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IN THE COURT OF JUDGE, FAMILY COURT – CUM – VII ADDITIONAL
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, WEST GODAVARI, ELURU.
PRESENT:
DR. Y. SRINIVASA RAO,
VII ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, WEST GODAVARI,
ELURU.
Tuesday, this the 7th day of April, 2026.
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 274/2023.
From what Court the appeal is:Principal Junior Civil Judge's Court - Cum- Judicial
Magistrate of First Class, Eluru.
No. of the case in that Court: C.C.No.620/2021
No. of the Criminal Appeal:Criminal Appeal No.274/2023
Name and Description of theSmt. Sunkara Gangaratnam, W/o. late Maradani Appellant/Accused.Ramachandra Rao, Hindu, Female, Aged 57 years, R/o. D. No. 16B-14-201, Ward No. 19, Sivagopalapuram, Tangellamudi, Eluru-534005, Eluru District.
Name and description of the:1. Sri. Jana Murali Kumar, S/o. Bankim Chandra, R/o. H. Respondents/Complainant&No. 3D-4/4-19, Loya Dibba, Western Street, Eluru-534001, RespondentEluru Mandal, Eluru District, A.P.
2. The State, rep., by the Public Prosecutor, Eluru, West Godavari District.
The Sentence and Law and which:In the result, Accused is found guilty for the offence it was imposed in the Trial Courtunder Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 and she is accordingly convicted under Section 255(2) of Cr.P.C. The accused is sentenced to suffer RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT for a period of One Year and she shall also pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five lakhs only) to the complainant as per section 357 (1)(b) of Cr.P.C within a period of Three months from today. In default of payment of said compensation amount, accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of Three months. Since the accused is never in Judicial Custody, the benefit under section 428 of Cr.P.C is not applicable to accused.
Whether confirmed, modified or reversed and if modified the:
MODIFIED
modification 2 Date of presentation:19-10-2023
Date of filing:20-10-2023
Date of notice issued:25-10-2023
Date of Bail bond:--
Date of appearance:24-11-2023
Date of hearing:02-04-2026
Date of Judgment:07-04-2026
This appeal is coming for hearing before me on 02-04-2026, on perusal of grounds of appeal and the evidence available on record and on hearing the arguments of Sri Seela Jaya Babu, Advocate for Appellant/Accused; and of Sri G. Babu Ganesh, Advocate for the 1st respondent; and Additional Public Prosecutor, for the 2nd Respondent/State and having stood over for consideration, this Court delivered the following
J U D G M E N T:-
1.The Criminal present appeal is preferred by the Appellant/Accused under Section 374 of Cr.P.C against the Calendar and judgment, dated 06.10.2023 in C.C. No. 620/2021 passed by the Principal Junior Civil Judge cum Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, which convicted her under
Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, praying that this Court to set aside the said Calendar and Judgment and to acquit her of the charges by allowing the appeal. For convenience, the parties are referred to as they arrayed before Trial Court.
2.The case of the Complainant, in brief, as infra:
The Complainant filed the above case alleging that the accused committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881. The complainant pleads that the accused borrowed
Rs.5,00,000/- on 14.07.2019 for personal and family needs and to clear debts.
The accused agreed to repay with interest at the rate of Rs.2/- per hundred per month and executed a promissory note in favour of the complainant. After 3 repeated demands for repayment the accused issued cheque number 000114 for Rs.5,00,000/- dated 28.06.2021 as part payment of the promissory note.
The cheque was presented for collection at State Bank of India, Bazar Branch,
Eluru, and it was returned with an endorsement of funds insufficient. After receipt of the cheque return memo the complainant sent a legal notice dated 05.07.2021 but the accused did not comply. The complainant alleges that the accused issued the invalid cheque which amounts to offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420 of the Indian Penal
Code. Hence the complaint.
3.On perusal of the material on record the case was taken on file by Trial court for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the accused. After receipt of summons the accused appeared before
Trial Court through his counsel. Copies of the case documents were furnished to the accused as required under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. The accused was later examined under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C. for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The allegations in the complaint were explained to her. The accused denied the allegations and claimed to be tried.
