Dr. Y.Srinivasa Rao

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IN THE COURT OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, AVANIGADDA

Present: Mr.Y.SRINIVASA RAO

Senior Civil Judge, Avanigadda

Tuesday, this the 17th day of March, 2020

A.S No.1/2018

Between:­

1. Rajulapati Jamadagni, S/o.late Subba Rao, Hindu, aged about 76 years, children's protection, resident of Mallampalli Village, Ghantasala Mandal, Krishna District.

2. Rajulapati Subba Rao, S/o.Jamadagni, Hindu, aged about 52 years, Cultivation, resident of Mallampalli Village, Ghantasala Mandal, Krishna District. …. … Appellants/plaintiffs.

And

1. Rajulapati Nancharamma @ Lakshmi Nancharamma, Hindu, aged about 67 years, housewife, resident of ward no.2, Santhi nagar, Nidadavolu, West Godavari District.

2. Rajulapati Adinarayana, S/o.Devaiah, Hindu, aged about 55 years, Cultivation, resident of Babujinagar, Nidadavolu, West Godavari District.

3. Rajulapati Venkateswara Rao, S/o.Adinarayana, Hindu, aged about 66 years, Cultivation, resident of Mallampalli Village, Ghantasala Mandal, Krishna District.

4. Rajulapati Veera Satyanarayana @ Satyanarayana, S/o.Venkata Narayana, Hindu, aged about 56 years, Cultivation, resident of Santhi nagar, Nidadavolu, West Godavari District.

5. Rajulapati Srinivasa Rao, S/o.Veeraswamy, Hindu, aged about 46 years, Cultivation, resident of Mallampalli Village, Ghantasala Mandal, Krishna District. …. … Respondents/ defendants.

This appeal came up on 16.03.2020 before me in the presence of Mr.S.R.M.Prasad, Advocate on behalf of the appellants and Mr.B.Nancharaiah Naidu, Advocate for the respondents 3 and 5 and the respondents 2 and 4 remained exparte and the 1st respondent died and upon hearing and considering the material on record, the appeal having been stood over till this day for consideration, this court made the following 

J U D G M E N T :­

This Appeal is filed under section 96 and Order 43 Rule 1 of

CPC to against the Judgment and decree in O.S No.118/2012 dt.21.08.2017 on the file of the Court of Principal Junior Civil

Judge, Avanigadda.

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2. The Appellants herein are the plaintiffs and the respondents herein are the defendants in the above Suit.

3. The parties to this appeal will be referred to herein­ after as plaintiffs and defendants as arrayed in the suit for the sake of convenience.

4. The case of the plaintiffs/ appellants in brief as follows: Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the absolute owners of the plaint schedule property which is an extent of ac.0.17 cents. It originally belongs to one Subba Rao who is father of 1st plaintiff, as it was purchased under registered sale deed dt.12.06.1944. Later, by virtue of a will dt.05.05.1969, plaintiffs got vested reminder right.

The testetor died in 1972. since then, plaintiffs were in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. During the lifetime of

Subba Rao, the joint family properties were partitioned in 1949 itself. Subba Rao and his sons got ac.2.20 cents each. Originally, the schedule property is beedu barm land. Later, the defendants dishonestly intenend to screen and camouflage the schedule property in their names. 2nd plaintiff got issued legal notice to the defendants and one Rajulapati Prasad. Later, reply notice dt.29.07.2011 was issued with false allegations. The plaintiffs came to know that these defendants illegally entered into the sale transaction with D5 and it is an illegal sale transaction. D1 to D4 are not real owners. Hence the above suit.

5. The case of the defendants in brief as follows: Defendant denied the theory of plaintiff. He contends that the alleged will dt.05.05.1969 was rank forged one. The schedule property bequeathed to Rajulapati Subba Rao through a partition list dt.06.06.1949. Later, Subba Rao died intestate. They have joint right till 12.09.2011. later defendants met the 1st plaintiff for negotiation of plaint schedule property and money was distributed to the plaintiffs.D5 who is one of the legal heirs of Subba Rao offered a price of Rs.30,000/­ for the plaint schedule property and that money was distributed the legal heirs of Subba Rao. On 3 12.09.2011, 1st plaintiff, defendants along with elders came for registration office for registration and a sale deed was executed in favour of D5. Since then, D5 was in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property as an absolute owner. Therefore, defendants pray to dismiss the suit with costs.

6. Based on the pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:

1. Whether the plaintiffs have right, title and interest over the plaint schedule property?

2. Whether will dt.05.05.1969 is true or genuine one or not?

3. Whether sale deed dt.12.09.2011 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiffs?

4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to declaration by declaring them as absolute owners of plaint schedule property?

5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the possession of the plaint schedule property from the 5th defendant?

4. To what relief?

7. During the course of trial, PWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A1 to A8 were marked on plaintiffs side before the trial court. On defendants side, Dw.1 was examined and no documents were marked. 

