Sri M.Srikantha Chary

IN THE COURT OF THE XIV ADDITIONAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS

JUDGE: CUM: ADDL. FAMILY JUDGE: VIJAYAWADA

PRESENT:- SRI M. SRIKANTHA CHARY, B.Sc., LL.B, XIV Additional District & Sessions Judge –cum – Addl. Family Judge, Vijayawada. Tuesday, this the 1st (First) day of November, 2016.

HMOP NO. 317 of 2014

Between:

Bavineni Vijaya Nagendra Babu, S/o. Sambasiva Rao, Hindu, aged about 34 years, Gold Appraiser in Bank of India, Kankipadu Branch, R/o.D.No. 12-89/1, beside lane of Sivalayam, Kankipadu Village and Mandal, Krishna District.

.. Petitioner.

And

Bavineni Sujatha, W/o. Vijaya Nagendra Babu, Hindu, aged about 29 years, resident of Karmika Nagar, Prasadampadu, Vijayawada Rural, Krishna District.

…Respondent.

The petition came for final hearing before me on 20.10.16 in the presence of Sri J.Youseph, Advocate for Petitioner and of Sri V.Ramesh Chandra Babu, Advocate for Respondent and having been heard and having stood over till this day for consideration, this Court made the following:

O R D E R:

The Petitioner/Husband has filed this petition Under Secs.

12(1) and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, ‘the Act’) seeking annulment of marriage on the ground that the Respondent/Wife was at the time of marriage pregnant by some person other than the Petitioner. Sec. 25 of the

Act is unnecessarily mentioned, as Petitioner does not claim any maintenance.

2.The facts of the case, as mentioned in the application, are that the Petitioner married the Respondent on 30.11.2012 in Venkateswara Swamy

Temple, Mantada as per Hindu rites, customs and ceremonies. As the parents of Respondent expressed inability to perform the marriage, the Petitioner himself spent the marriage expenses. The marriage was consummated. The couple led happy married life for 15 days only. Later the Respondent went to the house of her sister. She used to come to the house of Petitioner occasionally. She shifted all the gold ornaments i.e., Black beeds chain, 2 neckless, gold bangles, nanthadu etc., presented by the Petitioner at the time of marriage. She took an amount of Rs.80,000/- from Petitioner and gave to her sister’s husband Satyanarayana by saying that they are suffering with financial crisis. Finally the Respondent went to the house of Satyanarayana and never returned to her matrimonial home. When questioned by the Petitioner, the

Respondent replied that she became pregnant and the Doctors advised her to take bed rest and so she would stay at her sister’s house. Believing her words the Petitioner sent Rs.6,000/- pm to the Respondent for her welfare and well- being. She gave birth to a male child on 25.07.2013. The Petitioner grew suspicious and caused enquiry. He came to know that the Respondent married one Srinivasa Rao of Gandigunta village in February, 2000, led marital life with him for 10 days, took gold ornaments and cash from him and deserted him; and that without taking divorce from him she married the Petitioner. The

Petitioner further came to know that the Respondent developed illegal intimacy with the husband of her sister Satyanarayana before marrying the

Petitioner. Thus the Respondent cheated the Petitioner. When questioned, the

Respondent, her sister and her husband threatened the Petitioner to foist false criminal cases against him and to kill him if the fact is revealed to anyone.

The Petitioner filed a private complaint before a Vijayawada Court alleging offences under Sections 323, 420, 506(2), 494 r/w 120-B r/w 34 IPC in CF No.

179/2014 and the same is pending. There is no marital intercourse between the parties since the discovery of the above facts by the Petitioner. The marriage is, therefore, rendered voidable and liable to be annulled by a decree of nullity.

3.The Respondent/Wife has opposed the application. In the written statement filed, she admitted her marriage with the Petitioner on 30.11.2012, but denied the other petition averments. She pleaded that after marriage she joined the Petitioner at his house at Kankipadu and lived with him for 45 days, after which she had been shifted to her sister’s house in

Prasadampadu, Vijayawada due to pregnancy, where she stayed for a week; took treatment in the Hospital of Dr.Madhavi; later she went back to her in- 3 laws house at Kankipadu stayed there for about 15 days; that since there was no improvement in her health condition, the Petitioner himself left her at her sister’s house and went away. He used to visit her every week. Although she behaved herself well as an honest and dutiful wife, the Petitioner being addicted to bad vices demanded additional dowry and threatened to have a 2nd marriage. The Respondent further stated that the Petitioner asked her to get abortion in the 3rd month by saying that he was unable to bear the medical expenses. He used to come home by drinking alcohol and beat her during stay at his house. The Petitioner stopped to visit the Respondent at her sister’s house. After birth of child only the Petitioner came once to see her.

4.The Respondent further stated that Srinivasa Rao is her maternal uncle who is aged about 50 years. He married one Rajeswari; they were blessed with two children. Rajeswari abandoned him in the year 2000.

The kids had no mother to look after their well-being. Out of kindness and sympathy for the motherless children, she (Respondent) looked after the children by occasionally going to their house. She never imagined that the

Petitioner would create a horrible relation between her and her uncle. She was like a daughter to him. The Respondent further stated that her sister and her husband Satyanarayana are her well-wishers and moral supporters during the time of her pregnancy. They took every care of her from the day the

Petitioner dropped her at their house. The Respondent, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the petition with costs.

5.The point for consideration is:

Whether the Petitioner has proved that the Respondent

was at the time of marriage pregnant by some person

other than himself of which he was ignorant at the time

of marriage; and that there is no marital intercourse

since the discovery of the existence on the said ground,

and thereby he is entitled to seek annulment of marriage

with the Respondent, the marriage being voidable?

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6.During enquiry, the Petitioner has examined himself as PW1, and exhibited Exs. A1 to A3 documents. The Respondent got herself examined as RW1 besides examining her sister as RW2 and exhibited Exs.B1 to B5 documents.

POINT:

7.The learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that from the evidence of PW1 it is proved that the Respondent/RW1 led marital life with him just for 15 days after marriage. She deliberately stated it as 45 days in counter and chief-affidavit to cover up her lapses. During the course of cross-examination she categorically admitted that the statement in her chief- affidavit that she stayed for 45 days in the house of Petitioner is not correct.

Admittedly she has been residing in the house of her sister RW2 even now.

He pointed out that in cross-examination the Respondent/RW1 has disowned knowledge why this petition is field by the Petitioner; that she does not know the street name and neighbours of house at Kankipadu where she and

Petitioner lived. She further stated that she does not know the date when the

Petitioner dropped her at her sister’s house. Attention is invited to the fact that

RW1 admitted having lodged a report at Patamata Police against the Petitioner; that the police did counseling and obtained their signatures and advised her to live together. She deliberately stated that their signatures were obtained on a white paper, even though she signed on a complaint typed in computer. This report she lodged after receiving notice in this case. She admitted her signature in the report, Ex.A3. She gave her cell number also. The learned counsel drew attention to the averments in the report that the Respondent at the age of 16 years married Srinivasa Rao aged 40 years on 18.04.2001; that the marriage was disliked by herself and her father, but due to the pressure of senior maternal aunt it was performed. It is further stated in the report that the

Petitioner suspected her character and said that the son is not born to him. He alleged that she got illicit intimacy with her sister’s husband. The learned 5 counsel urged that RW1 declined to undergo DNA test for deciding paternity.

In this context, the learned counsel pointed out that the younger sister (RW2) is married in the year 2001 whereas the elder sister Respondent/RW1 was married long thereafter in 2012. This is quite unnatural. These circumstances, according to the learned counsel, make it abundantly clear that the Respondent/RW1 cheated the Petitioner by suppressing her 1st marriage and she did not get pregnancy through Petitioner because she stayed with the

Petitioner just for 15 days after marriage and left to her sister’s house where she developed illicit intimacy with sister’s husband and even till today she has been residing in the house of her sister only, and as such the Petitioner is entitled for a decree of divorce.

8.The learned counsel for Respondent/Wife has submitted written arguments. In substance, it is contended that the Petitioner/PW1 clearly admitted in cross-examination that the Respondent went to the house of her sister in January, 2013. He further admitted that he came to know about the pregnancy of the Respondent in the month of January, 2013 only. Admittedly he sent an amount of Rs.6,000/- pm for the welfare and well-being of the

Respondent; that after birth of child only he suspected the Respondent. It is pointed out in cross-examination for the first time the Petitioner stated that on 25.12.2013 when he went to see the child to the house of Satyanarayana, he witnessed the Respondent and Satyanarayana in a compromising position. The

Petitioner has not filed a copy of complaint lodged by him. Attention is invited to the fact that exactly on the same day i.e., 15.12.2013 the Petitioner alleged an incident that Satyanarayana along with his henchmen came to him and assaulted him. It reveals the deceptive character of the Petitioner. He was not referred to any hospital by the police. He has not examined the so-called elders who went to the Respondent on 28.12.2012 and asked her to join the

Petitioner. The allegation of Petitioner that the Respondent took away

Rs.80,000/- from his house is quite absurd. A person getting Rs.9,000/- pm is most unlikely to have a huge amount of Rs.80,000/- in the house. No proof is 6 filed by the Petitioner to show that he paid Rs.6,000/- every month to the

Respondent till the date of delivery. As regards Ex.A3 report, it is submitted that this document is hit by Secs. 62, 68, 76 and 79 of the Evidence Act, since it has not been called for from the Police and it has neither been duly attested nor duly certified. Attention is invited to the sheet of Complainant details attached to the report, in which the Gender is stated as ‘male’ and category is stated as ‘land dispute’ and for these reasons Ex.A3 is rendered ‘infructuous at law’. It is submitted that as per Ex.A4 the Respondent was treated in the hospital on 28.12.2012; an entry was made as LMP (Last Menstrual Period):

November, 16, 2012 and the next entry below it as EDD (Estimated Date of

Delivery): August 23, 2013. It clearly shows the Petitioner was aware that the

Respondent was pregnant by 28.12.2012 itself and it falsifies the claim of

Petitioner that he came to know about pregnancy in January, 2013. That is why the Petitioner did not challenge the legitimacy of the child but he put forth the allegation of illicit intimacy of Respondent with Satyanarayana. At any rate, such allegation is disproved or unproved. It is submitted that the

Respondent is an illiterate and innocent woman. She does not know what a

DNA test means and so no undue significance need be attached to her statement in cross-examination that she is not willing to undergo such test.

Moreover, a paternity test cannot be forced on a party to the case unless the point for determination is such that unless a DNA test is ordered a solution to the case will not be found. The fact that the Respondent, her father, her sister (RW2), her husband and his parents and 2 children (total 8 members) living under one roof rules out in illicit intimacy of Respondent with husband of

RW2. Since the maintenance and well-being of the Respondent was looked after by RW2, she produced Exs.B1 to B5 medical report of Respondent. It is submitted that Exs.B1 to B5 disclose the age of foetus which reveal that the

Petitioner is the father of the child. It is pointed out that the petition is field under Sec.25 of the Act but it is wholly inapplicable, and the Petitioner utterly failed to prove the ingredients of Sec.12(1) of the Act and as such the petition 7 be dismissed.

9. The Respondent admits her marriage with the Petitioner on 30.11.2012. Ex.A1 wedding card and Ex.A2 marriage photo disclose the marriage. Petitioner/PW1 says he and Respondent led marital life happily for 15 days only. Later the Respondent used to go to the house of her sister; she shifted all the gold ornaments i.e., Black beeds chain, neckless, gold bangles, nanthadu etc., presented by him at the time of marriage, besides Rs.80,000/- from him; that she gave that amount to her sister’s husband Satyanarayana.