4.Before Trial Court, the complainant was examined as PW.1 and the attestor of the promissory note was examined as PW.2 and exhibits Ex.P.1 to
Ex.P.5 were marked.
5.On merits the Trial Court convicted the accused and this present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/accused against the Calendar and judgment, dated 06.10.2023 in C.C. No. 620/2021 passed by the Principal
Junior Civil Judge -cum- Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, which convicted her under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act and sentenced her under Section 255(2) Cr.P.C. to undergo 4 rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the complainant within three months and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and the appellant prays that the conviction and sentence be set aside and that she be acquitted.
6.Aggrieved by the same, the Appeallant/Accused filed criminal appeal with the following grounds:-
1. The Calendar and Judgment of the Trial Court are contrary to the Law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case.
2. The Trial Court failed to comply with the Principles under Section 3 of
Indian Evidence Act in evaluating and appreciating the entire evidence is adjudicating the case under appeal.
3. The Trial Court failed to consider that as there was no clinching evidence to prove the transaction under Ex.P.5 Promissory Note to show the existence of legally enforceable debt, no presumption under
Section 139 of N.I. Act could be drawn in respect of Ex.P.1 cheque, only basing on the admission of signature of Ex.P.1 cheque as the appellant superficially denied the transaction whatsoever with the 1st respondent any manner either under Ex.P.5 Promissory Note or issuance of cheque under Ex.P.5 and in such case the burden to prove the transaction under Ex.P.5 as well as issuance of Ex.P.1 cheque is on the 1st respondent, which the Trial Court ignored to consider.
4. The Trial Court failed to consider that in the cross examination of
Respondent/Complainant as P.W.1, is clearly admitted that I am a white ration card holder I do not know whether the Government will issue white ration card holder I do not know whether the Government will issue white ration card to the persons whose income below
Rs.1,00,000/- which is not negotiable/enforceable under Law. As such the Trial Court ought not to have drawn the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act only based on mere admission of financial capacity on 5 Ex.P.1 cheque.
5. The Trial Court ought to have considered that the appellant/accused got elicited probable circumstances to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act.
6. The Trial Court failed to consider the appellant her friend said Hepsiba obtaining lone from the 1st respondent on that time he take cheque and promissory note to security from appellant, the said Hepsiba discharge entire debt but the 1st respondent not return the security cheque and promissory note the appellant Government Employee he take advantage file complaint to gain unlawfully the 1st respondent got filed the false case in Trial court though the complainant by forging, fabricating the above cheque. In fact the appellant no acquaintance with the complainant/respondent at any point of time and the and the cheque and promissory notes were fabricated documents and no consideration was passed between the appellant/accused and complainant/ respondent. The complainant/respondent taking advantage of that the accused/appellant is a Government employee shall demand him for more payment for wrong full gain. The Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence adduced by the appellant/accused in support of her defence.
7. The Trial Court failed to consider that in the cross examination of
Respondent/Complainant as P.W.1. is clearly admitted that from lent the amount to the accused/appellant the pronote executed dated on 14.07.2019 on time 10.30 to 11.00am as evaluated on that time the appellant Government Employee she is on duty she her staying her office and determined by necessarily taking into consideration the above evidence, which, the Trial Court totally ignored. Had the Trial
Court considered the said evidence, the ultimate conclusion ought to have drawn by the Trial Court that the presumption under 139 of N.I.
Act was able to rebut by the appellant/accused.
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8. The Trial Court erroneously placed reliance on the Judgments of Hon'ble
Supreme Court as observed in Para No. 31, 33 and 34, which are squarely not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case under appeal and erroneously convicted the appellant by brushing aside the citations relied on by the appellant to support his contention.
9. The Trial Court failed to consider that the 1st respondent failed to prove his financial capacity and so also the 1st respondent did not file any proof before the Trial Court to show that he was having amount of
Rs.5,00,000/- on the date of lending amount to the appellant which was elicited in his cross examination as P.W.1.