8. The trial court on appreciation of the material on the record, dismissed the said suit. Therefore, the unsuccessful plaintiff preferred this appeal against the said judgment and decree urging the following grounds:

1. The decree and judgement of the lower court are against the law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case

2. The lower court failed to appreciate the documentary and oral evidence let in by the appellants

3. The lower court has completely misunderstand the scope of the suit

4. The judgement of the lower court is completely biased and it suffers from grave legal and batched

5. The lower court has relied on documents which have not been proved according to law

6. The lower court has erred in accepting the oral testimony of the scribe who is PW.2 which is contrary to clear documentary evidence

7. The lower court ought to have decreed the suit.

8. The lower court has erred in not admitting the evidence Ex.A2 will which is a genuine document 4

9. The court has erred in observing the execution of the will in favour of 2nd appellant/2nd plaintiff under Ex.A2 will.

10. The lower court has come to conclusion that the respondents sold away the schedule property to the 5th defendant in the absence of plaintiffs after knowing the same about will in favour of the appellants

11. The lower court ought to have to believe the evidence of PW.2 as scribe of Ex.A2will and ought to have believe the same there is a transaction took place for execution of will by the father of grandfather of appellants

12. The lower court ought to have believe that the appellants are in exclusive right and possession and enjoyment of the schedule property under Ex.A2will

13. The lower court ought to have held that the appellants perfectly prove the execution of Ex.A2will by examining of PW.2 and also from the admissions from the respondents about execution and execution of will under Ex.A2 in favour of the appellants

14. The lower court ought to have decreed the suit

15. The decree and judgement of the lower court is in the form of a special pleading against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants, is liable to be set aside.

9. No oral or documentary evidence is adduced on either side in this appeal.

10. Heard both sides.

11. Now, the points for consideration is whether the trial

court justified in dismissing O.S No.118/2012 dt.21.08.2017

vide its judgment and decree? If so, whether the interference

of this court is warranted?

12. Point :­  This is a suit for declaration and recovery of possession.

According to the plaintiffs, they are absolute owners of the plaint schedule property. Ex.A1 is a document of 1944. it stands in the name of Subba Rao. The said Subba Rao was father of plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs set up another plea contending that Ex.A2 will was executed in favour of 2nd plaintiff by his father Subba Rao. It is thus the plaintiffs relied on Ex.A1 and A2 which are crucial for their stand of seeking declaration and recovery of possession. On the other hand, defendants took a plea that the legal heirs of the above said Subba Rao executed a sale transaction in favour of D5 and D5 was in possession of the schedule property. Ex.A8 is 5 certified copy of sale deed stand in the name of D5. Exs.A2 ot A7 are supportive documents for the plea of the plaintiffs and which are interchanging of legal notices among the parties. 

13. Now, it is curious to note that distinction between the suits for declaration simpliciter and the suits for declaration with further relief. In C.Mohammed Yunus vs Syed Unissa And Others ­ 1961 AIR 808, 1962 SCR (1) 67, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between the suits for declaration simpliciter and the suits for declaration with further relief. In this decision, the plaintiffs claiming as heirs of one F had sued to obtain a declaration of their rights in certain institution, which was in the management of trustees, with an injunction restraining the defendants (other claimants) from interfering with their rights.

While dealing with the question of limitation, the Supreme Court had held as follows: 

A suit for declaration with a consequential relief for injunction, is not a suit for declaration simpliciter: it is a suit for declaration with further relief. Whether the further relief claimed in a particular case as consequential upon a declaration is adequate must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Kunj Behari Prasadji v. Keshavlal Hiralal it was held that S.42 of the Specific Relief Act does not empower the court to dismiss a suit for a declaration and injunction and that an injunction is a further relief within the meaning of S.42 of the Specific Relief Act. In that case, the plaintiff had claimed that a certain Will was null and void and that being a close relative of the last holder of a gadi, he was entitled to be the Acharya in the place of that last holder and for an injunction restraining the defendants from offering any obstruction to his occupation of the gadi. It was held that such a suit was maintainable. From the ratio in the cited decision it is evident that a suit for declaration of title seeking further relief of recovery of possession or a consequential relief of perpetual injunction is not a suit for declaration simpliciter and it is a suit for declaration with further relief.

14. It is significant to note that in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, plaintiff should succeed on the strength of its title and not on the basis of weakness of the defendants case. See. Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath ­ (2019) 6

SCC 82. Further more, it is trite law that, in a suit for declaration 6 of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff as was held in Union of

India v. Vasavi Co­op. Housing Society Ltd ­ (2014) 2 SCC 269. 

15. While part­Ill of first division deals with suits relating to declarations; Part­V thereof deals with suits relating to immovable property. In Part­III there are three Articles, namely, 56, 57 and

58. While Article 56 prescribes three years period of limitation to institute a suit for declaration that the instrument issued or registered is a forged one; Article 57 prescribes an equal period for declaring the alleged adoption as invalid and Article 58, however, prescribes albeit an equal period in respect of any other declaration. It is obvious that Article 58 is in the nature of residuary provision among the declaratory suits. Indubitably the relief of declaration can be sought for in respect of an immovable property or movable property, or in respect of an instrument, or in respect of a decree, or in respect of an adoption. Thus, various types of declaratory reliefs can be sought for pertaining to those categories. 