Eventually, PW1 says in January, 2013 the Respondent went to the house of

Satyanarayana and did not return to him. When questioned about the same, the

Respondent informed that she became pregnant. Believing her words, the

Petitioner sent Rs.6,000/- pm for the welfare of Respondent. She gave birth to a male child on 25.07.2013. After birth of child, the Petitioner/PW1 suspected the Respondent. On enquiry, he came to know that the Respondent had earlier married one Srinivasa Rao in February, 2000 at Gandigunta; after living with him for 10 days she deserted him by taking gold ornaments and cash; that without taking divorce from him, she married him. PW1 further deposed that

Respondent developed illegal intimacy with her sister’s husband

Satyanarayana. PW1 further deposed that Satyanarayana and his henchmen came to him on 25.12.2013 abused and assaulted him and warned him that he should not demand the Respondent to join him by returning gold ornaments and cash. PW1 filed a private complaint before a Court in Vijayawada alleging offences under Sections 323, 420, 506(2), 494 r/w 120-B r/w 34 IPC, and the same is pending in C.F.No. 179/2014.

10. As against the above evidence of Petitioner/PW1, it is the evidence of Respondent/RW1 that she led marital life with Petitioner for 45 days, after which she had been shifted to her sister’s house due to pregnancy.

Later she went to her in-law house, stayed there for about 15 days, after which as there was no improvement in her health condition, the Petitioner left her at 8 her sister’s house and went away. She got treated in Dr.Madhavilatha hospital by staying in the house of her sister. RW1 further deposed that the Petitioner used to visit her at her sister’s house every week. RW1 proceeded to say that the Petitioner asked her to get aborted in 3rd month saying that he was unable to bear the medical expenses, but she refused. She alleged that the Petitioner started coming home in intoxicated state and beating her during her stay in his house and abused her in filthy language. He cleverly dropped her at her sister’s house. After birth of child only once the Petitioner came to see her and later stopped coming to her. As regards allegation of Petitioner, the

Respondent/RW1 explained that Srinivasa Rao is her maternal uncle, aged about 50 years, married to one Rajeswari, they were blessed with 2 children; that in the year 2000 Rajeswari abandoned him and the children; that out of kindness and sympathy for the motherless children she looked after the children by occasionally going to their house. She stated that she is like a daughter to Srinivasa Rao. She further explained that her sister (RW2) and her husband Satyanarayana are her well-wishers and moral supporters during the time of her pregnancy; they looked after her as their own daughter. RW1 further stated the allegations in Ex.A1 (sic. for Ex.A3) are fabricated.

11.On an analysis of the evidence on record, I find that the

Respondent/RW1 gave an imaginary, exaggerated and coloured version against the Petitioner/PW1. In the first instance, in cross-examination she simply stated she does not know why this petition is filed by the Petitioner; that she does not know the street name and neighbours house of her in-laws house at Kankipadu; that she does not know the date when the Petitioner dropped her at her sister’s house and above all that the statement in her chief- affidavit that she stayed for 45 days in the house of Petitioner is not correct.

Secondly, she admits having lodged a report with Patamata police against

Petitioner; that the police did counseling, obtained their signatures on a white paper and advised them to live together. She admits her signature in Ex.A3.

She further admits the cell number given in Ex.A3 belongs to her. I find the 9 claim of Respondent/RW1 that police obtained her signature on a white paper is unbelievable. A perusal of Ex.A3 shows it is a computerized Telugu report lodged by the Respondent/RW1, during pendency of this petition, wherein she narrated events right from the year 2001. She began stating that on 18.04.2001 her marriage with G.Srinivasa Rao was performed at Gandigunta near Vuyyuru. Then she was aged 16 years while her uncle (bride groom) aged 40 years; that the said marriage was disliked by herself and her father but was performed forcibly by her senior maternal aunt; that since she despised the marriage, her uncle did not lead conjugal life with her, and hence in the presence of elders they separated. The report Ex.A3 then says about the marriage between Respondent and Petitioner on 30.11.2012, and birth of son.

Respondent alleged that the Petitioner harassed her mentally when she was in 3rd month of pregnancy, took her to Madhavi Hospital for abortion, the Doctor refused; that the same Doctor conducted operation for delivery; that the

Petitioner did not visit hospital; that on 21st day when phoned he came with elders and asked her to give away the child to her sister; she refused; that without seeing that it was a new born child he hit the child against wall. The

Petitioner suspected her character and said that the son is not born to him. The

Report further reads that the Petitioner filed this OP for divorce, alleging that she got illicit intimacy with her brother-in-law, and the case is pending in

Court. Finally the Respondent prayed the police to take action against her husband (Petitioner) who is threatening her for divorce and see her end. The

Respondent not only signed and gave her cell number in the report, but also gave the address of Petitioner and his cell number.

12.The Respondent/RW1 cannot simply disown the report Ex.A3 by saying in her chief-affidavit that it is fabricated. Since the report is lodged during pendency of this OP, and particularly since serious allegations are made against the Petitioner that he mentally tortured the Respondent and even that he hit the new born child against the wall, it cannot be said the Petitioner drafted the report by using the white paper containing signature of Respondent, 10 as alleged by Respondent. Police have absolutely no reason to create such report n a matrimonial dispute by using any blank paper containing signature of Respondent. Moreover, the Respondent who is ably assisted by her well- versed sister (RW2) and her husband Satyanarayana would not sign on a blank paper in Police Station. I, therefore, reject the case of the Respondent/RW1 that Ex.A3 report is fabricated. It is pertinent to note that behind Ex.A3 report, the Respondent endorsed that as the Petitioner gave assurance in the presence of elders ‘not to interfere with her’, she is withdrawing the report. It is significant to note the Respondent does not say that the Petitioner assured to take her to his fold. She says the Petitioner assured not to interfere with her affairs. There is also report enclosed to Ex.A3 given by the Petitioner stating that he will not interfere with his wife and child and that himself and the

Respondent will lead their own life. These facts coupled with the own showing of Respondent that she had been shifted to her sister’s house (45) days after marriage when she was carrying pregnancy; that particularly in

Ex.A3 the Respondent for the first time stated that she was earlier married to

Srinivasa Rao way back on 18.04.2001 demonstrate that the Respondent suppressed the factum of her 1st marriage to the Petitioner. The conduct of

Respondent/RW1 residing in the house of her sister just a few days after marriage and giving birth a child in that house and even now continuing stay in their house without making any effort to join her husband (Petitioner) probablize the case of the Petitioner that the Respondent was pregnant by some person other than himself of which he was ignorant at the time of marriage.

The evidence on record makes it clear that there is no martial intercourse between Petitioner and Respondent since the discovery of existence of the said ground. RW1 admits in cross-examination that she has not filed any petition seeking any relief to herself and her son. Petitioner has every reason to believe that the Respondent got pregnancy through another person. In such a situation the Petitioner/Husband is certainly entitled to seek annulment of marriage with the Respondent.

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13.I do not consider it necessary to deal with the contentions of the learned counsel for Respondent regarding refusal of Respondent to undergo

DNA test to determine paternity of the child; about improbabilities in the case of Petitioner regarding the incident on 25.12.2013; the Petitioner not examining any elder who went to the Respondent and asked her to join the matrimonial home; about the Petitioner not having a huge cash of Rs.80,000/-; and finally that Ex.A3 is hit by Secs. 62, 68, 76 and 79 of the Evidence Act.

The circumstances of the case leave no manner of doubt whatsoever that

Ex.A3 is lodged by Respondent and it cannot be said the Petitioner obtained it by managing the police. The learned counsel for Respondent pointed out some silly things, such as in the format to which Ex.A3 report is enclosed, captioned ‘Complinent Details’, the gender is stated as ‘male’ and category as ‘land dispute’. Suffice to note the name of Complainant is shown as Sujatha (Respondent); the inapplicable words are not struck off. For example S/o. (or)

D/o. (or) w/o: as against the name of Petitioner. The Respondent cannot disown her report Ex.A3 by pointing out the above clerical mistakes in filling up the printed format attached to Ex.A3 report. It only exposes the nature of

Respondent in avoiding somehow her own report Ex.A3, which is staring at her.

14.For the foregoing discussion I accept the evidence of PW1, and hold that the marriage is rendered voidable on the ground that the Respondent was pregnant by some person other than the Petitioner. The point is answered accordingly in the affirmative.

15.In the result, I allow the petition with costs, annulling the marriage between the Petitioner and Respondent on 30.11.2012 by a decree of nullity.

Dictated to the Grade-I Steno, transcribed by her, corrected and

pronounced by me in the open Court on this the 1st day of November, 2016.

XIV Addl. District Sessions

Judge-cum- Addl. Family Judge,

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Vijayawada.

Appendix of Evidence: Witnesses examined:

For Petitioner:

PW1 – B.V.Nagendra Babu.

For Respondent:

RW1 –B.Sujatha. RW2- G.Sunitha.

Documents marked for Petitioner:

Ex.A1 – Wedding card by PW1.

Ex.A2- Marriage photo by PW1.

Ex.A3- Attested copy of complaint given by the Respondent. Ex.A4- Out Patient book by RW1.

Documents marked for Respondent: Ex.B1- Hospital record of Respondent of Sri Sai Hospital dt: 23.01.2013 . Ex.B2- Ultra sound scan of Respondent dt: 4.2.2013. Ex.B3- Ultra sound scan of Respondent dt: 23.02.2013. Ex.B4- Ultra sound scan of Respondent dt: 11.06.2013. Ex.B5- Ultra sound scan of Respondent dt: 20.07.2013.

XIV A.D.S.J-CUM-

A.F.J,VJA.

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IN THE COURT OF VII ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE: VIJAYAWADA.

Present: Sri M. Srikanth Chary, VII Addl. District Judge

Tuesday, this the 7th day of November, 2017

AS No.85 of 2007

Between:

1. 1. Annavarapu Babu Rao

2. 2. Annavarapu Jaswantha Rao

3. 3. Gunturu Kamala Devi

5. 4. Gandepudi Kanakavalli

6. 5. Gujjula Raja Kumari

7. 6. Annavarapu Vasantha

8. 7. Annavarapu Saratchandra

8. Annavarapu Bharatchandra …Appellants

AND

1. Annavarapu Kalyana Rao 

2. Annavarapu Ramesh Babu … Respondents

On appeal from the Judgment and decree dated 14­12­2006 of the II Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada made in:

O.S.No.3083 of 2001

Between:

Annavarapu Kalyana Rao .. Plaintiff

And

1. Annavarapu Babu Rao

2. Annavarapu Jaswantha Rao

3. Annavarapu Ramesh Babu

4. Gunturu Kamala Devi

5. Gandepudi Kanakavalli

6. Gujjula Raja Kumari

7. Annavarapu Vasantha

8. Annavarapu Saratchandra

9. Annavarapu Bharatchandra .. Defendants

This Appeal coming on for final hearing before me on 19­09­2017, and upon perusing the material papers on record and grounds of appeal and upon hearing the arguments of Sri t. Bhairraju, Advocate for the Appellant, and of Sri JRK Sarma, advocate for respondent 1 and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this court delivered the following:

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J U D G M E N T

1.This appeal arises out of the Judgment and decree dated dt.14­12­2006 of the II Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada in

OS No.3083/2001. The unsuccessful defendants 1,2 4 to 9 are the

appellants. D3 is shown as respondent 2 in appeal. To obviate any confusion, the parties are referred to in this appeal by their status in the Original Suit. 

2. The plaintiff filed the suit for partition of Item 1 into 8 equal shares and Item 2 into 5 equal shares and to allot one share in both items to him. The plaint averments, briefly stated, are as follows:

Plaintiff, defendants 1 to 6 and Varaprasad are the children of late Krupa Rao and Kanthamma. Krupa Rao died on 07­06­1979 leaving behind wife, and children (defendants 1 to 6 and Varaprasad) after retirement as teacher. Kanthamma also died on 25­06­1998 after retirement as teacher. Item 1 of the plaint schedule property was the ancestral property derived by

Krupa Rao in a partition effected along with his brothers. Item 2 is acquired by Kanthamma under the regd. Sale deed dated 17­01­1993. In the Will executed by Kanthamma on 9­4­1996 she has not mentioned anything about her rights over the share devolved by her in Item 1. Vara Prasad (4th son) died on 12­08­1999 leaving behind him his wife and sons (defendants 7 to 9). Thus the plaintiff, defendants 1 to 6 each and defendants 7 to 3 9 together are entitled for equal share in Item 1. Plaintiff is entitled for 1/8th share in Item 1.

