IN THE COURT OF THE SECOND FAST TRACK SESSIONS JUDGE
FOR EXPEDITIOUS TRIAL AND DISPOSAL OF CASES OF RAPE
AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL OFFENCES
ACT AT KHAMMAM
Monday, this the 3rd day of April, 2023
Present:Smt.R.Danie Ruth, I Addl.District and Sessions Judge, Khammam, FAC, Second Fast Track Sessions
Judge - for Expeditious Trial and
Disposal of Cases of Rape and Protection of Children from- Sexual Offences Act, Khammam
SPECIAL SESSIONS CASE No. 126 OF 2021 ===================================================
1.Name of the Complainant:The State of Telangana, through Inspector of Police, Khammam I-Town police station.
2.Name of the accused. :A1: Allam Maraiah @ Maraiah Kumar, S/o: Subba Rao, Age 25 yrs Astrology, R/o: H.NO.5-4-95/1, Parshibandham, Khammam. A2: Chirra babu Rao, S/o: Nagaiah, Age 48 yrs, Madiga, Medical officer at Sri Pooja Hospital, Khammam, R/o: Azeez street, Khammam. A3: Allam Subba Rao, S/o: Narayana, Age 58 yrs, Astrologer, R/o: H.NO.5- 4-95/1, Parshibandham, Khammam. A4: Allam Chinna Ramulu, W/o: Subba Rao, Age 55 yrs, housewife, R/o: H.NO.5-4-95/1, Parshibandham, Khammam.
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3.Crime No.:Crime No.286/2020 of Khammam I Town Police Station.
4.P.R.C.Number:---
5.Name of the Officer who committed :--- the case.
6.Prosecution conducted by:Sri.P.Srinivasa Rao, Special Public Prosecutor, Khammam.
7.Defence conducted by:Sri.Potla Madhava Rao, Advocate, Khammam.
8.Charges :U/Sec.376 r/w 511, 302, 326-A, 354, 370 r/w 34, 506, 201 r/w 34 of I.P.C. and Section 9 r/w 10 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Section 79 of Juvenile justice Act and Section 16 to 18 of Bonded Labour System (abolition) Act, 1976.
9.Plea of the accused :Not guilty.
10.Finding of the court:Found guilty.
11.Result: In the result, accused Nos.1 to 4 are found not guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 376 r/w 511, 302, 326-A, 354, 370 r/w 34, 506, 201 r/w 34 of I.P.C. and Section 9 r/w 10 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Section 79 of Juvenile justice Act and Section 16 to 18 of Bonded Labour System (abolition) Act, 1976 and accordingly he is acquitted under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C. for the above said offences. Bail bonds of the
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accused shall stand cancelled.MO! And 2 shall be destroyed after expiry of appeal time.
=================================================
This Sessions case came before me on 28.03.2023 for hearing in the presence of Sri.P.Srinivasa Rao, Special Public Prosecutor for the State and that of Sri.P.Madhava Rao, Advocate for the accused; upon perusing the material available on record and upon hearing thea arguments of both sides, this Court delivered the following:
J U D G M E N T
The Inspector of Police, Khammam I-Town Police
Station has filed charge sheet against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 376 r/w 511, 302, 326-A, 354, 370 r/ w 34, 506, 201 r/w 34 of I.P.C. and Section 9 r/w 10 of
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Section 79 of Juvenile justice Act and Sections 16 to 18 of Bonded
Labour System (abolition) Act, 1976.
2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under:
i) That on 05.10.2020 at 1600 hours defacto-complainant
Uppalaiah came to police station and lodged a report stating that
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his second daughter Narsamma, aged 13 years is working as maid in the house of accused no.1, 3 and A4 since five months and has been staying with them at their house. On 19.09.2020 at morning hours Accused no.3 informed him that his daguther caughthold of flames and received burnt injuries and immediately they admitted her in Sri Pooja Hospital, Khammam for treatment. Immediately he rushed to Pooja Hospital, later he came to know that on 19.09.2020 at about 0900 hours minor victim girl was present in front room, mean time accused No.1 went there and caught-hold of her hand, hugged her forcibly and demanded her to fulfill his sexual desire by using criminal force, on which the victim minor girl refused the proposal of the accused, on that, the accused got angry and intended to kill the victim girl, and took the petrol bottle and poured petrol on the victim girl and lit fire with match box and threatened her with dire consequences. Due to serious condition, the victim was shifted to Khammam Government Hospital on 05.10.2020 and later she was shifted to Osmania Hospital, Hyderabad for better
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treatment, and later she was shifted to Rainbow Hospital,
Hyderabad on 08.10.2020, where she died while undergoing treatment on 15.10.2020 at 1945 hours.
ii) On the basis of the above complaint, the then Inspector of
Police, (PW-29) registered the present case in Crime No.286 of 2020 for the offence under Sections 376 r/w 511, 302, 326-A, 354, 370, 506, 201 IPC and section 10 POCSO Act and section 79 of Juvenile Justice (Care & Protechion of Children) Act, 2015 and section 16, 17, 18 of Bonded Labour System Abolision Act against A1 and Section 21 of POCSO Act against A2 and Section 370, 201, 202 of IPC and section 21 of POCSO Act and Section 79 of Juvenile Justice Act and Section 16, 17 and 18 of Bonded
Labour System Abolision Act and issued F.I.R. and copies of it to the concerned. During the course of investigation, the said
Inspector of Police examined and recorded the statement of defacto complainant, visited the scene of offence i.e., house of accused, secured the presence of witnesses, examined and recorded their statements, observed the scene and had drawn a
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rough sketch of the scene of offence and incorporated the details in Crime Details Form in the presence of mediators. He secured the witnesses and recorded the statement of victim in pat II CD with coverage of videographer with the help of private videographer, secured the witnesses and examined and recorded the statement at Sri Pooja Hospital, Khammam and he sent a requisition to Spl.Judicial Magistrate, Mobile Court, Khammam to visit the Sri Pooja Hospital, Khammam and accordingly
magistrate visited and recorded the DD of the minor victim girl.
