Smt. Vempati Aparna
XXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE
HYD, City Civil Court Complex · Hyderabad · Telangana
Based on 14 recent ordersSMT. VEMPATI APARNA, XXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE, is posted at HYD, City Civil Court Complex, Hyderabad, Telangana, India. 14 court orders on record since 2026. 4 judgments with full text available. Primarily handles MVOP, OS, EP cases.
Featured Judgments
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IN THE COURT OF THE XXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE,
CITY CIVIL COURT: HYDERABAD
Tuesday, the 05th day of May, 2026
PRESENT: SMT. VEMPATI APARNA
XXVI Additional Chief Judge
A.R.B.O.P.No.26 of 2021 in Arbitration Case No. 368 of 2020
Between: 1.SRINIVAS THUMU, S/0. Sri T. Venkat Rao, Aged about: 40 years, R/o. H. No. 12-1-61, Moosapet, Hyderabad.
2. T. RAJNINI, W/o. S: Srinivas Thumu, Aged about: 36 years, R/o. H. No. 12-1-61, Moosapet, Hyderabad.
3. T. KAMALAMMA, W/o. sri. T. Venkat Rao, Aged about: 59 years, R/o. H. No. 12-1-61, Moosapet, Hyderabad.
....Petitioners/Respondent No.1 to 3
A N D
1. M/s Shriram City Union Finance Limited, having its registered office at No. 123, Angappa Naiken Street, Chennai. Administrative office at 3-6-478, 4th floor, Anand estates, Liberty Road, Himayath Nagar, Hyderabad Branch at Maarredpally, Secunderabad. Rep by its GPA Holder. … Respondent/Claimant
2. Sri. T. Sundara Ramaiah, Arbitrator, D.No.1-1-300/B, 1st Floor, Ashok Nagar Main Road, Above Canara Bank, Ashok Nagar, Hyderabad-500 020. … Respondent/Arbitrator
3. Sri B. Srinivas, S/o. Venkateswara Rao, Aged about 31 years, R/o. H. No. 8-4-372/131, Saibaba Nagar, Borabanda, Hyderabad-500 018.
... Respondent/respondent No.4
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This petition came before me for final hearing in the presence of Sri Moola Murali Mohan, Learned for the Petitioner; Sri M.S.Sastry, Learned counsel for respondent No.1; respondent No.2 remained exparte; and upon hearing and on perusing the material on record and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court passed the following:-
ORDER
1.This is a petition by the petitioners to set aside the
Award passed by the Learned Arbitrator in Arbitration
Case No.368 of 2020 d.23.01.2021.
2.As can be seen from the Arbitration award the
Arbitrator was unilaterally appointed by the respondent
No.1 which is held to be bad in law by the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi in Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v Narendra
Kumar Prajapat [2023 SCC Online Del 3148]. Therefore the matter was posted for hearing of respondent who failed to appear and remained exparte before this court.
3.Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Kotak Mahindra Bank
Limited v Narendra Kumar Prajapat was considering an appeal against the order of the Commercial Court dismissing the
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3 of 26 Execution petition filed for enforcing an Arbitration Award passed by an Arbitrator unilaterally appointed by the
Respondent No.1. Hon’ble High Court found the appointment to be in contravention of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TRF Limited v. Energo
Engineering Projects Limited [(2017) 8 SCC 377], Perkins
Eastman Architects DPC v HSCC (India) Limited [(2020) 20 SCC 760]. Hon’ble High Court further held as follows:
“6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant does not seriously dispute that the arbitrator unilaterally appointed by the claimant was ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator by virtue of Section 12(5) of the Act. He has largely focused his contentions on assailing the decision of the learned Commercial Court to award costs. It was also contended that the respondent was aware of the appointment of the arbitrator and had not raised any objection to such appointment; therefore the respondent is now precluded from challenging the impugned award.
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7.We find little merit in the aforesaid contentions. The proviso to Section 12(5) of the A&C Act is unambiguous. A party can waive its right to object to the ineligibility of an arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the A&C Act but the same is subject to two conditions. First, that the waiver is required to be by and done by an express agreement in writing; and second, that such agreement is entered into after the disputes have arisen. Unless both the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, there can be no waiver of the ineligibility of an arbitrator.
8. In Bharat Broadband Network Limited v.
United Telecoms Limited, (2019) 5 SCC 755, the Supreme Court had authoritatively held that waiver of a right to object to ineligibility of an arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the A&C Act cannot be inferred by conduct of a party. Such waiver can only be by an express agreement in writing.
The Court had also clarified that “the expression ‘express agreement in writing’ refers to an agreement made in words as opposed to
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9. In view of the above, the failure, if any, on the part of the petitioners to object to the unilateral appointment of the sole arbitrator, cannot be construed as waiver of his right under Section 12(5) of the A&C
Act.
10. The award rendered by an arbitrator who is ineligible to be appointed as such cannot be enforced.
11. In HRD Corporation v. GAIL (India) Ltd., (2018) 12 SCC 471, the Supreme Court held as under:
“Since ineligibility goes to the root of theappointment,Section 12(5)read with the Seventh
Schedule makes it clear that if the arbitrator falls in any one of the categories specified in the
Seventh Schedule, he becomes “ineligible” to act as arbitrator.
Once he becomes ineligible, it is clear that, under Section 14(1)(a), he then becomes de jure unable
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Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13.
Since such a person would lack inherent jurisdiction to proceed any further, an application may be filed under Section 14(2) to the
Court to decide on the termination of his/her mandate on this ground.” [emphasis added]
12. In Govind Singh v. Satya Group Pvt. Ltd. :
2023/DHC/000081 this court held as under:
“In view of the above, the remaining question to be addressed is whether an arbitral award rendered by a person who is ineligible to act as an arbitrator is valid or binding on the parties.
Clearly, the answer must be in the negative. The arbitral award
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13. The Learned Commercial Court has held that an award rendered by a person who is ineligible to act as an Arbitrator by virtue of the provisions of Section 12(5) of the A & C Act is a nullity and, therefore, cannot be enforced. It has accordingly dismissed the enforcement petition under
Section 36 of the A&C Act with the cost quantified as Rs. 25,000/-.
14. This Court finds no infirmity with the aforesaid view. A person who is ineligible to act an Arbitrator, lacks the inherent
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A&C Act. It is trite law that a decision, by any authority, which lacks inherent jurisdiction to make such a decision, cannot be considered as valid. Thus, clearly, such an impugned award cannot be enforced.”
4.The judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in
Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v Narendra Kumar Prajapat was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil)
Diary No. 47322/2023 Dt.12.12.2023. Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as follows:
“Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner.
Delay condoned.
From paragraph 6 of the impugned order, it appears to be an admitted position that the Arbitrator unilaterally appointed by the petitioner was ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator by virtue of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Hence, in view of this peculiar factual position, no case for interference is made out in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.
Pending Application also stands disposed of.”
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5.Thus, the appeal filed by the Kotak Mahindra Bank
Limited was also rejected and the judgment of the Hon’ble
High Court was confirmed. In the circumstances the award rendered by an arbitrator who is ineligible to be appointed as such cannot be enforced.
6.Thus, the illegality in the appointment of the
Arbitrator goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the
Arbitrator and the award rendered by such an Arbitration
Tribunal which lacks jurisdiction is also invalid and cannot be executed. The power of the Court to examine the validity of the award is admittedly very narrow. But the court does have the power to examine whether the award is a nullity in the eye of the law.
7.Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunder Dass v Ram
Prakash [AIR 1977 SC 1201] held as follows:
“3. Now, the law is well settled that an executing court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for
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10 of 26 lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an executionproceeding.Wherethereis lackof inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all. Vide
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340:(1955)1SCR 117] andSeth
Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath [AIR 1962 SC 199 : (1962) 2 SCR 747] . It is, therefore, obvious that in the present case, it was competent to the executing court to examine whether the decree for eviction
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Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust,
Jodhpur v Gokul Narain [(1996) 4 SCC 178] held as follows:
“15. The question then is: whether the objections can be raised in execution? This controversy is no longer res integra. In
Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra [(1990) 1 SCC 193] a three-Judge Bench of this Court was to consider whether the nullity of a decree can be raised in execution. Under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973) the building was governed by the provisions of the said Act. The civil court granted decree of eviction. When objection was raised in execution the executing court rejected the same. On appeal, this Court had held that a decree
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12 of 26 passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject-matter or on any other ground which goes to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction, is a nullity. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party.
If the court has jurisdiction but there is any defect in its exercise of jurisdiction it does not go to the root of its authority. Such a defect like territorial jurisdiction could be waived by the party which could be corrected only by way of an appeal or revision. In that case it was held that since the decree was a nullity the validity was upheld in execution.”