3. Kanthamma was in occupation of 126 sy site for over a period of 50 years prior to 1993. The Vijayawada Municipal

Corporation (VMC) decided to sell the said property to the occupier at nominal cost. Kanthamma through her sons paid Rs.3150 under challan dated 13­03­1981 for the entire site of 126 sy at the rate of Rs.25/­ per sy. Vijayawada Municipal Corporation executed regd. Sale deed for 98 sy only, an extent of 28 sy to

Kanthamma on the extreme north.

4. On 9­04­1996 Kanthamma executed a Will regarding Item

2. After her death on 25­06­1998 the excess extent of 28 sy on north is given possession and enjoyment to the plaintiff, excluding all of her children. In the remaining 98 sy of site and house (shown as Item 2), she made bequest among all her 5 sons. The plaintiff is entitled for 1/5th i.e., 19.6 sy. The plaintiff has been in occupation of the excess piece of property of 28 sy and he is enjoying the same exclusively. 

5. Defendants are not co­operating for partition of Items 1 and 2 inspite of notice dated 9­8­2000. Instead of co­operating with plaintiff the defendants colluded together and filed caveats before

Courts at Vijayawada, began to get Pattadar Pass book in the name of 1st defendant influencing the revenue authorities and tried to sell Item 1 of the plaint schedule property. Plaintiff issued notices to Sub­registrar and MRO to stop such illegal 4 transactions. 1st defendant having grudge against the plaintiff changed the boundaries of Item 1 meddling with boundaries of the land pertaining to the land situated on the north. Hence the suit.

6. Defendants 3,4,6 to 9 remained exparte. The other defendants have contested the suit claim. 1st defendant filed a written statement which is adopted by defendants 2 and 5. The contesting defendants admitted the relationship between the parties. Even while admitting that item 2 is the self­acquired property of Kanthamma, they have denied that Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa Rao and that he died intestate. They have pleaded that Krupa Rao bequeathed his property to

Kanthamma and after death of Krupa Rao, Kanthamma became absolute owner of property of Krupa Rao. They alleged that the

Will dated 9­4­1996 executed by Kanthamma is fabricated and created by the plaintiff for the purpose of suit. The defendants have pleaded that the plaintiff was given in adoption to the brother of Krupa Rao in the year 1955 and since then he had been living with his adoptive father Sudarsanam. The marriage of plaintiff was performed by Sudarsanam according to their custom.

Plaintiff never participated in the affairs of his natural father. The adoptive father settled some properties on 16­03­1959 under settlement deed. He also executed another settlement deed dated 5­6­1985 in favour of plaintiff. It is further pleaded that as per the

Will executed by Kanthamma on 2­1­1998 the entire properties fell to the share of her male children except the plaintiff. Plaintiff has never be in the possession and enjoyment of Items 1 and 2.

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As the notice issued by the plaintiff contained baseless contentions, 1stdefendant kept quiet without giving any reply. It is further pleaded that the suit for mere partition is not maintainable without seeking declaration of rights in the suit property.

Contesting defendants, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit.

7. On the strength of the above pleadings, the trial court has framed the following issues for trial:

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint schedule property as prayed for?

2) To what relief?

8. At the trial, PWs 1 to 3 are examined and Exs.A1 to A8 documents exhibited on behalf of the plaintiff. DWs 1 and 2 are examined and Exs.B1 to B5 documents exhibited on behalf of the contesting defendants.

9. On assessment of the oral and documentary evidence let­ in by both the parties, the lower court has observed that there is admission of DW1 that Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa

Rao. He further pleaded that Krupa Rao has not executed any document during his lifetime in respect of Item 1. Thus Item 1 devolved upon the legal heirs of Krupa Rao. The Will dated 2­1­1998 (Ex.B2) executed by Kanthamma is suspicious. She herself is not entitled to execute Will in respect of Item 1. As regards the plea of defendant that plaintiff went in adoption in the year 1955 and as such he will not get any rights over the property of natural father Krupa Rao, the trial Court observed that the plaintiff canvassed that he was only fostered but not adopted. The 6 trial Court held that Exs.A4, A5 gift deeds do not disclose adoption. So also Ex.A6 marriage extract. Ex.B1 gift deed which is 30 years old document reveals that plaintiff was being fostered.

Ex.B3 marriage extract reveals that Sudarshanam signed under the column father/guardian but it does not disclose that he was the adoptive father. So observing, it was held that adoption is not proved but it only shows plaintiff is treated as a fostered son.

That being so, the plaintiff cannot be deprived of his status in the natural family, unless he has relinquished his rights. There is no document showing any relinquishment. Hence plaintiff being one of the legal heirs of Krupa rao who died intestate is entitled along with other legal heris for a share in Item 1. With respect to Item 2, the trial Court observed that the plaintiff relies upon Will dated 9­4­1996 (Ex.A1) whereas defendants disputed that Will. They set up a Will dated 2­1­1998 executed by Kanthamma in which the plaintiff is totally excluded. The trial Court observed that prior to filing suit the plaintiff issued Ex.A2 notice, wherein there is no whisper about Ex.A1 Will. Furthermore, in OS 1588/2001 filed by plaintiff in the present suit stated that mother died intestate. So observing the trial Court rejected Ex.A1 saying that the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 attestors is of no help to the plaintiff. It was further held that Ex.B2 will set up by defendants is also suspicious. Accordingly Item 2 also devolves equally among all the legal heirs of Kanthamma, including plaintiff. The trial Court decreed the suit directing partition of Item 1 and 2 into 8 equal shares and for allotment of one such share to plaintiff. 

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10. Aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial Court, the appellants/ defendants 1,2,4 to 9 have preferred this appeal, raising the following grounds:

i)The order of the lower court is against the weight of evidence and the probabilities of the case.

ii)The lower Court ought to have dismissed the suit on the sole ground that the 1st respondent/plaintiff is not the heir of deceased Annavarapu Krupa Rao and his wife Annavarapu Kanthamma, in view of his severance from the family more than 50 years back.

iii)The lower Court ought to have accepted the contentions of the appellants that the 1st respondent/ plaintiff is not the heir of deceased Krupa Rao and his wife Annavarapu Kanthamma as he was given in adoption.

iv)The lower court ought to have given much credence to the settlement deeds and marriage certificate which clearly prove and establish that the plaintiff severed from the family more than 50 years back and that he was never treated as the family member of deceased Annavarapu Krupa Rao and his wife Annavarapu Kanthamma and as such he is not entitled to seek the partition of the plaint schedule properties. 

v)The observation of the lower court that there is much difference in between adopted son and fostered son is not on sound principles of law and facts. The observations and comment made by the lower Court in that regard are quite untenable and also suffer from serious legal infirmities.

vi)The lower court should have believed that Ex.B2 Will is genuine, and the same was duly executed by Annavarapu Kanthamma and that DW1 proved the said Will as required in law and that the evidence of DW2 is quite sufficient to accept the genuineness of the truthfulness of Ex.B2 Will.

8 vii)The lower Court failed to note that none of the brothers and sisters of the 1st appellant ever disputed the transaction under Ex.A2 and it itself goes to show that they gave authority to the 1st appellant to sell the property. Authority always need not be specific, even implied authority is valid in law.

viii)The lower court failed to note that Ex.A 2 sale deed is validly executed by the 1st appellant and the same is binding on all other members of the family and that the 1st respondent/plaintiff has no right to question the said transaction. 

Therefore, the appellants/defendants 1 to 8 prayed to allow the appeal with costs by modifying the judgment and decree of the lower Court. 

11. Now the points that arise for determination in this appeal are:

1) Whether the plaintiff was taken in adoption by his junior paternal uncle Sudarshan in 1955 and severed from natural family and thereby became not entitled to seek partition of plaint schedule properties?

2) To what relief?

12. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants 1,2,4 to 9 has contended that in Ex.A1 Will it is wrongly written as 5 sons, excluding the son/plaintiff. That apart, there is no mention about

Ex.A1 Will in Ex.A3 notice. There is admission of plaintiff in OS 1588/2001 showing that mother died intestate. It is further submitted that going by the recitals Ex.A4 gift deed it is clear that plaintiff was taken in adoption 26 years prior to 1985; in Ex.A6 marriage extract name of adoptive father is mentioned. There is recital in Ex,.B2 Will executed by mother Kanthamma to the effect that plaintiff was adopted son. It is, therefore, contended that 9 when once Ex.A1 will is disbelieved and the defendants have proved that plaintiff went in adoption, the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in Items 1 and 2 and hence the decree passed by the trial Court be set aside.

13. The learned counsel for the respondent 1/plaintiff has, on the other hand, contended that the parties are Christians, and there is no adoption under Christian law. He urged that the expression in Ex.A4 only means fostering not adoption; no date of so­called adoption is mentioned under Ex.A4 as also in Ex.A5 gift deed. Mere “taking” is not sufficient, especially when it is not certified by natural parents. None of the natural family members attended the ceremony; no natural family member attested the document. There is no document to show that the natural parents excluded the plaintiff from inheritance/succession. The burden is on the defendants to prove the adoption, but they failed to discharge the burden. In such a case, he argued that the plaintiff is to be treated as son of Krupa Rao and consequently plaintiff is entitled to succeed to the properties of Krupa Rao and

Kanthamma. It is submitted that instead of 5 shares in Item 2, the trial Court erroneously directed 8 shares and hence the decree passed by the trial Court be set aside and 5 shares be allotted in

Item 2.

14. The admitted facts are Krupa Rao and Kanthamma got 5 sons (plaintiff, defendants 1 to 3 and Varaprasad) and 3 10 daughters (defendants 4 to 6). One of the sons Vara Prasad died, leaving behind him wife (defendant 7) and 2 sons (defendants 8 and 9). Plaintiff seeks partition of Items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule property. He claims 1/8th share in Item 1 and 1/5th share in Item 2. According to the plaintiff/PW1, Item 1 i.e.,

Ac.0­60 cents of agricultural land is ancestral property of father

Krupa Rao, which he got from his father in partition along with his brothers. Father Krupa Rao died intestate on 7­6­1979. PW1 further says mother Kanthamma died on 25­06­1998 without mentioning anything about her share in Item 1 in the Will executed by her on 9­4­1996 (Ex.A1) Thus the plaintiff says himself, defendants 1 to 6 each and defendants 7 to 9 together (eight shares) are entitled for equal share in Item 1.

15. The contesting defendants, however, dispute the claim of plaintiff. At the earliest point of time in written statement, they stated that father Krupa Rao bequeathed Item 1 to wife

Kanthamma and after death of Krupa Rao, having become the absolute owner of Item 1, mother Kanthamma executed a Will,

dated 2­1­1998 (Ex.B2). She bequeathed Item 1 in favour of her 4

sons (defendants 1 to 3 and Varaprasad). Defendants denied the execution of Ex.A1 Will by Kanthamma. The general contention of the defendants in written statement that Item 1 is not the ancestral property of Krupa Rao is not relevant. Defendant 1/DW1 stated that Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa Rao. He clarified that the statement to the contrary in written statement is not correct. He further admitted that father Krupa Rao never 11 executed any document in respect of his property, either in favour of his wife Kanthamma or anybody else. He made it clear that in written statement as also in his chief affidavit it is wrongly mentioned that father bequeathed the properties in favour of

Kanthamma. The above admission of DW1 makes it clear that the execution of Will Ex.B2 by mother in favour of 4 sons is not valid, because mother Kanthamma has no exclusive rights over Item 1.

When thus the father Krupa Rao died intestate and when Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa Rao his property devolves upon all his 8 children.

16. The defendants have set up a plea that plaintiff went in adoption in the year 1955 to the family of his junior paternal uncle, who is brother of his father Krupa Rao. Plaintiffs stoutly deny this case of defendants. It is contended by the learned counsel for plaintiff that the evidence on record would only show that plaintiff was being fostered by Sudarsanam but not taken in adoption; that the word ‘fostering’ is different from ‘adoption’.

