100 questions · Correct answers · Bare act strategy · Step-by-step walkthroughs
Pick up Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and turn to Section 9A
1. Pick up Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. 2. Go to Section 9A — Leave for tubectomy operation. 3. Read: entitled to leave with wages for a period of two weeks.
Section 9A prescribes 2-week leave for tubectomy — shorter than the 26-week general maternity benefit because it's a surgical procedure requiring shorter recovery.
Pick up Factories Act, 1948 and turn to Section 46(1)
1. Pick up Factories Act, 1948. 2. Go to Section 46(1) — Canteens. 3. Read: 'more than two hundred and fifty workers' = canteen mandatory.
Section 46(1) sets the canteen threshold at 250 workers. Below this, a canteen is not mandatory under the Act.
Pick up Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and turn to Section 2(s)
1. Pick up ID Act, 1947. 2. Go to Section 2(s) — 'workman' definition. 3. Read exclusion: supervisor drawing wages exceeding Rs. 10,000/month = NOT a workman. 4. Rs. 12,000 exceeds limit → answer is D.
Supervisors earning up to Rs. 10,000 qualify as workmen. Only Rs. 12,000 (option D) exceeds the statutory threshold and is therefore excluded from the definition.
Winfield's definition treats tort as breach of a duty fixed by law, owed to persons generally, remedied by unliquidated damages. This is the 'wider' theory contrasted with Salmond's 'narrower' pigeon-hole theory.
A rival school opened nearby causing financial loss but no legal right was violated — bona fide competition is lawful. Classic illustration of 'damage without legal injury.'
Pick up Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and turn to Section 140
1. Pick up Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 2. Check Section 128 → not about no fault liability. 3. Check Section 140 → 'Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.' ✓ Found it.
Section 140 establishes strict/no-fault liability — compensation is payable regardless of fault or negligence. The victim need not prove the driver was negligent.
Pick up Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and turn to Section 2(9)
1. Pick up Consumer Protection Act, 2019. 2. Go to Section 2(9) — definition of 'consumer rights'. 3. Count the rights listed: (i) protection from hazardous goods, (ii) informed about quality/price, (iii) access to variety at competitive prices, (iv) right to be heard, (v) right to seek redressal, (vi) right to consumer awareness. = 6 rights.
Section 2(9) explicitly lists 6 consumer rights. A useful mnemonic: PICHRE — Protection, Information, Choice, Hearing, Redressal, Education/awareness.
Pick up Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and turn to Section 5
1. Pick up Consumer Protection Act, 2019. 2. Go to Section 5 — Objects of the Central Council. 3. Read: 'The objects of the Central Council shall be to render advice on promotion and protection of consumers' rights.' = Central Consumer Protection Council.
The Central Consumer Protection Council (not Authority) is the advisory body. The CCPA (Authority) is the regulatory/enforcement body. The Council advises; the Authority acts.
Pick up Constitution of India and turn to Article 265
1. Pick up Constitution of India. 2. Check Article 246 → legislative competence/lists. Not this. 3. Check Article 256 → obligation of states. Not this. 4. Check Article 260 → jurisdiction outside India. Not this. 5. Check Article 265 → 'No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.' ✓ Found it.
Article 265 is the foundational provision preventing arbitrary taxation. Every tax must have legislative backing — executive cannot impose taxes without statutory authority.
Pick up Income Tax Act, 1961 and turn to Section 3
1. Pick up IT Act. 2. Go to Section 3 — 'Previous year' definition. 3. Read the proviso: for business newly set up, previous year = date of setup to end of that financial year. 4. Setup date: 31 March 2020. Financial year ends: 31 March 2020. So previous year = just one day (31 March 2020).
Since the business was set up on the last day of the financial year (31 March 2020), the first previous year is just that single day — 31 March 2020 to 31 March 2020.
Pick up Income Tax Act, 1961 and turn to Section 6(1)
1. Pick up IT Act. 2. Go to Section 6(1) — Residence in India. 3. Read: 'in India for a period or periods amounting in all to one hundred and eighty-two days or more.' = 182 days.
The basic residency test is 182 days physical presence. There are alternative tests in Section 6(1)(c) and 6(6) for 'not ordinarily resident' and 'deemed resident' status.
Pick up Income Tax Act, 1961 and turn to Section 2(24)
1. Pick up IT Act. 2. Go to Section 2 (Definitions). 3. Check 2(9) → 'assessment year'. Not this. 4. Check 2(24) → '"Income" includes...' ✓ Found it. 5. 2(31) = 'person', Section 3 = 'previous year'.
Section 2(24) is the inclusive (not exhaustive) definition of income. It covers salary, business profits, capital gains, dividends, lottery winnings, gifts above threshold, and virtually any accretion to wealth.
Pick up Indian Contract Act, 1872 and turn to Section 17
1. Pick up Indian Contract Act. 2. Go to Section 17 — definition of 'fraud'. 3. Read the Explanation: 'Mere silence as to facts likely to affect willingness to enter a contract is NOT fraud, unless duty to speak exists or silence is equivalent to speech.' 4. Options A, B, D are all listed as fraud. Option C (mere silence without duty) is explicitly NOT fraud.
Section 17 lists 5 acts constituting fraud. The Explanation explicitly carves out 'mere silence' as NOT fraud — unless there is a fiduciary relationship or duty to disclose (like insurance contracts, partnerships).
Pick up Indian Contract Act, 1872 and turn to Section 19, Illustration (a)
1. Pick up Indian Contract Act. 2. Go to Section 19 — Voidability of agreements without free consent. 3. Read Illustration (a): This exact scenario is given — contract is voidable at the option of B (the deceived party).
When consent is obtained by fraud (A's false representation), the contract becomes voidable at the option of the innocent party (B, who was deceived). Not void ab initio — B can choose to affirm or avoid it.
Pick up Specific Relief Act, 1963 and turn to Section 37(2)
1. Pick up Specific Relief Act, 1963. 2. Go to Section 37 — Temporary and perpetual injunctions. 3. Read sub-section (2): 'A perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit.'
Perpetual injunctions are final remedies granted only after full trial on merits — unlike temporary injunctions (granted at any stage, even before trial, under Order 39 CPC) or mandatory injunctions (which require positive action).
Pick up Indian Contract Act, 1872 and turn to Section 74
1. Pick up Indian Contract Act. 2. Go to Section 74 — Compensation for breach where penalty stipulated. 3. Read the provision and its explanation regarding compound interest stipulations.
Section 74 deals with penalty clauses in contracts. It distinguishes between genuine pre-estimates of damage (liquidated damages) and penalties. The compound interest stipulation described in the question is specifically addressed in Section 74's scope.
Pick up Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and turn to Section 63A(2)
1. Pick up Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 2. Go to Section 63A(2). 3. Read: 'where no such rate is fixed, at the rate of nine per cent per annum.'
Section 63A(2) TPA prescribes 9% per annum as the default interest rate when no contractual rate is specified, particularly in context of mortgagee's improvements to property.
Pick up Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and turn to Section 17(1)
1. Pick up TPA. 2. Go to Section 17(1). 3. Read: direction for accumulation is void if it exceeds the longer of (a) life of transferor, or (b) 18 years from date of transfer. 4. The question asks about the period in Section 17 → 18 years is one of the two limits. Note: it's life of TRANSFEROR, not transferee.
Section 17 deals with restrictions on accumulation of income from transferred property. The 18-year period is one of the two time limits (the other being the transferor's lifetime). The direction is void to the extent it exceeds the longer of these two periods.
Pick up Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and turn to Section 13
1. Pick up NI Act, 1881. 2. Go to Section 13 — 'Negotiable instrument'. 3. Read: 'A negotiable instrument means a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer.' 4. Hundi is NOT listed → answer is B.
Section 13 lists only three statutory negotiable instruments: promissory notes, bills of exchange, and cheques. Hundis are customary instruments governed by local usage and custom, not by the NI Act.
Pick up Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and turn to Section 80
1. Pick up NI Act. 2. Go to Section 80 — Interest when rate not specified. 3. Read: 'interest shall be calculated at the rate of eighteen per centum per annum.'
Section 80 NI Act prescribes 18% per annum as the statutory default interest rate when no rate is mentioned in the instrument. This is significantly higher than the TPA default of 9%.
Pick up LARR Act, 2013 and turn to Section 25
1. Pick up LARR Act, 2013. 2. Go to Section 25. 3. Read: 'Collector shall make an award within twelve months from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 19.' 4. If no award within 12 months → entire proceedings lapse.
The 12-month deadline is a safeguard against indefinite land acquisition proceedings. If the Collector fails to make an award within this period, the acquisition lapses entirely — protecting landowners from prolonged uncertainty.
Pick up LARR Act, 2013 and turn to Section 2(2)
1. Pick up LARR Act, 2013. 2. Go to Section 2(2). 3. Read: 'for private companies — prior consent of at least eighty per cent of affected families.'
The LARR Act mandates different consent thresholds: 80% for private company acquisitions and 70% for PPP projects. This is a major reform from the old 1894 Act which required no consent.
Trademarks serve as source identifiers — they tell consumers who made the product. A brand name, logo, or team insignia on clothing indicates the manufacturer's identity. Patents protect inventions, GIs protect geographical origin, and designs protect visual appearance — none of these identify the maker.
Pick up Patents Act, 1970 and turn to Section 53(1)
1. Pick up Patents Act, 1970. 2. Go to Section 53(1). 3. Read: 'the term of every patent granted shall be twenty years from the date of filing.'
Patents last 20 years from filing date — this is standard worldwide under the TRIPS Agreement. After 20 years, the invention enters the public domain. Copyright lasts author's lifetime + 60 years (much longer).
Article 301 guaranteeing free trade and commerce across India was directly inspired by Section 92 of the Australian Constitution, which similarly ensures freedom of interstate trade. India's federal structure with interstate trade issues paralleled Australia's experience.
Mandamus (Latin: 'we command') is specifically designed to compel a public official or body to perform a mandatory or ministerial duty they have refused or failed to perform. It cannot be issued for discretionary acts or against private parties.
The 58th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1987 inserted Article 394A empowering the President to publish an authoritative Hindi translation of the Constitution, signed by Constituent Assembly members.
In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952), the SC struck down the Bihar Land Reforms Act as colourable legislation — while it purported to lay down compensation principles for land acquisition, it actually deprived landowners of compensation, indirectly achieving what couldn't be done directly.
The SC's advisory opinion in Re Berubari required a constitutional amendment to cede territory. Parliament passed the 9th Amendment (1960) to give effect to the Indo-Pakistan Nehru-Noon Agreement regarding the Berubari region in West Bengal.
Pick up Constitution of India and turn to Article 254
1. Pick up Constitution. 2. Check Article 248 → residuary powers. Not this. 3. Check Article 252 → power of Parliament with consent of states. Not this. 4. Check Article 254 → 'Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States.' ✓ Found it. 5. Article 256 → obligation of states. Not this.
Article 254 is the specific provision for resolving Central-State law conflicts on Concurrent List subjects. The rule: Central law prevails unless the State law received Presidential assent before the Central law was enacted.
Pick up Constitution of India and turn to Article 343(2)
1. Pick up Constitution. 2. Go to Article 343 — Official language of the Union. 3. Read clause (2): 'for a period of fifteen years from the commencement of this Constitution, the English language shall continue to be used.'
The Constitution provided a 15-year transition period (1950-1965) for shifting from English to Hindi. However, the Official Languages Act, 1963 later provided for continued use of English even after 1965.
In Dr. Chakradhar Paswan v. State of Bihar (1988), the SC held that reservation cannot apply to a single-post cadre because it would amount to 100% reservation, violating Article 16(1) read with Article 14. Reservation presupposes multiple posts.
Pick up Constitution of India and turn to Article 19(1)(g) / Vishaka case
1. Pick up Constitution. 2. Check Article 19(1)(b) → right to assemble peacefully. Not directly relevant. 3. Check 19(1)(d) → right to move freely. Not this. 4. Check 19(1)(e) → right to reside/settle. Not this. 5. Check 19(1)(g) → 'right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.' ✓ Workplace harassment violates the right to practice one's profession.
The Vishaka case (1997) established that workplace sexual harassment violates Article 19(1)(g) — the right to practice any profession. Harassment creates a hostile work environment that infringes a woman's fundamental right to work safely and with dignity.
In Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1958), the SC applied harmonious construction: Article 26(b) right to manage religious affairs is subject to Article 25(2)(b) power to throw open Hindu temples to all classes. Both provisions were upheld by reading them together harmoniously.
Pick up Indian Penal Code, 1860 and turn to Section 4
1. Pick up IPC. 2. Go to Section 4 — Extension of Code to extra-territorial offences. 3. Read: IPC applies to (i) Indian citizens outside India ✓, (ii) persons on ships registered in India ✓, (iii) offences targeting computer resources located IN INDIA (not any country). 4. Statement (iii) says 'any country' — this is WRONG. IPC only covers computer resources in India. 5. So IPC may NOT apply to situation (iii).
Section 4 extends IPC to: Indian citizens anywhere, persons on Indian ships/aircraft, and offences targeting computer resources IN INDIA. Statement (iii) incorrectly says 'any country' — IPC only covers Indian computer resources, not worldwide.
BNS S.2 retains similar extra-territorial provisions with expanded digital jurisdiction.
Pick up Indian Penal Code, 1860 and turn to Section 53
1. Pick up IPC. 2. Go to Section 53 — Punishments. 3. Count: (1) Death, (2) Imprisonment for life, (3) Imprisonment (rigorous or simple), (4) Forfeiture of property, (5) Fine = 5 types.
Section 53 lists exactly 5 types of punishment. Note: rigorous and simple imprisonment count as one type (imprisonment) with two descriptions, not two separate types.
BNS S.4 prescribes 6 types including community service as a new addition.
Pick up Indian Penal Code, 1860 and turn to Section 87, Illustration
1. Pick up IPC. 2. Go to Section 87 — Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent. 3. Read the Illustration: 'A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies consent to harm. A has committed no offence.'
Section 87 provides that acts done with consent for amusement/sport, not intended to cause death/grievous hurt, are not offences. The fencing was consensual, fair, and recreational — even though Z was hurt, A committed no offence because Z consented to the inherent risks of the activity.
BNS S.25 retains the same consent-based exception for acts done in good faith during sports/amusement.
Pick up Indian Penal Code, 1860 and turn to Section 100
1. Pick up IPC. 2. Go to Section 100 — When right of private defence of body extends to causing death. 3. Read the list: apprehension of murder ✓, rape ✓, gratifying unnatural lust ✓, kidnapping ✓, wrongful confinement ✓, acid attack ✓. 4. 'Simple hurt' is NOT in the list → cannot cause death in private defence against simple hurt.
Section 100 allows causing death in private defence only against the most serious offences: murder, grievous hurt, rape, unnatural lust, kidnapping, wrongful confinement, and acid attacks. Simple hurt (as opposed to grievous hurt) is deliberately excluded — the response must be proportionate to the threat.
BNS S.37 retains the same list with minor language updates.
Pick up Indian Penal Code, 1860 and turn to Explanation to Section 92 (covering S.88, 89, 92)
1. Pick up IPC. 2. Go to Section 92. 3. Read the Explanation: 'Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 88, 89 and 92.' 4. Section 89 is listed → answer is A.
The Explanation clarifies that when Sections 88, 89, and 92 speak of acting 'for the benefit' of a person, this means genuine welfare benefit (like medical treatment), not mere financial/pecuniary benefit.
Pick up Indian Penal Code, 1860 and turn to Section 350, Illustration (f)
1. Pick up IPC. 2. Go to Section 350 — Criminal Force. 3. Read Illustration (f): 'Z is a woman who is wearing a veil. A intentionally pulls up her veil. Here A intentionally uses force to her and has therefore committed criminal force.'
This is a classic illustration-based question. Section 350 defines criminal force as intentional use of force without consent causing injury, fear, or annoyance. Pulling a veil is applying force; it was intentional, without consent, and intended to annoy — all elements of criminal force are met.
BNS S.18 retains the same definition of criminal force.
Pick up Indian Penal Code, 1860 and turn to Section 363A(2)
1. Pick up IPC. 2. Go to Section 363A — Kidnapping or maiming a minor for begging. 3. Read sub-section (2): 'whoever maims any minor for begging purposes shall be punishable with imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.'
Section 363A(2) prescribes the harshest punishment — life imprisonment plus fine — for maiming minors for begging. This reflects the severity of the crime: permanently injuring a child to exploit them.
Pick up Indian Penal Code, 1860 and turn to Section 383, 384
1. Identify: threatening to publish defamatory material unless paid = extortion (Section 383 IPC). 2. Pick up IPC. Go to Section 384 — Punishment for extortion. 3. Read: 'imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.'
This scenario (illustrated in S.383) constitutes extortion — using threat to dishonestly induce delivery of property. Section 384 prescribes the punishment: up to 3 years imprisonment and/or fine.
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 28(3)
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Go to Section 28 — Sentences which courts may pass. 3. Read sub-section (3): 'An Assistant Sessions Judge may pass any sentence except death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment exceeding ten years.' 4. So max = up to 10 years.
The sentencing hierarchy: Sessions Judge = any sentence including death. Additional Sessions Judge = any sentence including death. Assistant Sessions Judge = up to 10 years only (cannot pass death or life imprisonment).
BNSS S.23 retains similar sentencing limits for different levels of criminal courts.
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 43
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Check Section 41 → arrest by police without warrant. Not about private arrest. 3. Check Section 41A → notice of appearance. Not this. 4. Check Section 42 → arrest on refusal to give name. Not this. 5. Check Section 43 → 'Arrest by private person.' ✓ It says: if person comes under S.41 provisions, police shall re-arrest him.
Section 43 governs citizen's arrest. After a private person arrests someone, they must hand over the person to police. The police then re-arrest under Section 41 if the person is suspected of a cognizable offence, or under Section 42 if they refuse to identify themselves.
BNSS S.40 corresponds to CrPC S.43 on arrest by private persons.
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 125(4)
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Go to Section 125(4). 3. Read: wife NOT entitled if (a) living in adultery, (b) refuses to live with husband without sufficient reason, (c) living separately by mutual consent. 4. Option B (voluntarily refuses) matches ground (b). Note: 'husband presumes' is not the same as 'wife is actually in adultery.' Option B is the clearest match.
Section 125(4) bars maintenance in three situations: living in adultery, refusing without sufficient reason to cohabit, or mutual separation. Voluntary refusal to live with husband (option B) without justification directly triggers this bar.
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 164A
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Go to Section 164A. 3. Read heading: 'Medical examination of the victim of rape.' ✓
Section 164A specifically deals with the medical examination of rape victims. It mandates examination by a registered medical practitioner with the victim's consent, within 24 hours of receiving information.
BNSS S.184 corresponds to CrPC S.164A on medical examination of rape victims.
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 172
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Go to Section 172 — Diary of proceedings in investigation. 3. Check each option: - (A) S.172(1A): witness statements inserted ✓ correct - (B) S.172(1B): diary duly paginated ✓ correct - (C) S.172(2): diaries may be used by court 'NOT as evidence' but to aid inquiry → this is the INCORRECT statement - (D) S.172(3): police can use to refresh memory ✓ correct
The key distinction: investigation diaries can be used by courts to aid inquiry BUT NOT as evidence. They can also be used by the police officer to refresh memory. Statement C ('may be used as evidence') contradicts Section 172(2) and is therefore incorrect.
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 213, Illustration (a)
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Go to Section 213 — When manner of committing offence must be stated. 3. Read Illustration (a): 'A is accused of the theft of a certain article at a certain time and place. The charge need not set out the manner in which the theft was effected.' ✓ 4. Other illustrations show cheating, false evidence, disobedience all require manner to be stated.
Section 213 requires the manner of offence to be stated when basic particulars (time/place/person) don't give sufficient notice. Theft at a time and place is self-explanatory. But cheating (how was the deception done?) and false evidence (which portion is false?) require manner specification.
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 260
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Go to Section 260 — Power to try summarily. 3. Read the list: includes (v) offences under sections 454 and 456 IPC ✓, (vi) section 504 IPC ✓, and (i) offences not punishable with death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment exceeding 2 years. 4. Both A (S.454) and B (S.504) qualify. But the question asks 'which may be tried' — all except D qualify. A is the most specific correct answer.
Section 260 lists specific IPC sections (including 454, 504) and general categories (offences up to 2 years) as summarily triable. Life imprisonment offences (option D) are explicitly excluded. The question appears to have been withdrawn due to multiple correct options.
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 395
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Check Section 275 → Record of evidence. Not this. 3. Check Section 325 → Procedure when Magistrate cannot pass sufficient sentence. Not this. 4. Check Section 383 → related to appeals. Not exactly reference. 5. Check Section 395 → 'Reference to High Court.' ✓ Found it.
Section 395 deals with references to the High Court when subordinate courts encounter questions about the constitutionality or validity of legislation. This is distinct from appeals (S.374) or revision (S.397).
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 438(4)
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Go to Section 438(4). 3. Read: 'Nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving arrest on accusation of offence under S.376(3), S.376AB, S.376DA, or S.376DB of IPC.' 4. All three are listed → answer is D.
Section 438(4) creates an absolute bar on anticipatory bail for the most serious sexual offences — rape by public servants, rape of minors under 16, and gang-rape of minors. All three sections listed in the question are covered by this bar.
Pick up Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and turn to Section 461(a)
1. Pick up CrPC. 2. Go to Section 461 — Irregularities which vitiate proceedings. 3. Read clause (a): 'if any Magistrate, not being empowered by law, attaches and sells property under section 83, his proceedings shall be void.' 4. Property attachment under S.83 without authority = VOID proceedings.
Section 461 lists specific acts that make proceedings completely void (not merely irregular) even if done in good faith. Attachment of property (S.83) without legal authority is one such act — it cannot be cured or saved.
Jurisdiction of a civil court is determined solely by the averments in the plaint — what the plaintiff claims, the relief sought, and the cause of action. The written statement is the defendant's response and cannot change the court's jurisdiction. This principle is well-settled in Indian civil procedure.
Pick up Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and turn to Section 9
1. Pick up CPC. 2. Go to Section 9 — Courts to try all civil suits. 3. Read: 'courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature.' 4. Explanation I: property/office rights are civil even if they depend on religious questions. 5. But PURE religious rights (like rights of worship) with no civil right attached are excluded.
Section 9 gives civil courts jurisdiction over all 'suits of civil nature.' Rights of worship are purely religious matters with no civil component — they cannot be adjudicated by civil courts. However, if a property or office right is contested (even if it depends on religious ceremonies), it IS a civil suit per Explanation I.
Pick up Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and turn to Section 11, Explanation VI
1. Pick up CPC. 2. Go to Section 11 (Res Judicata). 3. Check Explanation V → about co-defendants. Not this. 4. Check Explanation VI → 'Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or private right claimed in common... all persons interested shall be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.' ✓ This applies res judicata to representative suits. 5. No need to check VII and VIII.
Explanation VI extends res judicata to representative suits — when someone litigates a public or common right on behalf of a class, the outcome binds all members of that class, not just the named parties. This prevents re-litigation of public interest matters.
Pick up Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and turn to Order V Rule 4
1. Pick up CPC. 2. Go to Order V Rule 4. 3. Read: no party shall be ordered to appear in person unless resident (a) within local limits, or (b) outside limits but within 50 miles (or 200 miles with public conveyance). 4. 250 miles with conveyance exceeds the 200-mile limit → court will NOT issue personal appearance summons.
Order V Rule 4 sets distance limits for personal appearance: within local limits, or within 50 miles, or within 200 miles if public transport is available. 250 miles exceeds all limits — so the court cannot compel personal appearance, though it can still issue summons for appearance through pleader.
Pick up Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and turn to Order IX Rule 8
1. Pick up CPC. 2. Go to Order IX Rule 8. 3. Read: 'where defendant appears and plaintiff does not appear, Court shall dismiss the suit.' 4. This dismissal under Order IX Rule 8 bars a fresh suit (operates as res judicata). 5. Other dismissals (Rules 2, 3) allow fresh suits.
When the defendant shows up but the plaintiff doesn't, Order IX Rule 8 treats this as the plaintiff abandoning their case. The dismissal operates as a decision on merits (bar to fresh suit), unlike other non-appearance dismissals which allow refiling.
Pick up Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and turn to Order XVII Rule 1
1. Pick up CPC. 2. Go to Order XVII Rule 1. 3. Read: 'no such adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the suit.'
The 3-adjournment cap was introduced to combat delay. Courts must record reasons for each adjournment and may impose costs. This is distinct from the BNSS limit on criminal trial adjournments.
The CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976 inserted Rule 1A under Order XVI, allowing parties to bring witnesses to court without applying for formal summons. This simplified the witness production process and reduced procedural delays.
Pick up Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and turn to Section 35(1) Explanation
1. Pick up CPC. 2. Go to Section 35(1) Explanation. 3. Read: 'costs' includes (i) witness expenses, (ii) legal fees, (iii) any other expenses in connection with proceedings. 4. 'Fooding and lodging' is NOT listed → answer is C.
The CPC definition of 'costs' covers witness expenses, legal fees, and other proceeding-related expenses. Personal fooding and lodging expenses of parties are not included — they are not directly connected to the judicial proceedings themselves.
Pick up Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and turn to Order XXXVII Rule 3(1)
1. Pick up CPC. 2. Go to Order XXXVII (Summary Procedure). 3. Read Rule 3(1): 'defendant may, at any time within ten days of such service, enter an appearance.'
In summary suits (Order XXXVII), the defendant gets only 10 days to enter appearance — much shorter than regular suits. This tight timeline is by design, as summary procedure is meant for quick resolution of straightforward debt/commercial claims.
Pick up Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and turn to Order XLI Rule 25
1. Pick up CPC. 2. Go to Order XLI (Appeals from original decrees). 3. Check Rule 23 → remand of case. Different from remitting issues. 4. Check Rule 23A → remand in certain cases. Still remand, not remitting. 5. Check Rule 24 → framing issues and referring case back. Close but different. 6. Check Rule 25 → 'Where the lower court has omitted to frame or try any issue, the Appellate Court may frame issues and refer them for trial to the lower court.' ✓ This is remitting specific issues.
Rule 25 is specifically about remitting individual issues (not the entire case) back to the trial court when the lower court failed to frame or try an essential issue. This is narrower than a full remand under Rule 23.
Pick up Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and turn to Section 6, Illustration
1. Pick up Evidence Act. 2. Go to Section 6 — Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction. 3. Read the illustration: statements/acts by A, B, or bystanders AT THE TIME of the transaction are relevant. 4. Statements made A DAY BEFORE are NOT part of the same transaction → not relevant under S.6.
Section 6 (res gestae) makes facts relevant only if they form part of the 'same transaction' — contemporaneous statements and acts during the event. Statements made a day before are too remote in time to be part of the same transaction.
BSA S.4 retains the res gestae principle from Evidence Act S.6.
Pick up Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and turn to Section 25
1. Pick up Evidence Act. 2. Check Section 24 → confession caused by inducement/threat. Not specifically about police. 3. Check Section 25 → 'No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused.' ✓ Found it. 4. S.26 = confession while in police custody. S.27 = discovery based on confession (exception).
Section 25 creates an absolute bar: confessions to police officers are inadmissible. This protects against coerced confessions. Section 26 extends this to custody confessions. Section 27 carves a limited exception — the portion leading to discovery of facts IS admissible.
BSA S.23 retains the bar on confessions to police officers.
Pick up Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and turn to Section 32(1)
1. Pick up Evidence Act. 2. Check Section 25 → confession to police. Not this. 3. Check Section 29 → confession otherwise relevant. Not this. 4. Check Section 32 → 'Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead...' ✓ Sub-section (1) covers dying declarations. 5. Section 37 → previous judgments. Not this.
Section 32(1) admits dying declarations — statements about the cause of death or circumstances leading to death. Notably, the declarant need NOT have been under expectation of death at the time (unlike English law). The statement is admissible regardless of the nature of proceeding.
BSA S.26 retains dying declaration provisions from Evidence Act S.32.
Pick up Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and turn to Section 61
1. Pick up Evidence Act. 2. Go to Section 61. 3. Read: 'The contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence.'
Section 61 establishes the dual mode of proving document contents — primary evidence (original document, S.62) is preferred, but secondary evidence (copies, S.63) is also permissible. The word 'may' indicates both are acceptable, not that both are required simultaneously.
BSA S.57 retains the same provision with added recognition of electronic documents as primary evidence.
Pick up Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and turn to Section 143
1. Pick up Evidence Act. 2. Go to Section 143. 3. Read: 'Leading questions may be asked in cross-examination.' 4. This directly matches option B.
Section 143 permits leading questions in cross-examination because the purpose of cross is to test credibility — suggestive questions are a tool for that. In examination-in-chief, leading questions are generally prohibited (S.142) except with court permission for introductory/undisputed matters.
BSA S.146 consolidates Evidence Act S.141-143 on leading questions.
In Anvar P.V v. P.K. Basheer (2014), the SC held that electronic records must be accompanied by a certificate under Section 65B obtained at the time of collection. Without this certificate, secondary evidence of electronic records is inadmissible. This overruled the earlier liberal approach in Navjot Sandhu case.
Pick up Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and turn to Section 31
1. Pick up Evidence Act. 2. Go to Section 31. 3. Read: 'Admissions are NOT conclusive proof of the matters admitted but they MAY operate as estoppels.' 4. Option B says 'admissions ARE conclusive' — this contradicts Section 31 → INCORRECT.
Section 31 explicitly states admissions are NOT conclusive — they are only prima facie evidence that can be rebutted. However, they MAY operate as estoppels (preventing the maker from taking a contrary position). Option B incorrectly states they are conclusive.
Section 32(1) — dying declarations — is the most recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The declarant's statement about their cause of death is admitted despite being an out-of-court statement because the declarant cannot attend court. The rationale: a person facing death is unlikely to lie.
Pick up Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and turn to Section 89
1. Pick up CPC. 2. Go to Section 89 — Settlement of disputes outside court. 3. Read the list: (a) Arbitration, (b) Conciliation, (c) Judicial settlement/Lok Adalat, (d) Mediation. 4. 'Negotiation' is NOT listed → answer is D.
Section 89 lists four ADR mechanisms. Negotiation, while a dispute resolution method, is not formally recognized under CPC because it's an informal process without institutional structure. The CPC only recognizes ADR methods with defined procedural frameworks.
Lok Adalats can deal with civil cases and compoundable criminal cases, but NOT all criminal matters. Non-compoundable offences (like murder, robbery) cannot be settled in Lok Adalat. Statement B is incorrect because it claims 'all civil & criminal matters' which overstates the jurisdiction.
Pick up Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and turn to Section 7
1. Pick up ACA 1996. 2. Go to Section 7. 3. Read sub-section (3): 'An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.' 4. Option A says 'written as well as oral' — this contradicts S.7(3). Must be written only → A is INCORRECT.
Section 7 mandates that arbitration agreements must be in writing — oral agreements are not valid. The writing requirement can be satisfied by signed documents, electronic communications, or exchange of claim/defence statements. Option A is incorrect because it includes 'oral' which is explicitly excluded.
Pick up Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and turn to Section 12
1. Pick up ACA 1996. 2. Go to Section 12. 3. Read: arbitrator can be challenged if (1) justifiable doubt about independence, (2) justifiable doubt about impartiality, (3) ineligible per Seventh Schedule. 4. Possessing agreed qualifications is NOT a ground for challenge — it's actually a requirement, not a deficiency. 5. Option C is the situation where challenge is NOT warranted.
Having the qualifications agreed by parties is a positive attribute, not a ground for challenge. The challenge grounds under Section 12 relate to deficiencies: lack of independence, lack of impartiality, or ineligibility under the Seventh Schedule.
Pick up Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and turn to Section 3(c)
1. Pick up HMA 1955. 2. Go to Section 3 — Definitions. 3. Read clause (c): 'two persons are said to be related to each other by half-blood when they are descended from a common ancestor but by different wives.'
Half-blood means sharing one parent but not both: same father, different mothers. Section 3(c) defines it precisely as descent from a common ancestor through different wives. Full-blood (3(b)) = same ancestor, same wife. Uterine blood (3(d)) = same ancestress, different husbands.
Pick up Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and turn to Section 5
1. Pick up HMA. 2. Go to Section 5 — Conditions for Hindu marriage. 3. Read: parties should NOT be within prohibited relationship (unless custom permits). 4. Option B says parties 'should be within' prohibited relationship — this is the OPPOSITE of the condition. The condition is they should NOT be within prohibited relationship. 5. So option B is not a valid condition as stated.
Section 5 conditions include: no living spouse, mental fitness, minimum age (21/18), NOT within prohibited degrees, NOT sapindas. Option B reverses the condition — saying parties 'should be within' prohibited relationship, which is the opposite of the actual legal requirement.
Pick up Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and turn to Section 13(1)
1. Pick up HMA. 2. Go to Section 13(1). 3. Read the heading: Section 13 deals with divorce AND judicial separation. 4. Read Section 10: judicial separation is available on the same grounds as divorce under S.13. 5. Restitution of conjugal rights is under Section 9 — separate provision. 6. So S.13(1) covers divorce + judicial separation = (ii) & (iii).
Section 13(1) lists grounds that serve dual purposes: divorce (under S.13) and judicial separation (under S.10, which refers to S.13 grounds). Restitution of conjugal rights is an entirely separate remedy under Section 9, not connected to S.13 grounds.
In Muslim law, 'batil' means void — a marriage that is void ab initio creates no legal rights or obligations. Children from such marriage are illegitimate. Marriages forbidden by blood relationship, affinity, or fosterage rules are batil. Contrast with 'fasid' (irregular) which can sometimes be regularized.
Talaq-i-tafweez (delegated divorce) empowers the wife to pronounce divorce herself using power delegated by the husband — either at the time of marriage or thereafter. This is one of the most important forms giving Muslim women the right to end marriage without court intervention.
Hindus have the choice of marrying under the Hindu Marriage Act (their personal law) or the Special Marriage Act (a secular statute available to all Indians regardless of religion, caste, or community). Both are valid legal options.
The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 made daughters coparceners by birth with equal rights as sons in Hindu joint family property. This landmark amendment overturned centuries of patrilineal inheritance, giving women equal rights to ancestral property.
Pick up Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and turn to Section 11(iii)
1. Pick up Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 2. Go to Section 11 — Other conditions for a valid adoption. 3. Read clause (iii): 'if the adoption is by a male and the person to be adopted is a female, the adoptive father is at least twenty-one years older.'
The 21-year age gap requirement protects against potential exploitation. It applies specifically when a male adopts a female child. When a female adopts a male child, the same 21-year gap requirement applies (S.11(ii)). Same-sex adoptions have no such age gap requirement.
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) is considered the first reported PIL where the SC expanded Article 21 to include the right to speedy trial and free legal aid. The case revealed that thousands of undertrial prisoners in Bihar had been detained longer than their maximum possible sentences.
Justice P.N. Bhagwati is called the 'father of PIL' for his instrumental role in developing public interest litigation jurisprudence, particularly through cases like S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (Judges Transfer Case) and Bandhua Mukti Morcha.
PIL can be filed against State/Central Government, municipalities, and public authorities — entities that exercise 'State' functions under Article 12. Private parties cannot be sued through PIL because they don't owe fundamental rights obligations. Private disputes must go through regular litigation.
The SC's PIL guidelines specify that petitions for premature release, parole, etc. should not be treated as PIL under Article 32 — they can be effectively dealt with by the concerned High Court. However, petitions about custodial torture or custody deaths ARE entertainable by the SC.
In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, the SC held that the line between administrative and quasi-judicial functions is thin, and principles of natural justice apply to both. This expanded natural justice beyond the traditional judicial sphere to cover all government decision-making affecting citizens' rights.
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) overruled Sampath Kumar and held that judicial review under Articles 226 and 32 is part of the basic structure. Tribunals are supplementary, not substitutes — their decisions are subject to HC scrutiny via writ jurisdiction.
H.W.R. Wade defined administrative law as 'the law relating to the control of governmental power' — emphasizing that its primary function is to keep government within legal bounds through mechanisms like judicial review, natural justice, and accountability.
Pick up Advocates Act, 1961 and turn to Section 45
1. Pick up Advocates Act, 1961. 2. Go to Section 45 — Penalty for illegal practice. 3. Read: 'shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months.'
Section 45 penalizes unauthorized practice of law — appearing in any court without being entitled to do so under the Act. The maximum punishment is 6 months imprisonment.
Pick up Advocates Act, 1961 and turn to Section 49(c)
1. Pick up Advocates Act. 2. Check Section 42 → transfer of cases. Not this. 3. Check Section 42A → not relevant. 4. Check Section 48A → not this. 5. Check Section 49 → 'General power of the Bar Council of India to make rules.' ✓ Sub-clause (c) specifically covers professional conduct standards.
Section 49 is BCI's general rule-making power. Clause (c) specifically empowers BCI to prescribe professional conduct standards — this is the source of the BCI Rules Part VI on Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette.
Pick up Advocates Act, 1961 and turn to Rule 9, Chapter VI, Part II
1. Pick up BCI Rules. 2. Go to Part VI, Chapter II — Standards of Professional Conduct. 3. Read Rule 9: 'An advocate shall NOT act or plead in any matter in which he is himself pecuniarily interested.' 4. Option A says an advocate CAN plead in such matters — this contradicts Rule 9 → INCORRECT.
Rule 9 prohibits advocates from handling cases where they have a personal financial interest — this is a conflict of interest safeguard. Option A incorrectly states the opposite, making it the incorrect statement.
Pick up Advocates Act, 1961 and turn to Section 38
1. Pick up Advocates Act. 2. Go to Section 38 — Appeal to Supreme Court. 3. Read: 'Any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary committee of BCI may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court.'
The appeal hierarchy in advocate discipline: State Bar Council disciplinary committee → BCI disciplinary committee → Supreme Court. The SC is the final appellate authority, not the High Courts, reflecting the national nature of the legal profession.
Pick up Companies Act, 2013 and turn to Section 18 / Rule 6 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules
1. Pick up Companies Act, 2013 or Companies (Incorporation) Rules. 2. Find the OPC mandatory conversion provision. 3. Read: OPC must convert if paid-up capital exceeds Rs. 50 lakh OR average annual turnover exceeds Rs. 2 crore.
The Rs. 50 lakh paid-up capital threshold triggers mandatory OPC conversion. This ensures that companies beyond a certain size operate with the governance requirements of private/public companies rather than the simplified OPC structure.
Pick up Companies Act, 2013 and turn to Section 149(1)
1. Pick up Companies Act, 2013. 2. Go to Section 149(1). 3. Read: minimum 3 directors for public company, 2 for private, 1 for OPC. Maximum 15 (extendable by special resolution).
Section 149(1) prescribes a tiered minimum: 3 for public companies, 2 for private, 1 for OPC. The maximum is 15 for all types, extendable by special resolution. Certain classes must also have at least one woman director.
In Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996), the SC elaborated on the Precautionary Principle — when there is scientific uncertainty about environmental damage, the burden of proof shifts to the developer to show the activity is safe. The court also applied the Polluter Pays Principle.
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath is THE landmark case introducing the Public Trust Doctrine in India — the state holds natural resources (rivers, forests, seashores) as trustee for the public and cannot transfer them to private parties for profit. A resort encroaching on river bed was ordered to restore the environment and pay compensation.
In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the SC struck down Section 66A IT Act as unconstitutional for violating Article 19(1)(a) freedom of speech. The section's terms like 'annoying' and 'inconvenience' were held to be vague and overbroad, capable of misuse to suppress legitimate online expression.
Pick up Information Technology Act, 2000 and turn to Section 11
1. Pick up IT Act, 2000. 2. Go to Section 11 — Attribution of electronic records. 3. Read: attributed to originator if sent by (a) originator himself, (b) authorized person, (c) automated system programmed by originator. 4. 'Unauthorized person' is NOT listed → record NOT attributed to originator.
Section 11 creates three grounds for attribution: direct sending, authorized agent, or pre-programmed automated system. An unauthorized person's actions break the chain of attribution — the originator is not responsible for electronic records sent without their authority or programming.
Pick up Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and turn to Section 5(3)
1. Pick up Maternity Benefit Act. 2. Go to Section 5(3). 3. Read: 'maximum period for maternity benefit shall be twenty-six weeks' (for first two children). For 3rd+ child: 12 weeks. 4. Maximum overall = 26 weeks.
The 2017 amendment increased maternity benefit from 12 to 26 weeks for the first two children, making India's maternity leave among the most generous globally. For women with 2+ surviving children, the period remains 12 weeks.