Sri N.Ramesh Babu

IN THE COURT OF THE XII ADDITIONAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, VIJAYAWADA

Present: Sri N.Ramesh Babu, XII Addl. District & Sessions Judge

Wednesday, this the 21st day of September, 2016

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.48 of 2015

From what Court the : II Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court for appeal is preferred Railways, Vijayawada

Number of the case in : CC.No.355/2013 dated 02.03.2015 that Court Name and Description of : Mr.Chetty Venkateswara Rao alias Ratnam, the Appellant. S/o.late Chandraiah, Hindu, 31 years, Auto Driver, R/o.Prakasarao Palem village, Nallajerla Mandal, West Godavari District.

(Accused)

Name and Description of : The State : Sub-Inspector, RPF., Bhimavaram the Respondentrepresented by its Additional Public Prosecutor, Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Vijayawada.

The sentence and law : Accused is found guilty for the offence under which it was punishable under section 160(2) of Railways imposed in the Lower Act and he is convicted under Section 248(2) Court of Cr.P.C. Hence, the accused is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one (01) year. The remand period of the accused i.e., from 03.05.2012 to 17.05.2012 shall be given set-off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C.

Whether confirmed, : MODIFIED. modifiedor reversed; and if modified the modification.

DATES OF

Presentation Filing Notice Bail bond if Applicant Hearing Order issued by appellant ordered Court to has been to appear appear let out on bail 24.03.2015 24.03.15 25.03.15 --- 24.04.15 09.09.16 21.09.2016

This Criminal Appeal having came up before me for hearing on 09.09.2016 and upon perusing the appeal petition of Appellant/Accused and the evidence on record, and upon hearing the arguments of Mr.K.Satya

Sai Kumar, Mr.J.Suresh, Mr.P.Srinivasa Rao, Mr.G.Prasada Reddy,

Advocates for the Appellant/Accused, and of Mr.G.Rajeswara Rao,

Additional Public Prosecutor for the Respondent, and I do adjudge and pass

the following :- 2 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

J U D G M E N T

1. This is a Criminal Appeal filed by the Appellant/Accused against the respondent/State questioning the Judgment dated 02.03.2015 in

CC.355/2013 passed by the learned II Metropolitan Magistrate for Railways,

Vijayawada. For the sake of convenience, I refer the parties hereinafter as per their array in the calendar case before the Trail Court.

2. The facts in brief which necessitated for the appellant filing the present appeal are as follows :

The State represented by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Railway

Protection Force of Bhimavaram has filed a complaint against the appellant alleging that the appellant being the driver of TATA Ace Motor Vehicle bearing No.AP37 TB 2939 has hit the railway gate when it was closed for passage of 57229 passenger on 03.05.2012 at 00.55 hours which is punishable under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act. The Trail Court after following the due procedure has taken cognizance of the offence under

Section 160(2) of the Railways Act against the accused and by following the due procedure has conducted the trial. At the trial, the prosecution side has got examined seven witnesses as PWs.1 to 7 and got marked Exs.P1 to P17 documents on its behalf. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the accused. The case of the accused is mere denial of the case of prosecution and according to him he did not commit any offence and that he has been falsely implicated in this case. The Trail Court having analysed the evidence on record and after hearing both-sides has pronounced the impugned judgment in CC.No.355/2013 dated 02.03.2015, according to which the appellant was found guilty of the offence punishable under section 160(2) of the Railways Act and convicted him under Section 248(2) of

Cr.P.C., and sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one- 3 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- year giving set-off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C., the remand period which the accused had undergone between 03.05.2012 and 17.05.2012.

Challenging the same, the present appeal has been filed.

3. In the grounds of appeal, the appellant has contended that the

Judgment of the Trail Court is against Law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and that the Trail Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in right perspective and has failed to consider several aspects and facts and circumstances of the case and that the observations and findings of the Trail Court on several aspects are not correct basing on the evidence on record and according to Law, and that the Trail Court instead of acquitting the accused by giving benefit of doubt to him has convicted him erroneously and that the Judgment passed by the Trail Court is not sustainable at Law. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the message sent by PW2 who is the Gateman there is a clear mention that it is not possible to close the gate in the normal manner and so there was no possibility to close the gate and unless the gate is closed, the offence punishable under section 166(2) of the Railways Act would not attract and that there was no intention on the part of the appellant to break the railway gate and so the offence punishable under section 160(2) of the Railways Act is not made out against the accused and that the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and PW7 is interested evidence because they are all employees in the Railway Department and their evidence cannot be believed, and that the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision in ‘Union of India v. State of Punjab and another’ 1 . In this 12007 Crl.L.J. 4263 4 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- decision in para Nos.11 and 12 relating to the ingredients of Section160 (2) of The Railways Act it has been observed as follows :

“… Perusal of Section 160(2) would show that breaking of any gate or chain or barrier, set-up on either side of a level crossing, which is closed to road traffic, is made punishable with an imprisonment, which may extent to five year. Question requiring determination would be to see if this breaking of gate or chain or barrier would also include within its purview an act of rash and negligent driving leading to breaking of gate etc. There is no allegation against the 2 nd respondent that he had any intention to break the gate or chain or barrier while he was driving the truck.

Though not specifically mentioned but intention appears to be part of the offence created under Section 160 (2) of the Act. Any act on account of negligence or rashness would per force has to exclude intention to commit the act alleged. Breaking of gate or chain or barrier would include an element of intention in it as there is no indication that this offence is meant to punish rash or negligent act. Respondent No.2 is charged with an offence under

Sections 279, 427 IPC, meaning thereby that he is accused of driving a truck in a manner rash or negligent so as to endanger human life or which is likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. This offence is punishable with an imprisonment, which may extent to six months. In contrast, offence under Section 160(2) is more severely punishable. Obviously, there is no allegation against respondent No.2 for having hit the railway gate with any intention to break the same or to break the chain or barrier as set-up. It appears to be a case of pure and simple accident, which would go to reveal an offence under Section 279 of IPC. In my view, the purview of section 160(2) would be entirely different than any act of rash or negligent conduct. The

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate is justified in observing that

the offence of rash or negligent act. By its very nature of offence of rash or negligent act as created under various provisions of

Indian Penal Code, would exclude intention. Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it 5 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- would probably be caused. In this regard, reference can be made to S.N.Hussain v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1972 Supreme

Court 685 (1972 Crl L.J. 496). Section 80 IPC provides that nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune and without criminal knowledge or intention in doing of lawful act or in a lawful manner by a lawful means and with proper care and caution. It is the absence of such proper care and caution which is the essence of criminality in rash or negligent acts which are made punishable under various sections of the

Penal Code. Section 160(2) of the Act does not appear to be punishing those acts which are done without proper care and caution but would include those which are done with criminal knowledge or intention…” “…The nature of offence created under Section 160(2) can further be appreciated by making reference to the contents of Section 160(1). It provides that „if any reason, other than a railway servant or a person authorized in this behalf opens any gate or chain or barrier set-up on the either side of a level crossing, which is closed to road traffic, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years.”

Obviously, opening of gate or chain etc., by any person who is not a railway servant or not authorized in this behalf commits an offence under Section 160(1) of the Act. On the face of it, this section is meant to punish the deliberate conduct on the part of such person to open the gate etc. In other words, it would not include any rash or negligent conduct. Section 160(1), thus, provides an act of opening of the gate etc., and sub-section (2) of

Section 160 of the Act creates an offence on the part of any person who breaks any gate or chain or barrier. This whole section, as such, would exclude the element of rash or negligent act or omission meaning thereby that the section is meant to punish an intentional misconduct. A doubt, if any, in this regard, can be set at rest by making a reference to the provisions of section 154 of the Act, which punishes a rash or negligent act or omission on the part of any person which endanger safety of any 6 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- person travelling or being upon the railway etc. Similarly, a willful act or omission on the part of any person, which endanger or causes endanger to the safety of travelling of any person on or being upon any railway, has been made punishable under

Section 153 of the Act. A distinction between a willful and a negligent or rash act, as such, is clearly legislated. No indication can be gathered from the contents of section 160 of the Act that this section is meant to punish any act which is rash or negligent manner and, as such, would not fall within the purview of section 160(2). Accordingly, the provisions of section 179(2) would not have any applicability to the present case. The Additional Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Patiala, has rightly taken cognizance of the

offence on the basis of FIR registered under Sections 279, 427

IPC, which is the offence revealed from the facts of the case …”

4. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision in ‘S.N.Hussain vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh’ 2 . On the other-hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the Trail Court having considered the evidence on record has appreciated the same correctly and the evidence of PWs.1 to 7 supported by the contents of Exs.P1 to P17 documents clinchingly establishes the guilt of the accused under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act beyond reasonable doubt and that the Judgment passed by the Trail Court is correct in all respects and that there is no need for this Court to interfere with the same. He supported the Judgment of the

Trail Court and requested to dismiss the appeal.

5. I have perused the case record and the evidence on record both oral and documentary and the Calendar and Judgment passed by the Trail Court in CC.355/2013 dated 02.03.2015.

6. Now the points for determination are as follows:

2AIR 1972 SC 685 7 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.Whether the accused being the driver of TATA Ace bearing No.AP37

TB 2939 has hit the closed railway gate on 03.05.2012 at about 00.55 hours as alleged by the prosecution?

2.Whether the act of the accused in hitting the said gate with his vehicle attracts under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act 1989?

3.Whether the prosecution side is able to establish the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under section 160(2) of the

Railways Act 1989 beyond reasonable doubt?

4.Whether the Judgment passed by the Trail Court which is under appeal is correct basing on the evidence on record according to

Law?

7. Point Nos.1 to 4 :

For convenience sake, I take these four points for discussion together.

Among the seven-witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution side PW1 is the then Inspector of Railway Protection Force, Bhimavaram, and PW2 is the then Gateman and PW3 is the then Station Master of Athili Railway

Station. PW5 is the Motor Vehicle's Inspector and PW7 is the then J.E., of

Railways working at Tanuku. PW4 is said to be an agreement holder for purchase of TATA Ace motor vehicle bearing No.AP37 TB 2939. PW6 is said to be the owner of that vehicle. The evidence of PW2, the Railway Gateman is that on 03.05.2012 at about 12.55 AM he closed the L.C.Railway Gate for passage of Machilipatnam – Visakhapatnam passenger as per the instructions of the then Station Master who is PW3 and that two minutes thereafter the auto bearing No.AP37 TB 2939 driven by the accused hit that gate due to which the gate boom was bent and got damaged. So, he gave information about the same to the Station Master and detained the accused and his auto. PW2 has further deposed that at about 03.30 AM the Railway

Protection Force came and enquired about the incident and recorded his statement and he handed-over the accused and the auto to Railway

Protection Force Police who seized the auto and arrested the accused under 8 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- cover of a panchanama. PW3 has deposed that on 03.05.2012 around 12.55 AM he instructed PW2, the Gateman to close the gate for passage of the train bearing No.57229 and that he received indication of the closure of the gate and that subsequently PW2 had informed to him that after the gate was closed an auto bearing No.AP37 TB 2939 which was driven by the accused hit the railway gate due to which the gate boom was bent and got damaged. According to PW1 on 03.05.2012 around 02.25 AM he received security control message from Vijayawada about this case and then immediately he proceeded to the spot by 03.30 AM and found that the gate was in damage condition and also found the accused and his TATA Ace at the spot and that he prepared an observation report which is Ex.P2. The message he received has been marked as Ex.P1. According to PW1, he arrested the accused at 06.00 AM and seized the TATA Ace vehicle under a cover of panchanama which is Ex.P3, and that he prepared a seizure list which is Ex.P4. According to him, he recorded the confessional statement of the accused which is Ex.P6 and he also recorded the statement of PW2 which is Ex.P5.