17. The learned counsel for defendants has invited attention to

Ex.B1 settlement deed and Ex.B3/A6 marriage extract in support of his contention. A perusal of Ex.B1 shows plaintiff is fostered by

Sudarsanam. The document does not expressly say that plaintiff was taken in adoption. Similarly in Ex.B3 Sudarsanam signed in the column father/guardian. This document also does not disclose expressly that Sudarsanam is the adoptive father of plaintiff. Furthermore, in Ex.A4 and A5 gift deeds, it is stated that plaintiff is fostered by Sudarsanam since childhood. These 12 documents do not say that plaintiff was taken in adoption by

Sudarsanam.

18. It is an admitted position that Christian Law does not recognize adoption. The learned counsel for defendants relied upon the decision in Philips @ Alfred Malvin v. Gonsalvis ( AIR 1999 (Ker.) 187) in support of his contention that as Christian law does not prohibit adoption, adoption effected could in appropriate cases would be valid and legal.

19. The learned counsel for plaintiff relied upon the decision in Shabanam Hashmi v. Union of India (2014 AIR SCW 1329) whereinit was observed that the decision of Kerala High Court in

Philips @ Alfred Malvin (supra)  can be best understood to have been rendered in the facts of the respective cases.

20. The other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the defendants, namely,

1. KV Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal (1997 (1) Supreme 13)

2. L. Debi Prasad (died) by Lrs v. Tribeni Devi (AIR 1970 (SC) 1286)

3. Munivenkatappa v. Doddamuniyappa (2007Supreme (Kar)737 have no application to the facts of the present case, because they were rendered in cases arising under the Hindu Law. The fact that Sudarsanam who fostered plaintiff settled properties in favour of plaintiff does not make adoption as proved. I, therefore, reject the contention of the defendant that plaintiff was taken in 13 adoption and as such he ceased to be the member of natural family and not entitled to any share in Item 1. The defendants have failed to substantiate their contention in this regard.

21. A glance at Ex.B2 Will reveals it is an unregistered Will and it is surrounded by several suspicious circumstances. In the first instance, as already stated, a mention of Item 1 in this Will itself shows Kanthamma having no exclusive rights over Item 1 bequeathed it under Will. Secondly, Ex.B2 is a typed one; there are variations on pages regarding line spacing; signature of

Kanthamma bears different dates; even though one of sons (plaintiff) is eliminated from giving any share, no endeavor is made to get the Will registered. Lastly, the stamp used for drafting the

Will was purchased on 30­08­1990, whereas Municipal

Corporation executed sale deed only on 18­01­1993 i.e., about 3 years after purchase of stamp. When thus Ex.B2 Will is shrouded with suspicious circumstances, the evidence of DW2 one of the attestors is of no avail to the defendants. I, therefore, hold the defendants have failed to prove that plaintiff went in adoption. It follows the plaintiff continues to be the member of family of Krupa

Rao and Kanthamma and thereby he is entitled to share equally in

Item 1 of plaint schedule property along with other children of

Krupa Rao i.e., 1/8th share. 

22. Now coming to Item 2, plaintiff/PW1 relies upon Ex.A1 Will executed by mother Kanthamma among her sons including plaintiff and he is entitled for 1/5th share. Defendants, on the other hand, again relied upon Ex.B2 Will executed by mother.

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The mother bequeathed Item 2 in favour of her 4 sons excluding the plaintiff in Ex.B 2 Will. I already observed that Ex.B2 Will is highly suspicious and cannot be relied upon. Coming to Ex.A1

Will set up by the plaintiff, I find it is equally suspicious. Firstly, prior to filing the suit plaintiff issued Ex.A3 notice. In that notice there is no whisper about Ex.A1 Will. Secondly, plaintiff filed OS 1588/2001 for permanent injunction. Defendants have filed IA 319/17 in AS 85/2007 submitting copy of judgment in OS 1588/2001. In the plaint in that suit, the plaintiff has clearly stated that mother Kanthamma “died intestate on 25­06­1998”.

That being so, plaintiff cannot take a different plea in this suit that mother Kanthamma executed Ex.A1 Will. That being so, the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 is of no help to the plaintiff. When the 2

Wills Exs.A and B2 are disbelieved, it follows the 8 sharers are entitled to share both Items 1 and 2 equally.

23. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued that during pendency of suit 1st defendant sold away Item 1 under Ex.A2 regd.

sale deed. A reading of Ex.A2 shows it was executed by 1st defendant alone. The other sharers have not signed in the sale deed. It is not the case of DW1 that there are no other sharers.

What he stated in his evidence is that the other sharers have authorized him to sell away the said property. There is no recital in Ex.A2 showing any such authorization. The recital in Ex.A2 that the property exclusively belongs to 1st defendant is apparently false. The sale is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The sale does not bind the co­ 15 sharers including the plaintiff. Mere issuance of Ex.B5 title deed in the name of 1st defendant does not give him any exclusive title in respect of Item 1. Ex.B5 title deed is only a record of right issued for the purpose of collection of land revenue by the revenue authorities. The other co­sharers have not relinquished their rights in respect of both Items of suit schedule property. I find the trial Court has reached correct conclusions basing on proper assessment of the evidence let­in by both parties. I see no irregularity or illegality committed by trial court in coming to such conclusion. The appeal lacks merits. This point is answered accordingly.

POINT No.2:­

24. In the result, I dismiss the appeal with costs, confirming the judgment of the II Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada,

dated 14­12­2006 made in OS No.3083/2001.

(Dictated to the stenographer, transcribed by her, corrected and pronounced by me in the Open Court, on this the 7th day of November, 2017) 

VII ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE,

VIJAYAWADA.

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IN THE COURT OF VII ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE: VIJAYAWADA.

Present: Sri M. Srikanth Chary, VII Addl. District Judge

Tuesday, this the 7th day of November, 2017

AS No.74 of 2007

Between:

Annavarapu Kalyana Rao …Appellant

AND

1. Annavarapu Babu Rao

2. Annavarapu Jaswantha Rao

3. Annavarapu Ramesh Babu

4. Gunturu Kamala Devi

5. Gandepudi Kanakavalli

6. Gujjula Raja Kumari

7. Annavarapu Vasantha

8. Annavarapu Saratchandra

9. Annavarapu Bharatchandra … Respondents

On appeal from the Judgment and decree dated 14­12­2006 of the II Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada made in:

O.S.No.3083 of 2001

Between:

Annavarapu Kalyana Rao .. Plaintiff

And

1. Annavarapu Babu Rao

2. Annavarapu Jaswantha Rao

3. Annavarapu Ramesh Babu

4. Gunturu Kamala Devi

5. Gandepudi Kanakavalli

6. Gujjula Raja Kumari

7. Annavarapu Vasantha

8. Annavarapu Saratchandra

9. Annavarapu Bharatchandra .. Defendants

This Appeal coming on for final hearing before me on 19­09­2017, and upon perusing the material papers on record and grounds of appeal and upon hearing the arguments of Sri JRK Sarma, Advocate for the Appellant, and of Sri T. Bhairraju, advocate for respondents and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this court delivered the following:

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J U D G M E N T

1.This appeal arises out of the Judgment and decree dated dt.14­12­2006 of the II Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada in

OS No.3083/2001. The unsuccessful plaintiff in so far as item 2 is

concerned is the appellant. To obviate any confusion, the parties are referred to in this appeal by their status in the Original Suit. 

2. The plaintiff filed the suit for partition of Item 1 into 8 equal shares and Item 2 into 5 equal shares and to allot one share in both items to him. The plaint averments, briefly stated, are as follows:

Plaintiff, defendants 1 to 6 and Varaprasad are the children of late Krupa Rao and Kanthamma. Krupa Rao died on 07­06­1979 leaving behind wife, and children (defendants 1 to 6 and Varaprasad) after retirement as teacher. Kanthamma also died on 25­06­1998 after retirement as teacher. Item 1 of the plaint schedule property was the ancestral property derived by

Krupa Rao in a partition effected along with his brothers. Item 2 is acquired by Kanthamma under the regd. Sale deed dated 17­01­1993. In the Will executed by Kanthamma on 9­4­1996 she has not mentioned anything about her rights over the share devolved by her in Item 1. Vara Prasad (4th son) died on 12­08­1999 leaving behind him his wife and sons (defendants 7 to 9). Thus the plaintiff, defendants 1 to 6 each and defendants 7 to 9 together are entitled for equal share in Item 1. Plaintiff is entitled for 1/8th share in Item 1.

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3. Kanthamma was in occupation of 126 sy site for over a period of 50 years prior to 1993. The Vijayawada Municipal

Corporation (VMC) decided to sell the said property to the occupier at nominal cost. Kanthamma through her sons paid Rs.3150 under challan dated 13­03­1981 for the entire site of 126 sy at the rate of Rs.25/­ per sy. Vijayawada Municipal Corporation executed regd. Sale deed for 98 sy only, an extent of 28 sy to

Kanthamma on the extreme north.

4. On 9­04­1996 Kanthamma executed a Will regarding Item 2.

After her death on 25­06­1998 the excess extent of 28 sy on north is given possession and enjoyment to the plaintiff, excluding all of her children. In the remaining 98 sy of site and house (shown as

Item 2), she made bequest among all her 5 sons. The plaintiff is entitled for 1/5th i.e., 19.6 sy. The plaintiff has been in occupation of the excess piece of property of 28 sy and he is enjoying the same exclusively. 

5. Defendants are not co­operating for partition of Items 1 and 2 inspite of notice dated 9­8­2000. Instead of co­operating with plaintiff the defendants colluded together and filed caveats before

Courts at Vijayawada, began to get Pattadar Pass book in the name of 1st defendant influencing the revenue authorities and tried to sell Item 1 of the plaint schedule property. Plaintiff issued notices to Sub­registrar and MRO to stop such illegal transactions. 1st defendant having grudge against the plaintiff changed the boundaries of Item 1 meddling with boundaries of the land pertaining to the land situated on the north. Hence the suit.

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6. Defendants 3,4,6 to 9 remained exparte. The other defendants have contested the suit claim. 1st defendant filed a written statement which is adopted by defendants 2 and 5. The contesting defendants admitted the relationship between the parties. Even while admitting that item 2 is the self­acquired property of Kanthamma, they have denied that Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa Rao and that he died intestate. They have pleaded that Krupa Rao bequeathed his property to

Kanthamma and after death of Krupa Rao, Kanthamma became absolute owner of property of Krupa Rao. They alleged that the

Will dated 9­4­1996 executed by Kanthamma is fabricated and created by the plaintiff for the purpose of suit. The defendants have pleaded that the plaintiff was given in adoption to the brother of Krupa Rao in the year 1955 and since then he had been living with his adoptive father Sudarsanam. The marriage of plaintiff was performed by Sudarsanam according to their custom.

Plaintiff never participated in the affairs of his natural father. The adoptive father settled some properties on 16­03­1959 under settlement deed. He also executed another settlement deed dated 5­6­1985 in favour of plaintiff. It is further pleaded that as per the

Will executed by Kanthamma on 2­1­1998 the entire properties fell to the share of her male children except the plaintiff. Plaintiff has never be in the possession and enjoyment of Items 1 and 2.

As the notice issued by the plaintiff contained baseless contentions, 1stdefendant kept quiet without giving any reply. It is further pleaded that the suit for mere partition is not maintainable 5 without seeking declaration of rights in the suit property.

Contesting defendants, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit.

7. On the strength of the above pleadings, the trial court has framed the following issues for trial:

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint schedule property as prayed for?

2) To what relief?

8. At the trial, PWs 1 to 3 are examined and Exs.A1 to A8 documents exhibited on behalf of the plaintiff. DWs 1 and 2 are examined and Exs.B1 to B5 documents exhibited on behalf of the contesting defendants.

