Sri A Hari Hara Nadha Sarma

IN THE COURT OF THE II ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURTS : HYDERABAD

Saturday, the 20th day of APRIL, 2013

Present: Sri A.HARI HARA NADHA SARMA,B.Sc.,B.L.,

II ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

CMA.No.52 of 2012

and

I.A.No.1956 of 2012 in CMA.No.52 of 2012

CMA.No.52 of 2012

Between:

1. Syed Waheed Hussain

2. Qaisar Jahan

3. Afsar Jahan

4. Athar Jahan

5. Syed Basheer Hussain

6. Syed Hakeem Hussain... Appellants

AND

1. Fareeda Khan @ Fareeda Khanam

2. Durdana Khan... Respondents

APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDER AND DECRETAL ORDER DATED

9­3­2012 PASSED BY THE X JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE : CITY CIVIL COURT 

AT HYDERABAD

IN

I.A.No.750 of 2010 in

O.S.No.3833 of 2010

Between:

1. Fareeda Khan @ Fareeda Khanam

2. Durdana Khan... Petitioners/Plaintiffs

AND

1. Syed Waheed Hussain

2. Qaisar Jahan

3. Afsar Jahan

Page ­ 2CMA52­12&IA1956­12

4. Athar Jahan

5. Syed Basheer Hussain

6. Syed Hakeem Hussain... Respondents/Defendants

I.A.No.1956 of 2012

Between:

1. Syed Waheed Hussain

2. Qaisar Jahan

3. Afsar Jahan

4. Athar Jahan

5. Syed Basheer Hussain

6. Syed Hakeem Hussain... Petitioners/Appellants

AND

1. Fareeda Khan @ Fareeda Khanam

2. Durdana Khan... Respondents/Respondents

This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and Interlocutory Application coming on 25­03­2013 for final hearing and disposal before me in the presence of Sri S.Balchand, Advocate for the Appellants in CMA. 

No.52/2012 and for the Petitioners in I.A.No.1956/2012, and of Sri T. 

Padmaja, Advocate for the Respondents in CMA.No.52/2012 and in 

I.A.No.1956/2012, and having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:­

COMMON ORDER

1)This appeal is directed against the decree and decretal order 

dated 9­3­2012 passed in I.A.No.750/2010 in O.S.No.3833/2010 by 

the X Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Appellants are the respondents/defendants before the Court below and respondents herein are petitioners/plaintiffs. For the sake of convenience, parties are hereinafter referred to 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants'.

Page ­ 3CMA52­12&IA1956­12

2)I.A.No.750/2010 was filed by the plaintiffs before the Court below invoking Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. for granting temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the suit schedule properties.

3)(i) The assertion of the plaintiffs is that first plaintiff is the owner and possessor of property described as first schedule and second plaintiff is the owner and possessor of the property described as second schedule in the petition and plaint. Both properties are situate at 

Zamistanpur, Musheerabad, Hyderabad. First plaintiff's donor Mrs. 

Rehana Khan and second plaintiff got the property by way of gift from their father Matiulla Khan and the said gift was rectified through a memorandum of Hiba dated 14­3­1971.

3) (ii) Plaintiffs further asserted that Matiulla Khan became owner and possessor of the schedule properties and another property measuring in an extent of 2,000 sq. yards by virtue of Hiba (oral gift) 

dated 5­3­1961 and 16­9­1963. The principal donors are lawful owners 

and possessors of the property. It is further claimed by the plaintiffs that donor of first plaintiff constructed two rooms on first schedule pro­ perty. Name of first plaintiff was mutated in municipal records. Taxes 

Page ­ 4CMA52­12&IA1956­12 were paid upto 2007­2008. Second plaintiff has also constructed a room ACC house on second schedule property and got her name muta­ ted in municipal records. Thus, they are owners and possessors of the property.

3) (iii) It is further alleged by the plaintiffs that respondents have no manner of right over the properties and in pursuation of their habit of grabbing lands, made an attempt on 11­6­2001 to grab the land by trespassing into the property. Then a complaint was made against the defendants and the defendants assured that they will not repeat their interference. But again on 9­7­2008, a similar attempt to grab the land was made and a complaint was given for preventing the same.

3) (iv) Further contention of the plaintiffs is that donor of plain­ tiffs and her sister filed a suit in O.S.No.2242/1997 on the file of the 

VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for grant of perpetual injunction against the cousin of first defendant and an interlocutory application I.A.No.1767/1997 was filed for necessary relief and in I.A. 

No.962/1997, advocate­commissioner was appointed and a report was also filed by the said commissioner. It is further added by the plaintiffs 

Page ­ 5CMA52­12&IA1956­12 that the donor obtained permission to construct multi­storied building through a builder M/s Om Sri Sai Construction and the said builder has filed O.S.No.446/1999 against the donors of the plaintiffs and the said suit was ended in ex parte decree but thereafter with settlement. It is also the contention of the plaintiff that without any manner of right, defendants trespassed into the site on 6­10­2010 and tried to grab the same and when the same was brought to the notice of the police, they advised for approaching the Court stating that the dispute is of civil nature. Hence, the suit and impugned proceedings are filed for neces­ sary reliefs.

4)(i) On behalf of the defendants counter affidavit was filed by first respondent with the following objections:– Originally a suit was filed in City Civil Court (O.S.No.41/1/1955 of 1956, Second Judge, 

City Civil Court, Hyderabad) by one Dildarunnissa Begum for partition and administration of Kursheed Jahi Paigah Estate against all the share­ holders. The said suit was later withdrawn to the file of Hon'ble High 

Court and fresh number was assigned as O.S.No.58 of 1958 and later on renumbered as C.S.No.14/1958. Government of Andhra Pradesh was also added as party as defendant No.53. In the said suit, some of 

Page ­ 6CMA52­12&IA1956­12 parties entered into compromise and some contested the matter and finally judgment was delivered and preliminary decree was passed by 

Hon'ble High Court on 28­6­1963. Advocate one P.Ram Shah was 

appointed Commissioner to partition the properties according to the directions in the Judgment. Further, during pendency of the said suit as per orders dated 25­8­1962 vide I.A.No.413/1961 and 267/1962 receiver was appointed for various properties. Property covered Sy.No. 

116 (old) and new 179 of Zamistanpur is also the subject matter of the said suit. The said Zamistanpur property is item No.29 of IV Schedule and th same was held to be property given on grant to defendants 51 and 52 therein. However, as per the compromise recorded to which defendants 51 and 52 therein were parties. The said land was also liable to be partitioned among various share­holders.

4) (ii) It is further claimed by the defendants that Government acquired certain land for the purpose of allotment to Ramakrishna Co­ operative Society. It is the further contention of the defendants that most of the sharers rather 90% of the share­holders in Khurshid Jahi 

Paigah Estate whose shares were recognised under the preliminary decree sold away their rights in favour of Mir Osman Ali Khan (HEH 

Page ­ 7CMA52­12&IA1956­12

Nizam of Hyderabad through his financial adviser). Thereafter an application was filed under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. for impleadment of 

HEH the Nizam and they were arrayed as defendants 156 and 157 in 

O.S.No.14 of 1958. HEH Nizam had 50% rights and one Kazim Nawaz 

Jung had 50% rights but HEH Nizam conveyed his rights in favour of 

F.E. Dinshaw and Company Limited of Mumbai which later changed its name as Cyrus Investments Private Limited and the said name was also ordered in the legal proceedings.

4) (iii) Further defendants claimed that in the process of parti­ tion as directed by the Hon'ble High Court, lay­out plan was prepared by engineers in consultation with receiver for the land covered in an extent of Ac 22­24 gnts. in Sy.No.179 of Zamistanpur and 167 plots were laid. Receiver – cum – Commissioner prepared panchanama on 27­11­1984 handing over plots 7 to 13 and 17 and 18 to Cyrus Invest­ ments Private Limited and the said plots were handed over by High 

Court Receiver to Cyrus Investments Private Limited. Plots Nos.4 and 5 of the said plotting layout were allotted to Mirza Nazeer Baig and others in the partition scheme. But as per assignment dated 8­11­1997, from Mirza Nazeer Baig and others the said plots were taken over by 

Page ­ 8CMA52­12&IA1956­12 the first respondent. Further, it is claimed by the defendants, in E.P. 

No.4/1998 the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad issued warrant for delivery of possession of plots 4 and 5 and thus, possession was delivered and panchanama was prepared to that effect. 

It is also claimed by the defendants plots 4 and 5 came to the posses­ sion of Cyrus Investments Private Limited. Further defendants claimed that he has entered into registered agreement of sale – cum – general power of attorney with Cyrus Investments Private Limited relating to plots 7 to 13 and 17 and 18 and specific municipal numbers are also assigned for plots and possession was also given to him in respect of those plots. First respondent in his affidavit referred various sales made by him and he claimed that he is still in possession of plots 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and plots 4 and 5. Defendants referred to another suit O.S. 

No.630/1999 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court and an abortive attempt made by the plaintiffs for their impleadment and dis­ missal of the application filed by them for impleadment. By referring to all the above cited details and source of title and possession, defen­ dants denied the right and possession of the plaintiffs and claimed that the plaintiffs are not entitled for any of the reliefs.

Page ­ 9CMA52­12&IA1956­12

5)Counter affidavit filed before the Court below is running into 68 paragraphs, summary of the same is extracted above.

6)During the enquiry before the Court below, petitioners got 

Exs P­1 to P­13 documents on their behalf and on behalf of the defen­ dants Exs R­1 to R­47 documents were got marked.

7)Pleadings and documents placed by both sides and argu­ ments advanced are carefully considered. Extensive arguments are advanced on behalf of the appellants and written arguments are filed 

for the respondents. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the 

trial Court has initially granted injunction, when non compliance of 

Order 39 Rule 3 C.P.C. brought to the notice of the Court, the order was modified as status quo, but at last, the trial Court granted injunc­ tion without appreciating the contentions of the defendants. It is also argued by him that the matter is seized with the High Court, parti­ cularly, receiver was appointed by the Hon'ble High Court to adminis­ trate the property. The private transactions of any of the parties can not be recognised and trial Court failed to appreciate the said impor­ tant aspect. He has further argued that the land is vacant. The docu­ ments filed by the plaintiffs with certain municipal numbers are of 

Page ­ 10CMA52­12&IA1956­12 recent origin and they cannot be relied on for believing the possession over the property and trial Court erred in believing those documents for granting the relief prayed for.

8)Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiffs in his written arguments submitted by referring to an affidavit filed in the stay appli­ cation that even according to the defendants/appellants, six sale tran­ sactions were entered on behalf of them and on behalf of the Cyrus 

Investments Private Limited. Then, the suit schedule property cannot be considered as the property in possession of the defendants. It is further submitted by the plaintiffs that only prima facie possession needs consideration.

9)The appellants filed certain documents along with petition 

I.A.No.1956/2012 and required the Court to receive them as additional evidence and mark them as Exs R­48 to R­53. The defendants/appel­ lants contended that the documents are relevant and they are pertain­ ing to the recently disposed proceedings O.S.No.629/1999, O.S.No. 

630/1999, O.S.No.112/2001 and O.S.No.120/1990. The learned coun­ sel for the appellants/defendants would contend that the certified copies of the decrees and judgments passed in respective proceedings 

Page ­ 11CMA52­12&IA1956­12 are received recently and they are not available when the proceedings 

before the Court below.

10)Now the points for determination in I.A.No.1956/2012 and 

C.M.A.No.52/2012 are:–

1) Whether the documents sought to be filed by way of 

additional evidence covered by I.A.No.1956/2012 can 

be received?