During the course of further investigation police arrested the accused and sent for judicial remand. After collecting all the reports, and after completion of further investigation, charge sheet was filed.
3.This case was taken on file for the offence under
Sections 376 r/w 511, 302, 326A, 354, 370, 506, 201 of I.P.C.
and Section 10 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012, section 79 of JJ Act and Section 16, 17, 18 of BLSA
Act against A1 and Section 21 of POCSO Act against A2 and
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Sections Sections 370, 201, 202 of I.P.C. and Section 21 of
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Section 16, 17, 18 of BLSA Act against A3 and A4 in Sessions Case
No.126/2021 by this court.
4. On appearance of accused before the court, he was furnished with the copies of the relevant documents relied upon by the prosecution, as contemplated under Section 207 Cr.P.C.
5.Later, as per the proceedings of the Hon’ble Principal
District and Sessions Judge, Khammam in Dis.No.1115, dated 01.04.2021, this case was transferred to this Special Court, for disposal in accordance with law.
6. Thereafter, on hearing the learned Special Public
Prosecutor and the defence counsel under Section 226 of Cr.P.C.
and considering the material on record, charges under Sections 376 r/w 511, 302, 326-A, 354, 370 r/w 34, 506, 201 r/w 34 of
I.P.C. and Section 9 r/w 10 of Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012, Section 79 of Juvenile justice Act and
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Sections 16 to 18 of Bonded Labour System (abolition) Act, 1976.
against the accused were framed, read over and explained to them in Telugu, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
7.During the course of trial, the prosecution has examined P.Ws.1 to 21 and got marked the Exs.P1 to P34 and
Mos-1 and 2. On behalf of defence, Dw1 examined and Ex.D1 to D10 was marked.
8.After closure of prosecution side evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with regard to the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, for which, the accsued denied the prosecution side evidence and reported no defence.
9.This court heard the arguments of either side and perused the record. Written arguments filed by Special Public
Prosecutor.
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10.Now the points that arise for determination are, as follows:
1.Whether A-1 made an attempt to commit rape on the victim girl?
2.Whether A-1 knowingly or willingly caused the death of the victim minor girl, as she refused to fulfil his sexual lust?
3.Whether A-1 voluntarily caused grievous hurt to the victim girl by pouring petrol on her person?
4.Whether A-1 insulted modesty of minor victim girl by holding her hands and hugged forcibly with intent to outrage her modesty?
5.Whether A-1, A-3 and A-4 in furtherance of their common intention failed to report the matter about sexually exploited the minor victim girl?
6.Whether A-1 threatened the minor victim girl with dire consequences?
7.Whether A-1, A-3 and A-4 collected burnt cloth pieces and patrol bottle and put in municipal vehicle with intent to screen the evidence from legal punishment?
8.Whether A-1 caughthold hands of the minor victim girl and hugged her with a demand to fulfill his sexual lust?
9.Whether A-1, A-3 and A-4 in furtherance of their common intention kept the minor victim girl as maid servant?
10. Whether A-1, A-3 and A-4 in furtherance of their common intention kept the minor victim girl as maid servant, as bonded labour?
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11. Whether A-2 to A-4 in furtherance of their common intention failed to report about keeping the minor victim girl, as maid servant and when she refused to fulfil sexual lust of A-1, he poured kerosene and caused severe injuries?
12. Whether A-3 and A-4 in furtherance of their common intention failed to report and give information to the concerned, about the incident?
13. Whether the prosecution has proved its case and established the guilt of A-1 for the offence punishable under Sections 376 read with Section 511, 302, 326-A, 354 and under Section 9 read with Section 10 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and the guilt of A-1, A-3 and A-4 under section 370 read with Section 34, 201 read with Section 34 of IPC and under Section 79 of Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of children) Act, 2015, under Sections 16 to 18 of Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 and the guilt of A-2 to A-4 for the offence under Section 21 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and the guilt of A-3 and A-4 for the offence under Section 202 read with Section 34 of IPC, beyond all reasonable doubt?
POINTS 1 TO 10:
11.The case of prosecution is that on 19.09.2020 at about 6.00 am, when the deceased-victim girl was in front room,
A-1 went to her, caught hold of her and hugged her forcibly and demanded her to fulfill his sexual desire by using criminal force
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and when she refused, he got angry against her, took patrol bottle, poured on her and lit fire with match box and threatened her that he will kill her parents, if she disclose to anybody and that A-1 also received burn injury to his right hand middle finger. On hearing her cries, neighbours came and extinguished the fire by covering with Turki towel and the victim was shifted to Sri Pooja Hospital, Khammam and that on receiving the information, her parents came there and later on 05.10.2020, on their complaint, the police I Town registered a case, on the requisition of the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Khammam recorded dying declaration of the deceased.
12.Later, she was shifted to Government Hospital,
Khammam for better treatment and on the same day she was shifted to Osmania General Hospital, Hyderabad and from there, on 08.10.2020, she was shifted to Rainbow Hospital, Hyderabad, for better treatment, where she died while undergoing treatment.
13.P.Ws-1 and 2 are the parents of the deceased. They deposed with one voice that two years ago, their second
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daughter (deceased) was staying in the house of A-1, A-3 and A- 4 who are their relatives and 5 months thereafter, they received a phone call from A-3 that their daughter sustained burn injuries and they admitted her to Pooja Hospital of A-2 and that immediately, they rushed there and on their enquiry, she informed to them that accidentally she sustained burn injuries while litting her chudidar bumps, and they called their villagers to Hospital and the deceased told the same thing to the elders.
14.P.Ws-1 and 2 categorically stated that their villagers obtained their thumb impressions on a paper, in police station and they do not know the contents of complaint. They categorically stated that they never stated before the police that
A-1 tried to assault the deceased when she did not accept him, he poured petrol and lit fire. It is their evidence that they stated before the police that their daughter informed that while she was litting bumps of her pyjama, she accidentally sustained burn injuries. Both of them also stated that they never made acquisition against the accused. P.Ws-1 and 2 specifically denied
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the suggesion and pleaded their ignorance that the police and elders tutored their daughter to state against the accused by changing their earlier version as stated in Ex.D-1 to D-4.