16. One shall not be oblivious of the fact that part­V of first division specifically deals with category of suits relating to immovable property. Coming in the domain of part­V, Articles 64 and 65 specifically deal with the period of limitation to institute a suit for possession of immovable property based on previous possession and to institute a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. Having regard to the categorisation sought to be made in the Schedule, although

Part­Ill of the first division thereof apparently deals with suits relating to declarations, that part does not deal with suits relating to immovable property inasmuch as Part­V thereof exclusively deals with the suits pertaining to immovable property, prima facie it appears, therefore, that notwithstanding the fact that the suit is 7 filed for the relief of declaration but the suit is in respect of an immovable property, Article 58 of the Act has no application, instead Articles 61 to 67, which specifically deal with the suits relating to immovable property, seem to be applicable. See.

Gottumukkala Sundara Narasaraju's case (supra).

17. Where the plaintiff has neither title nor possession within 12 years of the suit, his suit for possession is barred by limitation.

(AIR1973 SC 2341). 

Limitation is for 6 months. Sec. 6 SR Act. Owner can sue the trespasserfor possession solely on the ground of such dispossession without proving his title. See. S.6(2)

(a) S.R.Act. If he fails to suit within 6 months, he can sue for possession based on title within 12 years U/Art. 65 of Limitation Act.  A is owner. B is in lawful possession. A dispossessed B force­ably. B can recover the property even from A, solely on the ground of his dispossession otherwise than in due course of law. But this he can do only under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act. If he fails to sue within the period of 6 months prescribed by that section, ''B'' cannot subsequently sue A for the recovery of the property. Sec. 6 (4) of S.R.Act. A is the owner of property. B is in unlawful possession. C , who has no title, dispossessed B by force and without recourse to law. Limitation is 6 months. However, if suit is not brought within 6 months, B can

sue C under section 6 (4) of the Act. Then, limitation

is 12 years under Art. 64 of Limitation Act. Point is suit is based on previous possession ; not based on title. S.6(4) , in fact, serves only as an Explanation to S.6 rather than as a substantive part of the section. A suit based on possessory title i.e., a title created by the fact of plaintiff's previous possession, is governed by the 12 years' rule under Art.64 of the limitation Act of 1963 and not by S.6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 even if it may be a case in which the plaintiff has been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law.  Where a trespasser who is forcibly ejected by the true owner of the property sues and obtains a decree against the true owner in a suit under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act, the true owner can afterwards sue on the basis of his title and recover possession from the trespasser who has been successful in the suit under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act. The true owner's suit will be governed byArt.65 of the Limitation Act,1963. 

8 If a true owner is ejected by force by a trespasser. In a suit under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act a decree is passed in favour of the true owner. He obtains possession in execution of such decree. In these circumstances, the trespasser, who has no title, cannot afterwards sue the true owner for possession. 

18. In a suit far declaration of title plaintiff has to prove his ownership of the property which he failed to establish Plaintiff, therefore, not entitled to obtain a decree for declaration that he is the lawful owner of the schedule property Conduct of plaintiff throughout is fraudulent Plaintiff, therefore, not entitled to the equitable relief of declaration of title to schedule property. See.

Mohd. Abdul Sattar @ Shaik Mahaboob Vs. Rahmatunnissa (Died) per L.Rs. and others 2015 (3) ALT 118. Article 59 of

LimitationAct, 1963 which prescribes a period of limitation of three years for filing a suit to cancel a document, applies only to voidable transactions and not to void transactions A void document is a nullity A decree for setting aside the same is not necessary.See. Siddiquinnissa Begum, (Died) per LRs and others

Vs. Shamsunnissa Begum (died) per LR and others 2015 (2) ALT

285. The only difference between Article 64 and Article 65 of the

Limiataion Act is such that in the former the onus lies on the plaintiff to prove his dispossession within 12 years while in the latter it is for the defendant to prove when his possession became adverse. The law of limitation relating to the suit for possession has undergone a drastic change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiff to aver and plead that he not only has title over the property but also has been in possession of the same for a period of more than 12 years. However, if the plaintiff has filed the suit claiming title over the suit property in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, burden would be on the defendant to prove that he has acquired title by adverse possession.It is to be 9 next noted thatin part III of the first division of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, which relates to suits for declaration, there are three Articles viz., 56, 57 and 58. Articles 56 & 57 relate respectively to (i) declaration that an instrument issued or registered is forged; and, (ii) a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid; or never, in fact, took place. Whereas Article 58 in that part, which deals with suits to obtain any other declaration, is a general provision. Part V of the said division deals specifically with the suits relating to immovable properties. The law is well settled that a special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope leaving the general provision to control cases where the special provision does not apply.