2) Whether the plaintiffs before the Court below esta­ blished a prima facie case of their possession over the suit schedule property and whether they could prove existence of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and about possibility of they suffering irreparable loss in the event of not granting injunction and whether plaintiffs are entitled for temporary injunction as prayed for?

3) Whether the impugned Orders are sustainable in law and on facts or whether any interference is necessary? 

If so, on what grounds?

4) What is the result of the appeal?

11)POINT No.1: Order 41 Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code reads as follows:

“27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court:– (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce 

additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the 

Appellate Court. But if–

(a) the Court, from whose decree the appeal is preferred, has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted; 

Page ­ 12CMA52­12&IA1956­12 or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, esta­ blishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or

(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produ­ ced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate 

Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.

(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.”.

The documents were not available with the defendants/appellants when the proceedings were pending before the Court below. The parties in the decrees and judgments now sought to be introduced are not before this Court and hence, receiving of documents is not necessary. In O.S. 

No.629/1999 first appellant alone is the plaintiff. Likewise, in O.S.No. 

630/1999 Cyrus Investments Private Limited from whom appellant is claiming title is a party. Both suits were filed against the Government. 

In O.S.No.112/2001 neither appellants nor respondents are parties. 

But Cyrus Investments from whom the appellants are claiming right is party. Further, in O.S.No.120/1990 one Aruna Reddy is party. Merely because some rights are asserted and even recognised in other pro­

Page ­ 13CMA52­12&IA1956­12 ceedings, particularly with regard to title and not regarding the posses­ sion in clear terms, whether such said documents can be straight away received by the appellate Court in a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal without a clear foundation in pleadings is an important aspect needs careful examination. Upon examination of the aspect that the copies of pro­ ceedings now sought to be filed are too remotely connected to the pro­ ceedings. Receiving of those documents as additional evidence found unnecessary for determination of appeal. Further all the necessary ingredients for receiving the additional evidence are not found. Hence, this point is decided against the appellants concluding that receiving of documents filed as additional evidence is not necessary.

12)POINTS Nos.2 and 3: In the written arguments filed on behalf of the respondents (plaintiffs) before this appellate Court, there is no clarity with regard to referring the parties as petitioners and res­ pondents. However, it can be understood that the word used as 'peti­ tioners' is relating to 'appellants' and the word used as 'respondents' is relating to the 'respondents' herein, who are plaintiffs before the Court below. Suit before the Court below is filed for bare injunction. The schedule of property is as follows:

Page ­ 14CMA52­12&IA1956­12

1ST SCHEDULE OF PROPERTY

All that the part and parcel of the H.No.1­7­29/1 (old portion of H.No.1­7­29) in Sy.No.179 admeasuring 1140 Sq. Yards situated at Zamistanpur, Musheerabad, Hyderabad District in GHMC is bounded by:

East : Road West: Neighbour's plot North: Road South: Sai Madhukunj Apartments

2ND SCHEDULE OF PROPERTY

All that the part and parcel of the H.No.1­7­29/1/2 ad­ measuring 700 Sq. Yards in Sy.No.179 situated at Zamistan­ pur, Musheerabad, Hyderabad District in GHMC is bounded by:

East : Neighbour's plot West : 40 ft. Road North : H.No.1­7­29 South : 20 ft. Road

The property covered by both schedules is covered by Sy.No.179 situ­ ated at Zamistanpur.

13)Ex P­1 is memorandum of gift. Plot numbers are not refer­ red and and even boundaries are not referred in the said document. It is not known how the property can be identified without specific boun­ daries. Ex P­2 is another document – memorandum of gift. This is also not referring to any particular boundaries to identify the property. Exs 

P­3, P­4 and P­5 are referring to certain door numbers but with the said door number whether the property can be identified, is a question left unanswered. Exs P­6 and P­7 are the letters addressed to police. Ex 

P­8 is judgment in O.S.No.2242/1997 which shows that the said suit 

Page ­ 15CMA52­12&IA1956­12 was dismissed as settled out of Court. Ex P­9 is the Commissioner 

Report which shows that the Commissioner in the said proceedings 

I.A.No.962/1997 in O.S.No.2242/1997 identified the property with the assistance of petitioner therein and noted certain physical features and referred that the land is vacant. Ex P­10 is another complaint to police. 

Exs P­11 and P­12 are also receipts issued by Municipal Corporation. 

Ex P­13 is legal heir certificate. With the aid of these documents Exs 

P­1 to P­13 identifying the property found not possible. But it can be taken that the property in question is vacant one. The documents filed on behalf of the respondents are referring to the litigation from the beginning and source how the property now in question along with other property has been in dispute in various litigations and how the part of the suit schedule property covered by the other legal proceed­ ings. Even a close reading of written arguments of respondents would indicate that the documents filed by the appellants/defendants are dealing with the title extensively. There is no serious dispute about the property being custodia legis and under the administration of receiver. 

In a suit for bare injunction, possession of parties as on the date of suit becomes most relevant and for ascertaining the possession, the pro­

Page ­ 16CMA52­12&IA1956­12 perty shall be clearly identifiable. Now identity of property if seen, the defendants/appellants are claiming right, title and possession pursuant to the alienation made by Cyrus Investments Private Limited which allegedly got the rights pursuant to the alienation made by sharers in the partition decree and said Cyrus Investment is also reportedly got itself impleaded in the other legal proceedings. The property claimed by the defendants is referred with plot numbers. The appellants are claiming right pursuant to registered agreement of sale – cum – general power of attorney vide Ex R­19. Ex R­19 is referring to source of title. 

Description of property referred under Ex R­19 is as follows:–

Schedule of the property which is subject matter of this 

Agreement of Sale cum Irrevocable Power of Attorney

a) Property bearing No.1­7­29/1/1 (Plot Nos.17 and 18 of layout measuring 950 sq. yards of area and bounded as under:–

On the East : 40' wide Road, On the West : Plot No.19 On the South : Madhu Kunj Apartment Complex On the North : 40' wide Road.

b) Property bearing No.1­7­29/1/2 (Plots Nos.7 & 8 of layout measuring 666.66 sq. yards of area and bounded as under:

On the East : Houses of others On the West : 40' wide Road, On the South : 20' wide Road, On the North : House of neighbour

c) Property bearing No.1­7­29/1/3 (Plots Nos.9, 10 & 11 of layout measuring 1125 sq. yards of area and bounded as under:–

On the East : 40' wide Road On the West : Plot No.12, On the South : Grave Yard On the North : Madhu Kunj Apartment Complex.

Page ­ 17CMA52­12&IA1956­12

Suit schedule property is extracted above. There is synonimity to the extent of door numbers to some extent. To the extent of municipal number 1­7­29/1, properties claimed by both parties is same. As far as second schedule of plaint is concerned, it is corresponding to item No. 

(b) of Ex R­19. But extent wise, there is difference between the pro­ perty described as schedule II of plaint and item (b) in Ex R­19. The land appears to be vacant. However, municipal number seems to have been assigned. Certain queries like whether both parties are claiming same property, what is the extent of property claimed by petitioners, how to identify the property with tax receipts alone is possible when there are only one or two rooms constructed, why the other material like electricity connection details etc. are not filed are left unanswered. 

At this stage, the material filed by the plaintiffs is indicating that defen­ dants are also claiming title and plaintiffs are claiming title pursuant to oral gift etc. The documents filed by the plaintiffs are not establish­ ing clear lawful possession. But some tax receipts with certain door numbers are filed by plaintiffs. Even from the end of defendants, ex­ cept the document showing some semblance of title there is no con­ vincing material to believe actual physical possession. Defendants are unable to explain how in respect of the municipal numbers referred by 

Page ­ 18CMA52­12&IA1956­12 them certain tax receipts are issued in favour of the plaintiffs. It is pertinent to note that weakness in the case of the defendants cannot be a ground to grant the relief straight away to the plaintiffs.

14)When totality of circumstances and all the recitals in the documents are carefully considered, this Court is of the view that there are many areas left unanswered by both parties and with the material available on record, it is not possible to give clear finding as to whether plaintiffs are in possession or defendants are in possession of the pro­ perty and the same can be decided only after complete evidence is adduced by both parties. Till then both parties can be directed to main­ tain status quo with regard to both nature and alienation of the pro­ perty and trial Court failed to examine the same and reliance of the trial Court merely on tax receipts found not correct as the substantial part of the property in dispute is vacant land. Further, this Court is of the view that it is necessary to vacate injunction orders passed by the 

Court below and direct both parties to maintain status quo. Points 2 and 3 are decided accordingly.

15)POINT No.4: In the result, appeal is partly allowed. 

Impugned Order and Decretal Order dated 9­3­2012 passed in I.A.No. 

Page ­ 19CMA52­12&IA1956­12 750/2010 in O.S.No.3833/2010, whereunder injunction is granted res­ training interference of the defendants/appellants, are set aside. How­ ever, by considering the facts and circumstances of the case, depth of contentions, both parties are directed to maintain status quo with regard to both nature and alienation of property. No costs.

I.A.No.1956/2012 is dismissed.

Dictated to the Personal Assistant, transcribed and typed 

by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the Open Court, this the 20th day of APRIL, 2013.

II ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

City Civil Court, Hyderabad

IN THE COURT OF THE III ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE:

CITY CIVIL COURT: AT HYDERABAD

Dated this the 28th day of March, 2012.

PRESENT: DR.SMT.G.RADHA RANI, B.Sc.,LL.M.,Ph.D.,

III ADDL.CHIEF JUDGE

O.P.No.2589 of 2008

Between:-

Dr. A.S.R.Gangadhara Rao.

...PETITIONER

And

1. The Indian Medical Association, A.P.State rep. by its Honorary General Secretary, Ch. Srinivasa Raju,

2. Dr. N. Appa Rao.

...RESPONDENTS

This petition coming on for final disposal before me in the presence of Sri K.V.Bhanu Prasad, Advocate for the petitioner and of Sri V.V.Anil Kumar, Advocate for the respondent No.1 and

Sri Sunil B.Ganu, Advocate for the respondent No.2 and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court made the following:- : O R D E R:

1.This petition is filed by the petitioner under Sec. 23 of the Public Societies Registration Act to declare the termination of his membership by the respondent No.1 association through the impugned order dated 30-10-2008 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice.

2.The petitioner submitted that for the purpose of removing his membership from the respondent No.1-association, the 2nd respondent hatched a plan to show that the petitioner was claiming himself as President of Nehru Nagar Local Branch at ­2­ O.P.No.2589/2008

Khammam and was trying to create a record to show that he was not the President of the Nehru Nagar local branch. He submitted that the impugned order does not indicate the reason for his suspension and submitted that he was not given an opportunity to be heard by the disciplinary committee before taking a decision and that it was in violation of the principles of natural justice and also the bye-laws. He submitted that the disciplinary committee never required him to attend before it or give explanation in writing which was mandatory under the bye-laws. He further submitted that the working committee meeting was said to be held on 26-10-2008 at 9 A.M. at Puttaparthi and the resolution was said to be communicated to the State Council, but the suspension order was passed on 26-9-2008 at 12 PM by the respondent No.1 even

before the so-called decision taken by the disciplinary committee

which showed the over enthusiasm of the respondents 1 and 2 to throw him out of the membership of the association.