8. PW1 has further deposed that during the course of his investigation on 04.05.2012 he obtained the damage certificate which is Ex.P7 and the ownership particulars of the said TATA Ace motor vehicle which is under

Ex.P8. According to him, he examined the witnesses and recorded their statements which are Exs.P10 to P13 and Ex.P16. He exhibited the copy of control message which is Ex.P14 and the copy of L.C.Gate register which is

Ex.P15. According to him, the Motor Vehicle's Inspector who is PW5 has inspected the said TATA Ace vehicle and issued a certificate which is Ex.P9.

PW5 namely Mr.V.Srinivas who is the Motor Vehicle's Inspector has deposed that on 09.05.2012 he inspected the TATA Ace motor vehicle bearing 9 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

No.AP37 TB 2939 at Bhimavaram Railway Station and found damage to the front bumper support frame to which there was dent and that he issued a report which is Ex.P9 opining that the accident was occurred not due to any mechanical defects of that vehicle. Only a suggestion was put to PW5 that he issued Ex.P9 report at the instance of Railway Protection Force Police but he denied the same. There is no suggestion put to him that there was no damage to the front bumper support frame and that there was no dent as deposed by him. The evidence of PW5 supported by the contents of his report under Ex.P9 shows that there was damage to the front bumper support frame to the TATA Ace motor vehicle and that there was a bent as deposed by him. PW5 being an official witness has no motive to speak falsely either in favour of the prosecution case or against the accused. Simply, because the prosecution was initiated by Police of Railway Protection Force

PW5 was under no obligation to concede to their request and issue a false report. Even otherwise what is the falsity in his report under Ex.P9 has not been explained by the accused in the cross-examination of PW5.

9. The evidence of PW7 is that on 03.05.2012 at about 01.20 AM he received a phone message from test-room, Vijayawada that an auto hit

L.C.Gate No.138 when it was in a closed condition and immediately he went to the said gate around 03.00 AM and found that there was a bent and damage to the said gate. According to him, in his presence Railway

Protection Force Police had observed the same and prepared an observation report which is Ex.P2 and that he attested the same. According to PW7, he has estimated the damage and gave a certificate which is Ex.P7.

10. During the course of his cross-examination, PW7 has deposed that the restoration work of boom relating to the gate was completed by 03.30 AM 10 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- and that up-to that time Police of Railway Protection Force were present there. In his evidence PW1 has deposed that he visited the said railway gate at 03.30 AM. Referring the same, the learned counsel for appellant contends that when restoration work was completed by 03.30 AM as deposed by PW7 and when PW1 has visited the spot at 03.30 AM there was no possibility for

PW1 to observe the damage and prepare the observation report and other proceedings and so the investigation done by PW1 is false and only a table investigation. But this contention cannot be accepted because the times stated by PWs.1 and 7 are approximate times and not exact times. As can be seen from the evidence on record the alleged offence was taken place on 03.05.2012 around 00.55 hours and only after that PWs.1 and 7 have visited the place of offence. The evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and 7 which is supported by the contents of Exs.P1 to P7 and Exs.P14 to P17 documents clearly shows that there was damage to the railway gate No.138 situated between Athili and Aravalli railway stations. The evidence of PW2 who is a direct witness to the alleged offence is that the accused with his vehicle which is TATA Ace hit the said gate due to which the damage was caused to the gate. Because of this hit only there was damage even to the said vehicle as observed by the Motor Vehicle's Inspector who is PW5. According to PW2, he detained the accused and the vehicle at the spot and handed-over to railway Police. PW1 has supported the evidence of PW2 in this regard.

Simply because PWs.1 to 3 and PW7 are the employees of the Railway

Department it cannot be said that there was collusion among them and that this case has been foisted against the accused. There is no motive for them to foist a case of this nature against the accused. The presence of the accused and his vehicle at the place of offence at the alleged time of offence is proved by the evidence of PWs.1 and 2.

11 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. According to the accused his auto was punctured and so he kept his vehicle near that gate and then he has been falsely implicated in this case.

But in view of the positive evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and PW7 the contention of the accused in this regard cannot be accepted. Moreover, the statement of the accused recorded by PW1 also supports the case of prosecution.

12. In his cross-examination, PW2 has stated that there was no damage to the auto. Referring the same, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the vehicle of the accused did not hit the gate and so there was no damage to the auto and that the evidence of PW5 cannot be believed. In his cross-examination, PW2 has clearly deposed that at the time of the accident the front-wheel of the auto was punctured and the auto was turtled to the side of the gate. The same has not been disputed or denied by the accused.

Moreover, the same was elicited in the cross-examination of PW2. It is unbelievable to say that in spite of auto was turtled there was no damage to the auto. PW2 probably might have not observed damage that was caused to the auto. So, basing on the evidence of PW2 it cannot be concluded that there was no damage to the auto.

13. In the message which has been marked as Ex.P1 it has been mentioned that gate is unable to close. Referring the same, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that when there was no possibility to close the gate the offence under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act would not attract but in the said message it is clearly mentioned that at 00.55 hours a four-wheel auto bearing No.AP37 TB 2939 hit the gate when gate is closed for passage of passenger Train No.57229 and gate is unable to close, gate boom damaged. Probably, the observation mentioned in that message that gate is unable to close might be because of the damage caused to the gate 12 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- due to hit by the side vehicle or as observed by the Trail Court in its

Judgment it might have been mentioned wrongly that gate is unable to close instead of gate is unable to open. This inability either to open or close is followed by the message that the said vehicle hit the gate when it was closed. So, the consequence of hit is that the gate is unable either to be closed or opened. It was because of the damage that was caused to the gate because of the hit with the said vehicle. For this reason I do not accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard.

14. The decision in ‘S.N.Hussain vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh’ relied upon by the learned counsel for appellant was based on different facts and circumstances which are not similar to the present case. In that case the railway gate was kept opened and so the accused driver drove his Bus through the gate and while the Bus was passing on the railway track, a

Goods-Train has dashed against that Bus, and the accident of that case was taken place. Considering the said aspect it was observed in that case that when the gate is kept opened and there was no train scheduled to pass at that time, the Bus driver would be justified in driving his vehicle through the level crossing and that the said case was clear case of unavoidable accident because of the negligence of the gateman in keeping the gate open and inviting the vehicles to pass. But in the present case, the evidence on record is very clear that the railway gate was closed for passage of passenger train at the relevant time of accident in this case. The evidence is very clear in the present case that the accused had hit the closed railway gate with his TATA

Ace vehicle. So, the decision in the cited case cannot be applied to the present case.

13 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

15. PW4 namely Mr.D.Ramachandram has deposed that he purchased the

TATA Ace vehicle bearing No.AP37 TB 2939 for Rs.2,00,000/- by payment of an amount of Rs.50,000/- to the owner of the vehicle namely Mr.B.Srinivasa

Rao (PW6) on 18.07.2011 by entering into agreement agreeing to pay the balance amount within six months but in the meantime he met with an accident and was hospitalized and could not pay the balance amount and so he did not receive the said vehicle. He admitted that he gave a statement to

Railway Protection Force Police which is Ex.P12 and he also admitted his signature on Ex.P12 statement. The Trail Court has treated this witness as hostile and on permission the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has cross-examined him with the permission of Court but PW4 has denied of stating as in Ex.P12 statement and that he received the said vehicle on 18.07.2011 and that he appointed the accused as the driver of that vehicle on 02.05.2012.

16. PW6 has deposed that he entered into agreement with PW4 to sell the said vehicle for Rs.2,90,000/- on receiving amount of Rs.50,000/- as advance, and that later PW4 met with an accident and not paid the remaining amount and so PW6 himself kept his vehicle with him in his custody and that he took the said vehicle from the Court for interim custody. During the course of his cross-examination conducted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor with the permission of the Court after

PW6 was treated as a hostile witness, PW6 has deposed that on 17.05.2011 he handed over the said vehicle to PW4 after receipt of the advance amount of Rs.50,000/-. During his cross-examination conducted by the learned counsel for the appellant, PW6 has deposed that because PW4 did not pay the balance amount in the year 2011, he brought the vehicle from PW4. In the present case, it is not necessary to decide as to whom between PW4 and 14 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

PW6 was illegally owning the vehicle on 03.05.2012 i.e., on the date of alleged incident in this case. Because there is direct evidence of PW2 that the accused drove the said vehicle at the time when it hit the railway gate and when the accused and the vehicle were detained soon after the incident at the place of incident itself no much importance need be given to the evidence of PWs.4 and 6. Whoever might be the legal owner of the said vehicle between PWs.4 and 6 as on 03.05.2011 it will not have any bearing in the present case. There is nothing in the evidence of PWs.4 and 6 that the accused is not the driver of the said vehicle at the time of alleged incident in this case.

17. The evidence on record very clearly shows that the accused hit the railway gate with his vehicle by driving the vehicle negligently and thereby caused damage to the railway gate and also caused damage to the vehicle which he was driving. As per the decision relied upon for the appellant in ‘Union of India v. State of Punjab and another’ cited supra it is necessary that in order to attract the offence under Section 160(2) of the

Railways Act there should be intention to break the gate or chain or barrier set-up on either-side of level crossing which is closed to road traffic. But in the present case, there is no allegation against the accused that he had any intention to break the gate or chain or barrier while he was driving the TATA

Ace motor vehicle. In the present case, there is no evidence to show that even the gate or chain or barrier set-up on either-side of a level crossing was broken by the accused. There is no breaking of the gate at all. Only some damage was caused to the railway gate. The value of the damage caused in this case to the railway gate was assessed at Rs.1,000/- by PW7 as per the document under Ex.P7. So, by respectfully following the decision in ‘Union of India v. State of Punjab and another’ which is cited supra which has 15 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- been relied upon by the appellant I hold that the offence under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act is not attracted to the facts of the present case.