19. In this case on hand, the trial court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove execution of Ex.A2 will.

The trial court disbelieved the evidence of PW1 and 2 and doubted execution of Ex.A1. The trial court expressed a doubt that as on the date of alleged execution of Ex.A2, whether 2nd plaintiff was borned or not. Ex.A2 was hand written document. Ex.A2 further indicates that one Rajulapati Mathaiah and Rajulapati Venkata

Narayana are the attestorsof the alleged will. It is well settled law that atleast one attestor must be examined to prove the execution of the will. But, in this case on hand, neither the said Mathaiah nor the said Venkata Narayana was examined to speak the contents of Ex.A2 will. In asmuchas, the plaintiffs did not chose to examine the attestors, this court holds that they failed to prove the execution of ExA2. Of course, PW.2/scribe of ex.a2 was examined. As I discussed earlier, the oral evidence of PW.2 is doubtful. PW.2 admits that he knows not the age of 1st plaintiff as on the date of execution of ExA2 will. The two attestors of ExA2 are no other than the the brothers of PW1. D5 is no other than great grandson of the deceased Subba Rao.

20. Evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 indicates that Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the absolute owners of the plaint schedule property which is 10 an extent of ac.0.17 cents. But, to substantiate the said plea, the plaintiff failed to prove the alleged Will dated 05­05­1969, a fortiori , the said Will is highly suspicious. Evidence of P.W.1 shows as if the schedule property is originally acquired by one Subba Rao who is father of 1st plaintiff, as it was purchased under registered sale deed dt.12.06.1944. Although it is such contention of the appellants, sale stands in the name of D.5 in respect of the same property shows contra plea to that of the theory of the plaintiffs.

Of course, the appellants shows as if, by virtue of a will dt.05.05.1969, plaintiffs got vested reminder right. The alleged testetor died in 1972 and since then, plaintiffs were said to be in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. I will show later on the evidence justifying that the appellants failed to prove the execution of the Will according to the law.

21. The fact that during the lifetime of Subba Rao, the joint family properties were partitioned in 1949 itself. Subba Rao and his sons got Ac.2.20 cents each. But, there is nothing in the record to hold that the sale transaction in respect of the schedule property stands in the name of D.5 is outcome of any fraud and misrepresentation. On the other words, the will/Ex.A.2 is not proved. It is absolutely necessary of execution of the Will under

Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act to prove that the Will was attested by two attesting witnesses, at least, who saw the testator signing the Will or the testator must personally acknowledge the signature on the Will that of him in the presence of the two attesting witnesses and they themselves signed the same in the presence of the testator. This requirement of law is not complied by the appellants in this case. This is the main infirmity to the theory of the appellants. 

22. It is well settled law that Section 71 of the Evidence

Act,1872 cannot be read so as to absolve a party of his obligation under Section 68 of the Evidence Act read with Section 63 of the

Indian Succession Act to liberally allow him, at his choice to make 11 available or not a necessary witness otherwise available and amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and confer a premium upon his omission or lapse, to enable him to give a go­bye to the mandate of law relating to the proof of execution of Will. Section 68 of Evidence Act applies not only to cases where document is admitted to be enforced to prove the legal right or relation it creates, but in case where such document is sought to be proved for a collateral purpose. 

23. Non­compliance with the provisions of Section 68 of

Evidence Act, however does not prevent the document from being used in evidence under Section 72 for any other or collateral purpose. Section 68 of Evidence Act makes it clear that it does not permit the utilization of a document, which is required by law to be attested as evidence until it is proved strictly in accordance with the provisions of the section. To prove the Will, it shall be attested by the two attesting witnesses at least who saw the testator sign the Will or the testator must personally acknowledge the signature on the Will that of him in the presence of the two attesting witnesses and they themselves signed the same in the presence of the testator Without attestation, execution of the deed of Will is not valid. 

24. Without attestation, execution of the Deed of Will is not valid. When no witness deposed of the alleged Will was signed by the deceased in his presence or that he had attested the document, execution of the very Will can be held as not proved.

Attestation of a Will means, testifying the signature of the executants. For a Will be to be valid and enforceable shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or the testator should personally acknowledge his signature or affixture of his mark to the Will in the presence of the attestors and without that acknowledgement, it cannot be inferred and further each of the witness has signed said Will in presence of testator and said 12 provision is not a mere Formality, But Mandatory. In T. Ramesh and others Vs. Laxmamma and others, 2017 (4) ALT 628, it was held that, execution of Will includes attestation and its proof.

In the absence of suspicious circumstances, it is suffice to prove testamentary capacity and due execution with attestation, and where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is heavy on the propounder to dispel the same for the court acceptance as genuine and last Will and testament.

25. Having the appellants failed to prove Ex.A.2/Will as required under the above principles of law, the trial court is justified in dismissing the suit on this point. This court finds that there are justifiable grounds to allow this appeal and the trail court's judgments need to be confirmed. I find the point in the negative. 