3.The respondent No.1 filed counter denying the petition averments. He submitted that the petitioner was in the habit of propagating rumours and without having any office bearer post or designation, he used to claim that he was holding the post of

President of Nehrunagar branch, Khammam, the petitioner was given an opportunity to attend before the disciplinary committee, but he failed to appear before the committee and the disciplinary committee recommended for suspension of the petitioner. He ­3­ O.P.No.2589/2008 submitted that there was no illegality or irregularity in the action of the 1st respondent in suspending the petitioner, the petitioner tried to confuse the timings of the meetings held on 26-10-2008 at

Puttaparthi but a plain reading of the letter dated 30-10-2008 would make it clear that the working committee meeting was held at 9 A.M. and the State Council accepted the recommendation of the State Working Committee at 12 P.M. He further submitted that

IMA (Head quarters), New Delhi suspended the petitioner from the membership and the same was communicated by its letter dated 30-12-2008. As the petitioner prime membership was under suspension, the petitioner has to challenge the proceedings of IMA

Headquarters, New Delhi by filing appropriate proceedings at New

Delhi and that there was an arbitration clause in the Memorandum

Rules and Bye-laws of IMA and that the petition was not maintainable and prayed to dismiss the petition with costs.

4.The respondent No.2 filed counter on the same lines as that of the 1st respondent adopting the counter of the 1st respondent and further submitted that the allegations made against him were without any basis and that he was commanding respect from one and all except from a few persons like that of the petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner requested for his candidature to Medical Council of India elections in the year 2002, but as he did not support him, he contested and got only six votes in the said election. He submitted that the petitioner made efforts ­4­ O.P.No.2589/2008 to stall the Goa meeting and denied that they removed the petitioner from the family pension scheme as well as from the membership of IMA having grudge against him and prayed to dismiss the OP.

5.Basing on the said pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial.

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled for declaring his termination from the membership by the respondent No.1 association through the impugned order dated 30-10-2008 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice as prayed for?

2. To what relief?

6.The petitioner had examined P.Ws 1 and 2 and marked

Exs.A-1 to A-16. The respondent No.1 examined R.W-1 and the respondent No.2 examined himself as R.W-2. Exs.B-1 to B-5 were marked on behalf of the respondents.

7.Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the respondents 1 and 2.

8.ISSUE NO.1

The petitioner examined himself as P.W-1. He stated that the order dated 30-10-2008 did not indicate the reason for his suspension and the disciplinary committee never requested him to attend before them or to give any explanation in writing, which was mandatory procedure under the bye-law. His another contention was that the suspension order was passed on 26-9-2008 at 12 PM ­5­ O.P.No.2589/2008 one month prior to the working committee meeting on 26-10-2008 which was perse improper. He submitted that he was asked to appear before the two member committee on 21-8-2008, but the two member committee never sat for taking any action and a Six member Committee took a decision behind his back without notice to him which was in violation of the principles of natural justice and the procedure contemplated under the bye-laws. He relied upon

Exs.A-1 to A-16 in support of his contention. Ex.A-1 is the suspension order dated 30-10-2008. Ex.A-1 disclosed that the

Hon.General Secretary of IMA, A.P. State intimated to the

petitioner about the decision of the State Council to suspend the petitioner from membership of IMA, A.P. State for five years. The said letter revealed that Dr.Kasturi Pramila, Convenor-Disciplinary

Committee of IMA AP State had submitted a report to the 155th

State Working Committee Meeting held on 26-10-2008 at 9 AM at

Puttaparthi and the said resolution was accepted unanimously by

State Working Committee and recommended to the State Council to suspend the petitioner from the membership of IMA AP State for five years and the State Council Meeting held on 26-9-2008 at 12

PM at Puttaparthi had accepted the 155th State Working Committee recommendation and that the same was conveyed to the petitioner.

Ex.A-2 is the notice issued to the petitioner. It disclosed that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 16-8-2008 calling for proof of his election as President IMA Nehru Nagar Branch and ­6­ O.P.No.2589/2008 to appear before the Chair-person, Disciplinary Committee, IMA AP

State on 21-8-2008. Dr.Laxman Rao, Finance Secretary of IMA was said to be the Convenor for the said meeting. Ex.A-3 is the letter addressed by the petitioner to the Secretary, IMA dated 19-8-2008 stating his inability to attend the said meeting on 21-8-2008 because of his prior occupation. Ex.A-8 disclosed that the petitioner was a Life Member of IMA through its Nehrunagar branch, A.P. Ex.A-11 is the letter dated 8-1-2008 addressed by the

Hony. General Secretary IMA AP State to Dr.Kasturi Pramila,

Chairman Disciplinary Committee to conduct enquiry against the petitioner for designating himself as President, IMA Nehrunagar branch of Khammam District without being elected by the members of IMA Nehrunagar branch. Ex.A-12 is the letter addressed by the said Hony.General Secretary of IMA AP on the same day to the petitioner to show cause as to why an action could not be initiated against him for pronouncing himself as self-elected and self- designated President of IMA Nehrunagar branch and that the matter was referred to Dr.Kasturi Pramila, Chairman Disciplinary

Committee, IMA A.P. Hyderabad. Ex.A-13 is the letter addressed by the same Hony.Secretary General, IMA dated 29-1-2008 certifying that the petitioner was not the President of IMA

Nehrunagar branch, A.P. State. Ex.A-14 is the letter addressed by the Hony.General Secretary of IMA, A.P. State to Dr.V.Laxman Rao

dated 14-8-2008 intimating his appointment as Convenor of

­7­ O.P.No.2589/2008

Disciplinary Committee of IMA AP State to convene the meeting on 21-8-2008 due to the inability of Dr.Kasturi Pramila to convene the meeting of Two Member Disciplinary Committee. Ex.A-15 is the resolution passed by the Six Member Disciplinary Committee held on 25-9-2008 recommending the suspension of the petitioner and their decision to submit it to the State Working Committee and the

State Council Meeting for approval.

A perusal of the Memorandum Rules and Bye-laws of the

Association under Ex.B-1 disclosed that part-III deals with the bye- laws of the Association and the termination of membership of any member was discussed under Bye-Laws 22 to 24 and Bye-law

No.22 relates to the termination of membership by way of resignation and Bye-law No.23 pertains to termination of membership on account of non-payment of subscription fee and

Bye-law No.24 deals with the termination of membership on the ground of undesirable conduct. Bye-Laws 22 and 23 are not applicable to the facts of the case. A perusal of Bye-law No.24 discloses that, ''Membership may be terminated by removal of name on the ground of undesirable conduct as under:-

a) If the conduct of a member be deemed by the

Working Committee or State or Territorial Branch Council or a Local Branch, prejudicial to the interest of the

Association or be calculated to bring the medical profession into disrepute, the Working Committee or the

State or Terr. Branch Council or the Local Branch, as the ­8­ O.P.No.2589/2008 case may be, may ask him to submit a written explanation of his conduct, in the event of the explanation being found unsatisfactory, the member may be asked either to apologise or to resign from the Association. If the member is agreeable, his apology shall be given due consideration and in case of a Branch Member, it shall be sent to the Headquarters through the State or Territorial

Branch, if one exists, with a confidential note giving details of the case for future reference. In the event of said member refusing either to apologise or to resign when asked to do so, a general meeting of the Local

Branch shall be called to consider the case and at least 7 days notice of the meeting shall be given to the member concerned and he shall be given an opportunity to explain his conduct if he desires to do so if at the meeting 3/4th of the members present and voting record their votes for the removal of his name from membership, the resolution shall be sent to the Headquarters through the State or

Territorial Branch, if one exists for final decision and in the event of the Working Committee concurring with the resolution of the Local Branch by 2/3rd majority, the

Working Committee by a similar majority should determine the nature of punishment which may be one of the following:.

1. Censuring.

2. Debarring his from being nominated/elected for any office of the Association or its State or Local Branch for a specified period.

3. Suspension from membership,

4. Removal of his name.

(b) By removal of name on the ground of conviction in a Court of Justice:-

Ipso facto (i) upon sentence after conviction in a court of justice for any crime entailing moral ­9­ O.P.No.2589/2008 turpitude, (ii) upon being deregistered by any

Medical Council of India on the ground of unethical conduct, from the date of de-registration and for the period of de-registration except in case of non- payment of renewal fee, if any, in the registering

Council or (ii) upon forfeiture through misconduct of the medical qualification by virtue of which he became eligible for membership.

(c) In case of Direct Members, similar procedure shall be followed by the State or Territorial

Branches and the Working Committee, as the case may be.''

The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 contended that no plausible explanation was offered by the petitioner to show that he was the President of Nehrunagar branch,

Khammam and relied upon Ex.B-2, a letter addressed by the Hony.

Secretary of IMA Nehrunagar branch to the Hon.General Secretary of IMA A.P. State dated 24-8-2008 intimating that no election was conducted to the President post of IMA Nehrunagar branch after expiry of Dr.J.M.Swamy, who was elected as President in 1999.

The learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contended that none of the members of Nehrunagar branch filed a complaint and the Journal published by the IMA disclosed the name of the petitioner as President for four consecutive years from 2005 onwards and that R.W-2 also admitted in his cross- examination about the same and relied upon Ex.A-6, the publication of IMA AP State of its 47th Annual Medical Conference and 50th ­10­ O.P.No.2589/2008

Annual Medical Conference, wherein the name of the petitioner was published as the President of the Nehrunagar branch,

Khammam.

But it is not within the purview of this Court to decide the truth of the allegations made against him. The only consideration before this Court in this case is whether the procedure adopted by the 1st respondent in terminating the petitioner from the membership of the 1st respondent/association was illegal or contrary to the principles of natural justice. As per

Bye-law No.24 of the Indian Medical Association, for terminating the membership of any member, 7 days notice is required to be given and he should be given an opportunity to explain his conduct and 3/4th of members present in the general meeting of the local branch should vote for the removal of his name from membership and a resolution should be sent to the headquarters through the

State or territorial branch and if the working committee concurrs with the resolution of the local branch by 2/3rd majority, the working committee also by 2/3rd majority should determine the nature of punishment. Ex.A-2, the notice issued to the petitioner asking him to furnish the details of the proof of his election as

President of IMA Nehrunagar branch dated 16-8-2008 disclosed that he was asked to appear before the Chair Person Disciplinary

Committee on 21-8-2008. The dates found in Ex.A-2 do not disclose that a clear 7 days notice was given to the petitioner to offer his ­11­ O.P.No.2589/2008 explanation. Without giving him an opportunity to offer his explanation, the disciplinary committee expressed its opinion to suspend the petitioner for a period of five years, as disclosed in

Ex.A-15 on 25-9-2008. Ex.A-11 discloses that initially Dr.Kasturi

Pramila, Chair Person Disciplinary Committee was asked to conduct enquiry against the petitioner and Ex.A-14 disclosed that as the Two Member Committee headed by Dr.Kasturi Pramila was unable to convene the meeting of disciplinary committee on 21-8-2008, Dr. Laxman Rao was appointed as the Convenor of the

Disciplinary Committee on 14-8-2008 and that the same was informed to the petitioner on 16-8-2008 as per Ex.A-2. Ex.A-15 disclosed that a Six Member Disciplinary Committee passed resolution recommending the suspension of the petitioner on 25-9-2008. The respondent No.1 had not adduced any evidence to show that he intimated the petitioner as to the formation of a six member disciplinary committee to conduct enquiry against him and that the said committee called for the explanation of the petitioner

before recommending the suspension of the petitioner, which was

found to be not in accordance with the principles of natural justice, as no opportunity was provided to the petitioner before passing an order of termination against him. Ex.A-15 also disclosed that the cause of action against the petitioner, recommending his suspension was the petitioner sending letters to the members of

IMA AP State and Presidents, Secretaries of IMA AP State Local ­12­ O.P.No.2589/2008

Branches on the letter head of IMA Nehrunagar branch and that the said letters were damaging the image and respect of IMA.