8.The law relating to appointment of Arbitrator changed after the 2015 amendment to the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 introduced Section 12 (5). Hon’ble
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Limited [(2017) 8 SCC 377] held as follows:
“12. Sub-section (5) of Section 12, on which immense stress has been laid by the learned counsel for the appellant, as has been reproduced above, commences with a non obstante clause. It categorically lays down that if a person whose relationship with the parties or the counsel or the subject-matter of dispute falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh
Schedule, he shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. There is a qualifier which indicates that parties may, subsequent to the disputes arisen between them, waive the applicability by express agreement in writing. The qualifier finds place in the proviso appended to sub- section (5) of Section 12. On a careful scrutiny of the proviso, it is discernible that therearefundamentallythree components, namely, the parties can waive the applicability of the sub- section; the said waiver can only take place subsequent to dispute having arisen
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53. The aforesaid authorities have been commended to us to establish the proposition that if the nomination of an arbitrator by an ineligible arbitrator is allowed, it would tantamount to carrying on the proceeding of arbitration by himself.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, ineligibility strikes at the root of his power to arbitrate or get it arbitrated upon by a nominee.
54. In such a context, the fulcrum of the controversy would be, can an ineligible arbitrator, like the Managing Director, nominate an arbitrator, who may be otherwise eligible and a respectable person. As stated earlier, we are neither concerned with the objectivity nor the individual respectability. We are only concerned with the authority or the power of the
Managing Director. By our analysis, we are obligated to arrive at the conclusion that once the arbitrator has become ineligible by operation of law, he cannot nominate another as an arbitrator. The arbitrator becomes ineligible as per prescription contained in Section 12(5) of the Act. It is inconceivable in law that
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15 of 26 person who is statutorily ineligible can nominate a person. Needless to say, once the infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse. One cannot have a building without the plinth. Or to put it differently, once the identity of the Managing Director as the sole arbitrator is lost, the power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator is obliterated. Therefore, the view expressed by the High Court is not sustainable and we say so.
55.Another facet needs to be addressed.
The Designated Judge in a cryptic manner has ruled after noting that the petitioner therein had no reservation for nomination of the nominated arbitrator and further taking note of the fact that there has been a disclosure, that he has exercised the power under Section 11(6) of the Act.
We are impelled to think that that is not the right procedure to be adopted and, therefore, we are unable to agree with the High
Court on that score also and, accordingly, we set aside the order appointing the arbitrator. However, as Clause (c) is independent of Clause (d), the arbitration clause survives and hence, the Court can appoint an arbitrator taking into consideration all the aspects. Therefore, we remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the prayer relating to appointment of an arbitrator.”
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9.Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman
Architects DPC v HSCC (India) Limited [(2020) 20 SCC 760] held:
“19. It was thus held that as the Managing
Director became ineligible by operation of law to act as an arbitrator, he could not nominate another person to act as an arbitrator and that once the identity of the Managing Director as the sole arbitrator was lost, the power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator was also obliterated. The relevant clause in said case had nominated the Managing
Director himself to be the sole arbitrator and also empowered said Managing
Director to nominate another person to act as an arbitrator. The Managing
Director thus had two capacities under said clause, the first as an arbitrator and the second as an appointing authority. In the present case we are concerned with only one capacity of the Chairman and
Managing Director and that is as an appointing authority.
20.We thus have two categories of
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17 of 26 cases. The first, similar to the one dealt with in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg.
Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4
SCC (Civ) 72] where the
Managing Director himself is named as an arbitrator with an additional power to appoint any other person as an arbitrator. In the second category, the
Managing Director is not to act as an arbitrator himself but is empowered or authorised to appoint any other person of his choice or discretion as an arbitrator.
If, in the first category of cases, the
ManagingDirectorwasfound incompetent, it was because of the interest that he would be said to be having in the outcome or result of the dispute. The element of invalidity would thus be directly relatable to and arise from the interest that he would be having in such outcome or decision. If that be the test, similar invalidity would always arise and spring even in the second category of cases. If the interest that he has in the outcome of the dispute, is taken to be the basis for the possibility of
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18 of 26 bias, it will always be present irrespective of whether the matter stands under the first or second category of cases. We are conscious that if such deduction is drawn from the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo
Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 :
(2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] , all cases having clauses similar to that with which we are presently concerned, a party to the agreement would be disentitled to make any appointment of an arbitrator on its own and it would always be available to argue that a party or an official or an authority having interest in the dispute would be disentitled to make appointment of an arbitrator.
21.But, in our view that has to be the logical deduction from TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd.
v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] Para 50 of the decision shows that this Court was concerned with the issue, “whether the
Managing Director, after becoming
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19 of 26 ineligible by operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate an arbitrator” The ineligibility referred to therein, was as a result of operation of law, in that a person having an interest in the dispute or in the outcome or decision thereof, must not only be ineligible to act as an arbitrator but must also not be eligible to appoint anyone else as an arbitrator and that such person cannot and should not have any role in charting out any course to the dispute resolution by having the power to appoint an arbitrator. The next sentences in the paragraph, further show that cases where both the parties could nominate respective arbitrators of their choice were found to be completely a different situation. The reason is clear that whatever advantage a party may derive by nominating an arbitrator of its choice would get counter-balanced by equal power with the other party. But, in a case where only one party has a right to appoint a sole arbitrator, its choice will always have an element of exclusivity in determining or charting the course for dispute resolution. Naturally, the person who has an interest in the outcome or decision of the dispute must not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator. That has to be taken as the essence of the amendments brought in by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016) and recognised by the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v.
Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72]”
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10.Thus as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court unilateral appointment of Arbitrator is not permissible even if the same is incorporated in the agreement between the parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lombardi Engineering
Limted v Uttarakhand Jal Vidut Nigam Limted [2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1422] was considering an application under Section
11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The contract between the parties stipulated that the disputes arising under the agreement shall be referred to arbitration and the contractor shall have to deposit 7% of the claim and that for a claim amount of more than 10 crore rupees the case shall be referred to a sole arbitrator appointed by the Principal Secretary/Secretary (Irrigation),
Government of Uttarakhand. With regard to the validity of the arbitration clause concerning the appointment of
Arbitrator the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“86. The issue as regards, the validity of arbitration clause empowering the
Principal Secretary/Secretary (Irrigation),
Government of Uttarakhand to appoint
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Eastman (supra):
87. If circumstances exist giving rise to justifiabledoubtsastothe independence and impartiality of the person nominated or if other circumstances warrant appointment of an independent arbitrator by ignoring the procedure prescribed, the Chief
Justice or his designate may, for reasons to be recorded ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint someone else.
[See : IOC v. Raja Transport Pvt. Ltd, (2009)8SCC520].
…
102. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached to the conclusion that we should ignore the two conditions contained in Clause 55 of the GCC, one relating to 7% deposit of the total amount claimed and the second one relating to the stipulation empowering the Principal Secretary (Irrigation)
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22 of 26 Government of Uttarakhand to appoint a sole arbitrator and proceed to appoint an independent arbitrator.”
11.Therefore, under Section 12 (5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and according the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Arbitration
Clause in the terms and conditions of the agreement between the Decree Holder and the Judgment Debtors is invalid and illegal. The appointment of Arbitrator pursuant to the said clause is also illegal. The Arbitrator so appointed dose not have inherent jurisdiction to try the claim. The award rendered by such Arbitrator is illegal, nonest and null and void in the eye of law.
12.This issue was considered by the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. S.M.Thangaraj and others [CRP No.5197/2024 dated 27.01.2025] and the
Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in Kotak Mahindra Bank
Limited Vs.Shalibhadra Cottrade Private Limited [E.P.No.193/2019
dated 02.07.2024], Bhawarlal Bhandari Vs. Universal Heavy
Mechanical Lifting Enterprises [1999(1) SCC 558 and Satish
Karthikeyan Vs. Axis Bank Limited [CRP (NPD) No.3808 of 2023
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dated 13.11.2024].InKotak Mahindra Bank Limited
Vs.Shalibhadra Cottrade Private Limited [E.P.No.193/2019 dated 02.07.2024] the petitioner therein had placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Kotak
Mahindra Bank Limited Vs. Narendra Kumar Prajapat [2023 SCC
OnLine Del 3148]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in
Narendra Kumar Prajapat. The Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta did not refer to the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court, even though it was cited before the Hon’ble High
Court. Further, the Hon’ble High Court in Shalibhadra
Cottrade Private Limited case had held that Hon’ble High
Court of Calcutta in Cholamandalam Investment and Finance
Company Ltd. vs. Amrapali Enterprises and Another [2023 SCC
OnLine Cal 605] had followed the judgment of the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi in Narendra Kumar Prajapat case and held that the award is invalid. In the circumstances, there is a difference of opinion in the judgments of the Hon’ble
High Court of Calcutta on this aspect. In view of this, with
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High Court of Delhi in Narendra Kumar Prajapat case, which was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has to be followed. The judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Narendra Kumar Prajapat case was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in
M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. S.M.Thangaraj and others [CRP No.5197/2024 dated 27.01.2025].
13.For all these reasons, with great respect and humility, the judgmentinNarendra Kumar Prajapatcase appliesandthe judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of
Madras in M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited case does not apply in the facts and circumstances of this case.
14.The Hon’ble Supreme court in Central Organization for
Railway Electrification Vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV), a Joint
Venture Company [2024 (6) CTC 495], was pleased to hold that unilateral appointment for public-private contracts are in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and the principle of express waiver contained under the proviso to
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Supreme Court however held that as a uniform rule it cannot be held that all such unilateral appointments are invalid and it has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the given contract.