15.In their cross-examination, P.Ws-1 and 2 admitted that on 4 occasions, their daughter statements were recorded through video in presence of their village elders and they were present on two occasions. When the videographs were shown to them they identified their daughter and that their daughter stated before the elders that it was an accident and nobody forced her and she never stated the name of accused or that they are responsible for the incident. Ex.D-1 to D-4 are the pen-drives containing video of statements of the deceased. They also admitted that the deceased was in hospital for 15 days from 19.09.2020 to 05.10.2020 and they stayed with her in hospital and that she stated that it was an accident.
16.P.Ws-1 and 2 who are parents are the crucial and material witnesses, on whose complaint the case was registered.
They did not speak anything against the accused. They denied
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the suggestions that their daughter informed them, that the accused No1 tried to outrage her modesty and that when she refused, he poured petrol on her and lit fire. According to prosecution as could be seen from charge sheet version, A-1 tried to outrage modesty of the deceased, but not by all the accused as suggested by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. Except vague suggestions, no specific suggestions were posed to the witnesses.
17.No suggestion was posed that the deceased was working as maid in the house of A-1, A-3 and A-4. Nothing has been elicited as so to show that they were won over by the accused. PW1 and PW2 have categorically stated that the accused are their relatives and they sent their daughter to their house as a relative. If really, there is truth, in the version of the prosecution, being parents, P.Ws-1 and 2 would have supported the version of prosecution. No parent will keep quite, or forgive the persons who assaulted their daughter which lead to her death. As discussed earlier, the parents of deceased there
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is nothing to show that they have compromised with the accused.
18.Both P.Ws-1 and 2 stated specifically that the elders obtained their thumb impressions on a paper in the police station, whereas the complaint on which the asserted First
Information was registered is having only one thumb impression.
10.Their statements recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 of Cr.P.C and by the police under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.
were marked as Ex.P-1 to P-6. P.Ws-1 and 2 categorically stated that at the instance of village elders and police, they stated
before the Magistrate as in Ex.P-1 and P-3.
19.P.W-3 is said to be the circumstantial witness and co- brother of P.W-1. He deposes that on receipt of information, he went to hospital and the deceased informed them that she accidently sustained burn injuries while she was litting her pyjama bumps, suddenly the flames arose and she sustained fatal injuries. He also did not speak anything against the accused.
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20.According to prosecution, on hearing cries of deceased, P.Ws-4 to 6, who are neighbours rushed to the house of A-1, A-3 and A-4. They depose with one voice that by the time they reached to their house, A-1 and A-3 extinguished the flames with blanket and made the deceased to sit on cot and that when they asked the victim, she stated that while litting fire to pyjama bumps and as they were long, she accidently got burnt injuries.
21.The evidence of P.W-10, who is brother of P.W-1, is also on the same lines as that of the evidence of P.Ws-1 to 3.
Further P.W-10 deposes that the victim was fine and able to speak normally and when he asked, she stated that she caught fire while litting pyjama bumps and that the villagers obtained signatures of his brother (P.W-1) on a white paper.
22.According to P.W-7, on 05.10.2020, on the instructions of their Inspector, she proceeded to Sri Pooja
Hospital, Khammam along with videographer and after identifying the victim, she recorded her statement under Section
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161 of Cr.P.C under videography and stated that A-1 caught hold her and tried to assault her sexually and when she resisted, he poured petrol on her and lit fire and as such she sustained injuries. Admittedly, the said statement said to have been recorded by P.W-7 is not exhibited for the reason best known to the prosecution. When such statement is not exhibited, it is not safe to give any significance to the testimony of P.W-7.
23.According to the prosecution, the victim was unable to speak till 05.10.2020 and she was able to speak on that day, she informed the incident to her parents and that later, she was shifted to Government Hospital, Khammam for better treatment. Shifting of victim to Government Hospital, Khammam, from there to Osmania General Hospital, Hyderabad and again she was shifted to Rainbow Hospital, Hyderabad, where she died while undergoing treatment reveals that the condition of the victim became serious from 05.10.2020 onwards. There is no evidence to show that at the time of recording statement, the condition of victim was stable and she was in fit state of mind
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to give statement and that P.W-7 ascertained the condition of victim to give statement, through the doctor.
24.P.W-8 deposes that he collected CC Footage and converted into DVD (Ex.P-11) and handed over the same to
Police I Town. Ex.P-12 is the 65-B certificate. In his cross- examination he stated that he did not watch CC footage of Sri
Pooja Hospital, Khammam and that he does not know the contents of Ex.P-11. It is not possible to extract the exact/relevant CC footage, without watching the original footage.
Apart from it, P.W-8 is a camera Technician. There is nothing to show that he is the custodian of CC Footage storage devise of Sri
Pooja Hospital, Khammam and that he is competent and proper authoritative person to issue Ex.P-12. Therefore, there is no need to take the testimony of P.W-8 and Ex.P-12 into consideration.
Even the same is taken into consideration; the prosecution did not adduce any evidence as to how and in which manner the same is helpful to the case of prosecution.
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25.Another interesting aspect is regarding checking of cloth traces in the dump yard. P.W-9 is said to be the municipal worker. He deposes that on 19.09.2020, he collected garbage in 15th division, including the house of A-1 and dumped the same in dump yard and that 4 days thereafter, their
Municipal Commissioner called him and instructed him to check out for any cloth traces in dump yard and accordingly, he searched for cloth traces in dump yard in presence of 2 constables and he did not find anything there.
26.From the evidence of P.W-9, it is clear that 4 days after 19.09.2020, which means on 23.09.2020, as per instructions of their Municipal Commissioner, he searched for cloth traces in dump yard in presence of 2 police constables.
Further, presence of police constables and instructions of
Municipal Commissioner to P.W-7, is evident that the police have started their investigation within four days after the asserted incident.
