that the defacto complainant is a Christian and as such he is stripped to his caste tag SC-Mala the learned counsel for the accused relied upon the evidence of the defacto-complainant who is 6 examined as P.W.1 and the Tahsildar who issued the caste certificate and examined as P.W.8. During the cross-examination of P.W.1 it was elicited that the defacto-complainant used to follow the customs of Christianity. The relevant excerpts in his evidence are as under.
“The marriage of my daughter Sameera was performed in SPG church No.1 with Deva Prasanna. The marriage was performed as per customs of Christianity. My daughters and my wife go to
SPG church No.1 for prayers. I am a member of SPG church
No.1. I am not a member to SPG No.2 and No.3”.
12. P.W.1 denied the suggestion that he does not belong to SC
Mala caste and that he is a known Christian in the locality. The evidence of
P.W.1 discloses that they have been observing the customs of Christianity and however that he is not a Christian.
13. P.W.8 would depose that on the request of the DSP he verified the castes of the defacto-complainant C. Rama Dasu ie., P.W.1 and the accused herein and that P.W.1 belongs to Mala community and that
Ex.P.4 is his caste-certificate and that the accused is a Muslim and that
Ex.P.5 is the caste certificate of the accused. During his cross-examination
P.W.8 categorically admitted that the persons converted to Christianity will become BCs. However, he further deposed that basing on the reports of RI and VRO he used to issue caste certificates. He denied the suggestion that without proper enquiry he issued the caste certificate of the defacto -complainant although he does not belong to a Schedule Caste. He denied the suggestion that P.W.1 being a Christian is a BC and not an SC.
14. The learned counsel for the accused relied upon a decision rendered by the Hon'ble High Court of A.P on 07.12.2015 in Crl.P.No.2036 of 7 2013 in the case of “Chinni Appa Rao and two others v. State of AP
represented by its Public Prosecutor, High court of AP Hyderabad
and another” In the said case the defacto-complainant was a Church paster by profession and however he is shown as SC Mala in the report. However ,in the said case the Tahsildar, Anakapalli cancelled the said caste certificate issued in favour of the defacto complainant as SC-Mala vide proceedings dt.20.09.2014 in Rc.No.292/2014/A. In the said case the defacto -complainant and his wife have categorically stated that they have been already converted into Christianity and as such they have been running a church since more than eight years. Therefore, the Hon'ble High Court held that the defacto-complainant no longer remained to be a person belonging to Schedule caste and accordingly quashed the proceedings taken under the provisions of SC & ST (POA), as Amendment Act, 2015.
15. I consider, the facts of the said case are altogether different.
There are clear admissions in the said case that the defacto-complainant has been converted into Christianity and that the Government also cancelled his
SC- caste certificate. But in the case on hand it is only evident that the defacto- complainant has been observing customs of Christianity and there is no positive evidence to show that he actually had been converted into
Christianity. The information is not enough to conclude that having membership in SPG church-I would by itself amounts to conversion into the
Christianity. In the absence of such positive information more particularly for the reason that the government is still considering him as a person belonging to SC -Mala caste and still the accused and others are considering him as a person belonging to SC-Mala caste only, I consider, the prosecution could establish that the defacto-complainant C. Rama Das belongs to SC-
Mala caste. Thus, I answer the above point.
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16. POINT NO.2:- The prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.7 as eye witnesses to the incident. However, the learned counsel for the accused would argue that only the family members of the defacto-complainant have supported the case of the prosecution and that the other independent witnesses did not support the case of the prosecution and therefore the case of the prosecution cannot be believed.
17. P.W.4 is the wife of P.W.1 and P.W.2 is brother of P.W.4. P.W.3 is a distant relative of the defacto-complainant. P.W.7 is the married daughter of the defacto-complainant ie., P.W.1 and P.W.4. P.W.5 and P.W.6 would depose that they noticed the occurrence of some incident at the time and however that they have not witnessed the actual incident. According to them they heard the cries of the quarrel (galata). Thus P.W.5 and P.W.6 have not corroborated the case of the prosecution with regard to the material aspects. However, the learned counsel for the accused would fairly argue that simply because the other eye witnesses happened to the relatives of the defacto-complainant, their testimony cannot be brushed aside intoto and that the Court would have to scrutinize their evidence with more caution than usual.