Ex.A-2, the notice issued to the petitioner on 16-8-2008 does not disclose the said allegation made against him or that he was asked to submit his explanation about it. Ex.A-2 only called for the proof of the election of the petitioner as President of IMA Nehrunagar branch, but not with regard to his sending letters damaging the reputation of IMA which was considered to be the reason for the disciplinary committee recommending for suspension of the petitioner. Hence, it discloses that the petitioner was asked to submit his explanation on an aspect which was different from the aspect which the disciplinary committee considered recommending him for suspension. Ex.A-1 also disclosed that Dr.Kasturi Pramila convenor of the disciplinary committee submitted a report to the 155th State Working Committee Meeting held on 26-10-2008 at 9

AM at Puttaparthi and the said resolution was accepted unanimously by the State Working Committee and recommended to the State Council for suspension of the petitioner from the membership of IMA AP State for five years.

The evidence of P.W-2, a former President of IMA AP

State and also the former Chairman of IMA AP State disclosed that

Dr.Kasturi Pramila moved a resolution recommending suspension of the petitioner in the annual conference meeting held at

Puttaparthi and that he raised an objection stating that it was not ­13­ O.P.No.2589/2008 in the agenda and hence it could not be placed in the meeting without notice to the members, as such the idea of moving the resolution was withdrawn then and there itself. He stated that no discussion was held on the issue of the petitioner and no working committee meeting was held on that day and only a record was created by the respondents as to the holding of the working committee meeting. He stated that if any working committee meeting was held, it would have been reflected in the State 51st

Annual Conference Book and no such meeting was held. Nothing was elicited in the cross-examination of P.W-2 to disprove the said aspects by him in cross-examination. The agenda of the meeting and the resolution passed by the State Working Committee were not placed before the Court. No evidence was placed before the

Court to show that the resolution was accepted by 2/3rd majority of the members present. Ex.A-1 also disclosed that the State Council meeting was held on 26-9-2008 at 12 PM at Puttaparthi and accepted the working committee recommendation. The said aspect was pointed out by the petitioner as the State Council Meeting was said to be held one month prior to the recommendation of the

Working Committee Meeting recommending his suspension which was not proper. The respondents submitted that it was only due to inadvertence the date was typed as 26th September, 2008. Even if it was considered as a typing mistake, the entire process of terminating the membership of the petitioner disclosed that it was ­14­ O.P.No.2589/2008 conducted in a hasty manner without following the procedure prescribed under Bye-laws or the principles of natural justice. The respondent No.1 does not appear to have given a clear 7 days notice to the petitioner asking for his explanation and there does not appear to be a discussion and voting among the members of local branch as well as in the working committee before passing a resolution as to his termination. Hence, I consider that the the respondent No.1 had not followed the procedure rescribed underr the bye-laws for terminating the petitioner from its membership and the order passed by them dated 30-10-2008 was also not in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Hence, I hold the termination of the petitioner from membership of the 1st respondent-association vide order dated 30-10-2008 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice. Issue

No.1 is answered accordingly in favour of the petitioner.

9.ISSUE NO.2.

In the result, the petition is allowed declaring the termination of the petitioner from the membership by the respondent No.1-

Association through impugned order dated 30-10-2008 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice. No costs.

Dictated to the Senior Assistant, transcribed by him,

corrected and pronounced by me in open court on this the 28th day of

March, 2012.

III ADDL.CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURT: HYDERABAD ­15­ O.P.No.2589/2008

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

WITNESSES EXMAINED FOR

PETITIONER RESPONDENTS

P.W-1: Dr.ASR Gangadhar RaoR.W-1Dr. Srinivas Raju P.W-2: Dr.V.Ram PrasadR.W-2: Dr.N.Appa Rao

DOCUMENTS MARKED FOR PETITIONER

Ex.A-1: Original copy of suspension order dt. 30.10.2008 Ex.A-2: Original copy of notice from respondent dt. 16.8.2008 Ex.A-3: Original copy of explanation of petitioner dt. 19.8.2008 Ex.A-4: Certified copy of order passed in I.A.No.2834/2008 in O.P.No.1588/2008 Ex.A-5: C.C. of interim order in I.A.No.3393/2008 in OP 1900/2008 Ex.A-6: Xerox copy of 47 to 50th State Council Meeting Book of IMA of A.P State, Ex.A-7: Xerox copy of bye-laws of IMA, Ex.A-8: Notary copy of life member certificate issued by IMA New Delhi Ex.A-9: Original copy of letter sent by IMA regarding Dr.N.Appa Rao FSS dt. 1.12.2007 Ex.A-10: Original copy of bunch of achievements of Dr.N,Appa Rao Ex.A-11: Letter of R-1 to Dr.Primila dt. 8.1.2008 Ex.A-12: Letter of R-1 to petitioner dt. 8-1-2008 Ex.A-13: Letter of R-1 to Dr.B.Mohan Rao, dt. 29.1.2008 Ex.A-14: Letter of R-1 to Dr.V.Laxman Rao dt. 14.8.2008 Ex.A-15: Decision of Six Member Committee dt. 25.9.2008 Ex.A-16: Letter from Dr.P.Gorkey, Secretary IMA Nehru Nagar Br. Khammam dt. 10.1.2009

DOCUMENTS MARKED FOR RESPONDENTS

Ex.B-1: Memorandum of Rules and Bye-laws of IMA Ex.B-2: Letter dt. 24.8.2008 addressed to Dr.B.Mohan Rao by Dr.P.Gorkey, Ex.B-3: Letter dt. 30.12.2008 addressed to Dr.Srinivasa Raju by IMA (Hqrs) New Delhi, Ex.B-4: Postal receipt, Ex.B-5: Postal receipt.

III ADDL.CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURT:HYDERABAD

IN THE COURT OF THE III ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE:

CITY CIVIL COURT: AT HYDERABAD

Dated this the 28th day of March, 2012.

PRESENT: DR.SMT.G.RADHA RANI, B.Sc.,LL.M.,Ph.D.,

III ADDL.CHIEF JUDGE

O.P.No.2589 of 2008

Between:-

Dr. A.S.R.Gangadhara Rao.

...PETITIONER

And

1. The Indian Medical Association, A.P.State rep. by its Honorary General Secretary, Ch. Srinivasa Raju,

2. Dr. N. Appa Rao.

...RESPONDENTS

This petition coming on for final disposal before me in the presence of Sri K.V.Bhanu Prasad, Advocate for the petitioner and of Sri V.V.Anil Kumar, Advocate for the respondent No.1 and

Sri Sunil B.Ganu, Advocate for the respondent No.2 and the matter having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court made the following:- : O R D E R:

1.This petition is filed by the petitioner under Sec. 23 of the Public Societies Registration Act to declare the termination of his membership by the respondent No.1 association through the impugned order dated 30-10-2008 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice.

2.The petitioner submitted that for the purpose of removing his membership from the respondent No.1-association, the 2nd respondent hatched a plan to show that the petitioner was claiming himself as President of Nehru Nagar Local Branch at ­2­ O.P.No.2589/2008

Khammam and was trying to create a record to show that he was not the President of the Nehru Nagar local branch. He submitted that the impugned order does not indicate the reason for his suspension and submitted that he was not given an opportunity to be heard by the disciplinary committee before taking a decision and that it was in violation of the principles of natural justice and also the bye-laws. He submitted that the disciplinary committee never required him to attend before it or give explanation in writing which was mandatory under the bye-laws. He further submitted that the working committee meeting was said to be held on 26-10-2008 at 9 A.M. at Puttaparthi and the resolution was said to be communicated to the State Council, but the suspension order was passed on 26-9-2008 at 12 PM by the respondent No.1 even

before the so-called decision taken by the disciplinary committee

which showed the over enthusiasm of the respondents 1 and 2 to throw him out of the membership of the association.

3.The respondent No.1 filed counter denying the petition averments. He submitted that the petitioner was in the habit of propagating rumours and without having any office bearer post or designation, he used to claim that he was holding the post of

President of Nehrunagar branch, Khammam, the petitioner was given an opportunity to attend before the disciplinary committee, but he failed to appear before the committee and the disciplinary committee recommended for suspension of the petitioner. He ­3­ O.P.No.2589/2008 submitted that there was no illegality or irregularity in the action of the 1st respondent in suspending the petitioner, the petitioner tried to confuse the timings of the meetings held on 26-10-2008 at

Puttaparthi but a plain reading of the letter dated 30-10-2008 would make it clear that the working committee meeting was held at 9 A.M. and the State Council accepted the recommendation of the State Working Committee at 12 P.M. He further submitted that

IMA (Head quarters), New Delhi suspended the petitioner from the membership and the same was communicated by its letter dated 30-12-2008. As the petitioner prime membership was under suspension, the petitioner has to challenge the proceedings of IMA

Headquarters, New Delhi by filing appropriate proceedings at New

Delhi and that there was an arbitration clause in the Memorandum

Rules and Bye-laws of IMA and that the petition was not maintainable and prayed to dismiss the petition with costs.

4.The respondent No.2 filed counter on the same lines as that of the 1st respondent adopting the counter of the 1st respondent and further submitted that the allegations made against him were without any basis and that he was commanding respect from one and all except from a few persons like that of the petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner requested for his candidature to Medical Council of India elections in the year 2002, but as he did not support him, he contested and got only six votes in the said election. He submitted that the petitioner made efforts ­4­ O.P.No.2589/2008 to stall the Goa meeting and denied that they removed the petitioner from the family pension scheme as well as from the membership of IMA having grudge against him and prayed to dismiss the OP.

5.Basing on the said pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial.

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled for declaring his termination from the membership by the respondent No.1 association through the impugned order dated 30-10-2008 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice as prayed for?

2. To what relief?

6.The petitioner had examined P.Ws 1 and 2 and marked

Exs.A-1 to A-16. The respondent No.1 examined R.W-1 and the respondent No.2 examined himself as R.W-2. Exs.B-1 to B-5 were marked on behalf of the respondents.

7.Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the respondents 1 and 2.

8.ISSUE NO.1

The petitioner examined himself as P.W-1. He stated that the order dated 30-10-2008 did not indicate the reason for his suspension and the disciplinary committee never requested him to attend before them or to give any explanation in writing, which was mandatory procedure under the bye-law. His another contention was that the suspension order was passed on 26-9-2008 at 12 PM ­5­ O.P.No.2589/2008 one month prior to the working committee meeting on 26-10-2008 which was perse improper. He submitted that he was asked to appear before the two member committee on 21-8-2008, but the two member committee never sat for taking any action and a Six member Committee took a decision behind his back without notice to him which was in violation of the principles of natural justice and the procedure contemplated under the bye-laws. He relied upon

Exs.A-1 to A-16 in support of his contention. Ex.A-1 is the suspension order dated 30-10-2008. Ex.A-1 disclosed that the

Hon.General Secretary of IMA, A.P. State intimated to the

petitioner about the decision of the State Council to suspend the petitioner from membership of IMA, A.P. State for five years. The said letter revealed that Dr.Kasturi Pramila, Convenor-Disciplinary

Committee of IMA AP State had submitted a report to the 155th

State Working Committee Meeting held on 26-10-2008 at 9 AM at

Puttaparthi and the said resolution was accepted unanimously by

State Working Committee and recommended to the State Council to suspend the petitioner from the membership of IMA AP State for five years and the State Council Meeting held on 26-9-2008 at 12

PM at Puttaparthi had accepted the 155th State Working Committee recommendation and that the same was conveyed to the petitioner.