So, the accused is not liable for punishment for the offence punishable under section 160(2) of the Railways Act. But the act of the accused in hitting the railway gate when it was closed with his vehicle in this case attracts the offence under Section 279 of IPC which is the driving of a vehicle on a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. So, the offence under Section 279 of IPC is made out in this case. The present case does not even fall under Section 427 of IPC because the damage was caused purely by an accident which was occurred due to negligence without any intention. So, the accused is liable for the offence punishable under section 279 of IPC, but not for the offence punishable under section 160(2) of the

Railways Act. The offence under Section 279 of IPC is concerned, it is not necessary to frame a charge according to Law. Even otherwise because the offence under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act is more severe in punishment than the offence under Section 279 of IPC, it is not necessary to frame any charge for the offence punishable under section 279 of IPC. From the above discussion, I hold that the accused is liable for punishment for the offence under Section 279 of IPC and the prosecution side is able to establish his guilt of the said offence beyond reasonable doubt.

18. The Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record in right perspective but its finding in respect of holding the accused guilty for the offence under section 160(2) of the Railways Act is not correct for the above stated reasons. So, the said finding that the accused is guilty of the offence under section 160(2) of the Railways Act and his conviction under section 16 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 248(2) of Cr.P.C., and the sentence of simple imprisonment for one (01) year passed against the accused are liable to be set-aside.

19. Concerning the punishment for the offence under section 279 of IPC

I feel that in the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into consideration the statement of the accused given before the Trial Court when he was questioned about the quantum of sentence, I feel that imposition of simple imprisonment for three (03) months is just and proper and sufficient in this case. Accordingly, I hold on the point No.1 that the prosecution side is able to establish that the accused being the driver of

TATA Ace bearing No.AP37 TB 2939 has hit the closed railway gate on 03.05.2012 at about 00.55 hours as alleged by the prosecution and on point

No.2 I hold that the act of the accused in hitting the said gate with his vehicle attracts the offence under section 279 of IPC but not under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act 1989, and on point No.3 I hold that the prosecution side is able to establish the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under section 279 of IPC but not under section 160(2) of the

Railways Act 1989, beyond reasonable doubt, and I hold on point No.4 that the Judgment passed by the Trail Court which is under appeal is correct basing on the evidence on record in believing the case of prosecution but not correct in other aspects of finding the accused guilty for the offence under section 160(2) of the Railways Act and his conviction under section 248(2) of

Cr.P.C., and the sentence of simple imprisonment for one (01) year imposed against him for the offence under section 160(2) of the Railways Act.

20. In view of my findings on point Nos.1 to 4, I hold that the accused is liable of punishment for the offence under section 279 of IPC and for conviction under section 255(2) of Cr.P.C., and so he is liable to be 17 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three (03) months for the offence under section 279 of IPC and that the judgment passed by the Trial Court is liable to set-aside with the said modification.

21. In the result, the accused is found guilty of the offence punishable under section 279 of IPC and on conviction under section 255(2) of Cr.P.C., he is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three (03) months for the offence under section 279 of IPC with a benefit of set-off under section 428 of Cr.P.C., the period of remand undergone by him between 03.05.2012 and 17.05.2012. The judgment passed by the Trial

Court is set-aside in respect of his finding guilty for the offence under section 160(2) of the Railways Act and his conviction under section 248(2) of

Cr.P.C., and the sentence of simple imprisonment for one (01) year passed against him for the said offence under section 160(2) of the Railways Act.

Accordingly, the APPEAL IS PARTLY-ALLOWED.

The Appellant/Accused is informed that he has got right to prefer appeal or revision against this judgment according to Law and also his entitlement of free legal aid.

This Judgment is dictated to the Stenographer Gr.II, transcribed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in this open court on this 21st day of September, 2016.

Sd/-N.Ramesh Babu

XII ADDL.DISTRICT JUDGE

VIJAYAWADA

Appendix of Evidence Nil

Sd/-N.Ramesh Babu

XII ADDL.DISTRICT JUDGE

VIJAYAWADA

18 XII Addl.Dist & Sessions Judge’s Court, Crl.A.No.48 of 2015 Vijayawada Dated 21.09.2016 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Copy to the II Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court for Railways Vijayawada.

Copy to the Appellant/Accused through the Superintendent of concerned Jail.

//True Copy//

Superintendent

XII Additional District & Sessions Judge’s Court

Vijayawada

IN THE COURT OF XII ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, VIJAYAWADA

PRESENT: SRI N.RAMESH BABU

XII ADDL.DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE

Monday, this the 7th day of November, 2016

ORIGINAL SUIT No.191 of 2013

Between :

Mr.Ravinootala Venkata Ramanaiah, S/o.Subbaiah, Retired Employee, D.No.FF3, Vaibhav Apartment, Near Ravindra Bharathi School, Maruthi Nagar, Vijayawada, Krishna District.…Plaintiff.

And

Mr.K.Radha Mohan Rao, S/o.Seethapathi Rao, Flat No.28, Road No.5, Lotus Land Mark, Kedareswarapet, Vijayawada, Krishna District.…Defendant.

= = =

This Suit coming on 03.11.2016 for hearing before me in the presence of Mr.M.V.Rama Rao and Mrs.G.Srilakshmi, Advocates for Plaintiffs, and of

Mr.V.Srinivasa Raju, Advocate for Defendant, and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, and upon consideration this Court delivered the following :

J U D G M E N T

1.This is a suit filed by the plaintiff to recover an amount of

Rs.16,20,791/- with costs and interest basing on five promissory notes and a hand-receipt.

2. a) The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant having borrowed an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- on 09.07.2010 for business purpose from the plaintiff had executed a promissory note agreeing to repay the said amount with interest at 24% per annum and that subsequently on 08.12.2010 the defendant paid an amount of Rs.40,000/- out of which an amount of

Rs.6,000/- is towards interest and an amount of Rs.34,000/- is towards

principal. Again the defendant had borrowed an amount of Rs.1,00,000/-

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 2 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- on 31.07.2010 from the plaintiff for business purpose and executed a promissory note agreeing to repay the said amount with interest at 24% per annum and that subsequently on 09.02.2011 the defendant has paid an amount of Rs.48,000/- out of which an amount of Rs.12,600/- was appropriated towards interest and an amount of Rs.35,400/- was appropriated towards the principal amount. So, the defendant is liable to pay an amount of Rs.64,600/- towards principal out of the said debt due under the said promissory note.

2. b) The plaintiff further contends that the defendant had borrowed an amount of Rs.4,25,000/- from the plaintiff on 08.10.2010 for business purpose agreeing to repay the said amount with interest at 24% per annum but executed the promissory note in the name of the wife of the plaintiff.

The defendant has paid an amount of Rs.35,000/- on 08.11.2010 and an amount of Rs.13,000/- on 09.11.2010 out of which an amount of

Rs.8,500/- was appropriated towards interest and an amount of

Rs.39,500/- was appropriated towards principal, and so the defendant was due an amount of Rs.3,85,500/- out of the said promissory note.

2. c) The plaintiff has borrowed another amount of Rs.2,00,000/- from the plaintiff on 08.10.2010 for his business purpose and executed a promissory note agreeing to repay the said amount with interest at 24% per annum.

On 08.01.2011 he paid an amount of Rs.48,000/- out of which an amount of Rs.12,000/- was appropriated towards interest and an amount of

Rs.36,000/- was appropriated towards the principal amount. So, the defendant was due an amount of Rs.1,64,000/- towards principal out of the said promissory note. The plaintiff has advanced an amount of

Rs.2,00,000/- to the defendant on 09.12.2010 for his business purpose and

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 3 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- evidencing the same the defendant had executed a hand-receipt agreeing to repay the said amount with interest at 24% per annum.

2. d) The plaintiff has further contended that the defendant had borrowed another amount of Rs.1,75,000/- from the plaintiff on 08.10.2010 for business purpose but executed a promissory note in favour of wife of the plaintiff agreeing to repay the said amount with interest at 24% per annum.

On 09.11.2010 the defendant paid an amount of Rs.40,000/- out of which an amount of Rs.3,500/- was appropriated towards interest and the balance amount of Rs.36,500/- was appropriated towards the principal relating to the said promissory note.

2. e) The plaintiff has further contended that on the demand made by the plaintiff, the defendant had issued a cheque bearing No.115627 on 05.12.2011 drawn on IDBI Bank Limited, Governorpet, Vijayawada for

Rs.1,00,000/- but when it was presented for encashment, it was returned dishonoured on 07.12.2011 with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The plaintiff has got issued a legal notice dated 07.03.2013 relating to the promissory note dated 09.07.2010 for Rs.1,00,000/- and another promissory note dated 31.07.2010 for Rs.1,00,000/- but the defendant having received that notice on 08.03.2013 did not make any payment. The plaintiff has got issued another notice dated 15.04.2013 relating to the remaining promissory notes and hand-receipt, but the defendant even though had received that notice but did not make any payment. The plaintiff contends that all the promissory notes and hand-receipt were scribed by the defendant himself. Hence, the suit has been filed for the said relief.

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 4 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The case of the defendant is that the case of the plaintiff is totally false and that all the allegations mentioned in the plaint against the defendant are false and that all the promissory notes and hand-receipt are fabricated documents and that the suit is not maintainable. The defendant further contends that the plaintiff worked as a Supervisor in Lotus land in which the defendant had purchased a property and so there was acquaintance between them and the plaintiff used to visit the gold-shop of the defendant and in the year 2011 the plaintiff has asked the defendant for payment of Rs.5,00,000/- for family expenses but the defendant had refused to advance that amount and so the plaintiff bore-grudge against the defendant, and by fabricating the documents, the plaintiff has filed the suit with false contents to have wrongful gain. The defendant has no necessity to borrow such huge amount from the plaintiff. The plaintiff has no capacity to lend such huge amount. Since the wife of the plaintiff is not shown as a party, the suit is not maintainable relating to the promissory notes standing in her name. The defendant has requested the Court to dismiss the suit with costs.

4. Basing on the above contentions of the parties, the following four- issues were framed and settled for trial :

1.Whether suit promissory notes are fabricated?

2.Whether part-payment endorsements are fabricated?

3.Whether plaintiff is entitled to suit claim as prayed for?

4.To what relief?

5. In order to prove the case of the plaintiff, the plaintiff himself got examined as PW1 and got examined one Mr.P.Rama Rao as PW2 and got marked Exs.A1 to A17 documents on his behalf. On the other-hand, the

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 5 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- defendant himself got examined as DW1 but exhibited no documents on his behalf. All these witnesses were cross-examined.

6. I have heard the learned counsel for both-sides. I have perused the case record and the evidence on record both oral and documentary.

7. Issue No.1 :

Whether suit promissory notes are fabricated?