18. He points out that even though the scene of offence is at a distance of less than 1 k.m. from the concerned PS; the defacto-complainant took about 3 hours time to give a report in the case on hand; that the evidence of P.W.1 indicates that the original oral report given by him was suppressed that there is no evidence to indicate how the accused could be identified in that darkness; that the neighbouring witnesses have not been examined and that all the more that the reason explained by P.W.2 and
P.W.3 for their presence at the alleged scene of offence would falsify the case 9 of the prosecution and therefore it eventually leads to disbelieve the whole case of the prosecution.
19. According to the prosecution P.W.2 and P.W.3 along with
P.W.6 went to the house of the defacto-complainant ie., P.W.1 for discussing regarding repairs of a bore well in their area and also for forming a speed breaker.
20. P.W.1 admittedly is the councilor of 19th ward of Proddatur.
P.W.2 deposes that he belongs to 14th ward. The learned counsel for the accused would point out that P.W.1 who is the councilor of 19th ward would have nothing to do with the problems or development works in the 19th ward and therefore P.W.2 and others going there to the house of P.W.1 for their problems in the 14th ward is highly improbable and therefore their very presence at the scene of offence at the relevant time cannot be believed at all. The said contention of the learned defence counsel is the main contention to drive the Court to disbelieve the case of the prosecution.
21. But a careful analysis of the circumstances that generally take place in society would prevent to this court to rush to any such conclusion because it could be a case where P.W.2 had requested P.W.1 who is his brother-in-law to prevail over the concerned authorities or the councilor of their ward to have the bore well repaired in their area. The said details are lacking and no explanation has been sought for from P.W.2 as to why he approached P.W.1 when he is not their ward councilor. If the said explanation does not match with the ordinary course of events, perhaps, it would be a ground to disbelieve the whole case of the prosecution. But such explanation that would belie the case of the prosecution, is lacking.
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22. On the other hand the evidence of P.W.3 offers a different explanation. It is the case of the prosecution from the beginning that P.W.2
J. Suresh, P.W.3 G. Sumanth and P.W.6 B. Dowla went to the house of P.W.1 and discussed about the development activities in their ward just before the said incident. Though P.W.6 did not support the case of the prosecution in material details he would depose that on 01.09.2016 at about 9.30 p.m., while he was taking meals in his house he heard galata and on that he went to the house of P.W.1 and by that time the said galata was over. The said evidence of P.W.6 indicates that his house was also near the scene of offence or thereabouts and therefore he could hear the said galata.
23. P.W.3 would depose that on 01.09.2016 at about 9.30 p.m., he along with P.W.2 and P.W.6 Dowla went to the house of P.W.1 and asked him to get the bore well repaired. It appears that for having repairs of the bore well situated near the house of Dowla, they approached the P.W.1. It is not anywhere in evidence to the effect that they approached P.W.1 for the repairs of the bore well situated in the 14th ward. It seems Dowla took P.W.2 and P.W.3 along with him to the house of P.W.1 to make a request for having repairs to the bore well, since P.W.2 and P.W.3 are the relatives of P.W.1, such approach is quite common and therefore the visit of P.W.2 and P.W.3 along with P.W.6 to the house of P.W.1 for effecting repairs to a bore well by itself cannot a ground to disbelieve the case of the prosecution and on the other hand the proper explanation would have indicated that they approach
P.W.1 for the repairs of the bore well situated in the 19th ward only and not in the 14th ward. Therefore, the said contention of the learned counsel for the defendant has become unsustainable.
24. P.W.1 to P.W.4 in unison would depose that P.W.2, P.W.3 and
P.W.6 came to the house of the P.W.1 with regard to the repairs to the bore 11 well, laying of speed breaker and other development works in that ward at about 9.10 p.m., and that while they were leaving that house, the accused came there and forced the daughter of P.W.1 to call him, although he was taking supper and thereupon she informed the same to P.W.1 and on that he came outside and at that time the accused questioned him for not taking up any development work in their area and that he has been laying roads in his area only and it is their fault to elect a person belonging to Mala caste and if such person is elected he would do in that manner only. P.W.2 to P.W.4 further depose that the accused threatened P.W.1 that he would set the houses of Mala people ablaze and dump him in the said fire. They would further depose that while leaving that place the accused threatened him to do away with his life by coming with his men. For want of any contradictions with regard to the said aspects, the learned defence counsel either did not lay any emphasis on those details.