9. On assessment of the oral and documentary evidence let­ in by both the parties, the lower court has observed that there is admission of DW1 that Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa

Rao. He further pleaded that Krupa Rao has not executed any document during his lifetime in respect of Item 1. Thus Item 1 devolved upon the legal heirs of Krupa Rao. The Will dated 2­1­1998 (Ex.B2) executed by Kanthamma is suspicious. She herself is not entitled to execute Will in respect of Item 1. As regards the plea of defendant that plaintiff went in adoption in the year 1955 and as such he will not get any rights over the property of natural father Krupa Rao, the trial Court observed that the plaintiff canvassed that he was only fostered but not adopted. The trial Court held that Exs.A4, A5 gift deeds do not disclose adoption. So also Ex.A6 marriage extract. Ex.B1 gift deed which is 30 years old document reveals that plaintiff was being fostered.

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Ex.B3 marriage extract reveals that Sudarshanam signed under the column father/guardian but it does not disclose that he was the adoptive father. So observing, it was held that adoption is not proved but it only shows plaintiff is treated as a fostered son.

That being so, the plaintiff cannot be deprived of his status in the natural family, unless he has relinquished his rights. There is no document showing any relinquishment. Hence plaintiff being one of the legal heirs of Krupa rao who died intestate is entitled along with other legal heris for a share in Item 1. With respect to Item 2, the trial Court observed that the plaintiff relies upon Will dated 9­4­1996 (Ex.A1) whereas defendants disputed that Will. They set up a Will dated 2­1­1998 executed by Kanthamma in which the plaintiff is totally excluded. The trial Court observed that prior to filing suit the plaintiff issued Ex.A2 notice, wherein there is no whisper about Ex.A1 Will. Furthermore, in OS 1588/2001 filed by plaintiff in the present suit stated that mother died intestate. So observing the trial Court rejected Ex.A1 saying that the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 attestors is of no help to the plaintiff. It was further held that Ex.B2 will set up by defendants is also suspicious. Accordingly Item 2 also devolves equally among all the legal heirs of Kanthamma, including plaintiff. The trial Court decreed the suit directing partition of Item 1 and 2 into 8 equal shares and for allotment of one such share to plaintiff. 

10. Aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial Court, the appellant/plaintiff has preferred this appeal, raising the following grounds:

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i)The finding of the trial Court with regard to division of Item 2 is against the principles of law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case.

ii)The learned judge failed to appreciate the circumstances and tenor of Ex.A3 notice. That notice was issued when 1st defendant was trying to alienate the property. 

iii)The learned Judge ought not have observed that the mentioning of sentence in OS 1588/2001 about the demise of his mother as intestate is not applicable to the suit OS 3083/2001 and also that in the said suit

OS 1588/2001 the property of his mother is not at all

included. 

iv)The learned trial judge ought to have observed that the plaintiff had clearly proved the execution of the Will Ex.A1 dated 9­4­1996 by his mother and nothing is elicited by the defendants showing any suspicious circumstances.

v)In view of the finding of the learned Junior Civil Judge about the execution of the Will, it ought to have ordered division of item 2 of the plaint schedule into five shares only and ought to have allotted 1/5th share to the appellant/plaintiff. 

Therefore, the appellant/plaintiff prayed to allow the appeal with costs by modifying the judgment and decree of the lower Court. 

11. Now the points that arise for determination in this appeal are:

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint schedule property?

2) To what relief?

Point No.1:

12. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has contended that the parties are Christians, and there is no adoption under Christian law. He urged that the expression in

Ex.A4 only means fostering not adoption; no date of so­called 8 adoption is mentioned under Ex.A4 as also in Ex.A5 gift deed.

Mere “taking” is not sufficient, especially when it is not certified by natural parents. None of the natural family members attended the ceremony; no natural family member attested the document.

There is no document to show that the natural parents excluded the plaintiff from inheritance/succession. The burden is on the defendants to prove the adoption, but they failed to discharge the burden. In such a case, he argued that the plaintiff is to be treated as son of Krupa Rao and consequently plaintiff is entitled to succeed to the properties of Krupa Rao and Kanthamma. It is submitted that instead of 5 shares in Item 2, the trial Court erroneously directed 8 shares and hence the decree passed by the trial Court be set aside and 5 shares be allotted in Item 2.

13. The learned counsel for the respondents/defendants has, on the other hand, contended that in Ex.A1 Will it is wrongly written as 5 sons, excluding the son/plaintiff. That apart, there is no mention about Ex.A1 Will in Ex.A3 notice. There is admission of plaintiff in OS 1588/2001 showing that mother died intestate. It is further submitted that going by the recitals Ex.A4 gift deed it is clear that plaintiff was taken in adoption 26 years prior to 1985; in Ex.A6 marriage extract name of adoptive father is mentioned. There is recital in

Ex.B2 Will executed by mother Kanthamma to the effect that plaintiff was adopted son. It is, therefore, contended that when once Ex.A1 will is disbelieved and the defendants have proved that plaintiff went in adoption, the plaintiff is not entitled 9 to any share in Items 1 and 2 and hence the decree passed by the trial Court be set aside.

14. The admitted facts are Krupa Rao and Kanthamma got 5 sons (plaintiff, defendants 1 to 3 and Varaprasad) and 3 daughters (defendants 4 to 6). One of the sons Vara Prasad died, leaving behind him wife (defendant 7) and 2 sons (defendants 8 and 9). Plaintiff seeks partition of Items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule property. He claims 1/8th share in Item 1 and 1/5th share in Item 2. According to the plaintiff/PW1, Item 1 i.e., Ac.0­ 60 cents of agricultural land is ancestral property of father Krupa

Rao, which he got from his father in partition along with his brothers. Father Krupa Rao died intestate on 7­6­1979. PW1 further says mother Kanthamma died on 25­06­1998 without mentioning anything about her share in Item 1 in the Will executed by her on 9­4­1996 (Ex.A1) Thus the plaintiff says himself, defendants 1 to 6 each and defendants 7 to 9 together (eight shares) are entitled for equal share in Item 1.

15. The contesting defendants, however, dispute the claim of plaintiff. At the earliest point of time in written statement, they stated that father Krupa Rao bequeathed Item 1 to wife

Kanthamma and after death of Krupa Rao, having become the absolute owner of Item 1, mother Kanthamma executed a Will,

dated 2­1­1998 (Ex.B2). She bequeathed Item 1 in favour of her 4

sons (defendants 1 to 3 and Varaprasad). Defendants denied the execution of Ex.A1 Will by Kanthamma. The general contention of the defendants in written statement that Item 1 is not the 10 ancestral property of Krupa Rao is not relevant. Defendant 1/DW1 stated that Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa Rao.

He clarified that the statement to the contrary in written statement is not correct. He further admitted that father Krupa

Rao never executed any document in respect of his property, either in favour of his wife Kanthamma or anybody else. He made it clear that in written statement as also in his chief affidavit it is wrongly mentioned that father bequeathed the properties in favour of Kanthamma. The above admission of DW1 makes it clear that the execution of Will Ex.B2 by mother in favour of 4 sons is not valid, because mother Kanthamma has no exclusive rights over

Item 1. When thus the father Krupa Rao died intestate and when

Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa Rao his property devolves upon all his 8 children.

16. The defendants have set up a plea that plaintiff went in adoption in the year 1955 to the family of his junior paternal uncle, who is brother of his father Krupa Rao. Plaintiffs stoutly deny this case of defendants. It is contended by the learned counsel for plaintiff that the evidence on record would only show that plaintiff was being fostered by Sudarsanam but not taken in adoption; that the word ‘fostering’ is different from ‘adoption’.

17. The learned counsel for defendants has invited attention to

Ex.B1 settlement deed and Ex.B3/A6 marriage extract in support of his contention. A perusal of Ex.B1 shows plaintiff is fostered by

Sudarsanam. The document does not expressly say that plaintiff was taken in adoption. Similarly in Ex.B3 Sudarsanam signed in 11 the column father/guardian. This document also does not disclose expressly that Sudarsanam is the adoptive father of plaintiff. Furthermore, in Ex.A4 and A5 gift deeds, it is stated that plaintiff is fostered by Sudarsanam since childhood. These documents do not say that plaintiff was taken in adoption by

Sudarsanam.

18. It is an admitted position that Christian Law does not recognize adoption. The learned counsel for defendants relied upon the decision in Philips @ Alfred Malvin v. Gonsalvis ( AIR 1999 (Ker.) 187) in support of his contention that as Christian law does not prohibit adoption, adoption effected could in appropriate cases would be valid and legal.

19. The learned counsel for plaintiff relied upon the decision in Shabanam Hashmi v. Union of India (2014 AIR SCW 1329) whereinit was observed that the decision of Kerala High Court in

Philips @ Alfred Malvin (supra)  can be best understood to have been rendered in the facts of the respective cases.

20. The other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the defendants, namely,

1. KV Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal (1997 (1) Supreme 13)

2. L. Debi Prasad (died) by Lrs v. Tribeni Devi (AIR 1970 (SC) 1286)

3. Munivenkatappa v. Doddamuniyappa (2007 Supreme (Kar) 737 12 have no application to the facts of the present case, because they were rendered in cases arising under the Hindu Law. The fact that Sudarsanam who fostered plaintiff settled properties in favour of plaintiff does not make adoption as proved. I, therefore, reject the contention of the defendant that plaintiff was taken in adoption and as such he ceased to be the member of natural family and not entitled to any share in Item 1. The defendants have failed to substantiate their contention in this regard.

21. A glance at Ex.B2 Will reveals it is an unregistered Will and it is surrounded by several suspicious circumstances. In the first instance, as already stated, a mention of Item 1 in this Will itself shows Kanthamma having no exclusive rights over Item 1 bequeathed it under Will. Secondly, Ex.B2 is a typed one; there are variations on pages regarding line spacing; signature of

Kanthamma bears different dates; even though one of sons (plaintiff) is eliminated from giving any share, no endeavor is made to get the Will registered. Lastly, the stamp used for drafting the

Will was purchased on 30­08­1990, whereas Municipal

Corporation executed sale deed only on 18­01­1993 i.e., about 3 years after purchase of stamp. When thus Ex.B2 Will is shrouded with suspicious circumstances, the evidence of DW2 one of the attestors is of no avail to the defendants. I, therefore, hold the defendants have failed to prove that plaintiff went in adoption. It follows the plaintiff continues to be the member of family of Krupa

Rao and Kanthamma and thereby he is entitled to share equally in 13

Item 1 of plaint schedule property along with other children of

Krupa Rao i.e., 1/8th share. 

22. Now coming to Item 2, plaintiff/PW1 relies upon Ex.A1 Will executed by mother Kanthamma among her sons including plaintiff and he is entitled for 1/5th share. Defendants, on the other hand, again relied upon Ex.B2 Will executed by mother.

The mother bequeathed Item 2 in favour of her 4 sons excluding the plaintiff in Ex.B 2 Will. I already observed that Ex.B2 Will is highly suspicious and cannot be relied upon. Coming to Ex.A1

Will set up by the plaintiff, I find it is equally suspicious. Firstly, prior to filing the suit plaintiff issued Ex.A3 notice. In that notice there is no whisper about Ex.A1 Will. Secondly, plaintiff filed OS 1588/2001 for permanent injunction. Defendants have filed IA 319/17 in AS 85/2007 submitting copy of judgment in OS 1588/2001. In the plaint in that suit, the plaintiff has clearly stated that mother Kanthamma “died intestate on 25­06­1998”.

That being so, plaintiff cannot take a different plea in this suit that mother Kanthamma executed Ex.A1 Will. That being so, the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 is of no help to the plaintiff. When the 2

Wills Exs.A and B2 are disbelieved, it follows the 8 sharers are entitled to share both Items 1 and 2 equally.

23. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued that during pendency of suit 1st defendant sold away Item 1 under Ex.A2 regd.

sale deed. A reading of Ex.A2 shows it was executed by 1st defendant alone. The other sharers have not signed in the sale deed. It is not the case of DW1 that there are no other sharers.