The plaintiff as PW1 filed his affidavit in the form of his evidence in examination-in-chief stating all the material facts which were mentioned in the plaint. He got marked the promissory note dated 09.07.2010 as Ex.A1, and the promissory note dated 31.07.2010 as Ex.A3, and the promissory note dated 08.10.2010 for Rs.4,25,000/- which stood in the name of his wife as Ex.A5, and the promissory note dated 08.10.2010 for Rs.2,00,000/- as Ex.A7, and another promissory note dated 08.10.2010 for Rs.1,75,000/- standing in the name of his wife as Ex.A9, and the hand-receipt dated 09.12.2010 as Ex.A11. He got marked a cheque dated 05.12.2011 as

Ex.A13, but it is not necessary to discuss about the same in this suit because according to the plaintiff it was dishonoured and the amount covered by that cheque was not realized by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has got marked the office copy of the legal notice dated 07.03.2013 as Ex.A14 and the office copy of another legal notice dated 16.04.2014 as Ex.A15, and the postal acknowledgement relating to the notice under Ex.A14 as Ex.A16.

The postal receipt relating to the notice under Ex.A15 has been marked as

Ex.A17. PW2 namely Mr.P.Rama Rao has filed his affidavit in the form of his evidence in examination-in-chief supporting the case of the plaintiff relating to his attestation of the promissory notes under Exs.A1, A3 A5, A7 and A9. On the other-hand, the defendant as DW1 filed his affidavit in the form of his evidence in examination-in-chief stating all the material facts

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 6 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- which were mentioned in the written statement. The evidence of PW1 on one-side and the evidence of DW1 on the other-side are nothing but oath against oath. The evidence of PW2 duly corroborates the evidence of PW1 on all material aspects connected to the promissory notes under Exs.A1, A3,

A5, A7 and A9. The contents of those promissory notes duly corroborate the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 on all material aspects. There is no corroboration to the evidence of DW1 from any angle.

8. The positive and consistent evidence of PWs.1 and 2 is that the defendant having borrowed the amounts covered by the promissory notes under Exs.A1, A3, A5, A7 and A9 had executed those promissory notes by scribing himself. So, according to PWs.1 and 2 the defendant himself is the scribe of those promissory notes. The defendant has simply denied the same. When it is the specific evidence of PWs.1 and 2 that the defendant himself had scribed those promissory notes, the burden lies on the defendant to prove that those promissory notes were not scribed by him and that they are not in his hand-writing. But except the oral evidence of defendant, there is no other evidence to prove that those promissory notes are not in his hand-writing. The defendant has not taken any steps to show that those promissory notes are not in his hand-writing. The defendant has not filed any document which was scribed by him for comparison of his hand-writing with the hand-writing available on those promissory notes.

The plaintiff may not be having any documents which were scribed by the defendant to compare the hand-writing of the defendant with the available hand-writing of those promissory notes. So, the oral evidence of DW1 alone is not sufficient to consider and believe that those promissory notes are not in the hand-writing of the defendant. All these promissory notes contain that they were scribed by the defendant himself. So, considering the positive and consistent evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and also the contents of

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 7 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- those promissory notes it can be concluded that the defendant had scribed all those promissory notes in his hand-writing. Further it can be held that he executed those promissory notes. Once the plaintiff is able to establish that those promissory notes were executed by the defendant, the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be drawn in favour of the plaintiff to the effect that all those promissory notes were supported by valid consideration. Even though such presumption is a rebuttable presumption, the burden lies on the defendant to rebut such presumption. Except the oral evidence of DW1 there is no other evidence or material to rebut such presumption. Even though it is not necessary for the defendant to adduce any direct evidence to rebut such presumption and for that purpose he can rely upon the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and material brought on record by the plaintiff, but here the defendant has failed to bring on record anything to rebut such presumption. Except putting some suggestions which were denied by PWs.1 and 2 nothing has been elicited to discredit their evidence. PW2 is an independent witness and he has no motive to speak falsely either in favor of the plaintiff or against the defendant. Because he attested all those promissory notes he gave evidence supporting such attestation in favour of the plaintiff. So, under these circumstances even the presumption under Section 118 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act can be drawn in favour of the plaintiff to the effect that the promissory notes under Exs.A1, A3, A5, A7 and A9 are supported by valid consideration.

9. Exs.A5 and A9 promissory notes admittedly stand in the name of

Mrs.Ravinootala Adilakshmi who is the wife of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has filed this suit even to recover the amount covered by those two promissory notes from the defendant. The wife of the plaintiff is not shown as a party to the suit. There is no endorsement on those two promissory

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 8 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- notes that they were transferred to the plaintiff for collection. The clear case and the evidence of plaintiff is that he lent the amount covered by those two promissory notes even though they were written in the name of his wife. So, according to him the amounts lent to the defendant under those promissory notes belonged to the plaintiff.

10. According to PW1, his wife is a house wife, and she died and no more.

It is not the case of the defendant that he borrowed amounts from the wife of the plaintiff under those two promissory notes. It is not even his case that the amounts lent under those two promissory notes exclusively belonged to the wife of the plaintiff. So, even though technically the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant that because those two promissory notes stood in the name of the wife of plaintiff, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the said amounts due under those promissory notes is correct, but because the amounts covered by those two promissory notes belong to the plaintiff, he is legally entitled to recover the same.

11. Even otherwise it is not the case of the defendant that the plaintiff and his wife were not living together, and that there was any conflict of interest between them. Even if the plaintiff and his wife were living together, the plaintiff being a kartha of the joint family is entitled to recover the said amounts covered by those two promissory notes in spite of those two promissory notes were obtained in the name of his wife, if those amounts were lent by the plaintiff. Moreover, even the plaintiff as an agent of his wife also entitled to recover the amounts covered by those promissory notes which stood in the name of his wife. So, in this view of the matter also the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amounts due under those two promissory notes.

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 9 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12. Concerning the capacity of the plaintiff to lend the amounts covered by those promissory notes the defendant has not specifically cross- examined PW1 as to how he could secure the amounts advanced to the defendant under those promissory notes. When there is positive and consistent evidence from PWs.1 and 2 that the plaintiff had lent those amounts to the defendant and that the defendant having received those amounts had executed those promissory notes the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff had no capacity to lend the amounts under those promissory notes cannot be accepted.

13. Coming to the case of the defendant, according to him the plaintiff has asked him to lend an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- and because he refused to advance that amount, the plaintiff having bore-grudge had fabricated those promissory notes by forgery and filed this suit. But in view of the positive and consistent evidence of PWs.1 and 2 this contention of the defendant does not appear to be acceptable one. Simply because the defendant had refused to advance an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- when asked by plaintiff, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has fabricated all those promissory notes by forgery with the hand-writing of the defendant and filed this suit. It is understandable if it is alleged that the signatures of the defendant are forged but it is unbelievable to contend that the hand-writings of the defendant including the signatures have been forged by the plaintiff for fabrication of all those promissory notes. So, I do not accept the contention of the defendant in this regard.

14. The defendant even contends that the signature on the postal acknowledgement under Ex.A16 does not belong to him. When the notice under Ex.A14 was addressed to him and the postal acknowledgement under

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 10 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ex.A16 contains his address, it cannot be accepted that the defendant has not received the notice under Ex.A14 and that the plaintiff has even forged his signature on the postal acknowledgement under Ex.A16. In spite of receiving the notice under Ex.A14, the defendant has not issued any reply notice for that notice. The defendant has admitted his signature on the suit summons and his signatures on his written statement and vakalat. His signatures on the suit summons and vakalat are identical but his signatures found on the written statement are different from his signatures on the vakalat and suit summons. So, it appears that the defendant has a habit of changing his signatures.

15. Even though initial burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that all those promissory notes are true, valid and binding on the defendant but the burden lies on the defendant to prove that all those promissory notes were fabricated by forgery. With the positive and consistent evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and the contents of those promissory notes, the plaintiff is able to establish that those promissory notes were executed by the defendant by borrowing the amounts covered by those promissory notes and that all these promissory notes are true, valid and binding on the defendant. The defendant has miserably failed to prove that all those promissory notes were fabricated by forgery by the plaintiff. Accordingly, I answer this issue in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

16. Issue No.2 :

Whether part-payment endorsements are fabricated?

The plaintiff has got marked the part-payment endorsement dated 08.12.2010 as Ex.A2 on the promissory note under Ex.A1, and the plaintiff has got marked the part-payment endorsement dated 09.02.2011 as Ex.A4 on the promissory note under Ex.A3. The plaintiff has got marked three

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 11 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- part-payment endorsements dated 08.10.2010, 08.11.2010 and 09.11.2010 as Ex.A6 on the promissory note under Ex.A5. Four part-payment endorsements dated 08.01.2011 have been marked as Ex.A8 on the promissory note under Ex.A7. The part-payment endorsement dated 09.11.2010 has been marked as Ex.A10 on the promissory note under

Ex.A9. The plaintiff has got marked a hand-receipt dated 09.12.2010 as

Ex.A11. My discussion in issue No.1 relating to the promissory notes under

Exs.A1, A3, A5, A7 and A9 is applicable even to the hand-receipt under

Ex.A11 which is said to be in the hand-writing of the defendant. If it is believed that those promissory notes were scribed by the defendant it must be believed that the hand-receipt under Ex.A11 was also scribed by the defendant because the hand-writing on the same is identical with the hand- writing on those promissory notes. So, basing on the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 relating to those promissory notes, it can be believed that the hand-receipt under Ex.A11 was executed by the defendant. A part-payment endorsement

dated 05.12.2011 has been marked as Ex.A12 but it relates to the cheque

under Ex.A13, the amount of which has not been realized. So, it is not necessary to discuss about the part-payment endorsement under Ex.A12 on the hand-receipt under Ex.A11. The evidence of PW1 is clear that even all these part-payment endorsements were scribed by the defendant himself. If the hand-writing of these part-payment endorsements is compared with the hand-writing on the said promissory notes they look alike and identical to each-other. So, if it is believed that all those promissory notes were scribed by the defendant, certainly it has to be believed that all these part-payment endorsements were made by the defendant. A clear scrutiny of the dates and the promissory notes and the part-payment endorsements shows that some portion of the amounts borrowed under some promissory notes were repaid to the plaintiff towards part-payments of the other promissory notes.

So, under these circumstances, it can be concluded that the plaintiff is able

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 12 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- to prove that all those part-payments are true and made by the defendant and the part-payment endorsements were scribed by the defendant himself.

It is for the defendant to prove that those part-payment endorsements were fabricated by the plaintiff. Among these promissory notes, the oldest promissory note is dated 09.07.2010 under Ex.A1. The plaintiff has filed the suit on 17.05.2013 within three years from the date of Ex.A1. So, there is no need for the plaintiff to fabricate the part-payment endorsements because all the promissory notes including Ex.A1 which is the oldest promissory note, were within period of limitation by the date of filing the suit on 17.05.2013. Fabrication of part-payment endorsements might be necessary only to save period of limitation and for no other purpose. So, under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has fabricated the part-payment endorsements. It can also be held that the defendant has failed to establish that those part-payment endorsements were fabricated by the plaintiff by forgery. Some of the part-payment endorsements do not contain the signatures of the defendant. But in view of my above discussion it is not material even if some of the part-payment endorsements do not contain the signatures of the defendant. Accordingly,

I answer this issue in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant holding that the defendant has failed to establish that the part-payment endorsements are fabricated by the plaintiff.

17. Issue No.3 :

Whether plaintiff is entitled to suit claim as prayed for?

In view of my findings on issue Nos.1 and 2 because I held that the suit promissory notes under Exs.A1, A3, A5, A7 and A9 and the hand- receipt under Ex.A11 are true, valid and binding on the defendant and that

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 13 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- even the part-payment endorsements under Exs.A2, A4, A6, A8 and A10 are also true, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit amount as prayed for in the plaint but with interest at 12% per annum from the date of presentation of the suit till date of this decree and at 6% per annum thereafter till the date of realization on the balance principal amounts due under those promissory notes. Accordingly, I answer this issue in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

18. Issue No.4 :

To what relief?

In view of my findings on issue Nos.1 to 3, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit amount of Rs.16,20,791/- with costs and interest on the balance principal amount of Rs.10,18,600/- at 12% per annum from the date of presentation of the suit till the date of this decree and at 6% per annum thereafter till the date of realization. Accordingly,

I answer this issue.

19. In the result, the suit is decreed for Rs.16,20,791/- with costs and interest on the balance principal amount of Rs.10,18,600/- at 12% per annum from the date of presentation of the suit till the date of this decree and at 6% per annum thereafter till the date of realization.

This Judgment is dictated to the Stenographer Gr.II, transcribed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in this open court on this the 7th day of November, 2016.

Sd/-N.Ramesh Babu

XII ADDL.DISTRICT JUDGE

VIJAYAWADA

XII Addl.District Judge’s Court, OS.No.191 of 2013 14 Vijayawada Dated 07.11.2016 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix of Evidence Witness examined

For Plaintiff : For Defendant :

PW1: Mr.R.Venkata Ramanaiah DW1: Mr.K.Radha Mohan Rao PW2: Mr.P.Rama Rao

Documents marked For Plaintiff :

Ex.A1 09.07.2010 Original promissory note Ex.A2 08.12.2010 Payment endorsement on Ex.A1 Ex.A3 31.07.2010 Original promissory note Ex.A4 09.02.2011 Payment endorsement on Ex.A3 Ex.A5 08.10.2010 Original promissory note executed in favour of plaintiff’s wife i.e., Adilakshmi Ex.A608.10.2010 Payment endorsements on Ex.A5 08.11.2010 09.11.2010 Ex.A708.10.2010 Original promissory note Ex.A808.01.2011 Four part-payment endorsements on Ex.A7 Ex.A908.10.2010 Original promissory note executed in favour of plaintiff’s wife i.e., Adilakshmi Ex.A1009.11.2010 Payment endorsement on Ex.A9 Ex.A1109.12.2010 Original hand receipt Ex.A1205.12.2011 Payment endorsement on Ex.A11 (given cheque) Ex.A1305.12.2011 Cheque No.115627 drawn on IDBI Bank Limited, Governorpet, Vijayawada. Ex.A1407.03.2013 Office copy of on issued by the plaintiff to the defendant Ex.A1516.04.2013 Office copy of on issued by the plaintiff to the defendant Ex.A1608.03.2013 Postal Acknowledgement Ex.A17--- Postal receipt of Ex.A15.

For Defendant :

--- Nil ---

Sd/-N.Ramesh Babu

XII ADDL.DISTRICT JUDGE

VIJAYAWADA

1

In the court of the VIII Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada.

Present:.Sri.N.Ramesh Babu,B.Com.,LL.B., VIII Addl.District Judge, Vijayawada.

Monday this the 24th day of December, 2018.

A.S.38 of 2015

Between:

Mr.Cherukumilli Subrahmanyam, S/o.Sri Rama Chandra Murthy, Hindu, 62 years, Penamaluru Village & Mandal, Krishna District.

.. Appellant.

And

Mr.Veeranki Srinivasa Rao, S/o.Late Kotaiah, Hindu, 40 years,

Penamaluru Village & Mandal, Krishna District. .. Respondent.

Appeal from the Decree and judgment dt.05.12.2014 passed by the Prl. Sr. Civil Judge Court, Vijayawada in O.S. No.1264/2011.

Between:

Mr.Cherukumilli Subrahmanyam, S/o.Sri Rama Chandra Murthy, Hindu, 62 years, Penamaluru Village & Mandal, Krishna District.

.. Plaintiff.

And

Mr.Veeranki Srinivasa Rao, S/o.Late Kotaiah, Hindu, 40 years,

Penamaluru Village & Mandal, Krishna District... Defendant.

This Appeal suit is coming up for final hearing on 13.12.2018 in the presence of Mr.K.Ramachandra, Advocate for Appellant and of Mr.Paul.P, Advocate for Respondent and perusing the material papers on record and other papers and this court delivered the following:

JUDGMENT

1.The appellant before this court is the unsuccessful plaintiff in

O.S.1264/2011 on the file of the learned Prl. Sr. Civil Judge,

Vijayawada and the respondent herein is the defendant in that suit.

2

2.For convenience sake I refer the parties hereinafter as per their array in the original suit before the trial court.

3.The plaintiff has filed O.S. 1264/2011 for eviction of the defendant from the plaint schedule property which is an extent of 5 cents house site consisting of house bearing D.No.8­224 (Old D.No.8­

138) at Penamaluru Village and Mandal in Krishna District and for future damages at Rs.1,000/­ p.m. from the date of receiving the notice got issued by the plaintiff and for costs of the suit.

4. The case of the plaintiff is that he is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and he raised a tatched shed in the same and lived therein for more than 10 years but due to his employment he left the plaint schedule property along with his family members in the year 1990 and went to Chennai, at which time at the request of the defendant by understanding the financial position of the defendant, he permitted the defendant to reside in the plaint schedule property with a condition to vacate the same as and when the plaintiff requires it.

The defendant paid taxes of the plaint schedule property in the name of the plaintiff. Subsequently in the year 2005 the plaintiff shifted his family to Vijayawada and requested the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule property and deliver vacant possession of the same to him but the defendant was postponing the same on one pretext or the other. In the year 2009 the plaintiff strongly insisted the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule property but the defendant with his men had threatened the plaintiff and his family members with dire consequences by bluntly refusing to vacate the plaint schedule property stating that the plaintiff had no right to ask the defendant to 3 vacate the plaint schedule property. So the plaintiff gave a report to police. The plaintiff got issued a notice dt.29.06.2011 U/s.106 of the

Transfer of Property Act demanding the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule property by the end of July, 2011. The defendant having received that notice did not give any reply.

5.The case of the defendant is total denial of the case of the plaintiff. According to the defendant the plaintiff was a stranger until he received the legal notice and that the plaint schedule property is a

Cheruvu Poramboke and that when it was vacant in the year 2004, he occupied the same and erected a zink sheet shed in it and paying house tax to the Gram Panchayat of Penamaluru Village and so there was no relationship of licensor and licensee between them in respect of the plaint schedule property. The further case of the defendant is that after receiving a notice he being a lorry driver went to Gowhati for his duty and after his return, he could not trace that notice and so he could not give any reply to the notice of the plaintiff. The defendant has requested to dismiss the suit.

6.Basing on the above contentions of the parties, the following three issues were framed and settled for trial.

1.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for eviction of the tenant?

2.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages for

Rs.1,000/­ per month?

3.To what relief? 

7.In order to prove the case of the plaintiff, he himself got examined as PW1 and got examined four other witnesses as PWs2 to 5 4 and got marked Exs.A1 to A4 documents on his behalf. On the other hand the defendant himself got examined as DW1 and got examined two other witnesses as DWs2 and 3 and got marked Exs.B1 to B11 documents on his behalf Exs.C1 to C7 documents were marked through PW5 namely Mr.A.Siva Rama Koteswara Rao, who is the then

Panchayat Secretary of Penamaluru Village.

8.The trial court having heard the arguments of both sides and analysed the evidence on record has dismissed the suit without costs pronouncing a judgment dt.05.12.2014 and a decree was drafted accordingly. Challenging the same the present appeal has been filed.

9.I have heard the learned counsel for both sides and perused the case record and the evidence on record both oral and documentary and also the decree and judgment passed by the trial court and the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff.

10.In the grounds of appeal the plaintiff has contended that the judgment of the trial court is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and that the trial court has not appreciated the evidence on record in right perspective and that it did not consider several facts and circumstances and aspects of the case and that its findings and observations on various aspects are not correct and that instead of decreeing the suit the trial court has erred in dismissing suit. The plaintiff has sought to set aside the decree and judgment passed by the trial court and to allow the appeal with costs throughout.

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11.Now the points that arises for determination are as follows:

1.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule property from the defendant as prayed for in the plaint?

2.What is the result of the appeal? 

Point: 

12.The plaintiff as PW1 filed his affidavit in the form of his evidence in examination­in­chief stating all the material facts which were mentioned in the plaint. The defendant has filed his affidavit in the form of his evidence in examination­in­chief mentioning all the material facts which were mentioned in his written statement. Their evidence is nothing but oath against oath. PW2 namely

Mr.A.Nageswara Rao, PW3 namely Mrs.Somala Ruknamma and PW4 namely Mrs.Ch.Vasantha who is no other than the wife of the plaintiff have filed their respective affidavits in the form of their evidence in examination­in­chief supporting the case of the plaintiff. DW2 namely

Mr.Bolem Musalaiah and DW3 namely Mr.Mattipalli Lucy Paul have filed their respective affidavits in the form of their evidence in examination­in­chief supporting the case of the defendant. The evidence of PWs2 and 3 on one side and the evidence of DWs2 and 3 on the other side are nothing but oath against oath. The evidence of

PW4 who is the wife of the plaintiff is nothing but the evidence of the plaintiff himself. Being the wife of the plaintiff, naturally PW4 is expected to support the case of her husband. The evidence of PW5 is regarding the documents marked as Exs.C1 to C7.

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13.Admitedly the plaint schedule property is tank poramboke and the plaintiff has no title over the plaint schedule property. For that matter even the defendant has no title over the plaint schedule property. Admittedly the defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property since the year 2005. Ex.C.6 and Ex.C.7 show that the name of the defendant was recorded as the occupier of the plaint schedule property for the years 2005­2006 and 2006­2007. The documents marked as Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.11 support the case of the defendant.

14.Among the witnesses examined on both sides the evidence of

PW.5 is material, because he is the then Panchayat secretary of

Penamaluru Village in which the plaint schedule property is situated.

According to him the document under Ex.C.1 pertains to Door Number 5­143 and the document under Ex.C.3 pertains to D.No.8­116.

According to him there is no door number mentioned in the documents marked as Ex.C.4 to Ex.C.7. The Door number of the plaint schedule property at present is 8­224 and its old door number is 8­138 even according to the plaint schedule. So the documents marked as Exs. C.1 to C.5 do not relate to the plaint schedule property and they are not useful for the plaintiff. Even though the name of the plaintiff is mentioned in Ex.C.1 because as per his own witness who is

P.W.5, Ex.C.1 relates D.No.5­143 and so it does not relate to the plaint schedule property.