25. The learned defence counsel would point out that P.W.1 to
P.W.3 did not speak abouts the presence of P.W.4 and P.W.7 in their evidence and therefore the presence of P.W.4 and P.W.7 is highly doubtful. But P.W.4 is none other than the wife of the defacto-complainant and as such her presence in their house while arranging meals to P.W.1 is quite obvious.
P.W.1 to P.W.3 appears to have focussed on the fact that the accused shouted on the daughter of the P.W.1 to call P.W.1 outside and on that she went inside and informed the same to her father and that then he came out side. When those are important facts, the presence of P.W.4 also by the side of P.W.1 would not gain any special attention because her presence is quite natural there. Therefore, simply because P.W.1 to P.W.3 did not state about the presence of P.W.4 who is the wife of P.W.1 in their house at the time of 12 the accident, it cannot be said that P.W.4 was not there at all. P.W.4 is the most natural witness in the case on hand.
26. It is not in dispute that the house of P.W.7 who is a married daughter of P.W.1 and P.W.4 is situated at some distance in the same ward.
P.W.7 would explain that there house is situated in the middle of the said street whereas the house of P.W.1 is situated towards an end of the said street on their rear side. She further explains that though it is not visible from their house directly as to what is happening at the scene of offence, if any galata occurs it is audible to them. Therefore, rushing of P.W.7 on hearing the said noise, to the scene of offence, cannot be readily ruled out.
Moreover, the evidence of P.W.7 indicates that the said incident lasted for about 20 minutes. Thus P.W.7 also corroborated the evidence of P.W.1 to
P.W.4 in all material respects. Nothing was elicited in her evidence to impeach the credibility of her testimony. It seems, by over sight, the prosecution failed to examine another important witness who is cited as
L.W.4. L.W4 C. Swaroopa Rani is another married daughter of P.W.1.
According to the prosecution the accused asked the said Swaroopa Rani only to call her father outside and on that she informed the same to her father and on that he came outside. If really the prosecution wanted to rely upon tutored witnesses, I conside,r they would not have missed the examination of L.W.4 as a witness. Nothing is found in the record as to why they could not examine L.W.4.
27. Although, P.W.5 and P.W.6 did not support the case of the prosecution with regard to material particulars of the offence alleged, they too would depose that while they were present in their house they heard cries from the house of P.W.1 and on that they went there and by that time the said incident was over. P.W.5 further deposes that he had seen the 13 accused asking P.W.1 about a cell phone. It is a strange statement which has not been explained by anybody. When the same is not the case of the prosecution and when it is not the case of the accused either that they quarreled with regard to any cell phone, the said evidence of P.W.5 gains no attention. P.W.5 and P.W.6 further indicate that their houses are situated in the vicinity of the scene of offnece and as such they could hear the said galata and came there. Therefore, it cannot be outrightly said that the prosecution did not examine any independent witness from that locality. It seems P.W.5 Shaik Jaffer Hussain is none other than the owner of the house where P.W.1 is residing and Ex.P.8 rough sketch of the scene of offence shows that he is residing in the upstairs of the said building itself.
28. Ex.P.8 scene observation report indicates that opposite to the scene of offence there are no houses and only a closed rice mill is there. On the eastern side of the scene of offence another road is there. All the said circumstances show that there is no possibility for so many persons including neighbours to witness the said incident closely. More over, according to the prosecution the said incident took place at about 9.30 p.m., and under those circumstances, the possibility of the several persons moving outside there is also remote. Therefore, the examination of only those persons who actually witnessed the incident, by the prosecution, cannot be a ground to disbelieve the case of the prosecution.
29. Another important aspect raised by the learned defence counsel is suppression of earlier report. According to P.W.1 he went to the
Police Station and informed the incident orally to them and on that they asked him to give a written report and therefore he gave Ex.P.1 report in writing. Although the learned defence counsel pointed out that labeling the earlier oral information as the FIR, I consider, such analysis far fetching and 14 cannot be countenanced. It is quite natural that victims go to the Police
Stations and inform about the incidents orally and on that the Police ask them to submit reports and in such circumstances it cannot be assumed that any oral report is suppressed. It was suggested to P.W.9 who registered the
FIR in the case on hand that the earlier oral report was suppressed since it did not disclose any non cognizable offence. The said suggestion was denied.