10. The Trial Court failed to consider that the 1st respondent did not disclose his avocation neither in his complaint nor in chief evidence affidavit before the Trial Court and so also the 1st respondent stated that he did not file any proof regarding his doing post office which was elicited in his cross examination as P.W.1.
11. The Trial Court failed to consider that the 1st respondent failed to examine the attesters of the Ex.P.5 promissory note and ought to have held that the 1st respondent fabricated the same.
12. The Trial Court failed to consider that the 1st respondent/PW.1 failed to any document to show that withdraw the amount from the bank on that day and he did not file the income tax return before the Trial Court and the Trial Court ought to have held that the alleged money is an unaccounted one and hence, no presumption could have been drawn under Sec. 118 and 139 of N.I. Act.
13. The Trial Court failed to consider the citations submitted by the appellant before the Trial Court viz., 1) Kanakamedala Venkata
Krishna Vs Peram Sai Swarupa of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra
Pradesh with regard to the failure to prove the financial capacity, non- examination of attesters, non filing of any income tax returns by the 1st respondent before the Trial Court, 2) K. Subramani Vs Damodara 7 Naidu of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India with failure on the part of the 1st respondent to produce the bank statement to show that his lending amount under Ex.P.5 promissory note and 3) Basalingappa Vs
Mudibasappa of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India with regard to probable defense raised by the appellant that the 1st respondent failed to prove his financial capacity.
14. In any view of the matter, the conclusion of the Trial Court regarding the guilt of the appellant/accused, conviction and sentence imposed including the fine on her is unsustainable which shows that the said judgment is predetermined with full of surmises and the same is liable to be set-aside.
For these grounds, the appellant, therefore, prays this Court to set-aside the conviction and sentence of imprisonment for a period of One year and
Rs.5,00,000/- which is to paid to the 1st respondent as compensation, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months, under the Calendar and Judgment dt.06.10.2023 in C.C.No. 620/2021 on the file of the learned
Principal Junior Civil Judge -cum- Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Eluru, West
Godavari District and thereby acquit the Appellant/Accused for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. of Act.
7.Heard both sides.
8.Now, the point to determination is whether the conviction and sentence recorded against the Appellant/Accused in the Calendar and Judgment dated 06-10-2023 in C.C. No.620/2021 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge -cum- Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Eluru, are sustainable under law and on facts, and whether the same are liable to be set aside by acquitting the
Appellant/Accused of the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act?
8 Point :—
9.This is a case of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
The complainant contends that the accused borrowed Rs.5,00,000/- on 14.07.2019 for personal and family needs and to clear debts. The accused agreed to repay with interest at the rate of Rs.2/- per hundred per month and executed a promissory note in favour of the complainant. After repeated demands for repayment the accused issued cheque number 000114 for
Rs.5,00,000/- dated 28.06.2021 as part payment of the promissory note. The cheque was presented for collection at State Bank of India, Bazar Branch,
Eluru, and it was returned with an endorsement of funds insufficient. After receipt of the cheque return memo the complainant sent a legal notice dated 05.07.2021 but the accused did not comply. The complainant alleges that the accused issued the invalid cheque which amounts to offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420 of the Indian Penal
Code.
10.The learned counsel for the Appeallant/Accused argues that the learned counsel for the accused submitted that the Trial Court failed to apply the basic principles of Section 3 of the Evidence Act in evaluating the entire evidence and adjudicating the case. The Trial Court ignored that there was no clinching evidence to prove the transaction alleged to be evidenced by Ex.P5 (promissory note), and therefore no presumption under Section 139 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act could lawfully be drawn in respect of Ex.P1 (cheque) merely because the signature on Ex.P1 was admitted. The counsel emphasised that the appellant had broadly denied any transaction with the 1st respondent/complainant, whether the promissory note (Ex.P5) or the issuance of the cheque (Ex.P1), and that once the appellant raised this denial the burden to prove the alleged transaction and issuance lay squarely on the 1st respondent, a burden the Trial Court ignored. Reference was also made to 9 admissions elicited in cross-examination of PW.1 (the complainant), including statements about being a white ration card holder and uncertainty about the government’s ration-card eligibility thresholds, which the counsel argued undermined any presumption of financial capacity; further, the Trial Court overlooked material contemporaneous facts (including that the appellant, a government employee, was on duty at the time the promissory note was purportedly executed) which together created probable circumstances sufficient to rebut any presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act.