15.In the present case, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has considered the contractual clauses similar to the agreement between the Decree Holder and the Judgment
Debtors and held the said clauses to be in violation of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court and declared the said unilateral appointment to be invalid. The said view was also confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the circumstances, the award in the present case suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction, since the appointment of Arbitrator itself is bad in law.
16.As discussed above when the decree is null and non est in the eye of the law since the Court which passed the decree does not have jurisdiction to pass such decree, the execution court can refuse execution of the decree. In the
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26 of 26 present case since the award is non est and void in the eye of law as the Arbitrator who passed the award lacked jurisdiction to pass the award as such, the above case is not maintainable.
17.In the result, the petition is allowed by setting aside the Award passed in Arbitration Case No. 368 of 2020, dt.23.01.2021.
Typed to my dictation by the Stenographer Grade-I, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court on this the 5 th day of May, 2026.
Sd/-
XXVI ADDL. CHIEF JUDGE
CITY CIVIL COURTS, HYDERABAD.
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IN THE COURT OF THE XXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE,
CITY CIVIL COURT: HYDERABAD
Tuesday, the 05th day of May, 2026
PRESENT: SMT. VEMPATI APARNA
XXVI Additional Chief Judge
A.R.B.O.P.No.26 of 2021 in Arbitration Case No. 368 of 2020
Between: 1.SRINIVAS THUMU, S/0. Sri T. Venkat Rao, Aged about: 40 years, R/o. H. No. 12-1-61, Moosapet, Hyderabad.
2. T. RAJNINI, W/o. S: Srinivas Thumu, Aged about: 36 years, R/o. H. No. 12-1-61, Moosapet, Hyderabad.
3. T. KAMALAMMA, W/o. sri. T. Venkat Rao, Aged about: 59 years, R/o. H. No. 12-1-61, Moosapet, Hyderabad.
....Petitioners/Respondent No.1 to 3
A N D
1. M/s Shriram City Union Finance Limited, having its registered office at No. 123, Angappa Naiken Street, Chennai. Administrative office at 3-6-478, 4th floor, Anand estates, Liberty Road, Himayath Nagar, Hyderabad Branch at Maarredpally, Secunderabad. Rep by its GPA Holder. … Respondent/Claimant
2. Sri. T. Sundara Ramaiah, Arbitrator, D.No.1-1-300/B, 1st Floor, Ashok Nagar Main Road, Above Canara Bank, Ashok Nagar, Hyderabad-500 020. … Respondent/Arbitrator
3. Sri B. Srinivas, S/o. Venkateswara Rao, Aged about 31 years, R/o. H. No. 8-4-372/131, Saibaba Nagar, Borabanda, Hyderabad-500 018.
... Respondent/respondent No.4
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This petition came before me for final hearing in the presence of Sri Moola Murali Mohan, Learned for the Petitioner; Sri M.S.Sastry, Learned counsel for respondent No.1; respondent No.2 remained exparte; and upon hearing and on perusing the material on record and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court passed the following:-
ORDER
1.This is a petition by the petitioners to set aside the
Award passed by the Learned Arbitrator in Arbitration
Case No.368 of 2020 d.23.01.2021.
2.As can be seen from the Arbitration award the
Arbitrator was unilaterally appointed by the respondent
No.1 which is held to be bad in law by the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi in Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v Narendra
Kumar Prajapat [2023 SCC Online Del 3148]. Therefore the matter was posted for hearing of respondent who failed to appear and remained exparte before this court.
3.Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Kotak Mahindra Bank
Limited v Narendra Kumar Prajapat was considering an appeal against the order of the Commercial Court dismissing the
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3 of 26 Execution petition filed for enforcing an Arbitration Award passed by an Arbitrator unilaterally appointed by the
Respondent No.1. Hon’ble High Court found the appointment to be in contravention of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TRF Limited v. Energo
Engineering Projects Limited [(2017) 8 SCC 377], Perkins
Eastman Architects DPC v HSCC (India) Limited [(2020) 20 SCC 760]. Hon’ble High Court further held as follows:
“6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant does not seriously dispute that the arbitrator unilaterally appointed by the claimant was ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator by virtue of Section 12(5) of the Act. He has largely focused his contentions on assailing the decision of the learned Commercial Court to award costs. It was also contended that the respondent was aware of the appointment of the arbitrator and had not raised any objection to such appointment; therefore the respondent is now precluded from challenging the impugned award.
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7.We find little merit in the aforesaid contentions. The proviso to Section 12(5) of the A&C Act is unambiguous. A party can waive its right to object to the ineligibility of an arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the A&C Act but the same is subject to two conditions. First, that the waiver is required to be by and done by an express agreement in writing; and second, that such agreement is entered into after the disputes have arisen. Unless both the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, there can be no waiver of the ineligibility of an arbitrator.
8. In Bharat Broadband Network Limited v.
United Telecoms Limited, (2019) 5 SCC 755, the Supreme Court had authoritatively held that waiver of a right to object to ineligibility of an arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the A&C Act cannot be inferred by conduct of a party. Such waiver can only be by an express agreement in writing.
The Court had also clarified that “the expression ‘express agreement in writing’ refers to an agreement made in words as opposed to
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5 of 26 an agreement which is to be inferred by conduct”.
9. In view of the above, the failure, if any, on the part of the petitioners to object to the unilateral appointment of the sole arbitrator, cannot be construed as waiver of his right under Section 12(5) of the A&C
Act.
10. The award rendered by an arbitrator who is ineligible to be appointed as such cannot be enforced.
11. In HRD Corporation v. GAIL (India) Ltd., (2018) 12 SCC 471, the Supreme Court held as under:
“Since ineligibility goes to the root of theappointment,Section 12(5)read with the Seventh
Schedule makes it clear that if the arbitrator falls in any one of the categories specified in the
Seventh Schedule, he becomes “ineligible” to act as arbitrator.
Once he becomes ineligible, it is clear that, under Section 14(1)(a), he then becomes de jure unable
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6 of 26 to perform his functions inasmuch as, in law, he is regarded as “ineligible”. In order to determine whether an arbitrator is de jure unable to perform his functions, it is not necessary to go to the
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13.
Since such a person would lack inherent jurisdiction to proceed any further, an application may be filed under Section 14(2) to the
Court to decide on the termination of his/her mandate on this ground.” [emphasis added]
12. In Govind Singh v. Satya Group Pvt. Ltd. :
2023/DHC/000081 this court held as under:
“In view of the above, the remaining question to be addressed is whether an arbitral award rendered by a person who is ineligible to act as an arbitrator is valid or binding on the parties.
Clearly, the answer must be in the negative. The arbitral award
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7 of 26 rendered by a person who is ineligible to act as an arbitrator cannot be considered as an arbitral award. The ineligibility of the arbitrator goes to the root of his jurisdiction. Plainly an arbitral award rendered by the arbitral tribunal which lacks the inherent jurisdiction cannot be considered as valid. In the aforesaid view, the impugned award is liable to be set aside as being wholly without jurisdiction.”
13. The Learned Commercial Court has held that an award rendered by a person who is ineligible to act as an Arbitrator by virtue of the provisions of Section 12(5) of the A & C Act is a nullity and, therefore, cannot be enforced. It has accordingly dismissed the enforcement petition under
Section 36 of the A&C Act with the cost quantified as Rs. 25,000/-.
14. This Court finds no infirmity with the aforesaid view. A person who is ineligible to act an Arbitrator, lacks the inherent
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A&C Act. It is trite law that a decision, by any authority, which lacks inherent jurisdiction to make such a decision, cannot be considered as valid. Thus, clearly, such an impugned award cannot be enforced.”
4.The judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in
Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v Narendra Kumar Prajapat was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil)
Diary No. 47322/2023 Dt.12.12.2023. Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as follows:
“Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner.
Delay condoned.
From paragraph 6 of the impugned order, it appears to be an admitted position that the Arbitrator unilaterally appointed by the petitioner was ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator by virtue of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Hence, in view of this peculiar factual position, no case for interference is made out in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.
Pending Application also stands disposed of.”
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5.Thus, the appeal filed by the Kotak Mahindra Bank
Limited was also rejected and the judgment of the Hon’ble
High Court was confirmed. In the circumstances the award rendered by an arbitrator who is ineligible to be appointed as such cannot be enforced.
6.Thus, the illegality in the appointment of the
Arbitrator goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the
Arbitrator and the award rendered by such an Arbitration
Tribunal which lacks jurisdiction is also invalid and cannot be executed. The power of the Court to examine the validity of the award is admittedly very narrow. But the court does have the power to examine whether the award is a nullity in the eye of the law.
7.Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunder Dass v Ram
Prakash [AIR 1977 SC 1201] held as follows:
“3. Now, the law is well settled that an executing court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for
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10 of 26 lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an executionproceeding.Wherethereis lackof inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all. Vide
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340:(1955)1SCR 117] andSeth
Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath [AIR 1962 SC 199 : (1962) 2 SCR 747] . It is, therefore, obvious that in the present case, it was competent to the executing court to examine whether the decree for eviction
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11 of 26 was a nullity on the ground that the civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit in which the decree for eviction was passed. If the decree for eviction was a nullity, the executing court could declare it to be such and decline to execute it against the respondent. Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust,
Jodhpur v Gokul Narain [(1996) 4 SCC 178] held as follows:
“15. The question then is: whether the objections can be raised in execution? This controversy is no longer res integra. In
Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra [(1990) 1 SCC 193] a three-Judge Bench of this Court was to consider whether the nullity of a decree can be raised in execution. Under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973) the building was governed by the provisions of the said Act. The civil court granted decree of eviction. When objection was raised in execution the executing court rejected the same. On appeal, this Court had held that a decree
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12 of 26 passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject-matter or on any other ground which goes to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction, is a nullity. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party.