I consider, as seen already, the said contention does not have any factual basis and therefore the same is liable rejected.
30. Another aspect pointed out by the learned defence counsel is that the prosecution witnesses failed to explain how they could identify the accused in that darkness. Admittedly, the accused is a known person. It was suggested to P.W.1 and P.W.4 that with the support of the accused only P.W.1 got elected to the office of the councilor. It was suggested to them that initially both P.W.1 and accused were the members of YSR Congress Party and that later the defacto-compliant defected to Telugu Desam Party being the follower of one Mukthiyar, Ex-Muncipal chairman, Proddatur and therefore there have been dissensions between the accused and the defacto complainant. Thus, the intimacy between the accused and defacto complainant is very much evident and under those circumstances identification of the accused by P.W.1 and others, more particularly his voice, is quite probable. Moreover, the investigating officer who is examined as
P.W.10 would point out that he had shown the presence of light pole nearby the scene of offence in Ex.P.8 rough sketch. Thus, there is every possibility of presence for enough artificial illumination at the scene of offence. The learned counsel for the accused would point out that the rough sketch does not show the existence of a light burning to the said light pole. I consider, till such time any positive evidence has been brought in to show that the said 15 light was not burning, in normal course of circumstances it has to be presumed that the said light was burning at the relevant time. Moreover, the said incident had taken place in the middle of houses and lighting from the said houses would also be there and therefore there is every possibility for the witnesses to identify the accused in that night. In fact, the analogy regarding the absence of light would be relevant if the offence is committed and the offender is not known and according to the accused it could have been committed by some body else and not by him. When it is not the contention of the accused as such, the said aspects regarding illumination at that time, pales into insignificance.
31. The learned defence counsel would point out that there is unexplained delay in lodging the FIR with the police and therefore the same is fatal to the case of prosecution. The circumstances of the case indicate that the incident took place between 9.30 p.m., to 10.00 p.m. Generally it takes time for anybody to take a decision whether to go to the Police Station or not, because there is no actual loss occurred to the defacto-complainant because of the abuse of him by the accused. Therefore, it could have taken some time for him to make up his mind. To give a report since it was late night he might have further hesitated to go to the police station at that time and ultimately since further delay would cause further suspicion, he appears to have gone to the Police Station after 12.00 mid night and it seems after going there he scribed a report and presented the same to the Police and finally it was registered in the Police Station at 1.00 a.m. All those circumstances are quite natural. No doubt the prosecution witnesses have not given any such explanation with regard to the said aspects. But, I consider, still the said delay is not too long to call for any suspicion about 16 any interpolations and embellishments, and as such the said delay has to be ignored.
32. Another aspect pointed out by the learned defence counsel to convince the Court that an earlier report was suppressed, is the absence of the signature of the defacto-complainant on Ex.P.6. In Ex.P.6 FIR in the relevant column No.14 meant for the signature of the defacto-complainant his signature is not there. P.W.10 would explain that a click on the computer at that column would surface the said signature of the defacto-complainant.
It seems they are not maintaining printed FIRs, but computerized FIR and therefore the entires in the said FIR have been made in computer type writing only and there are no manual entries except the signatures. In fact at column No.14 of Ex.P.6 FIR the signature of P.W.1 C. Ramdasu is very much there. It seems in the computerized extract of the FIR that was supplied to the accused the said signature is not there and as such it appears the learned counsel for the accused has been under the impression that the said signature of the defacto complainant at that column is not there. But the fact remains is that in Ex.P.6 ,the signature of P.W.1 is very much there.
33. Thus, the evidence on record indicates that, in the presence of P.W.2 to P.W.4 and P.W.7, P.W.1 was abused by the accused touching his caste, outside the house of P.W.1. Since the portion out side the house P.W.1 is a road, it has to be called as a public place undoubtedly. It is argued that as P.W.2 to P.W.4 and P.W.7 are no other than the relatives of P.W.1, if at all the accused is assumed as abusing P.W.1 touching his caste it would not have harmed his reputation because they cannot be called as public within the meaning of Sections 3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) Act, as amended in 2015. It was pointed out that P.W.5 and P.W.6 have not witnessed the said 17 abuse of P.W.1 by the accused and therefore P.W.1 would not have been actually insulted in public view. I consider whether P.W.1 actually insulted or not is not the criteria and the criteria, particularly for the offence under Sec.