11.The learned counsel for the accused further pointed out that the Trial
Court failed to consider evidence and allegations pointing to fabrication and falsification of documents and argues that it was the case that a third person,
Hepsiba, had taken a loan from the 1st respondent and had, according to the appellant’s account left the cheque and promissory note with the appellant as security; though Hepsiba allegedly discharged the debt, the 1st respondent did not return those securities and instead filed a false complaint relying on forged documents. The Trial Court overlooked that the appellant had no acquaintance with the complainant and that no consideration had passed between them. Crucially, the 1st respondent did not prove his financial capacity (no evidence of possessing Rs.5,00,000/- on the date of lending), did not disclose his avocation nor produce bank withdrawal records or income-tax returns, and failed to examine the attestors to Ex.P5, matters which, if considered, would have shown the alleged amount to be unaccounted and negatived the applicability of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of N.I.
Act. Finally, the counsel submitted that the Trial Court erred in placing reliance on certain Supreme Court judgments (paras 31, 33 and 34) which were said to be inapplicable to the facts of the case and in brushing aside the authorities cited by the defence. And that he relied on Kanakamedala Venkata Krishna
Prasad v. Peram Sai Swarupa & Another, 2016 Supreme (AP) 658, and K
Subramani vs K Damodara Naidu, 2015 AIR SCW 64, 2015 (1) SCC 99.
10 This Court will show later on the reasons hustling that the complainant established his case and these two rulings are not helpful to the defence of accused in this case on hand.
12.In Kanakamedala Venkata Krishna Prasad v. Peram Sai Swarupa &
Another, 2016 Supreme (AP) 658, It was held as follows:
“The Court below further observed that regarding the sources of income stated by the appellant/complainant, he did not disclose and filed any scrap of evidence to show that he got salary of Rs.15,000/- per month after deductions. So also failed to prove that saving the same from his rents, salary and some amount, which was released from deposits, the amount kept in the Court. So, in the absence of any such proof has been filed by the appellant/complainant, the huge amount much less Rs.5 lakhs appears to unbelievable one."
13.In K Subramani v. K Damodara Naidu, 2015 AIR SCW 64, 2015 (1)
SCC 99. It was held as follows:
“Three Judge Bench of this Court in the decision in Rangappa's case (supra) laid down that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the N.I. Act includes a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability and that is a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. Relying on the said ratio the Hon'ble High Court answered the two legal issues raised by it in the impugned judgment. Though the criminal appeals were preferred against the judgment of acquittal passed in all the cases arising under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the factual matrix and the evidence adduced were different. The High Court after answering the two legal issues did not consider the merits of each case individually and has simply remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh consideration.”
14.It is now significant to see the relevant rulings which are essential to consider in this case. In Rangappa vs Sri Mohan, AIR 2010 SUPREME
COURT 1898, it was observed as follows:
'6. Once the cheque relates to the account of the accused and he accepts and admits the signatures on the said cheque, then initial presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be raised by the Court in favour of the complainant. The presumption referred to in Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a mandatory presumption and not a general presumption, but the accused is entitled to rebut the said 11 presumption. What is required to be established by the accused in order to rebut the presumption is different from each case under given circumstances. But the fact remains that a mere plausible explanation is not expected from the accused and it must be more than a plausible explanation by way of rebuttal evidence. In other words, the defence raised by way of rebuttal evidence must be probable and capable of being accepted by the Court. The defence raised by the accused was that a blank cheque was lost by him, which was made use of by the complainant. Unless this barrier is crossed by the accused, the other defence raised by him whether the cheque was issued towards the hand loan or towards the amount spent by the complainant need not be considered....' Hence, the High Court concluded that the alleged discrepancies on part of the complainant which had been noted by the Trial Court were not material since the accused had failed to raise a probable defence to rebut the presumption placed on him by Section 139 of the Act.