26. In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the

Judgment and Decree in O.S No.118/2012 dt.21.08.2017 on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Avanigadda. No costs.

Typed by steno, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court, this the 17th day of March, 2020.

Sd/­Y.SRINIVASA RAO

Senior Civil Judge, 

Avanigadda.

Appendix of Evidence

No oral or documentary evidence is adduced on either side. Sd/­Y.SRINIVASA RAO

SCJ, AVG.

1

IN THE COURT OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, AVANIGADDA

Present: Mr.Y.SRINIVASA RAO

Senior Civil Judge, Avanigadda

Friday, this the 20th day of March, 2020

O.S No.29/2018

Between:­ Penumala Krupa Rao, S/o.late Narasimham, Hindu, aged about 64 years, retired ASI, permanent resident of Chodavaram Village, Nagayalanka Mandal, presently residing in Brundavana colony, Eswar apartment, Labbi peta, Vijayawada – 10, Krishna District. … …. Plaintiff.

And

1. Penumala Subba Rao, S/o.late Narasimham, Hindu, aged about 70 years, Agriculture, resident of Chodavaram Village of Nagayalanka Mandal, Krishna District.

2. Naligala Mariyamma, W/o.Lakshmaiah, Hindu, aged about 58 years, housewife, resident of Nadellavaripalem, house at Nadakuduru Village of Challapalli Mandal, Krishna District.

3. Karra Basava Rao, S/o.late Ramaswamy, Hindu, aged about 75 years, Agriculture, resident of Perlavani lanka, H/o.Remalavaripalem Village of Nagayalanka Mandal, Krishna District

4. Karra Bhaskara Rao, S/o.Basava Rao, Hindu, aged about 45 years, Agriculture, resident of Perlavani lanka, H/o.Remalavaripalem Village of Nagayalanka Mandal, Krishna District

5. Karra Sekhar, S/o.Basava Rao, Hindu, aged about 43 years, private employee, resident of 18th ward, Erikapadu, Gudiwada Mandal.

6. Karra Vijayalakshmi, D/o.Karra Basava Rao, Hindu, aged about 50 years, housewife, resident of Perlavani lanka, H/o.Remalavaripalem Village of Nagayalanka Mandal, Krishna District

7. Mendu Rajyalakshmi, W/o.late Srinivasa Rao, Hindu, aged about 47 years, housewife, resident of 18th ward, Erikapadu, Gudiwada Mandal.

8. Smt. Dasi Aruna, W/o.Harshavardhan, Hindu, aged about 36 years, housewife, resident of 8th ward, Avanigadda Village and Mandal, Krishna District

9. Yarramalla Gopi, Hindu, aged about 50 years, resident of door no.48, Apparao peta, Achuri Mandal, West Godavari District … …. Defendants.

This suit came up on 16.03.2020 before me in the presence of Mr.B.V.Seshagiri Rao, Advocate for the plaintiff and defendants 1, 2 and 4 to 9 remained exparte and the 3rd defendant died and upon hearing the plaintiff and the suit having stood over till this day for consideration, this court made the following

J U D G M E N T:­

This suit is filed for preliminary for partition of the plaint 2 schedule properties into two equal shares and to allot one share out of two shares to the plaintiff and to allot remaining share to the 1st defendant by metes and bounds with separate possession and for costs.

2. The case of the plaintiff in brief as follows:­ Plaintiff and defendants are children of one Penumala

Narasimham and Nancharamma. The said Narasimham, during his lifetime, owned and possessed and enjoyed the plaint schedule properties of item no.1 and item no.2/poramboke land ie., extent ac.0.62 cents of wet land in RS No.314/1 and ac.0.72 cents of wetland in RS No.231 situated in Chodavaram Village of Nagayalanka Mandal.

He purchased item no.1 from Meriyala Nageswara Rao and another under a registered sale deed dt.05.07.1962 doc.no.2292/1962 for valuable consideration of Rs.15,00/­. After the death of said

Narasimham, his legal heirs ie., plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2, their mother, elder sister of plaintiff enjoyed the said property with joint rights. Then, the said Nancharamma also died on 06.02.1986. After her demise, plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2, elders sister of plaintiff are in possession of said properties. At the time of final death ceremony of their mother, 2nd defendant and the elder sister of plaintiff/Karra

Merimma relinquished their rights in joint family properties as they were satisfied the amounts which were given by their parents towards their shares at the time of their marriages. Therefore, there is no right on plaint schedule properties. But, there is no written document for the same. Later, Elder sister of plaintiff/Merimma died and also her daughter by name Yarramalla Radha was died and that her husband/D9 is the legal heir of said Radha as they were no issues.

But, the 2nd defendant and all the legal heirs of said Merimma are shown in the proper and necessary parties in the suit. Plaintiff and 1st defendants are in constructive joint possession and enjoyment of properties with joint rights. But, D1 used to lookafter the properties and gave usufruct to the plaintiff every year as per his share as his employment. Later, the 1st defendant trying to alienate their joint 3 properties with malafide intention. When the plaintiff demanded for partition, he postponed the same. Therefore on 21.11.2017, the plaintiff issued a registered legal notice to the defendants 1 and 2, legal heirs of Merimma for demanding D1 for partition. 1st defendant received the said legal notice but kept silent for partition of properties.