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27.According to prosecution, the police have received the complaint on 05.10.2020, on which the First
Information was registered. It is well settled law that any information subsequent to investigation is hit by Section 162 of
Cr.P.C. If the First Information Report is kept aside, there is no earlier version before the Court.
28.P.W-11 is the photographer. His evidence reveals that the police called him to take photographs (Ex.P-14) of one patient who was admitted in Osmania Hospital, Hyderabad and that prior to that he went to Sri Pooja Hospital, Khammam and recorded the statement of deceased through video and the same was handed over to the police. Ex.P-15 is the CD and P.W-16 is 65-B Certificate.
29.The learned counsel appearing for the accused contends that P.W-11 did not record the statement of the deceased and those written dying declarations placed before the court are tutored and are brought into existence and as such the same cannot be taken into consideration. However the evidence
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of PW11 is in routine manner and is not help full to the case of prosecution.
30.P.Ws-12 and 13 are said to be the mediators for
Crime Details Form (Ex.P). Both of them have turned hostile and did not support the version of Investigation Officer.
31.According to prosecution on 06.10.2020, A-1 confessed his guilt of offence and a match box was seized. P.W-14 is the mediator for confession of A-1 and for seizure of matchbox (M.O-1) under Ex.P-19. His evidence nowhere reveals from where and how match box (M.O-1) was seized. P.W-14 categorically stated that at the time of recording confessional statement, police were present there. Admittedly, the confession in presence of police is inadmissible. The match box (M.O-1) is very much available in open market. Further the incident occurred on 19.09.2020 and alleged seizure was on 6.10.2020. No person who has committed a crime would dare to keep the objects or instruments involved in the crime which would indicate his guilt.
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32.P.W-14 is also one of the mediators for seizure of half burnt towel from the house of accused, on 14.10.2020. The police conducted panchanama on 06.10.2020 and again on 14.10.2020 in presence of same mediators creates a doubt, in the said version. Therefore, there is no need to give any weight to the testimony of P.W-14.
33.Admittedly, the death of deceased and the cause of death is not in dispute. P.W-15 is one of the mediators for
Inquest report (Ex.P-12). He corroborated the testimony of
Investigation Officer. But his part of evidence is also in routine manner.
34.The Medical Officer (P.W-16) deposes that on 21.10.2020, he examined A-1 and there is nothing to suggest that the male examined by him is not capable of performing sexual act. Ex.P-23 is Potency Certificate.
35.According to prosecution, A-1 also sustained injuries in the said incident. P.W-16 also corroborated that Dr. Manisha, who was CMO of Government Hospital, Khammam issued wound
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certificate (Ex.P-24) and as per said certificate Allam Maraiah (A1) sustained injuries to his right hand middle finger and the same is simple in nature. Admittedly, the deceased sustained burn injuries in the house of A-1, A-3 and A-4. P.Ws-4 to 6 depose that A-1, A-3 and A-4 extinguished the flames with blankets and made the victim to sit on a cot. When A-1 extinguished the fire with blanket, he might have sustained said injury. This itself, is not sufficient to take adverse inference against the accused.
36.P.W-17 is the Assistant Professor, MGMH, Hyderabad.
His evidence reveals that on 06.10.2020, he along with his staff went to Osmania Hospital, and examined the victim-Mote
Narasamma (deceased) and the victim that on 19.09.2020 at about 6.00 am, Mote Uppalaiah S/o Subba Rao entered into victim’s room, grabbed her hand and demanded her to fulfill his sexual desire and when she refused and resisted, said Mote
Uppalaiah suddenly took a petrol can which was stored in the house, poured on her and lit fire and as the patient ran into
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father’s room, of Mote Uppalaiah, again ran to her, torn her cloths, wrapped her on a cloth and left her at a private hospital,
Khammam and the victim was blackmailed not to reveal the truth to anybody otherwise she and her family members will be killed.
37.The evidence of P.W-17 further reveals that they sent nail clippings and blood group to FSL and they received report (Ex.P-26) on 09.12.2020 and that as per chemical examination report and physical, he issued opinion (Ex.P-25) stating that the nail clippings do not have semen, spermatozoa and foreign material. But, the possibility of sexual assault cannot be ruled out.
38.P.W-17 admitted in his cross-examination that he has noted down the history of the case. According to P.W-17,
Mote Uppalaiah assaulted and demanded the victim to fulfil his sexual desire and when she refused, he poured petrol on her and lit fire. Admittedly, Mote Uppalaiah is not the accused in this case. P.W-17 introduced name of Mote Uppalaiah and his version
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is contrary to the case of prosecution. He is not speaking anything against the accused in this case. His evidence is quite against the case of prosecution.
39.Thus it is clear that the prosecution adduced to sets of evidence. One is that Mote Uppalaiah is the offender and the second set is that Allam Maraiah @ Maraiah Kumar is the offender. There is no clarification given by the prosecution on this aspect.
40.Admittedly, there are multiple dying declarations both oral and written. The oral dying declarations were made to
P.Ws-1 to 6. The written dying declarations were made to
Woman Head Constable-981 (P.W-7) and Magistrate (P.W-18).
The entire issue in the present case hinges on the admissibility and evidentiary value of the dying declarations made by the deceased, two of which were in writing and recorded by P.W-7 and P.W-18 and the other were oral and communicated by the deceased to P.Ws-1 to 6.
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41.Section 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act deals with the admissibility of dying declaration, which states that the
Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts, made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured, without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the court unreasonable are themselves relevant facts.
42.An oral dying declaration is admissible in evidence as an exception to the general rule of evidence that hereby evidence is no evidence in the eyes of law. The oral dying declaration made before parents and other near relatives were made in the conscious state, is admissible as held in Amar Singh
V. State Of Rajasthan (2010) 9 SCC 64. In Pakala Narain Swamy
V. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47, it was held that “the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death of the declarant will be admissible if such transaction has some proximate effect”.
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43.Dying declaration under Section 32 (1) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible evidence, unless evidence is tested by cross-examination. Under Section 32 where a statement is made by the person as to the cause of death or as to any of the circumstances, which resulted in his death and when cause of death or that person's death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing made by the deceased to the witness, is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence.