Ex.A-2 is the notice issued to the petitioner. It disclosed that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 16-8-2008 calling for proof of his election as President IMA Nehru Nagar Branch and ­6­ O.P.No.2589/2008 to appear before the Chair-person, Disciplinary Committee, IMA AP

State on 21-8-2008. Dr.Laxman Rao, Finance Secretary of IMA was said to be the Convenor for the said meeting. Ex.A-3 is the letter addressed by the petitioner to the Secretary, IMA dated 19-8-2008 stating his inability to attend the said meeting on 21-8-2008 because of his prior occupation. Ex.A-8 disclosed that the petitioner was a Life Member of IMA through its Nehrunagar branch, A.P. Ex.A-11 is the letter dated 8-1-2008 addressed by the

Hony. General Secretary IMA AP State to Dr.Kasturi Pramila,

Chairman Disciplinary Committee to conduct enquiry against the petitioner for designating himself as President, IMA Nehrunagar branch of Khammam District without being elected by the members of IMA Nehrunagar branch. Ex.A-12 is the letter addressed by the said Hony.General Secretary of IMA AP on the same day to the petitioner to show cause as to why an action could not be initiated against him for pronouncing himself as self-elected and self- designated President of IMA Nehrunagar branch and that the matter was referred to Dr.Kasturi Pramila, Chairman Disciplinary

Committee, IMA A.P. Hyderabad. Ex.A-13 is the letter addressed by the same Hony.Secretary General, IMA dated 29-1-2008 certifying that the petitioner was not the President of IMA

Nehrunagar branch, A.P. State. Ex.A-14 is the letter addressed by the Hony.General Secretary of IMA, A.P. State to Dr.V.Laxman Rao

dated 14-8-2008 intimating his appointment as Convenor of

­7­ O.P.No.2589/2008

Disciplinary Committee of IMA AP State to convene the meeting on 21-8-2008 due to the inability of Dr.Kasturi Pramila to convene the meeting of Two Member Disciplinary Committee. Ex.A-15 is the resolution passed by the Six Member Disciplinary Committee held on 25-9-2008 recommending the suspension of the petitioner and their decision to submit it to the State Working Committee and the

State Council Meeting for approval.

A perusal of the Memorandum Rules and Bye-laws of the

Association under Ex.B-1 disclosed that part-III deals with the bye- laws of the Association and the termination of membership of any member was discussed under Bye-Laws 22 to 24 and Bye-law

No.22 relates to the termination of membership by way of resignation and Bye-law No.23 pertains to termination of membership on account of non-payment of subscription fee and

Bye-law No.24 deals with the termination of membership on the ground of undesirable conduct. Bye-Laws 22 and 23 are not applicable to the facts of the case. A perusal of Bye-law No.24 discloses that, ''Membership may be terminated by removal of name on the ground of undesirable conduct as under:-

a) If the conduct of a member be deemed by the

Working Committee or State or Territorial Branch Council or a Local Branch, prejudicial to the interest of the

Association or be calculated to bring the medical profession into disrepute, the Working Committee or the

State or Terr. Branch Council or the Local Branch, as the ­8­ O.P.No.2589/2008 case may be, may ask him to submit a written explanation of his conduct, in the event of the explanation being found unsatisfactory, the member may be asked either to apologise or to resign from the Association. If the member is agreeable, his apology shall be given due consideration and in case of a Branch Member, it shall be sent to the Headquarters through the State or Territorial

Branch, if one exists, with a confidential note giving details of the case for future reference. In the event of said member refusing either to apologise or to resign when asked to do so, a general meeting of the Local

Branch shall be called to consider the case and at least 7 days notice of the meeting shall be given to the member concerned and he shall be given an opportunity to explain his conduct if he desires to do so if at the meeting 3/4th of the members present and voting record their votes for the removal of his name from membership, the resolution shall be sent to the Headquarters through the State or

Territorial Branch, if one exists for final decision and in the event of the Working Committee concurring with the resolution of the Local Branch by 2/3rd majority, the

Working Committee by a similar majority should determine the nature of punishment which may be one of the following:.

1. Censuring.

2. Debarring his from being nominated/elected for any office of the Association or its State or Local Branch for a specified period.

3. Suspension from membership,

4. Removal of his name.

(b) By removal of name on the ground of conviction in a Court of Justice:-

Ipso facto (i) upon sentence after conviction in a court of justice for any crime entailing moral ­9­ O.P.No.2589/2008 turpitude, (ii) upon being deregistered by any

Medical Council of India on the ground of unethical conduct, from the date of de-registration and for the period of de-registration except in case of non- payment of renewal fee, if any, in the registering

Council or (ii) upon forfeiture through misconduct of the medical qualification by virtue of which he became eligible for membership.

(c) In case of Direct Members, similar procedure shall be followed by the State or Territorial

Branches and the Working Committee, as the case may be.''

The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 contended that no plausible explanation was offered by the petitioner to show that he was the President of Nehrunagar branch,

Khammam and relied upon Ex.B-2, a letter addressed by the Hony.

Secretary of IMA Nehrunagar branch to the Hon.General Secretary of IMA A.P. State dated 24-8-2008 intimating that no election was conducted to the President post of IMA Nehrunagar branch after expiry of Dr.J.M.Swamy, who was elected as President in 1999.

The learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contended that none of the members of Nehrunagar branch filed a complaint and the Journal published by the IMA disclosed the name of the petitioner as President for four consecutive years from 2005 onwards and that R.W-2 also admitted in his cross- examination about the same and relied upon Ex.A-6, the publication of IMA AP State of its 47th Annual Medical Conference and 50th ­10­ O.P.No.2589/2008

Annual Medical Conference, wherein the name of the petitioner was published as the President of the Nehrunagar branch,

Khammam.

But it is not within the purview of this Court to decide the truth of the allegations made against him. The only consideration before this Court in this case is whether the procedure adopted by the 1st respondent in terminating the petitioner from the membership of the 1st respondent/association was illegal or contrary to the principles of natural justice. As per

Bye-law No.24 of the Indian Medical Association, for terminating the membership of any member, 7 days notice is required to be given and he should be given an opportunity to explain his conduct and 3/4th of members present in the general meeting of the local branch should vote for the removal of his name from membership and a resolution should be sent to the headquarters through the

State or territorial branch and if the working committee concurrs with the resolution of the local branch by 2/3rd majority, the working committee also by 2/3rd majority should determine the nature of punishment. Ex.A-2, the notice issued to the petitioner asking him to furnish the details of the proof of his election as

President of IMA Nehrunagar branch dated 16-8-2008 disclosed that he was asked to appear before the Chair Person Disciplinary

Committee on 21-8-2008. The dates found in Ex.A-2 do not disclose that a clear 7 days notice was given to the petitioner to offer his ­11­ O.P.No.2589/2008 explanation. Without giving him an opportunity to offer his explanation, the disciplinary committee expressed its opinion to suspend the petitioner for a period of five years, as disclosed in

Ex.A-15 on 25-9-2008. Ex.A-11 discloses that initially Dr.Kasturi

Pramila, Chair Person Disciplinary Committee was asked to conduct enquiry against the petitioner and Ex.A-14 disclosed that as the Two Member Committee headed by Dr.Kasturi Pramila was unable to convene the meeting of disciplinary committee on 21-8-2008, Dr. Laxman Rao was appointed as the Convenor of the

Disciplinary Committee on 14-8-2008 and that the same was informed to the petitioner on 16-8-2008 as per Ex.A-2. Ex.A-15 disclosed that a Six Member Disciplinary Committee passed resolution recommending the suspension of the petitioner on 25-9-2008. The respondent No.1 had not adduced any evidence to show that he intimated the petitioner as to the formation of a six member disciplinary committee to conduct enquiry against him and that the said committee called for the explanation of the petitioner

before recommending the suspension of the petitioner, which was

found to be not in accordance with the principles of natural justice, as no opportunity was provided to the petitioner before passing an order of termination against him. Ex.A-15 also disclosed that the cause of action against the petitioner, recommending his suspension was the petitioner sending letters to the members of

IMA AP State and Presidents, Secretaries of IMA AP State Local ­12­ O.P.No.2589/2008

Branches on the letter head of IMA Nehrunagar branch and that the said letters were damaging the image and respect of IMA.

Ex.A-2, the notice issued to the petitioner on 16-8-2008 does not disclose the said allegation made against him or that he was asked to submit his explanation about it. Ex.A-2 only called for the proof of the election of the petitioner as President of IMA Nehrunagar branch, but not with regard to his sending letters damaging the reputation of IMA which was considered to be the reason for the disciplinary committee recommending for suspension of the petitioner. Hence, it discloses that the petitioner was asked to submit his explanation on an aspect which was different from the aspect which the disciplinary committee considered recommending him for suspension. Ex.A-1 also disclosed that Dr.Kasturi Pramila convenor of the disciplinary committee submitted a report to the 155th State Working Committee Meeting held on 26-10-2008 at 9

AM at Puttaparthi and the said resolution was accepted unanimously by the State Working Committee and recommended to the State Council for suspension of the petitioner from the membership of IMA AP State for five years.

The evidence of P.W-2, a former President of IMA AP

State and also the former Chairman of IMA AP State disclosed that

Dr.Kasturi Pramila moved a resolution recommending suspension of the petitioner in the annual conference meeting held at

Puttaparthi and that he raised an objection stating that it was not ­13­ O.P.No.2589/2008 in the agenda and hence it could not be placed in the meeting without notice to the members, as such the idea of moving the resolution was withdrawn then and there itself. He stated that no discussion was held on the issue of the petitioner and no working committee meeting was held on that day and only a record was created by the respondents as to the holding of the working committee meeting. He stated that if any working committee meeting was held, it would have been reflected in the State 51st

Annual Conference Book and no such meeting was held. Nothing was elicited in the cross-examination of P.W-2 to disprove the said aspects by him in cross-examination. The agenda of the meeting and the resolution passed by the State Working Committee were not placed before the Court. No evidence was placed before the

Court to show that the resolution was accepted by 2/3rd majority of the members present. Ex.A-1 also disclosed that the State Council meeting was held on 26-9-2008 at 12 PM at Puttaparthi and accepted the working committee recommendation. The said aspect was pointed out by the petitioner as the State Council Meeting was said to be held one month prior to the recommendation of the

Working Committee Meeting recommending his suspension which was not proper. The respondents submitted that it was only due to inadvertence the date was typed as 26th September, 2008. Even if it was considered as a typing mistake, the entire process of terminating the membership of the petitioner disclosed that it was ­14­ O.P.No.2589/2008 conducted in a hasty manner without following the procedure prescribed under Bye-laws or the principles of natural justice. The respondent No.1 does not appear to have given a clear 7 days notice to the petitioner asking for his explanation and there does not appear to be a discussion and voting among the members of local branch as well as in the working committee before passing a resolution as to his termination. Hence, I consider that the the respondent No.1 had not followed the procedure rescribed underr the bye-laws for terminating the petitioner from its membership and the order passed by them dated 30-10-2008 was also not in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Hence, I hold the termination of the petitioner from membership of the 1st respondent-association vide order dated 30-10-2008 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice. Issue

No.1 is answered accordingly in favour of the petitioner.

9.ISSUE NO.2.

In the result, the petition is allowed declaring the termination of the petitioner from the membership by the respondent No.1-

Association through impugned order dated 30-10-2008 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice. No costs.