15.In Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand
Pyarelal,(1993) 3 SCC 35 (Para. 12):
"Upon consideration of various judgments as noted herein above, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbably or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief onthe basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non- existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff. To disprove the presumption, the defendant has to bring on record such facts 12 and circumstances upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did not exist."
16.In M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr. v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 234 (Para. 19):
"... The authority shows that even when the cheque is dishonoured by reason of stop payment instruction, by virtue of Section 139 the Court has to presume that the cheque was received by the holder for the discharge in whole or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course this is a rebuttable presumption. The accused can thus show that the `stop payment' instructions were not issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the accused shows that in his account there was sufficient funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer bank and that the stop payment notice had been issued because of other valid causes including that there was no existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of cheque for encashment, then offence under Section 138 would not be made out. The important thing is that the burden of so proving would be on the accused. ..."
17.The ratio-decidendi in the above cases can be applied to this present appeal. Coming to the facts if this case, it is curious to see that a perusal of the entire evidence available on the record and findings of the Trial Court, this
Court is in no doubt to conclude that the complainant/respondent established his case for the offence under section 138 of N.I. Act.
18.It is not disputed that Ex.P1 cheque was drawn on the accused’s account at Andhra Bank, Gowravaram Branch, Eluru. Ex.P1 was returned with the endorsement “Funds Insufficient”, as shown by the bank’s return memo
Ex.P2, which the accused does not challenge. The complainant sent a legal notice (Ex.P3) on 05.07.2021 calling on the accused to pay the cheque amount within 15 days, and service of that notice is proved by Ex.P4. The cheque dishonour, the unpaid amount after notice, and the proved return memo together gave rise to prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Having regard to the statutory presumptions under Sections 13 118 and 139 of the Act, the Trial Court’s findings on these facts are sustainable.
19.The plea of accused that the cheque and promissory note were given only as security for a loan taken by one Hepsiba, that that debt was already discharged, or that the accused never borrowed the Ex.P5 amount from the complainant, were not proved. Since these defenses failed, the Trial Court rightly held that the complainant established the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
20.Mulling over all these facts and circumstances, this court holds this is a case in which section 357(4) of the Cr.P.C. must be invoked to meet the ends of justice as to the facts and circumstances of this case and that the Calendar and judgment dated 06.10.2023 in C.C. No. 620/2021 passed by the Principal
Junior Civil Judge cum Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, is liable to be modified. And the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year is to be set aside, as the accused is woman, a fortiori, she is old aged. Having regard to the fact that the accused is a woman and has made part payment of
Rs.10,000/- to the complainant on 16-03-2026 during the pendency of this appeal, and in the interest of justice, it is just, fair and reasonable to direct the accused to pay to pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the complainant within three months from the date of this judgment. I find the point accordingly.
21.In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed in part. The Calendar and
Judgment dated 06.10.2023 in C.C. No. 620/2021 passed by the Principal
Junior Civil Judge -cum- Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, is hereby modified. The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year/fine and the default sentence of simple imprisonment for three months are set aside.
However, having regard to the fact that the accused is a old aged woman and has made part payment to the complainant during the pendency of this 14 appeal, and in the interest of justice, the accused is directed to pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) under Section 357(4) of the Cr.P.C to the complainant within three months from the date of this judgment. In default of payment of the compensation, accused shall suffer simple imprisonment for term of three months.
Typed to my dictation by Stenographer directly on computer, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court on this the 7 th day of April, 2026.
Sd/- Y. Srinivasa Rao,
VII Additional Sessions Judge, West Godavari, Eluru.
APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE
No oral and documentary evidence is adduced on either side.
Sd/- Y. Srinivasa Rao,
VII A.D.S.J.,
W.G., Eluru.
Copy to:
Principal Junior Civil Judge's Court -Cum- Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru.
(with Trial Court record).