Plaintiff is entitled half share and D1 is entitled for remaining half share. Hence, this suit for partition. 

3. On receipt of notices, defendants 1, 2, 4 to 9 remained exparte and the 3rd defendant died.

4. During the course of trial, PW.1 was examined and Exs.A1 to

A9 were marked. 

5. Heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff.

6. Now, the point for consideration is whether the plaintiff is

entitled for partition of the plaint schedule property and for

separate possession as prayed for?

7. Point:­ The evidence of PW.1 shows that D1 is the elder brother. D2 is the younger sister. D4 to D8 are the children of D3. D3 is the sister of plaintiff. They are children of Penumala Narasimham and

Nancharamma. The said Narasimham, during his lifetime, owned and possessed and enjoyed the plaint schedule properties of item no.1 and item no.2/poramboke land ie., extent ac.0.62 cents of wet land in RS

No.314/1 and ac.0.72 cents of wetland in RS No.231 situated in

Chodavaram Village of Nagayalanka Mandal. He purchased item no.1 from Meriyala Nageswara Rao and another under a registered sale deed dt.05.07.1962 doc.no.2292/1962 for valuable consideration of

Rs.15,00/­. After the death of said Narasimham, his legal heirs ie., plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2, their mother, elder sister of plaintiff enjoyed the said property with joint rights. Then, the said

Nancharamma also died on 06.02.1986. After her demise, plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2, elders sister of plaintiff are in possession of said properties. At the time of final death ceremony of their mother, 2nd defendant and the elder sister of plaintiff/Karra Merimma relinquished their rights in joint family properties as they were satisfied the 4 amounts which were given by their parents towards their shares at the time of their marriages. Later, Elder sister of plaintiff/Merimma died and also her daughter by name Yarramalla Radha was died and that his husband/D9 is the legal heir of said Radha as they were no issues.

But, the 2nd defendant and all the legal heirs of said Merimma are shown in the proper and necessary parties in the suit. Plaintiff and 1st defendants are in constructive joint possession and enjoyment of properties with joint rights. But, D1 used to lookafter the properties and gave usufruct to the plaintiff every year as per his share as his employment.

8. Where a document is a record of a family arrangement, it is not liable to compulsory registration because it is based upon the recognition of a pre­existing right. Held in 1937, Audesh Singh v.

Sirtaji Kaur, AIR 1937 Oudh 347:

9. In Smt. R. Seethamma @ Seetha v. M. Thimma Reddy, Appeal

Suit No.349 of 2016, Judgment dt.27­04­2017, it was observed that the expression instrument of partition, as originally defined in Section 2 (15) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 did not include a Memorandum recording past partition. This is despite the fact that a memorandum would also come within the definition of the word instrument. Realizing that this created a loophole in the law relating to Stamp Duty, the

State of Andhra Pradesh made an amendment to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 by A.P. (Amendment) Act 17 of 1986, w.e.f., 16.08.1986. By this amendment, the words and a memorandum regarding past partition was inserted in the definition of the expression instrument of partition under Section 2 (15) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

1. Under purview of section 14 (1) of the Act, widow becomes absolute full owner of the property. 2. Inasmuch as she had no issues, under sec. 15 of the Act, 1956, legal heirs of her husband entitle to get the property. 3. In the given case, the widow’s husband’s brother’s son/plaintiff filed that suit for a declaration and possession of the 10 acres of land relying on the recitals in the Partition deed and thus, in view of section 8 and 15 of the Act, the plaintiff is entitled for a decree.

10. In A.C.Lakshmipathy v. A.M.Chakrapani Reddiar, (2001) 1

MLJ 1 at page 7, it is held that where the document is nothing but a 5 memorandum of what had taken place and as such, it is not a document requires compulsory registration as per Section 17 of the

Registration Act. In Audesh Singh v Sirtaji Kuar AIR 1937 Oudh 347 at page 349, it is held that where a document is a record of a family arrangement, it is not liable to compulsory registration because it is based upon the recognition of a pre­existing right.

11. A family arrangement can be arrived at orally. The terms in the family arrangement may be recorded in writing as a memorandum of what has been agreed between the parties. The memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose of being used as a document on which future title of the parties be founded. It is usually prepared as a record of what has been agreed upon so that there be no hazy notions about it in the near future. It is only when the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with an object of using that writing as proof of what they have arranged and, where the arrangement has been brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration as it is then that it will be a document of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess.

12. The effect of unregistered partition deed and held that an unregistered partition deed is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be looked into for the terms of partition but can be looked into for the purpose of establishing a severance in status. See. Chinnappareddigari

Pedda Muthyalareddy v. Chinnappareddigari Venkata Reddy, AIR 1969

AP 242. Latest ruling of 2017, Moghal Sardar Hussain Baig v. Syed

Farveej Begum, CRP.No. 1115 of 2017,dated 1207­2017.