Dictated to the Senior Assistant, transcribed by him,

corrected and pronounced by me in open court on this the 28th day of

March, 2012.

III ADDL.CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURT: HYDERABAD ­15­ O.P.No.2589/2008

APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

WITNESSES EXMAINED FOR

PETITIONER RESPONDENTS

P.W-1: Dr.ASR Gangadhar RaoR.W-1Dr. Srinivas Raju P.W-2: Dr.V.Ram PrasadR.W-2: Dr.N.Appa Rao

DOCUMENTS MARKED FOR PETITIONER

Ex.A-1: Original copy of suspension order dt. 30.10.2008 Ex.A-2: Original copy of notice from respondent dt. 16.8.2008 Ex.A-3: Original copy of explanation of petitioner dt. 19.8.2008 Ex.A-4: Certified copy of order passed in I.A.No.2834/2008 in O.P.No.1588/2008 Ex.A-5: C.C. of interim order in I.A.No.3393/2008 in OP 1900/2008 Ex.A-6: Xerox copy of 47 to 50th State Council Meeting Book of IMA of A.P State, Ex.A-7: Xerox copy of bye-laws of IMA, Ex.A-8: Notary copy of life member certificate issued by IMA New Delhi Ex.A-9: Original copy of letter sent by IMA regarding Dr.N.Appa Rao FSS dt. 1.12.2007 Ex.A-10: Original copy of bunch of achievements of Dr.N,Appa Rao Ex.A-11: Letter of R-1 to Dr.Primila dt. 8.1.2008 Ex.A-12: Letter of R-1 to petitioner dt. 8-1-2008 Ex.A-13: Letter of R-1 to Dr.B.Mohan Rao, dt. 29.1.2008 Ex.A-14: Letter of R-1 to Dr.V.Laxman Rao dt. 14.8.2008 Ex.A-15: Decision of Six Member Committee dt. 25.9.2008 Ex.A-16: Letter from Dr.P.Gorkey, Secretary IMA Nehru Nagar Br. Khammam dt. 10.1.2009

DOCUMENTS MARKED FOR RESPONDENTS

Ex.B-1: Memorandum of Rules and Bye-laws of IMA Ex.B-2: Letter dt. 24.8.2008 addressed to Dr.B.Mohan Rao by Dr.P.Gorkey, Ex.B-3: Letter dt. 30.12.2008 addressed to Dr.Srinivasa Raju by IMA (Hqrs) New Delhi, Ex.B-4: Postal receipt, Ex.B-5: Postal receipt.

III ADDL.CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURT:HYDERABAD

IN THE COURT OF THE II ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURTS : HYDERABAD

Tuesday, the 16th day of APRIL, 2013

Present: Sri A.HARI HARA NADHA SARMA,B.Sc.,B.L.,

II ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

A.S.No.355 of 2011

Between:

S.Mohan Das... Appellant

AND

1. The State of A.P. rep. by its

Principal Secretary to Government,

School Education (Exam) Department, Government of A.P. Secretariat, Hyderabad.

2. The Director of School Education, Government of A.P. Saifabad, Beside Telephone Bhavan, Hyderabad.

3. The District Education Officer, Hyderabad District, Opp: Nizam College, Hyderabad.

4. State Bank of Hyderabad, Rep. by its Managing Director, Head Office Gunfoundary,

Hyderabad.... Respondents

APPEAL AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 21­03­2009 PASSED BY THE III JUNIOR CIVIL JUDGE : CITY CIVIL COURT

AT HYDERABAD

IN

O.S.No.2388 of 2009

Between:

S.Mohan Das... Plaintiff

AND

The State of A.P. and others... Defendants

This Appeal Suit coming on 25­03­2013 for final hearing and 

Page ­ 2AS355­11dcln disposal before me in the presence of Sri P.P.Jaya Chandra, Advocate 

for the Appellant, of Sri K.Bala Krishna, Government Pleader for 

Respondents 1 to 3, and of Sri V.Raghu, Advocate for the Respondent 

No.4, and having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:­

J U D G M E N T

1)One Mr. S.Mohan Das (hereinafter referred to as 'appellant') filed the present appeal assailing the decree and judgment dated 21­3­ 2011 passed in O.S.No.2388/2009 by III Junior Civil Judge, City Civil 

Court, Hyderabad.

2)Appellant filed the suit in O.S.No.2388/2009 for declaring that his date of birth is 27­9­1951 but not 5­7­1949 and for a direction to defendants 2 to 4 in the suit to rectify the date of birth of appellant 

as 27­9­1951 instead of 5­7­1949 in their records.

3)(i) The case of appellant in brief is that he belongs to 

Schedule Caste illiterate family and he was born on 27­9­1951 and brought up by his grand parents. He was admitted in Government 

High School, Kulsumpura, Karwan, Hyderabad and studied there upto 

VI Class. Thereafter he has taken admission in Government High 

School, Vijayanagar Colony, Hyderabad and studied upto HSE in that 

Page ­ 3AS355­11dcln school. His parents and grand parents being illiterate, furnished in­ correct date of birth to school authorities without obtaining birth certificate from municipal authorities. He joined in service in State 

Bank of Hyderabad in the year 1975 and his date of birth was entered in service record maintained by respondent No.4 as 5­7­1949 instead of 27­9­1951. The appellant has no occasion to verify his correct date of birth. But recently he noticed the incorrect entry in his service record as to his date of birth when he obtained date of birth certificate from Municipal Authorities.

3) (ii) Further case of appellant is that after demise of his father during discussion with his mother, he was informed that his date of birth is 27­9­1951 but not 5­7­1949 and he was also informed that he was born in Government Maternity Hospital, Nayapool, Hyderabad and pursuant to such information he verified from the record of Births and 

Deaths Register maintained by Municipal Authorities and obtained birth certificate. After obtaining the certificate, the appellant approa­ ched respondents 1 to 3 for correction of date of birth in school certifi­ cates by making the representation on 9­2­2007 and on 11­7­2008 res­ pondent No.2 issued proceedings rejecting the request made by the 

Page ­ 4AS355­11dcln plaintiff.

3) (iii) Further case of appellant is that the date of birth certi­ ficate obtained by him is a legally valid one and the same is sufficient to carry out corrections in school records and also service record. The rejection proceedings issued by the second defendant on the ground of delay is illegal and arbitrary and even the proceedings of Government 

dated 14­3­2008 mentioned by second defendant are not binding on 

the appellant as they are issued in violation of principles of natural justice.

3) (iv) Further case of appellant is that he came to know about the wrong entry of his date of birth in the year 2003 and immediately, he obtained birth certificate from Municipal Authorities on 5­2­2003 and submitted representation to the school and other authorities and he has been pursuing the issue constantly. Thus, there is no delay on his part and he is entitled for correction of date of birth as he approa­ ched the concerned authorities and the Court soon after the knowledge as to correct date of birth.

4)The suit filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Court below by referring to various authorities and Government Orders and 

Page ­ 5AS355­11dcln also the conduct of appellant in waiting till the verge of his retirement. 

Aggrieved by the dismissal, the present appeal is filed. The appellant claims that the trial Court ought to have considered that the appellant got knowledge about mistake in the date of birth only during the year 2003 and soon thereafter, he has initiated proceedings for correction and principles of estoppel etc., cannot be applied.

5)(i) Written statement was filed on behalf of defendants 1 to 3 contending that as per G.O.Ms.No.1263 Education dated 6­5­1961 and G.O.Ms.No.430 dated 31­12­1991 and G.O.Ms.No.1348 Education dt.15­12­1981 the application for alteration of date of birth shall be made within three years from the date of completion of SSLC/HSC/SSC and in respect of employees, as per G.O.Ms.No.165 Finance dated 2­4­ 1984 every Government Employee shall within one month from the date of joining duty, make a declaration as to his date of birth and 

Head of the Office shall maintain service record in respect of such employee after making enquiry as to the declaration made determining the date of birth and date of birth mentioned in the service record of employee concerned duly attested by the Head of the Office shall be final and binding on the employee and Government Employee is estop­

Page ­ 6AS355­11dcln ped from disputing the correctness of such date of birth. The date of birth determined and entered in service record shall not be altered except in case of bona fide clerical error or under the orders of the 

Government.

5) (ii) Further defendants 1 to 3 claimed that upon examining the rule position and after careful perusal of the request of the appel­ lant, proceedings were issued by second defendant rejecting his appli­ cation by duly following the guidelines given by Hon'ble Apex Court and the appellant is not entitled for the relief claimed at the belated stage and the suit is liable to be dismissed.

6)(i) Respondent No.4 filed written statement contending that the appellant executed a service contract at the time of joining in service and as per the contract date of birth of appellant is 5­7­1949 and date of superannuation is fixed as 31­7­2009. The said service contract is binding on the appellant and fourth respondent and appel­ lant cannot just before retirement seek for alteration of date of birth to his benefit and such acts of appellant would not only affect the emp­ loyment but also will have impact on other employees of the fourth defendant.

Page ­ 7AS355­11dcln

6) (ii) It is further contended by the fourth respondent that the 

G.Os. cited by the defendants 1 to 3 and the law is clear and settled that an employee cannot claim for correction of date of birth at a belated stage. Answering the contention of the appellant, fourth res­ pondent claimed that the appellant is not entitled for any of the reliefs prayed for.

7)Pursuant to pleadings, trial Court settled the following issues for trial:–

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of declara­ tion as prayed for?

2) To what relief?

Additional issue dated 17­6­2010 framed is:–

Whether the suit is barred by limitation?

8)During trial, plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and Exs A­1 to 

A­26 were got marked on his behalf. One C.Phaniraja Sudhakar, Chief 

Manager working for fourth respondent was examined as DW.1 and 

Exs B­1 to B­5 documents were got marked on behalf of fourth defen­ dant. Further one G.Sree Rama Murthy, Assistant Director of School 

Education was examined as DW.2.

Page ­ 8AS355­11dcln

9)Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the trial Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of delay and the trial Court ought to have taken note of date of birth certificate Ex A­1. He has further argued that since the appellant claimed that he came to know about the correct date of birth during 2003, the trial Court ought to have taken the date of knowledge as criteria. Written arguments are also filed for the appellant. On behalf of the respondents 1 to 4 learned 

Government Pleader argued in support of the decree and judgment passed by the Court below by inviting the attention of this Court to the 

Government Orders and with regard to the procedure to be followed for correction of date of birth and lapses of the appellant in following the procedure. Learned counsel for fourth respondent filed written arguments and cited certain authorities in support of his argument that at a belated stage, the prayer for correction of date of birth for an employee cannot be entertained.

10)The points that arise for consideration and determination are:–

1) Whether appellant is able to prove that his correct date of birth is 27­9­1951 and the date 5­7­1949 entered in his SSC etc., certificates is not correct and 

Whether there is delay on the part of the appellant in 

Page ­ 9AS355­11dcln taking steps for correction of date of birth and whether such delay is fatal for correction of date of birth?

2) Whether the impugned Decree and Judgment are sus­ tainable in law and on facts and whether any inter­ ference is necessary? If so, on what grounds?

3) What is the result of the appeal?

11)POINT No.1: Appellant has fairly admitted in his evidence that he has mentioned date of birth at the time of joining employment 

as 5th July, 1949 and he has submitted his B.Com. provisional and 

degree certificates and he has completed degree in the year 1974 and attended medical examination on 22­10­1975 at the time of joining service and he has given declaration as to date of birth as 5­7­1949 and his date of birth as per school records is 5­7­1949 and that he does not know date of birth should be corrected within three years from the date of completion of SSC and he retired from service on 31st July, 2009 and the suit is filed on 4­5­2009 and that there is delay of twenty eight years in making an application for correction of date of birth.