If the court has jurisdiction but there is any defect in its exercise of jurisdiction it does not go to the root of its authority. Such a defect like territorial jurisdiction could be waived by the party which could be corrected only by way of an appeal or revision. In that case it was held that since the decree was a nullity the validity was upheld in execution.”
8.The law relating to appointment of Arbitrator changed after the 2015 amendment to the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 introduced Section 12 (5). Hon’ble
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Limited [(2017) 8 SCC 377] held as follows:
“12. Sub-section (5) of Section 12, on which immense stress has been laid by the learned counsel for the appellant, as has been reproduced above, commences with a non obstante clause. It categorically lays down that if a person whose relationship with the parties or the counsel or the subject-matter of dispute falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh
Schedule, he shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. There is a qualifier which indicates that parties may, subsequent to the disputes arisen between them, waive the applicability by express agreement in writing. The qualifier finds place in the proviso appended to sub- section (5) of Section 12. On a careful scrutiny of the proviso, it is discernible that therearefundamentallythree components, namely, the parties can waive the applicability of the sub- section; the said waiver can only take place subsequent to dispute having arisen
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14 of 26 between the parties, and such waiver must be by an express agreement in writing. …
53. The aforesaid authorities have been commended to us to establish the proposition that if the nomination of an arbitrator by an ineligible arbitrator is allowed, it would tantamount to carrying on the proceeding of arbitration by himself.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, ineligibility strikes at the root of his power to arbitrate or get it arbitrated upon by a nominee.
54. In such a context, the fulcrum of the controversy would be, can an ineligible arbitrator, like the Managing Director, nominate an arbitrator, who may be otherwise eligible and a respectable person. As stated earlier, we are neither concerned with the objectivity nor the individual respectability. We are only concerned with the authority or the power of the
Managing Director. By our analysis, we are obligated to arrive at the conclusion that once the arbitrator has become ineligible by operation of law, he cannot nominate another as an arbitrator. The arbitrator becomes ineligible as per prescription contained in Section 12(5) of the Act. It is inconceivable in law that
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15 of 26 person who is statutorily ineligible can nominate a person. Needless to say, once the infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse. One cannot have a building without the plinth. Or to put it differently, once the identity of the Managing Director as the sole arbitrator is lost, the power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator is obliterated. Therefore, the view expressed by the High Court is not sustainable and we say so.
55.Another facet needs to be addressed.
The Designated Judge in a cryptic manner has ruled after noting that the petitioner therein had no reservation for nomination of the nominated arbitrator and further taking note of the fact that there has been a disclosure, that he has exercised the power under Section 11(6) of the Act.
We are impelled to think that that is not the right procedure to be adopted and, therefore, we are unable to agree with the High
Court on that score also and, accordingly, we set aside the order appointing the arbitrator. However, as Clause (c) is independent of Clause (d), the arbitration clause survives and hence, the Court can appoint an arbitrator taking into consideration all the aspects. Therefore, we remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the prayer relating to appointment of an arbitrator.”
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9.Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman
Architects DPC v HSCC (India) Limited [(2020) 20 SCC 760] held:
“19. It was thus held that as the Managing
Director became ineligible by operation of law to act as an arbitrator, he could not nominate another person to act as an arbitrator and that once the identity of the Managing Director as the sole arbitrator was lost, the power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator was also obliterated. The relevant clause in said case had nominated the Managing
Director himself to be the sole arbitrator and also empowered said Managing
Director to nominate another person to act as an arbitrator. The Managing
Director thus had two capacities under said clause, the first as an arbitrator and the second as an appointing authority. In the present case we are concerned with only one capacity of the Chairman and
Managing Director and that is as an appointing authority.
20.We thus have two categories of
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17 of 26 cases. The first, similar to the one dealt with in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg.
Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4
SCC (Civ) 72] where the
Managing Director himself is named as an arbitrator with an additional power to appoint any other person as an arbitrator. In the second category, the
Managing Director is not to act as an arbitrator himself but is empowered or authorised to appoint any other person of his choice or discretion as an arbitrator.
If, in the first category of cases, the
ManagingDirectorwasfound incompetent, it was because of the interest that he would be said to be having in the outcome or result of the dispute. The element of invalidity would thus be directly relatable to and arise from the interest that he would be having in such outcome or decision. If that be the test, similar invalidity would always arise and spring even in the second category of cases. If the interest that he has in the outcome of the dispute, is taken to be the basis for the possibility of
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18 of 26 bias, it will always be present irrespective of whether the matter stands under the first or second category of cases. We are conscious that if such deduction is drawn from the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo
Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 :
(2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] , all cases having clauses similar to that with which we are presently concerned, a party to the agreement would be disentitled to make any appointment of an arbitrator on its own and it would always be available to argue that a party or an official or an authority having interest in the dispute would be disentitled to make appointment of an arbitrator.
21.But, in our view that has to be the logical deduction from TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd.
v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] Para 50 of the decision shows that this Court was concerned with the issue, “whether the
Managing Director, after becoming
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19 of 26 ineligible by operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate an arbitrator” The ineligibility referred to therein, was as a result of operation of law, in that a person having an interest in the dispute or in the outcome or decision thereof, must not only be ineligible to act as an arbitrator but must also not be eligible to appoint anyone else as an arbitrator and that such person cannot and should not have any role in charting out any course to the dispute resolution by having the power to appoint an arbitrator. The next sentences in the paragraph, further show that cases where both the parties could nominate respective arbitrators of their choice were found to be completely a different situation. The reason is clear that whatever advantage a party may derive by nominating an arbitrator of its choice would get counter-balanced by equal power with the other party. But, in a case where only one party has a right to appoint a sole arbitrator, its choice will always have an element of exclusivity in determining or charting the course for dispute resolution. Naturally, the person who has an interest in the outcome or decision of the dispute must not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator. That has to be taken as the essence of the amendments brought in by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016) and recognised by the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v.
Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72]”
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10.Thus as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court unilateral appointment of Arbitrator is not permissible even if the same is incorporated in the agreement between the parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lombardi Engineering
Limted v Uttarakhand Jal Vidut Nigam Limted [2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1422] was considering an application under Section
11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The contract between the parties stipulated that the disputes arising under the agreement shall be referred to arbitration and the contractor shall have to deposit 7% of the claim and that for a claim amount of more than 10 crore rupees the case shall be referred to a sole arbitrator appointed by the Principal Secretary/Secretary (Irrigation),
Government of Uttarakhand. With regard to the validity of the arbitration clause concerning the appointment of
Arbitrator the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“86. The issue as regards, the validity of arbitration clause empowering the
Principal Secretary/Secretary (Irrigation),
Government of Uttarakhand to appoint
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21 of 26 an arbitrator of his choice is concerned, the same could be said to be covered by the decision of this Court in Perkins
Eastman (supra):
87. If circumstances exist giving rise to justifiabledoubtsastothe independence and impartiality of the person nominated or if other circumstances warrant appointment of an independent arbitrator by ignoring the procedure prescribed, the Chief
Justice or his designate may, for reasons to be recorded ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint someone else.
[See : IOC v. Raja Transport Pvt. Ltd, (2009)8SCC520].
…
102. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached to the conclusion that we should ignore the two conditions contained in Clause 55 of the GCC, one relating to 7% deposit of the total amount claimed and the second one relating to the stipulation empowering the Principal Secretary (Irrigation)
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22 of 26 Government of Uttarakhand to appoint a sole arbitrator and proceed to appoint an independent arbitrator.”
11.Therefore, under Section 12 (5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and according the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Arbitration
Clause in the terms and conditions of the agreement between the Decree Holder and the Judgment Debtors is invalid and illegal. The appointment of Arbitrator pursuant to the said clause is also illegal. The Arbitrator so appointed dose not have inherent jurisdiction to try the claim. The award rendered by such Arbitrator is illegal, nonest and null and void in the eye of law.
12.This issue was considered by the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. S.M.Thangaraj and others [CRP No.5197/2024 dated 27.01.2025] and the
Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in Kotak Mahindra Bank
Limited Vs.Shalibhadra Cottrade Private Limited [E.P.No.193/2019
dated 02.07.2024], Bhawarlal Bhandari Vs. Universal Heavy
Mechanical Lifting Enterprises [1999(1) SCC 558 and Satish
Karthikeyan Vs. Axis Bank Limited [CRP (NPD) No.3808 of 2023
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dated 13.11.2024].InKotak Mahindra Bank Limited
Vs.Shalibhadra Cottrade Private Limited [E.P.No.193/2019 dated 02.07.2024] the petitioner therein had placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Kotak
Mahindra Bank Limited Vs. Narendra Kumar Prajapat [2023 SCC
OnLine Del 3148]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in
Narendra Kumar Prajapat. The Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta did not refer to the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court, even though it was cited before the Hon’ble High
Court. Further, the Hon’ble High Court in Shalibhadra
Cottrade Private Limited case had held that Hon’ble High
Court of Calcutta in Cholamandalam Investment and Finance
Company Ltd. vs. Amrapali Enterprises and Another [2023 SCC
OnLine Cal 605] had followed the judgment of the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi in Narendra Kumar Prajapat case and held that the award is invalid. In the circumstances, there is a difference of opinion in the judgments of the Hon’ble
High Court of Calcutta on this aspect. In view of this, with
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24 of 26 great respect and humility the judgment of the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi in Narendra Kumar Prajapat case, which was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has to be followed. The judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Narendra Kumar Prajapat case was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in
M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. S.M.Thangaraj and others [CRP No.5197/2024 dated 27.01.2025].