Family arrangement: How to prove it?

1. If the family arrangement is reduced to writing and it purports to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest of any immovable property, it must be properly stamped and duly registered as per the Indian Stamp Act and Indian Registration Act.

2. If the family arrangement is stamped, but not registered, it can be looked into for collateral purposes. A person cannot claim a right or title to a property under the said document, which is being looked into only for collateral purpose.

3. A family arrangement which is not stamped and not registered, cannot be looked into for any purpose, in view of the specific bar in Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. A document must be read as a whole.

4. As to the nature of transaction under the document, it cannot be 6 decided by merely seeing the nomenclature. Mere usage of past tense in the document should not be taken indicative of a prior arrangement.

13. In this case on hand, the relationship of the parties are not disputed. I have perused Exs.A1 to A9. Ex.A1 is the certified copy of registered sale deed dt.05.07.1962. When the plaintiff demanded defendants for partition but they postponed the same and so the plaintiff issued registered legal notice/Ex.A2 to the defendants. Exs.A3 and A9 are the postal acknowledgments. Exs.A4 to A8 are the returned notices of D3 to D6 and said Radha. Inasmuch as the evidence of

PW.1 and Ex.A1 to A9 are not challenged by the defendants who are remained exparte, a fortiori, Exhibits A1 and A2 clinch the issue, the plaintiff is not entitled for partition as prayed for. Point is answered accordingly. 

14. In the result, the suit is preliminary decreed with costs against the defendants 1, 2 and 4 to 9 for partition of plaint schedule properties into two equal shares and to allot one share out of two shares to the plaintiff and to allot the remaining share to the 1st defendant by metes and bounds with separate possession. 

Typed to my dictation by steno, corrected and pronounced by me in open court, this the 20th day of March, 2020. Sd/­ Y.SRINIVASA RAO

Senior Civil Judge, 

Avanigadda.

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

Oral Evidence

For plaintiff For defendants: None. PW.1: P.Krupa Rao

Documentary Evidence

For plaintiff For defendants: Nil. Ex.A1 is the Certified copy ofRegister Sale Deed, Dt.05­07­1962. Ex.A2 is the Office copy of Registered Legal Notice, Dt.21­11­2017. Ex.A3 is the Postal Acknowledgment, Dt.25­11­2017. Ex.A4 is the Returned notice of the 3rd defendant, Dt.23­11­2017. Ex.A5 is the Returned notice of the 4th defendant, dt.23­11­2017. Ex.A6 is the Returned notice of the 5th defendant, dt.24­11­2017.

7

Ex.A7 is the Returned notice of the 6th defendant, dt.25­11­2017. Ex.A8 is the Returned notice from Yarramalla Radha, dt.24­11­2017. Ex.A9 is the Postal acknowledgment of 8th defendant. Sd/­ Y.SRINIVASA RAO

SCJ, AVG.

1

IN THE COURT OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, AVANIGADDA

Present: Sri Y.SRINIVASA RAO

Senior Civil Judge, Avanigadda

Friday, this the 20th day of March, 2020

HMOP No.16/2020

Between:­ Bommidi Divya, W/o.Sambasiva Rao, D/o.Kokkiligadda Lakshmana, Hindu, aged about 27 years, parents protection, resident of Deenadayalapuram Village of Nagayalanka Mandal, Krishna District.

.... Petitioner.

And

Bommidi Sambasiva Rao, S/o.Pothu Raju, Hindu, aged about 29 years, Agriculture, resident of Deenadayalapuram Village of Nagayalanka Mandal, Krishna District. ….. …. Respondent.

This petition came up on 20.03.2020 before me in the presence of Mr.N.Eswara Rao, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent remained exparte and upon hearing and considering the material on record, this court made the following

O R D E R:­

This petition is filed under Section 13 (1) (ia) and (ib) of Hindu

Marriage Act 1955 seeking for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion.

2. The case of the petitioner in brief: The petitioner submitted that she is the legally wedded wife. Their marriage was performed on 30.05.2014 as per Hindu Religious Rites and Cast Custom at Deenadayalapuram, Nagayalanka mandal. At the time of marriage, the parents of the respondent gifted Rs.60,000/­ and presented gold ornaments to the petitioner. Thereafter the marriage was consummated. They led marital life for some time. Later, the respondent harassed the petitioner physically and mentally. He harassed for

additional dowry. Finally, in the month of August 2016, the respondent

necked out the petitioner from his conjugal society. Then the petitioner informed the same to her parents and that elders tried to reunite the respondent and petitioner. But the respondent did not hear the words of the elders. All the efforts made for mediation become futile. Hence, this 2 petition for seeking divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion.

3. On receipt of the notice, the respondent remained exparte.

4. During the course of enquiry, the petitioner was examined as

PW.1 and Exs.P1 and P2 were marked. 