12)Here this Court finds it relevant to note the observations of 

Hon'ble Apex Court made in a case between Punjab & Haryana High 

Court at Chandigarh vs. Megh Raj Garg and another reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 2295 vide para 12 which are as follows:

Page ­ 10AS355­11dcln “12. This Court has time and again cautioned civil courts and the 

High Courts against entertaining and accepting the claim made by the employees long after entering into service for correction of the recorded date of birth. In Union of India v. Harnam Singh (AIR 1993 SC 1367 : 1993 AIR SCW 1241) (supra), this Court considered the question whether the employer was justified in declining the respondent's request for correction of date of birth made after thirty five years of his induction into the service and whether the Central 

Administrative Tribunal was justified in allowing the original appli­ cation filed by him. While reversing the order of the Tribunal, this 

Court observed:

“A Government servant, after entry into service, acquires the right to continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed by the 

State in exercise of its powers regulating conditions of service, un­ less the services are are dispensed with on other grounds contained in the relevant service rules after following the procedure prescribed therein. The date of birth entered in the service records of a civil servant is, thus of utmost importance for the reason that the right to continue in service stands decided by its entry in the service record. 

A Government servant who has declared his age at the initial stage of the employment is, if course, not precluded from making a request later on for correcting his age. It is open to a civil servant to claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of irrefu­ table proof relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is no period of limitation pres­ cribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the Government ser­ vant must do so without any unreasonable delay. In the absence of any provision in the rules for correction of date of birth, the general principle of refusing relief on grounds of laches or stale claims, is generally applied by the courts and tribunals. It is nonetheless competent for the Government to fix a time­limit in the service rules, after which no application for correction of date of birth of a 

Government servant can be entertained. A Government servant who makes an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time, so fixed, therefore, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction 

Page ­ 11AS355­11dcln of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the courts or tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire. Unless altered, his date of birth as recorded would determine his date of superannuation even if it amounts to abridging his right to continue in service on the basis of his actual age. Indeed, as held by this Court in State of Assam v. Daksha Prasad Deka (AIR 1971 SC 173) a public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record and apply for its correction but till the record is corrected he cannot claim to continue in service on the basis of the date of birth claimed by him. This Court said: (SCC pp.625­26, para 4) : (Para 4 of AIR) “... The date of compulsory retirement under F.R. 56 (a) must in our judgment, be determined on the basis of the service record, and not on what the respondent claimed to be his date of birth, unless the service record is first corrected consistently with the appropriate procedure. A public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record and may apply for correction of the record. But until the record is corrected, he cannot claim that he has been depri­ ved of the guarantee under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution by being compulsorily retired on attaining the age of superannuation on the footing of the date of birth entered in the service record.”.

(Emphasis supplied)

Although some other authorities are cited by respondent No.4, since the copies supplied are not containing full report and as they are deal­ ing with different context of entries in school registers under Section 35 of Evidence Act, they are not found relevant. Hence, they are not referred.

Page ­ 12AS355­11dcln

13)In the present case, the appellant has completed his gradu­ ation by the year 1974 and joined employment in the year 1975. He has simply stated that in the plaint he recently came to know about the correct date of birth. During evidence, he improved that that in 2003 he came to know about the date of birth while discussing it with his mother. The request of appellant for correction of date of birth in school records is rejected by the concerned authorities in view of the rule position that within three years from the date of completion of SSC application for correction of date of birth shall be made. The appellant is relying on Ex A­3 declaration made by his father before a notary as to his date of birth and also entry in Ex A­1. No person concerning Ex A­1 has been examined by the plaintiff. Whether Ex A­1 is the extract of entries made in the register is a doubt left unanswered. If it is an ex­ tract, how name of appellant is also mentioned in the birth register is again a doubt left unanswered. Ex A­1 and Ex A­3 are declarations which mother of appellant made before notary. There is no other material to believe the correctness of the date of birth. Ex A­1 is not properly proved. Even otherwise, in view of the rule position quoted under the Government Orders and also the observations of the Hon'ble 

Apex Court extracted above, the prayer of the appellant for correction 

Page ­ 13AS355­11dcln of date of birth at belated stage cannot be entertained.

14)Learned counsel for appellant argued that for proving Ex 

A­1, the trial Court ought to have summoned person concerned with it and atleast trial Court ought to have directed the concerned authorities to conduct enquiry as to date of birth. But dismissed the suit without providing proper opportunity. He has further argued that, atleast, appeal may be remanded to the Court below for providing an opportu­ nity to the appellant to lead further evidence. This argument of the appellant found not convincing as nothing would prevent the appellant from placing the required evidence and it is not the case of the appel­ lant that his attempt for leading evidence to prove Ex A­1 was denied by the Court below. Therefore, this argument found not convincing.

15)Admittedly, there is delay. When exactly, the appellant realised about Ex A­1 is not stated. Even if the appellant has realised in the year 2003, it was too late, certainly beyond the period mentioned in the Government Orders cited above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, unhesitantly, it can be concluded that appellant failed to prove his date of birth as 27­9­1951 and even if the said date be correct, there is inordinate delay and such delay is fatal to the appel­

Page ­ 14AS355­11dcln lant's claim. Hence, appellant is not entitled for the relief of correction of date of birth.

16)POINT No.2: In view of the discussion made above and conclusions drawn under point No.1, the decree and judgment passed by the Court below found sustainable both in law and on facts and interference is not found necessary. Hence, they are confirmed.

17)POINT No.3: In the result, appeal is dismissed with costs. 

Decree and Judgment dated 21­3­2011 passed in O.S.No.2388/2009 by the III Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad are confirmed.

Dictated to the Personal Assistant, transcribed and typed 

by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the Open Court, this the 16th day of APRIL, 2013.

II ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

City Civil Court, Hyderabad

 IN THE COURT OF THE II ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

CITY CIVIL COURTS : HYDERABAD

Tuesday, the 16th day of APRIL, 2013

Present: Sri A.HARI HARA NADHA SARMA,B.Sc.,B.L.,

II ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

C.M.A.No.133 of 2011

Between:

1. Mohd.Faheem Siddiqui

2. Smt.Ghousia Nasreen ... Appellants

AND

1. T.Krishnaswamy

2. Vishnu Rao

3. T.Padma Rao

4. T.Mohan Rao Nos.1 to 4 through their G.P.As.

1. Sirajul Haq

2. Mohd. Abid Ahmed Siddiqui

5. Syed Khaja Raziuddin... Respondents

APPEAL AGAINST ORDER AND DECRETAL ORDER DATED 22­11­2011 PASSED BY THE IV SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE : CITY CIVIL COURT : AT 

HYDERABAD

IN I.A.No.662 of 2011 in O.S.No.1912 of 2011

Between:

1. T.Krishnaswamy

2. Vishnu Rao

3. T.Padma Rao

4. T.Mohan Rao Nos.1 to 4 through their G.P.As.

1. Sirajul Haq

2. Mohd. Abid Ahmed Siddiqui

5. Syed Khaja Raziuddin ... Petitioners/Plaintiffs

AND

Page ­ 2CMA133­11

1. Mohd.Faheem Siddiqui

2. Smt. Ghousia Nasreen ... Respondents/Defendants

This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal coming on 06­02­2013 for final hearing and disposal before me in the presence of Sri Ch. Raghuveer 

Reddy, Advocate for the Appellants, and of Sri M.A.K.Mukheed, Advo­ cate for the Respondents, and having stood over for consideration till this day, this Court delivered the following:­

J U D G M E N T

1)This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the Order and Decretal Order dated 22­11­2011 passed in I.A.No.662 of 2011 in 

O.S.No.1912 of 2011 by the IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, 

Hyderabad. Appellants are the respondents/defendants before the 

Court below. Respondents herein are the petitioners and plaintiffs. For the sake of convenience parties herein are referred to as 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants'.

2)Plaintiffs filed the suit in O.S.No.1912/2011 for granting perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff No.5 in respect of the house property bearing municipal No.8­1­402/66/A in survey No.307 ad­ measuring 210 sq. yards situated at Shaikpet village and Mandal des­ cribed fully in schedule to the plaint.

Page ­ 3CMA133­11

3)(i) The case of plaintiffs in brief is that originally the pro­ perty in an extent of Ac. 4­02 gnts. was owned by the father of plain­ tiffs 1 to 4 Devaiah, which is a patta land and said Devaiah has pur­ chased the property through Government auction in the year 1968. 

After purchase of property by Devaiah, his name was added in Khasra in the year 1974. Subsequently, patta pass book and title deeds were issued in his name. Said Devaiah died on 6­4­1984 leaving behind plaintiffs 1 to 4 as his legal heirs. Plaintiffs 1 to 4 executed registered general power of attorney dated 9­10­1992 and their general power of attorney has laid plots and sold to various persons and said persons have constructed houses in the land sold and residing therein since long time. Said entire colony is developed and known as Mini Gulshan 

Colony.

3) (ii) Further case of plaintiffs is that plaintiff No.5 purchased house bearing No.8­1­402/66/A under agreement of sale dated 10­11­ 2004 by paying entire sale consideration of Rs.3,15,000/­ from the general power of attorney of the plaintiffs 1 to 4 and he has been in possession of the property. It is also the case of the plaintiffs that earlier one S.M.Sirajul Rahman setting up a false claim filed a suit for injunction against first plaintiff vide O.S.No.2544/1998 on the file of 

Page ­ 4CMA133­11

XVII Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and the said suit suffered dismissal for default. It is further claimed by the plaintiffs that defendants without any authority or right by taking aid of anti­social elements attempted to interfere with the suit schedule property on 9­7­ 2011, 17­9­2011 and 18­9­2011 but the said effort was resisted by the plaintiff No.5 with the timely intervention of elders and neighbours. 

However, as the threat of forceful invasion by defendants is staring against plaintiff No.5, suit and impugned proceedings are initiated seeking appropriate reliefs.

4)I.A.No.662/2011 was filed before the Court below, seeking temporary injunction restraining the interference of the defendants in respect of the suit schedule property.

5)(i) Case of defendants in brief is that the allegations made by the plaintiffs as to right and ownership of Devaiah and plaintiffs 1 to 4 succeeding to the estate of Devaiah, etc., are false. Said Devaiah was 

Patwari of village. With an intention to grab the land, he got his name mentioned in Pahanies and created some other documents but the original owner Sri Shaik Mohammed Hassan who got the property from 

Nizam Nawab asserted his rights. Thereafter, Devaiah stopped inter­

Page ­ 5CMA133­11 fering with the land. Late Shaik Mohammed Hassan and after his death, his son Dr.Sirajul Rahman made plots by laying roads and sold to third parties. Now a colony known as Mini Gulshan Colony is deve­ loped with 65 plots and all the plot owners of the said colony got their right and title over their respective plots through Dr. S.M. Sirajul 

Rahman. The plaintiffs create certain documents to make wrongful gain and there is no plot No.66 in the colony.

5) (ii) It is further claimed by the defendants that first defen­ dant purchased the property from Sayyada Zohra under absolute agree­ ment of sale dated 16­10­2006. Said Sayyada Zohra purchased the property from S.M.Sirajul Rahman under an agreement of sale dated 20­10­2003. First defendant has executed a registered gift settlement deed dated 16­2­2010 in favour of second defendant. Thus, the second defendant became the absolute owner and enjoying the property by obtaining electricity connection and by getting the property assessed to property tax.

5) (iii) It is further claimed by the defendants that earlier suit filed by Dr. S.M. Sirajul Rahman vide O.S.No.2544/1998 is with regard to interference of the first plaintiff in respect of all plots and for the 

Page ­ 6CMA133­11 reasons known to him, said Sirajul Rahman allowed suit suffered dis­ missal for default and such dismissal which is not on merits, cannot be used by the plaintiffs.

6)Learned IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad by considering the above referred pleas and also the documents Exs P­1 to 

P­18 and R­1 to R­24 exhibited by both sides, allowed I.A.No.662/ 2011 granting temporary injunction as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said orders, the present appeal is filed.

7)Heard both sides extensively. Perused the impugned orders, grounds of appeal, and recitals in the documents, Exs P­1 to P­18 and 

R­1 to R­24. Arguments advanced by both sides are given thoughtful consideration.

8)Appellants are disputing the sustainability of the impugned orders on the grounds,­ (i) trial Court failed to consider the plea taken by the defendants as to late Sri Shaik Mohammed Hassan getting the property from Nizam Nawab and his son Dr. S.M. Sirajul Rahman making plots and selling to third parties and developing Mini Gulshan 

Colony with 65 plots only and trial Court also failed to consider that petitioner failed to prove the acquisition of right by Devaiah from 

Page ­ 7CMA133­11 whom plaintiffs 1 to 4 are claiming right, (ii) trial Court erred in ignor­ ing the contention of defendants that there is no plot No.66 in Mini 

Gulshan Colony and trial Court also failed to consider that plaintiff 

No.5 ought to have obtained certificate from the association of Mini 

Gulshan Colony showing his membership, (iii) trial Court failed to con­ sider the letter issued by the Association of Mini Gulshan Colony show­ ing the membership of defendant No.1 in respect of the association and his ownership in respect of plot No.63, (iv) trial Court failed to consider the municipal tax receipts, electricity bills, etc., filed by the defendants and also the photographs filed showing the construction activity, (v) trial Court erred in referring the photostat copy of layout filed by the defendants although it was explained that plot Nos.66 to 69 shown in the photostat copy belongs to Archaeological Department of Central 

Government, and (vi) trial Court failed to consider the other applica­ tions filed by the defendants seeking appearance of plaintiff No.5 before the Court below and another application filed under Section 340 of 

Criminal Procedure Code.

9)Arguments are advanced for the defendants/appellants by referring to above mentioned grounds of appeal that the impugned orders are not sustainable and are liable to be set aside. Per contra, 

Page ­ 8CMA133­11 arguments are advanced for respondents/plaintiffs contending that the trial Court has considered all merits and recitals in all the documents and plaintiffs are able to establish their possession over the property and appeal deserves dismissal with costs.

10)Points that would arise for consideration and determination are:­

1) Whether plaintiffs are able to establish prima facie  case of possession of plaintiff No.5 over the plaint schedule property as on the date of filing of suit and balance of convenience in his favour and possibility of their suffering irreparable loss in the event of not granting temporary injunction as prayed for?

2) Whether the impugned Orders are sustainable in law and on facts OR whether any interference is neces­ sary? If so, on what grounds?

3) What is the result of the appeal?

11)POINTs Nos.1 and 2: Main controversy raised by the defendants/appellants is that there is no plot No.66 in Mini Gulshan 

Colony. It is the clear assertion of the defendants that a number is assigned to each and every plot in Mini Gulshan Colony and at the end of the door number, plot number will be mentioned. The door number claimed by the defendants is 8­1­401/A/63. Door number claimed by the plaintiffs is 8­1­402/66/A. Ex P­1 special notice as to house tax 

Page ­ 9CMA133­11 assessment issued under Section 220 Cl. 2 of Hyderabad Municipal 

Corporation Act is containing the door number 8­1­402/66/A. Like­ wise, Exs P­2, P­3 and P­4 issued by the Municipal Corporation are con­ taining the similar number. The defendants/appellants are admitting that they have filed photostat copy of layout plan. In the said layout plan against the column indicating total number of plots, number 69 is mentioned. The argument of the defendants/appellants is that the four plots covered by 66 to 69 are under the custody of Archaeological 

Department. In proof of such contention except the oral assertion, there is no other material. The defendants are contending that there are only 65 plots. They have relied on Ex R­4 certificate issued by the 

President of Mini Gulshan Colony Association to show their ownership over plot No.63. When they can obtain a certificate showing ownership over a particular plot what prevented them from obtaining a similar certificate from the Association or Society as to how many plots are existing in the Mini Gulshan Colony, is not whispered. It is not as if finding defects in the defendants' case. When the plaintiffs are able to show some material as to existence of plot No.66 by referring to Exs 

P­1 to P­4 with which they can discharge the prima facie burden in regard to proving the existence of Plot No.66, the burden gets shifted 

Page ­ 10CMA133­11 to the defendants. When defendants are positively asserting that there are only 65 plots, nothing would prevent them from obtaining a certi­ ficate from the association showing the existence of 65 plots only. 

They can even file an authenticated copy of layout showing as to how many plots are in existence. Now we are at the stage of examining the case prima facie. Going deep into merits at this stage is neither neces­ sary nor advisable. When the prima facie material referred above is seen, this Court unhesitantly concludes that plaintiffs are able to prove the existence of plot No.66. It is not the case of the defendants that they owners of plot No.66. Their claim is with regard to plot No.63.

12)The next fold of defendants' contention is that they have acquired right from the original owner Shaik Mohammed Hassan. In the impugned orders vide para 18 para 21, learned IV Senior Civil 

Judge has considered the right claimed by the defendants at length. In 

para 21 by referring to Ex P­6, it is observed that name of Shaik 

Mohammed Hassan is deleted by referring to sale in favour of Devaiah. 

The defendants are claiming rights pursuant to agreement of sale. What are the rights of the defendants over plot No.63 is a different issue. But if both plaintiffs and defendants are claiming rights in respect of same plot, who is having better right is again a different issue. Now the suit 

Page ­ 11CMA133­11 is filed seeking injunction. Possession will be criteria. Plaintiffs are claiming right in respect of plot No.66. Defendants are claiming right in respect of plot No.63. The evidence placed by the plaintiffs is pertaining to plot No.66. Exs P­1 to P­4 are referring to plot No.66. 

Likewise, even the agreement of sale relied on by the plaintiffs is also referring to the same door number. However, the said agreement of sale cannot be looked into for want of proper stamping. The other documents relied on by the plaintiffs are relating to right of Devaiah from whom plaintiffs 1 to 4 are claiming right. In the impugned pro­ ceedings i.e., in petition schedule, the door number is specifically men­ tioned as 8­1­402/66/A. The injunction is granted by the trial Court in respect of the said door number. The defendants are claiming right in respect of door number 8­1­402/A/63. In respect of the property claimed by the plaintiffs, there is 20 ft. road on the southern side. In respect of the property claimed by the defendants also there is 20 ft. 

wide road on the southern side. Ex R­23 is the gift settlement deed executed by fifth plaintiff in favour of his wife. The property described therein is as follows:­ “All that the house bearing municipal No.8­1­ 402/66/A admeasuring 210 sq. yards equivalent to 175.58 sq. yards situated at Gulshan Colony, Shaikpet, Hyderabad bounded by: North: 

Page ­ 12CMA133­11

Neighbour's house property No.8­1­402/66, South: Neighbour's pro­ perty 8­1­402/67, East: Road 10 ft. width, West: Road 20 ft. width.”.

13)Property covered by the gift deed executed by first defen­ dant in favour of second defendant is as follows:­ “All that the pro­ ­perty house bearing municipal No.8­1­402/A/63 admeasuring 210 sq. 

yards or 175.56 sq. meters, situated at Mini Gulshan Colony, Shaikpet, 

Hyderabad bounded by, North: Neighbour's and road, South: 20 ft. 

wide road, East: Neighbour's on plot No.64, West: House No.8­1­402/ 

A/62.”. There is lot of variation in the description and boundaries.

14)The suit schedule property is as follows:­ “All that part and parcel of the house property bearing Mpl. No.8­1­402/66/A in survey 

No.307 admeasuring 210 sq. yards situated at Shaikpet village and 

Mandal known as Mini Gulshan Colony, Hyderabad and bounded by: 

North: Neighbour's property and dead end road, South: 20' wide road, 

East: Neighbour's property, West: Neighbour's property. There is diffe­ rence between the suit schedule property and the schedule in Ex R­23 which needs careful consideration. The common feature in suit sche­ dule and Ex R­23 is, door number is same. Ex R­23 is the document executed by fifth plaintiff in favour of his wife. So there arises doubt as 

Page ­ 13CMA133­11 to what is the effect of difference in boundaries in suit schedule and Ex 

R­23 when both are pertaining to same property.

15)How many plots are there in Mini Gulshan Colony, whether the property covered by Ex R­23 and suit schedule property are one and the same and whether they are different, whether the property claimed by the defendants i.e., 8­1­402/A/63 and the property claimed by the plaintiffs 8­1­402/66/A is one and the same on ground, among them who are the better title holders, are all the triable issues. Accord­ ing to the defendants, they are proceeding with constructions. Accord­ ing to the plaintiffs, they are in possession of the property. The trial 

Court did not address with regard to difference in the plaint schedule and schedule in Ex R­23. What is the stand of the plaintiffs with regard to Ex R­23, is not known. All these things will be clarified only when trial takes place. There are certain merits in the plaintiffs' case with regard to Devaiah acquiring right etc. At the same time, there are weaknesses in the plaintiffs' case with regard to acquiring rights pur­ suant to agreement of sale and variation in the schedule. Likewise, there are certain merits and demerits in the defendants' case. But as plaintiffs have come to Court, it is for the plaintiffs to prove their 

Page ­ 14CMA133­11 rightful possession as on the date of suit. Now at this prima facie stage, the tax receipts issued by the Municipal Corporation in respect of both plots 66 and 63 are probablising the existence of both plots. At the same time the defects in variation with regard to boundaries are creat­ ing some doubts. Everything will be clear only on full pledged trial. 

Hence, at this stage, this Court is of the view that both parties can be directed to maintain status quo with regard to nature and alienation of the property till the suit is decided on its own merits.

16)In view of the discussion made above, this Court finds that plaintiffs are able to show the existence of plot No.66 and prima facie  right of plaintiff No.5 over the said plot, at the same time, this Court finds that defendants are also able to make out prima facie case as to discrepancy in the schedule of property claimed by the plaintiffs when the same is particularly compared with Ex R­23 a document executed by plaintiff No.5 in favour of his wife. Hence, both parties can be direc­ ted to maintain status quo with regard to nature and alienation till suit is decided on its own merits and the impugned orders need modifica­ tion to that extent. Points 1 and 2 are decided accordingly.

17)POINT No.3: In view of the discussion made above, injunc­

Page ­ 15CMA133­11 tion granted by the Court below under the impugned orders is set aside and the same is modified as status quo directing both parties to main­ tain status quo with regard to both nature and alienation of the pro­ perty in dispute and claimed by them till disposal of the suit and both parties are permitted to take photographs of the suit site and file the same before the Court below showing the exact status of property as on the day. Further, trial Court is directed to dispose of the case as early as possible and both parties are directed to co­operate for the same. 

C.M.A. is disposed of accordingly.

Dictated to the Personal Assistant, transcribed and typed 

by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the Open Court, this the 16th day of APRIL, 2013.

II ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDGE

City Civil Court, Hyderabad