15.Coming to the documents exhibited by the plaintiff Ex.A.1 and

Ex.A.2 tax receipts do not contain any door number. So it cannot be said that they relate to the plaint schedule property. Even if they 7 relate to plaint schedule property they are not documents of title and so they are not useful to prove that the plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule property. Basing on those documents it cannot be said that plaintiff holds title over the plaint schedule property. Ex.A.4 sale deed does not relate to the plaint schedule property. The name of the plaintiff is not shown as the boundary owner in Ex.A.4. Ex.A.3 is only a postal acknowledgement relating to the notice got issued by the plaintiff to the defendant as per the evidence of P.W.1. Even it is not useful to consider that the plaintiff is owner of the plaint schedule property.

16.Basing on the oral evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses it cannot be considered and believed that the plaintiff raised the shed in the plaint schedule property and that he granted license by permitting the defendant to reside in the plaint schedule property, in the absence of any documentary evidence relating to the same. The plaintiff has not filed any document relating to his raising the shed in the plaint schedule property or permitting the defendant to reside in it. The plaintiff has not filed any document to prove his title or ownership in the plaint schedule property.

17.As per the decision referred by the trial court in its judgment in

Kota Prabhakar Rao and other Vs Kota Kanthamma and others

reported in 1998(1) ALT page 233 in a suit for recovery of possession based on title, unless the title is established, relief of possession cannot be given. So unless the plaintiff establishes his ownership and title over the plaint schedule property he is not entitled for the relief of 8 possession by evicting the defendant from the plaint schedule property. Since the plaintiff has failed to prove his title and ownership over the plaint schedule property he is not entitled for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property from the defendant.

18.From the above decision I hold on the point that the plaintiff is not entitled for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property from the defendant and that the suit is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed.

POINT NO.2:

19.In view of my finding on the earlier discussed and decided point

No.1 I hold that the Appeal is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. I further hold that the trial court having appreciated the evidence on record in right perspective by considering all the important and relevant facts and circumstances of the case has pronounced the judgment dt.05.12.2014 by dismissing the suit without costs. The contentions raised by the appellant against the decree and judgment of the trial court are not correct and they are not sustainable. The decree and judgment passed by the trial court are correct basing on the evidence on record and according to law and they deserve confirmation in all respects.

20.From the above discussion I hold that the appeal is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed and that the decree and judgment passed by the trial court deserve confirmation. Accordingly I answer this point in favour of the respondent and against the appellant.

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21.In the result, the appeal is dismissed by confirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge,

Vijayawada dt.05.12.2014 in O.S.No.1264/2011. But taking into consideration the special facts and circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their respective costs of the appeal.

Dictated to Personal Assistant, typed and transcribed by him,

corrected and pronounced by me in open court, this the 24th day of December, 2018.

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

Appendix of Evidence

NIL

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

10

In the court of the VIII Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada.

Present:.Sri.N.Ramesh Babu,B.Com.,LL.B., VIII Addl.District Judge, Vijayawada.

Tuesday this the 30th day of October, 2018.

A.S.4 of 2015

Between:

Smt.Simhadri Satyasri, W/o.N.Abhinay, Hindu, 33 years, Prajasakthi

Nagar, Vijayawada... Appellant.

And

1.Mrs.Pilla Karunasri, W/o.Late Srinivas, Hindu, 34 years, Gollapudi, Vijayawada. 2.Senior Superintendent of Post office, representing Indian Post, Vijayawada. 3.Union of India, Owning Indi Post, rep. by its Secretary, New Delhi. 4.Mrs.Gudivada Srilatha, W/o.Nageswara Rao, Hindu, 35 years,

Kothapet, Vijayawada­1. .. Respondents.

Appeal from the Decree and judgment dt.17.11.2014 passed by the III Addl. Jr. Civil Judge Court, Vijayawada in O.S. No.836/2013.

Between:

Mrs.Pilla Karunasri, W/o.Late Srinivas, Hindu, 34 years, Gollapudi,

Vijayawada... Plaintiff.

And

1.Senior Superintendent of Post office, representing Indian Post, Vijayawada. 2.Union of India, Owning Indi Post, rep. by its Secretary, New Delhi. 3.Mrs.Gudivada Srilatha, W/o.Nageswara Rao, Hindu, 35 years, Kothapet, Vijayawada­1. 4.Smt.Simhadri Satyasri, W/o.N.Abhinay, Hindu, 33 years, Prajasakthi

Nagar, Vijayawada... Defendants.

The plaintiff has filed O.S.836/2013 seeking to declare that a nominee is only a custodian subsequent to the death of an employee and can claim the amounts from the employers but all the legal heirs of the deceased employee are entitled to equal shares in those amounts according to law and further to declare that the plaintiff and the defendants 3 and 4 are entitled to distribute death benefits of late Mrs.M.Bharathi equally and further consequently to direct the defendants 1 and 4 to pay the death benefits of Mrs.M.Bharathi equally to the plaintiff and the defendants 3 and 4 and for costs of the suit.

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Value of the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction is value Rs.25,000/­. On which a court fee of Rs.786/­ and Rs.1,086/­ is paid herewith under section 34 (2) of A.P.C.F. and S.V.Act.

Appeal presented on 15.10.2015.

This Appeal suit is coming up for final hearing on 05.10.2018 in the presence of Mr.D.T.Vyas, Advocate for Appellants and of Mr.M.V.RamaRao,AdvocateforRespondentNo.1,of Mr.L.L.Narasimham, Advocate for Respondent No.2 and of Mr.K.Mohana Rao, Advocate for Respondent No.4 and Respondent No.3 inperson and perusing the material papers on record and other papers and this court doth order and decree:

1.That the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed with costs, confirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned III Addl. Jr. Civil Judge, Vijayawada dt.17.11.2014 in O.S.836/2013. 2.That the appellant do bear his own costs of Rs.3,424/­ towards this appeal suit.

Given under my hand and seal of this court this the 30th day of October, 2018.

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

Memorandum of Costs

ParticularsForFor AppellantRespon dent

Stamp on Vakalat & 52­00 Welfare1,872­00 Stamp on Appeal Process300­00 Petition stamp C.F.Affixed on documents Pleaders Fee Senior1,000­00 Junior Publication charges Writing charges100­00 Typing charges100­00 _________ Total3,424­00

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

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A.S.4 of 2015

30.10.2018

Judgment is pronounced (VSJ). In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs, confirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned III Addl. Jr. Civil Judge,

Vijayawada dt.17.11.2014 in

O.S.836/2013. 

VIII ADJ.

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In the court of the VIII Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada.

Present:.Sri.N.Ramesh Babu,B.Com.,LL.B., VIII Addl.District Judge, Vijayawada.

Friday this the 21st day of December, 2018.

A.S.6 of 2017

Between:

Mr.G.Ramakrishna, S/o.Tata Rao, Hindu, 36 years, Banda Road,

Kankipadu Post and Mandal, Krishna District... Appellant.

And

1.The Joint Collector, Krishna District, Camp office at Vijayawada. 2.The Asst. Director of Marketing, Vijayawada, Marketing Department, Gollapudi. 3.The Estate Officer, Rythu bazar, Patamata, Vijayawada. 4.The Tahasildar, Vijayawada Urban Mandal, Vijayawada.

 .. Respondents.

Appeal from the Decree and judgment dt.27.09.2016 passed by the I Addl. Jr. Civil Judge Court, Vijayawada in O.S. No.828/2015.

Between:

Mr.G.Ramakrishna, S/o.Tata Rao, Hindu, 36 years, Banda Road,

Kankipadu Post and Mandal, Krishna District... Plaintiff.

And

1.The Joint Collector, Krishna District, Camp office at Vijayawada. 2.The Asst. Director of Marketing, Vijayawada, Marketing Department, Gollapudi. 3.The Estate Officer, Rythu bazar, Patamata, Vijayawada. 4.The Tahasildar, Vijayawada Urban Mandal, Vijayawada.

.. Defendants.

This Appeal suit is coming up for final hearing on 06.12.2018 in the presence of Mr.S.Naga Srinivasa Rao, Advocate for Appellant and of Mr.N.Nageswara Rao, Addl.Government Pleader for Respondents and perusing the material papers on record and other papers and this court delivered the following:

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JUDGMENT

1.This appeal suit has been preferred by the unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S.828/2015 dt.27.09.2016 on the file of the learned I Addl. Jr.

Civil Judge, Vijayawada against the respondents, who are the

defendants in the suit. 

2.For convenience sake, I refer the parties hereinafter as per their array in the suit.

3.The plaintiff has filed O.S.828/2015 for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant, their men, agents, followers and servants etc. from ever interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the stall bearing No.56 situated in Rytu Bazaar, Swarajya

Maidan, Vijayawada. His case is that the said shop was allotted to him by the 1st defendant as per the proceedings bearing No.A1/163/2010 dt.15.05.2010 on payment of rental charges at Rs.1,500/­ P.M. He has been in possession and enjoyment of the same by doing business therein by selling vegetables since the time of allotment by payment of the rent and other charges regularly and that his entire family depends upon him. While so the 1st defendant had issued a notice dt.04.08.2014 stating that the allotment of his stall was cancelled and called him upon to vacate the stall within one week from the date of receipt of that notice and further that failing which necessary action would be taken according to law against him. So he filed the suit for the said relief.

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4.The case of the defendants as per the written statement filed by the 3rd defendant and the adoption memo filed by the defendant No. 1, 2 and 4 is that the suit is not maintainable for not issuing the notice

U/s.80 CPC by the plaintiff and that as per the directions issued by the Hon’ble High court in W.A.No.512/2003 in W.P.10336/2003 dt.12.09.2003 the Government of Andhra Pradesh has issued

G.O.Ms.No.22 dt.21.01.2004 framing some guidelines formulating the norms for allotment of shops for the self­help groups and the

Government has subsequently issued G.O.No.29 dt.16.02.2012, according to which the allotment of stalls to the self­help groups whose period exceeded more than 3 years shall be cancelled and further the

Hon’ble High Court has disposed W.P.No.9616/2012 with some terms

to the affect that if the licence period is still in force, the licencee should not be evicted and if the licence period is expired, the licencee can be evicted. Even the Writ Appeal No.1153/2012 filed against the order in W.P.9616/2012 was disposed off confirming the directions given in that writ petition.

5.The defendants further contend that the licence period of the plaintiff was expired and so for making fresh allotments the plaintiff is liable to vacate the stall and so the said notice was issued by the defendants in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble

High Court and as per the G.O.Ms.No.29 dt.16.02.2012 issued by the

Government. So the case of the plaintiff is false and the plaintiff is not entitled to continue in the stall and he is not entitled for the relief of permanent injunction. The defendants have requested to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs.

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6.Basing on the above contentions of the parties, the trial court has framed the following issues and settled for trial.

1.Whether the suit is bad for non­issuance of Section 80

CPC notice to the defendants prior to filing of the suit as contended by the defendants?

2.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of permanent injunction against the defendants as prayed?

3.To what relief? 

7.At the trial the plaintiff got himself examined as PW1 and got marked Exs.A1 to A8 documents on his behalf. On the other hand

Mr.M.Srinivasa Sastry, got himself examined as DW1 and no documents were marked.

8.The trial court having heard the arguments of both sides and analysed the evidence on record has pronounced the impugned judgment dt.27­09­2016, according to which the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed without costs. Challenging the same the present appeal has been filed.

9.In the grounds of appeal the plaintiff/appellant contends that the decree and judgment passed by the trial court are against law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and that the trial court has failed to observe several facts and circumstances of the case particularly the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property and that the trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in right perspective and that its findings and observations on various aspects are not correct basing on the evidence 5 on record and according to law and that the trial court instead of decreeing the suit has erroneously dismissed the suit and that the judgment is not maintainable and liable to be set aside.

10.I have heard the learned counsel for both sides and perused the case record and the evidence on record both oral and documentary and also the decree and judgment passed by the trial court and the grounds of appeal filed by the plaintiff.

11.The learned counsel for the plaintiff has contended in tune with the contentions raised by the plaintiff in the grounds of appeal. He requested to set aside the decree and judgment passed by the trial court and to decree the suit filed by the plaintiff with costs throughout by allowing the appeal.

12.On the other hand the learned Addl. Government Pleader has supported the judgment passed by the trial court and submitted his arguments in tune with the contentions of the defendants and he requested to dismiss the appeal with costs by confirming the decree and judgment passed by the trial court.

13. Now the points that arise for determination are as follows:

1.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for in the plaint?

2.Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial court are correct basing on the evidence on record and according to law?

3.What is the result of the appeal?

6

Point No.1:

14.The plaintiff as PW1 filed his affidavit in the form of his evidence in examination­in­chief stating all the material facts which were mentioned in the plaint. DW1 filed his affidavit in the form of his evidence in examination­in­chief stating all the material facts which were mentioned in the written statement. The oral evidence of PW1 on one side and the oral evidence of DW1 on the other side are nothing but oath against oath. The plaintiff got marked the copy of proceedings vide No.A1/163/2010 issued by the 1st defendant as Ex.A1 and photostat copy of the proceeding No.A1/12/2011 issued by the 1st defendant as Ex.A2 and photostat copy of the proceedings

No.A1/253/2012 issued by the 1st defendant as Ex.A3 and photostat copy of the notice issued by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff as Ex.A4 and bunch of rent receipts as Ex.A5 and office copy of the representation given by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant as Ex.A6 and office copy of the representation given by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant to renew the licence of the stall as Ex.A7 and photostat copy of the ID card as Ex.A8. There is no dispute between the parties regarding the documents marked as Exs.A1 to A8. There is no dispute regarding the payment of rental charges and other charges by the plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property. It is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff had ever committed default in payment of those charges.

15.It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property stall by doing business therein. Now it has to be seen as to whether the allotment of plaint 7 schedule stall to the plaintiff amounts to a licence or lease. If it is a lease the plaintiff is entitled to continue in its possession and enjoyment until he is duly dispossessed from the same by due process of law. If it is a licence the plaintiff is liable for eviction at any time by the defendants by cancelling the licence. Admittedly the plaint schedule stall for the plaintiff was allotted by the 1st defendant only for a period of one year initially and it was continued from time to time till the notice under Ex.A4 was issued and there is no extension of the period thereafter. The allotment of the stalls by the defendants to the plaintiff was not an actual agreement between them for considering the same as a lease. As it was allotted to the plaintiff under some terms and conditions for assistance to self­help groups it can be considered only as a licence. More over as per one of the conditions under allotment, the Joint Collector is authorised to cancel the allotment even before the expiry of the stipulated period of one year, in case if the terms and conditions of the allotment are violated. So under no stretch of imagination the said allotment can be considered as a lease between the plaintiff and the defendants.

17.As per the orders in the writ petition and writ appeal passed by the Hon’ble High Court the defendants are empowered to cancel the allotment if the period of allotment exceeds for more than 3 years and admittedly the plaintiff was allotted the stall in the year 2010 and even by the date of filing the suit in the year 2015 the said period of 3 years was already over and even the licence period of the plaintiff was expired. There was no extension of the licence after the expiry of the period of one year in favour of the plaintiff. The notice issued by the 8 defendants under Ex.A4 itself amounts to cancellation of the licence given to the plaintiff. Since there was no extension of the licence period and by the notice under Ex.A4 the allotment was cancelled the plaintiff is not entitled to continue in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule stall. His continuation in the plaint schedule stall is neither authorised nor legal. So the plaintiff is not entitled for continuing in the plaint schedule stall according to law and he is liable for eviction.

18.From the above discussion I hold that the allotment of the plaint schedule stall to the plaintiff is only a licence and not a lease and that the defendants have already cancelled the licence given to the plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule stall and so the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for in the plaint.

Accordingly I answer this point against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants.

Point No.2:

19.In view of my finding on the earlier discussed and decided point

No.1 I hold that the trial court has appreciated the evidence on record in right perspective and that it has considered all the important and material facts of the case and that its findings and observations mentioned in its judgment are correct and also the judgment passed by the trial court is correct basing on the evidence on record and according to law and that there was neither any irregularity nor illegality committed by the trial court in pronouncing the said judgment. Accordingly I answer this point.

9

Point No.3:

20.In view of my findings on points 1 and 2, I hold that the appeal is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed and that the decree and judgment passed by the trial court deserve confirmation in all respects. Accordingly I answer this point.

21.In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the decree and judgment dt.27.10.2016 in O.S.828/2015 passed by the learned I

Addl. Jr. Civil Judge, Vijayawada. But taking into consideration the special facts and circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their respective costs of this appeal.

Typed to my dictation by the typist, corrected and pronounced by me in open court, this the 21st day of December, 2018.

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

Appendix of Evidence

NIL

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

10

In the court of the VIII Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada.

Present:.Sri.N.Ramesh Babu,B.Com.,LL.B., VIII Addl.District Judge, Vijayawada.

Tuesday this the 10th day of July, 2018.

A.S.124 of 2016

Between:

Mr.Jamjam Koteswara Rao, S/o.Venkata Satyanarayana, Hindu, 50

years, R.K.Puram, Vijayawada... Appellant.

And

1.The Joint Collector, Krishna District, Camp office at Vijayawada. 2.The Asst. Director of Marketing, Vijayawada, Marketing Department, Gollapudi. 3.The Estate Officer, Rythu bazar, Patamata, Vijayawada. 4.The Tahasildar, Vijayawada Urban Mandal, Vijayawada.

 .. Respondents.

Appeal from the Decree and judgment dt.28.10.2015 passed by the VI Addl. Jr. Civil Judge Court, Vijayawada in O.S. No.359/2015.

Between:

Mr.Jamjam Koteswara Rao, S/o.Venkata Satyanarayana, Hindu, 50

years, R.K.Puram, Vijayawada... Plaintiff.

And

1.The Joint Collector, Krishna District, Camp office at Vijayawada.

11 2.The Asst. Director of Marketing, Vijayawada, Marketing Department, Gollapudi. 3.The Estate Officer, Rythu bazar, Patamata, Vijayawada. 4.The Tahasildar, Vijayawada Urban Mandal, Vijayawada.

.. Defendants.

The plaintiff has filed O.S.359/2015 for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant, their men, agents, followers and servants etc. from ever interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the stalls bearing Nos.93 and 94 situated in Rytu Bazaar, Kedareswarapet, Vijayawada.

Value of the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction is value Rs.18,000/­. On which a court fee of Rs.1,266/­ is paid herewith under section 34 (2) of A.P.C.F. and S.V.Act.

Appeal presented on 21.01.2016.

This Appeal suit is coming up for final hearing on 06.07.2018 in the presence of Mr.S.Naga Srinivasa Rao, Advocate for Appellant and of Mr.T.Srinivasa Rao, Addl.Government Pleader for Respondents and perusing the material papers on record and other papers and this court doth order and decree: 

1.That the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed confirming the decree and judgment dt.28.10.2015 in

O.S.359/2015 passed by the learned VI Addl. Jr. Civil

Judge, Vijayawada. 

2.That the parties are directed to bear their respective costs of this appeal.

3.That the appellant do bear his own costs of Rs.1,318/­ towards institution costs.

Given under my hand and seal of this court this the 10th day of July, 2018.

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. Memorandum of Costs

ParticularsForFor AppellantRespon dent

Stamp on Vakalat & 52­00 Welfare1,266­00 Stamp on Appeal 12

Process Petition stamp C.F.Affixed on documents Pleaders Fee Senior Junior Publication charges Writing charges Typing charges _________ Total1,318­00

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

13

A.S.6 of 2017

21.12.2018

Judgment is pronounced (VSJ).

In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the decree and judgment dt.27.10.2016 in

O.S.828/2015 passed by the

learned I Addl. Jr. Civil Judge,

Vijayawada. But taking into consideration the special facts and circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their respective costs of this appeal.

VIII ADJ.

1

In the court of the VIII Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada.

Present:.Sri.N.Ramesh Babu,B.Com.,LL.B., VIII Addl.District Judge, Vijayawada.

Saturday this the 15th day of December, 2018.

A.S.286 of 2016

Between:

Mr.Sunkara Naga Bhushana Rao, S/o.Seenaiah, Hindu, 42 years,

Kondapalli, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal, Krishna District... Appellant.

And

Mr.Maram Anjaneyulu, S/o.M.Pitchaiah, Hindu, 42 years,

Bhavanipuram, Vijayawada, Krishna District. .. Respondent.

Appeal from the Decree and judgment dt.24.06.2016 passed by the Prl. Sr. Civil Judge Court, Vijayawada in O.S. No.925/2011.

Between:

Mr.Maram Anjaneyulu, S/o.M.Pitchaiah, Hindu, 42 years,

Bhavanipuram, Vijayawada, Krishna District... Plaintiff.

And

Mr.Sunkara Naga Bhushana Rao, S/o.Seenaiah, Hindu, 42 years,

Kondapalli, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal, Krishna District... Defendant.

This Appeal suit is coming up for final hearing on 14.12.2018 in the presence of Mr.P.L.Prabhakar, Advocate for Appellant and of Mr.M.Raj Kumar, Advocate for Respondent and perusing the material papers on record and other papers and this court delivered the following:

2

JUDGMENT

1.The appellant who is the defendant in O.S.925/2011 on the file of the learned I Addl. Sr. Civil Judge, Vijayawada has filed this appeal against the respondent, who is the plaintiff in that suit.

2.For convenience sake I refer the parties hereinafter as per their array in the original suit before the trial court.