13.For all these reasons, with great respect and humility, the judgmentinNarendra Kumar Prajapatcase appliesandthe judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of
Madras in M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited case does not apply in the facts and circumstances of this case.
14.The Hon’ble Supreme court in Central Organization for
Railway Electrification Vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV), a Joint
Venture Company [2024 (6) CTC 495], was pleased to hold that unilateral appointment for public-private contracts are in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and the principle of express waiver contained under the proviso to
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25 of 26 Section 12 (5) also applies to situations where the parties seek to waive the allegation of bias against an arbitrator appointed unilaterally by one of the parties. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court however held that as a uniform rule it cannot be held that all such unilateral appointments are invalid and it has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the given contract.
15.In the present case, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has considered the contractual clauses similar to the agreement between the Decree Holder and the Judgment
Debtors and held the said clauses to be in violation of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court and declared the said unilateral appointment to be invalid. The said view was also confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the circumstances, the award in the present case suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction, since the appointment of Arbitrator itself is bad in law.
16.As discussed above when the decree is null and non est in the eye of the law since the Court which passed the decree does not have jurisdiction to pass such decree, the execution court can refuse execution of the decree. In the
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26 of 26 present case since the award is non est and void in the eye of law as the Arbitrator who passed the award lacked jurisdiction to pass the award as such, the above case is not maintainable.
17.In the result, the petition is allowed by setting aside the Award passed in Arbitration Case No. 368 of 2020, dt.23.01.2021.
Typed to my dictation by the Stenographer Grade-I, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court on this the 5 th day of May, 2026.
Sd/-
XXVI ADDL. CHIEF JUDGE
CITY CIVIL COURTS, HYDERABAD.
IN THE COURT OF THE MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL-
CUM- XXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE, CITY CIVIL COURT
AT: HYDERABAD
Present: Smt. Vempati Aparna
Chairman MACT-cum-XXVI Addl. Chief Judge
Monday, 18 th May, 2026
M.V.O.P. No. 153 of 2018
Between:
G.Ramesh, S/o. Guntaiah, Age about 22 years, Occ:Labourer, R/o. H.No.16-11-462/1/A Moosarambagh, Hyderabad, N/o. Old Tandoor Village, Tandoor Mandal, Vikarabad District.
…Petitioner
A N D
1. Vincent Melwyn Lobo, S/o. GreGory Lobo, Age: Major, Occ: Owner of Lorry bearing No.KA-19-AB-0269 R/o. H.No.2-3-214, Kotekani Road, Kapikad Bejai, Mangalore Dakshina Kannada, Karnataka State.
2.Reliance General Insurance Company Limited, rep. by its Regional Manager, Office at 4-1-327 to 337 IV Floor, Sagar Plaza, Abids Road, Hyderabad.
3.Hanumanthappa, S/o. Ningappa, Age: Major, Occ: Driver of Lorry bearing No.KA-19-AB-0269 R/o. Hole Mannur, RON Taluqa, Gadag District, Karnataka State.
…Respondents
Counsel for Petitioner : Sri A. Madhava Reddy Counsel for respondent No.2 :Sri G.S. Charyulu
Respondent Nos.1 and 3 remained ex parte
This petition coming on 20.04.2026 for final hearing; upon hearing the counsel on record and considering the material on record and having stood over for consideration till this day, this Tribunal has made the following:
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 2/22
:: O R D E R ::
1.The present petition is filed under Section 166 of Motor
Vehicle Act by the claim petitioner against respondent Nos.1 to 3 seeking compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) together with interest @ 18% per annum from the date of accident till the date of realization on account of injuries sustained by the petitioner herein in a motor vehicle accident occurred on 27.11.2017.
2. The brief averments of the claim petition are as under:
i. That on 27.11.2017, at about 6:30 P.M., the petitioner, along with his friend, Somla Naik, after completion of their work at
Gingurthy Village, was proceeding towards his house on a motorcycle bearing No.AP-28-AG-7621. When they reached near Indira Chowk Traffic Signal at Tandoor, a lorry bearing
No.KA-19-AB-0269, driven in a rash and negligent manner, came from behind and dashed against the motorcycle of the petitioner. As a result of which, both the petitioner and his friend fell on the road and sustained injuries to his left leg and multiple injuries all over the body.
ii.Immediately after the accident, petitioner was shifted to the
Government Hospital and on the advice of the doctors, he was shifted to Aditya Hospital, Hyderabad where he underwent surgery on 28.11.2017, including debridement and K-wire
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 3/22 fixation of toes/ankle fixation. Even after discharge from the hospital, the petitioner has been continuing treatment till date.
iii.In connection with the said accident, the police of Tandoor
Town Police Station registered a case in Crime No.251 of 2017 under Section 337 of IPC against the driver of the offending lorry.
iv.Prior to the accident, the petitioner was hale and healthy, aged about 22 years, and was working as a labourer, used to earn
Rs.15,000/- per month. He used to contribute the said income towards the maintenance of his family. Due to the accident, the petitioner suffered permanent disability on account of the crush injury to his left leg, resulting in loss of earning capacity. He is unable to sit, squat, or walk properly and continues to suffer physical pain, mental agony, and financial hardship, besides incurring huge medical expenses towards treatment.
v.Respondent No.1 being the owner, respondent No.2, being the insurer and respondent No.3, being the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident, are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the petitioner. As on the date of the accident, the said vehicle was covered by a valid insurance policy. Accordingly, the petitioner claimed compensation of
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 4/22
Rs.10,00,000/- for the injuries sustained by him in the accident.
3.That the respondents No.1 and 3 have chosen to remain ex parte.
However, respondents No.2 made his appearance and filed counter its respective counter.
4. The brief averments of counter of respondent No.2 are as under.
i.That Respondent No.2–Insurance Company denied all the material allegations in the claim petition as false and untenable and put the petitioner to strict proof of the manner of accident, injuries, income, occupation, and medical expenses.
ii.It is contended that the insurance particulars of lorry bearing
No.KA-19-AB-0269 were not established and further alleged that the driver of the crime vehicle was not holding a valid and effective driving license as on the date of the accident, which is violation of policy conditions and provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act.
iii.It was further contended that the petitioner failed to establish that the crime vehicle was being operated in compliance with permit conditions, fitness requirements, and other provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder.
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 5/22 iv.It is denied by respondent No2-Insurance Company that the allegation of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the crime vehicle and contended that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the petitioner himself, who suddenly stopped the motorcycle in the middle of the road, thereby contributing to the accident.
v.It is also contended that it is entitled to protection under
Sections 147 and 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act and that there was non-compliance with Sections 134(c) and 158(6) of the
Motor Vehicles Act by the owner of the vehicle and the concerned police authorities. It was also contended that the interest claimed by the petitioner is excessive. Hence, respondent No.2, therefore, prayed to dismiss the claim petition, in the interest of justice.
5.Learned counsel for respondent No.2 filed written arguments and the same is taken on record.
6.The learned counsel for petitioner relied on the following judgments:
i. Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar 1 ii. Yadav S v. Divisional Manager, New India Assurance
Company 2 iii. S. Ettiappan v. D. Kumar and Another 3 1 (2011) 1 SCC 343 2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 692 3 Civil Appeal No.13387 of 2025 dated 16.10.2025
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 6/22 iv. Chandramani Nanda v. Sarath Chandra Swain 4 v. Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh 5
Meena Devi v. Divisional Manager and Another 6 vi. s
7.The learned counsel for respondent No.2 relied on the following judgment:
i.Uttar Pradesh Road Transport Corporation v. Vibhor Fialok and another 7
8.Basing on the above pleadings, this Tribunal had framed the following issues for trial:
1. Whether the accident that occurred on 27.11.2017 was due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Lorry bearing Registration No.KA-19-AB-0269?
2.Whether the petitioner sustained injuries in the said accident?
3.Whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation? If so, what is the quantum of the compensation and from which of the respondents?
4.To what relief?
9. During the course of trial, PW1 to PW5 are examined and
Exs.A1 to A7 and Ex.X1 to X3 were on behalf of petitioner/claimant.
On behalf of respondents, no one was examined. However, Ex.B1 is marked with consent.
10. Respondent No.2 has filed a petition under Section 170 (B) of MV
Act vide I.A.No.1542 of 2025 with a prayer to take all or any of the 4 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2859 5 (2003) 2 SCC 274 6 AIR 2022 SC 5006 7 Civil Appeal Nos.1337-1338 of 2019 dated 18.02.2025
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 7/22 defences that are available to the insured and accordingly the said petition was allowed.