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What he stated in his evidence is that the other sharers have authorized him to sell away the said property. There is no recital in Ex.A2 showing any such authorization. The recital in Ex.A2 that the property exclusively belongs to 1st defendant is apparently false. The sale is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The sale does not bind the co­ sharers including the plaintiff. Mere issuance of Ex.B5 title deed in the name of 1st defendant does not give him any exclusive title in respect of Item 1. Ex.B5 title deed is only a record of right issued for the purpose of collection of land revenue by the revenue authorities. The other co­sharers have not relinquished their rights in respect of both Items of suit schedule property. I find the trial Court has reached correct conclusions basing on proper assessment of the evidence let­in by both parties. I see no irregularity or illegality committed by trial court in coming to such conclusion. The appeal lacks merits. This point is answered accordingly.

POINT No.2:­

24. In the result, I dismiss the appeal with costs, confirming the judgment of the II Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada,

dated 14­12­2006 made in OS No.3083/2001.

(Dictated to the stenographer, transcribed by her, corrected and pronounced by me in the Open Court, on this the 7th day of November, 2017) 

VII ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE,

VIJAYAWADA.

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IN THE COURT OF VII ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE: VIJAYAWADA.

Present: Sri M. Srikanth Chary, VII Addl. District Judge

Tuesday, this the 7th day of November, 2017

AS No.74 of 2007

Between:

Annavarapu Kalyana Rao …Appellant

AND

1. Annavarapu Babu Rao

2. Annavarapu Jaswantha Rao

3. Annavarapu Ramesh Babu

4. Gunturu Kamala Devi

5. Gandepudi Kanakavalli

6. Gujjula Raja Kumari

7. Annavarapu Vasantha

8. Annavarapu Saratchandra

9. Annavarapu Bharatchandra … Respondents

On appeal from the Judgment and decree dated 14­12­2006 of the II Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada made in:

O.S.No.3083 of 2001

Between:

Annavarapu Kalyana Rao .. Plaintiff

And

1. Annavarapu Babu Rao

2. Annavarapu Jaswantha Rao

3. Annavarapu Ramesh Babu

4. Gunturu Kamala Devi

5. Gandepudi Kanakavalli

6. Gujjula Raja Kumari

7. Annavarapu Vasantha

8. Annavarapu Saratchandra

9. Annavarapu Bharatchandra .. Defendants

This Appeal coming on for final hearing before me on 19­09­2017, and upon perusing the material papers on record and grounds of appeal and upon hearing the arguments of Sri JRK Sarma, Advocate for the Appellant, and of Sri T. Bhairraju, advocate for respondents and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this court delivered the following:

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J U D G M E N T

1.This appeal arises out of the Judgment and decree dated dt.14­12­2006 of the II Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada in

OS No.3083/2001. The unsuccessful plaintiff in so far as item 2 is

concerned is the appellant. To obviate any confusion, the parties are referred to in this appeal by their status in the Original Suit. 

2. The plaintiff filed the suit for partition of Item 1 into 8 equal shares and Item 2 into 5 equal shares and to allot one share in both items to him. The plaint averments, briefly stated, are as follows:

Plaintiff, defendants 1 to 6 and Varaprasad are the children of late Krupa Rao and Kanthamma. Krupa Rao died on 07­06­1979 leaving behind wife, and children (defendants 1 to 6 and Varaprasad) after retirement as teacher. Kanthamma also died on 25­06­1998 after retirement as teacher. Item 1 of the plaint schedule property was the ancestral property derived by

Krupa Rao in a partition effected along with his brothers. Item 2 is acquired by Kanthamma under the regd. Sale deed dated 17­01­1993. In the Will executed by Kanthamma on 9­4­1996 she has not mentioned anything about her rights over the share devolved by her in Item 1. Vara Prasad (4th son) died on 12­08­1999 leaving behind him his wife and sons (defendants 7 to 9). Thus the plaintiff, defendants 1 to 6 each and defendants 7 to 9 together are entitled for equal share in Item 1. Plaintiff is entitled for 1/8th share in Item 1.

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3. Kanthamma was in occupation of 126 sy site for over a period of 50 years prior to 1993. The Vijayawada Municipal

Corporation (VMC) decided to sell the said property to the occupier at nominal cost. Kanthamma through her sons paid Rs.3150 under challan dated 13­03­1981 for the entire site of 126 sy at the rate of Rs.25/­ per sy. Vijayawada Municipal Corporation executed regd. Sale deed for 98 sy only, an extent of 28 sy to

Kanthamma on the extreme north.

4. On 9­04­1996 Kanthamma executed a Will regarding Item 2.

After her death on 25­06­1998 the excess extent of 28 sy on north is given possession and enjoyment to the plaintiff, excluding all of her children. In the remaining 98 sy of site and house (shown as

Item 2), she made bequest among all her 5 sons. The plaintiff is entitled for 1/5th i.e., 19.6 sy. The plaintiff has been in occupation of the excess piece of property of 28 sy and he is enjoying the same exclusively. 

5. Defendants are not co­operating for partition of Items 1 and 2 inspite of notice dated 9­8­2000. Instead of co­operating with plaintiff the defendants colluded together and filed caveats before

Courts at Vijayawada, began to get Pattadar Pass book in the name of 1st defendant influencing the revenue authorities and tried to sell Item 1 of the plaint schedule property. Plaintiff issued notices to Sub­registrar and MRO to stop such illegal transactions. 1st defendant having grudge against the plaintiff changed the boundaries of Item 1 meddling with boundaries of the land pertaining to the land situated on the north. Hence the suit.

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6. Defendants 3,4,6 to 9 remained exparte. The other defendants have contested the suit claim. 1st defendant filed a written statement which is adopted by defendants 2 and 5. The contesting defendants admitted the relationship between the parties. Even while admitting that item 2 is the self­acquired property of Kanthamma, they have denied that Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa Rao and that he died intestate. They have pleaded that Krupa Rao bequeathed his property to

Kanthamma and after death of Krupa Rao, Kanthamma became absolute owner of property of Krupa Rao. They alleged that the

Will dated 9­4­1996 executed by Kanthamma is fabricated and created by the plaintiff for the purpose of suit. The defendants have pleaded that the plaintiff was given in adoption to the brother of Krupa Rao in the year 1955 and since then he had been living with his adoptive father Sudarsanam. The marriage of plaintiff was performed by Sudarsanam according to their custom.

Plaintiff never participated in the affairs of his natural father. The adoptive father settled some properties on 16­03­1959 under settlement deed. He also executed another settlement deed dated 5­6­1985 in favour of plaintiff. It is further pleaded that as per the

Will executed by Kanthamma on 2­1­1998 the entire properties fell to the share of her male children except the plaintiff. Plaintiff has never be in the possession and enjoyment of Items 1 and 2.

As the notice issued by the plaintiff contained baseless contentions, 1stdefendant kept quiet without giving any reply. It is further pleaded that the suit for mere partition is not maintainable 5 without seeking declaration of rights in the suit property.

Contesting defendants, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit.

7. On the strength of the above pleadings, the trial court has framed the following issues for trial:

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint schedule property as prayed for?

2) To what relief?

8. At the trial, PWs 1 to 3 are examined and Exs.A1 to A8 documents exhibited on behalf of the plaintiff. DWs 1 and 2 are examined and Exs.B1 to B5 documents exhibited on behalf of the contesting defendants.

9. On assessment of the oral and documentary evidence let­ in by both the parties, the lower court has observed that there is admission of DW1 that Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa

Rao. He further pleaded that Krupa Rao has not executed any document during his lifetime in respect of Item 1. Thus Item 1 devolved upon the legal heirs of Krupa Rao. The Will dated 2­1­1998 (Ex.B2) executed by Kanthamma is suspicious. She herself is not entitled to execute Will in respect of Item 1. As regards the plea of defendant that plaintiff went in adoption in the year 1955 and as such he will not get any rights over the property of natural father Krupa Rao, the trial Court observed that the plaintiff canvassed that he was only fostered but not adopted. The trial Court held that Exs.A4, A5 gift deeds do not disclose adoption. So also Ex.A6 marriage extract. Ex.B1 gift deed which is 30 years old document reveals that plaintiff was being fostered.

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Ex.B3 marriage extract reveals that Sudarshanam signed under the column father/guardian but it does not disclose that he was the adoptive father. So observing, it was held that adoption is not proved but it only shows plaintiff is treated as a fostered son.

That being so, the plaintiff cannot be deprived of his status in the natural family, unless he has relinquished his rights. There is no document showing any relinquishment. Hence plaintiff being one of the legal heirs of Krupa rao who died intestate is entitled along with other legal heris for a share in Item 1. With respect to Item 2, the trial Court observed that the plaintiff relies upon Will dated 9­4­1996 (Ex.A1) whereas defendants disputed that Will. They set up a Will dated 2­1­1998 executed by Kanthamma in which the plaintiff is totally excluded. The trial Court observed that prior to filing suit the plaintiff issued Ex.A2 notice, wherein there is no whisper about Ex.A1 Will. Furthermore, in OS 1588/2001 filed by plaintiff in the present suit stated that mother died intestate. So observing the trial Court rejected Ex.A1 saying that the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 attestors is of no help to the plaintiff. It was further held that Ex.B2 will set up by defendants is also suspicious. Accordingly Item 2 also devolves equally among all the legal heirs of Kanthamma, including plaintiff. The trial Court decreed the suit directing partition of Item 1 and 2 into 8 equal shares and for allotment of one such share to plaintiff. 

10. Aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial Court, the appellant/plaintiff has preferred this appeal, raising the following grounds:

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i)The finding of the trial Court with regard to division of Item 2 is against the principles of law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case.

ii)The learned judge failed to appreciate the circumstances and tenor of Ex.A3 notice. That notice was issued when 1st defendant was trying to alienate the property. 

iii)The learned Judge ought not have observed that the mentioning of sentence in OS 1588/2001 about the demise of his mother as intestate is not applicable to the suit OS 3083/2001 and also that in the said suit

OS 1588/2001 the property of his mother is not at all

included. 

iv)The learned trial judge ought to have observed that the plaintiff had clearly proved the execution of the Will Ex.A1 dated 9­4­1996 by his mother and nothing is elicited by the defendants showing any suspicious circumstances.

v)In view of the finding of the learned Junior Civil Judge about the execution of the Will, it ought to have ordered division of item 2 of the plaint schedule into five shares only and ought to have allotted 1/5th share to the appellant/plaintiff. 

Therefore, the appellant/plaintiff prayed to allow the appeal with costs by modifying the judgment and decree of the lower Court. 

11. Now the points that arise for determination in this appeal are:

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint schedule property?

2) To what relief?

Point No.1:

12. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has contended that the parties are Christians, and there is no adoption under Christian law. He urged that the expression in

Ex.A4 only means fostering not adoption; no date of so­called 8 adoption is mentioned under Ex.A4 as also in Ex.A5 gift deed.

Mere “taking” is not sufficient, especially when it is not certified by natural parents. None of the natural family members attended the ceremony; no natural family member attested the document.

There is no document to show that the natural parents excluded the plaintiff from inheritance/succession. The burden is on the defendants to prove the adoption, but they failed to discharge the burden. In such a case, he argued that the plaintiff is to be treated as son of Krupa Rao and consequently plaintiff is entitled to succeed to the properties of Krupa Rao and Kanthamma. It is submitted that instead of 5 shares in Item 2, the trial Court erroneously directed 8 shares and hence the decree passed by the trial Court be set aside and 5 shares be allotted in Item 2.

13. The learned counsel for the respondents/defendants has, on the other hand, contended that in Ex.A1 Will it is wrongly written as 5 sons, excluding the son/plaintiff. That apart, there is no mention about Ex.A1 Will in Ex.A3 notice. There is admission of plaintiff in OS 1588/2001 showing that mother died intestate. It is further submitted that going by the recitals Ex.A4 gift deed it is clear that plaintiff was taken in adoption 26 years prior to 1985; in Ex.A6 marriage extract name of adoptive father is mentioned. There is recital in

Ex.B2 Will executed by mother Kanthamma to the effect that plaintiff was adopted son. It is, therefore, contended that when once Ex.A1 will is disbelieved and the defendants have proved that plaintiff went in adoption, the plaintiff is not entitled 9 to any share in Items 1 and 2 and hence the decree passed by the trial Court be set aside.

14. The admitted facts are Krupa Rao and Kanthamma got 5 sons (plaintiff, defendants 1 to 3 and Varaprasad) and 3 daughters (defendants 4 to 6). One of the sons Vara Prasad died, leaving behind him wife (defendant 7) and 2 sons (defendants 8 and 9). Plaintiff seeks partition of Items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule property. He claims 1/8th share in Item 1 and 1/5th share in Item 2. According to the plaintiff/PW1, Item 1 i.e., Ac.0­ 60 cents of agricultural land is ancestral property of father Krupa

Rao, which he got from his father in partition along with his brothers. Father Krupa Rao died intestate on 7­6­1979. PW1 further says mother Kanthamma died on 25­06­1998 without mentioning anything about her share in Item 1 in the Will executed by her on 9­4­1996 (Ex.A1) Thus the plaintiff says himself, defendants 1 to 6 each and defendants 7 to 9 together (eight shares) are entitled for equal share in Item 1.

15. The contesting defendants, however, dispute the claim of plaintiff. At the earliest point of time in written statement, they stated that father Krupa Rao bequeathed Item 1 to wife

Kanthamma and after death of Krupa Rao, having become the absolute owner of Item 1, mother Kanthamma executed a Will,

dated 2­1­1998 (Ex.B2). She bequeathed Item 1 in favour of her 4

sons (defendants 1 to 3 and Varaprasad). Defendants denied the execution of Ex.A1 Will by Kanthamma. The general contention of the defendants in written statement that Item 1 is not the 10 ancestral property of Krupa Rao is not relevant. Defendant 1/DW1 stated that Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa Rao.

He clarified that the statement to the contrary in written statement is not correct. He further admitted that father Krupa

Rao never executed any document in respect of his property, either in favour of his wife Kanthamma or anybody else. He made it clear that in written statement as also in his chief affidavit it is wrongly mentioned that father bequeathed the properties in favour of Kanthamma. The above admission of DW1 makes it clear that the execution of Will Ex.B2 by mother in favour of 4 sons is not valid, because mother Kanthamma has no exclusive rights over

Item 1. When thus the father Krupa Rao died intestate and when

Item 1 is the ancestral property of Krupa Rao his property devolves upon all his 8 children.

16. The defendants have set up a plea that plaintiff went in adoption in the year 1955 to the family of his junior paternal uncle, who is brother of his father Krupa Rao. Plaintiffs stoutly deny this case of defendants. It is contended by the learned counsel for plaintiff that the evidence on record would only show that plaintiff was being fostered by Sudarsanam but not taken in adoption; that the word ‘fostering’ is different from ‘adoption’.

17. The learned counsel for defendants has invited attention to

Ex.B1 settlement deed and Ex.B3/A6 marriage extract in support of his contention. A perusal of Ex.B1 shows plaintiff is fostered by

Sudarsanam. The document does not expressly say that plaintiff was taken in adoption. Similarly in Ex.B3 Sudarsanam signed in 11 the column father/guardian. This document also does not disclose expressly that Sudarsanam is the adoptive father of plaintiff. Furthermore, in Ex.A4 and A5 gift deeds, it is stated that plaintiff is fostered by Sudarsanam since childhood. These documents do not say that plaintiff was taken in adoption by

Sudarsanam.

18. It is an admitted position that Christian Law does not recognize adoption. The learned counsel for defendants relied upon the decision in Philips @ Alfred Malvin v. Gonsalvis ( AIR 1999 (Ker.) 187) in support of his contention that as Christian law does not prohibit adoption, adoption effected could in appropriate cases would be valid and legal.

19. The learned counsel for plaintiff relied upon the decision in Shabanam Hashmi v. Union of India (2014 AIR SCW 1329) whereinit was observed that the decision of Kerala High Court in

Philips @ Alfred Malvin (supra)  can be best understood to have been rendered in the facts of the respective cases.

20. The other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the defendants, namely,

1. KV Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal (1997 (1) Supreme 13)

2. L. Debi Prasad (died) by Lrs v. Tribeni Devi (AIR 1970 (SC) 1286)

3. Munivenkatappa v. Doddamuniyappa (2007 Supreme (Kar) 737 12 have no application to the facts of the present case, because they were rendered in cases arising under the Hindu Law. The fact that Sudarsanam who fostered plaintiff settled properties in favour of plaintiff does not make adoption as proved. I, therefore, reject the contention of the defendant that plaintiff was taken in adoption and as such he ceased to be the member of natural family and not entitled to any share in Item 1. The defendants have failed to substantiate their contention in this regard.

21. A glance at Ex.B2 Will reveals it is an unregistered Will and it is surrounded by several suspicious circumstances. In the first instance, as already stated, a mention of Item 1 in this Will itself shows Kanthamma having no exclusive rights over Item 1 bequeathed it under Will. Secondly, Ex.B2 is a typed one; there are variations on pages regarding line spacing; signature of

Kanthamma bears different dates; even though one of sons (plaintiff) is eliminated from giving any share, no endeavor is made to get the Will registered. Lastly, the stamp used for drafting the

Will was purchased on 30­08­1990, whereas Municipal

Corporation executed sale deed only on 18­01­1993 i.e., about 3 years after purchase of stamp. When thus Ex.B2 Will is shrouded with suspicious circumstances, the evidence of DW2 one of the attestors is of no avail to the defendants. I, therefore, hold the defendants have failed to prove that plaintiff went in adoption. It follows the plaintiff continues to be the member of family of Krupa

Rao and Kanthamma and thereby he is entitled to share equally in 13

Item 1 of plaint schedule property along with other children of

Krupa Rao i.e., 1/8th share. 

22. Now coming to Item 2, plaintiff/PW1 relies upon Ex.A1 Will executed by mother Kanthamma among her sons including plaintiff and he is entitled for 1/5th share. Defendants, on the other hand, again relied upon Ex.B2 Will executed by mother.

The mother bequeathed Item 2 in favour of her 4 sons excluding the plaintiff in Ex.B 2 Will. I already observed that Ex.B2 Will is highly suspicious and cannot be relied upon. Coming to Ex.A1

Will set up by the plaintiff, I find it is equally suspicious. Firstly, prior to filing the suit plaintiff issued Ex.A3 notice. In that notice there is no whisper about Ex.A1 Will. Secondly, plaintiff filed OS 1588/2001 for permanent injunction. Defendants have filed IA 319/17 in AS 85/2007 submitting copy of judgment in OS 1588/2001. In the plaint in that suit, the plaintiff has clearly stated that mother Kanthamma “died intestate on 25­06­1998”.

That being so, plaintiff cannot take a different plea in this suit that mother Kanthamma executed Ex.A1 Will. That being so, the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 is of no help to the plaintiff. When the 2

Wills Exs.A and B2 are disbelieved, it follows the 8 sharers are entitled to share both Items 1 and 2 equally.

23. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued that during pendency of suit 1st defendant sold away Item 1 under Ex.A2 regd.

sale deed. A reading of Ex.A2 shows it was executed by 1st defendant alone. The other sharers have not signed in the sale deed. It is not the case of DW1 that there are no other sharers.

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What he stated in his evidence is that the other sharers have authorized him to sell away the said property. There is no recital in Ex.A2 showing any such authorization. The recital in Ex.A2 that the property exclusively belongs to 1st defendant is apparently false. The sale is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The sale does not bind the co­ sharers including the plaintiff. Mere issuance of Ex.B5 title deed in the name of 1st defendant does not give him any exclusive title in respect of Item 1. Ex.B5 title deed is only a record of right issued for the purpose of collection of land revenue by the revenue authorities. The other co­sharers have not relinquished their rights in respect of both Items of suit schedule property. I find the trial Court has reached correct conclusions basing on proper assessment of the evidence let­in by both parties. I see no irregularity or illegality committed by trial court in coming to such conclusion. The appeal lacks merits. This point is answered accordingly.

POINT No.2:­

24. In the result, I dismiss the appeal with costs, confirming the judgment of the II Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada,

dated 14­12­2006 made in OS No.3083/2001.

(Dictated to the stenographer, transcribed by her, corrected and pronounced by me in the Open Court, on this the 7th day of November, 2017) 

VII ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE,

VIJAYAWADA.

IN THE COURT OF MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS TRIBUNAL­CUM­

VII ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, VIJAYAWADA.

Present: Sri M. Srikantha Chary, Chairman­cum­VII Addl. District Judge

Wednesday, the 27th (twenty seventh) day of September, 2017

MVOP No.691/2007

Between:

Chatla Arjun …Petitioner

A N D

1. Mavuluri Subrahmanyeswara Reddy

2. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited, Rep. By its Branch Manager, Hyderabad.…Respondents

This petition is coming on for hearing before me on 28­08­2017 and upon perusing the petition, written statement and other relevant papers on record and upon hearing the arguments of Sri P. Ram Babu, Advocate for petitioner and of Sri BS Reddy, advocate for respondent 1; and Sri K. Srinivasa Rao, advocate for respondent 2; and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this court made the following:

A W A R D

This claim application has been filed by the petitioner under

Sec.166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) seeking compensation of Rs.1,00,000/­ on account of the injuries suffered by him in a road accident that occurred on 24­01­2007 involving a tractor­trailer. 

2. The averments in the petition, in brief, are as follows:

On 24­01­2007 at about 6­00 am the petitioner was travelling on a tractor from his house to work place. When the vehicle reached near NTR statue centre, Pamarru the 1st respondent drove the tractor in a rash and negligent manner with hectic speed. As a 2 result, the joint hook between the tractor and the trailer was cut off, and the tractor turned turtle. The petitioner and other passengers fell on road and received multiple injuries. The petitioner was shifted to Padmavathi Hospitals, Gudivada. Doctor who treated the petitioner issued wound certificate stating that the injuries sustained by the petitioner are grievous in nature. On the report given by the Koteswara Rao, the police registered a case in

Crime No.18/2007 under Secs.304 ­A,337 and 338 of IPC.

3. The petitioner is a coolie. He used to earn Rs.5000/­ per month. He was hale and healthy. The 1st respondent is driver­ cum­owner of the vehicle. He got valid driving licence. 2nd respondent is the insurer. Hence the respondents are liable to pay compensation to the petitioner jointly and severally.

4. Respondents have opposed the application. They filed separate counters. While putting the petitioner to strict proof of the material petition averments, 1st respondent has pleaded that the accident occurred only due to act of God which cannot be attributed to him (1st respondent). He further stated that his vehicle was insured with the 2nd respondent and the policy was in force by the date of accident. As such, the 2nd respondent alone is liable to answer the claim.

5. 2nd respondent has pleaded that the driver of the tractor was holding valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident.

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He was under the influence of alcohol at the time of accident and thereby violated the terms and conditions of the policy. The material on record reveals the petitioner along with 20 persons were engaged to travel in the tractor to the place of paddy crashing. The vehicle was registered for seating capacity of ‘1’ i.e., driver only. The vehicle should be used for agricultural purpose.

There is clear violation of policy terms and conditions as well as the permit of the vehicle. The petitioner is an unauthorised passenger.

Except the driver on tractor, no person is authorised to travel either in tractor or in the trailer and if any other person travels, he comes under the purview of the gratuitous/unauthorised passenger. It is further stated that because of own negligence of petitioner, the accident took place. Without obtaining transport endorsement, the tractor was used for transporting purpose. This is violation of the provisions of the Act. Respondents, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the petition. 

6. Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial:

1. Whether the petitioner sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 24­01­2007 near NTR Statue Centre, Pamarru due to the rash and negligent driving of crime vehicle Tractor and Trailer bearing No.AP 16 Y 6242/6243?