3.The plaintiff has filed O.S.925/2011 for recovery of an amount of

Rs.1,29,806/­ with costs and interest basing on a pronote dt.01.06.2010 alleging that the defendant having borrowed an amount of Rs.1,00,000/­ from the plaintiff on 01.06.2010 for agricultural expenses had executed a pronote on the same day in favour of the plaintiff at Vijayawada undertaking to repay the said amount with interest at 24% p.a. either to the plaintiff or to his order on demand and that subsequently inspite of the demand made by the plaintiff, the defendant did not discharge the debt due under the said pronote but issued an account payee cheque dt.05.08.2011 bearing No.465531 drawn on Syndicate Bank, Kondapalli branch for a sum of

Rs.1,20,000/­ towards part payment but when it was presented in

Andhra Bank, Vijayawada for collection, it was dishonoured on the ground that it exceeds arrangement. So the plaintiff got issued a legal notice dt.16.08.2011 which was acknowledged by the defendant but he failed to comply with the demand of the plaintiff, made in the notice.

4.The case of the defendant is that he got issued a legal notice on 20.07.2011 to Mr.S.Mallikarjuna Rao of Vijayawada by marking a copy 3 to the SHO, Law and Order, Ibrahimpatnam police station stating that there were business transactions between the plaintiff and

Mr.S.Mallikarjuna Rao and that the defendant was purchasing poultry feed from Mr.S.Mallikarjuna Rao and that about 2 years back when the defendant entered into the business transactions with

Mr.S.Mallikarjuna Rao, he obtained signed empty pronotes and cheques from the defendant as security and the defendant paid all the amounts when ever he purchased the poultry feed and subsequently he stopped the business due to recession in the market and requested

Mr.S.Mallikarjuna Rao to return his empty signed pronotes and cheques but he was postponing the same but later Mr.S.Mallikarjuna

Rao was visiting the house of the defendant and threatening that he would fill up the empty pronotes and cheques for higher amounts and dragged the defendant to the courts and in that connection

Mr.S.Mallikarjuna Rao got issued a reply notice with false allegations on 22.07.2011.

5.The further case of the defendant is that after receipt of the said reply notice the defendant had asked Mr.S.Mallikarjuna Rao about his unlawful activities and so he promissed in the presence of elders and mediators that he would hand over all the documents of the defendant but surprisingly Mr.S.Mallikarjuna Rao got issued a legal notice dt.16.08.2011 under the instructions from the plaintiff for unlawful gain in collusion with the plaintiff and later got filed the suit with false contents. The case of the plaintiff is false and all the allegations made by the plaintiff against the defendant in the plaint are all false and the defendant did not receive any consideration under the suit pronote 4 from the plaintiff and the plaintiff was set up by Mr.S.Mallikarjuna Rao and so the suit is not maintainable. The defendant has requested to dismiss the suit with costs.

6.Basing on the above contentions of the parties, the following three issues were framed and settled for trial.

1.Whether the suit pronote is fabricated on a blank signed pronote given by him to one Sikakolli Mallikharjuna Rao?

2.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit amount?

3.To what relief? 

7.In order to prove the case of the plaintiff, he himself got examined as PW1 and got examined two other witnesses as PWs2 and 3 and got marked Exs.A1 to A5 documents on his behalf. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the defendant. Even though the defendant as DW1 filed his affidavit but did not turn up for cross­examination and so the trial court has eschewed the evidence of

DW1. The learned counsel for both sides have not submitted arguments but the trial court has treated the arguments on both sides as heard and pronounced the judgment dt.13.10.2016 which has been challenged in the present appeal.

8.The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that from 22.09.2016 the trial court has adjourned the matter to 21.10.2016 for examination of DW1 as a last chance at the request of the learned counsel for the defendant but subsequently corrected the date of adjournment as 26.09.2016 by striking off the date which is dt.21.10.2016. On 26.09.2016 the evidence of the defendant was 5 closed because DW1 was not present and as there was no representation, the matter was posted to 28.09.2016 for arguments.

On 28.09.2016 since both parties called absent and the learned counsel for both sides were also not present, the matter was treated as heard and the matter was posted to 13.10.2016 for judgment and on 13.10.2016 the judgment was pronounced. On 21.10.2016 the defendant appeared before the trial court and came to know that the matter was disposed off on 13.10.2016 itself and so immediately he obtained a certified copy of the judgment and decree and preferred this appeal.

9.The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff did not raise any objection for the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. I have verified the docket of the trial court in O.S.925/2011. There is a clear correction regarding the date of adjournment from 21.10.2016 to 26.09.2016. On 22.09.2016 firstly the docket order was typed by posting the matter to 21.10.2016. By striking off the date of adjournment i.e., 21.10.2016 the learned trial Judge has written with his hand putting the date of adjournment as 26.09.2016.

Subsequently the judgment was pronounced on 13.10.2016 itself which is before 21.10.2016. The parties might have noted down the date of adjournment as 21.10.2016 and might have not been informed about the change of date from 21.10.2016 to 26.09.2016. So the parties might have no knowledge about the dates of adjournments which are dt.26.09.2016, 28.09.2016 and 13.10.2016. Even on 13.10.2016 notice regarding pronouncement of judgment was not served on both sides and so the notice was affixed to the notice board 6 and the judgment was pronounced. It is very clear from the docket order dt.13.10.2016.

10.The defendant as DW1 filed his affidavit in the form of his evidence in examination­in­chief but because of the change of date of adjournment he was not present on 26.09.2016 and so his evidence was eschewed. It is not fair on the part of the trial court to change the date of adjournment pre­poning the same without giving sufficient notice to the parties or their learned counsels. If the judgment was

pronounced subsequent to 21.10.2016 there was no scope for the

parties to make any comment against the trial court. But having adjourned the matter to 21.10.2016, pre­poning the same to 26.09.2016 without giving sufficient notice of the same to the parties or their learned counsel is not fair on the part of the trial court. So the judgment pronounced without providing an opportunity to the defendant to adduce his side evidence and without providing an opportunity to both sides for advancing their arguments is not sustainable at law. So under these circumstances the decree and judgment passed by the trial court are not sustainable at law and they are liable to be set aside. So I have to accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard and hold that the decree and judgment passed by the learned I Addl. Sr. Civil Judge,

Vijayawada dt.13.10.2016 in O.S.925/2011 are not sustainable at law and that they are liable to be set aside.

11.In the result, the decree and judgment passed by the learned I

Addl. Sr. Civil Judge, Vijayawada dt.13.10.2016 in O.S.925/2011 are set aside and the matter is remanded to the trial court with a direction 7 to restore the suit with the same number and to provide an opportunity to the defendant to adduce his side evidence and dispose off the matter by hearing both sides according to law. Accordingly this appeal is allowed, directing the parties to bear their respective costs of the appeal and to appear before the trial court on 04.01.2019.

Dictated to Personal Assistant, typed and transcribed by him,

corrected and pronounced by me in open court, this the 15th day of December, 2018.

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

Appendix of Evidence

NIL

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

8

In the court of the VIII Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada.

Present:.Sri.N.Ramesh Babu,B.Com.,LL.B., VIII Addl.District Judge, Vijayawada.

Tuesday this the 30th day of October, 2018.

A.S.4 of 2015

Between:

Smt.Simhadri Satyasri, W/o.N.Abhinay, Hindu, 33 years, Prajasakthi

Nagar, Vijayawada... Appellant.

And

1.Mrs.Pilla Karunasri, W/o.Late Srinivas, Hindu, 34 years, Gollapudi, Vijayawada. 2.Senior Superintendent of Post office, representing Indian Post, Vijayawada. 3.Union of India, Owning Indi Post, rep. by its Secretary, New Delhi. 4.Mrs.Gudivada Srilatha, W/o.Nageswara Rao, Hindu, 35 years,

Kothapet, Vijayawada­1. .. Respondents.

Appeal from the Decree and judgment dt.17.11.2014 passed by the III Addl. Jr. Civil Judge Court, Vijayawada in O.S. No.836/2013.

Between:

Mrs.Pilla Karunasri, W/o.Late Srinivas, Hindu, 34 years, Gollapudi,

Vijayawada... Plaintiff.

And

1.Senior Superintendent of Post office, representing Indian Post, Vijayawada. 2.Union of India, Owning Indi Post, rep. by its Secretary, New Delhi. 3.Mrs.Gudivada Srilatha, W/o.Nageswara Rao, Hindu, 35 years, Kothapet, Vijayawada­1. 4.Smt.Simhadri Satyasri, W/o.N.Abhinay, Hindu, 33 years, Prajasakthi

Nagar, Vijayawada... Defendants.

The plaintiff has filed O.S.836/2013 seeking to declare that a nominee is only a custodian subsequent to the death of an employee and can claim the amounts from the employers but all the legal heirs of the deceased employee are entitled to equal shares in those amounts according to law and further to declare that the plaintiff and the defendants 3 and 4 are entitled to distribute death benefits of late Mrs.M.Bharathi equally and further consequently to direct the defendants 1 and 4 to pay the death benefits of Mrs.M.Bharathi equally to the plaintiff and the defendants 3 and 4 and for costs of the suit.

9

Value of the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction is value Rs.25,000/­. On which a court fee of Rs.786/­ and Rs.1,086/­ is paid herewith under section 34 (2) of A.P.C.F. and S.V.Act.

Appeal presented on 15.10.2015.

This Appeal suit is coming up for final hearing on 05.10.2018 in the presence of Mr.D.T.Vyas, Advocate for Appellants and of Mr.M.V.RamaRao,AdvocateforRespondentNo.1,of Mr.L.L.Narasimham, Advocate for Respondent No.2 and of Mr.K.Mohana Rao, Advocate for Respondent No.4 and Respondent No.3 inperson and perusing the material papers on record and other papers and this court doth order and decree:

1.That the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed with costs, confirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned III Addl. Jr. Civil Judge, Vijayawada dt.17.11.2014 in O.S.836/2013. 2.That the appellant do bear his own costs of Rs.3,424/­ towards this appeal suit.

Given under my hand and seal of this court this the 30th day of October, 2018.

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

Memorandum of Costs

ParticularsForFor AppellantRespon dent

Stamp on Vakalat & 52­00 Welfare1,872­00 Stamp on Appeal Process300­00 Petition stamp C.F.Affixed on documents Pleaders Fee Senior1,000­00 Junior Publication charges Writing charges100­00 Typing charges100­00 _________ Total3,424­00

VIII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada. 

10

A.S.286 of 2016

15.12.2018

Judgment is pronounced (VSJ). In the result, the decree and judgment passed by the learned I

Addl. Sr. Civil Judge, Vijayawada dt.13.10.2016 in O.S.925/2011 are set aside and the matter is remanded to the trial court with a direction to provide an opportunity to the defendant to adduce his side evidence and dispose off the matter by hearing both sides according to law. Accordingly this appeal is allowed, directing the parties to bear their respective costs of the appeal.

VIII ADJ.