44.Undoubtedly, it is well settled that conviction can be based on the dying declaration itself if it is found satisfactory and reliable by a court, but at the same time, if there are any important infirmities in the dying declaration or the facts surrounded such evidence, warranting further assurance then the courts have to look for corroboration. Otherwise, the dying declaration if satisfies judicial conscience, requires no corroboration. The rule of corroboration requires that the dying declaration be subject to close scrutiny since the evidence
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is not tested by cross-examination. Any evidence adduced for the purpose of proving dying declaration has to be weighed independently and through the anvil of thorough scrutiny.
46.In the case on hand, oral dying declaration as it inspires confidence, as it is quite natural that the parents, neighbours and elder coming to the spot/hospital, soon after the information. That apart, registering of case, after many days, after commencing investigation by the police, casts a doubt in the case of the prosecution and, eventually, creates a concavity in the version of prosecution.
47.While dealing with the evidence of the declarant’s mind, the Hon’ble Constitution Bench, in Laxman V. State of
Maharashtra 1974 SCC (1) 309, has laid down thus: - “3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the
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existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross- examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite.”
48.It is well settled law that when there are multiple dying declarations and each one is inconsistent with the other,
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then all the said dying declarations ought to be discarded without any hesitation as held in Nallapati Sivaiah V. Sub-
Divisional Officer, Guntur, Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 2008
SC 19.
49.On 05.10.2020, on the requisition of the police, P.W- 18, the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise),
Khammam recorded dying declaration of the deceased. The evidence of P.W-18 reveals that the victim stated that she was working as domestic helper in the house of one Subba Rao since last 3 months prior to the incident and 15 days prior to recording to her statement Maraiah caught hold her hand and pulled her and asked her to sleep with him, for which she refused and she ran towards the door, then Maraiah came, poured petrol on her and set ablaze and that she raised hue and cries and ran towards father of Maraiah and Maraiah came and torn her dress and wrapped her in a cloth and admitted her in
Pooja Hospital, Khammam and that he threatened not to reveal
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anybody and threatened to kill her and her father and as such she was kept quiet and while undergoing treatment.
50.But, the oral dying declaration made to her parents and neighbours (P.Ws-1 to 6) is quite different that the deceased to them that when she was litting bumps, she sustained burn injuries accidently.
51.Admittedly, the incident took place on 19.09.2020.
The crime was registered on 05.10.2020. Thus, it is clear that the statements given to P.Ws-1 to 6 are the first oral dying declarations, after the asserted incident. Their version is corroborated with other and it reveals that when she was litting bumps, she sustained injuries accidentally. But the statement given to the Magistrate (P.W-18) is an improved version and contrary to the previous version. Therefore, it is to be scrutinized the subsequent version.
52.P.Ws-1 to 6 denied the suggestion that they are deposing falsehood due to compromise. Except vague suggestions nothing has been elicited by the learned Additional Public
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Prosecutor to show there was compromise. There is nothing to suggest the necessity to P.Ws-1 to 6 to speak falsehood and against case of prosecution.
53.P.Ws-1 to 3 admitted that the deceased statements were recorded, on four occasions, under videography in presence of elders and the same was exhibited as D-1 to D-4. P.Ws-1 to 3 identified the victim (deceased) and admitted that his daughter stated before the elders that it was an accident and nobody forced her and she never stated the names of the accused or that they are responsible for the incident. P.Ws-1 and 2 also admitted that the deceased was in hospital for 15 days from 19.09.2020 to 05.10.2020 and they stayed with her in hospital and that she stated that it was an accident.
54.P.Ws-1 and 2 pleaded their ignorance that the police and elders tutored their daughter to state against the accused by changing the earlier version as stated in Ex.D-1 to D-4.
55.The learned Additional Public Prosecutor contends that the accused did not examine the persons, who videographed
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the statements of deceased made before the elders, under Ex.D-1 to D-4. No doubt, the accused did not examine the persons who took the videography. But, Mee Seva Operator was examined as
D.W-1. His evidence reveals that on 20.11.2020, A-1 came to him with 3 cell phones and he verified the phones wherein Ex.D- 1 to D-4 are originally recorded and he verified the properties and found that they are originally recorded. He downloaded the video files and copies into pen-drives (Ex.D-1 to D-4) and he gave details for recorded time, date and length of video etc.. and that the length of the video available on the properties of the original video files and basing on the same he issued 65-B certificate (Ex.D-10). Ex.D-6 to D-9, are the conversation scripts of Ex.D-1 to D-4.
56.D.W-1 denied the suggestion that he has no authority to issue certificate under 65-B and that he colluded with the accused to side tract the case. No specific suggestions are posed that the statements were not recorded and that Ex.D-1 to D-4, are not original download extracts of videography.
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57.It is suggested to P.W-3 that he was not present at the time of recording the statement of victim under Ex.D-1 to D-
4. The very suggestion goes to show that the prosecution is not disputing the factum of recording the statement of the deceased recorded in Ex.D-1 to D-4. No suggestion is posed to P.Ws-1 to 3 that no such statements of the deceased were videographed under Ex.D-1 to D-4. Even though the person who videographed the statement made by the deceased has recorded the same
before the elders. Further, this Court finds nothing to disbelieve
the oral dying declaration given to P.Ws-1 to 6 and also the statements made before the elders as shown in Ex.D-1 to D-4.
The deceased did not speak anything against the accused and the said statements also corroborated the testimonies of P.W-1 to 6.
58.There is gap of 16 days, in recording the statement by P.W-7 and dying declaration by the Magistrate (P.W-18).
There is every possibility to tutor the declarant during said period. The prosecution did not offer any explanation as to why the Municipal Commissioner instructed P.W-9 to search for burnt
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cloth pieces in dump yard and as to why such search for cloth was done in presence of two police constables. It is also not explained why he failed to inform the police, if it is in his knowledge prior to 05.10.2020.
59.P.Ws-1 and 2 have stated that their villagers obtained their thumb impressions on a paper. But, Ex.P-1 is showing only one thumb impression. It is also strengthening the case of accused. It give rise to a suspicion that the police have suppressed the earliest version and brought as new version as stated before the Magistrate (P.W-18). All these aspects creates serious doubt and as such this Court is not inclined to give any weight to the dying declaration (Ex.P-27), as it goes to show that it was not given voluntarily. Be the case, Ex.P-27 did not carry any weight and the same has to be brushed aside and that statement given to woman HC (P.W-7) and the dying declaration (Ex.P-28) can be discarded without any hesitation.
60.There is delay of 16 days in lodging complaint. If really there is truth in the contention of the prosecution that A-1
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poured petrol and set ablaze, the parents (P.W-1 and 2) of the deceased would have lodged complaint immediately, without any delay.
61.The version of the deceased as recorded in the first and the second written dying declarations was entirely different from what was narrated by P.Ws-1 to 6 before the Court. For the above reasons, it can be safely relied on the oral statements allegedly made by the deceased to P.W-1 to 6 and statements made to elders which were videographed in Ex.D-1 to D-4 as they were worthy of credence. The narration as to the manner in which the deceased was set on fire was stated to be consistent and that the cross-examination of the said prosecution witnesses did not elicit anything to show that they were speaking falsehood before the court on the above aspect.
62.In support of his submission that where there are conflicting dying declarations, the Court can accept one and discard the other as long as it is satisfied that the basic
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statement of the deceased had remained consistent, as held in
State of Uttar Pradesh V. Veerpal and Another (2022) 4 SCC 741.
63. Dying declaration is the last statement that is made by a person as to the cause of his imminent death or the circumstances that had resulted in that situation, at a stage when the declarant is conscious of the fact that there are virtually nil chances of his survival. On an assumption that at such a critical stage, a person would be expected to speak the truth, courts have attached great value to the veracity of such a statement.
Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states that when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of death, or as to any of the circumstances which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing made by the deceased victim to the witness, is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. It is noteworthy that the said provision is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of ‘Evidence Act’ as held in
Criminal Appeal No.485 of 2012 between chandrabhan Vs. stae
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of Maharastra the Evidence Act that ‘hearsay evidence is inadmissible’ and only when such an evidence is direct and is validated through cross-examination, is it considered to be trustworthy.
64. In cases involving multiple dying declarations made by the deceased, the question that arises for consideration is as to which of the said dying declarations ought to be believed by the Court and what would be the guiding factors for arriving at a just and lawful conclusion. The problem becomes all the more knotty when the dying declarations made by the deceased are found to be contradictory. Faced with such a situation, the Court would be expected to carefully scrutinize the evidence to find out as to which of the dying declarations can be corroborated by other material evidence produced by the prosecution. Of equal significance is the condition of the deceased at the relevant point in time, the medical evidence brought on record that would indicate the physical and mental fitness of the deceased, the scope of the close relatives/family
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members having influenced/tutored the deceased and all the other attendant circumstances that would help the Court in exercise of its discretion.
65. Lakhan V. State of Madhya PradeshIn (2002) 6
SCC 710, where the deceased was burnt by pouring kerosene oil on her and was brought to the hospital by the accused and his family members, the Court noticed that she had made two varying dying declarations and held thus:
“9. The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in the legal maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire, which means “a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth”. The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called as “the Evidence Act”) as an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act, which provides that oral evidence in all cases must be direct i.e. it must be the evidence of a witness, who says he saw it. The dying declaration is, in fact, the statement of a person, who cannot be called as witness and, therefore, cannot be cross- examined. Such statements themselves are relevant facts in certain cases.
10. This Court has considered time and again the relevance/probative value of dying declarations recorded under different situations and also in cases where more than one dying declaration has
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been recorded. The law is that if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and made voluntarily by the deceased, conviction can be based solely on it, without any further corroboration. It is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon without corroboration. When a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be relied upon without having corroborative evidence. The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased must be in a fit state of mind to make the declaration and must identify the assailants. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details of the occurrence, it cannot be rejected and in case there is merely a brief statement, it is more reliable for the reason that the shortness of the statement is itself a guarantee of its veracity. If the dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot alone form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (Vide Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 22, Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974) 4 SCC 264, K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618, State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455, Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 5 SCC 254, Babulal v. State of M.P. (2003) 12 SCC 490, Muthu Kutty v. State. (2005) 9 SCC 113, State of Rajasthan v. Wakteng (2007) 14 SCC 550 and Sharda v. State of Rajasthan (2010) 2 SCC 85”.
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66. Amol Singh V. State of Madhya PradeshIn 2008(5) SCC 468, when faced with two dying declarations containing inconsistencies, the approach to be adopted by the Court was summarized as under:
“13. Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. (See Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P.) However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances.”
67. In Sher Singh and Another V. State of Punjab 2008(4) SCC 265, this Court has held thus:
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“16. Acceptability of a dying declaration is greater because the declaration is made in extremity. When the party is at the verge of death, one rarely finds any motive to tell falsehood and it is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross- examination are dispensed with in case of a dying declaration. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the court would insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court should ensure that the statement was not as a result of tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is for the court to ascertain from the evidence placed on record that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had ample opportunity to observe and identify the culprit. Normally, the court places reliance on the medical evidence for reaching the conclusion whether the person making a dying declaration was in a fit state of mind, but where the person recording the statement states that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. What is essential is that the person recording the dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement without there being the doctor's opinion to that effect, it can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to 38 (2008) 5 SCC 468 39 (1993) 2 SCC 684 40 (2008) 4 SCC 265 Criminal Appeal No.485 of 2012 be voluntary and truthful.
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A certificate by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and, therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of a statement can be established otherwise.”
68. It is thus clear that in cases where the Court finds that there exist more than one dying declarations, each one of them must be examined with care and caution and only after satisfying itself as to which of the dying declarations appears to be free from suspicious circumstances and has been made voluntarily, should it be accepted. As observed in the judgments quoted above, it is not necessary that in every case, a dying declaration ought to be corroborated with material evidence, ocular or otherwise. It is more a rule of prudence that courts seek validation of the dying declaration from attending facts and circumstances and other evidence brought on record.
69. It is well settled law that if there are more than one dying declarations, then the Court must scrutinize each one of them to find out whether the different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before
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accepting and relying on the same. At the end of the day, each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts. There can be no hard and fast rule on evaluation of the evidence brought before the Court, including the surrounding circumstances at the time when the deceased had made the dying declaration. The focus of the Court is of ensuring the voluntariness of the process, of being satisfied that there was no tutoring or prompting, being convinced that the deceased was in a fit state of mind before making the dying declaration, of ascertaining that ample opportunity was available to the declarant to identify the accused.
70. However, if a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused.
In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration. In this context, this court relies on a decision reported in Nallapati Sivaiah V. Sub- Divisional
Officer, Guntur, A.P. AIR 2008 SC 19, wherein Hon’ble Apex
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Court held as under:“It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in favour of the accused.”
71. There is no dispute that a Magistrate being an uninterested witness and a respected officer and there being no circumstances or material to suspect that he would have any animus against the accused or would in any way be interested for fabricating a dying declaration, such a declaration recorded by the Magistrate, ought not be doubted. But, in the case on hand, the statements by the deceased to her parents, relatives, neighbours and elder (Ex.D-1 to D-4) inspire confidence of the
Court and there is nothing to disbelieve their testimonies.
72.From the evidence of P.W-9 it is apparent that four days after 19.09.2020, the police have tried to seize burnt cloth pieces from dump yard with the help of Municipal Commissioner through P.W-9. There is no reason as to why the police kept quite without registering the case, even though they started
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investigation. This aspect creates serious doubt, on the version of prosecution. More particularly, regarding the dying declaration (statement) given to the Magistrate (P.W-20).
73.There is no dispute about the fact that the deceased did receive severe burn injuries on 19.09.2020. Dr. Abhijith
Subedar (P.W-19), who had conducted the postmortem, stated that she had received burn injuries over front and back of chest and upper part of front of abdomen, complete back and inner aspect of both upper limbs, and total to the extent of 45%. He also deposed that the probable cause of her death was due to burns.
74. Since there is no challenge regarding the statements made by the deceased before the elders as in Ex.D-1 to D-4, this
Court is not inclined to disbelieve or discard, the testimonies of
P.Ws-1 to 6 and Ex.D-1 to D-4 and the same can be considered as worthy oral dying declaration. For making them unreliable, this Court does not see any reason to delve into their credit worthiness.
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75. P.Ws-1 and 2 are parents of the deceased and are interest in the deceased, but not in the accused. There is nothing to suggest the need to them to speak false hood. There is nothing to show that the deceased was not in fit condition to make an oral declaration to P.Ws-1 to 6 and before elders.
Therefore, this Court has inclined to accept their testimony without any hesitation.
75. In the light of the evidence discussed above and being mindful of the principles governing appreciation of the evidence related to multiple dying declarations, this Court finds it difficult to accept the case of prosecution. On the other hand, the evidence of P.Ws-1 to 6 and Ex.D-1 to D-4 cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the accused guilty for the offence. Hence, the accused are entitled to being granted benefit of doubt. In view of the above discussion, the evidence of Investigation officers and mediators, did not render any help to the case of prosecution.
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76.On scanning the evidence on record, this Court holds that the prosecution has failed to establish that A-1 made an attempt to commit rape on the victim girl and that A-1 knowingly or willingly caused the death of the victim minor girl and that A-1 voluntarily caused grievous hurt to the victim girl by pouring petrol on her person and that A-1 insulted modesty of minor victim girl by holding her hands and hugged forcibly with intent to outrage her modesty and that A-1 catch hold hands of the minor victim girl and hugged her with a demand to fulfill his sexual lust.
77.Further the prosecution has also failed to prove and establish that A-1, A-3 and A-4 in furtherance of their common intention failed to report the matter about sexually exploited the minor victim girl and that A-1 threatened the minor victim girl with dire consequences and that A-1, A-3 and A-4 collected burnt cloth pieces and patrol bottle and put in municipal vehicle with intent to screen the evidence from legal punishment.
According these points are answered against the prosecution.
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78.POINTS 9 AND 10:None of the prosecution witnesses are speaking that the victim was working as maid servant in the house of A-1, A-3 and A-4. P.Ws-1 and 2 (parents of the deceased) depose that about 2 years ago they sent their daughter to their relatives (A-1, A-3 and A-4) house. They did not whisper that the deceased worked as servant in their house.
79.In absence of such evidence, it cannot be taken for granted that the deceased worked as maid servant in the house of A-1, A-3 and A-4. Therefore, the question of applicability of provision under Section 79 of Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of children) Act, 2015, under Sections 16 to 18 of Bonded
Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 does not arise. Accordingly, these points are answered against the prosecution.
80.POINTS 11 AND 12:According to the prosecution A- 2 to A-4 in furtherance of their common intention failed to report about keeping the minor victim girl, as maid servant and that when she refused to fulfil sexual lust of A-1, he poured kerosene and caused severe injuries and that A-3 and A-4 in
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furtherance of their common intention failed to report and give information to the concerned, about the incident.
81.Dr. Malathi, who is DM & HO, Khammam was examined as P.W-20. She deposes that on receipt of requisition from the Inspector of Police, Khammam-I Town, she visited
Pooja Hospital, where the deceased was admitted. She deposes that the deceased was admitted with 70% of burns and on enquiry she came to know that from 19.09.2020 till the date of her visit on 06.10.2020, for about 18 days she was undergoing treatment.
82.P.W-20 deposes that immediately she issued show cause notice under Section 9 (1) of Telangana Practicing Medical
Clinical Establishment Act, to the authorities of Pooja Hospital to submit their reasons for not following guidelines in dealing with medico legal case and that A-2 submitted an explanation stating that he also came to know the facts on the date of inspection itself and that Sri Kollai community elder of the victim made him to believe that victim sustained burns accidentally and due
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to pandemic situation, unable to get information in detail with the case attendance and that he concentrated on medical treatment and as such he could inform the same to police and medical department.
83.Admittedly, the prosecution did not file notice said to have been issued by P.W-20 to A-2 under Section 9 (1)
Telangana Practicing Medical Clinical Establishment Act.
84.As stated supra, from the evidence of P.W-9 it is apparent that four days after 19.09.2020, the police have tried to seize burnt cloth pieces from dump yard with the help of
Municipal Commissioner through P.W-9. When the police were having information about the incident and commenced the investigation, it cannot be said that again A-2 has to send the information to the police.
85.Furthermore, there is no doubt, during said period it was peak Covid-19 pandemic situation. According to P.W-20, A-2 did not follow the protocol in case of patient admitted with 70% of burn injuries. Because of such serious Covid pandemic
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situation, A-2 might have not intimated the police concerned. At the most it may be violation of the said Act referred supra. But, there is nothing to accept that A-2 failed to follow the procedure, in case of medical legal case.
86.In view of conclusions and findings on the above points, there is no hesitation to conclude that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of A-2 to A-4 for the offence under Section 21 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012 and the guilt of A-3 and A-4 for the offence under
Section 202 read with Section 34 of IPC, beyond all reasonable doubt.
87.POINT No.13:For the foregoing reasons, this Court has no hesitation to come to conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the guilt of A-1 for the offence punishable under Sections 376 read with Section 511, 302, 326-
A, 354 and under Section 9 read with Section 10 of Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and the guilt of A-1,
A-3 and A-4 under section 370 read with Section 34, 201 read
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with Section 34 of IPC and under Section 79 of Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of children) Act, 2015, under Sections 16 to 18 of Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 and the guilt of A-2 to A-4 for the offence under Section 21 of Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and the guilt of A-3 and A-4 for the offence under Section 202 read with Section 34 of IPC, beyond all reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this point is answered.
88.IN THE RESULT:The A-1 is found not guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 376 read with Section 511, 302, 326-A, 354 and under Section 9 read with Section 10 of
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and A-1,
A-3 and A-4 are found not guilty for the offence under Section 370 read with Section 34, 201 read with Section 34 of IPC and under Section 79 of Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of children) Act, 2015, under Sections 16 to 18 of Bonded Labour
System (Abolition) Act, 1976 and A-2 to A-4 are found not guilty for the offence under Section 21 of Protection of Children from
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Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and A-3 and A-4 are found not guilty for the offence under Section 202 read with Section 34 of IPC, beyond all reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused are acquitted under Section 235 (1) of Cr.P.C., for the said respective charges.
The bail bonds of the accused shall stand cancelled after
SIX months and that they are set at liberty, forthwith. MO.1 and 2 shall be destroyed after expiry of appeal time.
Directly typed to my dictation by the Stenographer, corrected and
pronounced by me in the open court on this the 4th day of April, 2023.
I Addl.District and Sessions Judge, Khammam, FAC, Second Fast Track Sessions
Judge - for Expeditious Trial and
Disposal of Cases of Rape and Protection of Children from- Sexual Offences Act, Khammam
-APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE-
WITNESSES EXAMINED FOR
PROSECUTION:
P.W.1:Mothe Uppalaiah-Defacto complainant and father of the victim
P.W.2:M. Venkateswarlu
P.W.3:V.Sreenu
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P.W.4:P.Lakshmi
P.W.5:K.Musalamma
P.W.6:K.Malleswari
P.W.7:Sk.Dorasani
P.W.8:A.Shiva Krishna
P.W.9:Y.Kranthi Kumar
P.W.10:M.Ramesh
P.W.11: M.Rajesh Babu
P.W.12:P.Yadagiri
P.W.13:L.nani
P.W.14:P.Ravi
P.W.15:D. Subba Rao
P.W.16:Dr.L.Sandeep
P.W.17:Dr.T.Viplav
P.W.18:M.Usha Sree
P.W.19:Dr.Abijith Subedar
P.W.20:Dr.Malathi
P.W.21:N.Chitti Babu, CI of police
DEFENCE: DW1: Vijay Bhaskar
EXHIBITS MARKED FOR
PROSECUTION:
Ex.P1: Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement of PW1
Ex.P2: Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of PW1
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Ex.P3: Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of PW1
Ex.P4: Section 16 Cr.P.C. statement of PW2
Ex.P5: Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of PW2
Ex.P6: Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of Pw2
Ex.P7: Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of Pw2
Ex.P8: Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of Pw3
Ex.P9: Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of Pw5
Ex.P10: Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of Pw6
Ex.P11:CD of CC TV Futage
Ex.P12: 65-B certificate
Ex.P13:Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of Pw10
Ex.P14:Photographs
Ex.P15:C.D.
Ex.P16: Certificate under Section 650B
Ex.P17:Signature of PW12 on CDF
Ex.P18:Signature of PW13 on CDF
Ex.P19:Confession and seizure panchanama
Ex.P20:Relevant portion of Confession and seizure panchanama
Ex.P21:Confession and seizure panchanama
Ex.P22:Inquest report of deceased
Ex.P23:Potency certificate of A1
Ex.P24:Wound certificate isused by Government Hospital, Khammam
Ex.P25:Opinon of PW17
Ex.P26:FSL Repoert
Ex.P27:Dying Declaration
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Ex.P28:Post Mortem Examination Report
Ex.P29:FSL Report
Ex.P30:Final Opinon
Ex.P31:Letter Addressed to PW20 to CI of police.
Ex.P32:First Information Report
Ex.P33:Date of birth certificate of victim
Ex.P34:Crime Details Form
DEFENCE:
Ex.D1 to D4 pen drive containing videos of statemen ts Ex.D5: certificate issued by the DW1 of TS government. Ex.D6: to D9 video conversation Script Ex.D10 is 65 Bcertificate of Indian Evidence Act.
Material objections marked, if any: MO1: Match Box MO2: Towel
I Addl.District and Sessions Judge, Khammam, FAC, Second Fast Track Sessions
Judge - for Expeditious Trial and
Disposal of Cases of Rape and Protection of Children from- Sexual Offences Act, Khammam
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