5. Now, the point for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to seek dissolution of the marriage on the grounds of cruelty and desertion?

6. Point: The evidence of PW.1 shows that PW.1 is the wife of PW.1 and their marriage was performed on 30.05.2014 as per Hindu Religious Rites and Cast Custom at Deenadayalapuram, Nagayalanka mandal. At the time of marriage, the parents of the respondent gifted Rs.60,000/­ and presented gold ornaments to the petitioner. Thereafter, the marriage was consummated. They led marital life for some time. 

7. In this case on hand, the evidence of PW.1 further shows that after marriage, the respondent harassed the petitioner physically and mentally. He harassed for additional dowry. Finally, in the month of

August 2016, the respondent necked out the petitioner from his conjugal society. Then, the petitioner informed the same to her parents and that elders tried to reunite the respondent and petitioner. But, the respondent did not hear the words of the elders. The efforts for reunion become futile. Therefore, there is no chance of reunion. 

8. As was held in Challa Suryaprabha Vs Challa Divakar

Venkataram, 2017 (2) ALT 417 (DB), cruelty is not defined under Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955, but it is an act of indifferent to or delighting in another pain. Cruelty may be infinite variety. It can be subtle or brutal.

It may be physical or mental. It may be by words, gestures or by mere silence, violence or non­violence. It is so clear that there is no chance of reunion. Therefore, PW.1 was entitled for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. Point is answered accordingly. 

11. In the result, the petition is allowed granting divorce to the petitioner/Bommidi Divya dissolving her marriage with the respondent/Bommidi Sambasiva Rao performed on 30.05.2014 on the grounds of cruelty and desertion.

3

Typed to my dictation by steno, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court, this the 20th day of March, 2020. Sd/­ Y.SRINIVASA RAO

Senior Civil Judge, 

Avanigadda.

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

Oral Evidence

For petitioner: For respondent 

PW.1: Bommidi DivyaNone

Documentary evidence

For petitioner: For respondent 

Ex.P1: Marriage photo with CD Nil. Ex.P2: Wedding card Sd/­ Y.SRINIVASA RAO

SCJ, AVG.

1

IN THE COURT OF CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE AT VIJAYAWADA.

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada. Saturday, this the 09th day of September, 2023.

Calendar Case No. 266/2022

BETWEEN:

The Station House Officer, I Town Police Station, Vijayawada …. Complainant and Accused * * *

This case is coming before me for final hearing in the presence of learned

Assistant Public Prosecutor for the Complainant and the matter having stood over till this day for consideration, this court delivered the following

::J U D G M E N T::

IN THE RESULT: Heard. A3 is produced from District Jail, Vijayawada. A4 and A5 are present. A3 to A5 is examined U/s.251 Cr.P.C., and they pleaded guilty voluntarily. A3 to A5 are convicted for the offence punishable U/s.160 and 269 of IPC U/s.252 of Cr.P.C. A3 to A5 are sentenced to pay fine of Rs.100/- (Rupees One Hundred only) each for the offence punishable U/s.160 of IPC. In default of payment of fine, they shall undergo S.I for one (1) month each. A3 to A5 are further sentenced to pay fine of Rs.500/- (Rupees Five Hundred only) each for the offence punishable U/s.269 of IPC. In default of payment of fine they shall undergo S.I for Two (2) months each. The remand period of A3 i.e. from 22.06.2023 to till date shall be set off u/s. 428 of Cr.P.C. The case against A1 and A2 was split up vide

CC.No.4858/2023..

Typed by the Stenographer, Gr.III on my dictation corrected and pronounced by me in open Court on this the 09 th day of September, 2023.

Sd/-XXXX

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada.

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

LIST OF WITNESSES

-NIL-

Sd/-XXXXX

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada.

1

IN THE COURT OF CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE AT VIJAYAWADA.

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada. Saturday, this the 09th day of September, 2023.

Calendar Case No. 495/2023

BETWEEN:

The Station House Officer, I Town Police Station, Vijayawada …. Complainant and Accused * * *

This case is coming before me for final hearing in the presence of learned

Assistant Public Prosecutor for the Complainant and the matter having stood over till this day for consideration, this court delivered the following

::J U D G M E N T::

IN THE RESULT: The Defacto-complainant and the accused are present.

Joint memo filed by both the parties for compromise. This matter is settled between the parties in the Lok-Adalat, Since the offence U/Sec.447, 506 of IPC are compoundable, and the parties are compromised the award is passed accordingly.

The accused is/are acquitted U/Sec. 320 (8) of Cr.P.C. for the offence U/Sec. 447, 506 of IPC. Bail bonds of the accused shall stand cancelled..

Typed by the Stenographer, Gr.III on my dictation corrected and pronounced by me in open Court on this the 09 th day of September, 2023.

Sd/-XXXX

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada.

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

LIST OF WITNESSES

-NIL-

Sd/-XXXXX

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada.