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IN THE COURT OF XXV ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE CITY CIVIL COURT: AT
HYDERABAD.
Thursday, this the 23 rd day of April, 2026
PRESENT: SRI D.V.NAGESWAR RAO
XXV ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE
Original Suit No.546 of 2014
Between: Anugita Abels, D/o D.V. Rao. No aged 69 years, Occ: Housewife, R/o Flat No.201, 202, B- Block, Moksha Apartments, Road No 2, Banjara Hills. Hyderabad-500034.
...Plaintiff
AND
1. Sumeet Gunti S/o Late C.S. Gunti, aged 45 years, Occ: Nil, R/o No.8-2-120/88/MB/303, Block-B, 302, Flat No.301 and 302, Moksha Apartments, Road No.2, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad-500034.
2. Tarandeep Gunti W/o. Sumeet Gunti, aged 43 years, Occ: Nil, R/o No.8-2-120/88/MB/303, (Block-B, 302), Flat No.301 and 302, Moksha Apartments, Road No.2, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad-500034.
3. Master Siddharth Gunti (Minor) aged 17 years, Occ: Student, represented by guardian and father Sumeet Gunti, R/o No.3-2-120/88/MB/303, (Block-B, 302), Flat No.301 and 302, Moksha Apartments, Road No 2, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad-500034.
4. Ms. Raaga Gunti (Minor) aged 11 years, Occ: Student, represented by guardian and father Mr. Sumeet Gunti, R/o 8-2-120/88/MB/303, (Block-B, 302), Flat No.301 and 302, Moksha Apartments, Road No.2, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad-500034.
...Defendants
This suit came on this day before me for final hearing and disposal in the presence of M.S.Srinivisa Iyengar, learned counsel for the plaintiff; Sri Vivek Jain, learned counsel for defendant No.1 and of Sri Imtiyaaz Ahmed Masroor, learned counsel for defendants No.2 to 4; upon hearing both the counsel and on perusing the material available on record and the matter having been stood over for consideration till this day, the court delivered the following:
::J U D G M E N T ::
1.The plaintiff filed the suit against the Defendants No.1 to 4 for passing a decree, directing the Defendants No.1 to 4 to vacate and put the plaintiff in peaceful and vacant possession of A and B schedule properties and for a sum of Rs.80,000/- per month being damage/mesne profits from the date of filing suit till the date of handing over the premises.
Plaint Averments:
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2.1The Plaintiff was the absolute owner in possession of premises bearing No. MCH No.
8-2-120/76/RG/10, constructed on land admeasuring 2570.20 sq. yards (2145.30 sq. meters) in Plot Nos. 88 and 89, Survey No. 403, Shaikpet Village, Road No. 2, Banjara Hills,
Hyderabad. The property originally belonged to Smt. D. Rukminidevi, mother of the
Plaintiff, who bequeathed it to the Plaintiff through a Will dated 11.03.1983, registered as
Document No. 13/1983 at the office of the Sub-Registrar, Chikkadpally. Subsequently, a portion of the land admeasuring 1568.78 sq. meters was exempted from the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, by G.O.Ms. No. 1295 dated 18.02.2003. Due to financial constraints, the Plaintiff entrusted the exempted land to
Musaddilal Construction and Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. for development. The developer constructed a residential building named “Moksha.” The Plaintiff retained ownership and possession of four flats in B-Block, namely Flat Nos. 201, 202, 301, and 302, while leasing the remaining flats to the developer for 99 years.
2.2The Plaintiff has three children, including Defendant No. 1, her second son. Despite personal hardships, the Plaintiff raised and supported her children, particularly Defendant
No. 1, who remained financially dependent. To assist him, the Plaintiff permitted Defendant
No. 1 and his family to reside temporarily in Flat Nos. 301 and 302 (Schedule A & B properties).
2.3From March 2014, Defendant No. 1 began subjecting the Plaintiff, aged 69 years, to acts of harassment, intimidation, and domestic abuse, causing severe mental distress and adversely affecting her health.
2.4Defendant No.1 further defamed the Plaintiff by sending false allegations to her husband residing in Germany. Upon being questioned, he threatened to malign her before authorities, including the German Embassy, unless the flats were transferred to his name.
He, along with Defendant No. 2 and others, also attempted to disrupt essential services such as water, electricity, and lift access, and allowed unauthorized occupants in the premises, thereby attempting to unlawfully assert control over the property.
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2.5The Plaintiff remains the lawful owner of the flats and had only granted permissive occupation to Defendant No. 1. Due to such occupation, the Plaintiff has suffered a loss of rental income amounting to approximately Rs. 80,000 per month.
2.6Consequently, the Plaintiff issued a legal notice dated 28.04.2014 directing
Defendant No. 1 to vacate the premises and compensate for loss of rent. Despite receipt of the notice, Defendant No. 1 neither complied nor responded, but instead filed a caveat.
Defendants Nos. 2 to 4, being family members of Defendant No. 1, are in unlawful possession of the suit schedule property and are liable to vacate and deliver peaceful possession to the Plaintiff.
Written Statement Averments of defendant No.1:
3.1The Defendant No.1 submits that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and is liable to be dismissed in limine. All adverse allegations not specifically admitted are denied, and the Plaintiff is put to strict proof thereof. It is admitted that the property originally belonged to Smt. Rukmini Devi, grandmother of Defendant No.1, and was bequeathed to the Plaintiff through a registered Will. It is further admitted that a portion of the land was exempted under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and that the property was developed through Musaddilal Construction and Real Estate Pvt. Ltd., with four flats in B-
Block allotted to the landowner and eight flats in A-Block to the developer. However,
Defendant No.1 alleges that such exemption was obtained by the Plaintiff through forged and fabricated medical records pertaining to Defendant No.1, including misrepresentation
before statutory authorities that funds were required for his medical treatment abroad.
3.2Defendant No.1 admits that the Plaintiff has three children but disputes the claim that she solely raised and supported them. It is stated that the Plaintiff divorced Defendant
No.1’s father in 1980, after which custody of Defendant No.1, then a minor, was granted to her. In 1983, the Plaintiff remarried and moved to Germany, leaving Defendant No.1 under the care of his father, who provided for his upbringing, education, and welfare. Defendant
No.1 asserts that the Plaintiff remained largely absent during his formative years, including during a serious accident in 1989. It is further alleged that the Plaintiff misused his medical condition to obtain statutory exemptions. Defendant No.1 contends that he is financially
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independent and professionally established, having held senior positions in reputed companies. He further states that the Plaintiff, being unable to manage the property, offered
Flat Nos. 201, 202, 301, and 302 to him for management and income generation, with an intention to transfer the same. A Power of Attorney dated 11.04.2008 was executed in his favour. Subsequently, with the Plaintiff’s knowledge and consent, a registered lease deed
dated 24.08.2012 (Document No. 3938/2012) was executed in favour of M/s RS Solutions
for 30 years, and the agreed rent is being paid.
3.3Defendant No.1 denies allegations of harassment, intimidation, or domestic violence and instead contends that the Plaintiff has initiated false and vexatious proceedings, including a criminal complaint alleging forgery in respect of the registered lease deed. It is stated that the lease deed was executed by Defendant No.1 as GPA holder of the Plaintiff and remains valid and unchallenged. The lease expressly restricts termination or eviction for a period of 30 years (24.08.2012 to 23.08.2042), rendering the present suit untenable. The
Plaintiff is also stated to have unilaterally attempted to cancel the GPA on 09.06.2014.
Defendant No.1 denies allegations of threats, defamation, or interference with essential services. It is contended that the Plaintiff misappropriated maintenance and corpus funds collected from occupants since 2008, and upon being questioned, the Defendant’s family assumed responsibility for maintenance. Defendant No.1 further states that he incurred expenses from personal funds for repair of building facilities, including the lift.
3.4Defendant No.1 disputes the Plaintiff’s claim of exclusive ownership and permissive occupation, as well as the alleged loss of rental income. It is asserted that the occupation and management of the flats are lawful and based on valid authority and agreements. Defendant
No.1 denies that his possession is unlawful or that he is liable to vacate the premises. It is stated that a reply dated 24.05.2014 was issued to the Plaintiff’s legal notice, though the same was returned undelivered. The Defendant reserves the right to produce supporting records. The suit is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed.
Written Statement Averments of defendant No.2 to 4:
4.1The Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 submit that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and is liable to be dismissed in limine. All allegations not specifically admitted are
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denied, and the Plaintiff is put to strict proof thereof. The Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 adopt the contents of the written statement filed by Defendant No. 1 regarding title, development of the property, and related matters. The Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 adopt the submissions concerning the relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1. It is stated that the
Plaintiff executed a Power of Attorney dated 11.04.2008 in favour of Defendant No. 1, authorizing him to deal with the property. With the Plaintiff’s knowledge and consent, a registered lease deed dated 24.08.2012 (Document No. 3938/2012) was executed in favour of M/s RS Solutions, a firm owned by Defendants Nos. 2 to 4, for a period of 30 years, and rent is being regularly paid. In view of the said lease, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties.
4.2The Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 deny allegations of harassment, intimidation, or domestic violence. It is contended that the Plaintiff has initiated false and vexatious proceedings, including a criminal complaint alleging forgery in respect of the registered lease deed. The lease was executed by Defendant No. 1 as GPA holder of the Plaintiff and remains valid and unchallenged. The lease restricts termination or eviction for a period of 30 years (24.08.2012 to 23.08.2042), and therefore cannot be terminated. The Plaintiff’s subsequent cancellation of the GPA dated 09.06.2014 does not affect the validity of the lease.
Consequently, the present suit is untenable. The Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 adopt the submissions made by Defendant No. 1 regarding allegations of interference, misuse of funds, and related matters.
4.3The Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 adopt the submissions made by Defendant No. 1 regarding ownership, possession, and alleged loss of rental income. The Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 deny that any legal notice was issued to them. In view of the subsisting registered lease in favour of M/s RS Solutions, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and is liable to be dismissed.
5.Basing on the pleadings extracted as above, on 18-11-2019, this court settled the following issues for trail;
1. whether the plaintiff is entitled for eviction of the Defendants No.1 to 4 from the suit schedule “A” and “B” properties ?
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2. whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages/mesne profits at Rs.80,000/- per month ? If yes, for what period ?
3. whether there is land lord and tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the Defendants ?
4. to what relief ?
6.In order to substantiate her case, the Plaintiff herself alone is examined as PW-1, and got marked Ex.A-1 to A-4. Ex.A5 is marked on behalf of plaintiff during cross examination of DW1, on confrontation. On the other hand, Defendant No.1 is examined as DW-1 and got marked Ex.B-1 to B-5 while Defendant No.2 as DW-2 and got marked Ex.B-6 to B-10.
7.Referring the pleadings and evidence on record, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted oral and so also written arguments. In support of his contention that a minor can not be a partner under Partnership Act, 1932, the learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs.
Dwarakadas Khetan & Co., 1960 SCC OnLine SC 234. In support of his further contention that there is no need for the plaintiff in seeking the relief of declaration, declaring the lease deed as null and void, the learned counsel mainly relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Prem Singh Vs. Birbal, reported in (2206) 5 SCC 353.
8.On the contrary, referring the pleadings and evidence on record, the learned counsel for the Defendants also submitted oral and so also written arguments. Referring to Prem
Singh’s case relied upon by the plaintiff, the learned counsel for the Defendnats submitted that as the Defendants No.3 and 4 being minors, they are represented by their grand father, and therefore, the preposition laid down in Prem Singh’s case does not applicable. In support of his contention that the Section 69 (2) of Partnership Act, 1932 bars suits instituted by an unregistered firm, but does not prohibit such a firm from defending its possession or right under a contract, the learned counsel relied on a judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Raptakos Brett & Co.Ltd., Vs. Ganesh Property, (1988) 7 SCC 184.
9.Contending that the plaintiff sought the relief of eviction, which is available under the Telangana Buildings (lease, rent and eviction) Act, 1960, the learned counsel for the
Defendants relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhulabhai Vs. State of
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Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78. In support of his further contention that the plaintiff did not approach the court with clean hands but suppressed the material facts, and therefore, the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed, the learned counsel relied on a judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1.
10.Heard the arguments on both side and perused the material available on the record.
Issues No.1 and 3:
11.Since both these issues are inter-related with one another, both the issues No.1 and 3 are taken up together for discussion. Before going to delve into the merits of the case as regard to these issues, this court is of the considered view that it is just and necessary to have a look into certain admitted facts. There is no dispute on the fact of the ownership of the plaintiff over the A and B schedule properties by virtue of will deed and that the
Defendant No.1 is her son. There is also no dispute on the fact that the Defendant No.2 is the wife while the Defendant No.3 and 4 are children of the Defendant No.1. Issuing of legal notice and receipt of the said notice is also an admitted fact. Now coming to the fact of the case, the contention of the plaintiff is that as the Defendant No.1 is financially weak, she allowed the Defendant No.1 to stay in A and B schedule properties, however, when the
Defendant No.1 was trying to grab the schedule property, she got issued a legal notice, demanding the Defendants to evict and hand over the possession of the schedule property.
12.On the other hand, while admitting the ownership of the plaintiff over the schedule property, the contention of the Defendants No.1 followed by the Defendants No.2 to 4 is that acting as an agent to the plaintiff under General Power of Attorney, the Defendant No.1 executed a lease deed in favour of the Defendants No.2 to 4 for 30 years, the plaintiff has no right to file the suit for eviction of the Defendants from the suit schedule property. For the said contention of the Defendants, the case of the plaintiff is that the Defendants forged and created the documents only to grab the suit schedule property. From the admitted case of the
Defendants, it can safely be inferred that the plaintiff permitted Defendants to use schedule property and therefore, the suit for eviction is correct remedy for plaintiff in view of the legal notice got issued by plaintiff, demanding the Defendants to vacate the property.
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13.Coming to evidence adduced on both side, reiterating their respective pleadings, the plaintiff made her appearance into the witness box as PW-1 and on the other hand, the
Defendant No.1 and 2 have filed their chief examination affidavits as DW-1 and DW-2.
Both the parties tested the witnesses in cross examination against each other. The saying of
PW-1 that the land ad measuring 1568.78 sq.mts out of total extent of 2145.30 sq.mts was exempted by the Government of AP from the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regularization) Act, 1976 vide G.O.Ms.No.1295, Dated 18-2-2003 as in Ex.A-1 is disputed by the Defendants on the ground that the plaintiff obtained such exemption by indulging in forgery and fabrication of documents pertaining to the Defendant No.1’s medical record.
14.During cross examination, PW-1 admitted that she made an application to the
Government seeking exemption from ULC and on such admission, the said application is marked as Ex.B-1. On questioning that she obtained exemption from ULC by making false allegations on the Defendant No.1 as regard to health, PW-1 denied the same as false.
However, in her further cross examination, PW-1 categorically admitted that the Defendant
No.1 met with a car accident and that she obtained ULC exemption showing the head injury sustained by the Defendant No.1, of course, PW-1 added that she has other financial problems. In view of the afore suggestion, on a perusal of Ex.B-1 on one hand and Ex.A-1 on the other hand, it shows that on a request made by the plaintiff as in Ex.B-1, the
Government considered and exempted the property from ULC as in Ex.A-1 mainly on the ground that the plaintiff wanted to sell the property for the treatment of her son for surgical operation of head injury in Germany and also to meet other financial commitments.
15.In her further cross examination, PW-1 clearly admitted that as on the date of obtaining Ex.A-2 exemption from ULC, she was already remarried to Dr. Abels and that she did not take the Defendant No.1 to Germany for any surgery or treatment and there was no surgery performed in India for the Defendant No.1 and added that it was a very very bad accident. PW-1 denied that it was a casual accident and nothing serious as alleged and that she obtained exemption from ULC on false and fabricated pretenses. From the afore narration of evidence of PW-1 made it clear that having shown health grounds of the
Defendant No.1, the plaintiff must have obtained exemption from ULC. However, the
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addition of PW-1 that she had other financial problems, has also been considered by the
Government and same is evidencing from para 2 of Ex.A-1, G.O.Ms.No.1295, Dated 18-12- 1993. Even though, from the evidence of PW-1, the representation made by plaintiff as in
Ex.B-1 as regard to health of the Defendant No.1 is found to be false, the other ground made by the plaintiff on her other financial problem has been considered and exempted from ULC as in Ex.A-1.
16.Even other wise, the defenses raised by the Defendants that the plaintiff obtained exemption from ULC as in Ex.A-2 on false representation is believed to be true, the same by itself is not a ground to deny the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property in view of clear admitted case of the Defendants as regard to ownership of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property by virtue of will deed executed by the mother of the plaintiff and that apart, it is not the case of the Defendants that they challenged exemption from ULC. Now coming to important aspect of tenancy relationship between the parties, as already observed herein before, the case of the plaintiff is that she permitted the Defendant
No.1 to stay in the suit schedule property and the same can be considered as permissive possession. In spite of the said contention, the Defendants are not denying the same except trying to contend that the plaintiff had obtained exemption as in Ex.A-1 on false representations etc.
17.As per the written statement filed by the Defendant No.1 and followed by the written statement filed by the Defendant No.2 to 4, the pleaded case of the Defendants is that acting as GPA of the plaintiff, the Defendant No.1 executed lease deed in favour of the Defendants
No.2 to 4 for a period of 30 years with effect from 24-08-2012 to 23-08-2042 and therefore, in terms of clause 3 (a) of lease deed, the plaintiff is not entitled to terminate the lease and evict the Defendants from the suit schedule property. However, knowing very well, the plaintiff got issued notice on 09-06-2014 canceling the GPA executed by the plaintiff in favour of the Defendant No.1 on 11-04-2008 and that apart, the plaintiff has not challenged the said lease deed even date and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed.
18.During cross examination, on confrontation of GPA, PW-1 admitted that she had given GPA in favour of the Defendant No.1 and accordingly, the learned Advocate-
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Commissioner shown to be marked the said GPA as Ex.B-2. In fact, no such GPA is came to be filed. However, in further chief examination of DW-1, the said GPA has been marked as
Ex.B-5 and therefore, the GPA hereinafter is referred to as Ex.B-5 instead of Ex.B-2 as marked by the Advocate-Commissioner. Admitting execution of Ex.B-2, PW-1 added that she gave it to the Defendant No.1 because, her building was constructed and since she was away in Germany, the Defendant NO.1 could handle any legal matters for construction of building. Having added so, PW-1 admitted that she could not say as to whether she got issued any legal notice canceling Ex.B-5, GPA executed in favour of the Defendant No.1. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff has not issued any legal notice canceling GPA covered by
Ex.B-5, except issuing legal notice as in Ex.A-2, where-under, she only demanded
Defendant No.1 to vacate the suit schedule property and hand over the possession of the same within 15 days.
19.In view of the admission of PW-1 as regard to cancellation of Ex.B-5, GPA, it can be said that the GPA is still remain in force. During cross examination, stating that Ex.B-5,
GPA authorizes him to deal with flat Nos.301 and 302 i.e., the suit schedule property, DW-1 added that Ex.B-5 authorizes him to deal with flat Nos.201 and 202 also. Further, admitting that Ex.B-5, GPA does not mention the flat Nos.201, 202, 301 and 302, DW-1 added that it is mentioned in Ex.B-5 that the building constructed on plot Nos.88 and 89. The said addition of DW-1, on perusal of Ex.B5, appears to be supported by contents therein.
Referring to para 4 of the written statement filed by Defendant No.1, the case of the
Defendants is that the plaintiff executed GPA as in Ex.B-5 in his favour. In spite of such specific plea, the reasons best know, the plaintiff neither denied nor admitted the same by filing any rejoinder even date, however, putting on questions to DW-1 during cross examination to the effect that as he forged the signatures of witnesses on Ex.B-5, he is not going to examine the as witnesses. Be that as it may, as already observed herein before, PW- 1 clearly admitted the execution of Ex.B-5 and therefore, the question of forging or creating
Ex.B-5, GPA does ot arise at all.
20.However, filing additional written arguments, the learned counsel for the plaintiff tried to contend that the GPA as in Ex.B-5 is unregistered and therefore, the same is legally
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invalid in terms of Section 33 of the Registration Act. On the contrary, relying on the admission of PW-1 as regard to execution of Ex.B-5, GPA, the contention of the learned counsel for the Defendants as per the additional written arguments is that once the execution is admitted, the authority conferred thereunder must be given full legal effect, and that under
Registration Act, 1908 and under Sections 186 and 188 of Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agent acting within the scope of authority conferred by the principal binds the principal and therefore, the contention of the plaintiff is liable to be rejected and Section 33 of the
Registration Act, does not come into play in view of above referred legal provisions. As seen from Ex.B-5, it shows that the Defendant No.1 was authorized to deal with immovable property including creation of interest over subject property as per clause 1, which, in terms of the Registration Act, 1908, Ex.B-5, GPA is a compulsorily registrable document and therefore, upholding the contention of the plaintiff, rejected the contention of the Defendants and hold that as Ex.B-5 is unregistered, the same can not be considered.
21.In view of the discussion made as above, it can be said that without proper authority, the Defendant No.1 might have brought the lease deed into light merely basing on Ex.B-5.
During further chief examination of DW-1, the lease deed is marked as Ex.B-4. No doubt true, as admitted by PW-1 she has not challenged the said lease deed covered by Ex.B-4, however, denied that as Ex.B-4 has not been challenged, the suit is liable to be dismissed.
Having contended that by virtue of Ex.B-5, GPA, he executed Ex.B-4, Lease Deed in respect of the suit schedule property, curiously, in his cross examination, DW-1 stated that the flat Nos.201, 202, 301 and 302 were never leased to any body and are in self occupation.
As per the plaint, flat Nos.301 and 302 are happened to be shown in the schedule as ‘A’ and ‘B’. However, stating that as per Ex.B-4, he leased out four flats to M/s. R.S. Solutions (partnership firm) represented by Defendant No.2 who is his wife and the Defendants No.2, who is his son and the Defendant No.4 who is his daughter, DW-1 denied that as those flats are being used for self occupation, it does not mean that R.S. Solutions is not in existence.
22.In his further cross examination, admitting that presently, the suit schedule flats are being used for residential purpose, DW-1 denied that as the schedule property is being used for residential purpose, R.S. Solutions has no relation with the suit schedule property and
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that with an intention to grab away the schedule property, he has leased out the same to R.S.
Solutions which is a partnership firm being managed by his wife, i.e., Defendant No.2. In her cross examination, DW-2 admitted that basing on Ex.B-5, GPA, the Defendant No.1 executed Ex.B-4, Lease Deed and that she is residing therein using the same for residence as well as for R.S. Solutions business. From the afore evidence of DW-1 and DW-2, made it clear that the Defendants are using the suit schedule property as lessees by virtue of Ex.B-4, which in fact, is undisputedly the property belongs to plaintiff by virute of Ex.A-1. As a matter of fact, it is not the case of the plaintiff that she filed a criminal case against the
Defendant No.1 and 2 alleging that they forged her thumb impression on Ex.A-4, lease deed, however, the plaintiff went on putting questions in cross examination of DW-1 and 2.
23.During cross examination, DW-1 categorically admitted that the plaintiff filed a criminal case in C.C.No.665 of 2016 against him and the Defendant No.2 with respect to thumb impression of the plaintiff being forged on original of Ex.A-4, lease Deed. Admitting so, DW-1 added that the said case is false and that the plaintiff did not disclose the existence of Ex.B-5 in C.C.No.664 of 2016 and that he put his thumb impression on Ex.B-5 on behalf of the plaintiff as GPA holder on form 32(A) annexed to Ex.B-4. On the other hand, DW-2 also admitted in her cross examination that the plaintiff filed a criminal case against herself and the Defendant No.1 alleging that they forged the signatures and thumb impression of the plaintiff and that as GPA to the plaintiff, the Defendant No.1 put his thumb impression on lease deed at form No.32 (A) annexed to lease deed covered by Ex.B-4. As seen form No.32 annexed to Ex.B-4, it shows that as GPA to plaintiff, the Defendant No.1 put his thumb impression and the same is clear admissions of the Defendants No.1 and 2.
24.Having brought the evidence on record in support of her allegation on forgery and creation of her thumb impression and signature on Ex.B-4 in the light of the criminal case in
C.C.No.665 of 2016, the reasons best known the plaintiff neither taken any such plea nor produced any criminal record as to show that basing on her complaint, the competent criminal court convicted the Defendants No.1 and No.2 basing on the material evidence on record. In the absence of any such material, merely referring to a criminal case, the plaintiff can not expect that the Defendants No.1 and 2 forged her signatures and thumb impression.
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That apart, the said evidence brought on record by the plaintiff is beyond the scope of her own pleadings in the plaint, which as per settled law, can not be taken into consideration. Be that as it may, the contention of the Defendants as per written arguments that the police dropped the offense of forgery, having not been denied or admitted, the same is deemed to be admitted and it can be hold that the plea of forgery of the plaintiff is liable to be rejected.
25.By virtue of discussion made above, even though, the plaintiff is found to be failed to prove the allegations made by her as regard to forgery or creation of documents, the plaintiff is found to be proved that the Defendants are in occupation of the suit schedule property as lessees by virtue of in valid Ex.B-4, Lease Deed which is found to be executed by virtue of in validated document as in Ex.B-5, GPA. Referring to clear admissions made by DW-1 and
DW-2 as regard to their possession over the suit schedule property as lessees, their possession can not be treated as legal as Ex.B-4, Lease Deed is found to be not valid document in the eye of law as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in the light of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Preme Singh’s case and therefore, there is no necessity for the plaintiff to seek the relief of declaration against the lease deed.
Therefore, the contention of the Defendants that without the relief of declaration, declaring the lease deed as void, the suit is liable to be dismissed, can not be taken into consideration.
26.By virtue of discussion made as above, it can be said that the plaintiff is found to be proved that she is the owner of the suit schedule property by virtue of Ex.A-1 and on the other hand, without any manner of right and title, the Defendants, legally entered into schedule property, and remained therein illegally simply basing on Ex.B-4, lease deed. As regard to payment of rents, the contention of the plaintiff is that allowing the Defendants to use the suit schedule flats, she lost Rs.80,000/- per month towards rental income. On the contrary, referring to Ex.B-4, Lease Deed, the contention of the Defendants is that having knowledge on execution of lease deed, the plaintiff is receiving annual rents at Rs.10,000/-.
Coming to evidence on record, on a question as to whether she is receiving any amount on monthly or yearly or otherwise in respect of the property under Ex.B-4 to the credit of her bank account, PW-1 answered as ‘NO’ and denied the suggestion that she is deposing false.
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27.Referring to Ex.B-4, Lease Deed, the contention of the Defendant No.1 is that acting as an agent to the plaintiff, he executed the lease deed as in Ex.B-4 in favour of the
Defendants No.2 to 4. In that view of the matter, it is for the Defendants No.2 to 4 to prove that as per the terms of Ex.B-4 they are paying the lease amounts to the plaintiff or credited such rental amount to her bank account. Having made her appearance into witness box as
DW-2, the Defendant No.2 deposed that the plaintiff is receiving annual rental amount of
Rs.10,000/-. In support of the said evidence, DW-2 got marked Ex.B-9, application, Dated 13-06-2025, requesting the Bank authorities to issue statement and Ex.B-8, letter, Dated 13- 06-2025 issued by the Bank Of Baroda and issued bank statements as in Ex.B-6 and B-7. At the time of marking Ex.B-6 and B-7, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that those as statements are computer generated copies and same can not be taken as evidence, was rejected by this court holding that those statements are containing the official signature and seal of the Bank Authorities and having not been challenged, the same became final.
28.During her cross examination, DW-2 categorically admitted that she used to pay the lease amount to the plaintiff by way of cheque deposit through her husband, the Defendant
No.1, and added that at the request of the plaintiff, the Defendant No.1 who is GPA used to deposit the amounts into the account of the plaintiff. DW-1 denied that they have deliberately created a bank account in the name of the plaintiff by misleading her and started depositing into the bank i.e., lease amount. However, DW-2 in clear terms, admitted that she has not filed any document as to show that the plaintiff instructed the Defendant No.1 to receive the lease amount from them and deposit the same into the bank. In her further cross examination, Dated 11-08-2025, DW-2 denied that she has filed Ex.B-8 and 9 to improve her case and that she has not paid the rent amount in respect of the suit schedule property to the plaintiff and that she has not filed any document as to show that she has paid rent upto date. However, DW-2 fairly stated that after 25-02-2018, she is paying the rents through cheque to another account of the plaintiff in R.B.L and that she handed over the cheque to her husband who in turn, used to deposit the cheque into the bank account.
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29.In view of the evidence of DW-2 narrated as above, as seen from Ex.B-6, Bank statement, the entries therein show that on 20-05-2013 an amount of Rs.10,000/- is shown to be deposited to the account of the plaintiff and similar entry is shown on 19-05-2014. As seen Ex.B-7, the entries therein show that on 23-05-2016 an amount of Rs.10,000/- is shown to be deposited to the account of the plaintiff, and similar entry can be seen on 17-05-2017 to the account of the plaintiff which is the account number as per Ex.B-8, letter issued by the Bank of Baroda on 13-06-2025 at the request made by the Defendant No.2 as in Ex.B-9.
The entry, Dated 24-05-2018 shows deposited amount of Rs.10,000/- in the name of the plaintiff. The entry, Dated 15-05-2019 show an amount of Rs. 50,114/-. The entry, Dated 22- 06-2020 show the payment of amount of Rs.10,000/- in the name of the plaintiff. The entry,
Dated 28-07-2021 shows the payment of Rs.10,000/- in the name of the plaintiff. Similar
entry can be seen vide dated 17-05-2022 for Rs.10,000/- in the name of the plaintiff. Similar entries can be seen vide dated 25-07-2023 for Rs.10,000/- and 03-06-024 for Rs.10,000/-.
All the entries in the bank statements covered by Ex.B-6 and 7 appears to be supported by the contention of the Defendants and evidence of DW-2 as regard to the payment of annual lease amounts.
30.By virtue of the evidence of DW-2 in the light of the entries in Ex.B-6 and B-7, it can be said that being the lessees, the Defendant No.2 to 4 through the Defendant No.1 have been paying the annual lease amounts to the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property right from the year 2013 till the years 2024. That being so, it can safely be inferred that the possession of the Defendants over the suit schedule property is not as owners but as lessees and therefore, the plaintiff has a legal right to demand the Defendants to vacate and hand over the suit schedule property as Ex.B-4 is found to be executed basing on a invalid document covered by Ex.B-5, GPA and it is thus, made it clear that the plaintiff has established that there is landlord and tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the
Defendants. As regard to issuing the legal notice, demanding the Defendants from the suit schedule property is concerned, PW-1 stated that in view of the circumstances, she was constrained to issue a legal notice on 28-04-2014, and that having received the same, the
Defendants neither vacated the suit schedule property nor got issued any reply notice.
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31.The evidence of PW-1 as regard to issuing legal notice and receiving the same, is well supported by Ex.A-2, Office Copy of Legal Notice and Ex.A-3, Postal
Acknowledgment. PW-1 stated that in stead of issuing reply or vacate the schedule property, the Defendant No.1 filed caveat petition. On the other hand, the pleaded case of the
Defendant No.1 is that he got issued reply notice on 24-05-2014 to the counsel for the plaintiff, however, the same was returned, and that the said notice and returned postal cover were misplaced and are untraceable and accordingly, reserved his right to file those documents as soon as they are traced. Contrary to the same, DW-1 deposed that he got issued reply on 24-05-2014 to the counsel for the plaintiff and same was returned unserved.
The said evidence of DW-1 appears to be contrary to his own pleadings and therefore, from the afore inconsistency, it can be held that the Defendant No.1 must have taken a formal plea on issuing reply notice. Had really, he got issued reply, certainly, he would have filed the same as pleaded by him. However, from the suggestion given to DW-1 in cross examination that he got issued a reply notice Dated 24-05-2014 with false pretenses, made it clear that the Defendant No.1 proved the fact that he got issued a reply notice to the notice got issued by plaintiff as in Ex.A-2.
32.As a matter of fact, the reasons best known, neither the Defendant No.1 nor the
Defendants No.2 to 4 have tested PW-1 during cross examination about reply notice.
However, from the afore evidence, in the light of Ex.A-2, made it clear that being the lawful owner of the suit schedule property, the plaintiff must have issued Ex.A-2, notice, demanding the Defendant No.1 to vacate and hand over the suit schedule property within the 15 days from the date of receipt of notice. As per PW-1, being the mother, she allowed the Defendant No.1 to use the suit schedule property, and therefore, natural, the question of existence of lease agreement or deed does not arise. However, it is a settled law that in the absence of contract or local law or usage to the contract, lease of immovable property for the purposes other than agricultural or manufacturing, shall be deemed to be lease from month to month, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by issuance of 15 days’ notice and in terms of Section 106 of T.P. Act, a landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy by giving a 15 days’ notice, and on expiry thereof, the proceedings could be initiated.
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33.In the facts and circumstance of the present case, the tenancy is deemed to be month to month. This is, in view of the evidence adduced by both the parties and the same would lead to an inference that the plaintiff is well entitled to terminate the tenancy by issuing a quit notice of 15 days as in Ex.A-2. The quit notice as in Ex.A-2 was issued on 28-04-2014 and the Defendant No.1 got issued reply notice on 24-05-2014, and as the Defendants failed to vacate and hand over the suit schedule property, the plaintiff filed the suit on 19-06-2014.
From the afore material, it can be said that more than 30 days notice was issued and it is thus, the notice issued under Ex.A-2 is in accordance with Section 106 of T.P. Act and the plaintiff validly determined the lease. Once the lease was determined, the Defendants as tenants or lessees even as per the case of the Defendants in the light of Ex.B-6 and 7, the
Defendants will not be allowed to squat on the schedule property and therefore, it can be said that the lease was validly determined, for which, defendants are liable to be evicted.
34.As per the material available on record, it appears that the plaintiff on one hand and the Defendants on the other hand made allegations against each other as regard to the harassment. According to PW-1, making false allegations against her, the Defendant No.1 sent a mail to her husband at Germany and thereby defaming her reputation, and that when she went to B-schedule property to enquire into the illegal acts, the Defendant No.1 threatened her and demanded to transfer the suit schedule property in his name, else he would write letters/complaint to the various authorities and German Embassy. On the other hand, denying the said evidence of PW-1, the Defendants tested PW-1 in cross examination by giving a simple suggestion that there is no harassment from the Defendants. As a matter of fact, having made gravamen allegations that the Defendants harassed her, the reasons best know, the plaintiff has not adduced any evidences in support of her case, and therefore, referring to the suggestion given to PW-1, it must be held that the plaintiff might have made certain unfounded allegations for the purpose of the case, as contended by the Defendants.
35.However, one way or the other, by testing DW-2 in cross examination, the plaintiff tried to establish somewhat that she was being harassed by the Defendants. During cross examination, DW-2 categorically admitted that she has not filed any criminal case against the plaintiff and that she has sent a legal notice to the plaintiff regarding domestic violence,
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and that she has sent the legal notice, Dated 09-06-2014 to her sister-in-law and her husband. On confronting the said legal notice, DW-2 admitted the same and is marked as
Ex.A-5. In view of the afore clear admissions, the suggestion given to DW-2 that as she always hated her mother-in-law, herself and her husband created the lease deed to grab the property, can be considered and can be held that the plaintiff was being harassed by the
Defendants and on the other hand, the Defendants are found to be failed to prove their case on harassment. Whatever the result it may be as regard to the allegations on the harassment, being the lawful owner, the plaintiff is entitled to demand the Defendants to vacate the property.
36.From the discussion made as above, even though, the plaintiff is found to be established her lawful right over the suit schedule property, the Defendants tried their best to establish that the plaintiff is having handful income by testing PW-1 in cross examination, however, beyond the scope of their own pleadings taken in the written statement filed by them. Reverting back to cross examination, PW-1 admitted that after divorce from the father of the Defendant No.1, she had re-married a professor, namely, Dr. Abels, and that under she has separated from Dr. Abels under a separate agreement, and that she is receiving periodical amounts from Dr. Abels, however, she does not want to answer to a question as to how much amount she is receiving from the said Dr. Abels. One a question that she is receiving Rs.1,00,000/- from Dr. Abels, and therefore, she does not want to produce the documents, PW-1 answered that it is not like that. However, on the very next question, PW- 1 clearly admitted that she is receiving 1,100 Euros monthly from Dr. Abels. On one another question as to whether she is the beneficiary of Dr. Abels, PW-1 answered that she is not beneficiary for the LIC policy of the Dr. Abels, and that she is entitled to get partly medical benefits.
37.During further cross examination, on a question as to whether she was receiving rent from a company by name Righ Agros, PW-1 answered that she does not know whether she received income from JCSS Consulting Pvt.Ltd, however, recollecting stated that she used to receive. Admitting that she received amounts from Mussadilal Constructions for land lease, PW-1 stated that she does not remember as to whether the said amount is of
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Rs.28,00,000/-. As a matter of fact, it is not the pleaded case of neither the Defendant No.1 nor the Defendants No.2 to 4 that the plaintiff leased out the property to Mussadilal
Construction, however, by virtue of orders in I.A.No.1100 of 2025, Dated 08-09-2025, DW- 2 got marked the certified copy of lease deed vide Doc.No.92 of 2008, Dated 04-01-2008, as
Ex.B-10. By virtue of the subsequent efforts made by DW-2 in getting Ex.B-10 marked, the admissions elicited from PW-1 as regard to financial capacity of the plaintiff, appears to be watered down in view of the clear admissions made by DW-2 in the light of Ex.B-10, Lease
Deed.
38.Looking into Ex.B-10, DW-2 categorically admitted that Ex.B-10 is between the plaintiff and Musaddilal Constructions and Real Estate Pvt Limited and that she has gone through Ex.B-10 when she submitted into the court. Looking into page 3 at para 3 of Ex.B- 10, DW-2 further admitted that it is mentioned in Ex.B-10 that the plaintiff is not in a financial position and therefore, approached the lessee as in Ex.B-10 to build a multi storied building at their own costs in consideration of granting lease for a period of 99 years. From the afore elicitation, made it clear that as on the date of Ex.B-10 i.e., 04-01-2008, the financial capacity of the plaintiff may not be in sound financial position and therefore, she must have been forced to execute Ex.B-10 whereas according to an answer given by PW-1 during cross examination, she was married Dr. Abels in the year 1983. In view of the same, had really PW-1 got sufficient income by way of rents and also from her husband, Dr. Abels, even is taken into consideration, there is no necessary for the plaintiff to execute Ex.B-10.
In view of the afore discussion, it can be said that all the attempts made by the Defendants in projecting the plaintiff as a women of sufficient income sources, can not be considered.
39.The case of the plaintiff and the evidence of PW-1 is that as she has no money to develop the property, covered by Ex.A-1 was entrusted to Musaddilal Construction & Real
Estate Pvt. Ltd for development of the property, and got constructed a building known as “MOKSHA”. The said evidence of PW-1 is well supported by clear admission of DW-2 in the light of Ex.B-10. PW-1 further deposed that she retained four flats for her personal use and remaining flats have been leased out to the Developer for 99 years and same is well supported by evidence of DW-1 and DW-1 in the light of Ex.B-10 and so also Ex.B-4.
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According to the said evidence, the plaintiff was allotted four flats vide flat bearing Nos.
201,, 202, 301 and 302 of second floor. From the evidence narrated as above, once again made it clear that there is no dispute on the fact that the plaintiff is the owner and possessor of the suit schedule flats and so also flat Nos.201 and 202 of second floor. The fact that the plaintiff is residing in flat No.201 and leased out flat No.202 is well supported by clear admissions of DW-1 on one hand and DW-2 on the other, during their cross examination.
40.In spite of the material evidence on record as discussed above, the Defendants are trying to contend that as the plaintiff has suppressed the fact of her financial condition and has not approached the court with clean hands, the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed in the light of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya
Naidu Vs Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1. The plaintiff filed the suit for eviction of the
Defendants from the suit schedule property and as already observed herein before, she has proved her case even in the light of the clear admissions of DW-1 and DW-2 during cross examination in the light of recitals as contained in Ex.B-4 and B-10. Therefore, the judgment in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu’s case relied upon by the learned counsel for the
Defendants is distinguishable from the fact and circumstances of the present case at hand.
One another contention raised by the learned counsel in the light of judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dhulabhai Vs State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78 is that the plaintiff seeks eviction, which is governed by Telangana Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction)
Control Act, 1960 and therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain suit.
41.Referring to Ex.B-4, Lease Deed, the case of the Defendant No.2 to 4 and evidence of DW-2 is that basing on the lease deed executed by the Defendant No.1 as GPA of the
Plaintiff as in Ex.B-5, she is depositing the lease amount of Rs.10,000/- per annum as evidencing by entries in Ex.B-6 and B-7, Bank Statements. On the other hand, in her cross examination, PW-1 denied receipt of the said lease amount, and also hurled a suggestion to
DW-2 in cross examination that for the purpose of the suit, they created Ex.B-6 and B-7. As already observed herein before, the Defendant No.1 is found to be executed Ex.B-4, lease deed basing on in valid GPA as in Ex.B-5 and therefore, basing on such in valid document, the contention of the Defendants that basing on Ex.B-4, the Defendants No.2 to 4 are
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deposing the amounts by itself is not sufficient for them to contend that the suit is governed by the Telangana Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 and therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the suit filed by the plaintiff is not based on the specified grounds of the Rent Control Act, but based on the ground that the Defendants created and forged the lease deed for running an unregistered partnership firm. From the afore facts of the case, therefore, the judgment in Dhulabhai’s case relied upon by the
Defendants is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case.
42.Referring to the clear admissions of DW-2 that the R.S. Solutions is an un-registered partnership firm, the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff in the light of Section 69(2) of Partnership Act, is that as firm is an un-registered, the same can not enter into a lease and therefore, the un-registered firm can not set up the lease deed as a defense.
Relying on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax,
Bombay Vs. Dwarakadas Khetan & Co., 1960 SCC OnLine SC 234, the further contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff in the light of clear admissions of DW-2 is that as the
Defendants No.3 and 4 are admittedly minors, they can not became partners and that apart, the Defendant have not filed any partnership deed and therefore, the R.S. Solutions, is a fictitious entry and therefore, the partnership deed allegedly entered into is void ab intio. On the contrary, relying on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raptakos Brett & Co.
Ltd Vs Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184, the contention of the learned counsel for the
Defendants is that the Section 69 (2) of Partnership Act, 1932 bars suit instituted by an un- registered firm to enforce the contractual rights, but does not prohibit such an unregistered firm from defending its possession or rights under the Contract. By virtue of the discussion made as above, when the every lease deed as in Ex.B-4 is found to be invalid document, the contention raised by both the parties can not be taken into consideration and more over, the said rival contentions appears to be traveled beyond scope of pleadings.
43.As regard to harassment on attempting to cut the water supply and electricity etc.,
PW-1 stated that in order to harass her, the Defendants No.1 and 2 attempting to cut her water supply and electricity supply and also deprive her of use of the lift and same is not only illegal but also inhuman. On the other hand, the Defendant not only denied the said
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allegations but also questioned PW-1 in cross examination. As has already observed herein
before, during cross examination, both DW-1 and DW-2 categorically admitted that the
plaintiff is residing in flat No.201. During cross examination, adding that she is not allowed to go up-stairs and that the Defendant No.1 cut off her water connection and lift for two and half years, looking into her chief examination affidavit, PW-1 categorically admitted she has not mentioned the said allegations and also admitted that she has report to the police. From the afore clear admissions, made it clear that PW-1 must have made unfounded allegations to get the sympathy from the court, as rightly contended by the Defendants. However, the allegations are found to be false, by virtue of discussion made as above, the plaintiff is able to demonstrate her legal right over the suit schedule property and made her attempts to get the Defendants vacated from the property by issuing Ex.A-2, legal notice. Therefore, issues
No.1 and 3 are answered in favour of the plaintiff and against Defendants.
Issue No.2:
44.From the discussion made as above and findings arrived thereat in respect of issue
No.1 and 3, it must be held that as the plaintiff is found to be owner of the suit schedule property and the Defendants are found to be in un-authorised possession basing on an invalid lease deed, and therefore, certainly, the Defendants are liable to pay certain amounts for un-authorised use of the suit schedule property, however, the plaintiff failed to prove as to what was agreed rental value for the suit schedule property and what was the damage caused to the suit schedule property, except contending that she is entitled for Rs.80,000/- per month towards rents. For the afore reasons, the plaintiff is given liberty to file a separate petition for claiming mesne profits or future rents. Accordingly, this court answered the issue No.2 in favour of the plaintiff and against the Defendants No.1 to 4.
Issue No.4:
45.Referring to discussion made as above and findings arrived thereat in respect of issue
No.1 and 3, it must be held that basing on oral evidence of PW-1 and documentary evidence, Ex.A-1 to A-5, the plaintiff is found to be established her case. For the afore discussion, this court is of opinion that plaintiff is entitled for a decree of eviction.
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46.In the result, the suit is decreed with costs, directing the Defendants No.1 to 4 to vacate and hand over the suit schedule property to the plaintiff within (2) months from the date of this judgment. The plaintiff is at liberty to file a separate petition to claim mesne profits.
Typed to my dictation by the Stenographer Grade-I, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court, this the 23rd day of April, 2026.
Sd/-
XXV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE:
Witnesses Examined
For the plaintiff: For the defendants:
PW1: Anugita Abels DW1: Sumeet Gunit DW2: Tarandeep Gunti Documents marked for the plaintiff:
Ex.A1 is the true copy of GO Ms.No.1295 dt.18-12-1993 Ex.A2 is the office copy of legal notice dt.28-04-2014 Ex.A3 is the original postal acknowledgment Ex.A4 is the certified copy of market value assistance Ex.A5 is the legal notice dt.09-06-2014 issued by DW2
Documents marked for the defendants: Ex.B1 is the office copy of petition submitted by plaintiff to Principal Secretary to Government under para (5) of GO Ms.No.925 dt.15-09-1989 Ex.B2 is original passport of DW1 issued in 1988 Ex.B3 is original passport of DW1 issued in 2006 Ex.B4 is certified copy of lease deed dt.24-08-2012 Ex.B5 is General Power of Attorney dt.11-04-2008 Ex.B6 is the bank statement issue by Bank of Baroda from 01-04-2012 to 31-03-2015 Ex.B7 is the bank statement issued by Bank of Baroda from 29-01-2015 to 02-01-2025 Ex.B8 is the letter dt.13-06-2025 issued by Bank of Baroda Ex.B9 is the application dt.13-06-2025 submitted by DW2 Ex.B10 is the CC of registered lease deed doc.No.92/2008 dt.04-01-2008
Sd/-
XXV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.