3(1) (s) of the said Act is whether the accused uttered such words which have the tendency of insulting him in public view or not. Since such language is likely to insult P.W.1, I consider the prosecution could prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence Section 3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) Act as amended in 2015. Thus, I answer the above point.
34. POINT NO.3:- It is settled law that unless a threat has caused actually apprehension in the mind of the victim Sec.506 of IPC., does not apply (sic. 1969 (35) Cut LT 691). Moreover, the defacto complainant is on a better footing than the accused and as such the alleged threats would not intimidate the defacto complainant. As P.W.1 to P.W.4 and
P.W.7 would depose about such threating of P.W.1 by the accused, the prosecution could establish such threatening only and for want of any evidence to the effect that P.W.1 was really frighted by the said threats given by the accused, I consider, the offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 of IPC., has not been established and therefore the prosecution could not prove the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC., beyond all reasonable doubt. Thus, I answer the above point.
35. POINT NO.4:- In view of the discussion and finding under the above points, I consider the prosecution could not prove the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC., and however it could prove the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 18 3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) as Amended Act, 2015, beyond all reasonable doubt. Thus, I answer the above point.
36. In the result, the Accused is found not guilty for the offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC., and he is acquitted under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C., for the said offence. However, the accused is found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) Act as
Amended in 2015 and he is convicted under Section 235 (2) of Cr.P.C for the said offence.
Dictated to the Grade-1 Stenographer, transcribed by him,
corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court, this the 21st day of
December, 2018.
Spl. Sessions Judge for S.Cs & S.Ts (POA) Act Cases, Kadapa.
Heard the Accused regarding quantum of sentence. Accused submitted that he did not commit any offence and that a lenient view may be taken in the matter.
The facts and circumstances of the case indicate the accused once was a close associate of the Defacto-complainant and as such his having such demeaning impression about the caste of the Defacto- complainant is highly doubtful. Moreover, the accused in his raze to demand the Defacto-complainant to do developmental works in his area also he lost control and committed the above offence. Under the above circumstances deserves minimum punishment only.
The Accused, therefore, is sentenced to under go simple imprisonment for six months only and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default simple imprisonment for one month, for the offence punishable under
Section 3 (1) (r) (s) of SC & ST (POA) Act as amended in 2015. The 19 substantive sentence and default sentence shall run consecutively. The remand period if there is (NIL) shall be given set off from the substantive sentence under Section 428 of Cr.P.C.
The unmarked case property if any shall be destroyed after the expiry of appeal time.
Accused is appraised of his right to file Appeal before the Hon'ble
High Court and Accused is also appraised of his right to seek legal aid also for filing appeal before the Hon'ble High Court.
Typed to my dictation to the Grade-1 Stenographer, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court, this the 21st day of December, 2018.
Sd/- G. Chakrapani.
Spl. Sessions Judge for S.Cs & S.Ts (POA) Act Cases, Kadapa.
APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE
WITNESSES EXAMINED
FOR PROSECUTION:-
P.W.1: C. Rama Dasu.
P.W.2: J. Suresh.
P.W.3: C. Sumanath.
P.W.4: C. Sundaramma.
P.W.5: S. Jaffar Hussain.
P.W.6: B. Dowla.
P.W.7: C.K. Rojamma.
P.W.8: K. Bhaskar Reddy.
P.W.9: P. Anjaneyulu.
P.W.10: P. Soukath Ali.
EXHIBITS MARKED FOR PROSECUTION:-
Ex.P.1: Complaint.
Ex.P.2: 161 Cr.P.C., statement of P.W.5.
Ex.P.3: 161 Cr.P.C., statement of P.W.6.
Ex.P.4: Caste certificate of P.W.1.
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Ex.P.5: Caste certificate of accused.
Ex.P.6: First Information Report.
Ex.P.7: Proceedings of SP, Kadapa.
Ex.P.8: Rough sketch.
WITNESSES EXAMINED AND
EXHIBITS MARKED FOR DEFENCE:
NIL.
MATERIAL OBJECTS MARKED:
Nil.
Sd/- G.C.
Spl. Sessions Judge for S.Cs & S.Ts (POA) Act Cases, Kadapa.