11.Heard arguments from both sides. Written arguments of petitioners and respondent No.2 have been filed, and this Tribunal has given thoughtful consideration to the said written arguments.
Issue Nos.1 and 2:
1. Whether the accident that occurred on 27.11.2017 was due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Lorry bearing Registration No.KA-19-AB-0269?
2. Whether the petitioner sustained injuries in the said accident?
12.In order to substantiate the case of the petitioner, the petitioner got himself examined as PW1 and filed an affidavit in lieu of chief examination as per the pleadings of the claim petition. Since the contents of chief examination of Pw1 are replica of averments made in the claim petition, as such the same is not extracted hereunder in order to avoid repetition of facts. Besides that, the petitioner also relied on documentary evidence marked as Exs.A1 to A7.
13.The cross examination of PW1 by the learned counsel respondent
No.2 shows that PW1 admitted that he had not filed any documentary proof regarding his avocation, monthly income, or loss of earnings. He further admitted that he was proceeding as a pillion rider on the motorcycle ridden by Somla Naik and that he had not filed the driving licence of the rider. PW1 also admitted that though the accident
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 8/22 occurred on 27.11.2017, the complaint was lodged on 28.11.2017.
However, he denied the suggestion that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the rider of the motorcycle. Further he stated that the motorcycle was stopped at the traffic signal when the offending lorry dashed it from behind. PW1 further admitted that, Ex.A4-discharge summary reflects crush injury to the left foot with stable condition after treatment and that he had not filed any record relating to the amputation treatment, which was done at Anjani Hospital, Ongole. He also admitted that he had not taken treatment from the doctors who issued Ex.A5-disability certificate and that the same was obtained on 25.10.2019. He denied to the suggestion that the disability certificate was obtained only for the purpose of claiming higher compensation.
14.PW2, who is working as Consultant Plastic Surgeon at STAR
Hospital and had previously worked at Aditya Hospital, deposed that the petitioner was admitted in Aditya Hospital on 28.11.2017 with history of crush injury to the left foot. He stated that the petitioner underwent debridement, K-wire fixation and dressing on 28.11.2017 and that further surgery was advised. However, the petitioner got discharged against medical advice on 29.11.2017. PW2 further stated that as per the admission notes, the petitioner had no other injuries except the crush injury to the left foot. During cross-examination of PW2, he admitted that the condition of the petitioner was stable at the time of discharge and that the petitioner did not return for follow-up treatment,
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 9/22 therefore, he was unaware of the condition of the petitioner’s foot.
However, he specifically stated that he personally treated the petitioner along with the team of doctors.
15.PW3, who is working as Billing Manager at Aditya Hospital, deposed that the petitioner was admitted in the hospital on 28.11.2017 and discharged on 29.11.2017. He stated that Ex.A6 is the inpatient final bill issued by the hospital and that the petitioner incurred medical expenses of Rs.83,558/-, out of which Rs.73,500/- was paid by cash and the remaining amount was given as discount by the hospital. He further stated that the petitioner had not availed any reimbursement or government scheme. During cross-examination, PW3 affirmed that the petitioner had paid Rs.73,500/- towards treatment expenses.
16.PW4, who is working as Orthopaedic Surgeon at Anjani Super
Speciality Hospital, Ongole, deposed that the petitioner was admitted in their hospital with history of road traffic accident and crush injury to the left foot. He stated that despite treatment, the petitioner developed infection and necrosis in the lower foot and consequently underwent below ankle amputation. PW4 further deposed that the injury was grievous in nature and that the petitioner would face difficulty in performing labour work and day-to-day activities.
17.During cross-examination, PW4 stated that the petitioner was initially treated at Aditya Hospital and thereafter admitted in their
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 10/22 hospital for further treatment. He further stated that despite regular dressing and medication, infection developed in the lower foot necessitating amputation and affirmed that he personally treated and operated the petitioner. He further deposed that the petitioner has not treated under any government scheme.
18.PW5, who was working as Superintendent of Area Hospital,
Kandukur and member of the Medical Board, deposed that the disability certificate dated 25.10.2019 was issued by the Medical Board comprising an Orthopaedic Surgeon, General Surgeon and himself. He stated that the petitioner was assessed with permanent physical disability of 70% and that the disability was assessed by the
Orthopaedic Surgeon during SADARAM Camp.
19.During cross-examination, PW5 admitted that he had not personally treated the petitioner and that he is an Anaesthetist by profession. However, he affirmed that the Orthopaedic Surgeon had examined the petitioner before issuance of the disability certificate and denied the suggestion that the disability was assessed without following proper medical guidelines or that the disability certificate was issued only to help the petitioner in the present case.
20.Learned counsel for respondent No.2 filed the written arguments contending that the petitioner failed to establish the alleged avocation, income and loss of earnings by producing cogent documentary
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 11/22 evidence. It was further contended that the disability certificate cannot be relied upon since the doctors issuing the same had not treated the petitioner and that the certificate was issued in SADARAM Camp for the purpose of availing government welfare schemes. Respondent No.2 also disputed the nature of injuries, disability and medical expenses claimed by the petitioner. It was further contended that the accident occurred due to the contributory negligence of the rider of the motorcycle and that the petitioner is not entitled to the entire compensation claimed.
Hence, prayed to dismiss the claim petition against respondent No.2.
21.In the light of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has established that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of lorry bearing No.KA-19-AB-0269. Further, the evidence of PW1 corroborated by Ex.A1-FIR and Ex.A2-Chargesheet, wherein the police, after detailed investigation, filed chagesheet against the driver of crime vehicle. Though respondent No.2 disputed negligence and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of petitioner, no rebuttal evidence was adduced on behalf of respondents to substantiate the said plea.
22. In Ranjeet and another Vs. Abdul Kayam Neb and another in
SLP (civil) No.10351/2019, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "It is settled in Law that once a charge sheet has been filed and the driver has been held negligent; no further
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 12/22 evidence is required to prove that the vehicle was being negligently driven in a motor vehicle claim case. Even if the eyewitnesses are not examined, that will not be fatal to prove the death of the deceased due to negligence of the driver of the vehicle."
23. Thus, with the foregoing discussion and in view of material available on record and in view of the above decision of Hon’ble Apex
Court, this Tribunal has no hesitation in holding that the petitioner sustained injuries in the accident that occurred on 27.11.2017 due to rash and negligent driving by driver lorry bearing No.KA-19-AB-0269 by the respondent No.3. Accordingly, issue Nos.1 and 2 are answered.
24. Issue No.3:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation, if so, from whom and to what extent?
25.It is not in dispute that the offending vehicle was covered by a valid insurance policy with respondent No.2-Insurance Company as on the date of accident. Since, an application under Section 170 of MV Act has been allowed, respondent No.2 failed to establish any valid defence.
Hence, respondent No.2 is liable to pay compensation.
26.In view of the findings recorded above, the respondent No.1 being the owner, respondent No.2 being the owner and respondent No.3 being the driver of crime vehicle i.e., lorry bearing No.KA-19-AB-0269 are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation.
27.On considering the above, issue Nos.1 and 2 are decided in favour of the petitioner by holding that the petitioner sustained injuries in the
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 13/22 accident that occurred on 27.11.2017 due to rash and negligent driving of lorry bearing No.KA-19-AB-0269. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled for just compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident as per the settled provisions contemplated under the Act. It is impossible to equate human suffering and personal deprivation with money. This Tribunal has to make judicious attempt to avoid such damages, so as to compensate the injured for the loss suffered by him.
In the above backdrop, this Tribunal has to assess by applying principles to award compensation to the injured as laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajkumar v. Ajay Kumar and another (supra)
with regard to injuries, expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines and transportation.
TRANSPORTATION AND EXTRA NOURISHMENT
28.Admittedly, the accident occurred near Indira Chowk traffic signal, Tandoor, Vikarabad and immediately, he was shifted to
Government Hospital and from there to Adithya Hospital, Hyderabad. In this regard, some expenditure was incurred. However, the petitioner has not filed any documentary proof for transportation. Therefore, this
Tribunal deems it appropriate to award a sum of Rs.10,000/- towards transportation. Further, considering the grievous nature of injuries and prolonged treatment undergone by the petitioner, this Tribunal
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 14/22 deems it appropriate to award a sum of Rs.20,000/- towards extra nourishment.
MEDICAL EXPENSES
29.The petitioner relied upon Ex.A6-inpatient bill of Rs.83,558/- issued by Aditya Hospital, Hyderabad and Ex.A7-medical bills of
Rs.55,748/- issued by Anjani Hospital, Ongole to substantiate the medical expenses incurred by him. The evidence of PW3 establishes that the petitioner paid an amount of Rs.73,500/- towards treatment at
Aditya Hospital. The evidence of PW4 further discloses that the petitioner incurred an amount of Rs.25,000/- towards treatment at
Anjani Super Speciality Hospital. Considering Ex.A6, Ex.A7 and oral evidence of PW3 and PW4 and in the absence of contra evidence from respondents this Tribunal deems it appropriate to award a sum of
Rs.98,500/- towards medical expenses.
ATTENDANT CHARGES
30.As discussed above, the petitioner sustained a grievous crush injury to the left foot which resulted in below knee amputation. To prove the same, the petitioner has filed Ex.A3-wound certificate and Ex.A5- disability certificate and examined PW2, PW4 and PW5. Due to the nature of injury, the petitioner would not have been able to manage his daily activities independently during the treatment and recovery period.
He would have required assistance for basic needs and movement. Such
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 15/22 requirement is a natural consequence of the injuries proved on record.
Hence, a sum of Rs.18,000/- is awarded towards attendant charges.
FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES
31.The evidence on record establishes that the petitioner suffered below knee amputation resulting in permanent disability. In such cases, there is a reasonable possibility of future medical requirements.
Considering the age of the petitioner and the long-term consequences of amputation, the requirement of future medical care cannot be ruled out. Therefore, this Tribunal deems it just and reasonable to award a sum of Rs.35,000/- towards future medical expenses.
PAIN AND SUFFERING:
32.To establish the injuries sustained, the petitioner relied on Ex.A3- wound certificate. The evidence of PW2 and PW3 coupled with Ex.A3 that the claim petitioner sustained grievous crush injury to the left foot and subsequently underwent amputation during the course of treatment. The evidence of PW5 further discloses that the Medical
Board assessed the permanent physical disability at 70%. Considering the grievous nature of injuries, amputation suffered, prolonged pain and physical discomfort, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- would be just and reasonable compensation towards pain and suffering.
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 16/22
LOSS OF AMENITIES
33.As discussed above, the evidence of PW1, PW4 and PW5 coupled with Ex.A3-wound certificate and Ex.A5-disability certificate, it is established that the petitioner suffered below knee amputation resulting in permanent disability. Due to the said injury, he will not be able to lead a normal life and will face difficulty in walking, moving freely, and performing routine personal and social activities. The disability has permanently affected his ability to enjoy normal amenities of life.
Therefore, this Tribunal awards a sum of Rs.45,000/- towards loss of amenities in life.
LOSS OF EARNINGS DUE TO DISABILITY
34.As seen from the record, the evidence of PW5 coupled with Ex.A5- disability certificate discloses that Medical Board assessed the permanent physical disability at 70%. The evidence of PW4 further establishes that the petitioner underwent below ankle amputation and would face difficulty in performing labour work and day-to-day activities. In view of the principles laid down in Raj Kumar v. Ajay
Kumar (supra) and considering the nature of injury below knee amputation and having regard to the avocation of the petitioner as labourer, this Tribunal deems it appropriate to consider the functional
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 17/22 disability affecting the earning capacity at 60% for the purpose of assessing loss of future earnings.
35.Though the petitioner claimed that he was earning Rs.15,000/- per month as a labourer, no documentary evidence is filed to substantiate the same. However, considering the avocation of the petitioner as labourer and the prevailing wages during the relevant period, this Tribunal deems it appropriate to take the monthly income of the petitioner at Rs.12,000/- per month.
36.The evidence of PW4 and PW5 coupled with Ex.A5-Disability
Certificate establishes that the petitioner sustained below ankle amputation resulting in permanent disability. Since the petitioner was working as a labourer, the said disability would substantially affect his earning capacity, therefore, the functional disability is taken at 60%.
Further, as the petitioner was aged about 22 years at the time of accident, addition of 40% towards future prospects is applicable as per the principles laid down in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay
Sethi 8and Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another9. Since the petitioner was aged about 22 years, the appropriate multiplier applicable is ‘18’.
37.As discussed above, the monthly income of petitioner was taken at Rs.12,000/- and upon addition of future prospects of 40%, the 8 2017 ACJ 2700 9 (2009) 6 SCC 121
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 18/22 monthly income comes to Rs.16,800/- and the annual income comes to
Rs.2,01,600/- (16,800/- x 12). Since the functional disability affecting the earning capacity was taken at 60%, the annual loss of earning capacity comes to Rs.1,20,960/- (2,01,600/- x 60%). Upon applying the multiplier “18”, the loss of future earning comes to Rs.21,77,280/- (1,20,960/- x 18). Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to
Rs.21,77,280/- towards loss of future earnings due to permanent disability. The tabular form of calculation is as follows.
Sl.No. PARTICULARS AMOUNT
1.Monthly IncomeRs.12,000/-
2.40% Future ProspectsRs.4,800/- 3Total Monthly IncomeRs.16,800/-
4.Annual Income (16,800/- x 12)Rs.2,01,600/-
5.60% Functional DisabilityRs.1,20,960/-
6.Multiplier applicable 18
7.Loss of Future EarningsRs.21,77,280/- (1,20,960 x 18)
Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to Rs.21,77,280/- towards loss of future earnings due to permanent disability.
38. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled for compensation under the following heads :
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 19/22
Sl.No. Particulars Amount awarded in Rs.
1.Transportation chargesRs.10,000/-
2.Extra NourishmentRs.20,000/-
3.Medical expensesRs.98,500/-
4.Pain and SufferingRs.1,00,000/-
5.Attendant chargesRs.18,000/-
6.Loss of amenitiesRs.45,000/-
7.Future medical expensesRs.35,000/-
8.Loss of future earnings Rs.21,77,280/-
TOTAL Rs.25,03,780/-
39.Though the petitioners have claimed compensation of
Rs.10,00,000/-, this Tribunal is empowered to award a higher amount if the evidence on record justifies the same. It is a settled law that just and reasonable compensation can be awarded even, excess of the amount claimed, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagappa v.
Gurudayal Singh (supra-5). In the present case, the compensation determined exceeds the amount claimed, the petitioners shall pay the requisite deficit court fee on the enhanced amount.
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 20/22
40.Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this
Tribunal deems it appropriate to award interest on the compensation at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till realization.
41. Issue No.4:- In view of finding on Issue Nos.1 to 3, this Tribunal holds that the petitioner is entitled for compensation against respondents. Accordingly, Issue No.4 is answered accordingly.
42. In the result- i. The petition is allowed with costs, directing respondents No.1 to 3 joinly and severally to pay the petitioer a sum of
Rs.25,03,780/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs Three Thousand
Seven Hundred Eighty only) towards compensation with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of claim petition till the date of realization.
ii.The respondent No.2-Insurance Company is directed to deposit the award amount within a period of two (02) months from the date of this award, failing which the petitioner is entitled to recovery the same by following due process of law.
iii.Upon such deposit, the petitioner is permitted to withdraw the entire amount in accordance with law.
iv.The petitioner is directed to pay the deficit Court fee, if any, on the enhanced compensation amount awarded.
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 21/22 v. Advocate’s fee is fixed at Rs.3,000/-.
Typed to my dictation, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court on this the 18 thday of May, 2026.
Sd/-
Chairman Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal– Cum XXVI Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Hyderabad
APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE
WITNESSES EXAMINED
FOR PETITIONERS: FOR RESPONDENTS:
PW1:G.Ramesh-NIL-
PW2:Dr.G.S.Ganeswar
PW3:V.Shivani
PW4:Dr.Damacharla Sriman
PW5:Dr.E.Vankat Rao
DOCUMENTS MARKED ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
Ex.A1:Certified Copy of FIR dated 28.11.2017 vide Cr.No.251 of 2017
Ex.A2:Certified copy of chargesheet dated 17.04.2018 vide C.C.No.22.08.2018. Ex.A3:Certified copy of wound certificate issued by Civil Assistant Surgeon, Tandoor Government Hospital dated 27.11.2017. Ex.A4:Original discharge summary issued by Adithya Hospital dated 29.11.2017. Ex.A5:Disability Certificate issued by Government of Andhra Pradesh Medical Board dated 25.10.2019. Ex.A6:Original Medical Bills of Rs.83,558/- issued by the Adithya Hospital, Hyderabad along with the payment receipts.
MACT cum XXVI ACJ, CCC, HYD MVOP 153/18 (Injuries) 22/22
Ex.A7:Original Medical Bills for a total amount of Rs.55,748/- total in No.55 issued by Anjani hospital, at Ongole along with payment receipts.
DOCUMENTS MARKED FOR RESPONDENT NO.2
Ex.B1: Copy of Insurance Policy.
Sd/-
Chairman Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal– Cum XXVI Additional Chief Judge City Civil Court, Hyderabad
-1- XXVI ACJ CCC HYD
O.S No.5/2024
IN THE COURT OF XXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE,
CITY CIVIL COURT AT HYDERABAD
Present: Smt. Vempati Aparna XXVI Additional Chief Judge,
Wednesday, this the 6th day of May, 2026
OS No.5 of 2024
Between: Jeripeti Yadagiri, S/o J.Narasimha, Age:53 years, Occ: Business, R/o. F.No.404, Jayabheri Orange Country, Nanakramguda, Gachibowli, Hyderabad.
….Plaintiff
AND
Dharamranga Raman Raj, S/o. Late DR.Dharam Raj, Age:33 years, Occ:Business, H.No.3-36, near Govt. School, Maredpalle, Secunderabad.
...Defendant
This suit is coming before me for final hearing and disposal on this day in the presence of Sri Y.Pulla Rao, learned Advocate for the Plaintiff and the defendant remains ex parte; upon hearing both the counsel and on perusing the material on record and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:
::JUDGMENT::
1.This is a suit filed by the plaintiff for Specific Performance of
Contract against the defendant seeking a direction to the defendant to execute a regular Registered Sale Deed in favour of plaintiff in respect of suit schedule property.
2. The averments of the plaint, in brief are as under:
i.That the defendant is absolute owner and possessor of the open land in plot No.1043 in Sy.No.120 (old 403/1) and 102/1 admeasuring 1288 sq. yards situated at Hakimpet village within the limits of Municipal -2- XXVI ACJ CCC HYD
O.S No.5/2024
Corporation, Hyderabad, Road No.19, Jubliee Hills, Hyderabad. The said property was originally acquired in the name of Defendant’s late mother. i.e.,
Smt.Prem Kumari, having been purchased by the defendant’s father from
Jubilee Hills Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., Hyderabad (Regd.
T.A.No.173) represented by its Treasurer and Secretary Sri T.C.Prasad and
A.V.Ranga Rao respectively on 21.03.1987 and subsequently the document was numbered as 641 of 1996.
ii.That the defendant’s mother and father died on 06.08.2017 and 05.01.2006 respectively leaving defendant’s as their only legal heir to the subject property. Further, the defendant offered to sell the said property to the plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.1,50,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore
Fifty Lakhs only) and the same was agreed to purchase by the plaintiff.
Accordingly, plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.75,00,000/- on 25.07.2021 and executed an Agreement of Sale on the same day and agreed to pay the balance sale consideration within a period of 9 months. Subsequently, on 22.11.2021, defendant paid an amount of Rs.30,00,000/- by way of cash in the presence of one Neelesh Kumar as witness and executed separate receipts for the amounts received. Thus, a total sum of Rs.1,30,00,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.
iii.That in the month of January, 2022, plaintiff arranged the balance sale consideration of Rs.20,00,000/- and demanded the defendant to execute the sale deed in favour of him but the defendant requested two month of time quoting the defendants inability to execute sale deed.
-3- XXVI ACJ CCC HYD
O.S No.5/2024
Thereafter, in the month of April, 2022, plaintiff demanded the defendant to execute the sale deed upon receiving the balanced sale consideration.
However, to the utter shock of plaintiff, defendant demanded Rs.75,00,000/-
additionally apart from the remaining sale consideration. Upon the same,
plaintiff pleaded the defendant to stick to the terms and conditions of the
Agreement of Sale dated 25.07.2021 but the defendant turned deaf ear and dodged the matter from time to time.
iv.Despite receiving substantial money from the plaintiff, defendant wrongfully demanded additional money. Plaintiff invested his hard-earned money in the said plot with a hope to construct his own house. However, defendant made plaintiff suffer psychologically and monetarily. As such, plaintiff has no other alternative except to this Court for the relief of Specific
Performance of Contract. Hence, the suit.
3.Despite giving an ample opportunity, defendant failed to file counter.
Accordingly, defendant was set ex parte on 06.10.2025.
4.In order to substantiate his case, plaintiff has filed overwhelming documentary evidence which were marked as Exs.A1 to A5.
5.Ex.A1 is the original Agreement of Sale dated 25.07.2021, Ex.A2 is original cash receipt of Rs.75,00,000/- dated 25.07.2021, Ex.A3 is original cash receipt for Rs.25,00,000/- dated 22.11.2021, Ex.A4 is C.C of Sale Deed pertaining to the suit schedule property issued by Joint Sub-Registrar,
Hyderabad-South, dated 21.03.1987, Ex.A5 is original cash receipt of
Rs.30,00,000/- dated 29.08.2021.
-4- XXVI ACJ CCC HYD
O.S No.5/2024
6.Thus, the version of P.W.1, wherein, the evidence affidavit filed in lieu of chief affidavit of evidence shows that the plaintiff entered into Agreement of Sale dated 25.07.2021 for the sale of suit schedule property with defendant and accordingly, paid an amount of Rs.75,00,000/- towards advance sale consideration to defendant and in his presence, executed Ex.A1 in the presence of attestor by name Neelesh Kumar and in his presence obtained cash receipt of Rs.75,00,000/- dated 25.07.2021 vide Ex.A2.
Further, paid an amount of Rs.25,00,000/- and for the same obtained cash receipt of Rs.25,00,000/- dated 22.11.2021 vide Ex.A3 by acknowledging the said amounts, which was signed by the attesting witness in the said
Agreement of Sale dated 25.07.2021.
7.The record and the documentary evidence placed before this Court shows the bona fide act of the plaintiff to prove his contention and whereas, the defendant remained absent and failed to challenge the averments of the plaintiff in order to disprove the contract which was entered between the plaintiff and the defendant. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, this Court deems fit to answer in favour of plaintiff and the defendant is liable to discharge his part of contract by executing sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.
8. In the result , the suit is decreed with costs granting specific performance of Agreement of Sale dated 25.07.2021 as prayed for, directing the defendant to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property within thirty (30) days from -5- XXVI ACJ CCC HYD
O.S No.5/2024
the date of judgment and in case of default, the plaintiff would be at liberty to obtain the same by following the due process of law.
Typed to my dictation, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court on this 6th day of May, 2026.
Sd/-
XXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE,
CITY CIVIL COURT, HYDERABAD.
APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE:
Witnesses examined:
For the plaintiff: For the defendant.
PW1:Jeripeti Yadagiri- NIL -
DOCUMENTS MARKED.
For the plaintiff:
Ex.A1: Original Agreement of Sale dated 25.07.2021
Ex.A2: Original cash receipt of Rs.75,00,000/- dated 25.07.2021.
Ex.A3: Original cash receipt for Rs.25,00,000/- dated 22.11.2021
Ex.A4: C.C of Sale Deed pertaining to the suit schedule property issued by Joint Sub-Registrar, Hyderabad-South, dated 21.03.1987.
Ex.A5: Original cash receipt of Rs.30,00,000/- dated 29.08.2021.
For the defendant:
- NIL -
Sd/-
XXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE,
CITY CIVIL COURT, HYDERABAD.
Order Record 13 total
| Case No. | Parties | Date | Type | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OP/153/2018 | G.Ramesh vs Vincent Melwyn Lobo | 18 May 2026 | Orders | — |
| MVOP/2321/2019 | Peddapuram Rajaiah vs Malleboina Ayyappa | 14 May 2026 | Orders | — |
| MVOP/1168/2024 | Md. Chanmuni vs Sitaram Jadhav | 11 May 2026 | Award | — |
| OS/5/2024 | Jeripeti Yadagiri vs Dharamranga. Raman Raj | 06 May 2026 | Judgement | — |
| A.R.B.O.P/26/2021 | Srinivas Thumu vs M/s. Shriram City Union Finance Ltd | 05 May 2026 | Orders | — |
| MVOP/408/2022 | Sravan .V vs Mahesh .P | 28 Apr 2026 | Orders | — |
| EP/19/2026 | G. Nagaraju vs Boini Shiva Kumar | 27 Apr 2026 | Orders | — |
| MVOP/1210/2025 | T Manikya Reddy vs P Jospeh | 24 Apr 2026 | Award | — |
| MVOP/204/2019 | M.Narender Reddy vs K.V.Subba Lakshmi | 23 Apr 2026 | Orders | — |
| MVOP/206/2019 | M.Niranjan Goud vs K.V.Subba Lakshmi | 23 Apr 2026 | Orders | — |
| OS/174/2025 | CHENNARDDYGARI SANJEEVA REDDY vs KANDULA V PRASAD GUPTA | 23 Apr 2026 | Judgement | — |
| OS/269/2024 | Chennareddygari Sanjeeva Reddy vs Kandula V. Prasad Gupta | 23 Apr 2026 | Judgement | — |
| MVOP/742/2019 | Chendi Renuka vs Ch.Ravinder Reddy | 20 Apr 2026 | Orders | — |
Frequently Asked Questions
How many cases has SMT. VEMPATI APARNA handled?
SMT. VEMPATI APARNA has handled 14 court orders since 2026 at HYD, City Civil Court Complex. The average disposal rate is 10 orders per month.
What types of cases does SMT. VEMPATI APARNA hear?
Based on available records, SMT. VEMPATI APARNA primarily handles Motor Accident matters (Motor Accident Claims) and Civil matters (Original Suits, Execution Petitions) at HYD, City Civil Court Complex.
Where is SMT. VEMPATI APARNA currently posted?
SMT. VEMPATI APARNA is posted as XXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE at HYD, City Civil Court Complex, Hyderabad, Telangana.
Are judgments by SMT. VEMPATI APARNA available online?
Yes. 4 judgments by SMT. VEMPATI APARNA are available on Legistro with full text, outcome, and sections cited.
How fast does SMT. VEMPATI APARNA dispose cases?
SMT. VEMPATI APARNA disposes approximately 10 cases per month, based on 14 orders handled over their tenure at HYD, City Civil Court Complex.
Since when is SMT. VEMPATI APARNA serving?
SMT. VEMPATI APARNA has been serving at HYD, City Civil Court Complex since 2026. and is currently posted there.
Case Types
Posting History
-
Apr 2026 — PresentXXVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE · 14 orders
Other Judges at this Court