2. If so, whether the petitioner is entitled to the compensation as prayed for? If so, from whom?

3. To what relief?

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7. On behalf of the petitioner, he has examined himself as PW1, and exhibited Exs.A1 to A6 documents. The insurance and transport officials are examined as Rws 1 and 2. Exs.B1 to B4 and

Exs.X1 to X3 documents are marked on behalf of the respondents. 

ISSUE Nos. 1 and 2:

8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that from the evidence of PW 1 and from Ex.A 1 FIR and Ex.A 6 charge sheet, it is proved that the accident occurred only due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by 1st respondent. No contra evidence is led by the contesting respondents. 

9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent/insurance company has contended that the petitioner was not covered under the insurance policy as he is an unauthorised passenger and under Sec.147 of the Act the risk of unauthorised passenger is not covered, especially when no extra premium is paid. It is further contended that the petitioner along with others were travelling in tractor and trailer even though the vehicle was registered for agricultural use only. He urged that as per evidence of RW2, Ex.X2 and X3 B­register extract of the crime vehicle shows the seating capacity is only ‘one’ i.e., driver. It means except driver no person can travel in the tractor and no person can travel in trailer. No additional premium was collected from 1st respondent and for these reasons the 1st respondent/driver 5 has violated the terms and conditions of Ex.B1 policy and the 2nd respondent/insurance company is not liable to indemnify the insured.

10. PW1 is the injured eye­witness. He has testified that on 24­ 01­2007 at about 6­00 am he was travelling on a tractor from his house to work place. When the vehicle reached near NTR statue centre, Pamarru the 1st respondent drove the tractor in a rash and negligent manner with hectic speed. As a result, the joint hook between the tractor and the trailer was cut off, and the tractor turned turtle. Himself and other passengers fell on road and received multiple injuries. A perusal of Ex.A1 FIR and Ex.A 6 charge sheet reveals that on the statement of one Koteswara Rao, the police registered a case in Crime No.18/2007 under Secs.304­

A,337 and 338 of IPC. After thorough investigation, the police laid charge sheet against 1st respondent under Secs. 304­A,337 and 338 IPC. A reading of Exs.A1 and A6 clearly show that the version given therein is exactly the same as deposed by PW1 as to how the accident occurred. Except suggesting that PW 1 is not covered under the policy as he is unauthorised passenger, the respondents adduced no contra evidence. Even though in Exs.A1 and A6 break of hook between tractor and trailer is said to be the cause of accident, Ex.A3 report of motor vehicle inspector does not show any such break of hook. On the other hand, he opined that accident was not due any mechanical defects of the vehicle combination involved in the accident. I, therefore, hold that the 1st 6 respondent was solely responsible for causing the accident on account of his rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. It follows the petitioner is entitled to just compensation.

11. Coming to the question as to who has to pay compensation, the insurance company/R2 contends that the 1st respondent has not paid any additional premium covering the risk of the coolies.

The tractor it meant to be used for agricultural purpose and when coolies were transported with the tractor to work in the field, it cannot be treated as valid and therefore, there is violation of the terms and conditions of the policy.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Anantapur District v. S.

Ramanjaneyulu (2011 (5) ALD 596) and New India Assurance

Co.Ltd., Anantapur v. T. Padma (2011 (6) ALD 699) in support of his contention that when the petitioner went as a coolie for agricultural purpose, it cannot be said they were carried for hire or reward and hence there is violation of terms and conditions of insurance policy so as to absolve the insurer. He urged that the insurer­company (2nd respondent) has to indemnify the injured.

13. Evidence of RW1 and Ex.A5/B1 insurance policy shows the vehicle was a goods carriage vehicle. It has come in the evidence of insurance official RW1 that it is a farmers package policy. RW2 testified that ‘B’ register of the vehicle (Exs.X2 and X3) 7 shows the seating capacity is only ‘one’ i.e., driver and the seating capacity of trailer is ‘nil’.

14. It is thus clear the insurance policy of the vehicle though was for third party cover with agricultural use, no additional premium was paid for life or injury of any person other than the driver travelling on the tractor. In this context, it is useful to refer to the decision in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. V.

Chinnamma (2004 ACJ 1909 (SC)), wherein the Hon’ble Apex

Court has observed as follows:

“(14) Furthermore, a tractor is not even a goods carriage.

The ‘goods carriage’ has been defined in section 2 (14) to mean ‘any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for sue solely for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods’ whereas ‘tractor’ has been defined in section 2 (44) to mean ‘a motor vehicle which is not itself constructed to carry any load (other than equipment used for the purpose of propulsion); but excludes a road­ roller’. The ‘trailer’ has been defined in section 2 (46) to mean ‘any vehicle’, other than a semi­trailer and a side­ car, drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle’.

(15) A tractor fitted with a trailer may or may not answer the definition of ‘goods carriage’ contained in section 2 (14) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The tractor was meant to be used for agricultural purposes. The trailer attached to the tractor thus necessarily is required to be used for agricultural purposes, unless registered otherwise. It may be, as has been contended by Mrs. K.

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Sharda Devi, that carriage of vegetables being agricultural produce would lead to an inference that the tractor was being used for agricultural purposes but the same by itself would not be construed to mean that the tractor and trailer can be used for carriage of goods by another person for his business activities. The deceased was a businessman. He sued to deal in vegetables. After he purchased the vegetables, he was to transport the same to market for the purpose of sale thereof and not for any agricultural purpose. Tractor and trailer, thereof, were not being used for agricultural purposes. However, even if it be assumed that the trailer would answer the description of ‘goods carriage’ as contained in section 2 (14) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the case would be covered by the decision of this Court in Asha Rani, (2003 ACJ 1 (SC) and the other decision following the same, as the accident had taken place on 24­11­1991, i.e., much prior to coming into force of 1994 amendment.”

15. The learned counsel for 2nd respondent/insurance company has relied upon the following decisions:

1)  MV Jayadevappa v. Oriental fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd (2005 ACJ 1801)

2) Vachala v. VR Kumar (2006 ACJ 2098)

3) National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Kancherla Mary (2012 ACJ 2419) 

4) Gangala Raju v. Rayavarapu Appa Rao (2010 (3) ALD 111)  insupport of his contention that where the vehicle is goods vehicle, it is not authorised to carry passengers and in such a case 9 insurance company is not liable for injury of passengers. In decision (1), Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, it cannot carry passengers and the insurance company is not liable for injuries of the passengers. In decision (2) it is held that when carrying of passengers in the vehicle is not allowed by the Act, question of insurance company covering the risk of passengers does not arise. In decision (3) it is held that the insurance company is not required to insure the gratuitous passenger traveling in the goods vehicle under Sec.147 (1) (b) (i) of the Act. In decision (4) it is observed that where premium has been paid only for driver of the tractor, and does not cover the labourers, insurance company is not liable to pay compensation. Following the above decisions, I hold that since the offending vehicle in the present case being a goods carriage and except the driver no other passenger is authorised to carry, and no

additional premium was paid covering the risk of the coolies, the

2nd respondent/insurance company cannot be directed to pay the compensation to the petitioner. No pay and recovery order can be passed even. The owner of the offending tractor (1st respondent) has committed breach of condition of insurance policy. The offending tractor at the time of accident was not being plied in accordance with the policy. So the 2nd respondent/insurance company is absolved from the liability of payment of award amount to the claimant. The owner of tractor (R1) alone is liable to satisfy the award. 

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16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Anantapur District v.

S. Ramanjaneyulu (2011 (5) ALD 596) and New India

Assurance Co.Ltd., Anantapur v. T. Padma (2011 (6) ALD 699)

in support of his contention that insurance company is liable in the case of carriage of passengers in tractor and trailer. Decision (1) was rendered in the case where no suggestion was given to the claimant by the insurance company that the policy prohibited use of vehicle for carriage of passengers for hire or reward. The Honble

High Court held that it cannot be said that those coolies were passengers being carried for hire and reward, therefore, insurance company cannot avoid its liability. In decision (2), insured paid specific premium for 5 hamalies. These 2 decisions in my considered view, have no application to the facts of the present case. Here no additional premium was collected for unauthorised passengers. These issues are answered accordingly.

ISSUE No.3:

17. Keeping in mind the nature of injuries suffered by PW 1, I shall now proceed to determine the just compensation to be awarded to PW 1.

a) Compensation for injuries, pain and suffering:­

18. It is the evidence of PW1 that he sustained multiple injuries all over the body in the accident. A perusal of Ex.A2 11 wound certificate issued by Padmavathi Hospitals shows that the petitioner received commuted condylar fracture left humerus with displacement, an abrasion over the right shoulder and an abrasion over the right ankle region. Injury 1 is opined to be grievous, while injuries 2 and 3 were the simple.

19. From the above evidence of PW1 coupled with Ex.A2 wound certificate it is clear that PW1 suffered 1 grievous injury. This injury suffered by PW 1 certainly would cause pain and suffering to him. Hence I feel it appropriate to award Rs.25,000/­ towards compensation for the injuries, pain and suffering to the petitioner. 

(b) Compensation for loss of earnings:

20. Since PW1 is an agricultural coolie. Though he claimed his monthly income as Rs.5,000/­ no scrap of paper is filed by the petitioner to substantiate his claim. I feel it appropriate to hold the monthly income of petitioner at Rs.3,000/­ since he received a grievous injury it is reasonable to held that he lost one month’s income. Hence I award Rs.3,000/­ to the petitioner under this head.

c) Medical expenses:

21. Petitioner did not file any medical bills. Hence no amount can be awarded under this head.

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d) Incidental charges and extra nourishment:

22. Since the petitioner underwent treatment in hospital, for fracture, I feel it is appropriate to award Rs.10,000/­ under this head. 

23. In the light of the above discussion, I am inclined to hold that the petitioner/injured is entitled for the following amounts under various heads towards compensation for the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident:

a) Compensation for pain and suffering : Rs. 25,000/­

b) Compensation for loss earnings : 3,000/­

c) Medical expenses : ­­

d) Incidental charges and Extra nourishment : Rs. 10,000/­ ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

TOTAL : Rs. 38,000/­

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

24. The above total compensation of Rs.38,000/­ (Rupees Thirty eight thousand only) arrived at, in my considered view, is just and reasonable compensation and it will meet the ends of justice. The petitioner is entitled for interest and costs. Issue No.3 is decided accordingly. 

25. In the result, the petition is partly allowed with proportionate coasts, awarding a total compensation of Rs.38,000/­ (Rupees

Thirty eight thousand only) as against the claim of Rs.1,00,000/­, with interest at the rate of 7.5% p.a. from the date of petition till 13 the date of deposit/realization against respondent 1 only. The petition is dismissed as against the 2nd respondent.

Respondent 1 is directed to deposit the awarded compensation within two months from the date of this award with accrued interest and proportionate costs, failing which the petitioner is entitled to claim interest @ 9% pa from the date of expiry of the said period of two months.

On such deposit, since the accident occurred about 10 years ago, the petitioner is permitted to withdraw the entire amount immediately. 

Advocate’s fee is fixed at Rs.1,000/­(Rupees one thousand only).

(Dictated to the stenographer, transcribed by her, corrected and

pronounced by me in Open Court, on this the 27th day of September,

2017)

CHAIRMAN,

MACT­CUM­VII ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE,

VIJAYAWADA.

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE 

WITNESSES EXAMINED

For Petitioner For Respondent

PW1: Chatla Arjun RWI: T. Soma Raju RW2: M. Vidyavati

Documents Marked:

For Petitioner:

Ex.A1::Attested copy of FIR Ex.A2::Attested copy of wound certificate. Ex.A3::Attested copy of MVI report. Ex.A4::Copy of driving licence of R1.

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Ex.A5::Copy of insurance policy. Ex.A6::Copy of charge sheet.

For Respondent:

Ex.B1: Insurance policy. Ex.B2: Copy of RC book. Ex.B3: Office copy of Regd. letter. Ex.B4: Acknowledgment of Ex.B3.

Through RW1:

Ex.X1: Extract of B­ Register. Ex.X2: Extract of B­ Register. Ex.X3: Authorisation letter.

CHAIRMAN,

MACT/VJA.